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- H961--Triennial Electrical Power Distribution System Testing Services Federal contract opportunity
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About this file
This file is an Electrical System Assessment report prepared by SSOE Group for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Tuscaloosa VA Medical Center, completed in August 2014. The comprehensive analysis evaluated the facility's electrical distribution system across multiple campus buildings, including short circuit analysis, arc flash hazard assessment, protective device coordination, emergency power systems, grounding, and voltage drop. The study was based on two onsite surveys conducted in January and March-April 2014, supplemented by as-built documents and facility data, utilizing SKM Power Tools software for system modeling and analysis.
Key findings indicate that while the vast majority of electrical equipment is properly rated to withstand available fault currents, several protective devices are underrated and require immediate replacement to prevent potential safety hazards and equipment damage during fault conditions. The facility experiences significant coordination deficiencies throughout most of the electrical system, necessitating substantial equipment upgrades and modifications to achieve selective coordination in compliance with NFPA 70 and NFPA 70E standards. Arc flash hazard analysis revealed that most equipment falls into Personal Protective Equipment Category 3 or lower, though approximately 17 devices are rated as "Dangerous" with no adequate protective equipment available. The emergency power system, consisting of seven generators with capacities ranging from 500 to 1,250 kW, operates in good condition with adequate capacity for projected loads, though concerns exist regarding undocumented internal modifications that may not comply with NFPA 110 and NEC Articles 700 and 701. The facility's peak demand of 3,915 kVA (approximately 25 percent of total transformer capacity) indicates adequate spare capacity for future growth. Additional recommendations include grounding system testing, replacement of obsolete cloth-type wiring in older buildings, correction of welding cable misuse, and development of accurate electrical equipment floor plans to improve maintenance and future engineering studies.
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| 36C24726Q0147_2.docx | DOCX document |
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Text version
Department of Veterans Affairs
Arc Flash Hazards Power System Analysis
SSOE Project No. 013-01064-00
August 22, 2014
Electrical System Assessment
Revision: 100% Submittal August 22, 2014
SSOE Project No. 013-01064-00
Prepared for:
U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs
Tuscaloosa VA Medical Center 3701 Loop Road
Tuscaloosa, AL 35404
Prepared by:
Joseph Kiumu, P.E.
SSOE Group Birmingham, AL jkiumu@ssoe.com 205-323-2373 www.ssoe.com
Reviewed by:
Edward McConnell, P.E.
08-21-20148-22-2014
Table of Contents
1.0 Executive Summary
1.1 Short Circuit
1.2 Arc Flash Hazard
1.3 Protective Device Coordination
1.4 Emergency Power System
1.5 Ground Resistance
1.6 Voltage Drop
1.7 Analysis and Recommendations
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Overview
2.2 Site Plan
2.3 Medium Voltage Distribution
2.4 Low Voltage Distribution
2.5 Short Circuit
2.6 Arc Flash Hazard
2.7 Protective Device Coordination
2.8 Emergency Power System
2.9 Ground Resistance
2.10 Voltage Drop
2.11 Study Software
2.12 Analysis and Recommendations
Appendix A – Meeting Minutes
Appendix B – Comments and Responses
VACO Comments – Tuscaloosa 60% Submittal
VACO Comments – Tuscaloosa 90% Submittal
Appendix C – Alabama Power Load Data
Appendix D – VHA Directive 2006-056 Compliance Survey
Appendix E – VAMC Site Plan
3.0 Short Circuit
3.1 Purpose
3.2 Computer Program Description
3.3 System Configuration
3.4 Computer Calculations
3.5 Assumptions
3.6 Conclusions
Appendix SC - A – Electric Utility Fault Current Information
Appendix SC - B – 3-Phase Short Circuit Report
Appendix SC - C – Short Circuit One-Line Diagrams
4.0 Arc Flash Hazard
4.1 Scope of Work
4.2 Introduction
4.3 Discussion
4.4 Assumptions
4.5 Conclusion
4.6 Informative Annex C Limits of Approach
4.7 Informative Annex K General Categories of Electrical Hazards
Appendix AF - A – Arc Flash Data Tables
Appendix AF - B – Arc Flash One Line Diagrams
Appendix AF - C – Arc Flash Equipment Warning Labels
5.0 Protective Device Coordination
5.1 Purpose
5.2 Selective Coordination
5.3 System Configuration
5.4 Calculations
5.5 Computer Program
5.6 Assumptions
5.7 General Protective Device Coordination Discussion
5.8 Devices to be evaluated
Appendix PDC - A – TCC Description & Analysis
Appendix PDC - B – Coordination Curves (TCCs)
Appendix PDC - C – Protective Device Settings
6.0 Emergency Power System
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Analysis
Appendix EPS - A – Test Load Data
7.0 Ground Resistance
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Analysis
8.0 Voltage Drop Analysis
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Assumptions
8.3 Interpretation
8.4 Assumptions
9.0 Analysis and Recommendations
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Electrical Equipment Clearance
9.3 Ground fault Protection
Appendix A – Equipment Assessment
Appendix B – Photographs
Electrical System Assessment 1
1.0 Executive Summary
SSOE Group has been commissioned by the Department of Veterans Affairs to conduct an Electrical System Assessment of the VA Medical Center in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The scope of this study includes short circuit analysis, protective device coordination, voltage drop calculations, arc flash hazard analysis and equipment condition assessment. The study begins at the incoming utility service (for the normal system) and at the emergency generators (for the emergency system) continuing through to each branch circuit panel board, motor control center in each building.
In order to do the system analysis, SSOE personnel conducted two onsite surveys to obtain data and information of existing electrical distribution system for Tuscaloosa VAMC. The first survey was conducted between Monday, January 6, 2014 and Tuesday, January 21, 2014. Second site survey took place between Monday March 31, 2014 and Wednesday, April 2, 2014 and between Tuesday April 8, 2014 and Thursday April 10, 2014. These site visits completed the bulk of the field investigation required for this project. Information was also obtained from facility as-built documents.
Note that the peak kVA demand, as obtained from the utility company, is 3,915 kVA. The total emergency generator capacity is 4525 kW. See section 2.8 and Appendix C for more details.
The field survey was performed in order to obtain actual equipment data required for the modeling of the site electrical distribution system, as well as to conduct a system assessment. As expected, some equipment data and information of the existing equipment was not available and some engineering assumptions were made for the purpose of this study. A list of the major assumptions can be found in each section where applicable. Further, differences were discovered between as-built documents submitted by the VA and existing conditions during the onsite survey. The electrical system information was used to build a power system model using the computer program (SKM Systems Analysis Software) in a one line diagram format. The data entered included nameplate data and/or specifications for transformers, motors, generators, protective devices, panelboards, distribution boards, and system wiring. Using different modules available in SKM power tools, an electrical short circuit study was completed to establish the available fault current at each point of application or bus. Other program modules were utilized to conduct a system analysis of arc flash hazard, protective device coordination, and evaluation of suitability of electrical equipment.
As a result of this study the following things should be noted:
1.1 Short Circuit
The vast majority of the system equipment is properly rated to withstand the available fault current.
There are several protective devices that are overdutied. Under fault conditions, these circuits could fail or cause equipment damage creating safety hazard.
Several devices are marginal close to be overdutied. Because of assumptions made in producing the electrical system model, these devices should be considered overdutied.
All equipment that are shown to be under rated for available fault current should be replaced immediately.
1.2 Arc Flash Hazard
The majority of equipment was hazard category 2 or less. However, this does not indicate that it is safe to work on this equipment while energized unless under extreme conditions where life would be at risk if equipment was de-energized. Recommendations and directions of NFPA 70E and OSHA regulations should always be followed
There were a number of busses that were hazard risk category 3 or 4. Some of these cases can be mitigated through revised breaker setting or in some cases installing new breakers whose setting can be more finely adjusted to reduce breaker clearance time for instantaneous fault.
Mitigation of arc flash would require a more in depth analysis of the system to be sure protective device coordination is not compromised. This may require significant equipment changes.
Electrical System Assessment 2
1.3 Protective Device Coordination
Most of the electrical system is not properly coordinated and will require significant equipment changes.
There are cases where devices could not be selectively coordinated without significant device changes.
Most thermo-magnetic breakers have limited coordination capabilities and new electronic trip breaker with narrower more adjustable bands will be required to achieve selective coordination.
Ground fault system is not properly coordinated. Recommendations for setting adjustment to achieve coordination have been provided.
1.4 Emergency Power System
This system is in good working condition.
Most of associated equipment is in new and excellent condition.
Based on load data, there is adequate capacity for additional loads.
1.5 Ground Resistance
This ground resistance is in good condition but has not been tested. Test results were therefore not available.
System testing needs to be conducted to ensure system is capable of working as intended.
Some of the older buildings do not appear to have grounding for branch circuits. This was common in the early days but needs to be rectified for electrical safety.
1.6 Voltage Drop
Because of the conservative restrictions in the scope of work, voltage drop appears to be quite high. In reality the building are lightly loaded and there are not concerns for voltage drop.
1.7 Analysis and Recommendations
Most equipment is in good condition Major issues are overdutied breakers or old obsolete equipment Cost for protective device coordination mitigation has not been included in the analysis and recommendations appendix. Cost estimate will be included in the 100% submittal.
Electrical System Assessment 3
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Overview
Tuscaloosa VAMC is located at 3701 Loop Rd in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. It is part of the Southeast network of VA medical centers (VISN 7). It is a multi-building campus comprising of community living, primary care, child care, administrative, etc. See table below for more detailed name and function of buildings that are part of this study.
Building 33 which is currently undergoing complete renovation and addition will not be part of this study.
According to documents provided by the VA, only buildings 1, 2, 7, 38, 61, 138, and 137 are patient care buildings. While those are patient care buildings, they are classified as business occupancy not healthcare.
1 Administration/Clinics 81,322 TAC-1, T-1A 2 Mental Health, Outpatient 34,759 TAC-2, T-2 3 Electric Shop,IT,SPD,Boiler 55,771 TAC-3, T-3A, T-3 4 Auditorium 11,624 TAC-5 5 Administrative Offices 18,629 T-5 6 VISN 7 Offices 6,850 T-6 7 CWT Home/PRRTP - Trans. Home 6,362 T-6 8 Tenant/Hospice 4,160 T-6
12 Warehouse 15,973 T-12 15 CWT Home/PRRTP - Trans. Home 5,692 T-6 17 Engineering 6,967 T-17A, T-17 18 Laundry 19,008 T-18A, T-18 38 Primary Care/Canteen 81,058 T-38A, T-38 39 Storage 52,221 TAC-39, T-39 40 VISN OI&T Offices 66,486 TAC-40, T-40 41 CWT Shop & Garage 11,832 T-41B, T-41 46 Chapel 4,229 T-46 60 Main Primary Switchgear 600 Alabama Power Service 61 Community Living/Center CLC 95,555 T-61 61 Generator Bldg 600 - 62 Generator Bldg 600 - 63 Management Offices/Library 16,811 135-MSB-BWA 101 Green House 3,599 - 135 Ambulatory Care 62,446 T-135 135 Generator (135) 600 - 137 Psychiatric Patient/Daycare/NHCU 280,893 T-137A, T137-B 138 Chiller Plant 4,896 T-70, T-138A, T-138B 139 Generator (137) 600 - 140 Generator (2 & 38) 600 - 141 Generator (33,39,40) 600 - 143 Dietetics Facility 16,307 T-143 145 Community Center 15,000 T-145/146 146 Cottage #1 10,000 T-145/146
BLDG BUILDING NAME/FUNCTION APPROX.
SQ. FT.
SERVICE
TRANSFORMER(S)/SWITCHBOARD
Electrical System Assessment 4
2.2 Site Plan
Site plan below provided by VAMC engineering personnel illustrates the current general layout of buildings around the VAMC campus.
2.3 Medium Voltage Distribution
Tuscaloosa VAMC is served by two overhead 12.47kV feeders from Alabama Power service grid. The Hargrove Road distribution service is the preferred source while Crescent Ridge distribution serves as alternate source.
This dual source provides adequate reliability of power to Tuscaloosa VAMC except from sizeable storm capable of knocking out overhead distribution. Both sources are protected by a recloser system which enables for service to be quickly reconnected automatically if outage is lost due to a temporally fault condition. A recloser is a circuit breaker that opens on short circuit and automatically recloses after a brief time delay in case the short circuit has cleared itself. The main Hargrove Road feeder has a recloser that will attempt to close on fault three times at delay of 0.2, 30, and at 40 seconds. The Crescent road feeder will attempt to reclose three times each after 18 second delay. After that the recloser will open permanently until reset by repair crew.
The two primary feeds from Alabama Power poles terminate underground into medium voltage primary switch gear in building 60, located near Building 137. The primary switch gear owned by the VAMC has an automatic transfer system which will automatically transfer from one source to the other in case of loss of power from one of the service feeders. The switch gear distributes the 12.47kV electrical power throughout the campus via system of exterior pad mounted primary switches and pad mounted transformers. The only exception is the chiller plant, building 138, which has a dedicated single feed from the primary switch gear.
Electrical System Assessment 5
The switchgear includes a power factor correction cabinet to improve quality of power. Overcurrent protection at primary switchgear is provided through ABB C0-8 relays which operate 1200 amp Square D VAD-3 vacuum circuit breakers to isolate circuits in case of fault or overload. The main feed to the primary switchgear is protected by a 51 relay while distribution circuits are protected by 50/51 relays. Both the main and feeders except for power factor correction are also protected by ABB GKC ground fault relays. Incoming medium voltage service is also protected by undervoltage relays for all three phases. Medium voltage cable runs underground through a system of electrical manholes to primary switches which (through explosive style fuses) feed distribution transformers for each building. The majority of primary switches are fed from two circuits out of the primary switch gear. This provides redundancy, enabling VAMC to manually restore power quickly in case one primary feeder is lost due to outage or needs to be isolated for repairs. Each building is fed by between one and three oil filled transformers which transform 12.47kV down to either 120/208V or 277/480V specific to each building.
Based on data provided by Alabama Power, the maximum demand from a 12 month history was 3.915MVA on July 2013. This amounts to approximately 178.17Amps at 12.47kV. Based on this information, the peak current (178.17A) is about 46.4% of 80% (384A) of main relay current setting on the primary switchgear. Peak demand is also about 47% of main breaker capacity. This provides for adequate spare capacity in case of future growth without the need for main service upgrade.
2.4 Low Voltage Distribution
Through a system of primary pad mounted switch gear, each building, except building 138, is fed from two circuits out of the primary switchgear. 12.47KV service is stepped down at each building through one, two, or three transformers depending on need of each building. Some buildings have both 120/208V and 277/480 service while others have distribution in single voltage configurations. See table below for more details. Buildings without individual service feeds are not shown on the table. Those include generator buildings and the green house building which are served by a feeder from one of the other buildings.
The majority of the buildings are served by switch gear that distributes electrical power to a network of feeder and branch circuit panels.
Detailed information of the distribution system for some of the buildings was difficult to obtain due to the discrepancies between as built drawings and actual existing electrical equipment. This was compounded by the fact that the facility does not have accurate electrical equipment floor plans indicating location of all equipment.
Also, there have been numerous in house electrical equipment modifications that are not recorded in any engineering or as-built documents. Further, due to the age of the facility, and number of undocumented modifications over many years, records of current existing conditions and results from those modifications are problematic to obtain. We recommend that VAMC engage in services to accurately identify the location of all electrical equipment in a floor plan format. This will make maintenance and future studies easier, more accurate, and more cost effective.
Tuscaloosa VAMC has some older buildings with original wiring including “cloth type” wiring. With age, this insulation degrades and becomes brittle, which can lead to electrical faults and/or fire. Assessing branch circuit wiring is not in the scope of this study but it would be recommended that all existing wiring in the buildings be evaluated and replaced with new as needed. There are a few cases in VAMC Tuscaloosa where welding cable has been used to provide wiring for emergency power upgrades. These cables are allowed to be sized for higher amperage than for similar sizes specified on table 310.15(B)(16) of the NEC for wielding applications only. Sizing cable for general wiring based on welding applications does not comply with NEC.
Electrical System Assessment 6
BLDG NO VOLTAGE
277/480 120/208 277/480 120/208 277/480 120/208 120/208 277/480 120/208
6 120/208 7,15 120/208
8 120/208 12 120/208
277/480 120/208 120/208 120/208 120/208 277/480 277/480 120/208 277/480 120/208 277/480 120/208
46 120/208 61 277/480 63 277/480
135 277/480 277/480 277/480 277/480 277/480 277/480
143 277/480 145 120/208 143 120/208
7-PP-BA
BUILDING SERVICE SUMMARY
SWITCHGEAR FED
138-MSB2
138-MSB-3
143-MPA
145-MDP
146-MDP
63-MSB-GA
135-MSB-BWA
137-MFP1-SEA
137-MSP1-SEB
138-MSB1
40-PP-EM-BNA
41-FP-1EA
41-PP-BEA
46-PP-GA
61-MSA
38-PP-GEN-BSE
38-MSB-BSE
39-FP-BNA
39-PP-EM-BNA
40-FP-BNA
T-145/146 T-145/146
1-FP-GCA
1-MSB-GWA
2-FP-GCA
2-PP-GCA
3-FP-GNA
3-PP-GNB
3-PP-GNA
5-FP-BWA
5-PP-EM-BWA
8-RP-BA
12-PP-1A
17-LP-GWA
17-PP-GWA
T-46
T-70
T-138A T-138B T-143
T-61
FED FROM 135
T-135
T-137A T-137B
TAC-40
T-40
T-41B T-41
T-38A T-38
TAC-39
T-39
18-RP-LE-1CC
18-PP-BEA
TAC-5
T-5
T-6 T-12
T-17A
T-17
T-18A T-18
T-6 T-6
6-PP-BA
TAC-3
T-3A T-3A
TRANSFORMER
TAC-1
T-1A
TAC-2
T-2
Electrical System Assessment 7
2.5 Short Circuit
The short circuit calculations determine available short circuit levels throughout the electrical distribution system under various operating conditions. The results of these calculations are used to confirm the short circuit rating of the switchgear, equipment and interrupting ratings of all protective devices. Using equipment data and available fault current data from Alabama Power, we conducted short circuit calculations using SKM power tools to determine available short circuit current levels throughout the electrical system. Calculated values are used to determine the suitability of electrical equipment to handle potential fault. While conducting the study, some of the panel boards were not labeled to indicate the AIC (Ampere Interrupting Capacity) rating of the buss. In these cases, the AIC rating of lowest rated breaker will be used. If breaker AIC is not available, 10kAIC will be assumed.
Several panelboard had busses and breakers that were underrated for available fault current. Equipment that is underrated will be identified and recommended for replacement
As a result of the short circuit calculations the following items should be noted:
The vast majority of the electrical system is properly rated to withstand the calculated short circuit fault currents.
There are several protective devices that are underrated. In a fault condition, these devices could be damaged and fail to open, causing equipment damage, fire, and a safety hazard for personnel.
The list of underrated equipment has been tabulated and is included in the Short Circuit section. The Short Circuit One-line Diagrams are included in the section appendices.
2.6 Arc Flash Hazard
As defined by IEEE Standard 1584, arch-flash hazard is a dangerous condition associated with the release of energy caused by an electric arc. According to the same standard, arch-flash analysis is a method to determine the risk of personal injury as a result of exposure to incident energy from and electrical arc flash. Safe flash protection boundaries and suitable personnel protection equipment was determined from arc-flash analysis. The arc flash calculations determine the level of incident energy (units of calories per centimeter squared) that personnel would be exposed to at a given distance (i.e. 18 inches) from the location of the fault. In addition the calculations define the arc flash boundary (AFB) as the distance where a person would expect to receive a second degree burn if exposed to an arcing fault. Using information gathered from field survey, provided in as-built documents, and data from VAMC personnel, an arc-flash hazard analysis was conducted using SKM power tools. Results are provided in the Arch Flash Hazard section. Arc flash boundaries, bolted fault and recommended PPE protection will be provided in informational labels designated for each piece of electrical equipment.
The following items summarize the results of the Arc Flash study:
Most of the electrical system is at a PPE Category 3 or less.
There about 17 devices at PPE Category DANGEROUS. There is currently no safety equipment that can provide protection for this level of arc flash. Any device with this rating should not be worked on or maintained under any circumstance when energized. If deemed necessary VAMC can explore engineering designs to determine methods to mitigate arc flash hazard levels in these cases.
Regardless of a unit’s PPE Category; whenever possible, equipment should be de-energized before working on or around electrical parts. This must be the highest priority. Based on OSHA and NFPA 70E basic rules, energized work is prohibited. Proper PPE is required to confirm that the electrical parts are de-energized. Until this is verified, electrical equipment is considered energized and shall be approached with care.
The complete list of equipment arc flash values and the Arc Flash One-line Diagrams are included in the section appendices.
SSOE recommends that any modifications to the electrical system be accompanied by an arc flash hazard analysis. Changes especially to breaker settings often leads to major changes in arc flash hazard levels. Results provided in this study are specific to existing conditions only.
Electrical System Assessment 8
2.7 Protective Device Coordination
The protective device coordination study examined the ratings and settings of the existing overcurrent protective devices and identified those devices that are currently not properly coordinated. Using SKM powertools Dapper Module, existing Protective devices have been analyzed in this study to identify ratings and settings. Those settings and ratings have been examined for coordination between upstream and downstream devices. In a properly coordinated system, the device closest to the fault will interrupt the circuit, thus minimizing the potential disruption to the electrical system. For this reason, coordination provides for a more reliable system. Further, Coordination is required for code required emergency power systems. According to the scope of work, coordination study for emergency systems will be conducted to last branch circuit panel while for normal branch, coordination will be studied to the last adjustable device but at a minimum two levels from service entrance switchgear/switchboard. For this study, breakers will be examined for coordination at 0.1 seconds and beyond.
Several NFPA codes address the issue of protective device coordination but place different requirements on coordination for various electrical systems.
While some of the buildings in the campus were business occupancy, where generator standby power is used to support egress lighting and life safety systems, coordination of electrical distribution for those systems is required.
In order to determine the systems degree of coordination, we have developed and plotted Time Current Characteristics (TCC) to show the existing relationships between the medium and low voltage fuses, breakers and equipment damage curves. Where the TCCs showed a lack of coordination, we have included updated curves immediately following the existing curves showing the revised settings. It is important to note that adjusting breakers to achieve coordination may lead to higher arch flash hazard levels. To achieve coordination, breakers are often set to delay opening to clear available fault in order to give downstream breakers time to open. This delay may lead to higher arc energy should arc flash result from a fault.
Protective Device Coordination –
Several protective devices lack proper coordination.
To achieve selective coordination as shown on recommended TCCs, new breakers are recommended because existing breakers do not have required adjustability.
Where new breakers are recommended, VAMC will need to engage in a design analysis of existing electrical equipment to ensure new breakers can be retro-fitted. In some of these cases new panel boards may be required in order to provide for the new breakers. Cost estimates will not include new panelboard.
- There are a number of protective devices that will not coordinate regardless of breaker settings or replacement. These are known as thermal magnetic breakers. The distribution system may need to be redesigned to relocate panels to be fed from higher capacity panels a at higher distribution level.
There are a number of reasons why this condition may occur, the main reasons are:
- The downstream device is relatively close in ampacity to the upstream device.
- Both the downstream and upstream devices have the same ampacity rating. This condition can be further compounded if the devices are of different breaker styles or manufacturer.
- The downstream device is a larger ampacity than the upstream device.
Breakers with both phase and ground fault functions are shown on separate curves for clarity.
The list of protective device revisions and all existing and updated coordination curves are included in the appendices following the Protective Device Coordination section.
2.8 Emergency Power System
Emergency power to the facility is provided by seven (7) generators located at separate, dedicated building across the campus. Maximum recorded loads from generator test data range from 15% to 37%. Each generator
Electrical System Assessment 9 may serve one or several buildings. Most of the generators are in excellent condition. Several of the generators and emergency power connections have been added internally by VAMC personnel and a record of engineering design was not available. Due to this, there are concerns that those systems may not meet requirements and intent of NFPA 110 and NEC articles 700 and 701, ensuring life safety and critical operations are not compromised by non-essential loads.
61 277/480 22% (JUNE 2013) GOOD
62 277/480 15% (SEPT 2013) EXCELLENT
135 277/480 37% (MARCH 2013) EXCELLENT
139 277/480 23% (JULY 2013) GOOD
140 120/208 26% (JAN 2013) EXCELLENT
141 277/480 24% (JUNE 2013) EXCELLENT
146 120/208 17.3% (MARCH 2013) EXCELLENT
EMERGENCY POWER SUMMARY
GEN
LOCATION
GEN SIZE (Kw) VOLTAGE BUILDINGS SERVED
125 145,146
500 135 650 137 500 2,38 1250 33,39,40,41,101,142,143
CONDITION
750 3,5,61 750 1,3,17,63
MAX RECORDED LOAD
2.9 Ground Resistance
As described in VHA Directive 2006-056, each facility should test the ground system every 36 months. A copy of this report should be available for any system analysis. Ground testing does not appear to have been conducted at the facility and therefore data was not available for this study. No other data was available from VAMC personnel on the grounding system. Overall, visual inspection indicates that the grounding system is provided as required by NEC. There were several instances at exterior transformers where condition of the grounding system appeared likely to be compromised by environmental conditions. These cases are highlighted in the Analysis and Recommendations section. Buildings 5, 39 and 40 still have the old wiring system before grounding became requirements for all branch circuits. These buildings do not appear to have grounding conductors in all the branch circuits. A thorough branch circuit analysis and testing with specialized equipment is recommended for these and other older VAMC buildings with the same wiring methods. Such analysis would be used to discover grounding deficiencies and make recommendations for mitigation.
2.10 Voltage Drop
A load flow analysis has been performed to determine voltage drop along each feeder. The scope of work specifies that voltage drop be analyzed at 80% of nameplate load at branch circuit level and 50% of name plate load at service and distribution level. Voltage drop is dependent on cumulative load flow from the branch circuit up to utility point. If all branch circuits are assumed to carry 80% load, the cumulative load levels yield unrealistic voltage drop at service equipment which in turn yields highly inaccurate voltage drop at the branch circuits. Based on the high number of branch circuit panels, the distribution system at VAMC Tuscaloosa does not appear designed to carry cumulative branch circuit load at 80% of name plate. It is not accurate to asses 80% load at each panel in isolation since the voltage at a branch panel is based on voltages of upstream busses. This however may represent the worst case load condition.
It is important to note that at full load, voltage drop across transformers is directly proportional to impedance (%Z).
Loading levels as called for in scope of work would push most cumulative voltage drops higher than recommended level of 5% based on NEC 210.19(A) FPN no. 4 and 215.2(A) FPN no. 2. (Note that the informational notes provided in the NEC are not required provisions but are used for informational purposes only.)
Load provided by Power Company indicates a peak demand of 3.9MVA against a total primary distribution transformer capacity of 16.95MVA which would indicate a capacity usage of about 25% at each building.
2.11 Study Software
As required in the project scope of work document, all calculations were performed using SKM Power Tools
Electrical System Assessment 10 software, Version 7.0.3.4. Several modules were used for individual parts of the study as outlined below:
2.12 Analysis and Recommendations
Electrical distribution equipment was surveyed as part of this study to identify their physical condition and suitability in performing as desired. Grading for this assessment was based on physical inspection and input from VAMC personnel. As outlined in the scope of work document, grading was based on the following categorization:
Grade A - Like New Condition. Majority of useful life span remains. "Excellent".
Grade B - Good Condition. Over half of useful life span remains. "Good" Grade C - Average Condition. Less than half of useful life span remains.
"Average”, or "Fair", or C+ "Above Average" Grade D- - Workable Condition. May be past assigned useful life, but still working. "Keep an eye on it" Grade E - Poor Condition. Past assigned useful life. Failure is not critical. "Poor" or "Problematic" Grade F - Critical Condition. Needs immediate attention. "Failing" or "Critical"
Except where physical deterioration was apparent, (i.e. visible water damage, rust, mechanical damage, etc.), grading was assigned based on age of equipment and operational history based on discussions with VAMC electrical personnel. Where equipment did not exhibit any degrading conditions, grading was based on the VHA Program Guide PG-18-3 “Service Life and Replacement Cycles” of 40 years for electrical systems. Engineering judgment was used to apply grading to equipment for the purpose of this study.
Electrical distribution equipment was also analyzed for code compliance with NFPA 70 and also issues identified in the scope of work document. Those issues will be highlighted in a separate section.
Recommendations for corrective action, along with a Budget Cost Opinion are included in the assessment table.
The budget costs represent programming level costs and are based on several assumptions which are outlined in the body of this report. These budget costs exclude construction contingencies, phasing related mark-ups, special or unique site/project conditions, off-peak construction, etc. In addition, some of the recommended upgrade/ correction may require power outages to affected buildings or areas. The extent of any outages is beyond the scope of this report and will vary from building to building. Avoiding any outage may require creative phasing plans and this will also affect the overall costs. VAMC should engage engineering service to produce larger design required for corrective action.
The system assessment, by distribution branch, along with recommendations and costs can be found in the Analysis and Recommendations section.
An electronic copy of the complete input data report for the Base Scenario (existing conditions) as reported by SKM Power*Tools is included on the accompanying CD and shall not be provided in hard copy.
Electrical System Assessment 11
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not thank the following individuals who went above and beyond to ensure the success of this project:
Karen L. Kelley Chief Engineering Service, Telephone 205-554-2063 E-mail Karen.Kelley@va.gov
Robert Martin Assistant Chief Engineer Telephone 205-554-2060 E-mail robert.martin7@va.gov
Dimos Triantafillu, P.E. General Engineer Telephone 205-554-2000, ext. 3283 E-mail Dimos.Triantafillu@va.gov
Reggie Mulhern Head of Electrical Services Telephone 205-310-9049 E-mail REGINALD.MULHERN@va.gov
Larry Duboise Electrical services Telephone 205-792-3978
Below are the SSOE points of contact:
Joseph Kiumu, P.E. Electrical Engineer Telephone 205-323-2373 Email jkiumu@ssoe.com
Sam Dunn Project Manager Telephone 205-323-2373 Email sdunn@ssoe.com
Candis Polite Electrical Designer Telephone 205-323-2373 Email cpolite@ssoe.com
Electrical System Assessment 12
Appendix A – Meeting Minutes
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Appendix B – Comments and Responses
Electrical System Assessment 18
VACO Comments – Tuscaloosa 60% Submittal
1) It will make the report more user-friendly to include sections of Protective Device Evaluation, Protective
Device Analysis & Recommendations & Equipment Evaluations. See attached examples (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) Response: The 90% submittal includes a Protective Device Evaluation, Device Analysis & Recommendations and a facility Equipment Evaluation.
2) It will make the report more user-friendly by providing comments on each TCC, see attached example of
TCC analysis and recommendations Response: TCC comments are included as an appendix to the Protective Device Coordination section. Only those TCC’s that do not coordinate or those that are revised in anyway are included in the detailed curve narrative.
3) To make the report more user-friendly if we can show existing & recommended settings in table format under for medium/low voltages, see attached example (Tables 4.1 & 4.2).
Response: A summary of setting changes is included in the Protective Device Coordination section. Only those breakers that have recommended settings changes are included in the tabulation with the recommended revisions highlighted.
4) SSOE may have the experience in developing technical documents for many different clients by using their format. Over the years, we have developed our own format that our reviews are accustomed to and we ask our consultants to follow the format shown in our sample study so the time to the review can be shorten and the review process can be more effective.
Response: The sample report format has been noted and incorporated into the 90% submittal.
5) Provide overview for normal medium/low voltage systems including emergency/standby systems.
Response: System overview is included in the Executive Summary section.
6) Coordination Curve, when upstream and downstream devices, are crossing/overlapping over each other.
What should we recommend to the facility - replace breaker, new setting, or other? If improvement can be made, provide recommended curve and description. See attached sample.
Response: Recommendations for such cases have been provided in the protective device coordination section. In some cases, device settings can simply be changes while other cases may require replacement breaker or system redesign.
7) Many Time Coordination Curve (TCC’s) appear not coordinated at all but associated “recommended conditions” are not provided for review. Provide description for existing and recommended curves. Put both curves side by side on the report. See attached sample.
Response: Recommended improvements and associated revised Time Coordination Curves are included in the Protective Device Coordination section.
8) Table of Content (TOC), even for 60% or 90% deliverables, show a full TOC as intent for 100%. And each section of the report shall be divided with tab.
Response: Comment is noted and will be followed on all future deliverables.
9) Each TCC shall be labeled as Existing or Recommended. Put both Existing and Recommended curves side by side in the report. Can we make time current values more readable?
Response: Existing and Recommended TCCs shall be provided side by side in the Protective Device Coordination section.
Electrical System Assessment 19
R ev ie w er
(L as t N am e)
Ty pe o f
D oc um en t
D is ci pl in e of C om m en t
Sheet # or Page # C om m en t
N um be r
Comment A ct io n
Response
Krupa Study Elec Exec Sum - Intro 1
Most studies include a Tab or Section 2, "Introduction" following the Exec Summary.
This section typically includes a station overview, brief description of the utility service, description of the campus distribution, emergency power systems (EES and/or standby) and other main features.
Please consider adding for next submittal; I can provide a sample ToC showing Tab/Section arrangement, if you'd like.
Executive summary section has been updated to include items in the comment section.
Krupa Study Elec Exec Sum 2
Executive Summary. As you develop the Exec Summary, please provide very concise description of any vital issues of which we need to alert VAMC Leadership. That is, describe less what you did….and more what you found (that leadership needs to know). All in a couple of pages, of course!
Issues of engineering concern has been included in the updated executive summary section
Krupa Study Elec General 3
Typically, each Tab or Section begins with a description, explanation and summary of the contents, rather than just inserting the data. For example, the tab on Short Circuit analysis and TCCs would have a brief overview.
A brief overview and description of each section will be provided for the 90% submittal
Electrical System Assessment 20
Krupa Study Elec Sec 6 4
In discussions with our Office of Emergency Management, we've found benefit in providing a very concise system overview. To that end, please include a summary of peak demand (i.e.
from utility), average demand (also from utility), system capacity (e.g. cumulative transformer, bus capacity, or other limiting factor) and emergency generator capacity (e.g. sum of EES and standby generators). Tabular form would be great! This info can be placed in Exec Summary or in the Introduction section (assuming one is added).
Peak demand data and details of the emergency system including test data shall be provided in the 90% report.
Krupa Study Elec App C 5
SoW Para. III.2. requires not only one-line diagrams but also site drawings (i.e. showing elec distribution on the VAMC campus); please provide.
A site drawing showing an overview of the buildings will be provided.
Updated electrical site plan showing new buildings is not available.
Krupa Study Elec App B 6
Some users have preferred one-line diagrams that more resemble construction documents (i.e. for electrician familiarities). Please discuss with the User (and with COTR) to see if this is desired.
SSOE would be glad to work with local VAMC to produce construction style one line drawings. However due to time and information required to produce this style of one line drawings such would be outside of scope of this project. Note: This would be provided at additional cost.
Electrical System Assessment 21
Krupa Study Elec General 7
As you develop the model (if not done so already), please ensure that the nomenclature (names of protective devices, busses, transformers, cables, panels, and other items) are those used by VAMC engineering staff. We have encountered studies which created unique names which, while perhaps being more logical to use SKM, negated the value of the study itself (i.e. the employees couldn't correlate the study to the actual devices).
For this study, we have used names of equipment as found during our survey and in as-built documents provided. There are several cases where new equipment have not been properly labeled. Also, in building such as 145 and 146 where equipment names are similar, building name has been prefixed to the equipment name for unique identification. To distinguish between equipment types, Breakers are noted with 'PD' and Panels with
'PNL'
Krupa Study Elec TCCs 8
The SoW (III.e.2.i and III.e.2.j in my copy), require provision of "explanation, analysis, and recommendation to achieve better coordination” and that this "analysis for recommended curve…shall be put right after the existing curve for comparison." So, we typically get studies arranged so the "Existing TCC #xyz" is followed by "Recommended TCC #xyz" so we can compare. I look forward to seeing such on the 90% submittal, along with the table to summarize the settings (SoW III.e.3.)
Appendix A of the Protective Device Coordination section includes all of existing breakers and their current settings. Curves with breakers requiring revision due to miscoordination are provided immediately following the existing curves. To minimize number of TCCs, panels with several breakers, will be provided with largest breaker shown.
Coordination with largest breaker should result in coordination with small amperage breakers.
Krupa Study Elec TCCs 9
Numerous TCCs appear to have miscoordination (e.g. Bldg 1 MSB-GWA to 1RP-SCA et al).
As noted above, if not properly coordinated, we'll expect to see a "Recommended" TCC showing proposed corrections to improve coordination.
Recommendations will be provided in a separate TCC right after existing TCC requiring changes.
Electrical System Assessment 22
Krupa Study Elec General 10
The naming nomenclature used for the TCCs is a concern;
relying only on description will become very cumbersome as the low voltage curves are included at 90%. You might consider identifying the TCCs by a sequential number as well as a description (e.g. TCC-001, MSB-GWA). At least provide page numbers. Reference such in a table. Without such, it will be very difficult for VAMC staff to locate the TCC of interest....especially if needed urgently.
TCC will be numbered for the 90% submittal as recommended in this comment
Krupa Study Elec General 11 A good start; I look forward to the next submittal!
Thank you for taking time to review and issue recommendations. We look forward to working with you as we work to complete this study and in future studies.
Electrical System Assessment 23
VACO Comments – Tuscaloosa 90% Submittal
Date : June 10, 2014 By : Larry Lau
1) Table of Content (TOC), it is kind of odd looking to have Appendix in between each section. Is there a good reason why we don’t number the Section and subsection the way the TOC shown in our previous sample? We prefer to see something like:
1. Introduction
1.1 Site Investigation
1.2 Comments and Response
Response: The 100% submittal includes an update table of contents.
2) Improved TCC’s, analysts and recommendations are included for review. Thank you.
3) This report included the overview of the medium voltage underground, normal and emergency systems. Thank you.
4) Short Circuit Evaluation, we like it when SSOE highlighted the FAILED devices. Thank you.
5) Label should have building number, recommended PPE and Fault Current. Follow the samples.
Response: The labels have been revised to include the information listed above.
6) One-line diagrams are easier to read. Thank you.
7) We like the way SSOE organized the Equipment Condition Assessment Table, it clearly states where, what and how much to correct each item. The provided information is going to benefit the staff or consultant who is going to input the deficiencies to CAI database.
8) Before 100% submittal, coordinate a conference call with medical center, VHA and CFM. The intent of this meeting is to offer an opportunity to end users (medical center, VHA, etc) to address any of their concerns regarding to the report.
Response: A conference call was scheduled and held on July 22, 2014.
9) As a reminder that for the 100% submittal, VHA, CAM and CFM will get an abridged hard copy (with all files including SKM backup copy on CD & pdf formatted report). The VAMC still gets the full set of hard copy & CD at 100%.
Electrical System Assessment 24
Reviewer (Last Name)
Type of Document
Discipline of
Comment
Sheet # or
Page # Comment Number Action
Krupa Study Elec General 1 In General, this submittal is much improved.
Krupa Study Elec Exec Sum 2
Second bullet statement under "Short Circuit" appears to be missing the word "are" between "that" and "overdutied." In the Third bullet, it appears the fourth word should be "marginally". Also, consider adding a brief statement to section on Short cicuit analsyis to see the equipment mentioned in fourth bullet.
Corrected
Krupa Study Elec Exec Sum 3
Under Arc Flash, recommend deleting word "extraneous" in the second line of first paragraph. It is, pardon the pun, extraneous in this case!!!
Changed to extreme
Exec Sum 4
Under Emergency Power System section of Exec Sum, please repeat statement made in the later Em Pwr tab that the system is suitable for projected loads. Also, reading this section, one would believe everything is good with the EES; however, reading the actual Em Power Section (i.e. on pg. 8), there seem to be concerns. Please coordinate so a consistent message is provided.
Statement has been added to executive summary
Krupa Study Elec
Exec Sum or Em Power Tab 5
In discussions with our Office of Emergency Management, we've found benefit in providing a very concise system overview. To that end, please include a summary of peak demand (i.e. from utility), average demand (also from utility), system capacity (e.g. cumulative transformer, bus capacity, or other limiting factor) and emergency generator capacity (e.g. sum of EES and standby generators). You already have the various pieces of data scattered among different sections. This info can be placed in Exec Summary or in the Introduction section (assuming one is added).
Added information to Executive Summary.
Electrical System Assessment 25
Krupa Study Elec Intro 6
In the fifth line of the overview, a statement is made that "According to documents provided by the VA, as part of VHA Directive 2006-056, only building…..are patient care buildings." Please clarify this statement. To my knowledge, Dir 2006-056 at no point dictates occupancy of buildings.
Removed "as part of VHA Directive 2006-056"
Krupa Study Elec Intro 7
In the first line of the last paragraph on pg. 4 (Med Voltage Distribution), you probably don't need to capitalize "Poles" ("from Alabama Power Poles…"); we're talking about utility poles here…not people of Polish ancestry! :-)
Corrected
Krupa Study Elec Intro 8
Opening statement of 3rd paragraph under Low Voltage Distribution (pg. 5) notes issues with VAMC as-built drawings. Good to know! Was this issue addressed in the Analysis and Recommendations section? In not, please include.
Added recommendation to the Analysis and Recommendations section
Krupa Study Elec Intro 9
Next to last sentence, last paragraph on pg 5 (Low Voltage): typo ("wielding" should be "welding", I presume). Also, when using NEC Table 310.15(B)(16), what equivalent conductor insulation should they use to determine amapacity? That is, state what facility should do to mitigate.
Corrected
Krupa Study Elec Intro 10
SSOE Points of Contact: on pg. 11, a list of VA personnel is provided. Please also add the contact information for SSOE personnel involved in the study. Good for both VA and SSOE to have that provided!
Added
Krupa Study Elec General 11
Please provide a good review of the document for formatting, grammar and spelling. Nothing major, but several little things. Besides those mentioned previously, even the formatting varies: see pg. 9 where spacing between sentences differs between paragraphs.
A thorough review has been conducted.
Krupa Study Elec Appendices 12
With the appendices scattered among the respective sections, cross-referencing is difficult.
Please provide tab for each appendix so we can locate quickly.
A tab will is provided for each appendix
Electrical System Assessment 26
Krupa Study Elec Arc Flash 13
On the Arc Flash analysis tables, could the "Dangerous" and perhaps HRC 4 (and possibly HRC 3) items be highlighted somehow? In the Protective Device tables, your highlighting was very effective in identifying issues (kudos for that!!!); highlighting devices with arc flash concerns would likewise be appreciated.
Added
Krupa Study Elec General 14
Krupa Study Elec Arc Flash 15
A point for discussion (vice a review comment): you correctly note that IEEE 1584 recognizes that circuits 240v or less fed from transformers 125kVA (or less) are unlikely to sustain an arc …and can therefore be excluded from the study. However, there seems to still be a requirmenet to provide hazard warning labels: other electrical hazards (namely shock) remain and NEC Article 110.16 doesn't necessarily exclude devices (as does IEEE 1584). What do you recommend in such cases (e.g. disconnects or small panels that might otherwise meet intent of 110.16)?
Can a generic label be made stating: "HRC 0 Supplied by a 125 kVA (max) at 240 v or less"? Your thoughts and recommendations are appreciated. Feel free to call me directly to discuss.
Generic labels will be provided
Krupa Study Elec Arc Flash 16
Under "Arc Flash Boundary" (pg 40) consider clarifying that 1.2 cal/cm2 is considered energy to give 2nd degree burns (i.e. curable burns)
Clarified with additional statement
Krupa Study Elec Arc Flash 17
Also on pg 40, under Personal Protective Equipment, it seems that perhaps the word "therefore" should be added after "2012 NFPA 70E and is…" and "….not included in this report."
Revised wording of statement
Krupa Study Elec Arc Flash 18
I was about to ask to include a sample Arc Flash label, but I finally found them. Just supports a previous comment about providing tabs for the appendices since they are scattered throughout…
Will provide tabs for appendices
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