W912LQ-16-T-0033_CERFP_Moulage_Role_Players_Scenario_(Plot).docx

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CERFP Moulage Role Players
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W912LQ-16-T-0033
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VIRGINIA NATIONAL GUARD

SIMULATED COLLAPSED STRUCTURE RESPONSE SCENARIO

APRIL 16, 2016

At 2:00p.m. EDT, Friday, April 15, 2016, both a severe thunderstorm warning and a tornado watch are declared by the National Weather Service for the Greater Richmond Area including Henrico and Hanover counties. A squall line is approaching from the SW as cooler air returns to the area after an unseasonably warm overnight. Both advisories are scheduled to last until 11:00 p.m. EDT. The Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) stands up the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 7:15 p.m. EDT. Television and radio stations in the area begin broadcasting the alerts.

At 5:30 p.m., the weather progressively gets worse; dark clouds, heavy rain, and strong winds are more frequent. Individual storm cell tracking begins and the at-risk area narrows to Henrico County. Tornado warning sirens sound for all municipalities in the direct path of the tornado and adjacent areas. People immediately call family and friends and mobile networks are inundated with phone traffic. Some network outages occur and calls cannot be completed. EOC notifies key personnel to take shelter and report to the EOC to begin coordinating response.

At 5:39 p.m., the tornado touches down in the northwest part of Henrico County and travels in a southeastern direction towards I-95 at an average speed of 17 mph.

For people that have taken shelter, the tornado lasts only a few minutes, but the tornado stays on ground for over two hours. It covers almost 40 miles with sustained winds over 200 mph. Large trees are debarked and uprooted, un-reinforced houses and buildings are shredded and the foundations wiped clean, utility poles are broken off at the bases and turn into missiles, wires are twisted, paint is sand blasted from cars, and most communication networks are out.

Secondary effects include interior gas lines are severed and have started fires, and roads are damaged or blocked by debris. Local hospitals are not completely destroyed, but most of the windows are shattered and some of the roofs are damaged. They can still function but only at partial capacity. Also, the tornado follows the path of I-95; cars on the road cannot avoid the path of the storm, and asphalt is literally torn up making access during the response stage extraordinarily difficult.

The initial response is delayed due to a number of issues. First, because of the length of time the tornado stays on the ground, it is still wreaking havoc in the area as the west side begins to respond. Heavy rainfall continues in the vicinity for another hour limiting visibility. There are extensive power outages on the north side of Richmond. In Hanover County, one communications tower has been destroyed and another is damaged. Cell phone communication in Richmond is sporadic due to the volume of calls.

At 6:04 p.m., the governor orders the Virginia National Guard to position traffic control, debris removal, security, communications, search and extraction, gross decontamination, and medical triage and stabilization assets at Fort Pickett Logistics Staging Base in preparation for deployment to the affected area.

A scheduled political rally expected to garner 3,000 attendees was cancelled prior to the tornado watch being issued, but upwards of 1,000 participants, volunteers, and campaign staff were forced to shelter in place beginning at 5:25 p.m. EDT April 15, 2016.

The largest part of the commercial complex, a two-story warehouse owned by Shykreli Pharma, experienced partial structural failure at approximately 6:03 p.m. Most of the personnel within self-evacuated, but an estimated 30 geriatric, aged, disabled, and youth were unable to evacuate and have been trapped. The remaining 600 displaced persons sought shelter and protection in other areas within the complex.

At 9:08 p.m., the large warehouse degraded into a combination collapse still in dynamic transition.

At 9:15 p.m., victims observed a yellow-green gas with a pungent, irritating odor, much like bleach.

At 9:31 p.m., the VDEM EOC requests deployment of the 34th Civil Support Team (CST) to the commercial complex to identify, assess, and mitigate any CBRN-related hazards.

At 10:52 p.m., the 34th CST arrives and the Perimeter Monitoring Team begins establishing the left and right limits as well as the hot line. At 1:04 a.m., the Survey Team uncovers a storeroom within the large warehouse containing (36), 58L liquid gas cylinders. Many were cracked and leaking or had broken or jarred regulators causing the pressurized liquid to vaporize.

The 34th CST took an initial sample, analyzed the material, and determined it to be industrial chlorine.

Local responders immediately issued a mass warning using megaphones and boom messages for all persons to shelter in place.

By 5:50 a.m., April 16, 2016, in concert with Henrico Fire Department HAZMAT Tech Team #1 and the CST, the cylinders were repaired and removed.

At 6:00 a.m. April 16, 2016, the VDEM EOC requests the Virginia National Guard to deploy the CERFP to an abandoned commercial complex to extract, decontaminate, medically triage, and stabilize the remaining victims from the site.

The Incident Action Plan (IAP) details a series of technical extraction requirements including: pancake collapse, void space, A-frame, vehicle stabilization, confined space, and structural shoring. Search and extraction (S&E) teams should be prepared to perform multiple technical rescue, rope rescue, confined space rescue, and vehicle extractions. Additionally, personnel must be able to breach void zones and void search using acoustic, auditory, and thermal methods.

The IAP identifies the potential of residual chlorine gas hazards as well as concrete dust, organic, and inorganic debris; animal and human waste; liquid sewage; and commercial biohazards and chemicals are present. No Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) are expected. As a result, the IC requested that all persons found at the site be decontaminated prior to transport to medical treatment facilities.

Observed victims have general injuries resulting from both the chlorine gas exposure and flying debris, shrapnel, and other objects. The worst reported injuries primarily include blunt force trauma, fracture and traumatic amputation, burns, blisters, and other crush-related injuries. The majority of persons experience some level of breathing problems from dust, smoke, or chlorine gas exposure, combined with some minor soft tissue damage.

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