Attachment_05_Safety_Assessment_Report.pdf

SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT (SAR)

FOR

UNDERWATER EGRESS TRAINING PROGRAM

Version 1.1

Prepared By:

PM TRASYS

MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND

12211 Science Drive

Orlando, Florida 32826-3275

March 2017

DISTRIBUTION D. Distribution authorized to Department of Defense (DoD) and

U.S. DoD contractors only (Administrative or Operational Use) (30 Mar 2017).

Other requests for this document shall be referred to Program Manager, Training Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command, 12211 Science Drive, Orlando, Florida 32826-3224.

i

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

Date Version Description

8 July 2011 Initial Initial SAR

30 March 2017 1.1 Updated to address RFP comments ii

Signature Page

Submitted:

Date:

Robert L. Adkins

Principal for Safety

Program Manager, Training System

Marine Corps Systems Command

Concurrence:

Robyn R. Ingerham

Deputy Product Manager Individual Training

Systems

William D. Vorhies

Product Manager Individual Training Systems

Ba L. Duong

Assistant Program Manager - Engineering

Luis F. Lara

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

Deputy Program Manager

Approved:

William W. Yates

Colonel, USMC

Program Manager iii

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1-1

1.1. Purpose ..................................................... 1-1

1.2. Scope ....................................................... 1-1

2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ..................................... 2-1

2.1. Underwater Egress Trainers (UET) ............................ 2-1

2.1.1. Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET) ................ 2-1

2.1.2. Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET) ................. 2-2

2.1.3. Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET) ..................... 2-2

2.1.4. Hoist ................................................... 2-3

2.1.5. Hoist Control Unit ...................................... 2-4

2.1.6. Remote Hoist Controller ................................. 2-5

2.1.7. Redundant Retract System (RRS) .......................... 2-6

2.1.8. Rotation Trolley ........................................ 2-6

3. UET Program System Safety ................................ 3-1

3.1. Safety Inspections Operations ............................... 3-1

3.1.1. Hoist Safety Checks ..................................... 3-1

3.1.2. Module Safety Checks .................................... 3-1

3.1.3. Shallow Water Egress Safety Checks ...................... 3-1

3.1.4. Hoist Wire Rope ......................................... 3-2

3.2. Training Team Key Personal .................................. 3-2

3.2.1. Site Manager ............................................ 3-2

3.2.2. Hoist Operator ........................................ 3-2

3.2.3. Rescue Diver ............................................ 3-2

3.3. Operating Environment ....................................... 3-3

3.3.1. Personnel Equipment Requirements........................ 3-3

3.3.1.1. Instructor ........................................... 3-3

3.3.1.2. Student .............................................. 3-3

4. System Safety Methodology ................................ 3-1

4.1. Assessment Methodology ...................................... 3-1

4.2. Hazard Categorization ....................................... 3-1

4.3. Analyses Methodology ........................................ 3-3

4.4. System Safety Precedence .................................... 3-4

4.4.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis ............................. 3-4

4.4.2. Hazard Logs ............................................. 3-5

4.4.3. Hazard Analysis Report .................................. 3-5 iv

4.5. Top Level Mishaps ........................................... 3-5

4.6. System Safety Engineering ................................... 3-6

4.7. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ......................................... 3-7

5. Conclusions and Recommendations .......................... 3-1

6. APPENDIX A: RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX ...................... 3-1

7. ACRONYMS ................................................. 3-1

List of Figures

Figure 2-1 - MAET Illustration ..................................... 2-1

Figure 2-2 – Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer ...................... 2-2

Figure 2-3 – Shallow Water Egress Trainer .......................... 2-3

Figure 2-4 – MAET Suspended by Hoist ............................... 2-4

Figure 2-5 - Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus Master Hoist Controller ....... 2-5

Figure 2-6 - InMotion R322 Remote Control Transmitter .............. 2-5

Figure 2-7 - InMotion R322 Remote Control Transmitter .............. 2-6

List of Tables

Table 4-1 – Hazard Severity Categories ............................. 3-1 Table 4-2 - Hazard Probability Level ............................... 3-2 Table 4-3 – Risk Assessment Code Matrix ............................ 3-3 Table 4-4 – Top Level Mishaps ...................................... 3-5

1-1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose

This Safety Assessment Report (SAR) is for the Underwater Egress

Trainer (UET) which is comprised of the Modular Amphibious Egress

Trainer (MAET), Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET), Shallow

Water Egress Trainer (SWET) and Hoisting System Model l0000/12000

XGI. The SAR is a comprehensive evaluation of the safety risks being assumed during training operation of the system. It identifies all design, and procedural hazards that may be present during operation. The SAR also identifies keys personnel and qualifications required to conduct training using the UET system.

1.2. Scope

This SAR documents the risk to trainee’s while conducting training evolutions using the UET system. This analysis also accounts for key personal who are critical to safety of the trainee. This analysis does not detail maintenance requirements completely.

Required inspections and safety checks prior to training and after training evolutions were reviewed.

2-1

2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

2.1. Underwater Egress Trainers (UET)

The UET is a multi-functional system used to train the Marine in underwater emergency egress procedures from simulated aircraft, wheeled and tracked vehicles. The UET has three design modules;

MAET, SVET and SWET. The MAET and SVET are specifically designed to utilize the overhead crane system. All UETs are equipped with a rotation trolley. The rotation trolley contains the airbrake system and attachment point. Figure 2-1 illustrates the MAET UET module showing connection point and other features.

Figure 2-1 - MAET Illustration

2.1.1. Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer (MAET)

The MAET platform uses a modular design that allows the system to replicate the following aircraft interiors, UH1 CH-46, CH-53, and

Osprey. Exits for the MAET are designed to provide accurate representation of the feel and operation of actual aircraft exits.

The MAET can be quickly changed to accommodate trainee and equipment requirements. The MAET consists of a stainless steel longitudinal frame to which intermediate ribs and continuous floor and ceiling gratings are attached. A plastic clad nose section is attached to one end of the MAET to simulate a cockpit. The intermediate ribs are drilled intact to hold in place interchangeable Acrylonitrile-Butadiene-Styrene (ABS) plastic

2-2 exterior panels. Figure 2-1 illustrates the exterior view of the

MAET.

2.1.2. Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer (SVET)

The SVET platform also uses a modular design that allows the system to replicate the interior of a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled

Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). Exits for the SVET are designed to provide representation of the feel and egress routes of the actual vehicle. The SVET is separated front to back. The front simulates a wheeled vehicle, the rear simulates an

AAV. The SVET consists of a stainless steel longitudinal frame to which intermediate ribs and continuous floor and ceiling gratings are attached. The intermediate ribs are drilled intact to hold in place interchangeable ABS plastic exterior panels. Figure 2-2 illustrates the exterior view of the SVET module.

Figure 2-2 – Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer

2.1.3. Shallow Water Egress Trainer (SWET)

The SWET, depicted in Figure 2-3, is a procedural device that has a specially designed frame fitted with buoyancy pods that allows it to be easily handled and inverted by instructors for students to practice egress procedures while turned upside down in a shallow water controlled training environment.

2-3

Figure 2-3 – Shallow Water Egress Trainer

2.1.4. Hoist

The UET is supplied with a Konecranes XL404N overhead hoist. The hoist is rated at 5,000 kg, allowing the modules weight of 6,460 pounds and a combined recommended passenger weight of 2,450 pounds

(or maximum passenger weight of 3,150 pounds) to be safely hoisted.

The hoist is a two-speed hoist in-all directions: up, down, left, and right. It is equipped with an upper and lower limit switch to stop the modules at preset upper and lower limits. Unless client-specifically modified otherwise, the hoist can traverse at two speeds either 10ft/min or 32 ft/min along the gantry beam upon which it is mounted. Figure 2-4 depicts the MAET connected to the hoist suspend from gantry beam.

2-4

Figure 2-4 – MAET Suspended by Hoist

2.1.5. Hoist Control Unit

Hoist master control panel contains clearly labeled buttons used to raise or lower the module at fast or slow rate and move it left or right at fast or slow rate of speed. The control panel also contains the ON/OFF switch for the airbrake. The airbrake position is cleared indicated with colored lights to indicate position. The

Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus, depicted in Figure 2-5, is a fully programmable control interface for the functions of the hoist. The

Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus provides remote hoist control via RF remote.

2-5

Figure 2-5 - Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus Master Hoist Controller

2.1.6. Remote Hoist Controller

The InMotion R322 remote control transmitter, depicted in Figure

2-6 interfaces via an RF signal with the Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus

Master Hoist Controller to provide remote control of the hoist.

Figure 2-6 - InMotion R322 Remote Control Transmitter

The InMotion R322 remote control receiver, depicted in Figure 2-7, connects to the Allen-Bradley 1000 Plus Master Hoist Controller via

2-6 an umbilical cord.

Figure 2-7 - InMotion R322 Remote Control Transmitter

2.1.7. Redundant Retract System (RRS)

The RRS is a pneumatic system that is used in the event of loss of power with system submerged in the pool. This system uses the compressed air to raise the module clear of the water onto pool deck. Air is supplied by a standalone 2400 psi air bottle.

2.1.8. Rotation Trolley

Rotation Trolley is centered on the module to allow the module to rotate up to 180 degrees when submerged. The rotation trolley also houses the rotation braking system and hoist connection point. The rotation braking system is a pneumatic system.

3-1

3. UET Program System Safety

3.1. Safety Inspections Operations

The UET safety procedures for operations begin at the start of each training day and are completed prior to and at the completion of training. The Site Manager ensures that all personnel are briefed and outside agencies are contacted in accordance with Emergency

Action Plan (EAP).

3.1.1. Hoist Safety Checks

Hoist safety checks include:

establishing system power visual inspection of:

o structural and mechanical components o wire rope system o trolley attachment system o electrical connections o air compression systems

A system test is completed in accordance with the pre-operational checklist found in the user maintenance manual.

3.1.2. Module Safety Checks

The UET Module safety checks for operation include:

the panel mounting boards emergency escape exits seatbelt Emergency Release System (ERS) seat belt buckles grating insert bolts bolt head panels rotational brake air supply system

The rotation trolley of the UET module is tested in accordance with daily preoperational inspection and maintenance checklist.

3.1.3. Shallow Water Egress Safety Checks

The SWET safety procedures for operation include visual inspection of bolts seatbelt emergency release system seatbelt buckles exit clamps and panel

3-2 proper inflation of the fenders

3.1.4. Hoist Wire Rope

Wire rope is to be visually inspected prior to and after all training events. The lift is to be load tested every two years when a new wire rope is installed per OEM manual.

3.2. Training Team Key Personal

All key personal are to be qualified and fully knowledgeable of required actions to be taken in the event of an emergency. All key personal need to be certified per position requirements (Rescue

Diver, Life Guard and Neurological Assessment).

Certification Government Approved Certifying Organizations

Rescue Diver/

Rescue Scuba Diver

- Professional Association of Dive Instructors (PADI)

- National Association of Underwater Instructors (NAUI)

Lifeguard - American Red Cross

- American Lifeguard Association

Neurological

Assessment

- Divers Alert Network (DAN)

3.2.1. Site Manager

Site Manager is responsible for all personnel and equipment on site. They are responsible for ensuring all inspections of equipment to be used during training event are completed to include all on site safety equipment. They are required to notify all base emergency facilities. The Site Manager is responsible for ensuring required safety briefs are given and the emergency action plan is posted and up to date.

3.2.2. Hoist Operator

Hoist Operator is responsible for pre-training inspections and conduct of functional tests as required by OEM manuals daily.

These inspections include the hoisting system and UET module to be used during the training events.

3.2.3. Rescue Diver

Rescue Scuba Divers or Rescue Divers must have completed all required certifications for PADI or NAUI. During training in the

MAET, the instructor student ratio is 2 students per 1 instructor for a maximum amount of 6 students inside the MAET. Two safety divers are used at all times during training operations that

3-3 involve MAET or SVET. One is placed on each side of the simulator during training and will assist students to the side of pool if necessary.

3.3. Operating Environment

Operating environment for training requires a fresh water pool with a minimum depth of 12 feet. The pool must have a shallow area in which the SWET course and the Emergency Breathing

Station can be conducted, with minimum depth of 48 inches.

When pool temperature is below 85 degrees the instructors need to monitor students for signs of hyperthermia and minimize stress on the students being exposed to long periods in a static environment.

Chemical testing and applications are not the responsibility of the UET training team. The monitoring of the chemicals is the base Public Works team. Site lead needs to verify that the chemical levels are safe to conduct training.

3.3.1. Personnel Equipment Requirements

3.3.1.1 Instructor

Personnel equipment that is worn inside the dunkers by instructors include a scuba mask, seatbelt cutter and wetsuits or approved trunks. Safety divers are outfitted with Self-Contained Underwater

Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA), diving mask, fins, seatbelt cutters and underwater flashlights.

3.3.1.2 Student

Student Personnel Protective Gear (PPE) during training is a complete set of utilities/flight suit, Kevlar helmet and boots.

Kevlar helmets are worn at all times during training operations.

4 System Safety Methodology

4.3 Assessment Methodology

The UET SAR primary objective is identifying potential hazards and developing mitigations to minimize or eliminate the risk of potential mishaps. The UET SAR utilizes closed loop hazard tracking, by which a hazard is identified and tracked until an acceptable solution is reached and implemented, thereby closing the hazard.

Identification and resolution of each potential hazard is completed in accordance with MIL-STD 882E. The safety requirements set forth in the UET are as follows:

a) The UET should not subject individuals above the expected stress during real event.

b) UET system should not be used to train personnel in use of nonstandard devices.

c) UET hoisting system must have redundant systems to prevent catastrophic events is primary system failure.

d) Key personnel must meet qualification requirements. Key personnel identified in the UET SAR are Site Manager, Hoist

Operator and Rescue Divers.

To aid achievement of the safety objectives, each identified hazard is characterized based on severity and probability levels. The assessment of severity and probability levels are qualitative, based on the precedents developed from the analysis of similar equipment and the experience and training of the analyst. Hazard severity categories and probability levels are assessed to provide a rational and objective method for prioritizing hazards. When the hazard category (I to IV) and the hazard probability level (A to F) are combined, a mishap risk assessment value is determined.

4.4 Hazard Categorization

Risk is dependent on the severity of the hazard. The hazard severity categories are designed to provide a measure of the worst credible hazard resulting from personnel errors, environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies and the failure or malfunction of systems, subsystems or components. The UET safety program hazard severity categories are shown in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1 – Hazard Severity Categories

Description Severity

Category

Mishap Result Criteria

Catastrophic 1

Could result in one or more of the following: death, permanent total disability, irreversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $10M.

Critical 2

Could result in one or more of the following:

permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel, reversible significant environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $1M but less than $10M.

Marginal 3

Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day(s), reversible moderate environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $100K but less than $1M.

Negligible 4

Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness not resulting in a lost work day, minimal environmental impact, or monetary loss less than $100K.

The second part in the determination of risk is the identification of the probability of occurrence. The probability that a mishap will occur during the planned life expectancy of the system is a qualitative assessment based on similar items and an evaluation of historical reliability and safety data. The probability rankings are shown in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2 - Hazard Probability Level

Description Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory

Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life of an item.

Continuous experienced.

Probable B Will occur several times in the life of an item.

Will occur frequently.

Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item.

Will occur several times.

Remote D Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item.

Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur.

Improbable E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced in the life of an item.

Unlikely to occur, but possible.

Eliminated F Incapable of occurrence. This level is used when potential hazards are identified and later eliminated.

Incapable of occurrence. This level is used when potential hazards are identified and later eliminated.

Once mishaps are categorized according to severity and probability, the risks are expressed as a Risk Assessment Code (RAC) which is a combination of one severity category and one probability level.

Table 4-3 assigns a risk level of High, Serious, Medium, or Low for each RAC. The matrix also identifies the risk acceptance criteria.

Table 4-3 – Risk Assessment Code Matrix

SEVERITY /

PROBABILITY

Catastrophic

(1)

Critical

(2)

Marginal

(3)

Negligible

(4)

Frequent

(A)

High High Serious Medium

Probable

(B)

High High Serious Medium

Occasional

(C)

High Serious Medium Low

Remote

(D)

Serious Medium Medium Low

Improbable

(E)

Medium Medium Medium Low

Eliminated

(F)

Eliminated

Hazard Risk Index Risk Level and Acceptance Authority

1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B HIGH – Acceptance of risk by the ASN (RDA)

1D, 2C, 3A, 3B SERIOUS – Acceptance of Risk by the Program

Executive Officer (PEO)

1E, 2D, 2E, 3C, 3D, 3E, 4A, 4B MEDIUM – Acceptance of Risk by the Program

Manager (PM)

4C, 4D, 4E LOW – Acceptance of Risk by the PM

4.5 Analyses Methodology

The Baseline Hazard Analysis (BHA) process is in an iterative process that relies on similarity to previous system designs, past experience on similar systems, and with similar operations.

Safety decisions regarding the resolution of identified hazards are based on the assessment of the risk(s) posed by the hazard. To aid achievement of the safety objectives, each identified hazard is

3-4 characterized based on its severity and probability levels. The assessment of severity and probability levels are qualitative, based on the precedents developed from the analysis of similar equipment and the experience and training of the analysts. Hazard severity categories and probability levels are assessed to provide a rational and objective method for prioritizing hazards. When the Hazard category (I to IV) and the hazard probability level (A to E) are combined, a means of determining priorities is created.

4.6 System Safety Precedence

UET development and acquisition ascribes to system safety precedence defined in MIL-STD-882E and contained in the following list.

a) Design for minimum risk: Hazards will be eliminated from the design at the earliest opportunity. If an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, it will be controlled through design selection.

b) Safety devices: Hazards that cannot be eliminated or controlled through design selection should be controlled to an acceptable level by using fixed, automatic, or other protective safety design features or devices. Provisions should be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices.

c) Warning devices: When neither design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate identified hazards, devices should be used to detect the condition and to generate an adequate warning signal to alert personnel to the hazard. Warning signals and their applications should be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the signals and should be standardized within like types of systems.

d) Procedures and Training: Where it is impossible to eliminate or adequately control a hazard through design selection or safety and warning devices, procedures and training should be used to control the hazard. Precautionary notations should be standardized as specified by the managing activity. Safety critical tasks and activities may require certification of personnel proficiency.

4.6.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

The BHA worksheets, contained in Appendices A of this document, form the initial basic safety hazards analysis performed on the UET. The

BHA is being updated and revised in accordance with MIL-STD 882E and is summarized in this Safety Assessment Report.

The BHA is based on the principle of examining all identifiable potential safety hazards in order to ensure that adequate

3-5 corrections/controls have been, or are being implemented.

4.6.2 Hazard Logs

The hazard logs formed a ready reference which showed the status of each BHA investigation, a short summary of the identified hazard, its possible effect, and the hazard severity and current hazard status.

All hazards resulting from similar design have been reviewed for applicability to UET and applied to the hazard log. All hazards identified from the UET hazard logs are contained in Appendix A.

4.6.3 Hazard Analysis Report

The Hazard Analysis Report (HAR) is developed using the hazard log.

The HAR is used to notify the rick acceptance authority of the residual risk associated with UET.

The HAR provided written description about each potential hazard identified, and provides data as to recommended correction or control.

HARs for each phase of the life cycle will be signed for by appropriate level for risk acceptance authority.

4.7 Top Level Mishaps

Table 4-4 provides a list of the Top Level Mishaps (TLMs) developed for the UET System. These TLMs provide standardization of the risk assessment.

Table 4-4 – Top Level Mishaps

Num Top Level Mishap Description

1 Suffocation Suffocation due to liquid entering lungs preventing oxygen absorption. This also includes shallow water blackout or embolisms caused by using breathing devices.

Personnel injury/death

2 Electrical shock and/or short

Electrocution/Electrical shock or electrical short. leading to personal injury/death and/or equipment damage 3 Equipment Damage Damage to any part of the UET systems. This damage can result in personal injury/death and/or equipment damage.

4 Exposure to high pressure air lines.

Damage to high pressure air-lines caused by improper maintenance procedures could result in personal injury/death and or equipment damage

3-6

5 Pinch/crush/Strike Personnel or equipment strike or impacted by module during training event to include storing or removal from cradle. Personal injury/death and/or equipment damage.

6 Fire Class C electrical fire personal injury/death and/or equipment damage

7 Slip, trip, fall Pools deck wet and or containing non training equipment. Personal injury/death.

4.8 System Safety Engineering

The BHA is subject to a continual updating during the UET life cycle. This updating is essential to preclude unacceptable hazards that can be introduced into the system as it undergoes modifications.

Safety hazards may be identified at any time during the system life cycle by a variety of methods, including lessons learned on similar systems, analyses, testing, and operations. Regardless of the method or timing of discovery, the administration of hazards and their resolutions will be accomplished in accordance with MIL-STD-882E.

The continuing System Safety Engineering strategy includes continuous monitoring of performer safety reports, test reports, quality assurance plan inspections and failure reports, and CM changes which may drive updates and re-assessments to the already conducted and required analyses.

The following Safety Analyses will be conducted or updated as necessary to support fielding of the UET System in accordance with

MIL-STD-882E:

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Objective Qualitative Evidence

Pre Training Screening

3-7

4.9 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

The hoist Model XGH 10000, MAET, SVET, and SWET simulators do not generate hazardous materials.

All lubricants that are used to grease the Model hoist are food grade quality and meet the requirements of CFR 178.3570, Chapter

21, and NSF registered as H1 classified lubricants. A catch pan is used when greasing the operating reels, housing and lifting cables to prevent contamination of the surrounding environment.

The In-Motion Series 322 wireless controller utilizes 4 AA size batteries. These batteries may be of d1e rechargeable type and are to be disposed of according to corresponding base and state regulations.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

Underwater training with qualified personal is considered risky by nature. The addition of non-qualified personal and the disorientation caused by the UET being rolled, only elevates the risk of conducting this training. The UET training curriculum supports training of personnel in the basics of underwater egress in shallow water prior to progressing to multi-personnel and deep water egress training.

The overall risk of conducting UET training is assessed at 1E

Medium. All risks that could not be eliminated shall be accepted at appropriate level of authority.

6 APPENDIX A: RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

HCR# Hazard Description Mishap Description Mitigations Recommendations Final

HRI

IV-D

Low

Equipment Failure-

Lifting cable

Lifting cable breaks and separates from simulator.

The system is built with redundancy for all key, load carrying components i.e. second lifting cable, (2) fall arrest straps.

Refer to section 7-5-11 of the

User Manual.

IV-D

Equipment Failure -

Bulkhead, Console/Seat

Bulkhead, Console/Seat

Comes Loose

Inspection of MAET/SVET, SWET is required prior to and after training event per

OEM Manuals pre and post operational checklists.

Equipment Failure-

Windshield

Windshield Breaks Ensure MAET/SVET, SWET are inspected before and after every use in accordance with the OEM pre and post operational checklists.

I-D

Serious

Equipment Failure-

Gantry Beam

Gantry Beam Fails Ensure Gantry is inspected before every use in accordance wid1 the OEM pre operational checklists and in accordance with all periodic maintenance requirements established by the OEM.

Refer to section 7-5-9 of the

User

Manual.

I-E

Medium

Final

Equipment Failure-

Hoist to Trolley

Shackle

Hoist Shackle Connection to MAET/SVET

Trolley Shackle Fails

Ensure Hoist and MAET /SVET shackles are inspected as scheduled by established periodic maintenance set forth by the OEM. The trainer trolley has a redundant attachment system as depicted in Figure 5.

Refer to section 7-5-10 of the

User Manual.

Equipment Failure-

Hoist Wire

Hoist Wire Ropes Break Ensure all wire ropes are inspected as scheduled by established periodic maintenance set forth by the

OEM.

Conduct load testing for man lift standards as set forth and established by OSHA every

48 months or when a new wire rope is installed.

Refer to section 7-5-11 of the

Equipment Failure-

Electrical Short

Electrical Short Into

Water

Ensure MAET/SVET are inspected before and after every use in accordance with the OEM pre and post operational checklists, additional ensure all periodic maintenance established by OEM is conducted .

Refer to section 7-5-16 of the

II-D

Equipment Failure-

Brake trolley slips around ring assembly

Brake trolley slips around ring assembly when lifting shackle is removed from lifting pin when stored in cradle assembly .

Place brake trolley stops before lifting pin is removed from lifting shackle.

Follow O M procedures as outlined in Model XGH 10000

Refer to section 7-5-13 of the

1-D

III-C

Equipment Failure -

Rotation Brake Air

Hose

Rotation Brake Air Hose

Bursts

Ensure MAET/SVET are inspected before and after every use in accordance with d1e OEM pre and post operational checklists, additional ensure all periodic maintenance established by OEM is conducted. Air hoses are attached to the leveling block and are isolated from cabin occupants.

Refer to section 7-5-12 of the

III-D

3-4

Equipment Failure-

Seatbelt emergency release handle

Seatbelt emergency release handle fails to operate and instructor fails to get seatbelt unfastened.

Lubricate all seatbelts release mechanisms. Lubricants used are classified as food grade quality and meet CFR 178.3570

Preoperational checks performed and annotated IAW MAET/SVET

Instructor carries seat belt cutter tool. Refer to section 7-

5-21 of the User

Manual.

3-5

Equipment Failure-

Power Failure

Power fails by any means Ensure MAET/SVET are inspected before and after every use in accordance with the OEM pre and post operational checklists, additional ensure all periodic maintenance established by OEM is conducted.

All facilities are equipped with a Redundant Retract System (RRS).

The RRS is a compressed air driven retract system that lifts the MAET/SVET from d1e water in the event of any power failure.

This device is required for training, The hoist will not operate in a fast lower mode if d1e RRS is not properly installed, and this is part of the daily pre operational inspection checklist.

Refer to section 7-5-15 of the

3-6

Equipment Failure-

Electrical Fire

Electrical Fire on Hoist or in Electrical Controls

Cabinet

Ensure MAET/SVET Hoist and Hoist control cabinet are inspected before and after every use in accordance with d1e OEM pre and post operational checklists.

Ensure all OEM established periodic maintenance and inspections are conducted.

Conduct daily safety brief and ensure access to phone to activate EMS.

Refer to section 7-5-18 of the

3-7

Equipment Failure-

Electrical Fire

Electrical Fire in Hoist or Jib Crane Control Panel

Ensure MAET/SVET Hoist and

Hoist control cabinet are inspected before and after every use in accordance with the

OEM pre and post operational checklists.

Ensure all OEM established periodic maintenance and inspections are conducted.

Conduct daily safety brief and ensure access to phone to activate EMS.

Refer to section 7-5-19 of the

Equipment Failure-

Trolley Wheels

Trolley Wheels Fail to operate or break

Ensure MAET/SVET are inspected before and after event use in accordance with the OEM manuals

Conduct pre and post operational checklists, additional ensure all periodic maintenance established by OEM.

Refer to section 7-5-20 of d1e

3-8

Equipment Failure-

MAET/SVET comes in contact with bulkhead of pool or building.

While moving MAET/SVET from its cradle assembly the operator could run into a wall or strike the bulkhead of the pool underwater.

A double set of adjustable limit switches prevents the accidental raising or lowering d1e

MAET/SVET beyond its operational limits.

Following site procedures when moving d1e MAET/SVET out of its cradle assembly.

Mark gantry beam wid1 East/West signs to ensure operator moves

MAET/SVET in the same direction identified on pendant control.

Holding breath too long or hyperventilation.

Shallow Water Blackout. Brief class regarding safety prior to entering the water.

Oxygen on site. Personnel ready to execute Emergency Response

Plan.

3-9

II-C

Failure to exhale while breathing from any compressed air source while ascending.

Diving related Embolism.

Pulmonary Over Inflation

Syndrome.

Brief class regarding safety and proper usage of compressed air breathing devices prior to entering the water.

Constant Instructor supervision willie using these devices.

Ensure access to I-Iyperbat1c

Chamber, Emergency transportation and Emergency contact information in place.

II-D

II-C

Mishandling gear/ equipment, tripping, lacking of situational awareness.

Bodily Injury. Brief class regarding training safety, safe locations and awareness. Constant Instructor supervision during training evolutions.

II-D

Suffocation due to liquid entering lungs preventing oxygen absorption.

Death from asphyxia/

Drowning.

Brief class regarding training safety and safety awareness.

Constant Instructor supervision during training evolutions. 02 and EMT on site ready to execute

Emergency Response Plan.

1-E

7 ACRONYMS

AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle

ABS Acrylonytrile-Butadiene-Styrene

BHA Baseline Hazard Analysis

DAN Divers Alert Network

DID Data Item Description

EAP Emergency Action Plan

ERS Emergency Release System

HAR Hazard Analysis Report

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle

HUET Helicopter Underwater Egress Trainers

MAET Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

NAUI National Association of Underwater Instructors

PADI Professional Association of Dive Instructors

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PQS Personal Qualification Standards

RAC Risk Assessment Code

RSS Redundant Retract System

SAR Safety Assessment Report

SCUBA Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus

SVET Submerged Vehicle Egress Trainer

SWET Shallow Water Egress Trainer

TLM Top Level Mishap

UET Underwater Egress Trainer