J_A_N32205-15-R-1006_Combined_USNS_John_Lenthall__FY15_ROH_(13_Mar_15)_REV_3_FBO.pdf

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND NORFOLK

SP64 471 EAST C STREET

NORFOLK, VA 23511-2419

J&A No. N32205-15-R-1006

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity: Department of the Navy, Military Sealift Command (MSC) - Norfolk.

2. Description of the Action Being Approved: This is a brand name justification for work to be provided for the ROH of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189) under RFP N32205-15-R-1006. This Justification is covering only the portion of the acquisition which an OEM authorized facility/Manufacturer/Representative is required and the approval level requirements will then only apply to that portion.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: MSC Norfolk requires Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) authorized technical field service representatives and OEM parts to accomplish the requirements of Work Items WI 201, 202, 203, 301, 305, 401, 402, 403,404, 405, 501, 504, 505, 506, 511, 517, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 905, 909, 910, and 911 for 55 day ROH repair availability, the estimated dollar value of the twenty-five (25) Work Items estimated at $1,183,083.00 which will be funded utilizing FY 15 Operations & Maintenance funds.

4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition: 10 U.S.C 2304 (c)(1), Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements, as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a).

5. Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Authority:

a. WI 201, Starboard Main Engine 12,000 Hours Overhaul

There are only two licensed U.S. authorized distributors and service centers, Fairbanks Morse Engines (FME) under licensing agreement, and Motor Services Hugo Stamp (MSHS) as a MAN Diesel SA authorized distributor and service center. Only FME and MSHS are capable of meeting the stringent Quality Assurance requirements and are certified by the OEM for same. The engineering construction, drawing and technical characteristics for the manufacturer of parts for these propulsion engines are proprietary to MAN diesel SAS-SEMT Pielstick.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the main engines as critical equipment. Failure of one main engine will force the ship to reduce speed. The loss of two main engines puts the ship in a C-4 status, thus becoming unable to perform it primary mission of providing underway replenishment services to the fleet. The reduction in speed can also pose a hazard to the crew, due to limited ship maneuverability. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the main engines are critical to the safe operations of the John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

b. WI 202, Main Engine Turbo Charger Overhauls

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the main engine turbochargers is ABB for the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189). OEM parts are required for all critical equipment onboard T AO class ships. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the main engine turbochargers is critical to the safe operation of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189). Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and technical data/drawings from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations.

This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the main engines as critical equipment. Failure of the main engines would restrict the ship to port and could not able to perform its required mission. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the main engines is critical to the safe operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

c. WI 203 Stbd Main Clutch and coupling Overhaul

The Original Equipment Manufacture of the Clutch, Coupling, and GFL is Eaton with the approval from Geislinger to Manufacture the GFL. There are two (2) know approved sources Eaton and Nolnacs in the United States. The Clutch and coupling is complex in design and require OEM technical representation to dissemble and refurbish. If any part of the Clutch system was to fail it could be catastrophic it could cause injury to personal and damage to ship's equipment. If the clutch was to be inoperable it would cause the ship to only have one (1) propeller which limits the ship's ability to maneuver in and out of port and next to ships during UNREPS. The clutch and components are classed by Safety Management System (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL as critical Equipment.

d. WI 301, Main Circuit Breaker Maintenance

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s main circuit breakers. Authorized repair facilities are available throughout the US and around the world to provide service to their equipment.

Vendor is required to provide tech support to oversee overhaul on board during the upcoming ROH.

CANAM is the only proven authorized service representative who can perform this work on site.

e. WI 305 Cargo Console Installation Supervision and Termination

The Cargo Console is Designed and Engineered by Electronic Marine Systems. The ABS approved drawings and technical documents are owned by Electronic Marine Systems. Marine Systems has installed this unit on the other sister vessel such as the USNS Big Horn TAO-198 USNS Kanawha T-AO-196, USNS Laramie TAO -203, and ETC. Electronic Marine System are The OEM for the installation and commissioning of the Cargo Console.

f. WI 401, Radar ECDIS Maintenance Annual (USCG & ABS)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Radar is FURUNO and the ECDIS is TRANSAS. FURUNO and TRANSAS have numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with a certificate of approved training for the FURUNO Radars and TRANSAS units that are installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company. Furuno Representatives have access to privy data such drawings, software, and Parts, due to consent changing IMO rules these items are needed to keep the Radars and ECDIS Systems in compliance with Class and regulatory bodies.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the radar as critical equipment. Loss of RADAR would essentially leave the vessel blinded during any condition that impairs the human visual or over the horizon detection of obstacles / threats. Without the RADAR systems fully operational this would leave the vessel in a no sail situation. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the radar ECDIS is critical to the safe operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189)

g. WI 402, NAVIGAT X Gyro Systems Preventative Maintenance

The OEM for the equipment is Sperry Marine. A Sperry qualified rep for servicing, parts and repairs is required to certify and ensure proper operation and bearing (heading accuracy). This is the primary electronic means available for determining ships heading and supplies this information to multiple equipment on the bridge and must be certified accurate and available for the vessel during navigation for safe passage. This is a Coast Guard requirement. Proper refurbishment and mmaintenance of the Gyro Compass is critical to the safe operation of the USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189) Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment, and the Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is required by ABS and USCG. Service of the GMDSS must be accomplished by USCG/ABS Approved and OEM Trained vendors. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the GMDSS is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189).

h. WI 403, GMDSS Recertification Annual l (USCG & ABS)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is FURUNO Japan LTD., Sailor, Thrane and Thrane. FURUNO has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with a certificate of approved training for the FURUNO FS-5000 GMDSS Console unit that is installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer authorized vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment, and the Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is required by ABS and USCG. This equipment provides several means of communication and distress signaling including Search And Rescue Transponders (SARTs) and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB). Service of the GMDSS must be accomplished by USCG/ABS Approved and OEM Trained vendors. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the GMDSS is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS

JOHN LENTHALL (T- AO 189).

i. WI 404, SVDR Rectification Annual (USCG & ABS)

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s Simplified Voice Data Recorded (SVDR) is NETWAVE formerly RUTTER. Vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training for the SVDR unit that is installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Navigational Equipment as critical equipment, and the SVDR is part of the vessel’s Safety Radio Certificate, as required by ABS.

The SVDR(Black Box) is a USCG and ABS required system that is integrated into the Radar and

ECDIS systems to records ship movements. Service of the SVDR must be accomplished by USCG/ABS Approved and OEM Trained vendors. If inoperable the ship cannot sail without proper authorization or waivers. Proper refurbishment and maintenance of the SVDR is critical to the safe navigation and operations of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189).

j. WI 405, Magnetic Compass Annual

The OEM is Baker Lyman & Company who owns all rights to design specifications, technical documentation, engineering documentation, drawings and parts for said equipment. To ensure proper certification is performed in accordance with the manufacturer. This is the only non-electronic means available for determining ships heading and must be certified accurate and available for the vessel during navigation for safe passage. This is a Coast Guard requirement.

k. WI 501 STBD PTO Clutch and Coupling Overhaul

The Original Equipment Manufacture of the PTO Clutch, Coupling, is Eaton with the approval from Geislinger to Manufacture the GFL. There are two (2) know approved sources Eaton and Nolnacs which both have proprietary rights to all technical documentation and parts. The Clutch and coupling is complex in design and require OEM technical representation to dissemble and refurbish. If any part of the Clutch system was to fail it could be catastrophic it could cause injury to personal and damage to ship's equipment. If the clutch was to be inoperable it would cause the ship to only have one (1) backup generator which limits the ship's available power for operating machinery to maneuver in and out of port and next to ships during UNREPS. The clutch and components are classed by Safety Management System (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL as critical Equipment.

l. WI 504 Engine Room Oily Water Separator Replacement (ABS)

The oily water separator is required per ABS and USCG to be installed and operated in accordance with MARPOL Annex I MEP 107. It is the requirement of MSC to maintain this equipment in accordance with regulatory requirements so that the ship will get an IOPP Statement of Fact. It is the requirement of the Class and Regulatory that we have only an OEM Representative Install and maintain, and calibrate this Equipment.

m. WI 505 Clayton Boiler Replacement

The OEM for the ship’s Auxiliary Boilers is Clayton Industries. Proper maintenance and refurbishment is required annually for ABS /USG inspections and is critical to the safe operation of the USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189). Clayton Industries provides authorized service, parts and technical data/drawings as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This ensures equipment reliability, crew safety and proper operation of the Systems, precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

n. WI 506 Replace Start Air Compressor

The Start Air compressors for the Main Engines and SSDG's were original manufactured by Hamworthy Engineering LTD. The company was than purchased by Hatlapa Marine Equipment Ltd. and then has been purchased by Macgregor. Currently Macgregor owns all Engineering documentation, drawings and right to the Hamworthy Start Air Compressors.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-ALL lists the main engines and any item that supports main propulsions as critical equipment.

o. WI 511, Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor (Bristol Babcock)

The OEM for the equipment is Bristol Babcock. USCG/ABS Annual regulatory recertification requires that an authorized Tech Rep must to perform annual calibration & recertification of the Cargo Control Oil Content Monitor. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

p. WI 517, Annual Incinerator Service

The OEM for the ship’s incinerator is Scandinavian Boiler Service. Proper maintenance and refurbishment is required annually for ABS /USG inspections and is critical to the safe operation of the USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189). Scandinavian Boiler Service provides authorized service, parts and technical data/drawings as required by USCG and ABS regulations. This ensures equipment reliability, crew safety and proper operation of the Systems, precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

q. WI-604, Annual, Lifeboats Inspections & Service (ABS)

Schat Hardening is the OEM for the Four (4) Life Boats; Schat Hardening owns all rights to design documentation, engineering documentation, technical documentation, and Parts. Life Boats are Categorized on the Per the SMS Form 10.6-002-01-A) T-AO critical Equipment list as Critical Equipment. If one (1) Life Boat is inoperable the ship is issued an 835 no sail from USCG and not and a C-4 Casrep would be issued and the ship would not be allowed to sail, this in turn impacts the mission.

r. WI 606 Port RHIB Davit Annual Servicing(ABS)

Allied Marine Services is the OEM for the Port RHIB Davit all rights to design, engineering, technical, and drawings are owned by them. All parts are only available through them. The RHIB Boat and support are categorized on the Per the SMS Form 10.6-002-01-A) T-AO critical Equipment list as Critical equipment. If the RHIB boat which is a lifesaving piece of equipment could not be launched and recovered this would be a C-4 CASREP and USCG would issue an 835 no sail impacting the ship's mission.

s. WI 607, Annual SCBA Compressor Servicing

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the vessel’s SCBA Compressor and Refill Station is MAKO. MAKO has numerous authorized vendors to provide service to their equipment. Vendor is required to provide documentation with Certificate of Approved training for the MAKO Model No. 9400E3 Compressor and Model No. M3100 Refill Station unit that is installed. Factory authorized suppliers provide parts and proprietary technical data/drawings only available from the original manufacturer Authorized Vendors. This maintains all OEM warranties, ensures equipment reliability, and crew safety therefore precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company.

Safety Management Systems (SMS) number 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment. The vessel’s SCBA Compressor and Refill Station is required to refill expended SCBA bottles used when fighting a shipboard fire or addressing a HAZMAT situation. Failure of the SCBA Compressor and Refill Station will severely reduce the Ship’s Force capability control/extinguish a fire and save the vessel from further damage.

t. 608 Annual, SCBA Equipment, Inspections (ABS)

Interspiro is the OEM for the SCBA Mask and Bottles. Interspiro owns all Technical, engineering, design documentation and parts. Interspiro owns all SOLAS Approval documentation, and testing perimeters per ABS and USCG only an approved OEM technical representative that has been trained and approved by them may inspect, test and repair the SCBA Mask and Bottles. Per Safe Management

Systems (SMS) Procedure NR. 10.6-002-01-AO lists the Damage Control Equipment as critical equipment.

u. 905 Cathelco Marine Growth Inhibitor

The Cathelco system is used to kill marine growth and organisms in the saltwater cooling system.

The system requires the copper and iron anodes to be replaced ever dry-docking. The system is classed by ABS and requires that the OEM or OEM representative to maintain the system. The OEM and owns all rights to technical, engineering, design documentation and Parts. The OEM technical Representative shall have privy to all documentation and parts that the OEM Owns.

v. 909 CRP Propeller Maintenance

Rolls Royce Marine North America (RRMNA) (Formerly Bird –Johnson Company) is the OEM whom engineered, designed, built the Controllable Reversible Pitch (CRP) Propeller System and is the only OEM who maintains license and all proprietary rights for the CRP system.

The CRP System is in accordance with MSC International Safety Management System Procedure 10.6.-002 the CRP systems are critical ship equipment. These systems are tied into main propulsion and loss of either one of these systems degrades the maneuverable of the vessel.

w. 910 Stern Tube Seal Maintenance

In accordance with the MSC International Safety Management System procedure 10.6-002-AO, the stern tube seals on the replenishment oilers are categorized as critical ship equipment.

Critical Ship Equipment is defined as equipment and systems that are necessary to sustain the proper operation and mission capability of the ship. Failure of these equipment and systems would pose a hazard to the ship, its crew, or the environment. This technical risk can be broken down into four subparts: potential for disruption to the ship’s mission support operating schedule; potential for increased costs for emergency dry docking events; potential for degradation in performance through a partial or complete failure of the component; potential to cause harm to the crew or the environment.

The components of the T-AO stern tube seal system constitute critical ship equipment because failure of the stern tube seal system poses a hazard to the ship, the crew and the environment.

Stern tube seals are installed on either end of the propulsion shaft stern tube, which is filled with oil to lubricate the installed stern tube bearings. The seals keep the lubricating oil in and sea water out of the stern tube. For the T-AO class stern tube seals, a seal system failure could cause catastrophic harm to the environment and international embarrassment through the leakage of up to 3400 gallons of oil per stern tube into the sea. An oil spill from the propulsion shaft stern tubes would also potentially violate environmental laws such as the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

x. 911 Cathodic Protection System Maintenance

The Cathodic Protection System protects the hull from Marine Growth. The OEM for the system is Siemens Water Technologies. Only approved authorized Representatives have access to proprietary data such as Engineering Technical Manuals and Drawings. Only approved OEM Representatives can procure needed parts.

6. Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable: The Government intends to post a synopsis and a Request for Proposal (RFP) at the Government Point of Entry, FedBizOpps website, with the intent of awarding a firm-fixed-price contract to the lowest price offeror. Any prospective contractor will be required to use the OEM or OEM authorized vendor(s) as a subcontractor to perform the work in the related WIs.

7. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost: The Contracting Officer will determine the anticipated cost to the Government of the supplies/services covered by this J&A will be fair and reasonable in accordance with FAR Part 15.

8. Actions to Removed Barriers to Future Competition. For reasons set forth in Paragraph 5, MSC has no plans at this time to allow prime contractors to solicit these requirements competitively, other than synopsizing the requirements. If another potential source emerges, MSC Norfolk will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible.

Services identified in paragraphs 5.a thru 5.x are specifically intended to be accomplished by OEM, authorized or former OEM tech reps to comply with US Coast Guard / ABS Regulatory requirements, manufacturer warranty and/or the MSC Safety Management System (SMS) Procedure 10.6-002-AO - Identification of Critical Equipment for addressing and identifying Ships Critical Equipment Risk Levels.

For all other work items there are no restrictions limiting use of OEM or authorized service reps or technicians.

CERTIFICATION AND APPROVALS

Technical/Requirements Cognizance:

I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance which are included in this Justification and its supporting acquisition planning documents, except as noted herein are complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Ray E. Coleman (757) 443-0886 12 March 2015 Signature Name (Printed) Phone No. Date

Legal Sufficiency Review:

I have reviewed this justification and it is deemed to be legally sufficient.

Contracting Officer Certification:

I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Competition Advocate Approval:

Upon the basis of the above justification, I hereby approve as Competition Advocate, the solicitation of the proposed procurement(s) described herein using other than full and open competition.