USAID CAF2 0 Analytic Guide DRAFT 2012.pdf

Draft for circulation USAID/DCHA/CMM

USAID/DCHA/CMM

USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Revised, version 2.0

USAID/DCHA/CMM

Draft for circulation as of February 21, 2012

USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Revised Edition, Version 2.0

DRAFT – February 21, 2012

Table of Contents Table of Contents Editing notes

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 USAID‘s Role

1.2 Why Assess?

1.3 When to Assess

1.4 What to Assess

1.5 About this Document

2 ORIENTATION: CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

3 DIAGNOSIS: FRAMWORK FOR ANALYSIS

3.1 Conflict Dynamics

3.2 Trajectories

4 RESPONSE: DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Four Approaches to Identifying Effective Responses

4.2 Prioritizing Possible Responses

A Annexes & Additional References

Editing notes

1. This document is a draft copy provided for informational and review purposes. It does not represent final guidance from USAID.

2. Annexes, full bibliography, and acknowledgements will be included in the final draft.

3. Comments included in double brackets, [[such as these]], indicate editors‘ notes on the draft.

1. INTRODUCTION

Development is a process of economic, social, and political change. Development expands people‘s choices, increases their opportunity to prosper, and increases their sense of security from disease, poverty, disaster, and violence. Change, however, creates struggle between old and new, competition for power and resources, debate over what has happened, and what should come next. In short, conflict is inherent to the process of development. As it strives to be the world‘s premier development agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) must consider conflict in the context of any intervention.

Of course, conflict itself is not a problem. It occurs naturally in all human relationships and societies. It is a necessary outcome of different people pursuing their interests and exercising their freedom, and it can be a powerful force for positive change and growth. It can drive innovation and motivate performance, encourage partnerships, and induce efforts to reduce injustice.

When conflict becomes violent, however, the effect on human well-being is disastrous. War is development in reverse. Armed conflict destroys lives, wastes capital, and directs scarce resources away from productive uses. According to The World Bank‘s World Development

Report 2011, some 366,000 people were directly killed in civil war battles between 2000 and

2008.

This same source notes that, as of the end of 2009, 42 million people were displaced as a result of conflict, violence, or human rights abuses.

The average cost of a typical civil war to a country and its neighbors is roughly $64 billion.

Additionally, in the immediate aftermath of a civil war, economic output declines by an average of six percent.

Negative outcomes are not confined to the direct targets of attacks. According to World Bank calculations, people living in countries currently affected by violence are twice as likely to be undernourished and 50 percent more likely to be impoverished than their counterparts in peaceful countries. Their children are three times as likely to be out of school.

Over the last three decades, poverty rates have been 20 percentage points higher in countries affected by repeated cycles of violence. For every year of violence in a country, poverty reduction lags by nearly one percentage point.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. (Washington, DC: The

World Bank, 2011), 336-337.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 61.

Collier, Paul, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2007), page xxx.

Cerra,Valerie and Sweta C. Saxena, ―Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery,‖ American Economic

Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (2008); page xxx.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 5.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 4.

http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext

The effects of mass violence extend well beyond the borders of a state involved in civil war.

Countries lose an estimated 0.7 percent of their annual GDP for each neighbor involved in armed conflict, and their own risk of civil war onset increases considerably.

More than a billion people live in conflict-affected, post-conflict, or fragile countries. These same countries receive approximately half of all U.S. foreign assistance.

Development and humanitarian assistance can play a powerful role in reducing conflict risks and shaping the trajectories—or possible alternative futures— of fragile states. Indeed, one study in sub-Saharan Africa found that a 10 percent increase in aid to an African country reduces conflict risk by eight percent.

Even without specifically targeting key drivers of conflict, development aid not only has the potential to prevent conflict and save lives, but also to conserve and grow resources as well. Indeed, effective aid can create new sources of income in post-conflict settings, which one study estimated a ratio of benefits to costs of 3.5 to 1.

At the same time, economic and political progress is often accompanied by societal strains that can engender conflict. There may be more competition for scarce resources, dissatisfaction with a lack of jobs for better educated youth, and increased corruption when valuable resources are discovered or exploited.

For the benefits of development assistance to be secure in the long term, the very real risk of conflict onset and recurrence must be mitigated. This is no small feat. The vast majority— roughly 80 to 90 percent—of conflicts that became active in the last decade were in fact recurring conflicts.

And when USAID operates in fragile or conflict-affected environments, it must ensure that its operations do not produce inadvertent negative consequences, such as by entrenching existing patterns of grievance or enabling key conflict mobilizers.

Experience has consistently shown that preparing a conflict analysis is a critical first step in crafting a development and humanitarian assistance program that effectively prevents conflict or speeds recovery and that is designed to ‗do no harm.‘

Box: Aid and Conflict

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 5.

Goldstone, Jack, et al. ―A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,‖ American Journal of Political

Science, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2010): page xxx.

U.S. Department of State and U. S. Agency for International Development, Leading Through Civilian Power: The

First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2010), 122.

Joppa de Ree and Eleonora Nillesen, ―Aiding Violence or Peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa,‖ Journal of Development Economics 88 (2009): 302.

Paul Collier, Lisa Chauvet and Haavard Hegre, ―The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries,‖ April

2008. Available at:

http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5399/security_chauvet.PDF;jsessionid=8AFDC41730

8A45126CF71C51ACD4087E?sequence=1

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2.

Putzel 2010 DNH; CDA Collaborative Learning Projects DNH Project; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium – list all three http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5399/security_chauvet.PDF;jsessionid=8AFDC417308A45126CF71C51ACD4087E?sequence=1 http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5399/security_chauvet.PDF;jsessionid=8AFDC417308A45126CF71C51ACD4087E?sequence=1

Fifty-seven percent of all USAID-administered overseas development assistance (ODA) goes to fragile and conflict-affected countries. Similarly, according to a 2010 report from IRIN, the independent news service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ―Some

71 percent of aid in 1999-2008 was spent in conflict-affected states.‖ The OCHA report goes on to explore the link between development and security, ―Non-humanitarian donor spending on conflict-resolution and peace and security-related activities increased 20-fold between 1998 and

2008, particularly in the areas of peacebuilding and security sector reform, compared with the doubling of humanitarian assistance over the same period.‖

Sources:

USAID (2012)

IRIN (2010)

Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2010)

1.1 USAID’s Role

USAID‘s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) was created in 2002 to support more careful analysis of conflict dynamics in countries where USAID operates. To further this end, one of CMM‘s first tasks was to create the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF

1.0). Working from the principles and concepts contained in this framework, CMM has conducted over 60 conflict assessments since its inception.

These assessments have informed agency policies, mission strategic planning, program design, and interagency coordination. Assessment teams and missions have learned a great deal from their experiences over the last nine years. Our thinking—as an agency and community of practice—about conflict prevention, mitigation, and management has evolved. Other organizations have developed assessment frameworks of their own and have made important contributions to our collective understanding. As a result of these developments, CMM concluded that it was necessary to revise the conflict assessment framework to reflect these changes.

The new CAF 2.0, outlined in this document, retains the spirit of CAF 1.0, but develops it further. While the core concepts have been retained, the CAF 2.0 provides a much stronger treatment of the connection between conflict diagnosis and response programming. The new framework also pays more substantial attention to the role of resiliencies and conflict-mitigating factors. Finally, CAF 2.0 includes a companion Application Guide that provides more specific, practical guidance on how to conduct an assessment.

Box: ICAF and Other Assessment Frameworks

The CAF 2.0 is complementary to the Interagency Conflict Assessment (ICAF). The latter is an analytical tool designed to enable a team comprised of a variety of U.S. Government (USG) agency representatives (the ―interagency‖) to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively and to prepare for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization. Although they are adapted to different purposes, the ICAF and various other U.S.

Government frameworks all work from fundamentally similar diagnostic premises, models, and terminology.

1.2 Why Assess?

A conflict assessment is an analytical process undertaken to identify and understand the dynamics of violence and instability. The CAF 2.0 represents USAID‘s unique methodological approach for implementing a conflict assessment to help its USAID Missions and operating units better evaluate the risks for armed conflict, the peace and security goals that are most important in a given country context, how existing development programs interact with these factors, how the programs may (inadvertently) be doing harm, and where and how development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and to build peace. Refer to the CAF 2.0 Application Guide for more information on assessment planning and implementation.

The CAF 2.0 provides a rigorous framework for collecting and analyzing data in an objective manner that can be applied uniformly across conflict settings. The importance of a tool that facilitates dispassionate and objective analysis of conflict cannot be overstated. Conflicts necessarily involve at least two perspectives on an issue or dispute. To avoid unwanted negative outcomes from assistance, such as inadvertently supporting one side against the other, it is essential for international actors to develop an independent, objective view of the conflict. A conflict assessment is a tool to facilitate this process. To be successful, therefore, assessment teams and those who work with them should adopt sound procedures and structures to uphold intellectual honesty and integrity throughout the process, to maintain transparency in the methodology, and to protect sensitive information when it is disclosed. As discussed elsewhere, it is also imperative to actively seek information from diverse stakeholders in a given context.

Text Box: What is the Difference between Conflict Sensitivity, Conflict Management, Conflict Mitigation, Conflict Prevention, and Peacebuilding?

Conflict sensitivity, conflict management, conflict mitigation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding are terms with similar but distinct meanings. Understanding the nuances is important to the diagnosis of and response to conflict, and it is essential for proper application of the CAF 2.0.

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: (1) understand the context in which it is operating, particularly with respect to inter-group relations; (2) understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and (3) act upon these understandings in way that avoids negative impacts and maximizes positive impacts vis-à-vis the conflict. These effects could be knock-on effects of the program/project impact, or could arise from operational aspects of the implementation. All development activities should be conflict-sensitive, but only some are designed to directly mitigate/manage conflict.

Conflict management activities explicitly aim to address the causes and consequences of conflict, but they are often implemented within a traditional development sector, such as within programs that address democracy and governance, environment, or economic growth. Many of these activities also lay the groundwork for significant longer-term results, and work to build the underlying institutions and systems of resilience that provide alternatives to violence. For example, conflict management efforts might include improving the governance of high-value natural resources that are linked to existing political or armed conflict; employment programs designed to reduce the number of available recruits for militias; or post-conflict reconstruction efforts to restore livelihoods. Such activities can also operate as a stand-alone program within a development portfolio.

Conflict mitigation activities seek to reduce the threat or impact of violent conflict, religious and political extremism, and widespread instability. Such activities promote peaceful resolution of differences, mitigate violence if it has already broken out, or establish a framework for peace and reconciliation in an ongoing conflict. Many, but not all, mitigation activities phase out shortly after the instability, or conflict, has abated and stability is reestablished. Projects that strengthen conflict early warning or response, formal and informal peace process undertakings, and various types of reconciliation programs serve as examples of conflict mitigation activity.

Conflict prevention activities attempt to resolve incompatibilities between groups in conflict before outbreaks of violence. From a long-term structural perspective, conflict prevention activities attempt to address the root causes of conflict by ameliorating the deleterious impact of poverty, gender inequalities, or grievances related to access to natural resources. There can sometimes be considerable overlap between the concepts of conflict prevention and conflict mitigation.

Finally, the terms conflict management, conflict mitigation, and conflict prevention are often used interchangeably to describe peacebuilding activities. In this document, conflict response is a term used to denote both conflict sensitive programming and peacebuilding programming.

Sources:

Woodrow and Chigas (2009)

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2004)

A USAID conflict assessment consists of two stages:

(1) Diagnosis – An analysis of political, economic, social, and security factors at work within a given country context, with a focus on core grievances and resiliencies; analysis of how key actors mobilize grievances and resiliencies to drive or mitigate conflict; forecasting how these dynamics and related trends might evolve in the future; and anticipating potential triggers or turning points.

(2) Formulation of response recommendations – A strategic analysis of existing programming to assess gaps and opportunities with respect to the conflict dynamics.

Based on a prioritization of issues and identification of suitable points of entry or leverage, this analysis yields recommendations for response options that support conflict prevention, management, or mitigation. The analysis is informed by practical consideration of organizational mandate, operational goals, resources, and constraints of

USAID Missions.

During the diagnosis, an assessment team will apply a framework to analyze the dynamics in a country that are leading to instability or violent conflict, or, alternatively, that contribute to maintaining peace and stability. In general, the stronger the conflict drivers are, and the weaker the mitigating factors, the greater the risk that violent conflict will occur. After examining the current conflict dynamics, the conflict assessment framework is used as a guide to trace various trajectories of the present into the future. The assessment team will work from the evidence base to articulate possible future scenarios that could lead to changes in a country‘s risk of violent conflict.

During the response, the assessment team draws on the first stage‘s rich analysis and consults with the USAID Mission, or operating unit, to formulate actionable options and recommendations. Depending on the intended use, the response stage could: contribute to strategic planning, such as through a Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS); be used to adapt an existing portfolio, such as through ‗pivoting‘ current programs to make them more conflict sensitive; or be used to design new development initiatives. Only rarely do assessments lead to the design of stand-alone programs targeting conflict specifically. More often, the intended goal is to apply development resources in a conflict-sensitive way.

1.3 When to Assess

Conducting a conflict assessment can add value to planning processes in all circumstances and country contexts. The CDCS process is a highly opportune time to undertake a conflict assessment, especially for countries identified as being vulnerable to instability and fragility.

Conflict assessments are recommended in situations of escalating violence, outright war, or post-conflict reconstruction, but they can also shed light on the underlying conditions that support radical or extremist movements, or that fuel pervasive instability short of full-scale conflict. In this latter regard, conflict assessments can complement large-scale program design or evaluation processes.

Even if a country has not experienced violent conflict in the past, conflict assessments can highlight potential areas of concern and can help development programs begin to address destabilizing trends before they reach a stage of crisis. Similarly, the factors leading to the outbreak of violence do not disappear once a peace agreement has been signed. In fact, in cases such as Guatemala‘s, levels of violence have actually increased following the official termination of hostilities.

By helping to prevent conflicts and ensure conflict-sensitive aid, conflict

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, page #?

assessments can help USAID to exert greater leverage in terms of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. foreign assistance.

Box: Conflict Vulnerability

To help USAID Missions determine whether or not they need to undertake a conflict assessment, CMM has developed a methodology based on rigorous analysis of quantitative data that identifies and ranks those countries most vulnerable to violent conflict and political instability.

CMM publishes this list annually for U.S. Government audiences only in the Alert Lists report.

It is strongly recommended that USAID Missions conduct a conflict assessment for countries that fall into highest, high, or moderate risk categories on either list, or for countries emerging from crisis.

1.4 What to Assess

For this document, and most conflict assessments in the field, the unit of analysis is the country or nation-state. The vast majority of violent conflicts since 1945 have been intrastate rather than interstate in nature and, as such, the USG is far more likely to find itself responding to a civil war than one directly between or among states (although states frequently intervene in other states‘ internal conflicts).

FIGURE 1: VIOLENT CONFLICTS 1946-2009, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012, HEWITT ET AL

Furthermore, USAID Missions generally operate on a country-by-country basis, with some regional offices. Given that these Missions are the main intended audiences and beneficiaries of conflict assessment reports, these assessments also usually focus on the country level.

This consideration notwithstanding, the concepts outlined in this framework may be applied fruitfully to cases of interstate conflict, as well as to subregional conflicts. The framework can also be used to examine subnational conflicts, such as in Mindanao in the Philippines, Aceh in

Indonesia, Manipur or Assam in India, the Niger Delta or Plateau State in Nigeria, and so forth.

BOX: No War, No Peace: Crime, Terrorism, and Other Forms of Violence

Fragile, unstable, and conflict-affected countries face multiple forms of violence. The extent to which the present framework may be usefully applied to cases of criminal violence, violent extremism, and terrorism remains unclear. Yet, as the World Development Report 2011 argues, [[Block Quote:]] ―21st century violence does not fit the 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years. Deaths from civil war, while still exacting an unacceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they were in the

1980s… But because of the successes in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into ‗war‘ or ‗peace,‘ or into ‗criminal violence‘ or ‗political violence.‘ […] Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability. First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and repeated: 90 percent of the last decade‘s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years. Second, new forms of conflict and violence threaten development:

many countries that have successfully negotiated political and peace agreements after violent political conflicts, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, now face high levels of violent crime, constraining their development. Third, different forms of violence are linked to each other. Political movements can obtain financing from criminal activities, as in the

Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland. Criminal gangs can support political violence during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Kenya. International ideological movements make common cause with local grievances, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan.‖

Source:

World Development Report (2011)

Box: VEI Policy

In 2011, USAID released its policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and

Insurgency. This policy provides USAID with a framework for improving the effectiveness of development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, and enhances its capacity to interact constructively with the U.S. Government interagency structure, and other partners, in challenging environments.

USAID (2011)

1.5 About this Document

The present document describes the revised conflict assessment framework (CAF 2.0), which was developed and applied by CMM in support of its technical leadership agenda. Its purpose is to inform USAID staff and development partners who will be undertaking and utilizing conflict assessments in the course of their work. As such, USAID, its contractors, and its grantees constitute the principal intended audience for the document. However, it has also been made publicly available for the benefit of other U.S. Government agencies, the broader policy community, academic and research institutions, and independent scholars and practitioners of international development and peacebuilding.

The document is organized into four chapters, including the following:

1. Introduction (Chapter 1).

2. Orientation (Chapter 2). Lays out the core terminology and concepts that provide an analytical foundation to the assessment.

3. Diagnosis (Chapter 3). Reviews the first stage of an assessment‘s two stages, which examines the current conflict dynamics and future trajectories of the framework.

4. Response (Chapter 4). Corresponds to the second stage of assessment, which includes the development of options and recommendations for the client Mission or operating unit.

Chapter 4 also addresses the strategic and practical considerations that the assessment team must take into account.

The purpose of the core content is to describe the key concepts of the CAF 2.0 and, just as importantly, illustrate their interconnections. In addition to the core conflict assessment framework, a number of annexes have also been provided to readers, including a glossary, a stakeholder analysis tool, and questions to prompt reflection and analysis.

As mentioned earlier, this publication should be read in conjunction with its companion document, the CAF 2.0 Application Guide, which provides concrete guidance for teams undertaking USAID conflict assessments, including for planning and logistics, field work, data collection, synthesis, writing, and reporting. Throughout the present document, readers will note several common features:

First, key concepts are accompanied by real world examples that are intended to provide a useful illustration of the idea. The case of Nigeria is referred to throughout the document. Nigeria is also used as a core case study in the Advanced Conflict Assessment

Training module that CMM developed as a complement to this document. The result is a consistent example across chapters and products.

Second, careful use of terminology is essential to successful application of the framework. Italicized bold font draws attention to key terms when their definition or explanation first appears. Regular italics are also used to draw attention to other important phrases or terms. A glossary of key terms is also provided in Annex [X].

Third, text boxes appear regularly throughout the document. The purpose of this highlighted content is to introduce social science research or core policy that has informed the development of the CAF 2.0.

2 ORIENTATION: CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Conflict is endemic to human societies. Conflict arises when people hold incompatible needs, interests, desires, and objectives and, thus, it is a natural outcome of the competition for scarce resources that occurs in much of the natural world. Conflict occurs within families, communities, workplaces, nations, regions and, indeed, within individuals. It may be managed constructively or destructively, i.e. it is possible to resolve conflicts peacefully, through negotiation and cooperation, as well as violently through force or threat.

Box: Armed Conflict

A USAID conflict assessment is primarily concerned with large-scale violent conflict and war because that is the type of conflict that is most destructive to human well-being and prosperity and, thus, to the agency‘s developmental and humanitarian objectives. Furthermore, preventing or mitigating armed conflict through development and diplomatic resources is generally a relatively cost-effective, life-saving means of furthering American interests abroad and maintaining global security.

When two political parties disagree over the allocation of resources in a government budget, for example, they are in conflict. In a state with functioning institutions, conflict may be resolved through mutual discussion and compromise, or through competition, which occurs at the ballot box in electoral democracies.

In some sense, violence is one tool among many to satisfy one‘s objectives. As the German military strategist Clausewitz famously remarked, ―War is politics by other means.‖ But, as tools go, violence is rarely an optimal choice for reasons detailed in the introduction to this guide. It is expensive, difficult to organize or maintain, and carries substantial risks for all involved. Partly because of the costs associated with it, violence is generally a last resort for most political actors and is limited to situations where people perceive a great threat—real or imagined—to their basic needs for survival, food and shelter, security, or identity.

Unfortunately, peacefully managing or resolving conflicts is challenging, especially when many different parties and interests are involved, as is the case with major disputes on the national or international stage. Although additional parties may increase the possibilities for creative settlement options, each new party at the negotiating table increases the complexity and difficulty of negotiations, and further obscures the path to a viable solution that satisfies everyone. And, of course, there are often parties who benefit from prolonging the conflict, or who stand to gain by manipulating it to their advantage.

Thus, in human societies, conflict management—like development—is fundamentally political.

It is a function of the behavior of large numbers of people whose collective action, or inaction, must be channeled toward some end, such as the selection of political leader, the passage of laws or rules, or the allocation of shared resources. Indeed, democracy, governance, law, arbitration, mediation, and so forth are all mechanisms for channeling social conflict into non-violent forms of negotiation and competition. Different social, political, and institutional environments may have different arrangements for managing conflicts and resolving disputes peacefully. In addition to electoral processes, or finding recourse through formal state institutions, the peaceful resolution of conflict can also include very informal, face-to-face negotiations. These may take place in societies based on small kinship groups, as well as patronage-based arrangements in more complex societies where public institutions are still highly personalized. The challenge is not just to understand sources of conflict, but also the institutional arrangements that exist in a given society to manage violence, to resolve disputes, and to organize collective action. It is also critical to understand what obstacles to effective collective action may exist.

Like politics generally, large-scale armed conflict is complex. Frequently, it involves multiple related but distinct disputes; some are more fundamental than others. The nature of these disputes, and the needs and interests underlying them, are themselves often contingent upon wider contextual factors that are liable to change over time. Similarly, parties in a competition, violent or peaceful, adopt a series of tactics and positions to advance their interests. In some cases, particularly when the interests of key actors differ from those they claim to represent, a key actor may purposefully hide or deflect their intentions through rhetoric.

Hence, the first task of conflict management is to distinguish the symptoms of the conflict from its sources. The latter are the fundamental disputes at the root of the conflict. To prevent or resolve a conflict, the parties involved usually must satisfy their needs and interests, at least minimally. In other words, the sources of conflict must be addressed, just as a doctor tries to treat the disease and not just the symptoms.

For example, in Jos, Nigeria, Christian and Muslim communities frequently clash in episodes of violence. Yet, although the symptom of conflict is intercommunal violence along sectarian lines, the source of the conflict will not be found in theology. Rather, the conflict‘s source competition for land between a group that perceives itself as indigenous to the area and another seen as more recent settlers. Those who perceive the conflict as a religious war have been unable to gain traction in resolving the conflict because, at its root, it is more about the governance of contested resources.

Box: Positions and Interests

In their widely referenced book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Roger Fisher, Bruce Patton, and William Ury distinguish the positions of the parties—the stance they take on an issue, or their demands—from their underlying interests. The positions are what the parties say they want. Their interests are the underlying core needs, wants, fears or concerns that underlie the position and are the reason or goal for the position—why they want the position.

Fisher, Patton, and Ury tell the story of two sisters who are fighting over an orange. They take the orange to their mother, who cuts the orange in half and splits it between them. One girl takes her half, tears off the peal, and eats the fruit. The other throws out the fruit, and uses the peel to add zest to a pie she is making. In this vignette, the position of each girl was that she wanted the orange for herself. However, the purpose for which each girl wanted the orange was different— their interests were not incompatible. If the mother had questioned her daughters before acting, she would have been able to distinguish between the symptoms of conflict (fighting over the orange) from the underlying sources (their respective interests in portions of the orange). With this information, she could manage the conflict more constructively by giving the whole peel to one and the whole fruit to the other, producing a more optimal outcome for all involved.

This is not to say that symptoms are unimportant. On the contrary, in armed conflict, these symptoms are frequently acts of violence that lead to loss of life. If development is the process by which an individual‘s and community‘s prosperity and freedom are increased, then violence exerts a reverse effect. The toll that physical violence takes is evident in the destruction of lives and property. Structural violence, however, is almost always invisible. The latter occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic, or cultural traditions. It may be embedded in ubiquitous social structures and normalized by stable institutions and regular experience.

In addition to the second-order effects of war and fragility, structural violence ultimately means people suffer more from poverty, disease, crime, and oppression than they would otherwise.

Both forms of violence are detrimental to development objectives and broad human security.

Box: Human Security

The concept of ―human security‖ emphasizes the security and well-being of people, rather than states, and it includes freedom from fear, freedom from want, and the freedom to live in dignity.

Human security, therefore, bridges the three spheres of international affairs— development, diplomacy, and defense—and concerns itself with a wide variety of issues and trends. The related concept of ―citizen security,‖ employed frequently throughout the WDR

2011, connotes a narrower focus on citizens‘ freedom from violence and the fear of violence.

Whether a dispute becomes an armed conflict depends in large part on the means and motives of groups who stand to gain or lose substantially from fighting. These motivations are, in turn, shaped by the political/institutional context, what is at stake, and what factors may exist to mitigate the potential for armed conflict. Real-world actors in a conflict—whether individuals, factions, or groups—are rarely monolithic. Decisions about whether to resort to violence are often as much about internal negotiation among different interests, and perceptions of alternatives to negotiation, as they are about calculations of risk and rewards. How groups become mobilized for violence is the subject of Chapter 3.

When armed conflict does occur or loom, the prospects for effective diplomacy and development are contingent upon the security situation. Experience has shown that there is an ebb and flow to most violent conflicts over time. Active fighting and confrontation is frequently preceded by a

Daniel Winter and Dana Leighton, ―Structural Violence‖ in Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology in the 21st Century, eds. Daniel Christie, Richard V. Wagner and Deborah D. Winter (New York: Prentice-Hall, 2000), page #.

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1994), 22-24. Commission on Human Security2003; UN General Assembly 2005b, 2009, 2010 period of escalation or failed negotiation, and it is often followed by a period of de-escalation, return to negotiation, or retrenchment. These peaks and lows have been dubbed the conflict cycle and are often depicted heuristically as a curve (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2: Conflict Curve (Lund

Because conflict is not a linear phenomenon, the conflict curve is an idealized model that does not represent the actual unfolding of war over time, nor is it meant to do so. Rather, it helps to signify that conflict occurs along a continuum in which active fighting represents a peak period, but not the whole conflict cycle. The curve underscores that a country which has not yet witnessed bloodshed may, nevertheless, have powerful forces of latent conflict brewing under the surface, which puts it at risk of war. Conflicts may exhibit repeated cycles of violence, or there may be multiple conflicts taking place within a country‘s territory. Each conflict situation may be at a different point on this idealized curve (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Similarly, although the guns may have stopped firing, the conflict per se may not be over. During the time it takes a country to recover from armed conflict, the risk of re-escalation is high, particularly when the issues driving the conflict have not been fully resolved.

For actors in the conflict, the risks and potential rewards to violence also vary with time. For example, extremist and criminal organizations often have an interest in escalating or prolonging a war. Thus, it is not unusual to see a de-escalation phase punctuated by major terrorist attacks, as these actors attempt to reverse the trend toward peace. On the other side of the spectrum, political moderates and others advocating for negotiations or peace will often find themselves sidelined as a conflict escalates, only to be bolstered during the peak of fighting and as both sides begin to suffer losses.

The conflict cycle carries important implications for response, which is the second part of any

USAID conflict assessment. During peaks of violence, USAID is often highly constrained, focused on humanitarian response, protecting personnel, and adapting existing programs to conserve past gains as much as possible. By contrast, during lulls in violence, the political and operational scope for development programming is likely to be much greater. With an orientation towards preventing escalation or re-escalation of the conflict, early intervention is

Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United

States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), page xxx.

Time

Latent

Conflict

Conflict Escalation Conflict De-escalation

Peak

Post-conflict

Peacebuilding

In te n s it y likely to yield greater returns on investment. Thus, the best time to conduct a conflict assessment is before the outbreak of fighting. And while no one holds a crystal ball to predict the future, personnel in the field often have a good sense of when, for example, the political situation is deteriorating. Early warning tools can lend additional evidence to the process of deciding whether and when to assess conflict dynamics. Conducting a conflict assessment will make explicit forecasts as to how conflict dynamics will likely trend in the future.

The next chapter offers more guidance on analyzing sources and symptoms of conflicts through analysis of current dynamics and projection of future trends. The final chapter on response returns to the question of how to respond to those dynamics, in the context of the conflict cycle, that maximizes impact and best utilizes USAID Mission resources.

3 DIAGNOSIS: FRAMWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The analytical power of CAF 2.0 comes from using it as a tool for collecting and organizing data, identifying connections, and distilling patterns. In the course of the assessment, the CAF

2.0 is applied to two analytical tasks.

First, the CAF 2.0 is used to diagnose the current conflict dynamics and possible future trajectories. In this framework, dynamics include the factors of grievance/resilience and key mobilizers. Trajectories consist of trends and triggers for future conflict. The components of this diagnosis are described in detail in this chapter, and summarized in the following figure:

Second, the CAF 2.0 is used to identify and recommend conflict response options appropriate for

USAID missions to pursue. As noted in the box on page [[PAGE6]], conflict response is a term used in this framework to denote both conflict sensitive development and direct conflict mitigation, conflict management, conflict prevention (i.e. peacebuilding) programming. An analytical framework for developing these recommendations is described more fully in Chapter

4.

3.1 Conflict Dynamics

The framework‘s model for conflict dynamics is based upon a theory of how, when, and why violent conflict occurs. This theory argues that armed conflict is driven by key actors in society—individuals, but also organizational actors of all sorts—who actively mobilize people and resources to engage in acts of violence on the basis of grievance, such as a group‘s perception that it has been excluded from political and economic life. Key mobilizers may have different means and incentives that affect the methods they employ to achieve their objectives;

violence is only one tactic among many. In this sense, the ―rules of the game,‖ and the resources and factors that drive incentives and decision-making, are informed by the context. Further, the theory behind the CAF 2.0 recognizes that when the institutions of society perform in ways that key identity groups consider to be legitimate and effective, then conflict-mitigating social patterns may emerge. In turn, illegitimate and ineffective institutions can drive dysfunctional patterns of fragility and stress. Whether and how armed conflict breaks out depends in part, therefore, on the resilience of those institutions, mechanisms, or other factors in society that provide the means to suppress or resolve conflict through non-violent means. Thus, the CAF 2.0 takes both the latent and active dimensions of armed conflict into account, including the given system‘s predilection toward conflict and the feasibility of sustained, large-scale fighting. The conflict dynamics describe the system of interactions and relationships among the framework components described above.

By necessity, the framework focuses both on violent/non-violent conflict and stability/ instability. It recognizes that any analysis of conflict is incomplete without attention to those attitudes, structures, and processes in society that—for better or worse—encourage stability and the status quo or enable peaceful change over time. This dual emphasis is necessary in analysis of the current conflict dynamics, as well as future trajectories.

Before turning to the presentation of the main elements that comprise the conflict dynamics portion of the CAF 2.0, a comment is warranted about the relative importance of any single element. Conflict arises from a complex interaction of multiple forces within social systems. As such, no single set of factors—whether they relate to characteristics of the key actors in the conflict, the level of institutional performance, or features of the broad political or social context—are predominant in terms of their causal impact on the risks of conflict. That is, no factor can be understood to be a singular cause of conflict without an understanding of how its impact on conflict is conditioned by its interactions with other factors. Readers should be attentive to how these connections between these many elements shape the risks for violent

The following sections outline the components of context, grievance and resilience, and mobilization.

3.1.1 Context

Context, as it is used here, refers to facts about the country that cannot be changed in the short term: its physical and geographical characteristics, history, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, institutions or ―rules of the game,‖ and its relationship and exposure to external forces.

In any given country, conflict dynamics both influence—and are influenced by—contextual factors. Yet, in contrast to other conflict dynamics, such as the shifting means and motives of key mobilizers, context changes relatively slowly and incrementally. Needless to say, no contextual factor is truly static in the long-term; for example, narratives of history change and global climate change, for example, may affect the physical environment. Although contextual circumstances change slowly, certain contextual factors have been proven to increase the risk for conflict (see box below on ―Contextual Risk Factors‖ [[on page xx]]).

For the purposes of a conflict assessment, it is not necessary to produce a comprehensive understanding of contextual elements, but it is important to identify those salient components of the context that directly relate to the conflict dynamics and trajectories. In other words, how do elements of the context interact with conflict factors (see [[Figure X]] below)? For instance, ―poverty‖ is often cited as a ―cause‖ of conflict. However, we know that many peoples and countries experience poverty, but not all of those people/places have serious conflict. What is it, therefore, about poverty in a particular conflict context that reinforces tensions? Is it extreme wealth disparities (perceived unfairness), differential access to credit/investment, or discrimination in access to education and, therefore, well-paying jobs? The challenge is to understand—more concretely and precisely—which contextual factors are important, and how they are important. Some of the links between certain contextual factors and conflict are reviewed below.

Conflict

Dynamics

Broader

Context

In the case of physical and geographic characteristics, climate and susceptibility to droughts or natural disasters may affect how frequently shocks to the society occur, and in what form.

Alternatively, the availability of extractable, or ―lootable,‖ natural resources—such as minerals, timber, or oil—have played a role in various wars in recent history, as they affect the motivation and capacities of actors to engage in violence.

Although interpretations of history evolve over time, the ―facts‖ remain in the past and are beyond the capacity of humans to change. Historical narrative, however, plays an important role in almost all conflicts, and past injustices are frequently cited as cause for present disputes.

Histories of state formation–legacies of colonialism and post-colonialism, for example—may be particularly salient to conflict. History, however, can also mitigate violence. In the case of

Nigeria, the civil war of the 1970s and the protracted experience with military rule has convinced many Nigerians that a return to such a system would be unacceptable. In both cases, it is important to understand how historical factors are influencing actor‘s current motivations, perceptions, and behavior.

Socio-economic and demographic characteristics are also features of human society that change over time. In the short term, however, phenomena like mass poverty, severe economic inequality, disproportionately high numbers of youth or concentrations of the population in urban slums can all put pressures on social institutions and the state, since there is little possibility of any immediate solution. For this reason, socio-economic and demographic actors are considered

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ―Greed and grievance in civil war,‖ Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56, No. 4

(2004).

contextual, but they relate to institutional performance (described below), and they are also likely to feature in the analysis of trajectories. For example, some countries have a large diaspora—an immigrant group that maintains a connection to its traditional homeland—that is almost always relevant to the conflict context (in some cases, diaspora may indeed be salient identity groups or key mobilizers in the conflict dynamics).

Institutions provide the formal and informal rules and practices governing human interactions, such as social norms, laws, and organizations. According to the 2011 World Development

Report, institutions ―include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs—as well as the organizational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state and nonstate organizations). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and therefore provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. Institutions operate at all levels of society—local, national, regional, and global.‖

Institutions affect the context of conflict by shaping the incentive structures, or ―rules of the game,‖ that influence the behavior of key mobilizers. (See box on ―Clarifying the Terminology of Institutions‖ below.)

Finally, external influences manifest themselves in a great variety of ways, but they are…