NASA-STD-5019a.pdf
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This document is a request for information from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Johnson Space Center regarding the Orion Main Engine. NASA is seeking capability statements and other information from interested parties to determine small business subcontracting goals and influence the future request for proposal for the Orion Main Engine contract. The scope of work will include development, build, testing and delivery of the initial Orion Main Engine as well as additional engines to support future Orion missions. NASA requests capability statements, revenue and employee information, ownership details, customers and relevant work experience from interested parties. NASA also seeks suggestions on contract type, incentives, barriers to competition, production capacity, oversight approach and safety/technical/programmatic risks. Respondents are requested to identify any potential organizational conflicts of interest and proposed mitigation strategies. Responses are due by July 22, 2019.
NASA-STD-5019A-FRACTURE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR SPACEFLIGHT HARDWARE
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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE – DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED
NOT MEASUREMENT
SENSITIVE
NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD
NASA-STD-5019A
w/CHANGE 2:
ADMINISTRATIVE
CHANGE
2018-03-29
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Approved: 2016-02-01 Superseding NASA-STD-5019
FRACTURE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
FOR SPACEFLIGHT HARDWARE
NASA-STD-5019A w/CHANGE 1
DOCUMENT HISTORY LOG
Status Document Revision
Change Number
Approval Date Description
Interim I 2006-09-12 Interim Release
Baseline 2008-01-07 Baseline Release—Transitioned from
NASA-STD-(I)-5019
Revision A 2016-02-01 General Revision. Revised to include only the key and sufficient requirements for fracture control and to incorporate nonmetal requirements that were previously referenced in MSFC-RQMT-3479, Fracture Control Requirements for Composite and Bonded Vehicle and Payload Structures.
1 2016-02-26 Administrative Change: Corrected section 6.2.5.a(2) from “Metallic parts have a material property ratio of KIc⁄Fty < 1.66 √mm (0.33 √in) and do not have sensitivity to EAC, SLC, or stress corrosion cracking as defined in NASA-STD-6016.” To “Metallic parts have a material property ratio of KIc/Fty ≥ 1.66 √mm (0.33 √in) and do not have sensitivity to EAC, SLC, or stress corrosion cracking as defined in
NASA-STD-6016.”
2 2018-03-29 Editorial/Administrative Change:
Corrected section 6.1.2.2, NFC External Shatterable Components, to read to: “. . .
meet 6.1.2.2.a, 6.1.2.2.b, and 6.1.2.2.c” rather than “. . . meet either 6.1.2.2.a, 6.1.2.2.b, or 6.1.2.2.c.”
FOREWORD
This NASA Technical Standard is published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to provide uniform engineering and technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, and methods that have been endorsed as standard for NASA programs and projects, including requirements for selection, application, and design criteria of an item.
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers and Facilities and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and other contractors only to the extent specified or referenced in applicable contracts.
This NASA Technical Standard establishes the fracture control requirements for human-rated spaceflight, since NASA policy states that fracture control be imposed on all human-rated spaceflight hardware. It was developed by a NASA-wide Fracture Control Working Group to provide a common framework for fracture control practices on NASA programs.
Requests for information should be submitted via “Feedback” at https://standards.nasa.gov. Requests for changes to this NASA Technical Standard should be submitted via MSFC Form 4657, Change Request for a NASA Engineering Standard.
_____Original Signed By________ _________01/07/2008________ Ralph R. Roe, Jr. Approval Date NASA Chief Engineer https://standards.nasa.gov/
SECTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
DOCUMENT HISTORY LOG
FOREWORD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF APPENDICES
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
1. SCOPE
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Applicability
1.3 Tailoring
1.4 Overview
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 General
2.2 Government Documents
2.3 Non-Government Documents
2.4 Order of Precedence
3. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Symbols
3.2 Definitions
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Fracture Control Plan
4.2 Responsibilities
4.2.1 Responsible Fracture Control Board
4.2.2 Responsible Program
4.2.3 Fracture Control Implementation
4.3 Classification of Parts and Implementation Requirements
4.4 Other Requirements
5. EXEMPT PARTS
6. ASSESSMENT OF NON-FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS
6.1 Established Approaches for Specific NFC Hardware Types
6.1.1 NFC Metallic Fasteners, Rivets, Shear Pins, and Locking Devices
6.1.1.1 NFC Low-Released Mass Fasteners, Rivets, and Shear Pins
6.1.1.2 NFC Contained Fasteners, Rivets, and Shear Pins
6.1.1.3 NFC Fail-Safe Rivets
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
6.1.1.4 NFC Low-Risk Fasteners
6.1.1.5 NFC Fail-Safe Fasteners
6.1.1.6 NFC Locking Devices
6.1.2 NFC Shatterable Components and Structures
6.1.2.1 NFC Internal Shatterable Components
6.1.2.2 NFC External Shatterable Components
6.1.3 NFC Rotating Hardware
6.1.4 NFC Sealed Containers
6.1.5 NFC Tools, Mechanisms, and Tethers
6.1.6 NFC Batteries
6.2 General Approaches for NFC Parts
6.2.1 NFC Low-Released Mass
6.2.2 NFC Contained
6.2.3 NFC Fail-Safe
6.2.4 NFC NHLBB Pressurized Components
6.2.5 NFC Low-Risk Parts
6.2.6 NFC Documented Non-Hazardous Failure Mode
6.3 Additional Activities for Composite or Bonded NFC Hardware
7. ASSESSMENT OF FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS
7.1 Fracture Critical Parts
7.2 Established Approaches for Specific Fracture Critical Hardware Types
7.2.1 Fracture Critical Metallic Pressure Vessels
7.2.2 Fracture Critical COPVs and Composite Overwrapped Pressurized Fluid
Containers
7.2.3 Other Fracture Critical Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Fluid Containers
7.2.4 Fracture Critical Lines, Fittings, and Other Pressurized Components
7.2.5 Fracture Critical Habitable Modules and Volumes
7.2.6 Fracture Critical Pressurized Structures
7.2.7 Fracture Critical Rotating Hardware
7.2.8 Fracture Critical Fasteners
7.2.9 Fracture Critical Shatterable Components and Structures
7.2.10 Fracture Critical Tools, Mechanisms, and Tethers
7.2.11 Fracture Critical Batteries
7.3 General Approach for Fracture Critical Metallic Parts Assessment
7.3.1 Loading Spectra
7.3.2 Assessment by Analysis
7.3.3 Assessment by Test
7.4 General Approach for Fracture Critical Composite or Bonded Hardware Assessment
7.4.1 Damage Threat Assessment
7.4.2 Impact Damage Mitigation Plan
7.4.3 Residual Threat Determination
7.4.4 Loading Spectra
7.4.5 Damage Tolerance Tests of Coupons
7.4.6 Damage Tolerance Tests of Hardware Elements
7.4.7 Strength and Life Assessments
7.4.8 Damage Tolerance Tests Full-Scale Flight-Like Hardware
7.4.9 Evaluate Flaws or Damage that Occur during BBA Testing
7.5 Optional Approaches for Fracture Critical Parts
7.5.1 Single-Event Fracture Critical Components
7.5.2 High-Cycle Fatigue Components
7.5.3 Proof Test Approach for Composite or Bonded Hardware
7.5.4 Fleet Leader Testing
7.5.5 Hazardous Fluid Containers for Payloads and Experiments
8. FLAW SCREENING, TRACEABILITY, AND MATERIAL
SELECTION
8.1 Flaw Screening
8.1.1 NDE for Metallic Parts
8.1.2 NDE for Composite or Bonded Parts
8.1.3 Proof Test
8.1.4 Process Control
8.1.5 Detected Flaws
8.2 Traceability for Fracture Control
8.3 Material Selection and Usage for Fracture Critical Parts
9. FRACTURE CONTROL DOCUMENTATION AND VERIFICATION
9.1 Fracture Control Documentation
9.1.1 Fracture Control Plan
9.1.2 Engineering Drawings
9.1.3 Fracture Control Summary Report
9.1.3.1 Detailed Information for the FCSR
9.1.3.2 Other Documentation
9.2 Verification
10. ALTERNATIVES
APPENDICES
APPENDIX PAGE
A Requirements Compliance Matrix B Reference Documents
FIGURE
LIST OF FIGURES
1 NASA-STD-5019A Fracture Control Requirements Diagram 2 NASA-STD-5019A Fracture Control Classification Logic Diagram 3 Fracture Control Assessment Process and Activities Corresponding to Parts
Classifications
TABLE
LIST OF TABLES
1 Overview of Fracture Control Requirements in NASA-STD-5019A 2 General Requirements 3 Exempt 4 NFC Requirements 5 Fracture Critical Requirements 6 Flaw Screening, Evaluation, and Materials Requirements 7 Documentation and Verification 8 Alternative Approach Requirement
FRACTURE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR
SPACEFLIGHT HARDWARE
1. SCOPE
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to establish the fracture control requirements for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) human-rated spaceflight hardware.
In accordance with NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, it is NASA’s policy to produce human-rated space systems that have failure tolerance for catastrophic events or that potentially catastrophic hazards are controlled through a defined process in which approved standards and margins are implemented that account for the absence of failure tolerance.
This NASA Technical Standard supersedes the baseline release of NASA-STD-5019, Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware.
Programs that are not human-rated may choose to impose these requirements on a mission or hardware to bolster the program or to serve as a stepping-stone for human rating.
1.2 Applicability
This NASA Technical Standard is applicable to human-rated spaceflight hardware.
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers and Facilities and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and other contractors only to the extent specified or referenced in applicable contracts.
Verifiable requirement statements are numbered and indicated by the word “shall” beginning in section 4. Explanatory or guidance text is indicated in italics beginning in section 4. To facilitate requirements selection and verification by NASA programs and projects, a Requirements Compliance Matrix is provided in Appendix A.
1.3 Tailoring
Tailoring of this NASA Technical Standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements.
Technical Authority in this context may vary from program to program. In accordance with NPR 7120.10, Technical Standards for NASA Programs and Projects, section 2.2.4, “The NASA Chief Engineer, the Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Chief Health and Medical Officer serve as or may delegate Technical Authority for all technical standards within their areas of responsibility.”
1.4 Overview
This document provides the hardware developer with the requirements, rationale, and methodologies to implement fracture control requirements. It also provides a guide to the Responsible Fracture Control Board (RFCB) when reviewing the Fracture Control Plan (FCP).
This document contains 26 requirements that are numbered as Fracture Control Requirements [FCRs] and that begin in section 4. These requirements use the word “shall.” Narrative text and requirement rationale are provided in italic format beginning in section 4. Narrative text is provided as guidance for the associated requirement. It is recommended that fracture control practitioners become familiar with all portions of this NASA Technical Standard.
The FCRs are summarized and briefly described in table 1, Overview of Fracture Control Requirements in NASA-STD-5019A. Figure 1, NASA-STD-5019A Fracture Control Requirements Diagram, shows a diagram of the FCRs and the section in this NASA Technical Standard in which that particular FCR appears.
A viable fracture control program relies on design, analysis, testing, non-destructive evaluation (NDE), and tracking of fracture critical hardware. It is expected that all spaceflight hardware will be manufactured consistent with industry or aerospace standards, practices, and quality. It is beyond the scope or intent of this document to address technical or quality disciplines that should already exist and be in place regardless of fracture control. Fracture control is imposed and required, not to correct deficiencies in other disciplines, rather to enhance the safety and mission reliability of systems by reducing the risk of catastrophic failure caused by the presence of flaws.
NASA-HDBK-5010, Fracture Control Implementation Handbook for Payloads, Experiments, and Similar Hardware, contains examples and additional guidance for interpretation and implementation of the requirements of this Standard. NASA-HDBK-5010, Revision A, is under development and may not be released at the time of publication of this NASA Technical Standard. Before the release of NASA-HDBK-5010A, the current handbook may provide interim guidance for applying this NASA Technical Standard. Note that NASA-HDBK-5010A will include guidelines for NASA-STD-5019A and will likely undergo a title change to reflect a broader scope than payloads and experiments.
Table 1—Overview of Fracture Control Requirements in NASA-STD-5019A General Category Requirement Description Section
Overarching fracture control requirement [FCR 1]
Requires that all hardware developers of human-rated spaceflight hardware implement fracture control by selecting the applicable approaches and activities from sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of this NASA Technical Standard for all parts and document the applicable FCRs in their hardware-specific FCP for review and approval by the RFCB.
4.1
NASA’s implementation of fracture control on human-rated spaceflight hardware
[FCR 2] Requires implementation by NASA. 4.2.1
[FCR 3] Requires implementation by program. 4.2.2
[FCR 4] Requires RFCB involvement. 4.2.3
Evaluation of all parts [FCR 5] Requires the evaluation of all parts used in human-rated spaceflight hardware for fracture control classification.
4.3
Exempt Classification [FCR 6] Criteria for classification of exempt parts 5
Non-Fracture Critical (NFC) Classification
[FCR 7] Established approaches and activities for NFC parts for specific hardware types 6.1
[FCR 8] General approaches and activities for NFC categories 6.2
[FCR 9] Additional activities for composite or bonded NFC hardware 6.3
Fracture Critical Classification
[FCR 10] Criteria for classification of fracture critical parts 7
[FCR 11]
Established approaches and activities for fracture critical categories for specific hardware types and materials types
7.2
[FCR 12] Approaches and activities for metallic hardware types not covered by 7.2 or 7.5 7.3
[FCR 13] Approaches and activities for composite or bonded parts not covered by 7.2 or 7.5 7.4
[FCR 14] Optional approaches and activities for specific hardware types not covered in 7.2 7.5
Flaw screening and evaluation, traceability, and material requirements for fracture critical parts and other applicable components
[FCR 15] Flaw screen requirement 8 [FCR 16] NDE requirement for metallic parts 8.1.1
[FCR 17] NDE requirement for composite or bonded parts 8.1.2
[FCR 18] Optional proof test requirement 8.1.3 [FCR 19] Optional process control requirement 8.1.4 [FCR 20] Detected flaw requirement 8.1.5 [FCR 21] Traceability requirement 8.2
General Category Requirement Description Section [FCR 22] Materials requirements 8.3
Documentation [FCR 23] Documentation products requirements associated with fracture control 9.1.2
[FCR 24] Fracture Control Summary Report documenting all parts 9.1.3
Verification [FCR 25] Requirement for verification 9.2 Alternative approaches [FCR 26]
Requirement for alternative approaches to the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard
Figure 1—NASA-STD-5019A Fracture Control Requirements Diagram
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 General
The documents listed in this section contain provisions that constitute requirements of this NASA Technical Standard as cited in the text.
2.1.1 The latest issuances of cited documents apply unless specific versions are designated.
2.1.2 Non-use of specifically designated versions shall be approved by the responsible Technical Authority.
The applicable documents are accessible at https://standards.nasa.gov, may be obtained directly from the Standards Developing Body or other document distributors, or information for obtaining the document is provided. Reference documents are listed in Appendix B.
2.2 Government Documents
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
JSC 20793
MSFC-STD-3029
Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements
Guidelines for the Selection of Metallic Materials for Stress Corrosion Cracking Resistance in Sodium Chloride Environments
NASA-STD-5001
NASA-STD-5009
NASA-STD-5017
NASA-STD-5018
NASA-STD-5020
NASA-STD-6008
NASA-STD-6016
Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware
Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture Critical Metallic Components
Design and Development Requirements for Mechanisms
Strength Design and Verification Criteria for Glass, Ceramics, and Windows in Human Space Flight Applications
Requirements for Threaded Fastening Systems in Spaceflight Hardware
NASA Fastener Procurement, Receiving Inspection, and Storage Practices for Spaceflight Hardware
Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft https://standards.nasa.gov/
NPR 7120.5
NPR 7120.10
NPR 8705.2
NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements
Technical Standards for NASA Programs and Projects
Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems
2.3 Non-Government Documents
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)/National Aerospace Standards (NAS)
NASM1312-11 Fastener Test Methods, Method 11 Tension Fatigue
NAM1312-111 Fastener Test Methods, Metric Method 111 Tension
Fatigue
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
ANSI/AIAA S-080-
Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure Components
ANSI/AIAA S-081-
Space Systems – Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs)
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International
CMH-17-1G Composite Materials Handbook
Southwest Research Institute
NASGRO® User’s Manual
2.4 Order of Precedence
2.4.1 The requirements and standard practices established in this NASA Technical Standard do not supersede or waive existing requirements and standard practices found in other Agency documentation.
2.4.2 Conflicts between this NASA Technical Standard and other requirements documents shall be resolved by the responsible Technical Authority.
http://www.sae.org/
3. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Symbols
ΔKth cyclic threshold stress intensity range ω maximum operating rotational speed > greater than √ square root ® registered trademark AIA Aerospace Industries Association AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics Al aluminum ANSI American National Standards Institute API American Petroleum Institute ASME The American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM ASTM International (formerly American Society of Testing and Materials) atm atmosphere BBA building block approach BPVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code cm centimeter(s) CMH Composite Materials Handbook COPV composite overwrapped pressure vessel cp-Ti commercially pure titanium CRES corrosion resistant (steel) DLL design limit load DOT Department of Transportation DTA damage threat assessment DUL design ultimate load EAC environmentally assisted cracking ECF environmental correction factor EVA extravehicular activity Fsu ultimate shear strength Ftu ultimate tensile strength Fty yield tensile strength FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCP Fracture Control Plan FCR Fracture Control Requirement FCSR Fracture Control Summary Report ft foot (feet) ft- lb foot-pound(s)
FOD foreign object debris HCF high-cycle fatigue HDBK handbook hr hour(s) IDMP Impact Damage Mitigation Plan in inch J joule(s) Jc critical J-integral JIc plane strain J-integral JSC Johnson Space Center K stress intensity factor Kc plane stress fracture toughness KEAC stress intensity factor threshold for EAC in a specific thickness KIc plane strain fracture toughness KIe effective fracture toughness KIEAC stress intensity factor threshold for plane strain environmentally assisted cracking KISCC stress intensity factor threshold for plane strain stress corrosion cracking KJIc stress intensity factor determined from the plane strain J-integral fracture toughness KSLC stress intensity factor threshold for sustained load cracking kip kilo-pound kPa kilo-pascal ksi kip(s) per square inch LBB leak-before-burst LEF load enhancement factor LEFM linear-elastic fracture mechanics m meter(s) mA milliampere MDCP Mechanical Damage Control Plan MDP maximum design pressure MEOP maximum expected operating pressure MIL military mm millimeter MMOD micro-meteoroid and orbital debris MPa megapascal(s) MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center MUA Materials Usage Agreement NAS National Aerospace Standard
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASGRO® fracture mechanics and fatigue crack growth analysis software NDE non-destructive evaluation NDI non-destructive inspection NDT non-destructive testing NFC non-fracture critical NHLBB non-hazardous-leak-before-burst NPR NASA Procedural Requirements PRC process specification psi pound(s) per square inch psia pound(s) per square inch absolute RTD residual threat determination RFCB Responsible Fracture Control Board RQMT requirement S standard SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SLC sustained load cracking SPEC specification STA solution treated and aged STD standard Ti titanium V vanadium ω maximum operating rotational speed
3.2 Definitions
A-Basis: A statistically calculated number that at least 99 percent of the population of values is expected to equal or exceed with a confidence of 95 percent.1
Adhesive Bond (Bond): The joining of parts, components, or materials using a joining substance or agent.
Assembly/Assemblage: An integral arrangement of parts that makes up an individual unit and that acts as a whole.
B-Basis: A statistically calculated value that at least 90 percent of the population is expected to equal or exceed with a confidence of 95 percent.2
1 See NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft; CMH-17, Composite Materials Handbook; Metallic Materials Properties Development and Standardization (MMPDS, Appendix A.2) as appropriate.
2 See NASA-STD-6016; CMH-17, MMPDS (Appendix A.2) as appropriate.
Bond: The joining of two parts through molecular attraction or through any non-mechanical means of connection.
Bonded Hardware (Structure): Hardware (structure) that is assembled using parts that are joined together with an adhesive.
Brittle Fracture: Sudden rapid fracture under stress (residual or applied) where the material exhibits little or no evidence of ductility or plastic deformation.
Building Block Approach (BBA): A development methodology often used with composites or bonded hardware that (a) starts with selecting the material system and manufacturing approach; (b) moves on to experimentation and analysis of small samples to characterize the system and quantify behavior in the presence of flaws and damage; (c) progresses to examining larger structures to examine buckling behavior, combined loadings, and built-up structures in the presence of credible damage; and (d) finally moves to complicated subcomponents and full-scale components to establish their damage tolerance strength and life.
Each step along the way is supported by detailed analysis to validate that the behavior of these structures is well understood and predictable.
Catastrophic Event: Loss of life, disabling injury, or loss of a major national asset.
Catastrophic Failure: A failure that directly results in a catastrophic event.
Catastrophic Hazard: Presence of a risk situation that could directly result in a catastrophic event.
Component: A hardware unit considered a single entity for the purpose of fracture control. A component contains at least one part.
Composite or Bonded Structure: Structure (excluding overwrapped pressure vessels or pressurized components) of fiber/matrix configuration and structure with load-carrying non-metallic bonding agents, such as sandwich structure or bonded structural fittings.
Composite Material: A combination of materials differing in composition or form on a macro scale. The constituents retain their identities in the composite; that is, they do not dissolve or otherwise merge completely into each other, although they act in concert.
Normally, the constituents can be physically identified and exhibit an interface between one another. Composite material is not intended to mean an assembly of parts.
Composite Hardware (Structure): Hardware (structure) assembled with parts made from composite materials.
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel: A pressure vessel with a composite structure fully or partially encapsulating a metallic liner. The liner serves as a fluid (gas and/or liquid) permeation barrier and may carry substantial pressure loads. The composite generally carries pressure and environmental loads.
Contained: A condition in which a suitable housing, container, barrier, restraint, etc., prevents a part or pieces thereof from becoming free bodies if the part or its supports fail.
Contamination: Any material included within or on the hardware that is not called for on the engineering drawings. Examples of contamination are dust, grease, solvent, solid objects, etc.
Crack or Crack-like Defect: A discontinuity assumed to behave like a crack for fracture control purposes.
Critical Stress Intensity Factor: The stress intensity factor at the initiation of crack growth in the part resulting in a catastrophic failure that is representative of the failure mode of concern for the metallic material process condition, weakest orientation, and thickness being evaluated. Examples for metallic materials may include: KIEAC, the stress intensity factor threshold for plane strain environment-assisted cracking; plane strain fracture toughness (KIc) may be appropriate for thick sections and/or as a lower bound value3; effective fracture toughness (KIe) is used in NASGRO® for crack growth analyses of surface or elliptical flaws;
KJIc calculated from JIc or a Kc calculated from Jc may be appropriate for the conditions described in the defining standard (ASTM E1820, Standard Test Method for Measurement of Fracture Toughness) such as evaluation of ductile tearing and instability; constraint-based assessments (ASTM E2899, Standard Test Method for Measurement of Initiation Toughness on Surface Cracks Under Tension and Bending), and/or tests may be needed for surface or other complex cracks in materials or conditions that invalidate the ability of Linear-Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) to represent crack growth.
Damage: See definitions of Flaw and Impact Damage.
Damage Threat Assessment (DTA): An evaluation of potential sources of flaws in composite or bonded hardware that includes definition, quantification, and an assessment of the residual strength sensitivity to flaws.
Damage Tolerance: Fracture control design concept under which an undetected flaw or damage (consistent in size with the flaw screening method or residual threat determination (RTD)) is assumed to exist and is shown by fracture mechanics analysis or test not to grow to failure (leak or instability) during the period equal to the service life factor times the service life.
Design Limit Load (DLL): See definition of Limit Load.
Design Ultimate Load (DUL): Limit load multiplied by the ultimate factor of safety.
3 Proof test assessments need to use upper bound fracture toughness; see section 8.1.3 in this NASA Technical Standard.
Environmental Correction Factor (ECF): An adjustment factor used to account for differences between the environment (thermal and chemical) in which a part is used and the environment in which it is tested.
Environmentally Assisted Cracking (EAC): A cracking process in which the environment promotes crack growth or higher crack growth rates than would occur without the presence of the environment (ASTM E1681, Standard Test Method for Determining Threshold Stress Intensity Factor for Environment-Assisted Cracking of Metallic Materials). An example is available in published literature (Lewis and Kenny, 1976).
Experiment: For fracture control, an arrangement or assemblage of hardware that is intended to investigate phenomena on a provisional, often human-tended, basis.
Fail-safe: A condition where a redundant load path exists within a part (or hardware), so that after loss of any single individual load path, the remaining load path(s) has sufficient structural capability to withstand the redistributed loads, and the loss of the load path will not cause a catastrophic hazard.
Fastener: For fracture control, any single part that joins other structural elements and transfers loads from one element to another across a joint.
Flaw: For metallics, glass, or brittle materials, a crack-like defect. For composite or bonded materials, an anomaly in the hardware that has the potential for adversely affecting strength, damage tolerance life, or must-work function. Examples of flaws in metallics include cracks, deep scratches and sharp notches that behave like cracks, material inclusions, forging laps, welding incomplete fusion, penetration, and slag or porosity with a crack-like tail.
Examples of flaws in composite or bonded materials may include cracks, cuts, scratches, delaminations, porosity/voids, disbonds, wrinkles, foreign object debris, impact damage, etc.
Damage (used alone) and flaw are equivalent.
Fleet Leader: Articles representative of spaceflight hardware with respect to production methods, e.g., materials, manufacturing, testing, that either have accumulated (or are scheduled to accumulate) more service lifetime in typical (or more severe) environments than the rest of the fleet and are monitored for indications of failure modes to provide early warning of known and unexpected risks to the rest of the fleet.
Flight (Spaceflight) Hardware: Any hardware (including spares) that is approved to be part of or carried by a launch vehicle, crew module, transfer stage, landing craft, payload, etc.
Flight-like Component: A component assembled and made of parts that are of flight specifications. Flight-like components are usually intended for qualification tests. Any deviations from flight have to be insignificant with respect to test objectives.
Fracture Critical: Fracture control classification that identifies a part whose individual failure, caused by the presence of a crack, is a catastrophic hazard and that requires safe-life analysis or other fracture control assessment to be shown acceptable for flight. A part is fracture critical unless it can be shown that there is no credible possibility for a flaw to cause failure during its lifetime or the part failure does not result in a credible catastrophic hazard.
Assessments for fracture critical parts include damage tolerance analysis, damage tolerance test, or defined approaches for specific categories. Parts under this classification receive flaw screening by NDE, proof test, or process control and are subjected to traceability, materials selection and usage, documentation, and engineering drawing requirements.
Habitable Modules or Volumes: Flight containers/chambers that are designated and designed to support human occupancy.
Hardware Developer: Organization directly responsible for doing the design, manufacture, analysis, test, and safety compliance documentation of the hardware. This includes implementing fracture control requirements.
Hazardous Fluid: For fracture control, a fluid the release of which would create a catastrophic hazard. These types of fluids may include liquid chemical propellants, liquid metals, biohazards, and other highly toxic liquids or gases. The release of such fluids would create a hazardous environment, such as a danger of fire or explosion, unacceptable dilution of breathing oxygen, an increase of oxygen above flammability limits, over-pressurization of a compartment, or loss of a safety-critical system.
Hazardous Fluid Container: Any single, independent (not part of a pressurized system) container or housing that contains a fluid the release of which would cause a catastrophic hazard and that is not classified as a pressure vessel.
Hazardous Material: For fracture control, a material the release of which would create a catastrophic hazard.
High-Cycle Fatigue (HCF): A high-frequency, low-amplitude loading condition created by structural, acoustic, or aerodynamic vibrations that can propagate flaws to failure. An example of an HCF loading condition is the vibrational loading of a turbine blade because of structural resonance.
Impact Damage: The injury or harm inflicted upon composite or bonded hardware by impingement of an object upon the hardware in question or the bumping or striking between the hardware in question and another object. Impact damage is a subset of the more general term damage (or flaw).
Impact Damage Mitigation Plan (IDMP): A plan for composite or bonded hardware to mitigate risk of impact damage to the flight hardware.
Initial Crack (Flaw) Size: The crack size that is assumed to exist at the beginning of a damage tolerance analysis, as determined by NDE or proof testing.
Kc: Plane stress fracture toughness. The value of stress intensity factor K at the tangency between a crack extension resistance curve (R-curve) and the configuration-dependent applied K curve (ASTM E1823, Standard Terminology Relating to Fatigue and Fracture Testing). This crack extension occurs under conditions that do not approach crack-tip plane strain. The R-curve and Kc vary with the material, specimen size, and thickness. Kc is used in NASGRO® to represent fracture toughness as a function of thickness for use in crack growth calculations.4
KIc: Plane strain fracture toughness. The crack extension resistance under conditions of crack-tip plane strain in Mode I for slow rates of loading under predominantly linear-elastic conditions and negligible plastic-zone adjustment that is measured by satisfying a standardized procedure with validity requirements (ASTM E399, Standard Test Method for Linear-Elastic Plane-Strain Fracture Toughness KIc of Metallic Materials). Another quantity, KJIc, defined for conditions with limited plasticity from JIc may also be useful (ASTM E1820).
KIe: Effective fracture toughness for a surface or elliptically shaped crack. The toughness is based on residual strength and the original crack dimensions. This parameter is meaningful only when crack-tip plastic zones are small and stable crack growth before failure is generally absent (ASTM E740/E740M, Standard Practice for Fracture Testing with Surface- Crack Tension Specimens, main body and section X1.2). For conditions with plastic effects and well-defined crack-tip stress fields with fracture controlled by crack initiation, an approach involving constraint may be applicable (ASTM E2899). Testing of flaws in specimens representative of the structure is needed to determine damage tolerance for plasticity conditions when crack-tip stress fields collapse. KIe is used in NASGRO® for analyses of crack growth.5
KEAC: The largest value of the stress intensity factor at which crack growth is not observed for a pre-cracked through-crack specimen of specified material, environment, and thickness that is tested for a significant duration in accordance with ASTM E1681.
KIEAC: The largest value of the stress intensity factor at which crack growth is not observed for a pre-cracked through-crack specimen of specified material, environment, and thickness that is sufficient to meet requirements for plane strain and is tested for a significant duration in accordance with ASTM E1681.
KIscc: KEAC is often denoted as KIscc in the literature.
ΔKth: Threshold stress intensity factor range below which flaw growth will not occur under cyclic loading conditions.
4 See NASGRO® User’s Manual where the Kc symbol is defined as “critical stress intensity” and section 2.1.4 that shows Kc as a function of material thickness and describes the usage of Kc.
5 See NASGRO® User’s Manual where the KIe symbol is defined as “effective fracture toughness for part-through (surface/corner) crack" and section 2.1.4 that describes how the KIe value is determined and how it is used.
Leak-Before-Burst (LBB): Characteristic of pressurized hardware whose only credible failure mode at or below maximum design pressure (MDP) with service life loads resulting from the presence of a potential flaw is a pressure-relieving leak at the flaw as opposed to burst or rupture at the critical stress intensity factor. As the hardware item leaks down, there is no re-pressurization or continued pressure cycles that could lead to continued crack growth. In this failure mode, the hardware will not fail in a fragmentary, catastrophic manner. Instead, only small, slow-growing leaks would develop, leaking in a controlled manner. Additional aspects of LBB assessments are described in section 6.2.4 in this NASA Technical Standard.
Life Factor: See definition of Service Life Factor.
Lifetime: See definition of Service Life. Refers to a specified life, as opposed to an analytically predicted life.
Limit Load: The maximum load expected on the hardware during its design service life including ground handling, transport to and from orbit, including abort conditions and on-orbit operations.
Limited Life Part: A part that has a predicted damage tolerance life that is less than the required service life factor times the complete service life. See definition of Service Life.
Load Enhancement Factor (LEF): A factor applied to the service life spectrum to satisfy a specified level of reliability and confidence with fewer cycles than would otherwise be required.
Low-Cycle Loads: A low-frequency, high-amplitude loading condition created by thermal, pressure, or structural loads that can propagate flaws to failure. An example of a low-cycle loading condition is the aerothermal loading of a turbine blade during launch.
Low-Fracture Toughness: Material property characteristic, in the applicable environment, for which the ratio is KIc Fty⁄ < 1.66 √mm �0.33 √in �. For steel bolts with unknown KIc, low-fracture toughness is assumed when material A-basis ultimate strength Ftu > 1,241 MPa (180 ksi). Parts made with materials of this characteristic may be at risk of a brittle fracture.
Materials Usage Agreement (MUA): A formal document showing that a noncompliant material is acceptable for the specific application identified.
Maximum Design Pressure: The highest possible operating pressure considering maximum temperature, maximum relief pressure, maximum regulator pressure, and, where applicable, transient pressure excursions. MDP for human-rated hardware is a two-failure tolerant pressure, i.e., it will accommodate any combination of two credible failures that will affect pressure. Some programs have defined MDP as a two-fault tolerant pressure.
Mechanism: A system of moveable and stationary parts that work together as a unit to perform a mechanical function, such as latches, actuators, drive trains, and gimbals.
Mission: A major activity required to accomplish an Agency goal or to effectively pursue a scientific, technological, or engineering opportunity directly related to an Agency goal.
Mission needs are independent of any particular system or technological solution (NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements).
Net-Section Stress or Strain: The stresses or strains computed for a hypothetical cut across a part, based on strength-of-materials theory. Possible bending loads can produce stress gradients across the net section, in which case the net-section stress is found to be the maximum combination of tension and bending stress, ignoring geometric stress concentrations. (An example of net-section stress calculation detailed in the NASGRO® User’s Manual, Appendix B.)
No-Growth Threshold Strain: For a composite or bonded part, the largest strain range
(where strain range is the maximum absolute value of strain in a load cycle) below which flaws compatible with the sizes established by NDE, special visual inspection, the DTA, or the minimum sizes imposed do not grow in 106 cycles (108 cycles for rotating hardware) at a load ratio appropriate to the application. Thresholds are determined on specimens with flaws for which sufficient load/cycles have been initially applied to cause flaw growth. The no-growth threshold strain is a function of the material and layup and is determined from test data in the appropriate environment for the applicable (or worst) orientation of strain and flaw for a particular design.
Non-Destructive Evaluation: Examination of parts for flaws using established and standardized inspection techniques that are harmless to hardware, such as radiography, penetrant, ultrasonic, magnetic particle, and eddy current. NDE is sometimes referred to as non-destructive testing (NDT) or non-destructive inspection (NDI).
Non-Hazardous-Leak-Before-Burst (NHLBB): A non-fracture critical classification for metallic pressurized hardware that contains a material that is not hazardous and that exhibits the LBB failure mode in a non-hazardous manner.
Part: Hardware item considered a single entity for the purpose of fracture control.
Pressure Vessel: A container designed primarily for pressurized storage of gases or liquids and that also performs any of the following:
a. Contains stored energy of 19,307 J (14,240 ft-lb) or greater based on adiabatic expansion of a perfect gas.
b. Stores a gas that will experience an MDP greater than 690 kPa (100 psia).
c. Contains a gas or liquid in excess of 103 kPa (15 psia) that will create a catastrophic hazard if released.
Pressurized Component: A line, fitting, valve, regulator, etc., that is part of a pressurized system intended primarily to sustain a fluid pressure and fluid transfer. Any piece of hardware that is not a pressure vessel or a pressurized fluid container but is pressurized via a pressurization system.
Pressurized Fluid Container: A container designed primarily for pressurized storage of gases or liquids that is similar to a pressure vessel but does not satisfy the definition of a pressure vessel.
Pressurized Hardware: Any of the various hardware items that support an internal pressure.
Pressurized Structure: A hardware item designed to carry both internal pressure and vehicle structural load.
Pressurized System: An interrelated configuration of pressurized components under positive internal pressure. The system may also include pressure vessels.
Proof Test: A test on the flight article that is performed to verify structural acceptability or to screen flaws. The proof test load and/or pressure level is the proof test factor times limit load and/or MDP. Proof tests may be conducted in the operational environment, or the test levels may be adjusted via an ECF. (Note that some sections within this NASA Technical Standard may specify when an ECF is optional versus when it is prescribed for the classification if the test is not conducted in the operational environment.)
Proof Test Factor: A factor that is multiplied by the limit load and/or MDP to arrive at the proof test levels. When proof tests are performed to establish structural acceptability, the proof test factor is specified. When screening for flaws with a proof test, the proof test factor is derived by fracture mechanics principles.
R Ratio: The ratio of minimum stress to maximum stress in cyclic loading.
Re-flight Hardware: Hardware items that have already met the requirements in this
NASA Technical Standard for service life, have flown on a flight vehicle, and are being manifested for an additional flight. Note that some fracture control categories in this NASA Technical Standard impose additional requirements that are to be satisfied before being re-flown.
Residual Strength: The maximum value of load (both externally applied and internal self-equilibrating loading, such as residual stresses) that a flawed or damaged part is capable of sustaining without catastrophic failure.6
Residual Threat Determination: An assessment that defines the worst-case credible flaw conditions that composite or bonded hardware will be designed to endure, considering all applicable flaw detection and mitigation strategies that are implemented for the flight hardware.
Responsible NASA Center: The NASA Center acting as the sponsor and/or coordinator for the program/project developing the payload/hardware.
Responsible Fracture Control Board: A designated multi-discipline group of experts at the NASA Center that has the authority to develop, interpret, and approve fracture control requirements and the responsibility for overseeing and approving the technical adequacy of all fracture control activities at the Center.
Rotating Hardware: Hardware that has a rotational mode of operation and devices with spinning parts, such as fans, centrifuges, motors, pumps, gyros, and flywheels.
Rupture: An instance of breaking or bursting suddenly and completely.
Safe Life: See definition of Damage Tolerance.
Safety Critical: For fracture control, a part, component, or system whose failure or loss would be a catastrophic hazard.
Sealed Container: Any single, independent container (not part of a pressurized system), component, or housing that is sealed to maintain an internal non-hazardous environment and that does not meet the definition of a pressure vessel.
Service Life: Time interval for a part beginning with manufacture and extending throughout all phases of its specified mission usage. The period of time or number of cycles that includes all relevant loadings, conditions, and environments encountered during this period that will affect flaw growth, including all manufacturing, testing, storage, transportation, launch, on-orbit, descent, landing, and if applicable, post-landing events, refurbishments, retesting, and repeated flights until the hardware is retired from service.
Service Life Factor: The factor on service life required in damage tolerance analysis or testing. The service life factor is often referred to as the life factor. (Note that the service life factor is specified as 4 for metallic materials in section 7.3.2.c in this NASA Technical Standard. The service life factor is specified as the B-basis number of service lives with the corresponding LEF for composites or bonded materials in sections 7.4.7.b and 7.4.8.e in this NASA Technical Standard.)
6 In the NASGRO® User Manual version 7.1.1, section 2.1.5 and Appendix O, there is discussion of a related failure condition invoked when net section stress exceeds the material flow stress.
Shatterable Materials: Any material that is prone to brittle failures during operation that could release many small pieces into the surrounding environment.
Special Visual Inspection: Close proximity, intense visual examination of localized areas of internal and/or external structure for indications of impact damage, flaws, or other structural anomaly. Appropriate access to gain proximity, e.g., removal of fairings and access doors, use of ladders and work stands, is required. High-intensity lighting, along with other inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, and surface cleaning, are used. Special visual inspections are done independently by two inspectors. When special visual indications are found, NDE is done.
Standard NDE: NDE methods of metallic materials for which a statistically based flaw detection capability has been established. Standard NDE methods addressed by this document are limited to fluorescent penetrant, radiography, ultrasonic, eddy current, and magnetic particle.
Sustained Load Cracking (SLC): Growth of a pre-existing crack in susceptible metallic alloys7 under sustained stress without assistance from an external environment. A threshold stress intensity factor can be obtained by procedures such as those in ASTM E1681 for the case of an inert or vacuum environment. One publication determines the effects of hydrogen content and temperature on SLC in Ti-6Al-4V (Boyer and Spurr, 1978).
Ultimate Factor of Safety (Ultimate Safety Factor): A specified factor to be applied to limit load. No ultimate structural failure is allowed for a load equal to the ultimate factor of safety multiplied times limit load.
Ultimate Strength (Capability): The load, stress, or strain at which collapse or rupture occurs.
Yield Strength: The stress that corresponds to a plastic axial strain of 0.002 mm/mm
(0.002 in/in).
7 SLC, because of the presence of interstitial hydrogen, occurs in titanium alloys, including commercially pure titanium (cp-Ti) and Ti-6Al-4V (Ti64), in both annealed and solution treated and aged (STA) conditions. Testing is necessary to determine the threshold stress intensity for the titanium alloy metallurgical condition and interstitial hydrogen content. Other materials with different crystalline structures such as steel and aluminum alloys that do not allow interstitial hydrogen may still exhibit SLC behaviors.
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Fracture Control Plan
A summary table of all FCRs in this NASA Technical Standard is shown in Appendix B in this NASA Technical Standard.
[FCR 1] A Fracture Control Plan shall be developed and maintained by the program for human-rated spaceflight hardware that satisfies all of the following:
a. Addresses all of the parts in the program-specific flight hardware.
b. Meets the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard.
c. Specifies fracture controls that are established to mitigate the risk of catastrophic failure caused by flaws throughout the service life of the hardware.
d. Has approval by the RFCB.
[Rationale: The FCP is necessary to document the hardware-specific fracture control requirements, such as parts classification, selected approaches for each part, and all required fracture control activities for the program or project. The RFCB-approved FCP is the working document that all responsible parties use for implementing fracture control requirements to a particular program or project.]
The FCP details the fracture control responsibilities, the classification of all parts for the specific hardware, the selected applicable fracture control approaches from the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard corresponding to each part’s category, as well as the approaches for flaw screening, traceability, and material selection of fracture critical parts. The hardware-specific FCP also documents all alternative approaches in accordance with the requirement of [FCR 26] in this NASA Technical Standard.
Each separate hardware project within a program may develop an FCP for its hardware.
The initial FCP should be submitted early in the program. An early draft and subsequent updates of an FCP are necessary for appropriate cost estimation.
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