Bowling Tests Summary.pdf

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Electrical Testing & Maintenance Report Summary

General

Williiam Henderson LLC, in cooperation with SDV Services Inc., provided electrical testing and maintenance services at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center Bowling Division in Lexington, Kentucky on November 2023 to February 2024 under contract number 36C2493P0897. All services were conducted in accordance with contract specifications, industry standards, NFPA

This report consists of the following:

Section 1 Electrical Testing and Maintenance Report Summary

Section 2 Publications/Exhibits

Section 3 Electrical Test Records

Section 4 Individual Thermographic Test Records

Section 5 Licenses, Certificates, Specialized Tools & Equipment

The types of equipment tested during this testing session included:

Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers

Medium Voltage Switches

Medium Voltage Network Protectors

Medium Voltage Oil- and Dry-Type Transformers

Low Voltage Switchboards and Circuit Breakers (select areas)

Automatic Transfer Switches

Motor Control Centers

Electrical Panels item and type.

William Henderson

LLC

in cooperation with

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Thermographic Inspection (Infrared)

In addition to regular testing procedures, infrared scan procedures were used wherever possible to determine serviceability and reliability of the equipment inspected to include panelboards.

The infrared services were conducted using a FLIR T440 thermal imaging camera.

While infrared technology can be an invaluable tool in predictive maintenance, it is not without limitations. Reflectivity, background, material emissivity and ambient temperature are among many factors that can influence thermal readings. As a result, reported temperature readings outlined in this report should not be viewed or used in terms of absolute temperature readings.

Instead, the readings should be viewed in terms of trends and relationships with other equipment components or like materials.

Supplemental tests were performed wherever possible and on an as-needed basis. These tests consisted of recording circuit loads and conducting Voltage Drop Tests. Circuit loads were monitored to assist in identifying potential phase imbalances or overload conditions. Voltage Drop tests were conducted to determine potential contact resistance issues. Both tests are extremely valuable in helping to determine potential sources of temperature variances.

The Individual Thermographic Report section of this report provides a report on each piece of equipment with a deficiency to include among other things:

Thermal image

Visual image

Thermal readings

Location

Condition and cause

Priority level

Recommended action

Repair Priority Levels for the problem as other pieces of equipment or hardware shield us and the camera from that view.

We also know at some point in time the equipment item will fail based on the reported condition but cannot with any certainty predict when that will happen. Therefore, every documented issue is important and should be carefully considered.

Many factors or questions need to be addressed when attempting to establish a repair priority level to resolve documented issues. In random order, some general guidelines or questions you might consider in assigning a repair priority level are:

1. How critical is the piece of equipment?

2. What are the ramifications if it fails? What areas will be affected?

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3. Is there a personnel hazard or danger?

4. Can the issue lead to collateral damage of related equipment either upstream, downstream or within the same area?

5. What is the cost of resolving the issue using a controlled, scheduled shutdown versus an emergency repair/replacement of the equipment item should the equipment fail unexpectedly?

6. Are resources (personnel, contractors, money, etc.) available to make the repairs?

The thermographer cannot readily address such issues or make such determinations. As a result, repair priority levels need to be determined by the VA personnel with the ability to address such questions or those pertinent to their facilities. Note answers to questions 1-5 should help to overcome or support obstacles encountered with question 6.

Findings & Recommendation

Outlined below are the findings and related recommendations for issues noted during this testing session. These findings are in random order and not prioritized based on severity of the issue.

1. Electrical System Condition

Issues/Recommendations

There are some notable areas of the electrical system in need of upgrading based on their poor condition, being well over 25 years of age based on industry standards and having surpassed the threshold of its 15-year service life outlined in the VA Electrical Design Manual reference below.

VA Electrical Design Manual Reference

1.15.4 AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION

(b) The equipment should be capable of remaining in use for a minimum of 15 years of additional life or having 60 percent of remaining life, if not the equipment shall be replaced.

a) The Tower Building medium voltage system is in poor overall condition and technically obsolete.

i. The GE Magna-Blast breakers are approximately 50 years of age, technically obsolete and in poor condition. The existing battery system is defective as it does not generate sufficient power supply to enable the breakers to be lowered and raised for testing and maintenance purposes. See picture to the right.

ii. The GE medium voltage air switches are of the same age as the Magna-Blast breakers above. More importantly, they contain floating contacts with a history of breaking. Replacement parts are no longer available beyond possibly salvaged parts. Failure of these contacts would render the switches inoperable

4 | P a g e resulting in a loss of normal power to all downstream circuits. An emergency replacement would be very lengthy and require the facility to operate on emergency power during this time. Note that normal power circuits would be completely down for the duration of the replacement.

iii. The network protectors provide no functionality as there are not multiple sources of power to the Tower Building by which they could switch in the event of a power loss to one of the incoming feeds. These should not be included in any future substation designs.

iv. The protective relaying systems in both the medium voltage substation and low voltage switchboards are also roughly 50 years of age and are original electro-mechanical relays.

These conditions create great concern regarding the reliability and ability to safely protect the electrical system and its occupants in this segment of the facility. These equipment items should be rated Assessment guidelines. These systems need to be replaced with the type of equipment contained in substations in the recently-installed Square D Substations 2A and 2B in the Chiller Plant vacuum circuit breakers, oil or dry-type transformers, solid-state relaying, etc.

In relation to the Tower Building low voltage switchboards, with rare exception, the trip units are roughly 40 years of age and proper operation is unpredictable. They are technically obsolete and reliability is unpredictable. These equipment items should be rated These trip units should be upgraded to the latest solid state trip units to provide a reliable system. The breakers themselves should be reconditioned as part of the trip unit upgrade as they are well built and very functional. That would save a significant amount of money in creating a reliable electrical system. The new trip units could include ground fault protection and eliminate the need for the existing obsolete ground fault relays.

Note there are several spare circuit breakers on the floor in the main electrical vault.

Barring a mechanical issue, these breakers could be refurbished first and used to swap out with the remaining breakers in these switchboards. This should minimize the overall impact of the refurbishment process. Refurbishment can extend the service life of these breakers an additional 25 years or so provided they are properly maintained.

b) The Main Hospital Low Voltage Switchboard #1 and #2 are of the same age as the Chiller Plant Substations 1A and 1B. These devices operated properly during the recent testing session. However, they contain the same obsolete trip units that are technically obsolete and are questionable in their response to a fault. Note the Main and Normal Power A&B circuit breakers were swapped out during the schedule outage with two (2) breakers that had recently been refurbished.

These equipment items should be Assessment guidelines. The trip units should be upgraded to the latest solid state trip units to provide a reliable system. The breakers themselves should be reconditioned as

5 | P a g e part of the trip unit upgrade as they are well built and very functional. Again, the refurbished breakers can be used to swap out the remaining breakers in these switchboards to minimize the overall impact of the refurbishment process. This has the same benefit of extending the service life of these breakers an additional 25 years or so provided they are properly maintained.

c) The Main Hospital generator and emergency switchboards are exposed to outside air due to louvres exposing these switchboards to abnormal ambient temperatures and dirt/debris. Such conditions have led to corrosion of the equipment and penetration of the dirt/debris into the switchboards and circuit breakers. This can affect the proper operation of the circuit breakers and can lead to either a delayed or failure to respond to a fault or power loss.

Abnormal temperatures combined with dirt/debris can lead the breakers to either open slowly or not at all in response to a fault with the potential for a catastrophic failure. This can lead to a significant arc flash incident and even fire. These

Assessment guidelines. Attachment B to this summary contains images of these four

(4) switchboards.

The four (4) automatic transfer switches in the generator room are also exposed to abnormal ambient temperatures. Of great concern is the condition of the grease used to lubricate the operating mechanisms used to shift the contacts between power sources. This grease can hard in times of abnormal ambient temperatures leading to a failure to transfer to the alternate source and servo-motor failure. Servo-motor failures have resulted in fires at other facilities where the motor continues to attempt switching contact positions but is physically prevented by the hardened grease.

Additionally, several circuit breakers in these switchboards are missing interior shields surrounding the operating handle as represented by the picture to the right. Such shields are designed to prevent personnel from accidentally coming into contact with energized components. This is a safety issue and should be corrected as soon as possible.

The generator and emergency switchboards should be replaced as soon as possible to provide safe and reliable power to the emergency circuits of the Main Hospital. Depending on timing, the above-referenced interior shield issue may be resolved by replacing these emergency switchboards.

A part of replacing the switchgear in this generator room is to segregate it from the generator itself to protect this equipment and ensure it meets its intended useful service life. Additionally, section 5.2.2 Primary Switchgear and section 5.5.1(f) Electrical Rooms and Closets of the VA Electrical Design Manual referenced below outlines the requirement to provide ventilation or cooling systems to maintain indoor temperatures required for proper operation of equipment.

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VA Design Manual

5.2.2 PRIMARY SWITCHGEAR

(a) Primary switchgear for Mission Critical facilities shall be located indoors, in a secure, protected location that complies with the Physical Security Design Manual. The area shall have the necessary ventilation or cooling systems to maintain indoor temperature as required for proper operation of the equipment, as well as access control.

Equipment shall be located above the Base Flood Elevation.

VA Design Manual

5.5.1 GENERAL

(f) Electrical spaces shall have the necessary mechanical ventilation or cooling system to maintain the indoor temperature range required for proper operation of the equipment.

d) Chiller Plant Substation 1A and 1B is an original Siemens-Allis substation comparable in age to the substations in the Tower Building carrying the same technical obsolescence and reliability issues. During the recent testing session, these breakers continued to be problematic from a mechanical perspective even though they have been serviced at regular intervals. This raises the question of their ability to respond to or operate in the event of a fault. Faults could escalate upstream taking out larger segments of the

These equipment items should be rated Assessment guidelines. The breakers in these two switchboards could be refurbished as with the two recently placed into service in the Low Voltage Switchboard #2 in the Main Hospital. This is a significantly more cost-effective solution and provides a minimal impact on the facility versus a complete replacement while extending the service life of these breakers an additional 25 years or so provided they are properly maintained.

It should be further noted the majority of the circuits in these substations are now spare with the installation of the new Square D Substations 2A and 2B. These Spare breakers could be refurbished and used to replace existing breakers that could then be refurbished.

e) ATS-1 and ATS-2 for switchboards SBC and SBE in the Tower Building main electrical vault were serviced by an ASCO technician during this testing session. A key issue with

More importantly, environmental issue related to such materials. For both reasons, these equipment guidelines.

NOTE

Attachment C to this summary identifies all operational circuit breakers to be considered for refurbishment as discussed above.

Supplemental Notes on Equipment Aging

Replacement parts are becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain due to age and technical obsolescence. More importantly equipment of this age and condition raises the question of reliability in regards to the ability of the equipment to properly and safely

7 | P a g e protect the facility. Careful consideration should be given to upgrading/refurbishing the older equipment throughout this facility.

As electrical equipment ages, the associated risk of a failure increases significantly. Such failures usually occur without prior warning and can be potentially catastrophic. Repairing or replacing aged equipment is another issue due to obsolescence or non-availability of parts. In the event of a failure, there is a great possibility parts will not be available or will have significant lead times. As an example, SDV found a defective main switch in a federal building that took 6 months to acquire a replacement part due to technical obsolescence.

This can lead to very costly repairs and extended down time for equipment and related circuits.

Included in section 2 to this report is an article presented by three professional engineers (PEs) specializing in electrical distribution systems omeo, PE. The first page of this article references the hazards of aging electrical systems and the unpredictability of equipment exceeding its useful service life. Equipment identified in this report has far exceeded this service life without upgrade and has this element of unpredictability regardless of past performance or testing.

Additionally, enclosed in the Publications section of this report is a Square D publication concerning placing electrical equipment in adverse environments with guidelines for properly protecting such equipment.

2. Improper Working Clearance

Issue

Switchboards HSB1 and HSB2 in the Chiller Plant have been placed directly against the wall as represented by the picture to the right. National clearance outlined below.

NEC Reference 110.26(A)(1)(a) Dead-Front Assemblies

(a) Dead-Front Assemblies. Working space shall not be required in the back or sides of assemblies, such as dead-front switchboards or motor control centers, where all connections and all renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, are accessible from locations other than the back or sides. Where rear access is required to work on nonelectrical parts on the back of enclosed equipment, a minimum horizontal working space of 762 mm (30 in.) shall be provided.

Exhibit 110.9 Distances measured from the live parts if the live parts are exposed or from the enclosure front if the live parts are enclosed. If any assemblies, such as switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, the working clearance dimensions would be required at the rear of the equipment, as illustrated. Note that for Condition 3, where there is an enclosure on opposite sides of the working space, the clearance for only one working space is required.

In the case of this switchboard installation, there are bus connections located in the rear of the enclosure that cannot be serviced from the front as they are blocked by other

8 | P a g e installed equipment (circuit breakers, support structures, secondary conductors, etc.).

Any attempts to service these connections as well as clean the rear portion of the enclosure from the front would require extensive disassembly of circuit breakers and secondary conductors that clearly is not the intent of the manufacturer or the NEC.

There appears to be confusion and misapplication related to installation guidelines of similar a person on the

-installed main low voltage switchboard definition. Operating personnel are protected from the energized components when covers are in place. However, this definition makes no reference to working space requirements.

NEC section 110.26(A)(1)(a), Dead-Front Assemblies (outlined below) uses this definition and applies other qualifying factors or elements in determining working spaces around such assemblies. Those factors or elements are:

1) Connections,

2) Renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, and

3) Accessibility from locations other than the back or sides.

Additional clarification regarding work space requirements is provided in Exhibit 110.9 switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, switchboard in question does have covers providing rear access that expose the switchboard bus components. This installation clearly meets these conditions requ horizontal working space.

Recommendation

Switchboards HSB1 and HSB2 in the Chiller Plant need to be relocated to provide the is necessary to facilitate proper maintenance and servicing of the bus and other components of the switchboard to include cleaning. Proper working clearance should be a point of emphasis for all future installations.

3. Overhead Sprinklers

Much of the electrical equipment located throughout this facility has sprinkler heads and related water pipes directly over or within the spray pattern of the electrical equipment as represented by the picture to the right. Additionally, no protective covers have been installed to prevent water from getting into the electrical equipment nor are physical protective devices installed to protect the actual sprinkler heads from physical damage.

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Both are required by National Electric Code section 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d) as outlined below.

110.26(F)(1)(a) through 110.26(F)(1)(d)

(F) Dedicated Equipment Space. All switchboards, panelboards, distribution boards, and motor control centers shall be located in dedicated spaces and protected from damage.

Exception: Control equipment that by its very nature or because of other rules of the Code must be adjacent to or within sight of its operating machinery shall be permitted in those locations.

(1) Indoor. Indoor installations shall comply with 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d).

(a) Dedicated Electrical Space. The space equal to the width and depth of the equipment and extending from the floor to a height of 1.8 m (6 ft) above the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower, shall be dedicated to the electrical installation. No piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or other equipment foreign to the electrical installation shall be located in this zone.

Exception: Suspended ceilings with removable panels shall be permitted within the 1.8-m (6-ft) zone.

(b) Foreign Systems. The area above the dedicated space required by 110.26(F)(1)(a) shall be permitted to contain foreign systems, provided protection is installed to avoid damage to the electrical equipment from condensation, leaks, or breaks in such foreign systems.

(c) Sprinkler Protection. Sprinkler protection shall be permitted for the dedicated space where the piping complies with this section.

(d) Suspended Ceilings. A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling that does not add strength to the building structure shall not be considered a structural ceiling.

The dedicated electrical space includes the space defined by extending the footprint of the switchboard or panelboard from the floor to a height of 6 ft above the height of the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower. This reserved space permits busways, conduits, raceways, and cables to enter the equipment. The dedicated electrical space must be clear of piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or equipment foreign to the electrical installation. Plumbing, heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning piping, ducts, and equipment must be installed outside the width and depth zone.

Foreign systems installed directly above the dedicated space reserved for electrical equipment must include protective equipment that ensures that occurrences such as leaks, condensation, and even breaks do not damage the electrical equipment located below.

Sprinkler protection is permitted for the dedicated spaces as long as the sprinkler or other suppression system piping complies with 110.26(F)(1)(c). A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling is permitted to be located directly in the dedicated space, as are building structural members.

The electrical equipment also must be protected from physical damage. Damage can be caused by activities performed near the equipment, such as material handling by personnel or the operation of a forklift or other mobile equipment. See 110.27(B) for other provisions relating to the protection of electrical equipment.

Exhibits 110.21, 110.22, and 110.23 illustrate the two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F), that is, the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

In Exhibit 110.21, the dedicated electrical space required by 110.26(F) is the space outlined by the width and the depth of the equipment (the footprint) and extending from the floor to 6 ft above the equipment or to the structural ceiling (whichever is lower). The dedicated electrical space is reserved for the installation of electrical equipment and for the installation of conduits, cable trays, and so on, entering or exiting that equipment. The outlined area in front of the electrical equipment in Exhibit 110.21 is the working space required by 110.26(A). Note that sprinkler protection is afforded the entire dedicated electrical space and working space without actually entering either space. Also note that the exhaust duct is not located in or directly above the dedicated electrical space. Although not

10 | P a g e specifically required to be located here, this duct location may be a cost-effective solution that avoids the substantial physical protection requirements of 110.26(F)(1)(b).

Exhibit 110.21 The two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F): the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

A facility-wide survey of all electrical rooms/closets in this facility should be conducted to identify electrical components not properly protected or shielded from the sprinkler systems spray patterns or with overhead water lines. Additionally, the survey needs to identify sprinkler heads without physical protective covers.

Shields need to be installed in all areas where electrical components are within the spray pattern or have overhead water lines to prevent damage to prevent overhead water sources (sprinklers and water lines) from penetrating the enclosures. Such penetration could lead to a potentially catastrophic failure. Protective covers or cages need to be installed on unprotected sprinkler heads to prevent accidental activation with the same potential for catastrophic failure as mentioned above.

4. Common Point of Failure

Switchboards SBC and SBE in the Tower Building have automatic transfer switches (ATS) on the front end of these two systems providing both normal and emergency power to these

11 | P a g e these switchboards will result in a total power loss to downstream circuits. In the event the Main circuit breaker fails, the entire switchboard will be without power. Additionally, spare circuit breakers are typically not available for these larger circuit breakers.

Recommendation

Due to the age of these two switchboards, the present configuration should not be changed.

However, both switchboards SBC and SBE should be replaced in the near future as mentioned earlier in this Summary. Consideration should be given to implementing smaller circuit feeding the ATS. Feeder breakers at the lower levels of the electrical system are typically smaller, replacements more readily available and are cheaper to replace or maintain spare circuit breakers.

5. Variable Frequency Drives (VFD)

This facility contains a considerable number of variable frequency drives (VFD) in lieu of traditional motor starters. Harmonics (voltage and current) are introduced into the electrical system by VFD power supplies along with those generated by computers and similar electronic devices. Harmonics studies are often performed to determine the impact of harmonics in the electrical system and potential means of mitigation or reduction. It appears such a study has not been performed at this facility.

Eaton White Paper Excerpt

Most power systems can accommodate a certain level of harmonic currents but will experience problems when harmonics become a significant component of the overall load. As these higher frequency harmonic currents flow through the power system, they can cause communication errors, overheating and hardware damage, such as:

generators, etc.

and shortened life span system power factor, resulting in penalties on monthly utility bills

A copy of the entire white paper has been provided in section 2 to this report.

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A project should be initiated to perform a harmonics study to confirm the presence and levels of harmonic loads to include transformers with unusually high sound levels that may be overheating due to harmonics. This study could be performed in conjunction with the above-referenced arc flash study.

Any issues should be corrected using the following Eaton guidelines outlined in the section 2 white paper:

a. Oversize the neutral wiring,

b. Install separate neutral conductors,

c. Install DC power supplies in equipment that are not affected by harmonics, or

d. Install K-type transformers capable of handling harmonic loads.

6. Transient Voltage Surge Suppression System (TVSS)

There appears to be a general lack of transient voltage surge suppression systems (TVSSs within this facility most notably on the main switchboard, distribution panels and automatic transfer switches. These systems are designed to protect the enclosed sensitive electronic boards from being damaged due to, among other things, voltage and current surges generated during power shifts to and from emergency power. This can lead to premature failure of these boards and greatly increase maintenance costs.

Additionally, all other systems within the facility containing sensitive electronic circuits (i.e., security and fire alarm systems, data centers, etc.) should be checked for similar protection issues to avoid such costly failures.

Two related magazine articles concerning the need for surge protection are located in the Publications section located in tab 2 to this report.

A facility-wide review should be conducted for equipment containing sensitive electronic components susceptible to damage from transient voltages and currents created during power shifts. At a minimum, this should include automatic transfer switches, security and fire alarm systems, data centers and data lines. Transient voltage surge suppression systems should be installed on all such equipment to prevent such damage, ensure system reliability and reduce maintenance costs on this equipment. Any installations should meet the provisions outlined in National Electric Code section 285.

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7. Circuit Directories/Identification

Numerous switchboards and panels throughout the facility were found be missing or have incomplete circuit directories. In some cases, circuits have multiple identifications where the circuits have changed over the years creating confusion as to which is the correct circuit.

Many new equipment installations were found without any circuit markings.

There are multiple panels with the same circuit ID. As an example, there are two or more panels labeled CLF and CPM in the Tower Building. This condition can be dangerous for personnel attempting to isolate a circuit for maintenance. Circuit markings are required by National Electric Code section 110.22(A) outlined below.

110.22(A) Circuit Identification

Each disconnecting means shall be legibly marked to indicate its purpose unless located and arranged so the purpose is evident. The marking shall be of sufficient durability to withstand the environment involved.

Furthermore, none of the emergency equipment in this facility is properly designated as emergency equipment as required by National Electric Code section700.9 referenced below.

700.9 Wiring, Emergency System.

(A) Identification. All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) for emergency circuits shall be permanently marked so they will be readily identified as a component of an emergency circuit or system.

A project needs to be initiated to perform the following:

a. Develop a circuit identification system for labeling electrical panels.

Consideration should be given to developing a system that creates some descriptive features to help locate a panel simply using the circuit id. Below is an example of such a system:

Panel ID: 1ALXXX

1 provides the floor level.

A indicates the hospital wing L N for normal, L for life safety, C for critical and E for equipment XXX a unique number or characters for each panel

b. Labels for emergency sourced panels need to be readily identifiable as being part of the emergency system. It is recommended these panel labels be done with white lettering on a red label to meet this requirement.

c. Replace existing panel id labels with the newly created circuit id labels. It would be highly beneficial to provide the power source and location on these labels.

This would enhance lockout/tagout procedures and reduce troubleshooting

14 | P a g e efforts typically slowed by attempting to locate the upstream power source for isolation purposes.

d. Create or update all circuit directories and remove old circuit labels throughout the facility. If this is done by VA personnel, consideration should be given to purchasing a 42-circuit tracing kit readily available for purchase for around $1,200. Such a kit substantially reduces the manhours required to trace circuits versus the effort required when utilizing a single circuit tracer.

e. All electrical single-line drawings should be updated to incorporate the new circuit id labels along with all upgrades and additions to the electrical system.

This is necessary to provide maintenance personnel with up-to-date information to ensure proper safeguards are in place while performing maintenance operations.

f. Lockout/tagout procedures should be revised upon completion of the drawing updates. Both are necessary to provide maintenance personnel with up-to-date information to ensure proper safeguards are in place while performing maintenance operations.

g. New equipment installations need to be closely monitored to ensure the installing contractor provides circuit directories and equipment labels. These labels should be consistent with the circuit id system referenced in step a above.

8. Transformer Oil Test Results

Test Results

Oil samples were taken of medium-voltage oil-type transformers in the Main Hospital and Chiller Plant. Each sample was tested using dissolved gas analysis (DGA). All test results were found to be well within established test limits with the exception of T-7 in the Chiller Plant. This sample showed abnormal levels of water. Water content is used to identify potential problems with the insulating or dielectric strength of the transformer oil.

The water condition of transformer T7 should be a point of emphasis during future testing sessions or additional sampling.

9. Transformer Negative Pressure

Issues

Transformers T5 and T6 in the Main Hospital contained pressure gauges indicating a negative pressure of roughly -2 psi. Negative pressure has the potential for moisture and air potential for a flashover and catastrophic failure. Fill ports nor pressure relief valves were installed on

15 | P a g e these two transformers to enable a nitrogen blanket being installed over the oil to prevent

Fill ports and pressure relief valves were installed by Henderson/SDV personnel during the scheduled power outage. A nitrogen blanket was placed over the oil to a pressure of roughly +4.0 psi.

Recommendations

No further action required.

10. Lack of Bus Duct Burms

The floor openings for the bus risers in this facility do not prevent liquids from penetrating the bus as represented by the picture to the right. This creates the potential for liquids to penetrate the bus with the potential for a catastrophic failure if left uncorrected. Such requirements are outlined in National Electric Code section 368.10(c)(2) and NEMA Standard Publication BU 1.1-2005 outlined below (complete publication has been included in the Publications section located in section 2 of this report).

368.10(c)(2) Installation Through Floors

(b) In other than industrial establishments, where a vertical riser penetrates two or more dry floors, a minimum 100-mm (4-in.) high curb shall be installed around all floor openings for riser busways to prevent liquids from entering the opening. The curb shall be installed within 300 mm (12 in.) of the floor opening. Electrical equipment shall be located so that it will not be damaged by liquids that are retained by the curb.

NEMA Reference

6.8.2.2 Floor Level Liquids.

6.8.2.2 Floor level liquids Four-inch minimum curbs should be installed around all floor openings for riser busways to prevent floor level liquids from entering the opening.

concrete burms are ideal, a comparable result can be achieved through metal fabricated burms combined with a silicone caulk to seal the base area.

11. Lack of Disconnect Means

The higher bus plugs in the electrical closets do not have any means of disconnecting power from the floor. National Electric Code section 404.8, outlined below, requires a disconnect

16 | P a g e means to be operable from the floor or The ladders placed in the majority of the electrical closets do not satisfy this code requirement.

404.8 Accessibility and Grouping.

(A) Location. All switches and circuit breakers used as switches shall be located so that they may be operated from a readily accessible place. They shall be installed such that the center of the grip of the operating handle of the switch or circuit breaker, when in its highest position, is not more than 2.0 m (6 ft 7 in.) above the floor or working platform.

Exception No. 1: On busway installations, fused switches and circuit breakers shall be permitted to be located at the same level as the busway. Suitable means shall be provided to operate the handle of the device from the floor.

Exception No. 2: Switches and circuit breakers installed adjacent to motors, appliances, or other equipment that they supply shall be permitted to be located higher than 2.0 m (6 ft 7 in.) and to be accessible by portable means.

Exception No. 3: Hookstick operable isolating switches shall be permitted at greater heights.

Additionally, the secondary side disconnect switch for panel PP1C1 in room C127 (Emergency Room area) has been placed above the drop ceiling with no means of disconnect from the floor. Furthermore, access to this disconnect from a ladder is obstructed by a shelf in this room.

Recommendation

The higher bus plugs ed to have some means by which to disconnect them from the floor to comply with NEC requirements.

Possible options are to connect rope/lanyards to both ends to the operating mechanism or place a device in each of the electrical rooms for such purposes. Whatever approach is selected, it must be long enough, strong enough and capable of providing full opening and closing motions on the bus plugs.

The PP1C1 disconnect switch needs to have some form of disconnect from the ground or needs to be relocated.

12. Tower Medium Voltage Battery System

As previously discussed, the battery system for the GE Magna-Blast medium voltage circuit breakers in the Tower Building is designed to power circuits for lowering and raising the breakers in their cubicles. This system was found to be in poor condition (as pictured to the right) with a system charge insufficient for the breakers to be lowered from their cubicle for testing and servicing.

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Until this medium voltage system is replaced, the battery system needs to be properly maintained to allow these breakers to be serviced. This may require initial replacement of the existing battery system.

13. 4-Hour ESS

The 4-hour ESS Test was performed on January 27, 2024 in accordance with guidelines established by NFPA 110 and VHA Directive 1028. Below is the timeline for completion of this phase of the project:

a) Outage was initiated at 8:04 Am with Kentucky Utilities (KU) turning power off to the facility.

b) All generators were reported as starting properly and all transfer switches transferred to the emergency position.

c) No reports of equipment problems were reported by VAMC personnel.

d) Slocum and Associates had technicians standing by to help with any equipment problems. No problems were reported by VA personnel.

e) After one hour of the facility being on emergency power only, VA personnel had not requested assistance nor were any equipment problems reported by VA personnel.

f) After two hours of the facility being on emergency power only, VA personnel had not requested assistance nor were any equipment problems reported by VA personnel.

g) After three hours of the facility being on emergency power only, VA personnel had not requested assistance nor were any equipment problems reported by VA personnel.

h) After four hours of the facility being on emergency power only, VA personnel had not requested assistance nor were any equipment problems reported by VA personnel.

i) At this time, 12:08 PM, the 4-hour requirement had been met. However, utility power was not restored to the facility until 12:30 pm.

j) All transfer switches transferred back to normal power and all generators went through normal cool down and shutdown.

k) During the entire utility outage, no problems were reported by VA personnel and no requests for assistance were made of Slocum personnel.

14. Arc Flash Hazard Analyses

In accordance with NFPA 70Eand VHA Directive 1028, an Arc Flash Hazard Analyses was conducted in conjunction with this testing session. Appropriate warning labels were generated and affixed to each equipment item evaluated under this analyses. Additionally, all protective devices were adjusted to reflect recommended settings outlined in the selective coordination phase of the analyses.

No further action required.

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15. Grounding Study

In accordance with VHA Directive 1028, a grounding system study was performed in conjunction with this testing session. The National Electrical Code (NEC) is a governing document for this Scope of Work. NEC 250.4 states the purpose of electrical system grounding is to limit the voltage imposed by lightning, line surges, or unintentional contact with higher-voltage lines. NEC 250.6 states the electrical system should be designed to prevent objectionable current. Stated differently, a properly designed and maintained electrical system meeting these objectives will help protect equipment and personnel from the harmful effects of stray currents and high voltages within this system.

An essential part of the electrical system grounding is directly connecting the electrical system's neutral to earth using grounding electrodes such as ground rods, water pipes, foundation steel, building steel, etc. Articles 250.50 and 250.52 define electrodes permitted for serving this function. Part of this study is to evaluate the grounding electrodes in use and if they are in serviceable condition.

Testing Overview

Within this facility, grounding electrodes were evaluated for the main substations as well as each medium voltage switch, transformer and service entrance.

equipment. This is evident as the original installation has not deteriorated. A clear reflection of efforts by maintenance personnel to support its upkeep.

Testing Procedures

Resistance and amperage readings were taken with a Megger DET2/3 Ground Test Kit and a Megger DET14C Earth Tester. These instruments induce a test current into the measured cable and simultaneously measures the voltage's reaction to the injected current.

Fall of Potential testing was not possible at this facility due to concrete and pavement preventing access to the soil for such measurements. As a result, ground tests were performed using a dual clamp or single clamp test as appropriate. Both methods being acceptable alternatives.

Each measured circuit's resistance is calculated from the injected current and resultant voltage measurements. Resistance as low as 0.01 ohms with a resolution of 1 milliohm can be measured up to 200 ohms. Readings of 200 ohms indicate an effective open circuit.

Test Results

All evaluated grounding electrodes were found to be serviceable condition and test measurements well within acceptable test limits. No further action required.

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16. Thermographic Issues

Issues

One (1) thermal issue was noted during the infrared scan of this facility. This issue was related to a defective conductor termination crimp. It is summarized in Attachment A following this summary and is fully reported on in tab 4 to this report.

Recommendations

See recommendation in Attachment A and tab 4 to this report.

CD-ROM Version

Inside the front cover of each report copy is a CD-ROM containing an electronic copy of the Electrical Testing & Maintenance Report. These have been created using Adobe Acrobat and can be viewed by anyone with Adobe Acrobat Reader 7.0 or higher on their computer.

Additional report and work order copies can be printed using this CD-ROM.

In the event you do not have a compatible viewer, you can download a free version from the internet following the instructions at:

www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/index.html

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Attachment A. Thermographic Report Summary

Main Hospital, Rm. CM408, 1-SF1 Starter - Starter 1-SF1 B secondary connection has a defective crimped connection.

Main Hospital, Rm. CM408, 1-SF1 Starter - De-energize the MCC. Remove the 1-SF1 starter condary conductor. Inspect for conductor damage. Repair or replace condcutor. Re-terminate crimped connection. Reinstall conductor and tighten all connections per manufacturer s.

22.7

39.4 °C

Attachment C. Circuit Breaker Refurbishment List

Circuit breakers listed below contain the following type of obsolete trip unit needing refurbishment.

Manufacturer Obsolete Trip Unit Siemens Statc Trip II Carriere FB-600 General Electric VersaTrip General Electric EC-1 General Electric EC-1B

Location Switchboard Breaker ID Main

ESB1, ATS-LS

ESB2, ATS-CR

Normal Power Bus C&D Tie

R1 R2

MCC3N

MCC4N

MP5

Main

PCC/LF/PFF

MCA

MCC

Main

SBK

SBJ

LE/LDD/PGG

MCB

CPK

CPH

ATS-CR

ATS-EQ

HEMG

HEMG1

Tower Building SBG Main

Tower Building SBH Main

Tower Building

Tower Building

Main Hospital LV Switchboard No. 1

Tower Building

LV Switchboard No. 2

SBA

SBB

SBC

SBD

SBE

Main Hospital

Tower Building

Tower Building

Location Switchboard Breaker ID Main Spare Chiller 1 Feed to HSB1 Tie

Main

MCC1

Spare Chiller 2 Spare

Chiller Plant Substation 1A

Substation 1BChiller Plant