Atch 14 -(U) SCG ID 06-089 USMC_TC3 SYSTEMS (FOUO).pdf

SCG ID# 06-089

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USMC Tactical Command, Control, Communications (C3) Systems

Security Classification Guide

MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND

09 APRIL 2020

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D. Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative or Operational Use, 9 April 2020. Other requests shall be referred to Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command (PfM CES), 2200 Lester Street, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5013.

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SECTION 1 – IDENTIFYING DATA

ID: 06-089

SU: USMC Tactical Command, Control, Communications (C3) Systems PR: MARCORSYSCOM (PfM CES)

CA: COMMARCORSYSCOM

OD: 20200409

CD: 20200409

RD: 20240409

SECTION 2 – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Purpose. To provide instructions and guidance on the classification of hardware, software, and other system information that comprises the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Tactical Command, Control, Communications (C3) Systems (USMC TC3 Systems) using an unclassified identification of the effort.

This Security Classification Guide (SCG) applies to those USMC TC3 Systems under the technical cognizance of Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Portfolio Manager Command Element Systems (PfM CES). Systems under the cognizance of MARCORSYSCOM PfM Supporting Establishment Systems (SES) are excluded. It is incumbent upon individual program offices to determine how this SCG applies to their system. This determination should be made in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff (AC/S G-2) Security Classification Management Office and documented in a “memorandum for the record” and then identified within each individual systems Program Protection Plan (PPP).

2. Authority. This guide is issued under authority of SECNAVINST 5510.36B. Classification of information involved in the USMC TC3 Systems is governed by and is in accordance with E.O. 13526.

This guide constitutes authority and shall be cited as the basis for classification, downgrading, or declassification of information and material involved in the USMC TC3 Systems.

Changes in classification required by application of this guide shall be made immediately. Information identified in this guide for protection as classified information is classified by Commander, MARCORSYSCOM.

3. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). This guide is issued by the PR identified in section 1 above, and all inquiries concerning content and interpretation, as well as any recommendations for changes, should be addressed to:

COMMANDER COMMANDER

MARCORSYSCOM and MARCORSYSCOM ATTN: AC/S G-2 SECURITY ATTN: PfM CES

2200 LESTER STREET 2200 LESTER STREET

QUANTICO, VA 22134-6050 QUANTICO, VA 22134-6050

Phone: (703) 432-3142/3143 Phone: (703) 432-9825/9881

4. Classification Challenges. If at any time, any of the security classification guidance contained herein is challenged, challenges should include sufficient description to permit identification of the specific information under challenge with reasonable effort. Challenges should include detailed justification outlining why the information is improperly or unnecessarily classified. Pending a final decision, handle and protect the information at its current classification level or at the recommended change level, whichever is higher until a final decision is made on the challenge by the appropriate authority. Classification challenges should be addressed to the

OPR.

5. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination. Authorized recipients of this guide may reproduce, extract, and disseminate the contents of this guide, as necessary, for application by specified groups involved in the USMC TC3 Systems, including industrial activities. Copies of separate guides issued to operating activities in application of this guide shall be sent to the OPR.

6. Public Release. The fact that this guide shows certain details of information to be unclassified, including controlled unclassified information, does not allow automatic public release of this information. Department of Defense (DoD) information requested by the media or members of the public or proposed for release to the public by DoD civilians or military personnel or their contractors shall be processed in accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01, DoD Directive 5230.09, DoD Instruction 5230.29, DoDM 5400.07, and SECNAVINST 5510.36B, as applicable.

Proposed public disclosures of unclassified information regarding the USMC TC3 Systems shall be processed through MARCORSYSCOM Office of Public Affairs and Communication (OPAC), Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Security (AC/S G-2), and PfM CES prior to publication via the Public Release Review SharePoint site.

7. Foreign Disclosure. Any disclosure to foreign officials of information classified by this guide shall be in accordance with the procedures set forth in SECNAVINST 5510.34B “Disclosure of Classified Military Information and Controlled Unclassified Information to Foreign Governments, International Organizations, and Foreign Representatives” of March 2019 and SECNAV M-5510.1, “Department of the Navy Foreign Disclosure Manual” of June 2019.

If a country with which the DoD has entered into a reciprocal procurement memorandum of understanding or offset arrangement, expresses an interest in this effort, a foreign disclosure review should be conducted prior to issuance of a solicitation.

8. Definitions

Communications Security (COMSEC). The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such communications. COMSEC includes crypto security, emission security, transmission security, and physical security of COMSEC materials and information.

Developing Agent. The Services and Agencies charged with the development of a viable system.

End User Device. The ultimate source or destination of information flowing through a system. A device, or system that employs an application network for the purpose of data processing and information exchange.

Need-to-Know. A determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.

The prospective recipient must hold the minimally appropriate clearance level, as determined by the information, and is beholden to a Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA).

Network. An interconnection of three or more communicating entities, or an interconnection of usually passive electronic components that performs a specific function (which is usually limited in scope); e.g., to simulate a transmission line or to perform a mathematical function such as integration or differentiation. Grouped within this family are also the definitions for Computer Network, Network Topology, Network Service, and Network Transport defined as follows:

Computer Network. A network of data processing nodes that is interconnected for the purpose of data communication, or a communications network in which the end instruments are computers.

Network Topology. The specific physical; i.e., real, or logical; i.e., virtual, arrangement of the elements of a network. Two networks have the same topology if the connection configuration is the same, although the networks may differ in physical interconnections, distances between nodes, transmission rates, and/or signal types.

Network Service. The description or status report of network interconnection or value-added service to users.

Network Transport. The assembly of functional units that establishes circuits and trunks interconnecting a group of switching nodes to provide data transmission services to users.

Storage. Refers to any read/write device used to house non-physical (i.e. binary) memory. This could include Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), and non-volatile memory (i.e. Random Access Memory (RAM)) among others.

Switch. Device used for controlling network configuration and traffic.

Threat. Any circumstances or event with the potential to adversely impact an information system (IS) through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service.

Trunk. Backbone connectivity (trunk circuit) that bundles voluminous user circuits into one large pipe, the size of which may be T1/E1, T3/DS3, OC3/STS-3 or above, between two nodes or switches in the network.

User. A generic term to describe the DoD Components that consume Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services, sometimes referred to as a DISN customer.

Video Equipment. Electronic equipment that broadcasts or receives electromagnetic waves representing images and sound.

This can include, but is not limited to video and audio recording devices.

Vulnerability. For the purposes of DISAC 300-115-3, vulnerability is defined as a weakness in the information system (IS), cryptographic system, or components (e.g., system security procedures, hardware design, and internal controls) that could be exploited by a threat source.

9. Derivative Classification Authority Block. Documents derivatively classified using this SCG as a source document shall use the following classification authority block in the bottom left corner of the cover and title page:

Classified By: List name and position, or personal identifier of the derivative classifier and, if not otherwise evident, include the component and office of origin.

Derived From: SCG ID# 06-089 of 20200409 Subj: USMC TC3 Systems Declassify On: 20450409

10. Special Notices. The following special notices are required to be placed on the bottom portion of the cover and title page of the document for unclassified material, or below the classification authority block, for classified material:

a. Documentation Marking. Classified and unclassified technical documentation generated under this program shall have a distribution statement from DoDI 5230.24 “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents” affixed to the cover page, title page, and a Standard Form (SF) 298, “Report Documentation Page,” where applicable. With the exception of filling in the “Reason to assign” and “Date of Determination,” the wording of the distribution statements shall not be modified. For example:

“DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D. Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only, Critical technology, (9 April 2020). Other requests shall be referred to Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command (PfM CES), 2200 Lester Street, Quantico, VA 22134-5013.”

b. Export Control Warning. All printed and electronic technical documents, containing export-controlled technical data shall be marked on the cover and title page with a warning statement. When it is technically infeasible to use the entire statement, an abbreviated marking may be used, and a copy of the full statement added to the “Notice To Accompany Release of Export-Controlled Data” required by DoDI 5230.24.

Abbreviated notice: “WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act”

Complete WARNING notice is:

“WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.), as amended. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties.

Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.”

SECTION 3 – OVERALL EFFORT

1. Identification. The numerical designation for the USMC TC3 Systems SCG, assigned by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy), is 06-089. PfM CES is the MARCORSYSCOM subject matter expert responsible for day-to-day interpretations of the guide.

2. Threat. The majority of programs utilizing this classification guide have developed a Validated Online Lifecycle Threat (VOLT) report specifically for their program/system.

These VOLTs are available on the Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNet) at the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s repository:

https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/mcia/SitePages/MCIA_ Home.aspx

3. Goal & Mission. The USMC TC3 Systems provides Marine Corps forces and organizations with a secure means to communicate, share data, consolidate battlespace information, and reach back to Garrison networks and organizations across the world. The USMC TC3 Systems SCG seeks to consolidate classification guidance for like-type USMC programs which support this mission.

This SCG will provide a common set of safeguarding and handling instructions from which to operate when addressing our capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations, and shortfalls.

4. End Item. The programs comprising the USMC TC3 Systems are in varying stages of the acquisition lifecycle depending upon program maturity. The overall USMC TC3 Systems is considered to be in the Operation and Support phase of the acquisition life cycle.

SECTION 4 – Financial. DoD policy prohibits the disclosure of budget and procurement data prior to presentation by the Executive Branch to the Congress.

TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASS

ON REMARKS

1. FY budget total U N/A N/A

2. Budget estimated data, including total (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures. U after submitted to Congress.

3. Unit Cost U N/A N/A

1. External photos of end item U N/A N/A All photos must undergo public release review before dissemination to the public.

2. Internal photos of end item U N/A N/A All photos must undergo public release review before dissemination to the public.

3. Software characteristics (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard In Accordance With (IAW) Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) policies and procedures.

SECTION 5 – MILESTONES. Individual program schedules and forward looking milestones are considered to be Unclassified//For Official Use Only. Due to the fact that program schedules and forecasted timelines provide insight into delivery of a new or improved capability, they can be valuable to an adversary seeking to degrade or delay the capabilities of these programs. Programs shall safeguard this information appropriately to avoid revealing acquisition obstacles or hurdles which must be overcome prior to delivery.

1. Program-Specific Integrated Master Schedule (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

Unclassified upon completion of demilitarization

2. Planned equipment delivery rate (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

Unclassified upon fielding.

3. Actual routing of delivery of end items

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

4. Scheduled shipping dates and times (U) See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

5. Milestones

A. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

Unclassified upon IOC.

B. Full Operational Capability (FOC) (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

Unclassified when FOC complete.

SECTION 6 – PERFORMANCE DATA AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. Contracting:

A. The fact that the USMC is soliciting a contract for Command, Control, or Communications Systems pre-award

U N/A N/A Public information

B. The fact that the USMC is placing a contract for Command, Control, or Communications Systems with a particular company, pre-award

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures. Source selection sensitive. Unclassified upon contract award.

2. General details of the Command, Control, and Communications Systems performance if the technology is commercially available

U N/A N/A

3. General details of how the Command, Control, and Communications systems will be integrated and used within the tactical network

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures, (e.g.

Operational Views, Concept of Employment, etc.)

4. Sufficient or specific details of government-only or developmental Command, Control, and Communications Systems performance

(U) See Remarks 1.4(g) 20450409

Classify In Accordance With (IAW) the capability, network or environment the hardware, software, or firmware will be operating on.

5. Specific details of how the Command, Control, and Communications Systems will be integrated and used within the tactical network

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

6. General Performance Capabilities of Tactical Command, Control, and Communications systems

(U) See Remarks

N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures.

7. Performance of Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems against Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Warfare (EW), or other forms of denial and disruption in a contested environment

S 1.4(g) 20450409 Declassify on 20450409 or upon end of program/system life.

8. Employed Hardware, Software, and Operating Systems A. General hardware, software or operating systems utilized by Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems

U N/A N/A

B. Specific version(s) of hardware, software or operating systems utilized by Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures. Does not include locations or details of specific use nor data to be manipulated or stored.

C. Specific version(s) of hardware, software or operating systems utilized by Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems

(U) See Remarks

S

TS/SCI

N/A

1.4(g)

1.4 (g)

See

Mark, handle and safeguard IAW CUI policies and procedures when specific versions of hardware, software, or operating systems for information systems processing up to Unclassified//CUI.

Secret when information systems processing up to Secret information provide sufficient details to exploit unmitigated vulnerabilities or when associated with an actual threat and likelihood of exploitation. Declassify 1 year after a security patch designed to mitigate vulnerabilities has been released and applied to all affected systems, termination of program, or 25 years from date of origin, whichever comes first.

Top Secret/SCI when information systems processing Top Secret/SCI information provide sufficient details to exploit unmitigated vulnerabilities or when associated with an actual threat and likelihood of exploitation. Declassify 1 year after a security patch designed to mitigate vulnerabilities has been released and applied to all affected systems, termination of program, or 25 years from date of origin, whichever comes first.

SECTION 7 – OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL

TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASS ON REMARKS

1. Unit deployment data See Remarks 1.4(a) See

Remarks Classified by the Combatant Commander’s SCG. See section 10.

2. Operational Mission Planning information (e.g.

communications plans, spectrum allocation, mission location and parameters)

See Remarks 1.4(a)

See Remarks

Classified by the Combatant Commander’s SCG. See section 10.

3. Logistics data (U) See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

SECTION 8 – HARDWARE. If hardware supports multiple networks, contains several sets of mission parameters/operational data, or information, treat hardware information at the highest classification of the information, network, or environment which it supports.

TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASS ON REMARKS

1. End User Devices:

a. Desktop Computer

U

10 years from date of origin

U - Prior to receiving network imaging and receiving any official information.

Follow CUI policy and procedure when a NIPR asset has been configured to operate on the Marine Corps Enterprise Information Technology Services (MCEITS) and connected to the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (NIPRNet), or contains any CUI.

SECRET when connected to SIPRNet or when memory storage devices contain any classified information.

Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the SIPRNet and memory storage devices are removed.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network or when memory storage devices contain any TS/SCI information. Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the TS/SCI network and memory storage devices are removed.

b. Laptops of origin

U - Prior to receiving network imaging and receiving any official information.

Follow CUI policies and procedures when a NIPR asset has been configured to operate on the MCEITS and connected to the NIPRNet, or contains any official CUI.

SECRET when connected to SIPRNet or when memory storage devices contain any classified information.

Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the SIPRNet and memory storage devices are removed.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network or when memory storage devices contain any TS/SCI information. Downgrade to unclassified when memory storage devices are removed and not connected to TS/SCI network.

c. Printers

U - Prior to receiving network imaging and receiving any classified information.

CUI when configured to operate on the MCEITS, when connected to of origin

NIPRNet, or contains any official information.

SECRET when connected to the SIPRNet or when memory storage devices contain any classified information.

Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the SIPRNet and memory storage devices are removed.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network or when memory storage devices contain any TS/SCI information. Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the TS/SCI network and memory storage devices are removed.

d. Tablets of origin

U - Prior to receiving network imaging and receiving any official information.

CUI after configured to operate on the MCEITS and when connected to NIPRNet or contains any official information.

SECRET when connected to SIPRNet or when memory storage devices contain classified information. Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the SIPRNet and memory storage devices are removed.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network or when memory storage devices contain any TS/SCI information. Downgrade to unclassified when disconnected from the TS/SCI network and memory storage devices are removed.

e. Cellphones of origin

U - When no CUI has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the device.

SECRET when the memory storage devices are installed with operational data or when connected to SIPRNet. Downgrade to unclassified when memory storage devices are removed and not connected to the SIPRNet.

TS/SCI when HDD is installed and Mission parameters are loaded with operational data or when connected to TS/SCI network. Downgrade to unclassified when memory storage devices are removed and not connected to the TS/SCI network.

g. Video Equipment of origin

U - When no CUI has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded.

SECRET when HDD is installed and Mission parameters are loaded with operational data or when connected to SIPRNet.

TS/SCI when HDD is installed and Mission parameters are loaded with operational data or when connected to the TS/SCI network.

2. Infrastructure:

a. Cryptographic Equipment See

Remarks See

Remarks See

Remarks Handle consistent with Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) when crypto key in not installed. When crypto key is installed, handle commensurate with the classification of the key loaded onto the device.

Refer to NSA/CSS Policy Manual 3.16, Control of Communications Security (COMSEC) Material and DON COMSEC Material Systems (CMS)-1 (CMS-1) for additional guidance

b. Firewall of origin

Unclassified when no CUI has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the memory storage device(s).

SECRET when installed and mission parameters are loaded with operational data or when connected to SIPRNet. Downgrade to CUI when disconnected from classified network and classified data has been purged.

TS/SCI when installed and mission parameters are loaded with operational data or when connected to TS/SCI network. Downgrade when disconnected from classified network and classified data has been purged.

c. Keyboard Video Mouse (KVM) switch of origin

U - When no information has been loaded and when not connected to a classified network.

SECRET when connected to SIPRNet.

Downgrade when removed and disconnected from classified network.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network. Downgrade when removed and disconnected from TS/SCI network.

d. Removable Storage Devices of origin

U - When no information has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the device.

SECRET when Mission parameters are loaded with operational data, or when connected to SIPRNet. Classify and declassify in accordance with the level of information on the device.

TS/SCI when TS/SCI information is loaded or when connected to TS/SCI network. Classify and declassify in accordance with the classification level of the information on the device.

e. Router of origin

U - When no information has been loaded onto the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the device.

SECRET when connected to SIPRNet.

Declassify when removed from the classified network and classified information has been purged from the device.

TS/SCI when connected to TS/SCI network. Declassify when removed from TS/SCI network and classified information have been purged.

f. Server

U - When no classified information has been loaded or processed on the device.

of origin

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI resides on the HDDs.

SECRET when HDD contains classified information or when connected to the SIPRNet. Declassify when the HDDS have been removed from the server.

TS/SCI when HDD contains TS/SCI information or when connected to the TS/SCI network. Declassify when removed from TS/SCI network AND the HDDs destroyed.

g. Storage of origin

Unclassified when no information has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the device.

SECRET when storage device is installed with Secret information, when Mission parameters are loaded with operational data, or when connected to SIPRNet. Declassify when removed from the classified network, when classified information has been purged, and operational data/mission parameters have been removed.

TS/SCI when HDD is installed with TS/SCI information, when Mission parameters are loaded with operational data, or when connected to TS/SCI network. Declassify when removed from TS/SCI network, when TS/SCI information has been removed, and operational data/mission parameters are removed.

h. Switch (network) of origin

Unclassified when no CUI has been loaded on the device.

CUI when connected to NIPRNet or when CUI has been loaded onto the device.

SECRET when operational data/mission parameters are loaded onto the device or when connected to SIPRNet.

Declassify when removed from the classified network and operational data/mission parameters have been removed.

TS/SCI when operational data/mission parameters are loaded onto the device or when connected to TS/SCI network. Declassify when removed from TS/SCI network and operational data/mission parameters are removed.

i. Wireless Network of origin

CUI when a wireless network is established for devices containing up to CUI.

SECRET when devices classified Confidential or Secret are connected to the wireless network or when connected to SIPRNet. Declassify upon removal of classified devices from network and connection with any classified networks.

TS/SCI when devices classified TS/SCI are connected to the wireless network or when connected to TS/SCI network. Declassify upon removal of TS/SCI devices from network and connection with any TS/SCI networks.

3. Communications Systems

a. Tactical Radios See

Remarks See remarks See Remarks

When cryptographic keys are loaded, classify IAW the classification level of the keys, system, or information resident on the terminal, whichever is higher.

When radios are not keyed, handle IAW DON CMS-1, Jul 2019

b. Satellite Communications Terminals See Remarks

See remarks See Remarks

When cryptographic keys are loaded, classify IAW the classification level of the keys, system, or information resident on the terminal, whichever is higher.

When no cryptographic keys are loaded, classify IAW the classification of the system and information resident on the terminal, whichever is higher.

Handle consistent with DON CMS-1 if cryptographic hardware is within system boundaries.

c. High Capacity Communications Systems (i.e.

Line of Sight Systems, Beyond Line of Sight Systems, Troposcatter)

See Remarks

See remarks See Remarks

When cryptographic keys are loaded, classify IAW the classification level of the keys, network, or information resident on the communications system, whichever is higher.

When no cryptographic keys are loaded, classify IAW the information resident on the communications system. Handle consistent with DON CMS-1 if cryptographic hardware is within system boundaries.

SECTION 9 – COMPUTER RESOURCES

1. Threats A. Assessment of threat and analysis of potential for exploitation, disruption, or degradation of Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems without discussing detailed threats, vulnerabilities, or countermeasure effectiveness

U See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

B. Detailed assessment of specific threats (actors, capabilities, and effectiveness) and estimate of potential for exploitation, disruption, or degradation of Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems

S 1.4(g) See

Remarks

See program-specific VOLT report for detailed threat information.

The Intelligence Community (IC) may also provide specific threat information that exceeds the classification of threats within the VOLT. Refer to classification and declassification guidance from the IC as it pertains to the threat information.

2. Vulnerabilities and Limitations A. An individual vulnerability to general Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware, software, or operating system without reference to models, locations, or tied to a specific program

U N/A N/A

B. An individual vulnerability to Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) hardware, software, or operating system without reference to models, locations, or tied to a specific program

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

C. Compilation of a cyber-vulnerability with any of the following: IP, specific location, system name, server name, or fully qualified domain name

CUI when associated with a NIPRNet asset or non-networked device processing up to CUI.

SECRET when associated with a SIPRNet or non-networked device authorized to process up to Secret information. Declassify upon mitigation of vulnerability or upon program/system end of life.

TS/SCI when associated with JWICS or non-networked device authorized to process information up to Top Secret/SCI. Declassify upon mitigation of vulnerability or upon program/system end of life.

3. Security patches

A. Information regarding general security patches to mitigate potential vulnerabilities

U N/A N/A (e.g. security patch release date)

B. Specific information regarding security patches

CUI. Types of vulnerabilities mitigated and method of patch delivery prior to release.

4. Test and Evaluation (T&E)

A. General information regarding a T&E event U N/A N/A (e.g. Q1FY22) and system/program/capability undergoing T&E

B. Specific information regarding a T&E event (U) See Remarks N/A N/A

CUI (e.g. specific dates, times, location(s), specific items under test).

C. Raw T&E test data See Remarks 1.4(g) See

Remarks

Classify and declassify in accordance with section 6, paragraph 7 (capabilities) and section 9 paragraph 2 (vulnerabilities) of this SCG.

Additionally consult the SCGs identified within section 10 for specific guidance (NSA-COMSEC, MARFORCYBER-Cyber, etc.)

D. T&E data that implicitly or explicitly reveals a vulnerability, capability gap, or degradation of system performance

See Remarks

1.4(g) See Remarks

Classify and declassify in accordance with section 6, paragraph 7 (capabilities) and section 9 paragraph 2 (vulnerabilities) of this SCG.

Additionally consult the SCGs identified within section 10 for specific guidance (NSA-COMSEC, MARFORCYBER-Cyber, etc.)

4. Security Controls

A. Selection of Security Controls

(U) See Remarks N/A N/A Mark, handle and safeguard IAW

CUI policies and procedures.

B. Specific employment of Security Controls See Remarks 1.4(g) 20450409

Classify IAW the highest level of the network or environment the hardware/software/firmware operates

C. Effectiveness of Security Controls

20450409

20450409

CUI if description of security controls used to combat general published threats without further association.

Secret when associated with a threat classified at the Secret level or when the controls are used on SIPRNet, or a system authorized to send/receive/store information at the Secret level.

TS/SCI when associated with a threat classified at the TS/SCI level or when the controls are used on JWICS, or a system authorized to send/receive/store information at the TS/SCI level.

SECTION 10 – OTHER

1. Related security classification guides. Other systems, plans, programs, or projects SCGs that relate to this program’s SCG include:

a. SCG ID# 02-247.4, Subj: USMC Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), dated 30 May 2017

b. SCG ID# 03-119.10, Subj: Cooperative Engagement Capability

(CEC)

c. SCG ID# 06-056.3, Subj: USN Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), dated 3 February 2017

d. NSA/CSS Instructions: CNSSI 4001 (for CCI), CNSSI 4005 (for COMSEC facilities/materials, and CNSSI 4006 (for COMSEC keying materials)

e. NSA CSS Policy Manual No. 3-16, Control of Communications Security (COMSEC) Material, 5 August 2005

2. New Research and Development. Information that results in a significant state-of-the-art advancement to this system shall be assigned a classification level pursuant to elements of information contained in this guide. Elements of information not covered in this guide and determined to be classified shall be assigned the lowest classification level deemed appropriate for the information and forwarded to the Commander, MARCORSYSCOM (AC/S G-2 SECURITY) for a final classification decision.

Pending a final determination, handle and protect the information at the recommended classification level.

3. Compilations. Compilations of information that are individually unclassified (or classified at a lower level) may be classified (or classified at a higher level) only if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that:

a. Qualifies for classification pursuant to Section 1.4 of E.O. 13526; and

b. Is not otherwise revealed by the individual elements of information.

Note: Classification of information by compilation is identified in sections 6 & 9 of this SCG.

4. Need-to-Know. All unresolved questions regarding "Need-to- Know" shall be forwarded to Commander, MARCORSYSCOM (PfM CES), 2200 Lester Street, Quantico, VA 22134-5013.

5. Acronym list

AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff CAC2S Common Aviation Command and Control System C Confidential CCI Controlled Cryptographic Item CA Classification Authority CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability CES Command Element Systems CMS COMSEC Material Systems COMSEC Communication Security COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf CUI Controlled Unclassified Information DISN Defense Information System Network DOD Department of Defense DODI Department of Defense Instruction DODM Department of Defense Manual DON Department of Navy EA Electronic Attack E.O. Executive Order EW Electronic Warfare FOC Full Operational Capability FOUO For Official Use Only FY Fiscal Year GOTS Government Off-The-Shelf HHD Hard Disk Drive IAW In Accordance With IC Intelligence Community ID Identification Number IOC Initial Operational Capability IS Information System JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

System KVM Keyboard Video Mouse MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command MARFORCYBER Marine Corps Cybersecurity MOUS Mobile User Objective System N/A Not Applicable NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement NIPRNet Non-Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network NSA National Security Agency

OCA Original Classification Authority OD Original Date OPR Office of Primary Responsibility OPAC Office of Public Affairs and Communications PfM Portfolio Manager PPP Program Protection Plan PR Primary Responsibility Q Quarter S Secret S/NF Secret/No Foreign SCG Security Classification Guide SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information SCMO Security Classification Management Office SECNAV Secretary of the Navy SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction SF Standard Form SIPRNet Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network T&E Test and Evaluation TS Top Secret TS/SCI Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented

Information U Unclassified U.S. United States USMC United States Marine Corps VOLT Validated Online Lifecycle Threat

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