Attachment 4 - Sample Module 1 (Intro to IFC and DoD).pdf

Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC):

Supporting the Joint Force Across the Competition Continuum

Module: 1 Introduction to Intermediate Force Capabilities

(IFC) and History of the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program

NLW Relevance, History, and Current Status

Purpose

Skill: This module will present information and relevance and rationale that provide the “why” for the developing, integrating and employing NLW within the Intermediate Force Capabilities construct

Knowledge: The IFC concept reinforces deterrence and expands the range of options available to commanders.

This class session will analyze the rationale and implications of NLW development and fielding. The session topics are:

The background that fostered the institutionalization of non-lethal weapons and technology into the DOD;

The current participants in the execution of the non-lethal program for DoD;

The various definition(s) and terminologies dealing with “non-lethal” weapons and technologies;

The relevance/utility of NLW to support military operations

Tasks: Complete the required readings;

Follow the PowerPoint presentation; please note that the presentation contains video and other content that is in addition to the lecture;

Select one of the following ‘Issues for Considerations’ questions from the list below for discussion in class

Issues for Consideration

1. Does the current global political-economic-military-social environment dictate more or less emphasis on intermediate force capabilities?

2. Are non-lethal technologies “harder” to use than lethal force?

3. Is the Department of Defense definition of non-lethal clear enough? How should it change?

4. Based on your early experience and knowledge of NLW, are you an advocate, neutral or an opponent of their full integration across the force?

5. Are NLW only tactical tools or can intermediate force capabilities influence the operational and strategic outcomes of a conflict?

6. What is the one aspect of NLW that provides the greatest utility to the warfighter?

7. What do you think is needed to make NLW more “acceptable” among warfighters?

Required Readings Week #1

Leimbach, Wendell Non-Lethal Weapons: Will Marines Ever Use This Capability? Marine Corps Gazette, August 2019.

Go to:https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Leimbach.pdf

Jerothe, Douglas J. DOD non-Lethal Weapons Program: Overview Brief and Information Exchange. Keystone Course, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington DC, 15 January 2015.

Go to: https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Resources/Presentations/Overview_Presentations/Keystone %20_Brief_15Jan2015_logo_fix.pdf

DOD Executive Agent Non-Lethal Weapons Planning Guidance, 2020. Go to: https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Resources/Publications/Government_Reports/DoD%20Non- Lethal%20Weapons%20Program%20Planning%20Guidance%20March%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-13-135329-303

Levine, Susan D. and Rutigliano, Joseph A. U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons: Reality vs Perceptions. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. Volume 47, Issue 1, Spring 2015. Go to: http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol47/iss1/18/

Anderson, Gary. Preventing Mosul from Becoming Fallujah on a Grand Scale. Small Wars Journal. 26 Nov 16. Go to: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/preventing-mosul-from- becoming-fallujah-on-a-grand-scale

Law, David. Next-Generation Non-Lethal Technologies. SPIE. 14 Sept 2016. M Go to: http://spie.org/newsroom/6484-next-generation-non-lethal-technologies

Fridman, Ofer. Nonlethal Weapons. A Technological Gap or Misdefined Requirements? Joint Forces Quarterly.

1st Quarter 2015. Read pages 71-77. Go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article- View/Article/577592/jfq-76-nonlethal- weapons-a-technological-gap-or-misdefined-requirements/

From Niche to Necessity; Integrating Nonlethal Weapons into Essential Enabling Capabilities. Joint Forces Quarterly:

3rd Quarter 2012, pgs 71-79. Go to: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a566671.pdf

Media Perspectives - Required Reading Week #1

Less-Lethal: Making Impact. Police. 10 March 2017. Go to: https://www.policemag.com/342206/less-lethal-making-impact

Johnson, Thomas. Rubber Bullets: Less Lethal for Whom? MIMESIS. 5 Dec 16.

Go to: http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/rubber-bullets-less-lethal-for-whom/14589

Singal, Jesse. How Militarizing the Police Can Increase Violence. Science of Us. 14 Aug 14. Go to: http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/how-militarizing-police-can-increase- violence.html

Turnbull, Grant. Non-Lethal Weapons Remain Non-Lethal. Army Technology.com. 25 June 2014. Go to: http://www.armytechnology.com/features/featureshock-tactics-ensuring-non-lethal-weapons-remain-non-lethal-4298406/

Magdaleno, Johnny. There’s No Such Thing as a 'Non-Lethal' Weapon. Vice, October 21, 2014.

Go to: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nnqk4b/theres-no-uch-thing-as-a-non-lethal-weapon-1021

Required Readings Week #1

Scan the Following:

Department of Defense Instruction 3000.3E dtd 31 Aug

18. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300003p.pdf?ver=20 18-10-24-112944-467

Organization of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/Organization.aspx

Kozloski, Robert. The Utility of Non-Lethal Force. Department of the Navy - Task Force Innovation Working Groups, 18 August 2015. Go to: http://www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/Documents/2015/08/NonLethalForce.pdf

Strategic Plan 2016 – 2025, Science and Technology, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. Go to:https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Resources/Publications/Government_Rep orts/JNLWP_ST_Strategic_Plan_FINAL_Distro_A.pdf

Overarching Elective Objectives

• Discuss operational requirements addressed through Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC), genesis of the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Program and associated policy and doctrine.

• Detail the program’s organizational construct, primary activities and functions, responsibilities and authorities and key stakeholders.

• Describe the NLW) subset of IFC currently available to warfighters and promising directed energy and nascent technologies.

• Demonstrate understanding of the unique legal, policy, human effects and planning considerations in developing/employing the NLW and IFC.

• Depict IFC utility and demand signal for operations and scenarios beyond security applications.

• Deliberate how the Joint Force’s ability to deliver intermediate force options across the spectrum of conflict offers operational and strategic benefits.

• Demonstrate understanding of IFC utility, viable applications and planning considerations through a written paper and classroom exercise.

Upon completion of this elective, students will be able to:

Module Learning Objectives

• Review the concept of IFC.

• Review the historical origins and rationale behind the

DOD NLW Program.

• Consider the value of Intermediate Force options and what they contribute to warfighting.

• Introduction to IFC

• History and origins of NLW within DoD

• Introduction to the DoD NLW Program (NLWP)

– Organizational construct of Joint/Service elements

– Overview on program vision, mission, policy and doctrine

• Relevance and utility of IFC to support force lethality and agility across the spectrum of conflict

• Challenges/misperceptions associated with IFC

Module 1 Course Content

Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC)

Video: move mouse over gray box to play, raise volume

Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC) Concept

“Intermediate Force Capabilities” is a non-doctrinal term used to describe a broader suite of capabilities that provide effects without destruction to include non-lethal weapons. IFC provide:

Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, IFC employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. NLW are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and materiel. Other IFC may have effects, by design, that are not reversible.

• Key advantages in achieving NDS objectives, such as the goal to create “a Joint Force that possesses decisive advantages for any likely conflict, while remaining proficient across the entire spectrum of conflict.”

• Warfighters from all communities the ability to compete decisively in the Gray Zone, to bridge the gap from presence to lethal effects lowering the probability of being portrayed as escalating tensions unnecessarily.

This course focuses on the IFC concept and the NLW subset of IFC.

Other subsets are relevant but are not covered during this course.

IFC is a new concept and has yet to be adopted by the other communities.

NLWNLW

IOIOEWEW

CyberCyber

IFC

Lethal Weapons &

Other Military

Capabilities

Lethal Weapons &

Other Military

Capabilities

Utility of IFC Across Warfare Spectrum

Competition Below Armed Conflict

Cooperation

(Peace)

Armed Conflict

(War)

“Gray Zone” competition dominates any conceptual spectrum of warfare and is ideally suited for IFC

Competition Continuum

IFC are strategic risk mitigation investments that provide warfighters tools to seize the initiative while competing below the level of armed conflict.

Phase 0:

Shape Phase 1:

Deter

Phase 2:

Seize

Initiative

Phase 3:

Dominate

Phase 4:

Stabilize

Phase 5:

Enable Civil

Authority

Phases of Warfare

History and Origins

“Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.”

Sun Tzu

Read More on Sun Tzu

…at times, limited lethality may be appropriate…

Early Concepts on Limited Lethality

Evolution of the DoD NLW Program (NLWP)

• 1993 -1995: General Zinni’s experiences in Somalia establishes operational requirements for less than lethal capabilities for the joint force.

• 1995: Public Law 104-106, Section 219 (FY96 NDAA) directs DoD to centralize NLW development and oversight.

• 1996: DoD Issues NLW policy directive o NLW reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options to commanders.

o NLW have the potential to enhance the commander’s ability to:

Adapt and tailor escalation of force options to the operational environment

De-escalate situations to preclude lethal force

Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of lethal weapons

World events and associated demands on DoD contributed to the reevaluation of NLW as a means to dominate the spectrum of force between diplomacy and lethality – through non-lethal means.

Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office

(JIFCO)

• Per Memorandum of Agreement

– Established the Joint NLW

Directorate (JNLWD) in July of 1997 at MCB Quantico, VA.

– Current MOA (2011) codifies joint and service authorities, responsibilities and activities.

– JNLWD re-designated as the JIFCO (2020) to emphasize focus on IFC.

– JIFCO manages the day-to-day operation of the Joint NLW Program (JNLWP).

Introduction to the DoD NLWP

"We're not always going to kill people in our sights, sometimes we just want them to stop what they're doing…” Lieutenant General Bradley A. Heithold, USAF Commander, Air Force Special

Operations Command (2015 Directed Energy Summit, Washington, D.C)

“Non-Lethal Weapons” remains the name of the DoD Program per the FY96 National Defense Authorization Act and DoD issuances.

A formal program name change may be pursued as the concept of IFC is further refined.

DoD NLWP Structure

Joint S&T

Joint R&D

Service S&T

Service

RDT&E

Service Procurement

Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office

(JIFCO)

Chairman, JNLW Integrated Product

Team

(DC PP&O)

Service O&M

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program

DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program

Direct Oversight Coordination

USD(P)

Policy Oversight (OS)

Service-Unique Non-Lethal Weapons

Programs

USD(A&S)

Principal OS

USD(R&E)

Technical OS

DoD NLW Program Executive Agent

CMC

DoD NLWP Executive Agent Planning Guidance March 2020

“Continued research, development, and investment in NLW – better characterized as “intermediate force capabilities” – will enhance our ability to respond to challenges across the continuum of conflict.”

“This guidance incorporates the U.S. National Defense Strategy, aligns with DoD priorities, and describes how intermediate force capabilities support military objectives, including activities below the level of traditional armed conflict.”

“To emphasize the contributions of intermediate force capabilities to the Joint Force … the Joint

NLW Directorate will be renamed the Joint Intermediate

Force Capabilities Office.”

DoD NLWP Vision and Mission

Mission “The DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program develops and fields Intermediate Force Capabilities between presence and lethal effects in support of the Joint Force.”

Vision “Transform the National Security Enterprise by mainstreaming the planning and employment of Intermediate Force Capabilities to arm the Joint Force with the fullest range of capabilities in support of National Security objectives.”

Per EA Planning Guidance 2020

JIFCO Functions

• Coordinates Joint activities that support the services and combatant commands; maintains insight on Service-unique activities

• Stimulates IFC development through science and technology (S&T), research and development (R&D) and evaluation of promising technologies

Coordinates DoD IFC policy and Joint doctrine, concepts, and education

Coordinates DoD IFC policy and Joint doctrine, concepts, and education

Manages Joint Research &

Development / Science & Technology programs

Manages Joint Research &

Development / Science & Technology programs

Conducts Joint technology/system demonstrations, exercises, and assessments

Conducts Joint technology/system demonstrations, exercises, and assessments

Conducts industry engagements and Joint professional military education

Conducts industry engagements and Joint professional military education

NOTE: Although there’s Joint research and development funding, Services are responsible for their own IFC procurement.

DoD NLW Policy

• DoD Directive 3000.03E as amended on 31 August

2018:

– Defines DoD policies and assigns responsibilities for the development and employment of NLW

– Designates the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD NLW Program

– Directs the EA to stimulate and coordinate NLW requirements across DOTMLPF-P

– Details NLW benefits to commanders that include enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of lethal weapons

DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.03E has yet to be updated to reflect NLW as IFC. Although IO, Cyber and EW provide non-kinetic capabilities useful across the competition continuum, they are guided by their respective directives / publications / policies and not by DoDD 3000.03E.

Current DoD NLW Definition Per DoD Dictionary

Weapons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment.

DODD 3000.03E further defines NLW:

NLW are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and materiel.

Risk of Significant Injury (RSI) is the metric used to measure the propensity of an IFC to cause irreversible injury/effects.

IFC Relevance Across the Spectrum of Conflict

IFC Relevance

• The IFC concept reinforces deterrence and expands the range of options available to commanders.

• IFC deliver a level of force that achieves immediate target response and can provide predictable and intended reversible effects, allowing the affected target to return to pre-engagement functionality.

• IFC have the potential to enhance the commander’s ability to:

1. Reduce unnecessary casualties

2. Preserve infrastructure

3. Determine intent at range

4. Create decision space at all levels of warfare

5. Enable force applications responses to threats without escalation

6. Increase cost to adversaries to operate in the Gray Zone

7. Maintain credibility in the information space

8. Provide allies/partners with an ability to defend themselves

Investment Disparity of IFC Despite Strategic Utility

Phase 0:

Shape Phase 1:

Deter

Phase 2:

Seize

Initiative

Phase 3:

Dominate

Phase 4:

Stabilize

Phase 5:

Enable Civil

Authority

Investments in IFC do not come at the expense of lethality to the overall force

Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5

Suitability of Lethal Capabilities (Other than Deterrence)

If the Services accept the term “enhanced lethality” as the sole attribute that informs requirements and acquisition decisions, their ability to equip relevant combat forces today and tomorrow will greatly suffer.

Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5

Suitability of IFC

Capability well suited to phase

Capability of limited utility

Capability not appropriate for use

OperationalOperational

StrategicStrategic

TacticalTactical

The 21st Century operational and tactical commander must include IFC in his commander’s estimate of the situation throughout the staff planning process.

• The use of lethal force at any level of war has strategic implications; IFC provide commanders options without losing in the information space.

• IFC limit collateral damage and non-combatant casualties.

Strategic Implications

Levels of War

• IFC can augment and enhance effectiveness of lethal weapons to facilitate mission accomplishments.

IFC Mindset Challenges/Misperceptions

• Mindset: Why do we need IFC when our focus is on lethality?

– Why would I bring a bean bag to a gunfight?

– We are all trained to be killers, when I fire a weapon it is to kill someone.

– I don’t want my personnel to think about which weapon to use

(lethal or non-lethal). In life and death situations you use your instincts; shoot first and figure out the rest later.

– NLW are for law enforcement, not for military operations, etc.

– I am in the military - we doctrinally focus on lethality.

IFC Challenges/Misperceptions

“If all you have is a hammer…you tend to view all problems as nails…” - Abraham Maslow

• Common opposition to IFC

– Logistics

– Programmatic

– Legal

– Ethical

• Logistics

– My people are carrying too much gear as it is, adding IFC will add to their burden.

– If I bring IFC to the fight, what am I leaving behind?

• Programmatic

– Funding IFC removes funding from lethality / force modernization.

– IFC technologies are not mature or sophisticated enough to provide utility to the warfighter.

• Legal

– NLW or IFC technologies will never be developed because of international treaties and conventions.

• Example: For years, dazzling lasers were not developed or fielded because of concerns they would violate the protocols on blinding laser weapons.

• Ethical

– We should be developing fewer weapons.

– The NLW subset of IFC provides a slippery slope that will eventually subvert civil liberties and facilitate torture.

The Art of War in the Modern World

• “Rules of Engagement are what separate principled militaries from barbarians and terrorists.”

• "Having seen our troops…I doubt any military in history could match [them] avoiding injuring the innocent."

• “Engage your mind before your trigger finger.”

General James N. Mattis

Discussion Items

• How do IFC support the operational art and the range of military operations (ROMO)?

• Any student experiences using or planning for the use of the NLW subset of IFC in an exercise or operation?

• What are students’ initial opinions on the role for IFC; are they limited to ops such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) or should they be considered in a broader scope?

• We will explore and deliberate on the role of IFC across the range/phases of military operations.

Issues for Consideration

• Do current global environments dictate more or less emphasis on IFC?

• Are IFC technologies “harder” to use than lethal force?

• Is the DoD definition of NLW clear enough? How would you define IFC?

• Based on your knowledge of IFC, are you an advocate, neutral or a non-advocate? Why?

• Are IFC only tactical tools?

• What utility do IFC provide to the warfighter?

• What do you think is needed to make IFC more ‘acceptable’ within the military? Why?

Tactical Events Have Operational and Strategic Implications

Summary

• The DoD NLWP was codified in public law (NDAA) following demonstrated operational need.

• Joint program oversight is provided by CMC (as EA), OSD(P) OSD(A&S) and OSD(R&E) through formal processes; the EA maintains insight on service programs.

• IFC are relevant across the range and phases of military operations for:

o Minimizing fatalities and limiting collateral damage o Conducting access control for vehicles/people o Clearing buildings w/o entry o Controlling crowds o Enabling Enemy Prisoners of War/Detainee Ops o Supporting pandemic response ops o Denying enemy use of ground/facilities/infrastructure w/out destruction of them o Enabling Gray Zone and Phase 0 response

• Challenges/misperceptions are longstanding and hinder full integration and employment of NLW; however, they can be overcome.

Questions