AWPlanforE-9TMRS08Jul22.pdf

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When completed, DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only for administrative and operational use, Other requests shall be referred to the Program Office identified in Block 1.

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AFLCMC/EZZ Template 110-4, 11SEP2020 Prescribed by AWB-110 Page 1 of 6

AIRWORTHINESS PLAN FOR MODIFICATIONS

SECTION I: SYSTEM INFORMATION

DATE

29 June 2022

PREPARED BY

William Richardson

MDS

E-9A

PROGRAM OFFICE

AFLCMC/WLDW

PROJECT TITLE

E-9A TMRS Replacement Project

PROJECT/TRACKER NUMBER

CONTRACTOR(S)

CDSI

CONTRACT/REQUIREMENT NUMBER(S)

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The E-9A Telemetry relay System (TMRS) will be replaced with more modern equipment with the goal of more effectively performing the USAF mission of collecting and relaying missile and target drone telemetry for tests and weapons system evaluations over the Gulf of Mexico. This replacement effort is to remedy Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) issues with the data processing and electronics components in aft fuselage of the E-9A. This project is being implemented to satisfy an AF Form 1067, ACC 21- 196 Modification Proposal. The TMRS replacement is intended to meet existing mission requirements and does not add new capability to the E-9A aircraft.

In regards to the FAA-Military seam. The E-9A has an existing FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) that certifies the safe carriage of the TMRS equipment racks, including rack installation, weight, power requirements, and heat loading of the equipment to be installed in the racks. The installation of the TMRS equipment, the interconnecting wiring between the equipment and the racks, and the safety and functionality of the TMRS equipment has been USAF AW Certified using MIL-HDBK-516. Additionally, there is an existing STC for the “canoe” (a USAF directed change to the outer mold line of the aircraft) which has the purpose of covering TMRS antennas. The antennas and their installation are USAF AW certified as noted above. The TMRS replacement equipment and antennas will follow this same FAA-Military airworthiness certification seam. It is anticipated that these existing STCs will NOT be updated – that the replacement equipment and antennas will be substantiated to be within the weight, power and heat loading certified by these STCs. The USAF will certify airworthiness (using MIL-HDBK-516) of the installation and functionality of the new TMRS equipment/antennas.

Reference Photos below depict the canoe on the side of the E-9A and the equipment racks within the E-9A.

This TMRS modification is not intended to have any impact on Safety of Flight of the E-9A. This modification will not change the flight envelope and will not impact aircrew flight operations. TMRS will be operated (as it is currently) with personnel dedicated to TMRS operations, that are not located in the cockpit of the E-9A.

Minimal changes to aircraft flight and maintenance manuals are anticipated. Manual changes will be focused on TMRS operations and maintenance.

The preliminary Risk Hazard Assessment (RHA) is 12.

See attachment 1 for more detailed rationale.

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SECTION II: COUPLING AIR SYSTEMS

DOES THIS MODIFICATION AFFECT THE AIRWORTHINESS OF ANY COUPLING AIR SYSTEM (ref. AWB-320)?

☐ Yes ☒ No

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SECTION III: AIRWORTHINESS RELATED DETERMINATION

IS THIS MODIFICATION AIRWORTHINESS RELATED (ref. AWB-120)?

☒ Yes ☐ No (If “No”, sign this section, retain this form, no other sections need to be completed.)

APPROVER (Name, Title, Office)

NA

SIGNATURE & DATE

NA

SECTION IV: REPORTABILITY

HAZARD ASSESSMENT

☒ Attachment I ☐ Other (specify): Click here to enter text.

OVERALL RISK

12 REPORTABILITY (ref. AWB-120)

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☐ Reportable ☒ Non-reportable

SECTION V: AIRWORTHINESS APPROACH

BASELINE AIR SYSTEM AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL

The airworthiness approach will be to require the Contractor installing and testing the TMRS replacement equipment to substantiate that the new TMRS equipment will not impact the existing FAA Certifications of the E-9A. The replacement TMRS equipment is USAF mission equipment and the installation/integration will be USAF AW Certified using MIL-HDBK-516. The Contractor will be the primary source of AW documentation.

CERTIFCATION BASIS SOURCE DOCUMENT

MIL-HDBK-516C

PLANS FOR LEVERAGING OTHER AIRWORTHINESS APPROVALS (existing or planned) The E-9A Program Office will leverage the existing FAA Type Certificate and Supplemental Type Certificates of the E-9A. The installation and functionality of the new TMRS equipment/antennas will be USAF AW certified using MIL-HDBK-516

PERSONNEL AND QUALIFICATIONS

Air Vehicle Function (Ref. MIL-HDBK-516C) Reviewer Relevant Qualifications (SME Endorsements or

Competency Management Levels) Systems Engineering Gary Haler

Structures John Cerra Flight Technology NA for this mod

Propulsion Jered Guinn Subsystems Jered Guinn

Crew Systems NA for this mod Diagnostic Systems NA for this mod

Avionics NA for this mod Electrical System Jered Guinn

E3 Jered Guinn System Safety Gary Haler

Computer Systems Jered Guinn Maintenance Jered Guinn

Armament / Stores Integration NA for E-9A Passenger Safety NA for E-9A

Air Transport, Cargo Safety NA for E-9A

LEAD DEVELOPMENTAL TEST ORGANIZATION

E-9A Program Office (with assistance from 96th Test Wing)

PLANNED RESTRICTIONS AND CONDITIONS

None

EXPECTED NON-COMPLIANCES WITH AIRWORTHINESS CRITERIA

None

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AUTHORITIES FOR APPROVING AIRWORTHINESS PRODUCTS

☒ IAW AWB-225 ☐ Other: Click here to enter text.

ADDITIONAL AIRWORTHINESS APPROACH INFORMATION

Plan to submit a Flight Test Compliance Report to substantiate a Flight Test MFR to support flight testing for demonstrating program requirements have been met, and substantiating some of the MIL-HDBK-516 criteria have been met. Flight Test Report - with other testing/analysis/technical data - will be used to support an Operational Compliance Report and amended MTC.

SECTION VI: PLAN FOR DEVELOPING OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS

The contractor selected for developing/integrating the new TMRS equipment will also be required to develop technical data supplements for the existing T-6A TMRS operations and maintenance manuals.

SECTION VII: APPROACH TO OBTAIN SUBSTANTIATING DATA

The contractor selected for developing/integrating the new TMRS equipment will be required to provide the E- 9A Program Office with all documentation indicating performance requirements have been met, as well as a draft Compliance Report with all supporting documentation. This will include a technical analysis and assessments, test reports, a System Safety Hazard Analysis; and draft supplements to any E-9A manuals impacted by this modification.

SECTION VIII: DIGITAL ENGINEERING

This acquisition process will not require digital engineering.

SECTION IX: CERTIFICATIONS SUPPORTING AIRWORTHINESS

☐ FAA:

☐ STC ☐ TC

☐ PFR Endorsement (FAA Certified CNS/ATM Capability) ☐ Joint Interoperability Certification

☐ AF SEEK EAGLE:

☐ LCR ☐ RFC ☐ CR

☐ CNS/ATM Certification ☐ Directed Energy Review Board Approval for Use

☐ NNMSB:

☐ THAR ☐ TMSS

☐ Cargo & Airdrop Tech Approvals ☐ Aerial Refueling Certifications

☐ RF Spectrum ☐ Other (Specify in Section XII)

Additional information:

Table Acronym List:

SoF – Safety of Flight

SECTION X: RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITIES

POLICY THAT ESTABLISHES RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITIES

Medium and Low Risks – Ms Abbigail Pogorzelski Serious Risks – Mr Paul Waugh, Mobility and Training Aircraft Director High Risks - Mr Andrew Hunter, SAF/AQ, Asst SECAF for Acquisition Technology and Logistics

SECTION XI: SCHEDULE

Task Date RFP Release May 22

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AW Plan Approved Jul 22 Certification Basis Submitted Jun 22 Certification Basis Approved Jull 22 Contract Award Aug 22 SRR - SFR Oct 22 PDR Nov 22 CDR Dec 22 Certification Basis Update (if applicable) Oct 22 Certifications Supporting Airworthiness (from Section IX) Sep 22 Compliance Report Submitted Dec 22 Compliance Report Approved Dec 22 FT MFR Issued Jan 23 Preliminary TOs Complete Mar 23 FT Starts Feb 23 Evaluation of FT Results, possible down-select components Apr 23 Certifications Supporting Airworthiness (from Section IX) May 23 Compliance Report Submitted Jun 23 Compliance Report Approved Jul 23 Formal TOs Complete Jul 23 OT/Ops AW Approval Issued Jul 23 Issue Military Certificate of Airworthiness Jul 23 OT and Operations Start Jul 23 NOTE: Specialty processes (e.g., those used for FMS or UAS programs) may require additions to this schedule

SECTION XII: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SECTION XIII: COORDINATION

The information herein is accurate, and I concur on this modification’s airworthiness plan.

REVIEWER (Name, Title, Office) Gary R. Haler, E-9A Chief Engineer

REVIEWER (Name, Title, Office) Dr Michael P. Blinn, Engineering Chief, CE-DTA

REVIEWER (Name, Title, Office)

Required if modification affects any coupling air system (ref. Section III).

AERIAL REFUELING DELEGATED TECHNICAL AUTHORITY (Name, Title, Office)

NA

I concur with the airworthiness plan presented herein and will ensure its implementation.

PROGRAM MANAGER (Name, Title, Office) KELLY J. JORDAN, E-9A Program Manager

AFLCMC/WLDW

SECTION XIV: APPROVAL

I approve this modification’s airworthiness plan. It is valid for the description and airworthiness approach stated herein. Changes to either of these may result in increased risk and a reportability determination change.

APPROVER (Name, Title, Office) Robert L. David, Director of Engineering Mobility & Training Aircraft Directorate

AFLCMC/WL

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ATTACHMENT I: HAZARD ASSESSMENT

Air Vehicle Function (Ref. MIL-HDBK-516C)

Description of Modification’s Impact to Air Vehicle Function Credible Hazard(s) Unmitigated Risk

(Severity and Probability) Reviewer

Systems Engineering ☒ 4.1 Design criteria ☐ 4.2 Tools & databases ☒ 4.4 Manufacturing & quality ☒ 4.5 Operator & MX manuals ☒ 4.6 Configuration management

These are components that are commercially available; configuration on aircraft will be controlled by technical data; sources of components will be from previous USG aircraft installations of TMRS, manuals will be adapted to accommodate this new equipment

Not Required Not Required

Structures ☒ 5.1 Loads ☒ 5.2 Structural dynamics ☒ 5.3 Strength ☒ 5.4 Durability & damage tolerance ☒ 5.5 Mass properties ☒ 5.6 Flight release

FAA Cert: The new TMRS equipment will be shown by analysis to be within the weight and balance that is has been previously FAA Certified – no additional FAA Certification will be obtained.t structure and must be analyzed and/or tested.

USAF Cert: USAF certification will consist of substantiating that loads and W&B are within the existing approved envelope, and that equipment is adequately mounted and interconnected.

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Damage to aircraft structure due to new loading is unlikely but possible; new components/mounting may not survive the loading and vibration environment; W&B could be impacted. Potential for loss of subsystems or loss of aircraft due to poor W&B or long term structure damage.

Flight Technology ☐ 6.1 Flying qualities ☐ 6.2 Vehicle control functions (VCF) ☐ 6.3 Aerodynamics and performance

TMRS replacement modification does not impact Flight Technology

NA

Propulsion ☐ 7.1 Propulsion risk management ☒ 7.2 Gas turbine engine applications ☐ 7.3 Alternate propulsion systems

USAF Cert: The new TMRS equipment will be shown by test and analysis to be EMC compatible with engine related electronic equipment.

USAF Cert: Potential for TMRS to interfere with engine controls and degrade engine operations/control.

Subsystems ☐ 8.1 Hydraulic & pneumatic systems ☒ 8.2 Environmental control sys. (ECS) ☐ 8.3 Fuel system ☒ 8.4 Fire and hazard protection ☐ 8.5 Landing gear ☐ 8.6 Auxiliary / emergency power sys.

☐ 8.7 Aerial refueling ☐ 8.8 Mechanisms

FAA Cert: The new TMRS equipment will be shown by analysis to be within the heat loading currently provided for in the current FAA Certified design - no additional FAA Certification will be obtained.

USAF Cert: Verification that heat loading is within acceptable limits.

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Potential for overheating of TMRS equipment, loss of mission is possible (Negligible).

USAF Cert: Potential for integration issues between the TMRS and fire protection system

Crew Systems ☒ 9.1 Escape and egress system ☒ 9.2 Crew stations, control stations & a/c interiors ☐ 9.3 Air system lighting ☒ 9.4 Human performance ☐ 9.5 Life support systems

FAA Cert:

USAF Cert: Verify TMRS install does not negatively impact egress, safety of TMRS operators, adequate ops/MX manuals are provided, and crash survivability

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Potential for aircrew injury during emergency egress or crash loading (Catastrophic). Potential for inadequate operation/MX of TMRS, loss of mission (negligible)

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Air Vehicle Function (Ref. MIL-HDBK-516C)

Description of Modification’s Impact to Air Vehicle Function Credible Hazard(s) Unmitigated Risk

(Severity and Probability) Reviewer

☐ 9.6 Transparency integration ☒ 9.7 Crash survivability ☐ 9.8 Lavatories, galleys & areas not continuously occupied

Diagnostic Systems ☐ 10.1 Failure modes ☐ 10.2 Operations

TMRS replacement modification does not impact Diagnostics

NA

Avionics ☐ 11.1 Avionics architecture ☐ 11.2 Avionics subsystems ☐ 11.3 Avionics

TMRS replacement modification does not impact Avionics

NA

Electrical System ☒ 12.1 Electrical power generation ☒ 12.2 Electrical wiring system

FAA Cert: The new TMRS equipment will be shown by analysis to be within the electrical loading currently provided for in the current FAA Certified design - no additional FAA Certification will be obtained. .

USAF Cert: Connection to equipment rack electrical power and interconnecting wiring will be USAF AW certified.

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Inadequate wiring or wiring support could result in overloaded circuits or chaffing, potential for fire, smoke, fumes.

E3 ☒ 13.1 Component/subsystem E3 qual.

☒ 13.2 System-level E3 qualification

FAA Cert: The potential for EMI between TNRS equipment and flight safety equipment will not be FAA Certified.

USAF Cert: Potential for EMI between TMRS equipment and aircraft equipment will be verified utilizing ground and flight testing.

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Potential for TMRS interference with Safety of Flight equipment, potential for loss of aircraft.

System Safety ☒ 14.1 System safety program ☒ 14.2 Safety design requirements ☐ 14.3 Software safety program

System safety and risk reviews take place during key milestones; before flight testing; and before approving new configuration for operations

Not Required Not Required

Computer Systems ☐ 15.1 System processing architecture ☐ 15.2 Design & functional integration ☒ 15.3 Processing hardware & electronics ☒ 15.4 Software development processes ☒ 15.5 Software architecture & design ☒ 15.6 Software qualification & installation

FAA Cert: None

USAF Cert: Verify HW is suitable for the E-9A environment; verify adequate config control of TMRS equip and TMRS SW loads

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Potential for failure of TMRS HW/SW, loss of mission (Negligible)

19 Pruitt

Maintenance ☒ 16.1 Maintenance manuals / checklists ☒ 16.2 Inspection requirements

FAA Cert: None Update of Flight Manual and Aircraft MX Manuals will be minimal to non-existent.

USAF Cert: USAF must val/ver and publish the updated technical data, primarily TMRS Ops &

MX

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF Cert: Potential for loss of effective TMRS use, loss of mission (negligible)

19 Richardson

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Air Vehicle Function (Ref. MIL-HDBK-516C)

Description of Modification’s Impact to Air Vehicle Function Credible Hazard(s) Unmitigated Risk

(Severity and Probability) Reviewer

Armament / Stores Integration ☐ 17.1 Gun/rocket integration & interface ☐ 17.2 Stores integration ☐ 17.3 Laser integration & interface ☐ 17.4 Safety interlocks

NA for E-9A

Passenger Safety ☐ 18.1 Survivability of passengers ☒ 18.2 Fire resistance ☐ 18.3 Physiology requirements

FAA Cert: None

USAF Cert: Verify that the TMRS installation is not a possible ignition source for flammable materials.

FAA Cert: No additional FAA Cert

USAF: Potential electrical ignition source due to proximity to flammable materials

Air Transport, Cargo Safety ☐ 20.1 Air transportability and airdrop ☒ 20.2 Mission/test equipment and cargo/payload safety

NA for E-9A