Attachment 7 - Juba Electrical Distribution Study - Final (For Information Only).pdf

UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION STUDY

U. S. Embassy, Juba, South Sudan

Submittal:

Final

Date:

December 9, 2019

Contract Number:

72066819-P-00040

Prepared For:

U.S. Agency for International Development Juba, South Sudan

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION STUDY – JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF REPORT

APPROACH

FACILITY EXISTING CONDITIONS

General

Office Compound

Residential Compound

CURRENT AND FUTURE POST PROJECTS

FACILITY OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

ER1.1 GENERATOR CONNECTIVITY

ER1.2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION TOPOLOGY

ER1.3 GENERATOR SELECTION AND SIZING

ER1.4 LOCAL ELECTRICAL UTILITY COMPANY

ER1.5 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP

ER1.6 UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

INFRASTRUCTURE

ER1.7 MULTIPLE GENERATOR PLANTS ON EACH COMPOUND

ER1.8 FUEL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

ER1.9 REMOTE MONITORING AND ALARMING

ER1.10 PORTABLE GENERATOR(S)

ER1.11 LOAD BANK

ER1.12 RC SAFE HAVEN MANUAL TRANSFER SCHEME

ER1.13 TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER GENEATOR AND UPS

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ER2.1 PREVENTATIVE (AND PREDICTIVE) MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

ER2.2 TRAINING PROGRAM

ER2.3 VARIOUS REMEDIAL DEFICIENCIES

ER3.1 PROGRAMMABLE THERMOSTATS

ER3.2 LED LIGHTING

ER3.3 OCCUPANCY SENSORS

ER3.4 SOLAR WATER HEATER

ER3.5 PHOTOVOLTAICS

ER4.1 SITE LIGHTING ILLUMINATION LEVELS

ER4.2 SITE LIGHTING MASTER ANNUNCIATOR AND CONTROL

ER4.3 SITE LIGHTING ALTERNATING CIRCUITS

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – POWER MONITORING REPORT

APPENDIX B – SINGLE LINE DIAGRAMS AND SITE PLANS

APPENDIX C – GENERATOR CALCULATIONS

APPENDIX D – SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATION, ARC FLASH CALCULATION AND

LOAD ANALYSIS

APPENDIX E – SITE LIGHTING CALCULATIONS

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TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Aerial view of the OC and the RC

Figure 2: OC Electrical Distribution Diagram

Figure 3: OC Generator Inventory

Figure 4: RC Electrical Distribution Diagram

Figure 5: RC Generator Inventory

Figure 6 - IEEE 241 example of Radial Distribution

Figure 7 - IEEE 241 Example of Loop Arrangement

Figure 8: Office Compound kW Load Profile

Figure 9: Residential Compound kW Load Profile

Figure 10: Blue Safe Haven Single Line Diagram (typical of Orange Safe Haven)

Figure 11 RC Kitchen panel showing improperly mounted breaker and conductors spliced in panel enclosure (NEC violation)

Figure 12: Bus tap enclosure at CMR Generator with no overcurrent protection

Figure 13 Panel located in the CMR ATS Building requiring replacement. Working clearance in front of panel is not NEC compliant

Figure 14: Generator fuel pipe leak at the OC Generator Yard

Figure 15: Tap box behind OC motorpool with no conductor overcurrent protection

Figure 16: OBO's 5 Zones of Site Lighting

Figure 17: RC walkway path lighting at Courthouse 2. Figure 18: Typical perimeter wall light fixture. . 43

Figure 19: Typical requirements for illuminance levels in the OBO Design Guidelines for Site Lighting ... 44

Figure 20: Example of a Master Annunciator and Control Panel (typically located in Post 1)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the aftermath of recent unexpected outages, Mason and Hanger was commissioned to perform an Electrical Distribution Study of the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan’s Office and Residential Compounds. The scope of the study is to perform an assessment and determine current weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and possible upgrades that can improve the reliability of both compounds. Special attention is given to the improvements of the prime rated generators and their configuration.

The facility staff has recognized that the electrical generation and distribution system is its lifeline for continued operation, resulting in higher availability expectations. Exemplary of this is the addition of automatic transfer switches intended to improve resiliency. As an unintended consequence, their addition has also revealed the limitations of the facility staff to implement, maintain and operate more sophisticated equipment within the current system.

Acknowledged are plans to either replace the existing Embassy or significantly renovate the Office Compound. With that in mind, operation of the facilities over ten years has been used for the purposes of recommendations. Should recommendations introduced herein be implemented, some subsequent renovations may be reduced, deferred or avoided in their entirety. Adopting similar operational philosophies will place less strain on the management team through those transitions.

Within the following recommendations, several themes are repeated that can be summarized herein as follows:

• Remedial activities are recommended such as equipment repair, maintenance, and replacement that is necessary for building code compliance, sustaining facility and personnel safety and extending equipment useful life expectancy. Other examples of deficiencies are noted in the planned fire pump replacement and existing site lighting system.

• Additional administrative tools are recommended such as enhanced operator and technician training, preventative maintenance planning, keeping spare stock inventory, remote monitoring and alarming, and automation that ensure better system performance and extend operator effectiveness.

• Proper recordkeeping such as equipment labeling, documented Sequences of Operations, and removal of abandoned equipment help to avoid human error in operation, further increase system performance and increase safety.

• Improved performance recommendations such as generator onboard paralleling controls and energy conservation measures improve efficiency and extend the operational capacities of equipment and operations.

The analysis and findings of the study are presented in the section titled “Detailed Observations and Recommendations”, and are described by separate observations and associated recommendations. A Recommendation Summary table lists all of the recommendations. Each engineering recommendation is rated, on a scale from 1-10, for Cost, Ease of Implementation, Urgency, and Impact on Reliability. These ratings will help decision makers evaluate the relative cost and benefit of the various recommendations.

While this report is focused primarily on the main electrical distribution system and generators, there are several observations and recommendations that pertain to the management and operations practices at the facility. It is important that Post management understand that poor facility management practices create vulnerability and risk to the mission that is just as real as the risk from improperly configured electrical systems. Poor operation and management practices contribute to human error, which is one of the main sources for power failures.

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF REPORT

As a prime generation 24-hour facility, the Office Compound (OC) and Residential Compound (RC) require a highly robust electrical infrastructure, as well as concurrent maintenance capability, in order to minimize the potential for unexpected outages and early equipment failures. Recently, a generator failure at the RC highlighted the need for a thorough and independent evaluation. This report identifies vulnerabilities, weaknesses and make recommendations to improve the power distribution system.

APPROACH

Mason and Hanger conducted a site survey of the OC and RC Compounds from April 22 through April 29, 2019. The survey team consisted of:

Larney Clark Patrick Markley, P.E.

Our approach to the study followed these steps:

• Document Review

• Field Survey and Investigation

• Interviews with users, O&M staff, etc.

• Metering (power monitoring) both compounds

• Analysis and Assessment

The Mason and Hanger team spent 8 days onsite surveying and documenting the facility and its systems, interviewing key personnel, O&M staff, and reviewing documents in an effort to develop a comprehensive understanding of the facility’s electrical distribution system. During this survey, staff had explained of a recent outage occurring due to a radiator coolant malfunction at startup on a recently overhauled generator.

Mason and Hanger gratefully acknowledges the many contributions of site personnel in arranging access, making key personnel available for interviews, and obtaining and compiling the extensive list of documents that we requested. The goal of conducting an in-depth assessment of a facility on which very little electrical distribution system information would not have been possible without this excellent support.

The following pages include a description of the existing electrical distribution system, known current and future post projects, and the analysis and findings of the study. A Recommendation Summary table lists all of the recommendations with ratings for each on a scale of 1-10 for cost, ease of implementation, urgency, and impact to reliability.

Appendices to the report contain drawings and supporting documents that clarify pertinent portions of the systems and provide useful reference information.

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FACILITY EXISTING CONDITIONS

General

The U.S. Embassy in Juba is comprised of two major compounds, the Office Compound (OC) and the Residential Compound (RC). The OC and the RC have been the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Juba on and off since the 1980’s throughout civil strife and war. The Office Compound became the site of the U.S. Consulate in 2008, when the Residential Compound’s capacity to serve as residential and office functions were exceeded. In 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation and the U.S. Consulate became the U.S. Embassy.

The OC is approximately 1.7 acres in size and is located on Kololo Road, north of the European Union Embassy. The main vehicle and pedestrian access to the OC are through the Compound Access Control (CAC) on the East of the facility from a paved frontage road. A separate vehicle service CAC on the West connects to a dirt road. The OC has a number of mixed uses, including a USAID program office, Embassy office and consular services. Additionally, there are support buildings that include IRM, kitchen/cafeteria, vehicle maintenance shop, motor pool dispatch office, workshop and storage.

The RC is approximately 7 acres. Access to the RC is provided via two access control facilities, each on the west frontage road, one being close to the center of the west perimeter known as the “North CAC”, and the second being close to the southwest corner and known as the “South CAC”. A network of circulation roads within the RC provides access to mission housing. The RC contains housing structures provided in including five “single family” type villas, and 28 efficiency residences. An on-site cafeteria provides catering for mission staff, and a recreation building and swimming pool are centrally located.

Figure 1: Aerial view of the OC and the RC.

Typical for South Sudan businesses and residences, the OC and RC generate their own electricity by on-site generators. In 2016, the governments of South Sudan and China began working together to rehabilitate the country’s electrical distribution system. During the survey, new concrete poles for medium voltage distribution were observed along roads around both the OC and RC compounds.

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Office Compound

The radial electrical distribution system for the OC is comprised of (4) generators in a (2) automatic transfer switch (ATS) scheme. Each switch scheme was installed in 2017 to automate the transferring of generators. ATS-1 has malfunctioned and is operated in manual mode. ATS-2 is fully functional but is operated manually. There are two gen set sizes used for the OC, which are 400kW/500kVA and 328kW/410kVA units. A single generator runs at a time to fulfill the entire compound’s load needs.

Downstream electrical distribution equipment is located in the Generator Electrical Building. Included equipment is ATS-1, ATS-2, Distribution Panelboards ‘GP1’, ‘GP2’, ‘MDP1’, and ‘MDP2’. Panel’s ‘MDP1’ and ‘MDP2’ serve buildings and other large electrical loads on the OC. See Figure 2 for OC Electrical Distribution Diagram and Drawing OCE-1 in Appendix C for the overall Single Line Diagram. See Figure 3 for the OC generator inventory. Note that Generator 9 and Generator SH are listed in the figure, but not further explained as they are not campus-level distribution equipment.

Figure 2: OC Electrical Distribution Diagram

Figure 3: OC Generator Inventory

The fuel system for the OC is comprised of (2) 20,000L underground holding tanks and (1) 34,100L above ground tank. One of the underground tanks is used for the fueling of the generators and the other underground tank is used for vehicles via vehicle dispensing pump. The fuel system is manually operated with multiple valves and electric pumps to isolate and fill individual tanks as well as the generator tanks.

GenSet # Manufacturer Model KW kVA Rating Voltage Year Hours Controller Serial Number Overhaul Hours Overhaul Date

1 Caterpillar 550/C15 400 500 Prime 400/230 2009 17,957.6 EMCP 3.1 CAT00000CC5L03332 -- --

2 Caterpillar 450/C15 328 410 Prime 415/240 2011 18,409.9 EMCP 3.1 CAT00000CC5L04732 -- --

3 Caterpillar 450/C15 328 410 Prime 415/240 2011 6,293.9 EMCP 3.1 CAT00000AC5L04698 -- --

4 Caterpillar 550/C15 400 500 Prime 400/230 2009 --- EMCP 3.1 CAT00000JC5L03420 -- --

9 Olympian GEH250 200 250 Standby 400/230 2004 --- --- OLY00000CRNS02924 --- ---

SH Olympian GEP88-1 64 80 Prime 415/240 2008 --- PW 1.0 OLY00000J11803244 --- ---

Office Compound - Generator Data

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The generator that is “running” has its tank filled twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening.

The fuel tank levels are measured each day by the generator operator and confirmed by a USAID employee.

Fuel is also tested each day. Fuel oil piping is supply only, without a return line. There is no fuel port on the exterior of the perimeter wall and there are no fuel filling alarms or leak detection. Once a week, (2) fuel trucks deliver fuel by routing hoses through an opening at the bottom of the perimeter wall into an in-ground connection point that fills the underground tanks.

Residential Compound

Similar to the OC, the radial electrical distribution system for the RC is comprised of (4) generators in a (2) automatic transfer switch (ATS) scheme. Transfer switches on the RC were also installed in 2017 to automate the transferring of generators. ATS-2 has malfunctioned and is operated in manual mode. ATS- 1 is fully functional but is operated manually. There are three gen set sizes used for the RC, which are 400kW/500kVA, 520kW/650kVA (newly installed) and 640kW/800kVA. A single generator runs at a time to fulfil the entire compound’s load needs. The electrical distribution equipment is located in the Generator Electrical Building. The equipment includes ATS-1, ATS-2, Distribution Panelboards ‘GP1’, ‘GP2’, ‘GP3’, ‘MDP1’, ‘MDP1A, ‘MDP2’, and ‘MDP2A’. Panels ‘MDP1’, ‘MDP1A, ‘MDP2’, and ‘MDP2A’ serves the electrical loads on the RC. See Figure 4 for RC Electrical Distribution Diagram and drawing RCE-1 and RCE-2 in Appendix C for the overall Single Line Diagrams. See Figure 5 for the RC generator inventory.

Note that Blue S.H. and Orange S.H. are listed in the figure, but not further explained as they are not campus-level distribution equipment.

Figure 4: RC Electrical Distribution Diagram

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Figure 5: RC Generator Inventory

The fuel system for the RC is comprised of (3) 25,400L underground holding tanks and (2) 27,000L, (1) 18,000L, and (2) 1,000L above ground tanks. The fuel system is manually operated with multiple valves and electric pumps to isolate and fill individual tanks as well as the generator tanks. The generator that is “running” has its tank filled twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening. The fuel tank levels are measured each day by the generator tech and confirmed by a USAID employee. The fuel is tested each day. There fuel oil distribution is supply piping only with no return lines. There is no fuel port on the exterior of the perimeter wall and there are no fuel filling alarms or leak detection. Once a week, (2) fuel trucks deliver fuel by routing hoses through an opening at the bottom of the perimeter wall and connect to an in-ground connection point that fills the underground tanks.

GenSet # Manufacturer Model KW kVA Rating Voltage Year Hours Controller Serial Number Overhaul Hours Overhaul Date

1 Caterpillar 550/C18 400 500 Prime 415/240 2006 13,473.7 EMCP 3.1 CAT00000EG4C01302 13,011.0 3/8/2019

2 Caterpillar 550/C18 400 500 Prime 415/240 --- --- EMCP 3.1 CAT00000JG4C04613 15,830.0 8/17/2017

3 Caterpillar 550/C18 400 500 Prime 415/240 2006 20,403.3 EMCP 3.1 CAT00000HG4C01248 19,692.0 2/21/2019

4 FG Wilson P800P1 640 800 Prime 415/240 --- 879.0 PW.1.0 FGWRPES3DPS01452 --- ---

5 Caterpillar DE715E0/C18 520 650 Prime 415/240 2018 --- --- --- --- ---

CMR Olympian GEP150-2 108 135 Prime 415/240 2010 97.4 PW 1.1 OLY00000T11900777 --- ---

RAI Olympian GEP110-4 80 100 Prime 415/240 2012 --- PW 1.1 OLY00000HLEN03187 --- ---

Blue S.H. Olympian --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

Orange S.H. Olympian --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

Residential Compound - Generator Data

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CURRENT AND FUTURE POST PROJECTS

The U.S. Embassy in Juba currently has the following projects in planning, design or construction.

Compound Security Upgrade for the Office Compound and the Residential Compound Contract Number 19AQMM19R0212

Phase One: OC Safe Haven Emergency Ventilation and FE/BR doors in the USAID Annex.

Phase Two:

• USAID Annex upgrade to Safe area

• RC/OC CAC exterior gate and motor Upgrade

• OC observation posts on top of USAID roof

• RC South East perimeter wall visual screening

• RC South CAC hardened guard booth and vehicle entry point

• RC North CAC vehicle entry point

• RC helicopter landing zone (HLZ) modification

• RC HLZ alternate vehicle entrance/exit on east side of compound

• Floodgate on RC HLZ new gate design and replacement

• Access door for the OC emergency generator fuel tank

• Replace the four existing doors glazing identified in the survey report.

USAID Fire Protection Expansion Currently under construction

• Replacement of the diesel fire pump with electric fire pump

• Modification to existing Chancery and Annex sprinkler piping

• Sprinkler system expanded to include Motor pool offices (ablution)

• New NAC and smoke detectors

Site Planning Services for Existing Office Compound (OC) FY19 Capital Project May 4, 2019

Major project elements include the following: New Office Annex (NOX), Support Annex and Maintenance Shops, one Compound Access Control (CAC), one Compound Vehicle Egress Facility, Mail Screening Facility, Utility Building, Official Vehicle Parking, Site Perimeter Wall, and Site Development. TSS and Site Lighting improvements.

Existing facilities to be retained are the USAID Office Building and the Support Building (communications).

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FACILITY OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

Observations and recommendations are included herein based on document review, field observations, and discussions with facility personnel. Each engineering recommendation (ER) has been organized into sequential activities intended to build upon one another and are identified with their weighted value in mind.

Some recommendations offer immediate “stop gap” measures to improve the facility while others are more strategic in nature, requiring longer durations of planning, design and implementation as well as further study. The goal is to improve the facility’s system reliability for a 10 year planning horizon with 20% growth.

Recommendations have been developed and organized in a logical, organized, phased manner consistent with engineering best practices.

The table below presents a summary listing of all the engineering recommendations that are described in detail in subsequent pages. Each engineering recommendation is rated on a scale from 1-10 for Cost, Ease of Implementation, Urgency, and Impact on Reliability. None of the engineering recommendations carry an Urgency rating of 10 (most urgent) because it was felt that any issue with that degree of urgency has likely been addressed by the site already. These ratings will allow comparison between options and help decision makers evaluate the relative cost and benefit of the various engineering recommendations.

ITEM DESCRIPTION

RANKING *

COST

EASE OF

IMPLEMENTATION

URGENCY

IMPACT ON

RELIABILITY

ER1.1 Generator Connectivity 7 8 8 9

ER1.2 Electrical Distribution Topology 5 4 6 9

ER1.3 Generator Selection and Sizing 3 8 9 9

ER1.4 Local Utility Company 4 4 1 8

ER1.5 Electric Fire Pump 6 6 9 8

ER1.6

Underground Electrical Distribution

System Infrastructure 4 3 5 7

ER1.7

Multiple Generation Plants on each

Compound 4 2 3 9

ER1.8

Fuel Storage and Distribution

System 7 6 7 8

ER1.9 Remote Monitoring and Alarming 8 6 7 7

ER1.10

Portable Generator(s) and Building

Entrance Manual Transfer Switches 6 7 6 7

* Note: In each criteria, the higher the number, the more desirable it is to implement the recommendation.

1 = High Cost, Difficult to Implement, Low Urgency, and Low Impact to Reliability (low ‘Bang for Buck’)

10 = Low Cost, Easy to Implement, High Urgency and High Impact to Reliability (high ‘Bang for Buck’)

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ITEM DESCRIPTION

RANKING *

COST

EASE OF

IMPLEMENTATION

URGENCY

IMPACT ON

RELIABILITY

ER1.11 Load Bank 7 8 7 6

ER1.12

RC Safe Haven Manual Transfer

Scheme 9 9 9 9

ER1.13 TOC Generator and UPS 7 8 9 9

ER2.1

Preventative (and Predictive)

Maintenance Program 6 7 9 9

ER2.2 Training Program 6 8 9 9

ER2.3 Various Remedial Deficiencies 7 7 8 7

ER3.1 Programmable Thermostats 9 9 4 2

ER3.2 LED lighting 6 4 4 2

ER3.3 Occupancy Sensors 8 9 4 2

ER3.4 Solar Water Heating 6 5 4 2

ER3.5 Photovoltaics 5 4 4 2

ER4.1 Site Lighting Illumination Levels 7 5 8 2

ER4.2

Site Lighting Master Annunciator and Control 8 8 8 2

ER4.3 Site Lighting Alternating Circuiting 6 6 8 2

* Note: In each criteria, the higher the number, the more desirable it is to implement the recommendation.

1 = High Cost, Difficult to Implement, Low Urgency, and Low Impact to Reliability (low ‘Bang for Buck’)

10 = Low Cost, Easy to Implement, High Urgency and High Impact to Reliability (high ‘Bang for Buck’)

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ER1.1 GENERATOR CONNECTIVITY

Observation:

For both compounds, generator connectivity is not optimized, leading to higher possibility of outages. The term “generator connectivity” is used to explain how the generators are connected to the balance of the electrical distribution system and how the interconnection is operated. The original facility generator connectivity design utilized key-interlocked, manually operated circuit breakers to connect individual generators to the distribution system. This system was selected based on its simplicity, low reliance on operator and technician knowledge and safety at the cost of brief outages during transitions between generators and the reliance on rapid human response in the event of a failure. While this configuration limits distribution topology ‘single points of failure’, the manually operated breakers reside in a common generator building.

The generator connectivity has been modified from its original design with the introduction of automatic transfer switches between generators and the manually operated breakers. This modification was intended to decrease the reliance on human intervention should a generator, its output breaker, or its wiring fail for any reason causing an outage. In its current state, the system exhibits the limitations of both the manual and ATS-based connectivity since the transfer switches cannot connect all generators to all distribution systems. Additionally, the modified design is not well documented, understood or maintained. See Figures 2 and 4 that illustrate the possible hazardous back feed that could occur if both transfer switches called for a start of two generators concurrently.

Three feasible generator-connection strategies have been evaluated: manual-operation, automatic-transfer based and paralleling systems.

Manual operation: As previously identified, the manual operation is simplest, but relies on operator intervention and can be hazardous to equipment and personnel should training be lacking or high stress / fast reaction events be likely. As it is manual in nature, limited technician functions are required as there are limited automated features requiring maintenance.

Automatic transfer operation: This strategy eliminates or reduces outage time for intentional transition between individual generators through logic and protective devices. Under unintentional failures, these devices automatically sense outages and deliver a start signal to available generators. To provide a transfer switch-based solution, time delays and a cascaded, multi-tiered connection would be required to connect all generators to common distribution. Should equipment fail, the system could be operated manually providing partial availability during repair. This system does not allow for generator run time balancing.

Documentation and spare parts inventories are required as well as proper training of technicians on operation, preventative and routine maintenance. Should transfer switch-based connection extend into closed transition or ‘make-before-break’ schemes, a deeper understanding of electrical theory and more technician training would be required for equipment and personnel safety.

Paralleling operation: Similar to the ATS-based strategy above, paralleling operation eliminates outages during intentional transitions of generators and simplifies the reconnection availability of generators.

Conversely, it reduces the quantity of necessary inventory required under the ATS-based solution and simplifies the cascading necessary. Beyond closed-transitions of individual generators, this strategy allows for the potential to run several generators continuously either for redundancy or for capacity and allows for manual operation with all safety and protective devices intact. The paralleling controller manages all load sharing, load sense, load share, load demand and engine hour balancing. Programming and configuration as well as a thorough demonstration and training period would likely be required offering both operators and technicians more in depth knowledge of the system parameters. While available under either previous strategy, paralleling offers easy access to power monitoring and alarm built into the paralleling controllers.

Paralleling is traditionally implemented either in centralized or decentralized fashion. Centralized variants are contained in a paralleling switchgear or cabinet with electrically operated breakers while decentralized options replace ‘onboard’ generator controllers and breakers with networked paralleling controllers and

Mason & Hanger Page 14 electrically operated, paralleling controlled breakers. These controls are available in both retrofit and new install options from several major manufacturers, including Caterpillar.

Recommendation:

Implement paralleling option through the use of a Cat EMCP 4.4-based, onboard, decentralized paralleling solution. Such controls and electrically operated breakers should be provided; complete with proper spare stock, programming, configuration, documentation, demonstration and training. By being onboard, this eliminates any additional space requirements and can be retrofit onto any existing or procured with any future Caterpillar generators. This would require removal of existing compound ATS units, replacement of existing EMCP 3.1 controllers, generator output breakers, and network control cables in conduit between onboard controllers.

Should this recommendation not be taken or be extended into the future; proper documentation, repair and replacement of each existing campus ATS’ is required.

Recognition should be made that implementing this concurrently with other recommendations will enhance overall facility operation and maintenance through their mutual benefits.

See http://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/CM20170511-31738-25712 for CAT EMCP 4.4 product data and schematics.

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ER1.2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION TOPOLOGY

Observation:

As radial electrical distribution systems, both the OC and RC have single points of failure, inaccessible / inconvenient access to capacity downstream and inability to create load priority. Additionally, radial systems promote ‘run-to-failure’ as they require planned outages to perform routine preventative maintenance.

Figure 6 - IEEE 241 example of Radial Distribution

As with many electrical distribution systems, they expand as they age. Unless thoughtfully managed with industry best practices, their growth can extend in less than ideal ways, resulting in larger disruptions to service including critical loads. Additionally, harsh environments and poor maintenance accelerate deterioration of equipment and wiring resulting in shorter service lives. A well-designed distribution system can allow for more convenient, and more complete scheduled maintenance concurrent with system operation. The more critical a distribution system’s loads, the more important redundancy becomes. The more accurately geographic or density-based load growth can be estimated, the better the distribution can be operated.

Simple radial distribution systems extend out from a central location in hub-and-spoke topology. Other topologies such as loop distribution systems, allow for alternate connections and reduce single points of failure and isolate faulted segments of the distribution system. These topologies are even further enhanced when geographically separated.

Other distribution system arrangements such as primary and secondary selective systems and spot network arrangements have not been included herein as they require higher capital and operational investments to be viable at this time.

Recommendation:

Replace and relocate aging MDPs and associated wiring infrastructure and implement loop feed strategy to reduce single points of failure and extend distribution system capacity geographically closer to loads and better allow for future growth.

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Figure 7 - IEEE 241 Example of Loop Arrangement

See also ER2.3 regarding aging equipment, code violations, and poor documentation.

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ER1.3 GENERATOR SELECTION AND SIZING

Observation:

Based on existing loads captured while on site and the forecasted growth, the installed generators are operating beyond their ratings and capacities. Additionally, seasonal variance and anticipated load growth will further exacerbate this condition. Within Appendix A, the Power Monitoring Report elaborates further on the details of metering completed on site.

The Office Compound load profile is provided below and is based on the 7 day metering data collected at site for the 328kW/410kVA genset. Prime Rated Power generators has unlimited annual runtime and variable loading of up to 70% average load factor. The green horizontal line in the graph represents 70% of the generator nameplate rating. Although the maximum recorded load (blue graph) exceeds the 70% rating twice during the recording period, it is below the 70% average load factor per ISO 8528-1. The gray graph represents 20% growth above the maximum recorded kW load reading and it shows that the 328kW/410kVA genset will not meet the future 20% growth needs.

Figure 8: Office Compound kW Load Profile.

For the above profile, it should be noted how weather affects the load of the compound. At the beginning of the 7 day metering period, daytime high temperatures were in the mid 90s (35C) while later in the week the daytime high temperatures were in the high 80s (30.5C) with periods of rain. The graph confirms that electricity usage was lower with the cooler temperatures.

The Residential Compound load profile is provided on the next page and is based on the 7 day metering data collected at site for the 400kW/500kVA genset. As stated for the Office Compound generator, Prime Rated Power generators has unlimited annual runtime and variable loading of up to 70% average load factor. The green horizontal line in the graph represents 70% of the generator nameplate rating while the red horizontal line represents generator nameplate rating. As you can see from the graph, the maximum recorded load (blue graph) that the generator not only exceeded the 70% average load factor but it also exceeded it’s 100% nameplate rating on four separate occasions.

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Figure 9: Residential Compound kW Load Profile.

The International Building Code (IBC), as adopted by most US federal and local authorities, requires construction to conform to NFPA 110. NFPA 110 defines Emergency Power Supply (EPS) Level 1 and Level 2 systems. Level 1 systems are explained as those where “failure of the equipment or system could result in loss of human life or serious injuries” while failure of Level 2 systems “could create hazards or hamper rescue or firefighter operations”. These EPS’ are intended to be separate and distinct electrical distribution systems that will not be disconnected based on a failure of the ‘normal’ power distribution system.

Recommendation:

Provide new generators for both compounds with all the appropriate accessories to satisfy compound loads.

Initial recommended sizing criteria is based on a 10% expected seasonal variation of loads captured while on site plus a 20% site load growth factor over the anticipated 10 year planning horizon. Current review of the compound loads indicates that the Office Compound generators are sized appropriately for the (2) 400kW/500kVA units but the (2) 328kW/410kVA units are undersized when including the load for the new fire pump. It should also be noted that the Office Compound generators have high run-hours. Replacement units for the (2) 328kW/410kVA gensets is expected. Residential Compound loads exceed the ratings of installed gensets. Initial recommended sizing selections are based on ISO 8528-1:2018 prime rated gensets not less than 800 kW or multiple generators combined to satisfy starting and running conditions.

Refer to Appendix C for generator calculations based on the existing load and the future growth load for both compounds.

At a minimum, each compound should have additional generators in an N+2 configuration, where N is the number of generators required to satisfy the facility load. Consideration should be given to further enhance the site to N+3 to allow for more downtime associated with the site’s isolation from available parts and factory trained maintenance and the harsh environmental factors.

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Refer to https://youtu.be/uEQvxY4gloA for an introduction to CAT SpecSizer and http://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/CM20170619-43609-08733 for an overview of generator ratings and applications.

Implement power monitoring system as recommended elsewhere in this report for evaluation of seasonal load variances in refining generator selection. See https://electroind.com/product-info/shark-200-data-logging-power-metertransducer/ for example of Electro-Industries Shark 200 meter. Note that remote annunciation is required by NFPA 110 for Level 1 EPS. Refer to ER1.9 for additional information regarding remote monitoring / alarming.

Assure gensets satisfy real, apparent and power factor limitations of site, noting how closely these sites’ real and apparent power are (due to high power factor), primarily limiting equipment to its kW rating. As well, selected capacities must fall within PRP limitations for 70% load factors, whether in parallel or single-unit operation. Initial review of load profiles do not currently illustrate variance in loads to suggest smaller paralleled generators on off-peak hours. Refer to ER1.1 for benefits associated with recommended generator connectivity and associated controls and how connectivity may offer benefits whether paralleled or not and associated remote monitoring capabilities.

Evaluate equipment load classifications (emergency and legally required standby) and segregate facility loads with separate, additional standby power sources that comply with applicable building codes, like those required by IBC as stated above.

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ER1.4 LOCAL ELECTRICAL UTILITY COMPANY

Observation:

The OC and RC have on-site generation with no connection to the local electrical utility company’s distribution system. When South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, approximately 1% of the population had access to utility electricity while the balance of the electricity-using population generates their own. South Sudan Electricity Corporation (SSEC) is responsible for the country’s power distribution, generation and infrastructure. In 2016, the South Sudanese government and POWERCHINA signed a deal called the Juba Power Distribution System Rehabilitation and Expansion Project to upgrade the power supply system. Currently, the installation of medium voltage transformers and power poles extends throughout the city of Juba and along the roadways surrounding the OC and RC.

Recommendation:

Consider the technical merits of connecting to the new power grid. Currently, the quality and reliability of the new system is not known and will require additional study through a comprehensive Power Quality Report. The anticipated benefits are:

• Reliability is increased as two sources are concurrently available inclusive of the local utility company and the compound generation plants.

• Overall operational costs are lower as generators become an alternate on-site source of electricity in lieu of continuous operation.

• Lower maintenance costs due to reduced runtime.

• Reduced reliance on generator overhaul or replacement procedures.

• Lower fuel consumption since the generators only run during power outages.

• Reduced contract staff need for day-to-day generator operation and maintenance.

If this recommendation is not accepted, refer to all other recommendations this report to optimize the compound’s electrical generation and distribution systems operation.

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ER1.5 ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP

Observation:

While on site, the existing fire pump was inoperable and appeared to have been in that state for quite some time, leaving the facility’s assets and personnel vulnerable to destruction from any fire event. The facility staff indicated an upcoming project to replace the existing diesel engine-driven fire pump with an electric fire pump and the design documents were reviewed.

From the design document review, several noteworthy observations were made. They include:

1. The design documents do not have markings top and bottom as required for SBU.

2. The design documents do not reflect the installed conditions of the electrical distribution system.

a. Automatic transfer switches not indicated on single line diagram while indicated in a misleading way in General Note 17 on Drawing FP-00.

b. Several generators are not identified with accurate ratings.

c. Key interlocks not installed.

d. Breakers and various loads missing from single line diagram and panel schedule (tap box, support building, West CAC, cafeterias, motor pool, Gen bldg.)

3. Has a determination been made by a responsible party that the On-Site Power Production Facility is ‘reliable’ and ‘located and protected to minimize the possibility of damage by fire’ per NFPA 20:9.2.2 and NEC Article 695.3(A)(2)? If not, the design does not satisfy NEC Article 695.3. Further, in NFPA 20:9.2.2, a backup source must be provided independent of the normal source of power (On-Site Power Production Facility).

4. It is not clear how the supervision required by NEC 695.4 and that indicated in NFPA 20:9.2.3.3 is satisfied and the conveyance used between the disconnecting means and a supervisory location.

5. No indication is made that voltage at fire pump terminals under starting and running is maintained concurrent with other loads being served by the existing generators in compliance with NFPA 20:9.4.1 and NEC 695.7.

6. Fire pump disconnecting means are within equipment that feeds loads other than fire pumps which doesn’t seem to comply with NEC 695.4(B)(3)(3).

7. Transfer of power between normal and alternate sources must occur within the Fire Pump Room per NFPA 20:9.6.4.

8. Phase conductors (#4AWG) do not seem to satisfy the requirements of 695.6 and the wire load calculations shown on the drawings unless termination provisions of the source breaker and the fire pump are labeled suitable for use with 75 deg. C conductors based on NEC Table 310.15(B)(16) as modified by NEC 110.14(C)(1)(a).

9. No indication is made that any overload protection within the (3) sequential 400A breakers serving the fire pump have been eliminated to satisfy NEC 695.6(C) or how they satisfy the quantity limitation requirements of NEC 695.4 and NFPA 20:9.2.3.

10. No indication is made that any existing ground fault protection on the fire pump sources have been eliminated to satisfy NEC 695.6(G).

Recommendation:

Review design to assure complete compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.

See also the recommendation ER1.1 for generator connectivity that will provide an alternate source of power to a fire pump concurrently with safeties afforded through synchronism check of generators.

Should this recommendation not be taken, assure the Authority Having Jurisdiction has granted all waivers associated with Code deficiencies noted herein otherwise the life safety systems on the compound are not code compliant.

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ER1.6 UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE

Observation:

20-30 years of continual service in an optimal environmental and operating condition is recognized by most manufacturers as traditional cable service life. Considering its original installation date, cabling systems are likely expected to begin failing. Accelerated degradation is caused by elevated temperatures, exposure to UV, high humidity or water submersion, exposure to dust, dirt and corrosive contaminants. A combination of aging cable and improper wire-in-raceway wiring methods were observed on both compounds. Exposed stub-ups are susceptible to physical damage. Aging terminations, splices and taps can result in cable faults and electrical stress points if not monitored. Deteriorating underground insulation results in unexpected outages. Undocumented and difficulty gaining access to system capacity results in bad habits causing higher operational and maintenance costs.

Recommendation:

Develop a master planned underground raceway and cabling routing scheme. The scheme should be composed of multiple paths each with spare ducts satisfying expected distribution growth, density needs and provide for the phased replacement of failed cable. Ducts should have adequate pulling points as well as points to access spare ducts for future extension.

Consideration should be given to implementing concurrent with the recommendation associated with ER1.2 Electrical Distribution Topology.

If this recommendation is not accepted, all cables and wiring should be tested in accordance with NETA MTS soonest with documentation kept on file for baselining cable deterioration for replacement prior to and avoiding unexpected ultimate failure.

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ER1.7 MULTIPLE GENERATOR PLANTS ON EACH COMPOUND

Observation:

Each generator plant is located on the corner of its associated compound. By placing it there, it is less noticeable, less noisy and similarly less a disruptive to the compound’s US personnel. While this is the case, space is constrained, expansion is limited, voltage drops are created across the distribution system, and their physical locations are a security vulnerability. Additionally, the existing location on the Residential Compound is on low-lying property, which required the installation of dikes to avoid equipment flooding.

Recommendation:

Assign an alternate location to establish the geographic reassignment of a portion, ideally 50% of each generation plant so that at the time of genset replacements, they can be installed to minimizing the effects of voltage drop and extending the reach of the generator plant’s capacity. The electrically preferred location on the OC is the space near the containerized gym / exterior conference room by the wastewater treatment plant. The RC preferred location is near the space being left vacant when the backup RAI generator is relocated. Another possible RC location includes the northeast, assuming the successful extension of the perimeter if and when the South African House and the hotel is acquired and load density shifts due to that geographic expansion.

Consideration should be given to implementing concurrent with the recommendation associated with ER1.1 Generator Connectivity, ER1.2 Generator Selection and Sizing, ER1.6 Site Electrical Underground Distribution Infrastructure.

If this recommendation is not accepted, review of the generation plant’s physical vulnerabilities should be undertaken to assure there are no threats of attack present and consideration be given to screening exposed conductors on cable tray, equipment and maintenance from the degrading effects of the sun and overhead projectiles.

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ER1.8 FUEL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Observation:

Fuel distribution systems are manually operated and include many transfer options, requiring significant operator time.

Recommendation:

Enhance fuel storage and distribution system through modification applying the following principles:

Simplification - Fuel should be moved as little as possible. Each time fuel is moved, the chance of overfilling, leaking or maintenance issues increase. For a manual controlled system, fuel should come into the main storage tank and then supplied directly to day/belly tanks.

Filtration is another important item to ensure operational status of the generators. Strainers and fuel polishers would greatly improve the fuel quality being served to the generators.

Automation with manual backup of the fuel transfer is time saving and ensures overall availability of the generator plant. As fuel system becomes more complicated, automation becomes more important to avoid human error. The current system is complicated due to multiple tanks and fuel transfer required. Further, automation frees operations staff to perform maintenance work. Integration of remote alarming and monitoring should be considered as a key feature to reduce time for response to events.

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ER1.9 REMOTE MONITORING AND ALARMING

Observation:

No remote monitoring or alarming exists for the electrical generation and distribution systems.

High availability is determined through increasing mean time between failures and by reducing time to repair as well. When facilities require immediate attention, rapid assessment and deployment of appropriate resources is critical. Beyond providing responders critical information in a timely manner, collected analytics in the hands of trained technicians can avoid premature failures altogether, shifting preventative maintenance to predictive maintenance. Monitoring and alarming provide the rapid response needed to improve increased availability and reducing failures.

Recommendation:

Develop and install a networked metering and alarm system to gather data for trending and immediate alarming to posted locations. Collected data could include power used, generator run status, generator engine monitoring, engine cabin temperature, breaker status, temperatures, fuel tank fill values, fuel tank pump running, thermostat set points and occupancy sensing. Alarms could include fuel tank low alarms, fuel pump failure, generator engine coolant and oil temp alarms, battery and charging system monitoring alarm, and wastewater treatment plant alarms. These systems can dial / page multiple cellular devices with pre-programmed notifications with increasing escalation until the event is acknowledged.

Implement concurrent with the recommendations associated with ER1.1 Generator Connectivity, ER1.5 Electrical Fire Pump, and ER1.8 Fuel Storage and Distribution to integrate as much proposed and existing data as possible.

If this recommendation is not accepted, consider a more basic variant using limited general status alarms with comparable remote paging functions and daily collection of maximum values for input into spreadsheets for trending capabilities.

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ER1.10 PORTABLE GENERATOR(S)

Observation:

There is no equipment currently installed to allow preventative/predictive maintenance to be performed without an outage, thereby producing a culture of maintenance avoidance.

Recommendation:

Procure a limited quantity of portable generators, sized and selected based on individual building loads.

Introduce a manual transfer switch with quick-connect outlet at each building electrical entrance. These actions will allow for upstream feeder isolation and testing while allowing for continued operations to be maintained within each building.

Consideration should be given to implementing concurrent with the recommendations associated with ER1.2 Electrical Distribution Topology, ER1.7 Multiple Generator Locations on Site, ER2.1 Preventative Maintenance Program.

If this recommendation is not accepted, develop a scheduled preventative maintenance program with building occupant input to minimize disruption while performing all required preventative and predictive maintenance best practices for all facility systems.

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ER1.11 LOAD BANK

Observation:

There is no facility-owned load bank to exercise the engine-generators. A load bank provides an electrical load to test the operational integrity of the electrical distribution system’s capacity and it’s components. The OC and RC each currently utilize one generator to handle the electrical loads of each compound for a duration of 250 hours (approximately 10 days). The non-running generators are required to be tested weekly. Testing the generators under a no-load condition is not adequate to ensure performance.

Additionally, the generators that have routine service (oil change, etc.), service due to a break down (fan belt, etc.) or a major…