Cert Basis Compl Rpt E-9A TMRS Repl 3Aug22.xlsx

Introduction

MIL-HDBK-516C

Airworthiness Certification Criteria

Certification Basis and Compliance Report Template

This workbook is a compilation of all airworthiness certification criteria, standards, and methods of compliance from MIL-HDBK-516C, in addition to all USAF approved Change Notices. Use this workbook to construct a Certification Basis and Compliance Report.

Distribution Statement A – Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, when not filled in.

When filled in, enter Distribution Statement appropriate for content.

Example: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative and Operational Use, 23 Nov 2015. Other requests shall be referred to the Example Program Office.

Instructions to the Applicant

1) Cover Page: Identify what document is being submitted (list below) and develop the appropriate cover sheet tab while hiding the other tabs that don't apply vaterrj: Cover Page Detail:

(1) MDS – Enter the Mission Design Series (MDS) for the platform (e.g. B-52H).

(2) Title – Either “Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria” or “Modification Airworthiness Certification Criteria for the ABC Modification.”

(3) Supporting – Select appropriate Cover Page supporting the required TAA decision.

(4) Version – Enter a document identifier needed to maintain configuration control. This would typically be a number that increases sequentially with each submission of this TACC/MACC.

(5) Date – Enter the date that this TACC/MACC is submitted

(6) Managing Office – Enter identification and contact information for the Program Manager (PM). Add signature blocks as needed for the CE and other coordinating offices.

(7) TAA Signature – The block for TAA signature must appear at the bottom of the page for those activities identified in USAF AWB-003 as requiring TAA approval.

2) Signatures: Ensure that the appropriate "electronic" signatures are included. After the document has been signed the document will not allow updates

3) The System Information Tab: has two blank MS Word documents imbedded for the System Description and Limitations sections. These areas can be expanded as required.

4) Compliance Summary Tab: should be hidden for the Certification Basis or Experimental Flight Release Basis submission and made visible for the Compliance Report. The Compliance Summary will automatically populate itself from the Compliance Column and the HRI entered in the Risk Acceptance Level Column in the 516 Section Tabs 4 to 20.

5) Document Summary Tab: should be hidden for the Certification Basis or Experimental Flight Release Basis submission and made visible for the Compliance Report. This tab should be used to highlight critical/key documents that support the Compliance findings. Note: Summary tab is for higher level review than the documents referenced in for each criteria in 516 Section Tabs 4 to 20.

6) Tabs 4 Systems Engineering thru 20 Other Considerations: contain "Criteria" from MIL-HDBK-516C that are not to be altered in any way by the PM/CE. These criteria are to be listed as they appear in MIL-HDBK-516C.

7) Tabs 4 Systems Engineering thru 20 Other Considerations: contains "Standards" and "Methods of Compliance" MIL-HDBK-516C. These areas typically require some tailoring for the specific aircraft configuration.

8) Enter Distribution Statement appropriate for added content on the 'Introduction' tab.

9) Delete or hide this instruction page tab before submitting this document

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

Cover Page (Cert Basis)

MDS: E-9A

Version: 1

Date: July 2022

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

Date: ____________ Date: ____________

Cover Page (Compliance Rpt)

MDS: E-9A

COMPLIANCE REPORT

Version: {revision identifier}

Date:

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

Date: ____________

System Information

Certification Basis:

vaterrj: Certification Basis Source:

For Commercial Derivative Aircraft (CDA), this section will also include the FAA Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) and any applicable Supplemental Type Certificates (STC), and the division between FAA and Department of Defense (DoD) certification.

System Description:

Limitations:

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A

Compliance Summary

Listing of Noncompliant Criteria & SSRA Summary:

Non-Compliant Criteria System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA) HRI # vaterrj: List all Non-compliant Criteria and associated System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA). SSRA can have single Criteria Non-compliance or Multiple equating to one Risk

USAF AIRWORTHINESS RISK ACCEPTANCE MATRIX

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A

Criteria Compliance Summary

Compliance Summary Compliant High Risk Serious Risk Medium Risk Low Risk Error 0 0 0 0 0 0

Doc Summary (Compliance Report)

Listing of Documents:

vaterrj: Instructions to the Applicant Please list all Critical/Key documents for each Mil-Hdbk-516 Section that make up the TACC/MACC Compliance Report substantiating data.

AWRA for Noncompliant Criteria (generated by Program Office)

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

4 Systems Engineering Para# Mil-HDBK-516C Certification Criteria Applicable (Y/N) Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria Standard Method of Compliance Substantiating Data References Program Office Responsible Engineer Compliant (Y/N) Risk Assessment Level for Non-Compliances (RHI) EZ Quicklook Comments (Is the package complete, data available, non-compliances and risks ID'ed) EZ Quicklook Implications/Impact EZ SME Compliance Assessment (Y/N) EZ Comments on Compliance

EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA

1. Reliability, quality, and manufacturing program plans.

2. Contractor policies and procedures.

3. Durability and damage tolerance control plans.

4. Work instructions.

5. Process specifications.

6. Production/assembly progress reports.

7. Quality records.

8. Defect/failure data.

9. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.

10. Tech data package.

11. As-built list to include part numbers/serial numbers for all critical safety items/components.

12. List of deviations/waivers and unincorporated design changes.

13. List of approved class I engineering change proposals (ECPs).

14. DD Form 250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report.

15. Configuration management plans/process description documents.

16. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources Plan.

17. Obsolete Parts Plan.

18. Test reports.

19. Test plans.

20. FAA Airworthiness Directives and Advisory Circulars.

21. Manufacturer-issued service bulletins.

22. Civil aviation authority certification plan.

23. Civil aviation authority certification basis.

24. Civil aviation authority certification report.

25. System Safety Analysis Report.

26. Counterfeit Prevention Plan.

CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE

The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.

4.1 4.1 Design criteria.

4.1.1 4.1.1 Requirements allocation.

Criterion: Verify that the design criteria, including requirements and ground rules, adequately address airworthiness and safety for mission usage, full permissible flight envelope, duty cycle, interfaces, induced and natural environment, inspection capability, and maintenance philosophy.

References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others

MIL-STD-882

SAE ARP4761

Program Office SRD

SEMP (A012)

Criterion: Verify that airworthiness and safety design criteria are adequately addressed at component, subsystem and system levels, including interfaces, latencies, software and information assurance.

References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others

MIL-STD-882

SECNAVINST 4140.2

Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group (JACG) Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group (JACG) Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook

AMCOM REG 702-7

DoDM 4140.01

SAE AS6081

SAE AS6174

Criterion: Verify that, for commercial derivative air vehicles, the air vehicle's certification basis addresses all design criteria appropriate for the planned military usage.

References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others.

Criterion: Verify that safety of flight related failure conditions have been adequately addressed in the design criteria.

References: MIL-STD-882

NAVAIRINST 5000.21

NAVAIRINST 5100.3

AR 385-10

AR 385-16

DoDI 5000.36

SAE ARP4754

SAE ARP4761

Criterion: Verify that the air system is designed to operate in the natural and induced environments for which it is intended.

References: JSSG-2005: 3.2.3, 4.2.3

MIL-HDBK-310

MIL-STD-810 provides guidance on environmental qualification MIL-HDBK-87213: 3.2.3 provides guidance on environmental requirements for cockpit display equipment.

14 CFR 23.1309, 25.1309, 27.1309, 29.1309

Verify TMRS operations are adequate in the anticipated environment

Environmental Test Reports from Manufacturer

Criterion: Verify that the air systems design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, and their degraded and failed modes and states. Verify that the air system and air vehicle detect and respond appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight and safety critical function degraded states or failures.

N TMRS does not impact safety of flight Standard: The design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle. The air system design criteria identify flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures.

The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures.

The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to air vehicle flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention.

The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s) between the operator and air vehicle.

The air vehicle response to loss of command and control data link is appropriate and safe for the airspace in which the air system will be operated.

The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to the sense and avoid function for the airspace in which the air system will be operated, with or without operator intervention.

The air system (including air vehicle) responses to flight and safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s):

a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,

b. Activate only when needed,

c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states (see also 6.2.2.4 of this document),

d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,

e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and

f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions (see also 11.1.1.5 of this document).

(For information, see also 6.2; 8.3.10; 11.1.1 and 11.2.3; Section 15; and 17.2.9 of this document.)

Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, simulation, demonstration, and inspection of documentation.

Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states; flight and safety critical functions degraded states and failures; and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s). Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes ensure air system responses are appropriate for the intended airspace.

Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle, are identified.

Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures are identified.

A combination of ground testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to: (1) flight or safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention, (2) loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s), and (3) sense and avoid function, with or without operator intervention. This testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) responses:

a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,

b. Activate only when needed,

c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states,

d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,

e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and

f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions.

(For information, see also 6.2.2.4, 6.2.2.8, and 6.2.2.9 of this document.)

Criterion: Verify that the flight termination function, if incorporated into the design, is safe, secure and reliable.

Reference: RCC 319-14

4.2.1 4.2.1 Tool and database processes.

Criterion: Verify that all tools, methods, and databases used in the requirements management, design, risk control and assessments of safety are applied appropriately and exhibit accuracy commensurate with their application.

Inspection of documentation verifies that the design analysis, modeling and simulation tools are substantiated by and based on actual test data (when available). Actual system verification results are compared with design analysis, modeling and simulation tool results and databases for validation purposes.

References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others.

MIL-HDBK-470

MIL-STD-3022

ADS-51-HDBK

4.3.1 4.3.1 Selection of materials.

Criterion: For Army and Navy air systems, verify that the material selection process uses validated and consistent material properties data, including design mechanical and physical properties such as material defects, and corrosion and environmental protection requirements (see also Section 19, Materials; Section 5, Structures; and Section 7, Propulsion; Section 8, Air Vehicle Subsystems of this document).

a. An Aerospace Materials Specification (AMS) issued by the SAE Aerospace Materials Division,

b. An ASTM standard published by ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials),

c. A government (Military or Federal) specification, or

d. Other specifications as approved by the procuring agency.

If an approved specification for the product is not available, an acceptable draft specification has been prepared.

References: JSSG-2001

JSSG-2006

MIL-HDBK-516: Sections 19, 5, 7 and 8

MMPDS-08

CMH-17

ADS-13-HDBK

4.4.1 4.4.1 Key characteristics.

Criterion: Verify that key product characteristics (including critical characteristics) have been identified.

References: AFLCMC/EZSM Manufacturing Development Guide, Section 6.5, "Key Characteristics and Processes"

AFI 63-501

AMCOM REG 702-7 Management Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group

SECNAVINST 4140.2

ASME Y14.5

SAE AS9100

SAE AS9103

14 CFR 23.601-23.605, 25.601-25.603, 27.601-605, 29.601-29.605

Criterion: Verify that all critical process capabilities exist to meet key product characteristic requirements (including critical characteristics).

References: AFLCMC/EZSM Manufacturing Development Guide, Section 6.6, "Variability Reduction", for additional information on Cpk, Critical Processes, and Process Control Plans

AFI 63-501

AMCOM REG 702-7

Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group

SECNAVINST 4140.2

SAE AS9100

SAE AS9103

14 CFR 23.601-23.605, 25.601-25.603, 27.601-605, 29.601-29.605

Criterion: Verify that all critical process controls exist to assure key product characteristic requirements (including critical characteristics) are met.

References: AFLCMC/EZIM Manufacturing Development Guide, Section 5.6, "Variability Reduction", for additional information on Product Acceptance Criteria

AFI 63-501

AMCOM REG 702-7

Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group

SECNAVINST 4140.2

SAE AS6081

SAE AS6174

SAE AS9100

SAE AS9102

SAE AS9103

FAR Part 9.3, First Article Testing and Approval

14 CFR 23.601-23.605, 25.601-25.603, 27.601-605, 29.601-29.605

Criterion: Verify that the as-built configuration matches the as-designed configuration.

References: AFLCMC/EZSM Manufacturing Development Guide, Section 4, "Quality Systems", and Section 5.6 "Variability Reduction"

AFI 63-501

Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook, Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group

SAE AS6081

SAE AS6174

SAE AS9100

FAR Part 46, "Quality Assurance"

14 CFR 23.601-23.605, 25.601-25.603, 27.601-605, 29.601-29.605

Verify TMRS equipment is nondevelopmental and is under manufacturing config control; does the manufacturer meet ANSI quality standards, etc

Manufacturer ANSI Certification and/or Manufacturer CM Plan (A005 if applicable)

Criterion: Verify that nondestructive inspection (NDI) processes have been validated to assure conforming parts.

References: JSSG-2006: A.3.11.6, A.4.11.6

MIL-HDBK-1783

SAE ARP5089

SAE AS6081

SAE AS6174

4.5.1 4.5.1 Procedures and limitations.

Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes.

References: MIL-HDBK-516: 9.4, Human performance

MIL-STD-38784

MIL-DTL-85025

NAVAIRINST 13034.1

14 CFR 23.1541, 23.1581, 25.1541, 25.1581, 27.1541, 27.1581, 29.1541, 29.1581

Verify contractor has provided adequate Ops/MX manuals (or manual updates)

Proposed Manual Changes (A011)

Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document the technical data, and that the technical data are consistent with the defined functional and product baseline.

References: MIL-STD-38784

14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301

Verify contractor has provided adequate Ops/MX manuals (or manual updates)

Proposed Manual Changes (A011)

Criterion: Verify that procedures are in place for establishing and maintaining air system flight safety, as affected by product design changes, safety issues, changes in operations, maintenance, transportation or storage.

References: JSSG-2001: 3.3.5.1, 3.3.7.1 JSSG-2009: Appendix I

MIL-HDBK-515

MIL-STD-1530

MIL-STD-1796

MIL-STD-1798

MIL-STD-3024

NAVAIRINST 13034.1

Verify contractor has provided adequate Ops/MX manuals (or manual updates)

Proposed Manual Changes (A011)

4.6.1 4.6.1 Functional baseline.

Criterion: Verify that the functional baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.

References: MIL-HDBK-61: 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961: Appendix A

NAVAIRINST 4130.1

14 CFR: 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301

Criterion: Verify that the allocated baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.

References: MIL-HDBK-61 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961, Appendix A

NAVAIRINST 4130.1

Criterion: Verify that the product baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.

References: MIL-HDBK-61: 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961: Appendix A

NAVAIRINST 4130.1

14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301

Verify new Aircraft drawing and parts lists are final and under configuration control; verify the E-9A installation drawings are complete and come under PO config control via CCB process

List what USG has of the final design TDP (A015):

Drawings Parts Lists Wire Diagrams

Criterion: Verify that all safety-critical items are tracked and under configuration control.

References: MIL-HDBK-61: 7, Configuration Status Accounting

14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301

0 1 0 0

Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.

5 Structures Para# Mil-HDBK-516C Certification Criteria Applicable (Y/N) Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria Standard Method of Compliance Substantiating Data References Program Office Responsible Engineer Compliant (Y/N) Risk Assessment Level for Non-Compliances (RHI) EZ Quicklook Comments (Is the package complete, data available, non-compliances and risks ID'ed) EZ Quicklook Implications/Impact EZ SME Compliance Assessment (Y/N) EZ Comments on Compliance

The air vehicle structure, herein referred to as the aircraft, includes the fuselage, cockpit, wing, main and tail rotor, proprotor, empennage, tail pylon, structural elements of landing gear, the control system, control surfaces, drive system, rotor control systems, radomes, antennas, engine mounts, nacelles, pylons, thrust reversers (if not part of the engine), inlets, aerial refueling mechanisms, shipboard related airborne apparatus/devices (fixed wing catapult and arresting components; rotary wing/tiltrotor recovery assist, securing probe/harpoon system components and backup structure), structural operating mechanisms, structural provisions for seats, equipment, medical evacuation equipment, storage and on-board facilities payload, cargo, personnel accommodations, etc.

EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA

1. Design criteria.

2. Loads analyses.

3. Internal load and stress analyses.

4. Materials, processes, corrosion prevention, nondestructive evaluation and repair data.

5. Results from any design development tests conducted.

6. Proof test results.

7. Flutter, mechanical stability and aeroservoelastic analyses.

8. Loads wind tunnel test data.

9. Flutter wind tunnel test data.

10. Ground vibration test results.

11. Damage tolerance and durability analyses.

12. Component/full-scale static and fatigue test results.

13. Live fire test results and ballistic analysis.

14. Bird strike test and analysis results.

15. Arresting wire strike test and analysis results.

16. User and maintainer manuals or equivalent.

17. Flight operating limits.

18. Strength summary and operating restrictions.

19. Damage tolerance and durability test results.

20. Full-scale durability test results.

21. Functional test results.

22. Flight loads test results.

23. Instrumentation and calibration test results.

24. Control surface, tabs and damper test results.

25. Thermoelastic test results.

26. Limit-load rigidity test results.

27. Flight flutter test results.

28. Mass properties control and management plan (interface).

29. Weight and balance reports (interface).

30. Inertia report.

31. Design trade studies and analyses.

32. Fuel system test results.

33. Results of actual weighing

34. Weight and balance handbook, or equivalent.

35. Hazard analysis.

36. Environmental criteria and test results.

37. Vibration and acoustic test results.

38. Aircraft tracking program.

39. Landing gear and airframe drop test plans and results.

40. Mechanical stability test plans and results.

41. Whirl test plans and results.

42. Tie-down test plans and results.

43. Structural description report.

44. Tipover and rollover stability analyses.

45. External store interface and release data.

46. Ground and/or air transport rigging procedures, interface loads, and associated inspections.

47. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.

48. Ground and rotor blade clearance dimensional data.

49. Loss of lubrication testing.

50. Heat generation/rejection analysis.

CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE

The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.

The documents referenced under any criterion, standard and/or method of compliance may provide other standards which are applicable. In addition to the specifically enumerated criteria, standards and methods of compliance, structures are checked for a variety of 14 CFR references and Airworthiness Circulars. Due to the complexity of different design configurations, each section in 14 CFR 23 and 25 should be consulted for applicability.

5.1 5.1 Loads.

5.1.1 5.1.1 Design flight and ground loads.

Criterion (Army, Navy and Air Force): Verify that the loads used in the design of the aircraft include the maximum, minimum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight loading conditions for the air vehicle. These include loads during piloted or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, gusts, pressurization, turbulence, take-off, landing, catapult (if applicable), shipboard and land based arrestments (if applicable), ground operations, maintenance activity, systems failures from which recovery is expected (to include rapid depressurization) and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage.

a. Load factor selection considers the following items:

(1) Mission and flying techniques employed to execute the required mission.

(2) Weapon types and…