Nigeria Conflict Assessment .pdf

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 1

POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS:

NIGERIA CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

AUGUST 2010

POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS:

NIGERIA CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

AUGUST 2010

This report was produced by the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation with the support of

Management Systems International, Inc through Task Order No. 7 of Contract DFD-I-07-05-0251-00.

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 1

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. CONFLICT DRIVERS

1.1 MANY NATIONS, ONE ROOF: IDENTITY AND THE ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA 10

1.2 ECONOMIC DRIVERS: POVERTY AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE OIL ECONOMY 12

1.3 BIG MEN AND LITTLE PROGRESS: NEOPATRIMONIALISM 15

1.4 INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS: FEDERALISM, RENT-SEEKING, AND INDIGENEITY 16

1.5 INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES 20

1.6 CONFLICT DRIVERS REVIEW 20

III. MITIGATING FACTORS

3.1 NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS: FEDERALISM, ETHNIC ROTATION, AND DOWNWARD PRESSURE 22

3.2 TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 23

3.3 PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE 24

3.4 BRIGHT SPOTS 24

3.4.1 KADUNA 24

3.4.2 WASE, PLATEAU STATE 26

3.4.3 SAPELE, DELTA STATE 26

3.5 COMMON THEMES OF RESILIENCE 27

IV. CURRENT MANIFESTIONS OF CONFLICT

4.1 THE NIGER DELTA: HOW LONG WILL THE HOLDING PATTERN LAST? 29

4.2 JOS AND PLATEAU STATE: WAITING FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF VIOLENCE 32

4.3 RELIGION AND ITS CHALLENGES: THE FRAGMENTATION OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE NORTH 34

4.4 FRAYING EDGES: BOKO HARAM AND OTHER RADICAL FRINGE GROUPS 38

V. TRAJECTORIES

5.1 TRENDS 40

5.2 TRIGGERS 40

5.2.1 PRESIDENT JONATHAN’S CHALLENGE TO THE ETHNIC ROTATION PRINCIPLE 40

5.2.2 THE 2011 ELECTIONS: WATERSHED OR FLASHPOINT? 42

5.2.3 THE YOUTH QUESTION 44

5.2.4 ECONOMIC THREATS 45

5.2.5 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 46

5.2.6 THE ENVIRONMENT 46

VI. RESPONSES

6.1 REVERSING NEOPATRIMONIALISM, ETHNO-RELIGIOUS INSECURITY, AND THE RENTIER STATE 48

6.1.1 RESPONSE: INFUSING CONFLICT PROGRAMMING INTO THE USAID COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PORTFOLIO 49

6.2 REINFORCE NIGERIA’S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE 51

6.2.1 RESPONSE: ASSIST PRE-EXISTING LOCAL CAPACITY 52

6.3 DEFUSING ELECTION CONFLICTS 52

6.3.1 RESPONSE: CONFLICT-WISE ELECTION MONITORING 52

6.4 PREVE NTING FURTHER CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE BELT AND FAR NORTH 53

6.4.1 RESPONSE: BUILD ON THE ISLANDS OF PEACE 53

6.5 PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE RESUMED VIOLENCE IN THE NIGER DELTA 54

6.5.1 RESPONSE: STEM THE TIDE 54

6.6 FUNDING PROGRAMMING ALTERNATIVES FOR USAID 56

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APPENDIX A: LEGITIMACY DEFICIT IN THE 2007 ELECTIONS 57

APPENDIX B: TEAM INTERVIEWS 58

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. MAP OF NIGERIA 7

FIGURE 2: ASSESSMENT TEAM DESTINATIONS 9

FIGURE 3. ETHNICITY AND RELIGION 11

FIGURE 4. NIGERIA'S THREE REGIONS IN 1955 12

FIGURE 5. PER CAPITA FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 14

FIGURE 6. TOTAL ANNUAL FEDERAL ALLOCATIONS TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS 15

FIGURE 7. THE NEOPATRIMONIAL HIERARCHY 16

FIGURE 8. THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT ECONOMY – A PARTIAL SKETCH 31

FIGURE 9. SHARI’A LAW AND GROWING CHRISTIAN POPULATIONS 37

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Nigeria prepares to celebrate 50 years of independence, the nation can look back on a great deal of accomplishments. The iron frame of federalism, an ethnic rotation principle undergird by an elite bargaining culture, the glue of oil wealth, along with continuing moderating influences of traditional and religious structures and a vibrant civil society, have all managed to keep Nigeria united at the national level since the 1967-70 civil war. Yet it also remains a deeply conflicted country, with over 200 ethnic groups evenly split between Islam and Christianity, grinding poverty amid massive oil wealth, governments dominated by an oligarchy characterized by staggering corruption and questionable elections, some of the worst social indicators in the world, and over 20,000 deaths in communal violence since returning to civilian rule in 1999.

Several national conflict trends are of particular concern:

The overwhelming source of vulnerability to conflict in Nigeria remains the poor performance of the Nigerian government itself at all levels, and its corrupt neopatrimonial overlords. Pro-violence groups from Boko Haram to militias in the Niger Delta all share a common narrative of anger over the nation‟s poor governance. Police and military brutality and impunity are common threads fostering violent groups.

Politicians nationwide are turning to armed youths for political leverage – “politics by other means” – in the party primaries and elections. Many of these gangs and militias are gaining more permanent structures and bargaining capacities that could militarize politics in some states and localities, and exacerbate tensions in zones that are already heavily armed like the Niger Delta. The proliferation of small arms and high youth unemployment exacerbate this problem.

President Goodluck Jonathan‟s possible run for election in 2011 would break the ethnic rotation principle and could usher in instability or opportunities for change, depending upon how the new political coalitions line up. The ruling Peoples Democratic Party itself remains an obstacle to reform and as a party has little interest in improved elections in 2011. Its internal divides are an opportunity for new political opposition, which is necessary for reform, yet may also increase political instability in the short run. Yet the nomination of a new, credible election chairman promises hope for change.

Massive poverty, unemployment, and lack of public service infrastructure remain a constant source of public frustration and also undermine the ability of reformist actors, such as political opposition and civil society groups, from organizing.

In addition, this assessment highlights several regional trends in need of assistance:

The absorptive capacity of the traditional Islamic establishment in the North is under great stress and fraying at the edges. The vast majority of the recent wave of itinerant preachers who have risen to take advantage of this situation in recent years are peaceful in orientation, but a handful of groups have rebelled against the Nigerian state and its corrupt status quo. The most violent group, Boko Haram, was crushed by the Nigerian military in 2009, but it is now regrouping.

Plateau state remains locked in conflict and is ready for another round of violence, particularly as the election season approaches. In addition, violence in Plateau is often met with reprisal killings in other states of the northeast.

The recent amnesty process in the Niger Delta has bought a general lull in the fighting, but has done nothing to address its root causes and, without any widespread demobilization, has created financial incentives for future militancy. The forthcoming election season will also test the tenuous peace, and will certainly break if key political factions in the region are unable to agree on consensus candidates for summit political offices such as the governors.

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To address these conflict concerns, the assessment team makes the following recommendations:

1. Integrate Conflict Analysis into USAID’s Nigeria Country Strategy and Portfolio: Many of these conflict drivers originate at the very root of Nigerian politics and society, and require comprehensive, multi-sector strategies to address. Much of USAID‟s non-conflict programming already works in these sectors, and with a conflict audit could more consciously target these drivers. Health, education, and state and local government programming, for instance, could benefit from conflict resolution analysis, as could civil society assistance in such areas as budget monitoring, producing scorecards for state and local governments, and advocacy training. In addition, use of Participatory Development practices in USAID program development, utilizing a combination of large-scale dialogue techniques, could help target groups make collaborative decisions about their future in a fashion that addresses local conflicts. Support for multi-stakeholder initiatives, focused on key concerns such as indigeneity or religious rights, could also help to address key structural conflict issues nationwide.

2. Reinforce Nigeria’s Conflict Management Architecture: Nigeria‟s dense network of conflict resolution NGOs and other civil society groups engaged in peacemaking activities are in need of assistance, particularly religious actors and traditional rulers, as well as key federal agencies (particularly the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution) and universities tasked with conflict resolution responsibilities. Traditional rulers and religious actors in particular have played pivotal peacemaking roles in the cases examined below, particularly through more permanent local dialogue institutions in conflict zones, when available. Neighborhood associations have also played key roles in some communities and would benefit tremendously from technical assistance and alliance building with other peaceable neighborhoods and conflict resolution initiatives. Specific attention should also be paid to the media and how they can craft their work in a fashion that assists conflict resolution. The internet and “smart phone” technology also offer untapped resources for early warning and conflict resolution initiatives.

3. Prepare USAID Election Partners for Conflict-Wise Election Monitoring in 2011: USAID and its development partners are already planning extensive support for INEC and for a host of election-monitoring organizations for the 2011 general elections. These actors are also critical players in containing the inevitable election-related conflicts that will arise in many localities across the country. As USAID partners develop their support strategies for election activities, they could also integrate a conflict resolution strategy that involves: establishing all-party committees, deploying conflict resolution activists from USAID partner networks alongside election monitors and Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) workers, and assisting INEC to deploy its own conflict resolution units to key election hotspots across the nation.

4. Build on the Islands of Peace in the Middle Belt and Far North: Pockets of interfaith and cross-cultural initiatives and networks are active across Plateau state and other conflict-torn parts of the Middle Belt, northeast, and Far North, and could be assisted and better coordinated together. State government-based initiatives could also be constructed or assisted where available, and federal initiatives like the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) are also important vehicles that can assist in networking and strategy-building among the many pockets of civil society activity in religious conflict zones.

5. Preventing Renewed Violence in the Niger Delta: Although oil production has temporarily increased from the lull in fighting produced by last year‟s amnesty program, the politicization of the amnesty process and the forthcoming elections in 2011 are both likely to aggravate matters. Consequently, USAID should use caution when considering direct support for the Federal Government‟s activities related to the proposed rehabilitation program for ex-militants, and activities channeled through the Federal Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs. USAID is already engaged in a variety of important economic, health, education, and governance activities in the Niger Delta that could indirectly contribute to peacebuilding, as could support for civil society actors working to bring militants out of the creeks and into gainful work. In addition, given the deep need for governance reform in the region, USAID could consider extending its local governance program to one of the core delta states, with appropriate

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 5 modifications to fit local realities. USAID could also approach fresh partners in the areas of governance reform and peacebuilding, particularly: 1) churches and 2) female youths. Interviewees particularly singled out some of the Niger Delta‟s Protestant mega-churches as potential change agents. Lastly, some international oil corporations‟ local development initiatives in the Niger Delta present a possible point of entry for conflict programming, under certain conditions (articulated in Section 6). Chevron in particular seems open to creative ideas and approaches, and the notions of participatory governance it is piloting through its GMOU program appear to be netting some gains for peace and security.

Lastly, the report makes several brief recommendations regarding USAID funding alternatives, including a short-term “bridge” program cycle followed by a more comprehensive five-year program cycle.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The team would like to express its deep thanks to the US Embassy and the USAID Mission in Nigeria for their support throughout the assessment.

We are also grateful to Jennifer Stewart and Lynn Carter at MSI for their organization, advice, and support for the assessment process.

Four of the maps in this report were produced with StarPlanet software: Frank van Cappelle (2009) StarPlanet: Interactive Data Visualization and Mapping Software, Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality, Paris:

http://www.sacmeq.org/statplanet/files/User_Manual_StatPlanet.pdf.

Lastly and most importantly, we are deeply indebted to the many Nigerian respondents who took time out their busy schedules, sometimes at personal risk, to meet with us and help us understand the nation‟s conflict dynamics. Consequently, in order to protect respondents from any possible repercussions from opinions presented in this report, we have used non-specific attribution for interview citations, unless the quote appears in a public source.

http://www.sacmeq.org/statplanet/files/User_Manual_StatPlanet.pdf

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FIGURE 1. MAP OF NIGERIA

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I. INTRODUCTION

Violent conflict has been a persistent and demoralizing pattern in Nigeria since civilian rule returned in 1999, resulting in thousands of deaths, millions of dollars in destruction, dampened investment and economic growth, and increased dissatisfaction with democratic governance. Given the significant drag that the repeated violent outbreaks place on Nigeria‟s development performance and prospects, the USAID Mission to Nigeria (USAID/Nigeria) has supported a series of programs to build Nigerian capacities to identify conflict hot spots and work with the contending parties to find non-violent solutions to their disputes.

The latest of those conflict programs, Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM), ended in June 2010. Prior to designing a new generation of conflict programs, USAID/Nigeria decided to conduct a conflict assessment “to accurately understand the nature of the current conflict dynamics in Nigeria and its likely trajectories.” In addition to diagnosing Nigeria‟s conflict dynamics, the assessment was “expected to identify gaps in current support to Nigerian efforts to prevent conflicts and build peace” and to identify, among those gaps, where USAID would be best positioned to provide effective assistance.

In early 2010, USAID/Nigeria turned to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) for support in organizing and conducting the assessment. CMM readily agreed, especially as the Mission was willing to serve as a pilot application of CMM‟s revised conflict assessment methodology. The centerpiece of the updated approach is the second generation analytical tool, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (CAF 2.0), but also includes specific guidance on how to apply the tool to diagnose the current conflict dynamics, specify various trajectories of the levels of future violence, and identify priority responses.

THE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

FRAMEWORK, VERSION 2.0

The analytical power of CAF 2.0 comes from using its concepts and their specified interrelationships as tool for seeking out and sorting data, identifying connections, and distilling patterns. In the course of the assessment, the CAF 2.0 is applied to three analytical tasks. First, the CAF 2.0 is used to diagnose the current conflict dynamics. Specifically, that task is to identify those dynamics within a given society that (1) lead to instability and violent conflict (the drivers of conflict) and (2) seek to maintain stability and the status quo (the mitigating factors). In general, the stronger the drivers of conflict and the weaker the mitigating factors, the greater is the risk that violent conflict will occur.

Both drivers of conflict and mitigating factors arise when key actors in society—individuals, but also organizational actors of all sorts—actively mobilize important attributes in that society. For drivers of conflict, key actors mobilize core grievances, such as a group’s ingrained perception that it has been excluded from political and economic life. For mitigating factors, key actors mobilize resiliencies that may be embedded in the traditions, historical experience, or institutions that make up that society such as a society’s common religious heritage. The diagnostic task also includes examination of a set of interrelated concepts that help tease out these grievances and resiliencies (identities, institutional performance and societal patterns) and the overarching social and environmental context.

After diagnosing the current conflict dynamics, the same framework is used to as a guide to trace various trajectories of the present into the future. This analysis considers the relative strengths of the conflict dynamics and mitigating factors, as wells the influence of future trends, such as economic growth/stagnation or demographic shits, and possible trigger events, such as flawed elections, that can raise the probability of one trajectory over another.

Finally, CAF 2.0 is used to structure the identification of the changes needed to lower the risk of violent conflict.

This is set of necessary changes becomes the starting point for applying various filters to arrive at a series of responses that are best suited for USAID support.

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CMM assembled a nine-person team to conduct the assessment:

four USAID employees supported to two American and three

Nigerian country experts.1 The assessment began in April 2010 with the preparation of a background desk study supplemented with three weeks of fieldwork from May 9 – 28.

During the field work, the team divided into three sub-teams to permit more intensive examination of conflict issues in the Niger Delta, Plateau State and the northeast, and Kaduna and the northwest respectively (see Figure 2 for states the team visited and Appendix B for more detailed itineraries). Altogether the team interviewed over 150 individuals, representing a wide range of positions and perspectives.

Researching the current situation in the Niger Delta posed a particular challenge due to restrictions placed on the travel of American officials to that region. The solution was to rely on two Nigerian members of the team to conduct on-the-ground interviews, supplemented with 10 focus groups (5 each in Delta and Rivers States) and interviews in Abuja with key actors ranging from government officials to Delta politicians to leaders of the militant groups.

With this data, this assessment gauges the current state of violent conflict trends in Nigeria and highlights potential avenues for donor support to assist the efforts of Nigerian actors to moderate and resolve these trends.

The team consisted of USAID staff Chom Bagu (Nigeria Mission), David Hunsicker (CMM), Marie Pace (OCR), and

Tjip Walker (CMM) and country experts Bakut Bakut (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigeria); Darren Kew (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Oshita Oshita (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigeria), Aaron Sayne (Transnational Crisis Project) and Ukoha Ukiwo (University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria).

FIGURE 2: ASSESSMENT TEAM DESTINATIONS

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II. CONFLICT DRIVERS

Nigeria has always mystified external observers, and not a few internal ones, as to how it manages to persist as a single political entity. With over 200 ethnic groups evenly split between Islam and Christianity, grinding poverty amid massive oil wealth, governments dominated by an oligarchy characterized by staggering corruption and questionable elections, some of the worst social indicators in the world, a civil war shortly after independence, and over 20,000 deaths in communal violence since returning to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria seems destined for massive violent conflicts. One account has already judged that “this house has fallen.”2 The US National Intelligence Council in 2005 worried that the outright collapse of Nigeria by 2020 was a significant risk that needed to be considered in US policy planning.3

Yet somehow Nigeria survives, with its people still “suffering and smiling,” in the words of the nation‟s great Afrobeat star, Fela Anikulapo Kuti. The iron frame of federalism, the glue of oil wealth commonly called the „national cake‟, along with continuing moderating influences of traditional and religious structures, have managed to keep Nigeria united at the national level since the civil war ended in 1970, although localities continue to suffer occasional violent episodes. Important macroeconomic reforms during the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) have also opened possibilities for growth outside the oil sector, and started the nation down the difficult path of attracting foreign investment. By the late 1990s, an informal ethno-regional rotation principle, occasionally called “power shift,” had spread across the political elite as a basic metric for power-sharing and providing some predictability and a modicum of stability to the political game. Ironically, skyrocketing corruption has also helped the oligarchs build a vast, multi-ethnic “big tent” through the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which has created strong bargaining relationships among the elite which has moderated potential national rifts for the past decade.

This rogues‟ peace, however, has come at the price of blatant contempt for the public interest, forcing 9 out of 10 Nigerians to live on less than US$2 per day with very few necessary services and meager employment prospects outside Abuja or Lagos. Public frustrations with the politicians‟ feast at the government trough may reach a breaking point, with the insurgency in the Niger Delta serving as a harbinger of unrest in other parts of the federation, particularly as the oligarchs turn increasingly to threats of violence to support their claims to state offices. National conflagrations along the major fault lines are possible, but the slow unraveling of the nation in pockets of localized violence seems more likely in the short run, if government cannot produce tangible improvements in broad-based economic growth, public services, and political responsiveness.

1.1 Many Nations, One Roof: Identity and the Ethnic Security Dilemma

Nigeria is infamous for its tremendous ethnic and religious diversity, which is the starting place for any inquiry into conflict dynamics in the country. As the Giant of Africa and home to over 200 ethnic groups practicing Christianity, Islam, and local religions, it has both benefited and suffered from the basic fact of its sheer size. Its great population has ensured that international actors have seen Nigeria as an important strategic partner in the West African region. Moreover, its diversity has helped to create a natural pluralism to the nation‟s politics that has served as a check on authoritarianism over the years and ensured vigorous debate. Occasionally, however, debate has degenerated into deadlock, which at times has slid into episodes of violence and – once – a civil war.4

2 Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (Public Affairs, 2000).

3 National Intelligence Council, “Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa‟s Future,” Conference Report March 2005, http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_africa_future.html.

4 See, among many: Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, A History of Nigeria, (Cambridge UP, 2008).

http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_africa_future.html

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Historically, ethnicity has been the primary social category upon which political mobilization has been built in Nigeria, and it remains so today. Broadly speaking, ethnicity typically becomes a conflict factor when the interests served by the ethnic group are perceived by its members as threatened by another group, or when one group (or groups) is (are) perceived to be socially ranked below another group (or groups) so that social mobility is blocked.5 The combination of these factors can foster fears of marginalization, exclusion, and even assault in members of one group toward members of other ethnicities.

Both of these characteristics of ethnicity played out with deadly effect in Nigeria in the years shortly before and after independence in 1960. Colonialism forced previously independent polities – each with their own deep cultural traditions and identities – under one political roof, and the British policy of indirect rule generally allowed those polities to persist by incorporating them into the colonial governance profile. Thus as independence approached, this structure made ethnicity the most obvious political category for political organization. Moreover, the prospect of over 200 ethnicities under one government raised the threat of domination by other groups, creating a common anxiety that one‟s own group needed to control the government if its interests were to be protected.

Consequently, Nigeria at independence was politically divided along ethnic lines in a deeply insecure situation known as the ethnic security dilemma.6 Under such circumstances of ethnic polarization, groups generally perceive control of political office as a zero-sum game, such that one group‟s gain in power is another group‟s loss. In order to compensate for perceived losses and group insecurity, members of ethnic groups in general feel that they must build their own group‟s power at all cost – if they do not, they fear they will be marginalized in their access to government, excluded, or even overwhelmed by others. A conflict spiral soon erupts, as each group takes increasingly threatening decisions in order to secure its position and respond to the perceived growing threats from others.

Precisely such a conflict spiral ignited shortly after independence among Nigeria‟s “big three” – the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo, who constitute two-thirds of the population. The three-region federation left in Nigeria by the British facilitated this dynamic, since each of the big three controlled one of the federal units, which encouraged ethnic unity and allowed them to dominate the minorities within their own regions. As the big three moved to dominate the federal government, they escalated the conflict with increasingly threatening actions that ended in civil war from 1967-70, crushing an effort by the Igbo to secede.

5 See the literature discussions on ethnic identity in the social psychology schools of interdependence and social identity, such as: A.R. Flippen, H.A. Hornstein, W.E. Siegel, and E. Weitzman, “A Comparison of Similarity and Interdependence as Triggers for Ingroup Formation,” 22 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (1996): 882-893; H.

Tajfel and J.C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in S. Worchel & W. G. Austin, eds.

Psychology of intergroup relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 2nd Ed., 1985).

6 Darren Kew, “Building Democracy in 21st Century Africa: Two Africas, One Solution,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter/Spring 2005).

FIGURE 3. ETHNICITY AND RELIGION

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Recognizing this dynamic, post-civil war military regimes wisely divided the Nigerian federation into 12, 19, and ultimately 36 states by 1996. This broke the big three ethnic groups into multiple states, accenting important sub-ethnic divisions and creating avenues for multiple centers of leadership (governors and state assemblies) within each group. In addition, 18 of the current 36 states are dominated by Nigeria‟s many ethnic minorities, making them key stakeholders and giving them important voices in federal politics, which, among other benefits, diluted the powers of the big three, created buffers among them, and opened new opportunities for ethnic coalition building.

Federalism has been an indispensible factor in keeping Nigeria united since 1970, but the ethnic security dilemma remains an underlying source of tension that continues to color perspectives on politics. In some localities, the dilemma plays out on a smaller scale, occasionally bursting into violence among communities. Political elites in the 40 years since the civil war have managed to avoid another catastrophic conflict spiral at the national level, but crises in 1983, 1993, and 1998 went dangerously far down that path before pulling back, and several incidents under the Fourth Republic, such as the 2000 Shari‟a crisis in Kaduna and the recent fighting in Jos (see below), threatened to spark national bouts of violence before they were contained.

1.2 Economic Drivers: Poverty and the Dominance of the Oil Economy

A second major source of conflict in Nigeria since its early days has been the perverse economic impacts of widespread poverty amid great wealth.

In the 1970s, the Nigerian economy became overwhelmingly oil-dependent, which impacted both the ethnic security dilemma and the federal system. The close of the civil war saw a steep rise in national oil wealth. In 1970, oil revenue was a mere $250 million, yet by 1974 it had spiked to $11.2 billion.7 Today oil and gas account for over 40 percent of the country‟s GDP, 80 percent of federal government revenues, and more than 90 percent of foreign exchange revenues.8

Altogether, Nigerian oil has generated close to $700 billion in revenues since the 1960s, including nearly $400 billion to the Federal Government. During the 2003-08 oil boom, annual receipts increased exponentially. A five-year audit of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 2006, for instance, logged government revenues of over $96 billion.9 Yet this income has not proven of simple benefit to the political and economic stability of the nation. In the account of one leading expert: “The economic record since the oil boom is one of lackluster growth, increasing poverty, widening inequality and a spectacular decline in

7 U.S. Energy Information Administration Data.

8 World Bank, “Nigeria: Country Fact Sheet,” 2008.

9 The Guardian (Nigeria), “Crude oil prices rise to $71.40 per barrel; government makes N12.4 trillion in five years”, 18 April 2006.

FIGURE 4. NIGERIA'S THREE REGIONS IN 1955

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 13 performance. From 1980 to 2002, economic growth averaged just 2 per cent annually, and real income per capita stands today at about one third the level achieved in 1980….Nigeria‟s once-thriving agricultural and solid mineral exports are moribund; manufacturing today constitutes a smaller proportion of the economy (about 4 per cent) than at independence. The economy drifts on a sea of oil, blown by the capricious winds of international energy markets.”10

Observers have introduced a number of explanations for this state of affairs. First, economic analysts frequently conclude that oil has infected the Nigerian economy with “Dutch disease” – that is, the phenomenon whereby an increase in revenues from a natural resource raises the exchange rate, making other export goods uncompetitive. Consider the case of Nigerian agriculture: prior to independence in 1960, agriculture accounted for almost two thirds of GDP. In the wake of the 1970s oil boom, however cultivation dropped off from 18.8 million hectares in 1975 to 11.05 million in 1978. Thus, the volume and value of agricultural output dropped by nearly 50 per cent in the space of three years. Meanwhile, in the period between 1970 and 1981, outputs of Nigeria‟s traditional export crops -- principally, cocoa, palm oil, and rubber – fell by 74 percent.11 Today agriculture contributes only 27 percent to national GDP, even as it continues to employ 60 percent of the population.12 And the country, once a major exporter of food to West Africa and beyond, has become a massive importer.

The price volatility of oil as a market commodity has also helped create wild cycles of boom and bust in government revenue receipts and spending. In particular, the oil bonanzas of the late 1970s and 2000s saw spectacular hikes in government intakes. These were generally absorbed as windfall, however, with little clear long-range planning and savings. Newfound oil wealth distorted budgets and lured officials from fiscal constraint.13 The aftermath has typically been distinguished by slews of white-elephant projects, recurrent bouts of unmanageable government debt, increasing popular mistrust and alienation from government, and chronic failure at the federal, state, and local levels to assume constitutionally mandated responsibilities as engines of development and economic growth.14

Nigeria‟s constitutions and federal laws placed all oil reserves and revenues under sole government custody, a condition that persists today.15 One effect of this was that the revenue dependence observed at the federal level replicated itself within the state and local governments, as the cash available from government contracts far exceeded what local economies (and thus local taxes) could produce. Perceptions soon spread that individual wealth could accumulate much more quickly through rent-seeking behavior rather than other forms of economic activity.

10 P. Lewis, “Getting the Politics Right: Governance and Economic Failure in Nigeria,” in Rotberg (2006), 99

11 N. Shaxson (2005), op.cit., 314.

12 CIA, World Factbook, Nigeria.

13 See e.g., Apter, The Pan-African Nation, 2006.

14 See e.g., International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” 2006.

15 Both the 1969 Petroleum Act and Article 44(3) of the 1999 Federal Constitution cordon off all oil revenues and reserves as exclusive Federal government property. Article 1 of the Petroleum Industry Bill currently under debate reaffirms this disposition. Article 1 of the 1978 Land Use Act appoints state governors “trustees” over most lands “for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians.”

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Procedurally, revenues from national resources – chiefly, oil – are now collected monthly in a Federation Account and allocated to the federal government, states, and local government areas (LGAs) following a formula designed by the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), a federal-level

FIGURE 5. PER CAPITA FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 15 body.16 Today, with the arguable exception of Lagos State, all of Nigeria‟s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory depend overwhelmingly on these allocations from the center to meet budgetary requirements.

Figure 5 presents state-by-state per capital federal allocations for 2006 as both a bar graph and a map.

The oil-producing states of the Niger Delta receive “derivation” revenue, an additional 13% of all national oil revenues before they are sent to the Federation Account for division among the 36 states – where they then receive an additional 1/36th share.

Consequently, the four states that produce the most oil are by far the richest states in the federation – and, as discussed in subsequent sections, they are also the most conflict-ridden.

The end result of this oil dependence was an economy that saw many productive – and job-producing – sectors crumble as government attention focused almost exclusively on the oil industry. With local industries dying and agriculture neglected, the states soon found themselves almost completely dependent upon their shares of the federally distributed oil rents. Most perversely, despite nearly $700 billion in oil wealth since the 1960s, 92% of Nigerians now live on less than two dollars per day.17 Anger and frustration have followed such widespread poverty amid plenty, providing ample fuel for conflicts.

1.3 Big Men and Little Progress: Neopatrimonialism

Because of the shift to oil dependence, socio-economic patterns in the country also changed. The oil boom of the 1970s was met with socialist-influenced notions that the government should control the “commanding heights” of the economy, in order to more equitably distribute the profits across the federation. Massive parastatals were created to manage the oil (and later gas) industries, flooding the federal government with oil earnings. Military leaders – in power all but four years from 1966 to 1999 – and their civilian allies soon saw irresistible levels of revenues flooding into the government, and corruption skyrocketed.

These political elites soon grew fabulously rich during a period when most Nigerians saw their standards of living drop by 75% (1980 to 1995), as the oil boom faded and the nation‟s massive debts forced it to cut the modest social services available. The socio-economic distance between political elites and the vast majority of Nigerians soon jumped, such that these military leaders and their allies grew exponentially in power as

16 1999 Constitution, Third Schedule, Part I, 32 (b). For more detail on Federal revenue allocation procedures, see A.

Phillips, “Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21(4), 1991,103-111;

R. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, 2001; E. Ahmad and R. Singh, “The Political Economy of Oil Revenue sharing in Nigeria,” IMF Working Paper, 2003; C and O. Uche, “Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria,” ASC Leiden Working Paper, 2004; International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Failing Federal Experiment, 2006.

World Bank Development Indicators 2006, available at http://web.worldbank.org.

FIGURE 6. TOTAL ANNUAL FEDERAL ALLOCATIONS

TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS

(FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE 2008)

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20899413~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 16 individuals. Their expanding fortunes allowed them to build vast networks of clients – initially within their immediate identity groups, but soon they extended across ethnic and religious lines, and ultimately for the most powerful of these “big men” or “godfathers,” across the federation. This development marks the rise of neopatrimonialism, in which individuals in power develop hierarchical loyalty networks fueled by patronage from government coffers:

“The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.”18

Consequently, by the time the military exited power in 1999, Nigeria was dominated by an oligarchy of political mandarins, many of whom had served in the military or collaborated with them. Many of these key oligarchs formed the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1998, and utilized both the confidence of the military and their massive resource advantage to dominate the 1999 elections. Once in power, the PDP extended its control and welcomed leading opposition politicians into it ranks. The oligarchy thrived as the PDP utilized its lock on power to undermine election quality, such that by 2007, elections had become largely farcical (see Appendix A), with outcomes increasingly decided by bruising power battles within the PDP or within the ruling parties of the few opposition states.

Neopatrimonialism thus fuels conflicts in Nigeria in several ways. It entrenches a small oligarchy in power, who use this monopoly to hoard the oil wealth and channel it to their supporters.

Government policy becomes private business, such that broad-based development that would benefit the public is of little concern to power-holders. Desperately needed government service delivery grinds to a halt, and accounting and anti-corruption institutions are undermined, as are institutions that would allow political opposition or public oversight. With legitimate means of opposition blocked, political challengers and frustrated members of the public writ large often perceive that they have little alternative to pursue their interests but to utilize the same neopatrimonial tactics, including, in some cases, violence.

1.4 Institutional Weakness: Federalism, Rent-Seeking, and Indigeneity

This weakness in public institutions fostered by neopatrimonialism has proven particularly problematic for the management of conflicts. Since the 1970s, the “iron frame” of Nigeria‟s federal system has been an essential ingredient in the nation‟s ability to recover from the civil war and to create a greater sense of inclusivity that has helped somewhat to reduce the perceptions of threat and blocked social mobility that fuel

18 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa,” 46 World Politics 4 (July 1994): 458.

FIGURE 7. THE NEOPATRIMONIAL HIERARCHY

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 17 the ethnic security dilemma. Yet as discussed above, the quest for “true federalism” (as often heard in Nigerian parlance) remains incomplete, as the political economy of oil has reduced most of the federal units to dependency on the Federation Account.

With 36 states, 774 local governments, and an electorate of over 60 million voters,19 as well as an enormous population and ethnic diversity, Nigeria could be forgiven some shortcomings in the practice of federalism. Still, much of the weakness of its federal structure can be traced to official mismanagement, particularly during the 29 of Nigeria‟s 49 post-independence years under increasingly corrupt military rule. As one analyst has noted: “Military federalism is a contradiction in terms. All major state and local appointments came from above.”20 Military rule reduced the states and localities to administrative units controlled from the presidency, which meant that during those years Nigeria was more of a federation in name than in practice, and that – after the brief 1979-83 experiment – the nation has only really been practicing presidential federalism since 1999. Moreover, military centralization created the over-dominant executive branches and the authoritarian-style political culture of neopatrimonialism that the nation struggles with today. The centralization of oil revenues at the federal level also provoked much disharmony over un-remediated poverty and the perceived absence of government as an agent of development and economic growth.

This lack of a clear, commonly-held state building enterprise has engendered both political processes and a concept of citizenship that revolve almost exclusively around access to entitlements. Since independence, Nigerian federalist politics has been distribution politics, overwhelmingly focused on dividing the spoils of

19 DFID. Independent Electoral Assessment Team Final Report Nigeria, January 2010.

20 J. Paden, “Unity with Diversity: Toward Democratic Federalism,” in R. Rotberg (ed.), Crafting the New Nigeria:

Confronting the Challenges, 2004, 18.

SECURITY FORCES

Since at least the military period, the Nigerian security forces have enjoyed an unenviable reputation for extortion, human rights abuses and general excesses. Arbitrary arrests, torture, extra-judicial killings, poor conditions of confinement, disappearances and use of excessive force are still widely and regularly reported.

The security forces also regularly play roles in exacerbating conflict situations, whether through partiality, corruption, or political mani-pulation – their involvement in election-related violence, for in-stance, has been singled out as particularly negative. Massive re-prisal killings have also occurred, some with death tolls ranging into the thousands. Gaps in effective policing have also helped spawn some of the nation’s most difficult security threats, from the rise of ethnic militias to the trade in stolen Niger Delta oil. Interviewees recounted all of the above, and documentation by civil society lends it additional credence. Informants also believed the security forces would continue to play a violent and anti-democratic role in the upcoming elections.

By most accounts, the security forces are both poorly governed and partly ungovernable. Sheer size provides one explanation:

with over 340,000 employees and a byzantine organizational struc-ture, the police force alone is one of Nigeria’s largest employers.

Although organized structurally as an exclusive arm of the Federal Government, the security forces are also seen as far from mono-lithic, with ever-shifting allegiances and influence in national, state and local affairs. One common perception is that factions within are essentially ―for hire,‖ committing violence at the behest of politi-cal chieftains, business entities (esp. the multinational oil compa-nies) or powerful state governors. Poor training and compensation of personnel, insufficient arms and equipment, and institutionalized corruption have all been cited as causes of police violence, togeth-er with a culture of official impunity. Government has regularly failed to name, discipline, arrest or prosecute uniformed perpetra-tors. Moreover, some gross violations have been openly condoned by government officials, up to and including the Presidency. And throughout Nigeria has shown a prickly unwillingness towards meaningful police reform or other outside assistance at a systemic level.

Nigeria Conflict Assessment 18 national wealth, political power and other goods incidental to state administration.

Revenues from oil -- or “the national cake,” as Nigerians often call their resource riches -- number chief among these.

Indeed “there is a sense,” observers note, “in which the history of post-colonial Nigeria is synonymous with the grubby processes of revenue mobilization and allocation.”21 Revenue allocation has frequently been the focal point of contention between both state and federal officials, and among the states. Often, issues of “fair” distribution so far dominate public debate on wealth-sharing that no shared, long-range vision of social investment is sought, with most splits decided through unregulated political contest as factions lock horns over a shrinking „cake.‟ Every contest becomes zero-sum: without a shared idea of how rents can be leveraged for common good, each transfer has its winners and losers.

Expectations around wealth are perennially unstable. Prominent Nigerian social scientist Claude Ake described the situation as follows: “The habit of consuming … without producing … underlies our fanatical zeal for political power, and our political fragmentation. For us the state is not so much the incarnation of a corporate political identity as a battlefield.”22 General Ibrahim Babangida, who managed to misplace the US$12.2 billion that Nigeria earned during the 1990-91 oil “boomlet,” described the situation concisely: “cake-sharing psychosis.”23

For most Nigerians, who do not have access to oil rents, a similar zero-sum perspective plays out over control of land. With a majority of Nigeria‟s burgeoning population engaged in agriculture, control of land is often seen as a matter of life and death. Not only does land facilitate survival, but it also determines the most basic political baseline of the entire system: citizenship. Land ownership is determined by a patchwork of local customs and legislation across the country, but a common principle known as indigeneity is typically used to determine which groups are the original owners of land and where individuals originate for purposes of determining such basic rights as voting, access to state services (such as scholarships), and buying land.

Typically, local governments, often in consultation with local traditional rulers, make the classification of who is an “indigene.” Without a certificate of indigeneity, individuals often face additional hurdles to voting or running for public office in that locality, may be denied public services, and can often face barriers to land ownership. Consequently, groups that control particular local governments have sometimes applied

21 M. Watts, “Trusts, trust and trusting in the Niger Delta,” NEXT, 31 October 2009.

22 C. Ake, “Our Problems Not in Others But Ourselves,” address to the inaugural dialogue of the Obafemi Awolowo Foundation, December 1992.

23 H.E. Ibrahim Babangida, Annual Budget Speech, 1992, ii.

ARMS

Interviewees reaffirmed easy access to small arms as an aggravating factor in conflict across several parts of Ni-geria, particularly the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt.

Especially strong alarms were raised about increasing movement of arms into Plateau State. Past estimates of small arms in Nigeria range from 1 to 3 million.

Major transit countries, markets and entry points shift over time, and craft weapons from the Southeast (esp. ―Awka‖ guns from Anambra) continue to play an important role.

Nigeria’s Federal and State governments, by most ac-counts, have done little to curb arms-related activity.

Regulation of sales,…