Att._J.24_EIRP_World_Bank_2012_Report.pdf

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR0002198

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA Credit 3845-AF, Grant H284-AF, Grant H398-AF and Grant 498-AF)

ON ONE IDA CREDIT AND THREE IDA GRANTS

(IDA Credit 3845-AF) IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 27.9 MILLION

(US$ 40.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

(Grant H284-AF) IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 16.8 MILLION

(US$ 25.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

(Grant H398-AF) IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 17.1 MILLION)

(US$ 28.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

(Grant 498-AF) IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 22.7 MILLION)

(US$ 33.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

FOR THE

EMERGENCY IRRIGATION REHABILITATION PROJECT

21 June 2012

Sustainable Development Department

Agriculture and Rural Development Sector

Afghanistan Country Management Unit

South Asia Region

P ub lic D is cl os ur e A ut ho riz ed

P ub lic D is cl os ur e A ut ho riz ed

P ub lic D is cl os ur e A ut ho riz ed

P ub lic D is cl os ur e A ut ho riz ed

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective April 20, 2012)

Currency Unit = Afghani (AFN)

US$1.00 = 49.00 AFN

SDR1.00 = US$1.474

Government Fiscal Year: March 21 – March 20

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CDC Community Development Council

EA Environmental Assessment

EIRP Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project

EMP Environmental Management Plan

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN

FM Financial Management

GOA Government of Afghanistan

ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report

IDA International Development Association

IRR Internal Rate of Return

ISR Implementation Status Report

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MEW Ministry of Energy and Water

MIS Management Information System

MOF Ministry of Finance

MTR Mid-Term Review

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NSP National Solidarity Program

O&M Operation and Maintenance

PCU Project Coordination Unit

PSC Project Steering Committee

TA Technical Assistance

TOR Terms of Reference

WBG World Bank Group

WUA Water User Association

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerroro

Country Director: Robert Saum

Sector Manager: Simeon K. Ehui

Project Team Leader: Jun Matsumoto

ICR Team Leader: Srinivasan Raj Rajagopal

AFGHANISTAN

Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information ...................................................................................................... iv B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................. iv C. Ratings Summary ...................................................................................................... iv D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... v

E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... v F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... vi

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................. vii H. Restructuring (if any) .............................................................................................. viii

I. Disbursement Profile ............................................................................................... viii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

3. Assessment of Outcomes

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

6. Lessons Learned

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analyses Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR

Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents

Maps: IBRD AFG 39365

IBRD AFG 39366

A. Basic Information

Country: Afghanistan Project Name:

AF: Emergency

Irrigation Rehabilitation

Project

Project ID: P078936 L/C/TF Number(s):

IDA-38450,IDA-

H2840,IDA-

H3980,IDA-H4980

ICR Date: 06/26/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:

GOVERNMENT OF

AFGHANISTAN

Original Total

Commitment:

XDR 27.90M Disbursed Amount: XDR 76.29M

Revised Amount: XDR 77.00M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agencies:

Ministry of Energy and Water

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 08/14/2003 Effectiveness: 03/19/2004 03/19/2004

Appraisal: 11/20/2003 Restructuring(s):

10/24/2006

04/03/2007

Approval: 12/23/2003 Mid-term Review: 09/25/2005 03/25/2006

Closing: 09/30/2007 12/31/2011

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory

Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No

Quality at Entry

(QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 10 10

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 10 10

Irrigation and drainage 75 75

Sub-national government administration 5 5

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Other rural development 28 28

Rural policies and institutions 14 14

Rural services and infrastructure 29 29

Water resource management 29 29

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Praful C. Patel

Country Director: Robert J. Saum Alastair J. McKechnie

Sector Manager: Simeon Kacou Ehui Gajanand Pathmanathan

Project Team Leader: Jun Matsumoto Mohinder S. Mudahar

ICR Team Leader: Srinivasan Raj Rajagopal

ICR Primary Author: Srinivasan Raj Rajagopal

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to provide farmers in the project areas with improved reliable and equitable distribution of irrigation water to increase agricultural productivity and farm income, improve food security and livelihoods, and reduce vulnerability due to droughts.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The Project Development Objective is to assist the Borrower in restoring irrigated agricultural agricultural production in rural areas, through improved, reliable water supply to rehabilitated irrigation schemes.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from approval documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increase in irrigated area

Value quantitative or

Qualitative)

Date achieved

Comments

(incl. % achievement)

This PDO indicator

Indicator 2 : Increase in productivity

Value quantitative or

Qualitative)

(incl. % achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from approval documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Number of hectares of irrigable land rehabilitated.

Value

(quantitative or Qualitative)

Indicator 2 : Number of hydro-meteorological stations rehabilitated

Value

Indicator 3 : Number of Feasibility Studies prepared

Value

Indicator 4 : Number of Ministry staff trained in various subjects.

Value

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.

Date ISR

Archived

DO IP

Actual Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 06/04/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00

2 12/02/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.16

3 06/08/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 4.83

4 12/12/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.55

5 05/25/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.69

6 12/07/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 21.08

7 06/11/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.76

8 12/15/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 34.20

9 06/14/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 45.02

10 12/26/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.30

11 05/18/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 59.94

12 11/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 69.39

13 05/21/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 82.24

14 12/05/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 88.19

15 06/03/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 96.46

16 12/13/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 112.78

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring

Date(s)

Board

Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at

Restructuring

Amount

Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring &

Key Changes Made

DO IP

10/24/2006 N S MS 19.11

Poor performance of the Hydro-met network resulted in it being dropped.

04/03/2007 N S S 24.47

Additional financing was required to cover the shortfall in

ARTF Grant and to reintrouduce a simplified

Hydro-met component.

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) was based on the Transitional

Support Strategy (TSS) for Afghanistan approved by the Board in March 2003. The TSS was designed to support the National Development Framework (NDF) through which a national strategy for economic development was articulated by the then transitional Government of

Afghanistan. The World Bank supports four key TSS sectors: Improving livelihoods; Fiscal strategy, institutions and management; Governance and public administration reform; and enabling private sector development. Among these sectors prioritized by the World Bank, the

EIRP was designed to support activities that would improve livelihood opportunities in rural areas through a rehabilitated irrigation system and improved management of national water resources, including rehabilitation and modernization of a once well-functioning but now dilapidated hydromet system.

2. Agriculture production accounts for over half of Afghanistan’s GDP and most of its direct exports. More than 75 percent of the population lives in rural areas and depends on agriculture as their source of livelihood. Lack of assured water supply at the farm-level in the existing irrigation systems which have been dilapidated by 25 years of conflict, neglect, droughts and floods is one of the major constraints to food production, agricultural growth and rural development.

3. The project was approved at the end of 2003. In 2002, it was estimated that the actual area under irrigation was only about one-third of the area under irrigation in 1993 and even in this area, the irrigation systems were working at a very low efficiency of about 25%. Furthermore, Afghanistan is estimated to use only about 30% of its water resources with considerable undeveloped potential for hydropower, irrigation and potable water supplies. Development and

Management of water resources in Afghanistan is constrained by the lack of accurate and up-to-date hydro-meteorological information (available record pre-dates to the years before the conflict and hence is about 25 years out of date). In the same vein, it is also essential to rebuild institutions and human resources essential for sustainable development and management of the water resources.

4. The EIRP was designed to address these issues and was fully consistent with the National

Development Framework and the TSS of Afghanistan. The World Bank has wide experience in supporting development in post-conflict countries and countries in transition. In addition, the

Bank brings global expertise in water resources management and irrigation rehabilitation. The

Government of Afghanistan recognizing the global experience of the Bank in supporting rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure requested World Bank financing for the NDF’s water resources development program including irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation on an emergency basis as part of a multi-donor multi-million dollar national program proposed by the Government to rehabilitate the irrigation system over a period of three years.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

5. The project development objective (PDO) was to provide farmers in the project areas with improved, reliable and equitable distribution of irrigation water to increase agricultural productivity and farm income, improve food security and livelihoods, and reduce vulnerability to droughts. This objective was to be achieved by (i) rehabilitating and improving the existing dilapidated irrigation infrastructure; (ii) restoring and modernizing the hydro-meteorological network for better monitoring, planning, sustainable use and management of water resources, including contingency planning for droughts and floods; and (iii) developing the institutional capacity of public sector water institutions, existing community water organizations and farmers for operating and maintaining irrigation system in a sustainable manner. Since this was an emergency operation no Results Framework was prepared (also confirmed by the Task team

Leader of the Preparation team) and no quantifiable intermediate output targets were identified.

However, key performance and project monitoring indicators were provided in Tables 2 and 6 of the Technical annex and are reproduced in the following section.

The key PDO indicators were as follows:

Component Indicator

A Number of hectares of irrigable land rehabilitated

Number and type of beneficiaries

Contribution to irrigation scheme rehabilitation by beneficiaries

Balanced geographical distribution of rehabilitated irrigation schemes

B Number of hydro-meteorological stations rehabilitated

Number of rating curves at hydrological stations established

Number of river sub-basins with water balance calculated

C Number of feasibility studies prepared

D Number of Ministry staff trained in various subjects

Ministry staff assessments by international consultants

Offices (m ) equipped and used for project implementation

Implementation Plan

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators

6. The Bank approved the restructuring of the project on October 24, 2006. The restructuring covered the refinement of the original PDOs and Key Performance Indicators, revision of the project outputs, cancellation of the original component B (rehabilitation of the

Hydro-meteorological System) and the reallocation of funds allocated for this component among the other three remaining components, mainly for Component A (Rehabilitation of Irrigation

Schemes). The revised PDO is “to assist the Borrower in restoring irrigated agricultural production in its rural areas, through improved and reliable water supply to rehabilitated traditional irrigation schemes”. The revised key performance indicators for the achievement of the PDO were:

Increased area under agricultural production; and

Percentage increase in agricultural production in rehabilitated schemes

7. There was another restructuring in March 2007 when additional financing of US$ 25 million equivalent was approved to fill a financing gap. There was no revision to the PDO but the

Rehabilitation of Hydro-meteorological Component was reintroduced as Component D. The revised key PDO indicators were not changed.

8. Both Afghanistan Transition Support Strategy (TSS) and Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of

April 2006 anticipated more rapid transition from emergency post conflict status to a more normalized situation (ISN) and began the transition from a short-run emergency orientation to a longer term development orientation (TSS).

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

9. The primary target group is the farmers and their families living in the rural areas covered by the irrigation schemes to be rehabilitated. Government institutions as well as communities involved in the rehabilitation, modernization, operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure were the other target group. Capacities of the second target group were to be enhanced through the original component D and revised component C through the technical assistance provider. Even though the investment started as an emergency recovery operation, it included components for rehabilitating the hydro-met network together with the building up of the hydro-met services of Afghanistan, a vital requirement for the medium and long-term development and management of water resources of Afghanistan. Similarly the technical assistance component also focused on improving the capacity of the Ministry staff in technical, financial and managerial aspects of rehabilitating, developing and managing irrigation and associated water resources infrastructure.

1.5 Original Components

10. The original project components were (A) rehabilitation and improvement of about 1,280 irrigation schemes consisting of small (1,100), medium (160) and large (20) schemes; (B) rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological network; (C) preparation of feasibility studies and monitoring; and (D) institutional development.

1.6 Revised Components

11. After the original project was signed, there was 1 restructuring in 2006, and three additional financing in 2007, 2008 and 2009. History of revised components is presented below:

Component A Component B Component C Component D

Original Project

Rehab. of 1,280 irrigation schemes

Rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological network

Preparation of feasibility studies

Institutional development

2006 Restructuring

Rehab. of 750 medium/ lesser and 10 large irrigation schemes

Feasibility study for

Kokcha multi-purpose water resource development

Institutional development

Revised key performance indicators for the achievement of the PDO:

Increased area under agricultural production; and

Percentage increase in agricultural production in rehabilitated schemes

2007 Additional

Financing

Rehab. of 750 medium/ lesser

Feasibility study for

Kokcha multi-

Institutional development

Rehabilitation of hydro-

Component A Component B Component C Component D and 10 large irrigation schemes. Target area increased from 280,000 to

390,000 ha purpose water resource development meteorological network

2008 Additional

Financing

Rehab. of 780 medium/ lesser and 14 large irrigation schemes. Target area increased from 390,000 ha to 480,000 ha.

Feasibility study for

Kokcha multi-purpose water resource development

Institutional development

Rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological network

2009 Additional

Financing

Rehab. of 865 medium/ lesser and 22 large irrigation schemes. Target area increased from 480,000 ha to 571,000 ha.

Feasibility study for

Kokcha multi-purpose water resource development

Institutional development

Rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological network

12. 2006 Restructuring: After the restructuring in 2006, the original Component B

(Rehabilitation of Hydro-meteorological Network) was dropped and in Component A the target of 1,100 small schemes and 160 medium schemes was changed to 750 medium and lesser schemes. The target for the large schemes was reduced from 20 to 10. The original Component C

Preparation of Feasibility Studies and M&E was changed to include only one feasibility study namely Feasibility Study for Kokcha multi-purpose water resources development and was made

Component B including the M&E work. The original Component D The institutional development of MEW became Component C.

13. 2007 Additional Financing: After the first additional financing in March 2007, the

Rehabilitation of Hydro-meteorological Network was reintroduced as Component D. Other components remained unchanged. The additional financing was to make up the shortfall caused by non-availability of ARTF funds originally allocated for this project.

14. 2008 Additional Financing: After the second additional financing in June 2008, the number of medium and lesser schemes to be rehabilitated was increased by 30 to 780 and the number of large irrigation schemes to be rehabilitated was increased by 4 to 14. Other components remained unchanged.

15. 2009 Additional Financing: After the third additional financing in May 2009, the number of medium and lesser schemes to be rehabilitated was increased by 85 to 865 and the number of large irrigation schemes to be rehabilitated was increased by 8 to 22 in Component A.

Under Component C, following additional activities were included: (i) provision of academic and practical training in monitoring and evaluation; (ii) completion of the WAPECA building in

Kabul; (iii) construction of new office buildings MEW at Panjsher, Konarha, Norestan, Zabul and

Konarha; (iv) construction of boundary walls of existing office buildings of MEW at Laghman, Khost, Daikundi, Kandahar, Pakteka and Bamiyan; and (v) acquisition of vehicles, digital cameras, multimedia projectors, and GPS devices for the central and regional offices of MEW.

Under Component D further expansion of hydro-meteorological facilities including thirty cableways for river flow measurements and six silt measurement laboratories and other measuring equipments such as current meters, echo sounders and accessories such as motor boats were provided for.

1.7 Other significant changes

16. The Bank approved restructuring of the project in October 2006. This covered the refinement of the original PDO and Key performance Indicators, revision of project outputs, cancellation of the original component B (rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological system), and reallocation of funds allotted for this component among the other three remaining components, mainly for Component A (rehabilitation of irrigation schemes). The reasons for dropping

Component B were given as (i) protracted delays in procurement; (ii) overly ambitious design of the component to the then existing capacity in MEW and prevailing conditions in Afghanistan;

and (iii) shortage of funds for emergency rehabilitation works, which were the highest priority of the government. At this restructuring, the targets for Component A were revised from 1100 small, 160 medium and 20 large schemes to 750 medium and lesser and 10 large schemes.

17. The original project cost estimate was approximately US$ 75 million. It was expected to be financed by an IDA Credit of US$ 40 million and an ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust

Fund) Grant of US$ 35 million. IDA provided the US$ 40 million Credit through Cr. 3845-AF but the ARTF grant financing was not made available. An additional financing of US$ 25 million in the form of an IDA Grant was approved in April 2007 to cover the full scope of the project and the Credit closing date was extended by one year to September 30, 2008. At this time, considering the importance of hydro-meteorological data for the development and management of water resources in Afghanistan, the hydro-meteorological component (which was dropped in the restructuring exercise of 2006), was reinstated in the project as Component D with a simplified design suitable for Afghanistan’s security conditions and skill levels.

18. Given the substantial requirements for rehabilitation of irrigation schemes and the reported satisfactory performance of EIRP, a second additional financing was approved in the amount of US$ 28 million in June 2008 with an extension of Credit/Grant closing date by another two and a half years to March 31, 2011.The PDO, components, arrangements for implementation, procurement, financial management and disbursements remained unchanged except for an increase in the targets for medium and lesser as well as large schemes under Component A.

19. In 2007, when the Government requested additional financing, it had envisaged a program for about US$ 50 million. Since funds were not available only US$ 28 million could be provided. However, in 2009, another IDA Grant for US$ 33.5 million was approved to scale up activities considering the additional financing as the fastest means of project processing in order not to lose the momentum generated under EIRP while a subsequent follow-on project preparation was getting under way. The PDO, components, arrangements for implementation, procurement, financial management and disbursements as well as the Credit closing date remained unchanged. The increase in scope of activities under Components A, C and D were as described in paragraph 17 above.

20. In 2011, the Credit closing date was extended to December 31, 2011 to allow more time for completion of rehabilitation work on already awarded contracts that were delayed among other reasons due to security issues.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

21. This project was originally approved for a three year period as an emergency project to assist the then Transitional Government of Afghanistan to immediately address issues related to dilapidated irrigation infrastructure and to initiate much needed capacity building in the country.

The project objective as defined originally focusing on providing reliable and equitable water supply to the beneficiary farmers through rehabilitation of dilapidated irrigation infrastructure was sound and appropriate for the country’s circumstances and immediate development needs.

The project was based on a sound analysis of the situation regarding irrigation infrastructure and the need to rehabilitate the hydro-met system which was functioning well until 1980 until destroyed by years of conflict and neglect. Since the irrigation schemes numbering in thousands were to be rehabilitated, the project design clearly specified selection criteria for each scheme, including the requirement for beneficiary participation and contribution. Issues related to mine risks and negative attributes were also discussed and the ways to handle these were clearly laid out. Detailed social and environmental framework templates were developed for use by the designers. The preparation team also wrote detailed terms of reference for the technical assistance needed in each discipline for the successful implementation of the project.

22. Assessment of Project Design: The project components cover the requirements of the project development objective. They allowed for immediate rehabilitation of schemes, preparation of feasibility studies for large-scale investments which would take some time to materialize, re-establishment of the hydro-met service together with replacement of existing non-functioning hydrological stations with modern up-to-date gauges and allocation of resources to build the capacity of the Ministry. Since Afghanistan had a well-functioning hydrological network, no detailed network design was necessary and the preparation team wisely adopted the locations of the existing stations to replace them with modern stations using technologies available in 2003. Recognition of the importance of reliable up-to-date hydrological information was one of the strong features of preparation. The rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure was based on community requests for immediate assistance and was focused on specific repairs in existing traditional irrigation systems. Recognizing the post-conflict situation and the reluctance of internationally recognized firms to work in the country at that time, the Bank and the Borrower opted to sole source the specialized agency of the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO) to provide the requisite technical assistance. The contribution from the technical assistance team was the key factor in the successful implementation of component A. In the execution of other components this arrangement has worked reasonably well although the technical assistance services provided in these areas could have been better as discussed in later sections.

23. Government Commitment: The transitional government in place at the time of project approval as well as the government that followed fully supported the project concept and the design. There were, however, some weaknesses during implementation, particularly with respect to the rehabilitation of hydro-met stations and establishment of hydrological services of

Afghanistan.

24. Risks identified at appraisal: The likely risks identified at approval were related to (i) weak institutional capacity; (ii) security situation in the country; (iii) land mines; (iv) misallocation, misuse or inefficient use of funds; and (v) riparian issues. These risks did indeed materialize and the ones related to riparian issues was handled through rehabilitation of existing infrastructure in line with Bank policies, and the risk related to misuse or misallocation of funds was handled through close monitoring by the international financial management specialist of the technical assistance team. Schemes were rehabilitated only in the areas cleared and approved by the UN mine clearance force. The other two risks did have an adverse impact on project implementation and monitoring and evaluation activities. These risks could not be avoided and it was correct to proceed with the investment recognizing the existence of these risks.

25. The quality at entry was not measured by the Quality Assurance Group but the ICR mission rates the Quality at Entry (QAE) based on the above review summary as Satisfactory.

26. Additional Financing was provided in three tranches. The first tranche was to replace the

ARTF grant which was not forthcoming and was approved in March 2007 and the mission is of the view that it was correct to proceed with the emergency approach for rehabilitation of infrastructure. However, the subsequent tranches approved in June 2008 and May 2009 should have taken a more holistic view of rehabilitation and switched from emergency operation to a development operation. Since these were done during implementation, the above rating for QAE does not cover these additional tranches.

2.2 Implementation

27. Factors outside the control of Government and the Implementing Agency: When the project was approved, the overall security situation in the country was improving and was expected to stabilize. However, during the implementation period the security situation worsened which resulted in implementation delays and limitation of access to project sites. In spite of this, the project has managed to achieve most of its revised (increase from 280,000 ha to 571,000 ha through three tranches of additional financing) targets in irrigation rehabilitation.

28. Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Staffing of the Ministry was under the control of the Government. The Ministry did experience difficulty in attracting and then sustaining well-qualified staff due to the dearth of such persons in Afghanistan. However, the ICR mission has concluded that the Ministry management could have paid much greater attention and should have taken required actions in (i) employing staff and encouraging the establishment of an independent Monitoring and Evaluation Unit as required by the project; and

(ii) developing a hydro-meteorological service which would be the backbone of further water resources developments in the country. There were also delays in procurement of civil works and goods due to lack of adequate well-qualified staff which could have been trained by the project technical assistance program. Similarly the Ministry did not provide qualified full-time staff to be trained in financial management aspects by the international financial management specialist of the technical assistance provider.

29. The Project Co-ordination Unit (PCU) was established under this investment to manage and implement the project with support from the technical assistance team provided through the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. As such they were learning project management and implementation in the initial stages of the project. The staff of

PCU, both in the central office in Kabul and the regional offices in Kabul, Bamiyan, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar, Kunduz and Jalalbad have learnt substantially from this investment. However, the

PCU could have strongly requested the technical assistance provider to provide world class training as envisaged in the third tranche of additional financing to improve their technical knowledge in the preparation of rehabilitation plans and designs as well as financial management and procurement skills. There were procurement delays even in the last three years of the project which could have been avoided. Similarly, the hydro-met component could have been better handled by the PCU ensuring collaboration with the Water Management Department. In these areas, improvements have happened at the closing time of the project.

30. Implementation Efficiency: The rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure has been carried out reasonably efficiently. This component has been a priority of the Government. There are some areas with respect to technical aspects of the designs, procurement and contract management which could have been done better and more efficiently. The rehabilitation of hydro-meteorological network and associated hydrological services of Afghanistan was not carried out efficiently. The mission attributes this to lack of serious commitment on the part of the Ministry and lack of cooperation between PCU and WMD. Similarly capacity building efforts have not been up to the mark due to deficiencies in the technical assistance provider as well as lack of due diligence from the Ministry. The technical assistance team could have relied much more on the technical expertise available at its headquarters in Rome, particularly for remote sensing and GIS applications in irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation and monitoring and evaluation efforts. It could have also derived much more technical support from its regional office in Bangkok.

31. Implementation Delays: There were delays at the start-up of the project. A major factor affecting implementation throughout the project period has been the generally unfavorable operating environment in the country. This resulted in the inability of the technical assistance provider to attract and retain well-qualified subject matter specialists in some disciplines and the inability of MEW to effectively mobilize national staff. In the early years of project implementation, project proposals were prepared by the technical assistance team. When this responsibility was gradually shifted to national staff as required in the project design, the rate and quality of project proposals preparation suffered. In addition, there were delays in procurement due to misunderstanding of Bank procurement guidelines by both the Borrower and the

Contractors and lack of capacity for contract management in the PCU as well as the technical assistance team. Hence rehabilitation of some of the larger schemes was delayed. The rehabilitation of even the simplified hydro-meteorological network has been substantially delayed and only 54% of the works have been completed at the time of Credit/Grant closing.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

32. Design: A detailed monitoring and evaluation framework was outlined in the Technical

Annex (Appendix 10) which is the parent document for the entire investment. A project monitoring and evaluation system is provided in Table 2 of the Technical Annex. This captures well the parameters to be measured to evaluate achievements against each component leading to an evaluation of the achievement of the PDO. The design also incorporated a detailed terms of reference for a monitoring and evaluation consultancy. A consulting firm or independent organization was to be recruited to carry out monitoring and evaluation of project impacts. The main objectives were to evaluate the success in meeting the project objectives, and to assess its physical, agricultural, social, financial/fiscal, and economic impact. The M&E framework provided for independent and continuous feedback to the implementing entities on the project’s performance and the impact of its various components so that corrective action or fine tuning could be undertaken in a timely manner.

33. An international consulting firm was recruited to carry out the M&E activities in 2006 after substantial delays. The firm worked through 2007 and set up a foundation and baseline for

M&E activities in the Ministry. At the end of 2007, the contract was terminated and an individual international expert was recruited by the Ministry to continue the M&E activities. An organization chart with job descriptions was prepared at this time but was not followed up properly by MEW and an inadequate unit was set up. The M&E functions specific to the project were then assigned to the technical assistance team.

34. Implementation: From 2008 until Credit/Grant closure, the international M&E specialist of the technical assistance team located full-time in Kabul worked together with national staff on monitoring and evaluation. Since the revised key performance indicators after the restructuring exercise in 2006 were restricted to increase in irrigated area and agricultural productivity, the

M&E focused on these aspects by conducting field surveys at the end of each crop season. M&E surveys and analyses covered Component A only and the outputs/outcomes of the other three components were either not covered or not covered systematically. Given the insecure operating environment in the country the M&E implementation could have benefitted substantially with the use of advanced technologies available.

35. Utilization: The M&E results were to be used in adjusting the implementation of the project and also to fill in data gaps identified during the monitoring. The mission held detailed discussions with the International M&E specialist as well as project management and based on the information derived from these discussions has concluded that M&E results were not utilized in implementation course correction as required. Hence the project implementation did not learn from the M&E activities and in turn did not guide further M&E activities.

36. Overall, the M&E performance of the project is rated as moderately unsatisfactory

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

37. The project had a “B” environment category and “S2” safeguards classification. No significant adverse environmental or social impacts occur during the project life. The project has followed the guidelines of ESMF developed in the Technical Annex in 2003, and applied for both social and environmental screening of subprojects in the planning/design and implementation stages. Furthermore, EMPs for larger schemes were developed and shared with the Bank.

Following the social and environmental screening, limited environmental and social assessments were carried out for some medium irrigation schemes which were anticipated to have some limited adverse impact. Regarding land requirements, government land has been used for building meteorological stations, offices for the provincial WMDs as well as establishment of nursery for

Nahr-e-Lashkari canal green belt. Where small strips of land along the right of way of canals and rivers were required for hydrological stations, these were contributed by community or through individual voluntary donation. Such practices are very common in Afghanistan and socially accepted when impact is insignificant; however documentation of procedures followed have not been done consistently. In one case only, construction work on sub-project was stopped following a complaint from an individual land owner: construction of Panjsher Water Management

Department office building was dropped when MEW was unable to find a solution satisfactory to the private owner of the land in question.

38. During project implementation a safeguard focal point was placed within M&E unit to oversee the implementation of ESMF. The project has provided training on ESMF to relevant staff and project engineers from different regions who were also assigned to work with an international consultant in developing Limited Environmental Assessments (LEAs). Hence some capacity building of MEW/PCU on social and environmental safeguard related to irrigation rehabilitation and development has taken place.

39. Since most of the rivers in Afghanistan, on which the sub-projects supported under the project were located, are international waterways Bank’s policy OP 7.50 was triggered. However, the sub-projects were emergency rehabilitation of existing infrastructure which did not involve works and activities that would exceed the original scheme, change its nature, or so alter or expand its scope and extent making it appear a new or different scheme. The task team had determined that the rehabilitation works did not adversely change the quantity and quality of water flowing to the other riparians and were also not affected adversely by the other riparians’ water use. Accordingly as provided for under OP 7.50 paragraph 7, a waiver was sought from the notification requirements and was approved by the Regional Vice President.

40. Overall, the safeguard performance of the project is rated as moderately satisfactory.

Procurement

41. The project was implemented by the technical assistance of FAO. FAO provided a competent international procurement specialist (IPS) throughout the project implementation.

Besides input from IPS there were national procurement officers working in the FAO/PCU team as well. The National officers were working under the guidance of the IPS. The IPS was able to develop the capacity of procurement staff in MEW to a limited extent.

42. During project implementation there were certain contract packages which were handled in the regional offices and due to weak capacity in the regional offices there were several deviations found during Post Procurement Review (PPR).

43. Delay in approval of the TOR, technical specification, bill of quantities was another issue which impacted negatively on the procurement process throughout implementation.

44. The project had problems also due to poor contract management. Majority of the contracts were not completed within initial implementation period and there were considerable delays in the contract implementation. The lack of capacity in contract management resulted also in the PCU requesting IDA for no objection of contract extensions on post- facto basis.

45. There were certain issues on the technical quality of the procurement process. For instance the client prepared an unrealistic BOQ for Nahir Lashkari Large scheme and the contractor did the construction work beyond the BOQ and due to inadequate supervision by the project staff/technical assistance provider there was considerable variation and the project had to request the Bank for no objection on post-facto basis.

46. Another procurement issue was related to the rehabilitation of WAPICA building. The project team issued bidding document without proper design and BOQ which resulted in huge contract amendment.

47. Overall, the procurement performance of the project is rated as moderately satisfactory.

Financial Management

48. The project which comprised IDA 3845, H284, H398 and H498 operated under the steadily improving Project Financial Management reforms under implementation by the

Government of Afghanistan with the World Bank assistance. Under these reforms proper records of grants received and disbursements through the special accounts were maintained by the

Ministry of Finance, Special Disbursement Unit (SDU) which was initially manual and later migrated to Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS). The funds flow to the project was timely.

49. Proper records of eligible expenditure for various components and activities were maintained by the implementing agency – Ministry of Energy and Water through a dedicated project coordination unit (PCU). The internal controls were adequate and the project introduced internal audit towards the end of the project. The internal audit arrangements will roll over to all

MEW implemented projects. Regular IUFRs in the agreed format were submitted during the life of the project.

50. Annual audited financial statements were submitted regularly though there were some delays in the initial years. The audit opinion of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan was qualified for the initial three years but thereafter the audit opinion was unqualified (clean). Audit observations were promptly resolved.

51. The financial management capacity strengthened during the course of the implementation of the project. The Bank’s FM unit participated in all supervision missions and provided guidance and hand holding support to strengthen the FM arrangements. The project closed with a

‘Satisfactory’ FM supervision rating.

52. The project’s FM performance is Satisfactory.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

53. A follow-on operation titled Irrigation Restoration and Development Project (IRDP) has been approved by the Board and is currently under way. The IRDP with an estimated cost of about US$ 148.7 million became effective on 15 June 2011. The project duration is about 6.5 years. IDA would finance about US$ 97.8 million and the remaining amount would be covered by ARTF (US$ 48.4 million) and Government of Afghanistan (US$ 2.5 million). IRDP follows in general the approach of the EIRP but with an addition of a small dams component. There would be continued technical and managerial support to the PCU by the EIRP technical assistance team which has been asked to continue with the assignment. If the implementation lessons learned and reported in this ICR are followed, the sustainability of investments made in capacity building is likely. In the follow-on project, training should continue to be provided to the community organizations and the Mirabs of schemes rehabilitated under the EIRP as well. Given that several of the rehabilitation interventions are on streams with substantial bedloads, the operation and maintenance of structures built across or on the banks of these streams would require further technical and financial assistance to be provided to the communities to ensure sustainability. The mission found that some of the structures rehabilitated under the project were already damaged by flood flows carrying significant bed and suspended loads. Other smaller structures would be maintained by the communities themselves, particularly due to satisfactory training provided to them in operations and maintenance by the project. The mission is optimistic that the communities have the ability to operate and maintain the smaller structures.

54. The sustainability of the interventions also depends upon the capacity of the staff of the

Water Management Department (WMD) of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) both at the central and regional levels. Since EIRP has not involved these officers in the rehabilitation program, this would require training of these officers in the follow-on project. MEW should continue to maintain adequate skilled staff strength in the WMD offices and provide them with adequate resources such as computers and accessories, vehicles, allowances etc. (which could be reimbursed on a declining scale through the IRDP).

55. The build-up of institutional capacity, both in the MEW and the PCU would continue under the IRDP as specific substantial provisions have been made in that project. The Bank has made the correct decision to proceed with the follow-on project without gaps, as this would help in maintaining the momentum currently being generated in capacity building of staff.

56. Many of the problems encountered in the implementation of the hydro-met component in

EIRP such as (i) the role of the PCU in the procurement and installation of gauging stations; (ii) role of WMD in taking over responsibility of operation and maintenance of these stations; and

(iii) operationalization of the hydro-met services are being sorted out in the follow-on IRDP.

MEW is now aware of the importance of vetted hydrological and meteorological data in the preparation of new water resources developments. The Bank-supported AWARD project has also brought out the requirements of good hydrological analyses in the preparation of a Bankable investment portfolio. These aspects should be nurtured and fully developed in the follow-on

IRDP.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

57. The objectives, design and implementation are just as relevant to current country and global priorities and Bank assistance strategy as they were at appraisal. The overall rationale of supporting investments in improving irrigated agriculture is in line with the strategy articulated in the National Development Framework of 2002 as well as the Afghanistan National Development

Strategy (ANDS) developed in 2008. The development and management of water resources has been accorded high priority in the ANDS. Given these the ICR mission assessment is the operation is highly relevant to the needs and priorities of the sector. The design of the project was in line with these highly relevant objectives and the implementation arrangements were also consistent with the design.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives:

58. The achievement of project development objective has been assessed by the ICR mission using the key performance indicators provided in the Technical Annex of the original Credit.

59. Irrigation Rehabilitation: The final targets set after the third additional financing in May

2009 for rehabilitation of 863 medium and lesser schemes and 22 large schemes were almost met with some delays. 710 medium and lesser schemes and 19 large schemes have been completed.

About 38 schemes had to be abandoned during construction due primarily to substantial security issues such as killing or kidnapping of project and contractor staff by insurgents. There has been an increase in the net irrigated area by about 25%.