ufc_4_010_01_2018_c1.pdf

UFC 4-010-01

12 December 2018

Change 1, 19 August 2020

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM

STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS

DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR BUILDINGS

Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use.

Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright holder.

Indicate the preparing activity beside the Service responsible for preparing the document.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Preparing Activity)

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND

AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER

Record of Changes (changes are indicated by \1\ ... /1/)

Change No. Date Location 1 08/19/2020 Corrected metric conversions, references and terminology. Updated: multiple paragraphs to incorporate criteria change requests and to provide clarification. Updated Fig 3-1 and 3-2. Deleted paragraph A-8

This UFC supersedes UFC 4-010-01, dated December 2018.

FOREWORD

The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD (AT&L) Memorandum dated 29 May 2002. UFC will be used for all DoD projects and work for other customers where appropriate. All construction outside of the United States is also governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Host Nation Funded Construction Agreements (HNFA), and in some instances, Bilateral Infrastructure Agreements (BIA).

Therefore, the acquisition team must ensure compliance with the most stringent of the UFC, the SOFA, the HNFA, and the BIA, as applicable.

UFC are living documents and will be periodically reviewed, updated, and made available to users as part of the Services’ responsibility for providing technical criteria for military construction. Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) are responsible for administration of the UFC system. Defense agencies should contact the preparing service for document interpretation and improvements. Technical content of UFC is the responsibility of the cognizant DoD working group. Recommended changes with supporting rationale may be sent to the respective DoD working group by submitting a Criteria Change Request (CCR) via the Internet site listed below.

UFC are effective upon issuance and are distributed only in electronic media from the following source:

• Whole Building Design Guide web site http://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod.

Refer to UFC 1-200-01, DoD Building Code \1\/1/, for implementation of new issuances on projects.

AUTHORIZED BY:

LARRY D. McCALLISTER, PhD, PE, PMP, SES

JOSEPH E. GOTT, P.E.

Chief Engineer

Chief, Engineering and Construction Directorate of Civil Works

Naval Facilities Engineering Command

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

NANCY J. BALKUS, P.E., SES, DAF MICHAEL McANDREW Deputy Director of Civil Engineers DCS Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (HAF/A4C) HQ, United States Air Force

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Facilities Investment and Management) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations, and Environment) http://www.wbdg.org/pdfs/ufc_implementation.pdf http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_cat.php?o=29&c=4 http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_cat.php?o=29&c=4 http://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod

CHANGE SUMMARY SHEET

Document: UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings

Superseding: UFC 4-010-01, 11 December 2018.

Description: The purpose of this criteria is to establish minimum engineering standards for DoD projects that incorporate antiterrorism (AT) based mitigating measures not associated with an identified threat or level of protection. The intent of these standards is to reduce collateral damage and the scope and severity of mass casualties in buildings or portions of buildings owned, leased, privatized, or otherwise occupied, managed, or controlled by or for DoD in the event of a terrorist attack. This document applies to all DoD Components and to all DoD inhabited buildings as defined in the applicability section of this UFC.

Information in Chapter 4 and Appendix B will be removed when UFC 4-027-01, Design to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks in Expeditionary Environments and UFC 4-020-02: Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual are published.

Reasons for Document:

• This UFC establishes the minimum engineering standards that incorporate antiterrorism based mitigating measures not associated with an identified threat against DoD personnel and assets. This document has been updated to remove mitigation measure tied to a specific explosive weight.

Impact:

• This change has no cost implications with regards to the cost of construction for facilities that do not require a higher level of protection, and will promote efficiencies in land use and installation comprehensive planning.

Unification Issues

• There are no unification issues.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 BACKGROUND

1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1-3 INTENT

1-4 IMPLEMENTATION

1-5 APPLICABILITY

1-5.1 New Construction

1-5.2 Existing Buildings

1-5.3 Building Additions

1-5.4 Leased Buildings

1-5.5 Privatized Buildings

1-5.6 DoD Purchases of Existing Buildings

1-5.7 Non-DoD Tenant Buildings on DoD Installations

1-5.8 National Guard Buildings

1-5.9 Expeditionary Structures

1-6 EXCEPTIONS

1-6.1 Low Occupancy Buildings

1-6.2 Low Occupancy Family Housing

1-6.3 Fisher Houses

1-6.4 Town Centers

1-6.5 Enhanced Use Leases

1-6.6 Transitional and Temporary Structures and Spaces

1-6.7 Military Protective Construction

1-6.8 Parking Structures

1-7 OCCUPANCY CALCULATION

1-7.1 Gas Stations and Car Care Centers

1-7.2 Visitor Centers and Museums

1-7.3 Visitor Control Centers at Entry Control Facilities / Access Control Points

1-8 REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

1-8.1 DoD and Heads of DoD Components ii

1-8.2 Geographic Combatant Commanders

1-8.3 Installation Specific Requirements

1-9 EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STANDARDS

1-10 GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS

1-11 PROJECT PLANNING AND DESIGN CRITERIA

1-12 HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMPLIANCE

1-12.1 Security and Stewardship

1-12.2 Compliance with Laws

1-12.3 Compliance with DoD Standards

1-13 GLOSSARY

1-14 REFERENCES

1-15 PLANNING AND INTEGRATION

1-15.1 Threat-Specific Requirements

1-15.2 Effective Planning

1-15.3 Critical Facilities

1-16 MASTER PLANS

1-17 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES

1-17.1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings

1-17.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual

1-17.3 Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual

1-17.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals

1-17.5 Security Engineering UFC Application

1-18 STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 2 PHILOSOPHY, DESIGN STRATEGIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

2-1 GENERAL

2-2 PHILOSOPHY

2-2.1 Time

2-2.2 Design Practices

2-3 DESIGN STRATEGIES

2-3.1 Prevent Building Collapse

2-3.2 Minimize Hazardous Flying Debris

2-3.3 Provide Effective Building Layout iii

2-3.4 Limit Airborne Contamination

2-3.5 Provide Building Mass Notification

2-4 ASSUMPTIONS

2-4.1 Baseline Antiterrorism Protective Measures

2-4.2 Policies and Procedures

2-4.3 Training

CHAPTER 3 STANDARDS

3-1 INTRODUCTION

3-2 STANDARD 1. STANDOFF DISTANCE

3-2.1 Minimum Standoff

3-3 STANDARD 2. UNOBSTRUCTED SPACE

3-3.1 Concealment

3-3.2 Trash Containers

3-3.3 Electrical and Mechanical Equipment

3-3.4 Fuel Tanks

3-3.5 Walls and Screens

3-3.6 Enclosures

3-3.7 Parking Within Unobstructed Spaces

3-3.8 Adjacent Existing Buildings

3-4 STANDARD 3. DRIVE-UP/DROP-OFF AREAS

3-5 STANDARD 4. ACCESS ROADS

3-6 STANDARD 5. PARKING BENEATH BUILDINGS OR ON ROOFTOPS.

3-7 STANDARD 6. PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE RESISTANCE

3-7.1 Progressive Collapse Design

3-8 STANDARD 7. STRUCTURAL ISOLATION

3-8.1 Building Additions

3-8.2 Portions of Buildings

3-9 STANDARD 8. BUILDING OVERHANGS AND BREEZEWAYS

3-9.1 Building Elements

3-10 STANDARD 9. EXTERIOR MASONRY WALLS

3-11 STANDARD 10. GLAZING

iv

3-11.1 Glazing

3-11.2 Exterior Stairwells, Vestibules, and Covered or Enclosed Walkways. . 24

3-11.3 Replacement with Wall or Roof Systems

3-11.4 Alternative Window Treatments

3-12 STANDARD 11. BUILDING ENTRANCE LAYOUT

3-12.1 New Construction

3-12.2 Existing Buildings

3-13 STANDARD 12. EXTERIOR DOORS

3-13.1 Glazed Doors

3-13.2 Sliding Glass doors and Revolving Doors

3-13.3 Overhead Doors

3-14 STANDARD 13. MAIL ROOMS AND LOADING DOCKS

3-14.1 Location

3-15 STANDARD 14. ROOF ACCESS

3-15.1 New Construction

3-15.2 Existing Buildings

3-16 STANDARD 15. OVERHEAD MOUNTED ARCHITECTURAL

FEATURES

3-17 STANDARD 16. AIR INTAKES

3-17.1 New Construction

3-17.2 Existing Buildings

3-18 STANDARD 17. MAIL ROOM AND LOADING DOCK VENTILATION. 28

3-18.1 Other Heating and Cooling Systems

3-18.2 Dedicated Exhaust Systems

3-18.3 Outside Intakes, Relief, and Exhausts

3-18.4 Isolation Controls

3-18.5 Walls and Sealing Joints and Doors

3-19 STANDARD 18. EMERGENCY AIR DISTRIBUTION SHUTOFF

3-19.1 Outside Air Intakes, Relief Air, and Exhausts

3-19.2 Critical Areas

3-19.3 Unoccupied Areas

3-19.4 Fan Coil Units and Air Conditioners v

3-20 STANDARD 19. EQUIPMENT BRACING

3-21 STANDARD 20. UNDER BUILDING ACCESS

3-22 STANDARD 21. MASS NOTIFICATION

CHAPTER 4 STANDARDS FOR EXPEDITIONARY STRUCTURES

4-1 GENERAL

4-2 SITE PLANNING STANDARDS

4-2.1 Standard 1. Standoff Distances

4-2.2 Minimum Standoff

4-2.3 Standard 2. Structure Separation

4-2.4 Standard 3. Unobstructed Space

4-3 ADDITIONAL STANDARDS

4-3.1 Container Structures and Pre-engineered Buildings

4-3.2 Fabric Covered, Trailers, Modular Structures, and other Expeditionary Structures

4-4 ANTITERRORISM RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX A RECOMMENDED ANTITERRORISM MEASURES FOR NEW AND

EXISTING BUILDINGS

A-1 INTRODUCTION

A-2 RECOMMENDATION 1. VEHICLE ACCESS POINTS

A-3 RECOMMENDATION 2. HIGH-SPEED VEHICLE APPROACHES

A-4 RECOMMENDATION 3. DRIVE-UP/DROP-OFF AREAS

A-5 RECOMMENDATION 4. BUILDING LOCATION

A-6 RECOMMENDATION 5. RAILROAD LOCATION

A-7 RECOMMENDATION 6. ACCESS CONTROL FOR FAMILY HOUSING.

A-8 RECOMMENDATION 8. BUILDING SEPARATION

A-9 RECOMMENDATION 9. VISITOR CONTROL

A-10 RECOMMENDATION 10. ASSET LOCATION

A-11 RECOMMENDATION 11. ROOM LAYOUT

A-12 RECOMMENDATION 12. EXTERNAL HALLWAYS

APPENDIX B BEST PRACTICES

B-1 INTRODUCTION

vi

B-2 SITE PLANNING FOR STATIONARY VEHICLE BOMBS AND HAND

DELIVERED DEVICES

B-2.1 Standoff Distances

B-2.2 Unobstructed Space

B-2.3 Drive-Up/Drop-Off Areas

B-2.4 Access Roads

B-2.5 Parking Beneath Buildings or on Rooftops

B-3 ARCHITECTURAL AND STRUCTURAL DESIGN

B-3.1 Windows and Skylights

B-3.2 Exterior Doors

APPENDIX C REPRESENTATIVE STANDOFF DISTANCES FOR CONVENTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION and Expeditionary Structures

C-1 INTRODUCTION

C-2 USING THIS APPENDIX

C-3 WALLS

C-4 ROOFS

C-5 WINDOWS

C-6 EXPEDITIONARY STRUCTURES

APPENDIX D GLOSSARY

D-1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

D-2 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

APPENDIX E REFERENCES

FIGURES

Figure 1-1 Security Engineering UFC Applicability

Figure 3-1 Installation Perimeter with Outer Clear Zone

Figure 3-2 Installation Perimeter without Outer Clear Zone

Figure 4-1 Standoff and Separation Distances for Expeditionary Construction 36

Figure B-1 Standoff Distances – With Controlled Perimeter

Figure B-2 Standoff Distances – No Controlled Perimeter

Figure B-3 Parking and Roadway Control for Existing Buildings – Controlled Perimeter 42

Figure B-4 Parking and Roadway Control for Existing Buildings – No Controlled Perimeter 42 vii

TABLES

Table B-1 Levels of Protection – New and Existing Buildings

Table C-1 Representative Standoff Distances for Very Low Level of Protection 7 61

Table C-2 Representative Standoff Distances for Low Level of Protection 7

Table C-3 Representative Standoff Distances for Medium Level of Protection 7 .. 63

Table C-4 Representative Standoff Distances for High Level of Protection 7

Table C-5 Conventional Construction Parameters

Table C-6 Standoff Distances for Expeditionary Structures

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 BACKGROUND.

One of the findings in the 1996 Downing Commission report on the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was that there were no standards for force protection in fixed DoD facilities. In partial response to that finding, the initial version of this document was published as an interim standard in December 1999. It applied to Military Construction (MILCON) funded new construction and major renovations of DoD buildings beginning with the Fiscal Year 2002 program. It was transmitted by a memorandum dated 20 September 2002 from the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and was referenced as a requirement by DoD Instruction 2000.16.

1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

The purpose of this standard is to establish minimum engineering standards that incorporate antiterrorism (AT) based mitigating measures where no identified threat or level of protection has been determined in accordance with UFC 4-020-01.

1-3 INTENT.

The intent of these standards is to reduce collateral damage and the scope and severity of mass casualties in the event of a terrorist attack. These standards provide cost effective, implementable, and enforceable construction standards to protect personnel against terrorist attacks. While complete protection against all potential threats for every inhabited building is cost prohibitive, the intent of these standards can be achieved through prudent master planning, real estate acquisition, and design and construction practices.

1-4 IMPLEMENTATION.

Implement in accordance with the Implementation, Administration, and Enforcement paragraph in UFC 1-200-01. These standards apply to projects funded under host-nation agreements after the implementation date of these standards or as soon as negotiations with the foreign governments can be completed.

Due to major changes between these standards and previous editions, projects currently under design and beyond 35% completion may consider complying with these standards where possible.

1-5 APPLICABILITY.

These standards apply to all DoD Components, to all DoD inhabited buildings and high occupancy family housing, to all inhabited tenant buildings on DoD installations, and to all DoD expeditionary structures.

1-5.1 New Construction.

Implementation of these standards is mandatory for all new construction regardless of funding source.

1-5.2 Existing Buildings.

Implementation of these standards is mandatory to existing buildings when triggered as specified below, regardless of funding source.

1-5.2.1 Major Investments.

Implementation of these standards to bring entire inhabited buildings into compliance is mandatory for all DoD building renovations, modifications, repairs, revitalizations, and restorations where project costs exceed 50% of the replacement cost of the existing building in accordance with UFC 3-701-01 except as otherwise stated in these standards. The \1\ project costs used to compare against the 50% threshold are exclusive of the additional /1/ costs identified to meet these standards.

Where \1\ project /1/ costs do not exceed the 50% threshold, compliance with these standards is recommended, but not required.

1-5.2.2 Change of Occupancy Level.

Implementation of these standards is mandatory when any building or portion of a building is converted from low occupancy to inhabited occupancy. Examples would include a warehouse (low occupancy) being converted to administrative (inhabited) use.

1-5.2.3 Window, Skylight, Glazing, and Door Replacement Projects.

Because of the significance of glazing hazards in a blast environment, implementation of all provisions of Standard 10 is mandatory for existing inhabited buildings any time a window, skylight, or glazing is being replaced. This also applies to installation of supplemental windows behind existing windows (inside face) and to installation of windows in new openings.

Because of the significance of door hazards in a blast environment, implementation of all provisions of Standard 12 is mandatory for existing inhabited buildings any time doors are being replaced.

1-5.2.4 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems and Associated Controls.

Whenever HVAC systems featuring outside air intakes or control systems associated with HVAC systems including outside air intakes are being replaced or modified, apply provisions of Standards \1\ 16 and 18. /1/ Modifications include, but are not limited to modifications such as complete air handling unit replacement, outside air control damper replacement, major ductwork reconfiguration, control system replacement, and control system reprogramming. Modifications do not include replacement of or repair of components such as coils and fans and do not include control system software updates or reprogramming in support of additional equipment added to an existing control system.

1-5.3 Building Additions.

Inhabited additions to existing buildings must comply with the minimum standards for new buildings. If the addition is 50% or more of the gross area of the existing building, the existing building will comply with the minimum standards for existing buildings in Chapter 3. Cost of building additions will not be included in calculating the 50% trigger for major investments.

Throughout these standards references to new construction will be considered to be inclusive of additions to existing buildings.

1-5.4 Leased Buildings.

\1\ In accordance with DoD Instruction 2000.12, all leased facility space or space in buildings owned or operated by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) not located on DoD property must comply with the security standards established by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) in The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard. The ISC standard must additionally be applied to leased space not on DoD property in foreign countries. Facility space leased prior to 7 December 2012 must comply with the ISC standards to the extent practicable in accordance with existing lease agreements. /1/

1-5.5 Privatized Buildings.

Privatized inhabited buildings and high occupancy family housing that meet the applicability provisions above, will comply with these standards.

1-5.6 DoD Purchases of Existing Buildings.

Existing inhabited buildings purchased for use by DoD will comply with the minimum standards for existing buildings. Those buildings will meet the requirements before they can be occupied by DoD personnel.

1-5.7 Non-DoD Tenant Buildings on DoD Installations.

Tenant buildings on DoD installations other than those that meet one of the exemptions below are required to comply with these standards because it is assumed that the tenant buildings are likely to be turned over to DoD sometime during their design life and that they will then be occupied by DoD personnel. For the purposes of these standards, occupancy levels for non-DoD tenant-built building will be calculated assuming that building occupants are DoD personnel.

1-5.8 National Guard Buildings.

National Guard buildings that use Federal funding for new construction, renovations, modifications, repairs, or restorations that meet the applicability provisions above, will comply with these standards.

1-5.9 Expeditionary Structures.

Implementation of these minimum standards is mandatory for all expeditionary structures that meet the occupancy criteria for inhabited buildings. See Chapter 4 for structure types that meet the expeditionary structures criteria. Many expeditionary structures are in forward operating locations where there is a conventional and/or terrorist threat more severe than those addressed in these standards. In those situations, more detailed planning and additional measures are needed for providing protection. Refer to the GTA 90-01-011 \1\/1/.

1-5.9.1 New Structures.

These standards apply to all new expeditionary structures effective as of the implementation date of these standards.

1-5.9.2 Existing Structures.

These standards will apply to all existing expeditionary structures as they undergo major modifications or renovations as of the implementation date of these standards.

1-6 EXCEPTIONS.

The following buildings are exempt from all provisions of these standards. Compliance with these standards for those buildings is recommended where possible. In addition, there are some exemptions to individual standards that are included in the text of those standards in CHAPTER 3.

1-6.1 Low Occupancy Buildings.

Buildings whose occupancies do not meet the occupancy levels of inhabited buildings.

1-6.2 Low Occupancy Family Housing.

Family housing with 12 units or fewer per building.

The exemption of family housing with 12 units or fewer in a single building acknowledges that the density of such units is generally low, reducing the likelihood of mass casualties. It also acknowledges the fact that low-density housing has rarely been directly targeted by terrorists.

1-6.3 Fisher Houses.

Fisher houses with 24 units or fewer.

1-6.4 Town Centers.

Town Center buildings that include retail, health, or community services space on the first floor and not more than 12 units of family housing above that space.

This exception does not apply where the buildings contain any occupancy other than retail, health, community services, and family housing or where the retail space is more than half of the total area of the family housing.

1-6.5 Enhanced Use Leases.

Facilities associated with enhanced use leases on DoD installations, unless a facility warrants additional force protection due to its specific purpose and/or location per title 10 U.S.C. section 2667(b)(8). Application of these standards must be justified on a case-by-case basis.

1-6.6 Transitional and Temporary Structures and Spaces.

Buildings, structures, and spaces that are required for limited durations to maintain operations during construction, for other temporary mission requirements, or for administering construction contracts.

Lightweight buildings or trailers are frequently provided for these structures, and those kinds of structures are commonly not commercially available with construction such as laminated glass windows that will meet these standards. Enforcing the standards on those structures, therefore, would be of questionable economic feasibility for the short duration for which they are anticipated to be used.

1-6.6.1 Transitional Structures and Spaces.

Buildings and structures, including buildings and structures leased to provide transitional spaces during the life of the construction or renovation contract for which the transitional buildings and structures are being provided, but no longer than 5 years.

1-6.6.2 Temporary and Relocatable Buildings.

Temporary and relocatable buildings that are intended for use for less than 5 years in non-expeditionary environments are exempt from all provisions of these standards.

1-6.7 Military Protective Construction.

Facilities designed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (or equivalent) standards for collaterally protected, semi-hardened, protected, and hardened facilities are exempt from all provisions of these standards. (Refer to Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) document 6160/SHLOFA-059-82.)

These facilities are exempted because the military conventional and nuclear weapons threats to which they are designed are much more stringent than those included in these standards due to their purpose of protecting critical military functions. Facilities designed to protective construction standards will provide higher levels of protection for facility occupants than those required by these standards.

1-6.8 Parking Structures.

Parking structures are exempt from these standards except where there are areas built into the structures that meet the definition of inhabited buildings. People accessing their vehicles do not need to be included in any calculation of population or population density.

1-7 OCCUPANCY CALCULATION.

The starting point for applying the Standards is based on buildings or portions of buildings being routinely occupied by 11 or more DoD personnel and with a population density of greater than one person per 430 gross square feet (40 gross square meters).

The determination of occupancy is usually straightforward but in some cases there are questions on how to calculate occupancies. The following are examples of how to determine occupancy.

1-7.1 Gas Stations and Car Care Centers.

Where DoD or non-DoD visitors to Gas Stations and Car Care Centers routinely increase the occupancy of those buildings to levels meeting the definition of inhabited buildings, those buildings will comply with these standards.

1-7.2 Visitor Centers and Museums.

Where DoD or non-DoD visitors to visitor centers, museums, and similar buildings on DoD property routinely increase the occupancy of those buildings to levels meeting the definition of inhabited buildings, those buildings will comply with these standards.

1-7.3 Visitor Control Centers at Entry Control Facilities / Access Control Points.

Where DoD personnel and the average daily peak occupancy of visitors routinely increase the occupancy of those buildings to levels meeting the definition of inhabited buildings, those buildings will comply with these standards. See UFC 4-022-01 for average daily occupancy calculation.

1-8 REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.

The following regulatory authorities may establish antiterrorism related requirements in addition to the Standards in this UFC.

1-8.1 DoD and Heads of DoD Components.

DoD and heads of DoD Components may establish additional guidance or standards for facilities under their authority or to account for any component related special circumstances.

1-8.2 Geographic Combatant Commanders.

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) may establish additional guidance or standards within their areas of operations. Such guidance is typically included in Antiterrorism Operations Orders (OPORD).

1-8.3 Installation Specific Requirements.

As required by DoD Instruction O-2000.16 and service directives, each installation must have an Antiterrorism Plan. The plan provides procedures and recommendations for reducing risk and vulnerability of DoD personnel, their family members, facilities, and assets from acts of terrorism. Installation Antiterrorism Plans may define a Design Basis Threat for the installation; however, UFC 4-020-01 must be used to establish the Design Basis Threat and level of protection for individual projects.

1-9 EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STANDARDS.

These antiterrorism standards establish criteria to minimize mass casualties and progressive collapse of buildings from terrorist attacks. DoD 6055.09-M, DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards as implemented by Service component explosive safety standards, establish acceptable levels of protection for accidental explosions of DoD-titled munitions. The explosive safety and antiterrorism standards address hazards associated with unique events; therefore, they specify different levels of protection. Compliance with both standards is required where applicable. Where conflicts arise, the more stringent criteria will govern.

1-10 GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS.

Comply with UFC 1-200-01, DoD Building Code \1\/1/. UFC 1-200-01 provides applicability of model building codes and government unique criteria for typical design disciplines and building systems, as well as for accessibility, antiterrorism, security, high performance and sustainability requirements, and safety. Use this UFC in addition to UFC 1-200-01 and the UFCs and government criteria referenced therein.

It is assumed that the provisions of these standards will be coordinated with all other applicable DoD building and design criteria and policies. Nothing in these standards should be interpreted to supersede the provisions of any other applicable building or design criteria. Where other criteria mandate more stringent requirements, the most stringent is applicable.

1-11 PROJECT PLANNING AND DESIGN CRITERIA.

The standards contained within this document do not establish the Design Basis Threat or Level of Protection for DoD buildings. Use UFC 4-020-01 to establish the Design Basis Threat and Level of Protection for individual projects.

1-12 HISTORIC PRESERVATION COMPLIANCE.

1-12.1 Security and Stewardship.

The Department of Defense remains the lead federal agency in balancing security threats with the protection of historic properties. The Department of Defense abides by federal legislation on protecting cultural resources, and issues its own complementary policies for stewardship.

1-12.2 Compliance with Laws.

Implementation of these standards will not supersede DoD’s obligation to comply with federal laws regarding cultural resources to include the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA). Installation personnel must determine possible adverse effects to historic structures and/or archaeological resources during project development and consult accordingly.

Personnel at installations outside the United States should coordinate with the applicable host nation regarding possible adverse effects to cultural resources.

1-12.3 Compliance with DoD Standards.

Conversely, historic preservation compliance does not negate the requirement to implement other Department of Defense policy. Federal agencies are always the decision-maker in the Section 106 process of the National Historic Preservation Act. An agency should seek to avoid prolonged consultations that conflict with the imminent need to implement security requirements. Preservation considerations and antiterrorism standards are not mutually exclusive, and any compliance conflicts should be quickly and effectively resolved in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.

1-13 GLOSSARY.

APPENDIX D contains acronyms, abbreviations, and definitions of terms.

1-14 REFERENCES.

APPENDIX E contains a list of references used in this document. The publication date of the code or standard is not included in this document. Unless otherwise specified, the most recent edition of the referenced publication applies.

1-15 PLANNING AND INTEGRATION.

When the best procedures, proper training, and appropriate equipment fail to deter terrorist attacks, adherence to these standards goes toward mitigating the possibility of mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel in the buildings in which they work and live. Although predicting the specific threat is not possible, proper planning and integration of those plans provide a solid foundation for preventing, and if necessary reacting, when terrorist incidents or other emergencies unfold.

1-15.1 Threat-Specific Requirements.

Determining the Design Basis Threat is an installation function requiring programmers, antiterrorism officers, and members of the threat working group. Determining the facility specific Design Basis Threat is the first step in planning antiterrorism requirements.

However, without a defined level of protection, only the minimum standards apply. The Design Basis Threat and level of protection are unique for each individual facility and are based on the threat likelihoods and the values of the assets in the building. Use UFC 4-020-01 to determine the Design Basis Threat and level of protection for individual projects. The process outlined in UFC 4-020-01 will determine if the minimum AT standards are adequate or if additional protective measures are required.

1-15.2 Effective Planning.

An effective planning process facilitates the necessary decision making, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and ensures support actions generally go as planned. A team consisting of the chain of command and key personnel from all appropriate functional areas who have an interest in the building and its operation executes this planning process. The team should include, as a minimum, antiterrorism/force protection, intelligence, security, and facility engineering personnel. This team is responsible for identifying requirements for the project, facilitating the development of supporting operational procedures, obtaining adequate resources, and properly supporting all other efforts needed to prudently enhance protection of the occupants of every inhabited DoD building. For further information on planning and integration, refer to UFC 4-020-01.

1-15.3 Critical Facilities.

\1\ Buildings that must remain operational to maintain mission capability may warrant a level of protection higher than provided by these standards. When required, ensure the security design criteria is developed using UFC 4-020-01. /1/

1-16 MASTER PLANS.

Installation master plans must include roadmaps \1\ to accommodate present and future antiterrorism needs /1/ for new and existing facilities. Master plans should consider threats and levels of protection for facilities. For site planning this may include standoff from parking, base perimeters, and entry control facilities / access control points, but it can also include utilities, vantage points, and the location of high value assets.

1-17 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES.

This UFC is one of a series of security engineering unified facilities criteria documents that cover minimum standards, planning, preliminary design, and detailed design for security and antiterrorism. The manuals in this series are designed to be used sequentially by a diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the design cycle. The manuals in this series include the following:

1-17.1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.

This UFC establishes standards that provide minimum protection against terrorist attacks for the occupants of all DoD inhabited buildings. This UFC is intended to be used by security and antiterrorism personnel and design teams to identify the minimum requirements that must be incorporated into the design of all new construction and major renovations of inhabited DoD buildings and inhabited tenant buildings on DoD installations. They also include recommendations that should be, but are not required to be incorporated into all such buildings.

1-17.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual.

UFC 4-020-01 presents processes for developing the design criteria necessary to incorporate security and antiterrorism into DoD facilities and for identifying the cost implications of applying those design criteria. Those design criteria may be limited to the requirements of the minimum standards, or they may include protection of assets other than those addressed in the minimum standards (people), aggressor tactics that are not addressed in the minimum standards, or levels of protection beyond those required by the minimum standards. The cost implications for security and antiterrorism are addressed as cost increases over conventional construction for common construction types. The changes in construction represented by those cost increases are tabulated for reference, but they represent only representative construction that will meet the requirements of the design criteria. The manual also addresses the tradeoffs between cost and risk. The Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual is intended to be used by planners as well as security and antiterrorism personnel with support from planning team members.

1-17.3 Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual.

UFC 4-020-02FA provides interdisciplinary design guidance for developing preliminary systems of protective measures to implement the design criteria established using UFC 4-020-01. Those protective measures include building and site elements, equipment, and the supporting manpower and procedures necessary to make them all work as a system. The information in UFC 4-020-02FA is in sufficient detail to support concept level project development, and as such can provide a good basis for a more detailed design. The primary audience for the Security Engineering Design Manual is the design team, but it can also be used by security and antiterrorism personnel.

1-17.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals.

In addition to the standards, planning, and design UFCs mentioned above, there is a series of additional UFCs that provide detailed design guidance for developing final designs based on the preliminary designs developed using UFC 4-020-02. These support manuals provide specialized, discipline specific design guidance. Some address specific tactics such as direct fire weapons, forced entry, or airborne contamination. Others address limited aspects of design such as resistance to progressive collapse or design of portions of buildings such as mail rooms. Still others address details of designs for specific protective measures such as vehicle barriers or fences. The Security Engineering Support Manuals are intended to be used by the design team during the development of final design packages.

1-17.5 Security Engineering UFC Application.

The application of the security engineering series of UFCs is illustrated in Figure 1-1.

UFC 4-020-01 is intended to be the starting point for any project that is likely to have security or antiterrorism requirements. By beginning with UFC 4-020-01, the design criteria will be developed that establishes which of the other UFCs in the series will need to be applied. The design criteria may indicate that only the minimum standards need to be incorporated, or it may include additional requirements, resulting in the need for application of additional UFCs. Applying this series of UFCs in the manner illustrated in Figure 1-1 will result in the most efficient use of resources for protecting assets against security and antiterrorism related threats.

Figure 1-1 Security Engineering UFC Applicability

1-18 STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Mandatory DoD minimum antiterrorism standards for new and existing inhabited buildings are contained in Chapter 3. Mandatory DoD minimum antiterrorism standards for expeditionary structures are contained in Chapter 4. Where specific Design Basis Threat and level of protection are identified, additional guidance is included in

APPENDIX B.

Additional recommended measures for new and existing inhabited buildings are included in APPENDIX A. The standards and recommendations in this document include a combination of performance and prescriptive requirements. In many cases where there are minimum prescriptive requirements, those requirements are based on performance standards and there are generally provisions to allow those performances to be provided through alternate means where those means will provide the required levels of protection.

CHAPTER 2 PHILOSOPHY, DESIGN STRATEGIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

2-1 GENERAL.

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the philosophies on which these standards are based, the design strategies that are their foundation, and the assumptions inherent in their provisions. The further purpose of this chapter is to provide background and rationale for the requirements in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3; therefore, nothing in this chapter should be construed to establish a requirement. Effective implementation of these standards depends on a reasonable understanding of the rationale for them. With this understanding, engineers and security and antiterrorism personnel can maximize the efficiency of their solutions for complying with these standards while considering site-specific threat and mission related issues and constraints that might dictate measures beyond these minimums.

2-2 PHILOSOPHY.

The overarching philosophy upon which this document is based is that comprehensive protection for every inhabited facility against the range of possible threats is cost prohibitive, but that appropriate protective measures can be provided for all DoD personnel at a reasonable cost. Those protective measures are engineering solutions intended to lessen the risk of mass casualties and collateral damage resulting from terrorist attacks. Implementation of these standards will provide some protection against a wide range of threats and will reduce injuries and fatalities. The costs associated with these standards are assumed to be less than the physical and intangible costs associated with incurring mass casualties.

Furthermore, all DoD decision makers must commit to making smarter investments with the scarce resources available and stop investing money in inadequate buildings that DoD personnel will have to occupy for decades, regardless of the threat environment.

There are two key elements of this philosophy that influence the implementation of these standards.

2-2.1 Time.

Protective measures must be in place prior to the initiation of a terrorist attack.

Incorporating those measures into DoD buildings and inhabited tenant buildings on DoD installations is least expensive at the time those buildings are being constructed, are undergoing major renovation, repair, restoration, or modernization, or when existing buildings are being purchased. Because of that investment strategy, it is recognized that it may take significant time before all DoD buildings and inhabited tenant buildings on DoD installations comply with these standards.

2-2.2 Design Practices.

The philosophy of these standards is to build a baseline level of resistance to terrorist attack into all DoD inhabited buildings. That philosophy affects the general practice of designing inhabited buildings. While these standards are not based on an identified threat or level of protection, they are engineering solutions intended to provide the easiest and most economical methods to minimize injuries and fatalities in the event of a terrorist attack. The primary methods to achieve this outcome are to construct superstructures to avoid progressive collapse, minimize hazardous flying debris, provide effective building layout, limit airborne contamination, and provide building mass notification. These and related design issues are intended to be incorporated into standard design practice.

2-3 DESIGN STRATEGIES.

There are several major design strategies that are applied throughout these standards.

They do not account for all of the measures considered in these standards, but they are the most effective and economical in protecting DoD personnel from terrorist attacks.

These strategies are summarized below.

2-3.1 Prevent Building Collapse.

Provisions for preventing building collapse are essential to minimizing mass casualties of building occupants. Those provisions apply regardless of standoff distance or the ability of buildings to resist blast effects since structural systems that provide greater continuity and redundancy among structural components will help limit collapse for any extreme loading events.

2-3.2 Minimize Hazardous Flying Debris.

In past explosive events where there was no building collapse, a high number of injuries resulted from flying glass fragments and debris from walls, ceilings, and fixtures (non-structural features). Flying debris can be minimized through building design and avoidance of certain building materials and construction techniques. The glass used in most windows breaks at very low blast pressures, resulting in hazardous, dagger-like fragments. Minimizing those hazards through reduction in window numbers and sizes and through enhanced glazing construction has a major effect on limiting mass casualties. Hazardous fragments may also include secondary debris from such sources as barriers and site furnishings.

2-3.3 Provide Effective Building Layout.

Effective design of building layout and orientation can significantly reduce opportunities for terrorists to target building occupants or injure large numbers of people.

2-3.4 Limit Airborne Contamination.

Effective design of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems can significantly reduce the potential for chemical, biological, and radiological agents being distributed throughout buildings.

2-3.5 Provide Building Mass Notification.

Providing a timely means to notify building occupants of threats and what should be done in response to those threats reduces the risk of mass casualties. Effective designs will include means for both local and remote origination of information.

2-4 ASSUMPTIONS.

This section includes assumptions that form the foundation of these standards and assumptions and philosophies behind some of the provisions of these standards.

2-4.1 Baseline Antiterrorism Protective Measures.

The location, severity, and nature of terrorist threats are unpredictable. It would be cost prohibitive to provide protection against the worst-case scenario in every building.

These standards provide a reasonable baseline of antiterrorism protective measures for inhabited DoD buildings and inhabited tenant buildings on DoD installations. Designing to these standards will provide general collateral protection and will establish a foundation upon which to build additional measures \1\/1/ in the future.

The terrorist threats addressed in these standards are further assumed to be directed against DoD personnel. Threats to other assets and critical infrastructure and specific threats to facilities are beyond the scope of these standards, but they are addressed in UFC 4-020-01. The following are the terrorist tactics upon which these standards are based:

2-4.1.1 External Explosive Threats.

These minimum standards are not based on a specific Design Basis Threat identified against the facility being designed. These minimum standards provide collateral damage protection for explosive threats directed against other nearby facilities.

2-4.1.2 Mail Bombs.

Explosives in packages delivered through the mail can cause significant localized damage, injuries, and fatalities if they detonate inside a building. No assumption as to the size of such explosives is made in these standards. Provisions for mail bombs are limited to specifying locations of mail rooms so that they can be more efficiently hardened if a specific threat of a mail bomb is identified in the future.

2-4.1.3 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Weapons.

For the purposes of these standards, these weapons are assumed to be improvised weapons containing airborne agents employed by terrorists. These standards do not assume comprehensive protection against this threat. They provide means to reduce the potential for widespread dissemination of such agents throughout buildings in the event of an attack either outside buildings or in mail rooms.

2-4.2 Policies and Procedures.

It is assumed that policies and procedures will be developed to support these standards and other related issues and that those policies and procedures will be incorporated into antiterrorism plans, training, and exercises. It is assumed for the purposes of these standards that policies and procedures will be developed by physical security personnel at individual installations or buildings based on their local capabilities and situations.

2-4.3 Training.

It is assumed that key security and facility personnel will receive training in security engineering, antiterrorism, physical security, and related areas. It is further assumed that all DoD personnel have been trained in basic antiterrorism awareness in accordance with DoD Instruction O-2000.16, that they are able to recognize potential threats, and that they know the proper courses of action should they detect a potential threat.

CHAPTER 3 STANDARDS

3-1 INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish standards to provide appropriate protective measures for the protection of DoD personnel at a reasonable cost. These standards represent engineering solutions intended to lessen the risk of mass casualties and collateral damage resulting from terrorist attacks. Implementation of these standards will provide some protection against a wide range of threats and should reduce injuries and fatalities.

The standards in this chapter provide the minimum protective measures for DoD inhabited buildings. Engineers, security and antiterrorism personnel must consider site-specific threats, mission related issues and constraints that might dictate measures beyond these minimums. Use UFC 4-020-01 to establish project requirements and determine if these minimum standards are adequate or if additional mitigation measures are required. The engineering risk analysis conducted as part of UFC 4-020-01 should be consistent with the terrorism risk analysis conducted by the installation security/AT staff.

3-2 STANDARD 1. STANDOFF DISTANCE.

The previous version of Standard 1 established standoff distances to parking, roadways, and controlled perimeters that were based on building construction and occupancy. In this revision of Standard 1, standoff distances only apply to distances to installation perimeters for new construction and additions to existing buildings that are required to comply with these standards.

Exception: Existing buildings within an installation perimeter are exempt from this standard.

3-2.1 Minimum Standoff.

The minimum standoff distance for new construction and additions to existing buildings to the installation perimeter is 20 ft. (6 m) \1\ when there is 30 ft. (9m) of clear zone or greater outside the perimeter. Provide a minimum aggregate standoff of 50 feet (15 m) inclusive of the clear zones outside and inside the installation perimeter. For example, if an installation has an established inner clear zone of 20 ft. (6 m) but the outer clear zone is 20 ft. (6 m) wide, the standoff distance to the installation perimeter must be 30

ft. (9 m) wide. Where there is no clear zone outside the perimeter, the minimum standoff distance is 50 ft. (15 m).

For buildings that are outside an installation perimeter, use UFC 4-020-01 to establish project requirements. Where UFC 4-020-01 determines project specific Design Basis Threat and Level of Protection, design the project for the resulting standoff distance in accordance with APPENDIX B. /1/

3-2.1.1 Clear Zone.

\1\ This standard does not established the requirement for clear zones. Clear zones are defined by DoD and Service policy. Clear zones are established around the perimeters to provide unobstructed views to enhance detection and assessment. Typically, clear zones are free of all obstacles, topographical features, and vegetation exceeding 8 in.

(200 mm) in height that could impede observation or provide…