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SOLICITATION ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AVIATION SYSTEMS TRAINERS - ENHANCEMENTS (SOFAST-E)
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W900KK-13-R-0002
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PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION

FOR THE

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)) Special Operations Forces Aviation Systems Trainers – Enhancements (SOFAST-E)

Delivery Order 0001

Prepared by U.S. Army PEO Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) 12350 Research Parkway Orlando, FL 32826-3276

PRF-PT-00577

W900KK-13-R-0002

14 September 2012

Revision History

Rev.

Date
Description
Author

Table of Contents

SectionTitlePage
1.SCOPE1
1.1Background1
2.APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS1
2.1General1
2.2Government documents1
2.2.1Specifications, standards, and handbooks1
2.2.2Other Government documents, drawings and publications2
2.3Non-Government publications3
2.4Order of precedence3
3.REQUIREMENTS3
3.1Functional and performance requirements3
3.1.1Missions3
3.1.2Required states and modes4
3.1.3Performance requirements4
3.1.3.1160th SOAR Common Instructor Operator Station (IOS) Graphical User Interface (GUI) for the MH-47-2 and MH-60-2 Combat Mission Simulator (CMS)4
3.1.3.2ASTi Telestra 4 Digital Audio Communications System4
3.1.3.3MH-47-2 Block 2.3 Update4
3.1.3.3.1Miscellaneous Control Panel4
3.1.3.3.2AN/ARC-231 Multiband Radio5
3.1.3.3.3AN/ARC-231 Dual Fill Panel5
3.1.3.3.4Low Profile Control Audio Panel (LPCAP)5
3.1.3.3.5Digital Intercom Communications System (DICS) and Flight Director (FD) Lighting Control Panel5
3.1.3.3.6Interior Lighting Control Panel5
3.1.3.3.7Anti-Ice Control Panel with Manual Continuous Ignition System (MCIS)5
3.1.3.3.8Lithium Ion Battery Condition Warning Status Panel5
3.1.3.3.9Pilot & Copilot Cockpit Stalk Lights5
3.1.3.4Stimulated Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) Environment Conversion5
3.1.3.4.1Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) (Qty. 5)5
3.1.3.4.2Control Display Units (CDUs) (Qty. 2)6
3.1.3.4.3Multi-Function Knobs (MFKs) (Qty. 2)6
3.1.3.4.4Multi-Function Control Units (MFCUs) (Qty. 2)6
3.1.3.4.5Data Concentrator Units (DCUs) (Qty. 2)6
3.1.3.4.6General Purpose Processor Units (GPPUs) (Qty. 2)6
3.1.3.4.7Embedded Dig Map6
3.1.3.5Computational System Recapitalization6
3.1.3.5.1Computer hardware requirements6
3.1.3.5.1.1Computer processing requirements6
3.1.3.5.1.2Computer operations control function7
3.1.3.5.1.3Peripherals7
3.1.3.5.1.3.1Processing resource and reserve capacity8
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.1Spare main memory8
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.1.1Spare time8
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.2Spare shared memory9
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.3Memory access9
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.4Spare mass storage9
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.5Synchronous real-time functions9
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.5.1Concurrent sparing9
3.1.3.5.1.3.1.6Non-synchronous functions9
3.1.3.5.1.3.2Spare I/O capacity9
3.1.3.5.1.4Operating systems9
3.1.3.5.1.5Diagnostic software10
3.1.3.5.1.5.1Computer and peripheral diagnostic programs10
3.1.3.5.1.5.2System daily operational readiness test program10
3.1.3.6SOA CAAS Upgrade/Concurrency10
3.1.3.6.1Circuit Breaker Update10
3.1.3.6.2Integrated Warning, Caution, Advisory (Voice) [IWCA(V)] Update10
3.1.3.6.3P3I Embedded GPS & INS (EGI) Update10
3.1.3.6.4Radar Systems10
3.1.3.6.4.1Multi-mode RADAR (MMR) Update10
3.1.3.6.5Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)11
3.1.3.6.5.1Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) Update11
3.1.3.6.5.2Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) Correction11
3.1.3.6.5.3Hostile Fire Indicator (HFI)11
3.1.3.6.6Digital Automatic Flight Control System (DAFCS) Upgrade11
3.1.3.6.7MH-47-2 CMS AN/ARS-6(V)12 Personnel Locator System (PLS) Radio Model12
3.1.3.6.8Instructor/Operator Station (IOS) Malfunctions12
3.1.3.6.9Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS)12
3.1.3.6.10Thrust Control Lever (TCL)12
3.1.3.7Engine Flight Performance Model (EFPM) Update12
3.1.3.8Guidance Control Point (GCP)12
3.1.3.9Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC)12
3.1.3.10AN/ZSQ-2 Electro Optical Sensor (EOS)12
3.1.3.11Simulation Interoperability13
3.1.3.12Special Operations Forces Tactical Environment (SOFTAC)13
3.1.3.12.1SOFTAC characteristics and capabilities13
3.1.3.12.2Tactical Environment (Distributed Network)15
3.1.3.13Visual Systems Upgrade16
3.1.4Reliability16
3.1.5Maintainability16
3.1.6Environmental conditions16
3.1.7Transportability17
3.1.8Materials and processes17
3.1.8.1Parts17
3.1.8.1.1Custom designed microelectronic devices17
3.1.8.1.2Power supplies17
3.1.8.1.3Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) sensitive assemblies and equipment17
3.1.8.2Materials17
3.1.8.2.1Flammable materials18
3.1.8.2.2Fungus-inert materials18
3.1.8.2.3Hazardous materials18
3.1.8.2.4Metals18
3.1.8.3Processes18
3.1.8.3.1Corrosion prevention19
3.1.9Electromagnetic radiation19
3.1.9.1Electromagnetic environmental effects (E3)19
3.1.9.1.1Electromagnetic environment19
3.1.9.2Life cycle, E3 hardness19
3.1.9.3Electromagnetic radiation hazards (EMRADHAZ)19
3.1.10Product Markings20
3.1.10.1Reference designators20
3.1.10.2Cable and wire markings20
3.1.10.2.1Cable marking method20
3.1.10.2.2Cable marking information21
3.1.10.2.2.1“W” and “P” cable designations21
3.1.10.2.2.2To-from designators21
3.1.10.2.2.3Assembly/part number22
3.1.10.3CaNDI marking23
3.1.10.3.1CaNDI identification, nameplates, and labels23
3.1.10.4Warning marking for simulated and modified equipment23
3.1.10.4.1Trainer-use-only identification23
3.1.10.5Safety markings23
3.1.10.5.1Equipment energized from multiple power sources24
3.1.11Drawing Format24
3.1.12Interchangeability24
3.1.13Safety24
3.1.13.1Emergency equipment power disconnect24
3.1.13.2Temperature sensing alarms25
3.1.14Human systems integration engineering25
3.1.15Security and privacy25
3.1.15.1CMS security25
3.1.15.1.1Cabinet door locks25
3.1.15.2Information Assurance25
3.1.15.2.1IA and IA-enabled Information Technology (IT) products25
3.1.15.2.2Special purpose systems26
3.1.15.2.3Storage of classified information26
3.1.16Logistics26
3.1.16.1Maintenance26
3.1.16.1.1Maintenance concept26
3.1.16.1.1.1Levels of maintenance26
3.1.16.1.2Qualitative maintainability requirements27
3.1.16.1.2.1Special tools27
3.1.16.1.2.2Built-In Test (BIT)28
3.1.16.1.2.3Lamps28
3.1.16.1.2.4Blown fuse indicator lights28
3.1.16.1.2.5Utility receptacles28
3.1.16.1.2.6Maintenance intercommunications system28
3.1.16.1.2.7Accessibility28
3.1.16.1.2.7.1Cable slack29
3.1.16.1.2.7.2Parts29
3.1.16.1.2.7.3Assemblies29
3.1.16.1.2.7.4Covers, panels, and doors29
3.1.16.1.2.7.5Handles30
3.1.16.1.2.7.6Modular assemblies30
3.1.16.1.2.8Circuit cards30
3.1.16.1.2.8.1Circuit card connectors30
3.1.16.1.2.8.2Circuit card connectors, power and ground30
3.1.16.1.2.8.3Wiring board extender cards30
3.1.17Facilities and facility equipment30
3.1.17.1Trainer power requirements31
3.1.17.1.1Power-line monitoring and protection31
3.1.17.1.1.1Under and overvoltage31
3.1.17.1.1.2Voltage transients31
3.1.17.1.1.3Phase rotation31
3.1.17.1.1.4Under-frequency31
3.1.17.1.1.5Frequency transients31
3.1.17.1.1.6Power interruption32
3.2Fabrication32
3.2.1Workmanship32
3.2.1.1Cleaning32
3.2.1.2Threaded fasteners32
3.2.1.3Wiring32
3.2.1.4Shielding32
4.VERIFICATION32
4.1Methods of verification32
4.2Classes of verifications33
4.3Inspections and tests33
4.3.1Visual inspections33
4.3.2Functional tests33
4.3.2.1Computer system tests33
4.3.2.2Trainee station tests33
4.3.2.3IOS tests34
4.3.2.4Ancillary items tests34
4.3.2.4.1Structural tests34
4.3.2.4.2Electrical tests34
4.3.2.4.3Grounding and grounding systems test34
4.3.2.5DORT verification34
4.3.2.6Vehicle dynamics tests34
4.3.2.7Tactical systems tests35
4.3.3Operation and mission tests35
4.3.3.1Training scenarios35
4.3.3.2Mission tests35
4.3.3.3Stress tests35
4.3.3.4Free play tests36
4.3.3.5Threat environment tests36
4.3.3.6Malfunctions tests36
4.3.3.7Database correlation tests36
4.3.4Product assurance tests36
4.3.4.1Thermal survey36
4.3.4.2EMR tests36
4.3.4.3ESD tests37
4.3.4.4Reliability assessment37
4.3.4.5Maintainability assessment37
4.3.4.6Human systems integration engineering compliance tests37
4.3.4.7Nonfunctional examinations37
4.3.4.8Security and IA verifications38
5.PACKAGING38
6.NOTES38
6.1Definitions38
6.1.1Chargeable failures38
6.1.2Commercial Item39
6.1.3Control Drawing40
6.1.4IA-Enabled Operating System40
6.1.5Initial Support Kit (ISK)40
6.1.6Interchangeable item40
6.1.7Non-chargeable failures41
6.1.8Non-Developmental Item (NDI)41
6.1.9Non-relevant failures41
6.1.10Relevant failures41
6.1.11Scheduled Maintenance42
6.1.12Trainer Peculiar Equipment (TPE)42
6.1.13User Interface42
6.1.14Unscheduled On-site Maintenance42
6.1.15Verification methods42
6.1.15.1Analysis42
6.1.15.2Demonstration43
6.1.15.3Examination43
6.1.15.4Test43

APPENDICES

Appendix A - VISUAL SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS FOR The Special Operation Forces Aviation Systems Trainers – Enhancements (SOFAST-E) MH-47-2 (DO-0001) System Upgrade Revision 1.2 (4 October 2012)

PEO-STRI-12-W0XX

W900KK-X-XX-XXXX

Day Month Year ii ii Specification For the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) [SOAR(A)] Special Operations Forces Aviation Systems Trainers – Enhancements (SOFAST-E) Delivery Order 0001

SCOPE

This Specification establishes the functional and performance requirements for the development, integration and testing of the Delivery Order 0001 upgrades to be made to the Special Operations Aviation MH-47-2 Combat Mission Simulator (CMS), the MH-60-2 CMS and the Exercise Management Control (EMC) located at the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment [SOAR(A)] Ft. Campbell, KY.

Background The 160th SOAR (A) flight simulation and mission rehearsal facilities presently use a mix of simulators, simulation applications, and mission rehearsal systems that exist at various stages of concurrency and compatibility with Regimental operational capabilities and configurations. The Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA) flight training systems, flight simulation, and mission rehearsal master plan requires that these simulators, simulations, and mission rehearsal systems be as common as possible and capable of supporting current mission profiles, including but not limited to interoperability between devices while staying current with operational systems enhancements and upgrades. For the purposes of this specification, the terms CMS, trainer, training system and training device are equivalent.

APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

General The documents listed in this section are specified in sections 3, 4, or 5 of this specification. This section does not include documents cited in other sections of this specification or recommended for additional information or as examples. While every effort has been made to ensure the completeness of this list, document users are cautioned that they must meet the specified requirements of documents cited in sections 3, 4, or 5 of this specification, whether or not they are listed.

Government documents Specifications, standards, and handbooks The following specifications, standards, and handbooks of the exact revision listed below form a part of this specification to the extent specified herein.

Department of Defense Standard Practices
MIL-STD-130N
-
Identification Marking of U.S. Military Property

(Copies of these documents are available online at http://assist.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/ or from the Standardization Document Order Desk, 700 Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094.)

Other Government documents, drawings and publications TM 1-1520-272-10-1 dated 17 Feb 2009

Operator’s Manual for MH-47G Helicopter

TM 1-1520-272-10-2 dated 17 Feb 2009

Operator’s Manual for MH-47G Helicopter App D Common Avionics Architecture System

TM 1-1520-272-CL dated 17 Feb 2009 w/ C-3 23 Mar 2011

Operator’s and Crewmember’s Checklist MH-47G Helicopter

TM 1-1520-272-MTF dated 17 Feb 2009 w/C-5

Maintenance Test Flight Manual for MH-47G Helicopter

SOA CAAS 6.5F1 Slides dated 5 Dec 2011

6.5F1 Critical Design Review

DAFCS Training Slides

MH-47G DAFCS Qualification Course Slides

MH-47G DAFCS Fact Sheet dated 7 Mar 2012

MH-47G DAFCS Fact Sheet

DAFCS MH-47G Supplement dated 31 Jan 2012

MH-47G DAFCS Supplement

Flight Deck Operational Requirements (FDOR)for the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) dated 17 Feb 2012

FDOR for USASOC CAAS

Block 2.3 CDR slides dated 22 Feb 2012

Block 2.3 CDR Slides

CAAS 6.1, 6.3, and 6.5 Differential Slides

CAAS Differential Slides

Non-Government publications The following documents of the exact revision listed below form a part of this document to the extent specified herein.

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
ANSI Z535.1-2006
-
Safety Color Code
ANSI Z535.2-2002
-
Environmental and Facility Safety Signs
ANSI Z535.3-2002
-
Criteria for Safety Symbols
ANSI Z535.4-2002
-
Product Safety Signs and Labels
ANSI Z535.5-2002
-
Accident Prevention Tags

(Copies of these documents are available from www.ansi.org or Global Engineering Documents, 15 Inverness Way, East Englewood, CO 80112.)

Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA)
EIA RS-471
-
Symbol and Label for Electrostatic Sensitive Devices

(Copies of this document are available from www.eia.org, or http://global.ihs.com/, or Global Engineering Documents, 15 Inverness Way, East Englewood, CO 80155-6800

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
IEEE 200-1975, Revision 1988
-
Standard Reference Designations for Electrical and Electronics Parts and Equipment (ANSI/IEEE Y32.16)

(Copies of this document are available from www.ieee.org or IEEE Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ 08854-1331.)

160th SOAR Common IOS Software Design Manual and User Guide ver 1.0

SOFTAC Users Guide

Order of precedence In the event of a conflict between the text of this specification and the references cited herein, the text of this specification takes precedence. Nothing in this specification, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations, unless a specific exemption has been obtained.

REQUIREMENTS

Functional and performance requirements Missions The modifications and upgrades shall accommodate the requirements for realistically rehearsing all of the operational missions of the 160th SOAR (A). The modifications and upgrades shall provide realistic aircrew training, improved safety, and mission rehearsal capability and shall not degrade current capability. The modifications and upgrades shall improve systems reliability and maintainability, and provide increased systems performance.

Required states and modes The existing states and modes resident on each CMS or peripheral devices (i.e. Debrief Room, EMC, etc) shall not be degraded as a result of incorporating the required modifications to any system supporting the CMS.

Performance requirements The performance baseline of the existing training devices shall not be degraded as a result of incorporating the required modifications. The performance baseline of the MH-47-2 CMS and MH-60-2 CMS and the EMC shall meet or exceed the Pre-Modification Inspection results, and any other tests conducted to describe the simulation characteristics and system performance prior to contractor modifications. This includes all functional relationships between various subsystems, such as the motion system, control loading system, instructor stations, trainee stations, networks, and visual system. The following requirements shall apply to the MH-47-2 CMS unless otherwise noted.

160th SOAR Common Instructor Operator Station (IOS) Graphical User Interface (GUI) for the MH-47-2 and MH-60-2 Combat Mission Simulator (CMS) The 160th SOAR common IOS GUI shall function as described in the 160th SOAR Common IOS Software Design Manual and User’s Guide. The common IOS GUI shall replicate all simulation controls and displays of the existing IOS system. The common IOS GUI shall be modified to support any functionality inherent in the MH-47-2 CMS and MH-60-2 CMS which is not currently supported in the common IOS GUI as determined by the IOS Working Group.

ASTi Telestra 4 Digital Audio Communications System The MH-47-2 CMS T4 model shall simulate and provide all MH-47G communications (ARC-201D, ARC-220, ARC-231, ARS-6B and intercom) and associated functionality to include navigation and terrain effects in both standalone and interoperability modes. The EMC T4 shall simulate and provide radio communications between the EMC, the MH-47-2 CMS and MH-60-2 CMS.

MH-47-2 Block 2.3 Update The MH-47G aircraft items listed below which have been modified IAW the MH-47G Block 2.3 production line and any applicable Modification Work Orders (MWO) shall be fully integrated into the MH-47-2 CMS.

Miscellaneous Control Panel The MH-47G Miscellaneous Control Panel shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

AN/ARC-231 Multiband Radio The ARC-231 radio model shall be updated to the V11.0 configuration with functionality to include Guard mode operations. Each instance of the ARC-231 radio model shall interface with the SOA CAAS. One instance of the ARC-231 radio model shall also be capable of operating in a stand-alone mode. Current capabilities of the ARC-231 radio model shall not be lost or diminished. The AN/ARC-231 Multiband Radio simulation shall replace the current AN/ARC-164 and AN/ARC-186 functionality and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

AN/ARC-231 Dual Fill Panel The second simulated AN/ARC-231 Dual Fill Panel shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Low Profile Control Audio Panel (LPCAP) Three simulated LPCAPs (Pilot, Copilot & Air Mission Commander) shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Digital Intercom Communications System (DICS) and Flight Director (FD) Lighting Control Panel The MH-47G DICS & FD Lighting Control Panel shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Interior Lighting Control Panel The MH-47G Interior Lighting Control Panel shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Anti-Ice Control Panel with Manual Continuous Ignition System (MCIS) The MH-47G Anti-Ice Control Panel w/ MCIS shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Lithium Ion Battery Condition Warning Status Panel The MH-47G Lithium Ion Battery Condition Warning Status Panel shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Pilot & Copilot Cockpit Stalk Lights The MH-47G Pilot & Copilot stalk lights shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Stimulated Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) Environment Conversion The MH-47-2 CMS stimulated CAAS environment shall be installed per the aircraft drawings and shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) (Qty. 5) The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate the MH-47G aircraft MFDs. The MH-47-2 CMS MFDs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Control Display Units (CDUs) (Qty. 2) The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate the MH-47G aircraft CDUs. The MH-47-2 CMS CDUs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Multi-Function Knobs (MFKs) (Qty. 2) The MH-47-2 CMS shall use the MH-47G aircraft MFKs. The MH-47-2 CMS MFKs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Multi-Function Control Units (MFCUs) (Qty. 2) The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate the MH-47G aircraft MFCUs. The MH-47-2 CMS MFCUs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Data Concentrator Units (DCUs) (Qty. 2) The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate or simulate the MH-47G aircraft DCUs. The MH-47-2 CMS DCUs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

General Purpose Processor Units (GPPUs) (Qty. 2) The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate the MH-47G aircraft GPPUs. The MH-47-2 CMS GPPUs shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Embedded Dig Map The MH-47-2 CMS shall stimulate the MH-47G aircraft Embedded Dig Map. The MH-47-2 CMS Embedded Dig Map shall function as in the design basis aircraft.

Computational System Recapitalization The CMS shall be equipped with computational systems sized and configured to perform all time critical calculations of the instructional systems, simulation environment, and aircraft simulation systems meeting the system performance and fidelity requirements of this specification. The CMS shall provide the means to go from a power off state to a ready for training state in one hour or less.

Computer hardware requirements The CMS shall consist of Commercial Item hardware and open system architecture. Interfaces to hardware shall be encapsulated using industry interface standards. The major elements of the CMS architecture shall be in accordance with the following subparagraphs. The architecture shall support current network capabilities both real time and non real time (e.g. mass storage devices, Debrief station). The system will support at a minimum current Hz rates including a 60Hz Image generator interface.

Computer processing requirements The computer system shall have sufficient processing capacity to meet the performance requirements and spare processing requirements described in this specification. Each host of IOS processor shall have a minimum operating speed of 3.33 GHz that shall produce cockpit indications and cockpit sensations of aircraft performance as well as IOS displays and indications that are free of discernible stepping, oscillating, jittering, or other erratic behavior. Solution and iteration rates, and the algorithms employed, shall provide mathematically consistent and stable solutions to the flight dynamics equations.

Computer operations control function The computer control function shall provide control of the computational system, including start-up from a powered-down condition, loading the operational programs, bringing the system to operating status, shutdown, trapping unexpected system transient events, operation, and management of network system components, and control of system diagnostics. The computer control function shall provide the means to enter commands interactively at the operating system level, and observe and record responses to the entered commands. The use of the computer control function shall not require more than one operator. Real time debugger will be incorporated with the following threshold capabilities: Display all data pool variables in a selectable format (decimal, hexadecimal, floating point, double word, integer, binary) defaulting to the variables defined type with a range of 1 to 20 at a time. All data pool variables will be able to be stored into using the display function types defined. The debugger will have the ability to start and stop all Exec controlled software. Software timing capabilities at a module/frame current and worst case time will be displayed.

Peripherals Peripherals shall be provided to support the following functions:

a. Storage of software and databases used for operation, maintenance and testing of the CMS.

b. Backup of information to writable mass storage devices and recovery of information stored on writable mass storage devices.

c. Reading to, and writing from, data storage and transmission media, including:

1) Digital Versatile Disc Compact Disc Re-Writer (DVD/CD-RW)

2) Removable Hard Drives

d. Hard copy output (printing) of information necessary to support the operation, maintenance, and testing of the CMS IAW the requirements of this specification and the intended use of the CMS. Except for those printers used to simulate actual flight hardware, the following requirements shall apply:

1) Special paper, such as thermal, shall not be required for proper operation.

2) Printing shall be available in both color and black and white.

3) Printer shall provide the means to print on 8.5-in. x 11-in., and 11-in. x 17-in. paper.

4) Paper trays shall hold a minimum of 200 sheets.

5) Printing speed shall exceed twenty (20) pages per minute in black and white mode and ten (10) pages per minute in color.

e. All user displays, except those used to simulate actual flight hardware, shall have the following characteristics:

1) Diagonal measure of the visible surface shall meet or exceed nineteen (19) in.

2) Visible screen surface shall be pure flat (no curvature).

3) Highest supported resolution shall be no less than 1920 horizontal by 1080 vertical pixels at 75 Hz Non-interlaced or greater refresh rate.

4) Dot pitch shall be no greater than 0.26 millimeters (mm) both horizontally and vertically.

5) Visible screen surface shall have a glare reducing coating.

6) Shall be of a low radiation design.

7) Integrated digital on-screen controls shall be available for adjusting display parameters such as: image size, position, tilt, pincushion, trapezoidal, brightness, contrast, degauss, etc.

Processing resource and reserve capacity The computer system shall provide processing resource and reserve capacity to meet the performance requirements and to allow for expansion and modification. The spare processing requirements are as per the following requirements.

Spare main memory At least 30 percent of the capacity of installed main memory shall remain unutilized during worst-case CMS operations. This applies to real-time computer systems only.

Spare time During realistic worst-case operation, at least 30 percent of processing capacity of each installed CPU shall be unused while at the same time not degrading operation in any manner. This spare requirement shall be measured and applied to the smallest execution time increment (frame time worst case) implemented on each CPU. For example, a 60 Hz iteration rate, the minimum rate for critical flight dynamics computational paths, is composed of 60 frames, each of 16.667 milliseconds (ms) duration. Spare time for each frame shall be 30 percent of 16.667ms, which is 5 ms. Testing for 30% spare frame time will be done by using a time burner which will have various settings from 1 ms to 16 ms (in increments of .01ms) of burn time. Burn time increments will be set using the debugger. No system will show any degradation in operation with a 30 percent (5.0 ms) time burn applied regardless of the total frame time. Computer data buses and back plains will not exceed 30 percent of bandwidth under maximum simulator loading. All computer interfaces will not exceed 30 percent of bandwidth under maximum simulator loading (e.g. Ethernet, 1553, Arinc, RS232…). Processors embedded in Commercial Item products not used for hosting other computer programs (i.e. beyond those integral to the Commercial Item product) are exempt from this requirement. Spare processing capacity shall apply to the host and IOS computer system hardware. Processors embedded in Commercial Item products not used for hosting other computer programs (i.e., beyond those integral to the Commercial Item product) are exempt from this requirement. CMS functionality shall remain satisfactory when CPU processing time utilization is limited to 70 percent of available time.

Spare shared memory At least 50 percent of the capacity of installed shared memory shall remain unutilized during worst-case CMS operations. This applies to real-time computer systems only.

Memory access Installed memory shall be directly accessible by one (1) or more processors.

Spare mass storage At least 50 percent of the formatted capacity of each mass storage device shall remain unutilized during worst-case CMS operations.

Synchronous real-time functions For synchronous real time systems, spare processing time (consisting of 30 percent of the available processing time in that period) in each period of time, corresponding to the highest iteration rate being used, shall be provided for each processor frame. For instance, for a 30 Hz iteration rate, the period of time is 33.33 milliseconds and the spare provided in each period must be at least 5.0 milliseconds.

Concurrent sparing Spare time requirements for synchronous and non-synchronous functions shall be met concurrently.

Non-synchronous functions Non-synchronous functions shall perform in accordance with the requirements of this specification while 50 percent of the processing time is locked out, and the means shall be provided for the operator to select the percentage of processor time to be uniformly locked out.

Spare I/O capacity For each type of channel for each separate interface, the spare I/O channel capacity shall be no less than 20 percent of the installed input/output channel capacity including analog-to-digital, digital-to-analog, digital-to-digital, discrete interface devices, and serial and parallel computer interface ports.

Spare back plane capacity shall be no less than 50%, as applicable.

Operating systems All operating systems shall comply with Information Assurance, security, software, and operating systems sections of this specification. The host computer operating system new or reused shall be Open Source and support the Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX). The OS shall support the real-time performance necessary to maintain the required level of fidelity.

Diagnostic software Diagnostic software shall test the operation of the computers, peripheral equipment, and other hardware, and shall identify malfunctioning components to the lowest replaceable unit. The diagnostic software shall include the programs described in the following subordinate paragraphs.

Computer and peripheral diagnostic programs Diagnostic programs for the computers, network, and peripherals shall be Commercial Item software.

System daily operational readiness test program Daily Operational Readiness Test (DORT) programs shall provide the means for operating personnel to determine that the CMS are ready for operation. Provisions shall be made for the automatic sequencing through the DORT program, or portions thereof, to verify the desired output at each step. The operator shall have the option of either proceeding, after noting the discrepancies, or stopping the execution. Identification of errors shall be displayed. The system DORT shall require less than 30 minutes to complete. The DORT shall verify proper communication between all subsystems and that each subsystem is functioning without error.

SOA CAAS Upgrade/Concurrency The latest version of SOA CAAS installed into the MH-47-2 CMS shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The following systems shall be modified or updated to ensure SOA CAAS functionality is representative of the design basis aircraft.

Circuit Breaker Update The MH-47-2 CMS shall replicate the current circuit breaker panels with all associated changes resulting from the SOA CAAS upgrade, BGAD 2.3 update, and as per the design basis aircraft.

Integrated Warning, Caution, Advisory (Voice) [IWCA(V)] Update The MH-47-2 CMS IWCA(V) system shall be updated to incorporate all changes to the aircraft configuration file which result from implementing the SOA CAAS upgrade as per the design basis aircraft.

P3I Embedded GPS & INS (EGI) Update The MH-47-2 CMS EGI model shall be updated with the SOA CAAS GPS position filtering as per the design basis aircraft.

Radar Systems Multi-mode RADAR (MMR) Update The MH-47-2 MMR simulation shall be updated to support an additional clearance altitude selection of 1000 feet added for the Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance mode.

The MH-47-2 MMR simulation shall replicate the added ability to display each MMR video output on different Multi-function Displays (MFD) simultaneously.

Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) Update The current ASE suite shall be upgraded to the latest configuration as in the design basis aircraft to include the following components:

a. Infrared Counter Measures (IRCM) suite

b. Radio Frequency Counter Measures (RFCM) suite

c. Common Missile Warning System (CMWS)

d. AVR-2B Laser Warning Receiver (LWR) Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) Correction The current MH-47-2 CMS ASE suite shall be corrected to properly simulate the Threat Intervisibility Advisory as a result of the SOA CAAS update.

Hostile Fire Indicator (HFI) The MH-47-2 HFI simulation shall function and show the appropriate indications on the DEWD as in the design basis aircraft.

Digital Automatic Flight Control System (DAFCS) Upgrade The MH-47-2 aerodynamics model shall implement the following DAFCS modes and associated functionality:

a. PHOLD – holds position in a hover

b. VHOLD – velocity hold

c. DECEL - deceleration

d. ALT-RAD – radar altitude hold

e. ALT-INRT

f. LEVEL (new mode) – holds wings level and airspeed greater than 40 kts

g. Shipboard Mode On the MH-47-2 CMS, the pitch and roll core response types of the DAFCS system shall incorporate a pure attitude command/attitude hold (ACAH) starting at a hover and ending with total ACAH washout at 100 KCAS to a rate command/attitude hold (RCAH) response type in accordance with the Boeing control law design criteria. The DAFCS configuration shall allow Flight Director coupling in the pitch, roll, and vertical axes. The DAFCS handling and altitude beep trim safety latching features of DAFCS OFP 3.2 shall be implemented. The MH-47-2 CMS shall have the capability to select either AFCS or DAFCS and the existing flight model shall react appropriately with the selected flight control system. The IWCA(V) model shall be updated with the appropriate DAFCS messages. The DAFCS model shall couple in the pitch and roll axes when operating in the Terrain Following (TF) mode.

MH-47-2 CMS AN/ARS-6(V)12 Personnel Locator System (PLS) Radio Model The PLS radio model shall be updated to the V12.0 software configuration with associated functionality. CAAS software pages will accurately reflect the installation of the V18.0 software as the design aircraft. The PLS radio model shall include the capability for the Combat Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL) System and Search and Rescue Satellites (SARSAT).

Instructor/Operator Station (IOS) Malfunctions The IOS shall be updated with the functionality necessary to support the implementation of the SOA CAAS upgrade.

Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) The HUMS implementation shall consist of the appropriate SOA CAAS page flow and static values representative of what is seen in the design basis aircraft.

Thrust Control Lever (TCL) Both the pilot and copilot MH-47G TCL shall be updated to activate the TCL “MARK” button with the following functionality as in the design basis aircraft:

a. Pressing the “MARK” button for less than 2 seconds shall exhibit the same functionality as the “MARK” button on the CDU.

b. Pressing and holding the “MARK” button on the TCL for greater than 2 seconds shall activate the HOV REF STR function as the current HOV REF STR button on the MFD.

Engine Flight Performance Model (EFPM) Update The MH-47G CMS shall replicate each respective aircraft’s current EFPM. The capability to manually load the EFPM through the DTU-7100 shall not be lost or diminished.

Guidance Control Point (GCP) The MH-47-2 EGI model shall have the GCP updated with the correct lever arm for the location of each EGI as per the design basis aircraft.

Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) The SIRFC simulation shall maintain concurrency with the latest version of SIRFC, to include but not limited to, updating the SIRFC to the latest configuration and software load as per the design basis aircraft for the MH-47-2 CMS. The existing list of computer generated forces (CGF) from SOFTAC to include any new entities required to test the full spectrum of SIRFC shall be integrated in the CMS. These additional entities shall have the correct electronic signatures modeled and shall interact appropriately with all facets of the SIRFC.

AN/ZSQ-2 Electro Optical Sensor (EOS) The AN/ZSQ-2 EOS model shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The EOS model shall be updated to include, but not be limited to, the following attributes:

a. The EOS shall display the current modeled software load.

b. The EOS shall default to Infra Red-Image Intensifier (IRI2) for the MH-47G/ Assault version.

c. The EOS shall have the capability to capture and record video to the DTU-7100. The recorded video shall be displayed on any selected multi-function display (MFD).

Simulation Interoperability The baseline internal and external simulation interoperability shall not be degraded by the incorporation of the respective enhancements made to the MH-47-2 CMS.

Special Operations Forces Tactical Environment (SOFTAC) SOFTAC shall simulate and provide the CMS with the computer generated forces/semi-automated forces (CGF/SAF) entities that interact with the CMS in the virtual environment in the following modes:

1. Stand alone with SOFTAC (non-networked).

2. Distributed Networked Modes:

a. CMS to CMS via the SOFTAC HLA interface (direct network)

b. CMS to the Distributed Environment (networked via FSIMNET) through the DIS bridge to interoperate the CMS with other external CGF/SAFs/TADSS that are DIS compliant.

The CMS shall incorporate a Local SOFTAC (internal to the host) and a distributed networked SOFTAC (via the DIS Bridge); the differentiation of the local and distributed threat environment shall be transparent to the user. The distributed networked capability shall be initiated via button clicks on an IOS GUI; The SOFTAC shall control or manage the following entity characteristics or capabilities:

1. Tactical Behaviors

2. Sensors

3. Weapons

4. Communications

5. Expendables (Flares, Chaff, Tactical Smoke)

6. Laser Pointers, Laser Designators, and Laser Range Finder SOFTAC characteristics and capabilities SOFTAC shall provide the following characteristics or capabilities between the SOFTAC, IOS (Control GUIs) and CMS Host.

1. Aerial Refueling

a. Refueling operations shall utilize a C-130 type airframe tanker model including refueling drogues. The tanker aircraft shall have initial position, altitude, course and speed selectable by the instructor. Appropriate correlation information shall be provided for the tanker drogue model and the helicopter refueling probe tip to provide “lock-in/out” determination.

b. Aerial Refueling correlation(s) shall determine and report to the host computer contact between the probe tip and drogue basket. Contact between the probe tip and the outer surface of the basket shall result in a “lock-out” determination and shall cause the drogue basket to be smoothly deflected to the side of the probe. Contact between the probe tip and the inner surface of the basket shall result in a “lock-in” determination provided there is adequate relative velocity between the probe tip and the basket. A “lock-in” determination shall cause the drogue basket to move to a centered position on the probe tip and to occult the tip of the probe. Disconnection shall also be simulated based upon the relative positions and velocities of the tanker, ownship and drogue. A “lock-in” discrete to the flight simulation processor shall initiate a simulation of the fuel flow into appropriate fuel tanks with the appropriate effect on aircraft weight and center of gravity. A “lock-out” discrete shall terminate fuel flow.

c. Provide activation of the refueling director lights in the refueling pods under software control.

d. Provide in-flight refueling simulation from either the left of right refueling pod as selected by the instructor.

e. The MH-47-2 shall have the capability of recording an Aerial Refueling operation during one of the recording segments. During playback, either the MH-60 or the MH-47 can be chosen as the lead ship and a simultaneous refueling exercise performed.

2. The MH-60M model shall include simulation of ownship refueling probe travel to both extended and retracted positions when controlled from the cockpit.

a. The external MH-60M 3D model as seen from other simulators/stealth viewers in both the stand alone and distributed networked modes shall display the appropriate MH-60M 3D model with probe retracted and extended as a function of the selected MH-60M own ship probe retract/extend switch position.

3. The external rescue hoist shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The external rescue hoist shall be controlled from the IOS and interact with entities from the Tactical Environment.

a. The external 3D model as seen from other simulators/stealth viewers in both the stand alone and distributed networked modes shall display the 3D model with the rescue hoist cable extending, retracting and attaching, detaching to the selected 3D life form model.

4. The Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System (FRIES) shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The FRIES shall be controlled from the IOS and interact with entities from the Tactical Environment.

a. The external 3D model as seen from other simulators/stealth viewers in both the stand alone and distributed networked modes shall display the 3D model with the FRIES fast ropes extended from the rear and/or side fuselage companionway door of the 3D model. 3D life form models shall have fast rope animations of the said 3D life form models negotiating the fast rope process. The FRIES fast ropes most also detach from the 3D Model upon completion of the 3D life form models fast rope animations.

5. The cargo hook system shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The cargo hook system shall also be controlled from the IOS and interact with entities from the Tactical Environment performing sling load operations.

a. The external 3D model as seen from other simulators/stealth viewers in both the stand alone and distributed networked modes shall display the appropriate 3D model of the ownship and the attached sling load.

6. The SOFTAC shall stimulate the CMS complete suite of Aircraft Survivability Equipment.

7. The M134 DC Mini-Guns shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The M134 DC Mini-Guns shall be controlled from the IOS and interact with SOFTAC entities.

8. The M240 Mini-Guns shall function as in the design basis aircraft. The M240 Mini-Guns shall be controlled from the IOS.

9. The SOFTAC shall provide maritime entities with material codes that allow for takeoff and landings/ship board operations (see Appendix A).

a. The external 3D model as seen from other simulators/stealth viewers in both the stand alone and distributed networked modes shall display the 3D model interacting with the ship/platform in the virtual environment.

Tactical Environment (Distributed Network) The two CMS Tactical Environment Distributed Networked modes shall be:

1. CMS to CMS via the SOFTAC HLA interface (direct network).

2. CMS to the Distributed Environment (networked via FSIMNET) through the DIS Bridge; the DIS Bridge shall be able to support up to three exercises (i.e. three different DIS exercise IDs).

These modes shall provide interoperability between the existing facilities and CGF/SAFs/TADSS:

a. Mission Rehearsal Observation Center (MROC) located in Frank Hall

b. Battle Staff Training System (BSTS), White Cell and Tactical Operations Center (TOC), located in Feistner Hall

c. Modern Air Combat Environment (MACE)

d. Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2)

e. Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer Semi Automated Forces (AVSAF)

f. Tactical Terrain Visual System (T2VS)

g. ASTi role player communication suites (PCVR /Voisus Synapse) The Tactical Environment Distributed Network shall continue to support Mission Training and Mission Rehearsal Situational Training Exercises (STXs). Interoperability will be established by utilizing the Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) Protocol through the DIS Bridge. All ground entities passing through the DIS Bridge shall employ a method for a ground clamped appearance.

Visual Systems Upgrade The 160th common visual solution (IGs and projectors) shall function as described in Appendix A Visual System Requirements.

Reliability The minimum acceptable Mean-Time-Between-Failures (MTBF) for the equipment added or modified as a result of the required modifications shall be 320 hours.

Maintainability Quantitative maintainability requirements for the equipment added or modified as a result of the required modifications shall be a Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) of 30 minutes, a Maximum-repair-time (MMAX) of 45 minutes to the 90th percentile for Unscheduled On-site Maintenance, and a Mean-Preventive-Maintenance-Time (MPT) of 60 minutes per day for Scheduled Maintenance.

Environmental conditions The equipment added as a result of the required modifications shall withstand the environmental conditions below:

a. Temperature:

(1) Operating: +10 degrees Celsius (deg. C) (50o F) to +30 deg. C (86o F)

(2) Non-operating: +0 deg. C (320 F) to +50 deg. C (122o F)

b. Relative humidity:

(1) Operating: 55 percent +/- 35 percent nominal, not to exceed 50 percent, non-condensing

(2) Non-operating: Up to 80 percent, non-condensing Transportability Transportability of any equipment to and from the installation site shall be accomplished via commercial transportation. Soldering, welding, unsoldering, cutting and destruction of materials shall not be required to disassemble and reassemble the equipment. Components requiring or exceeding two man lift requirements shall have provisions for lifting and moving by forklift.

Materials and processes Materials and processes shall be in accordance with the following requirements. Commercial and Non-Developmental Items (CaNDI) and GFE are exempt from these requirements, unless otherwise specified in this section.

Parts The CMS modification hardware shall be comprised of CaNDI to the maximum extent practicable. Trainer Peculiar Equipment shall be kept to a minimum. CMS modification hardware shall be standardized to the maximum extent possible to reduce the number of different parts used in the trainer design.

Custom designed microelectronic devices The use of custom designed microelectronic devices shall be avoided unless no reasonable alternative exists.

Power supplies All power supplies to be used in the required MH-47-2 CMS modifications shall be Commercial Items to the maximum extent practicable. The new power supplies added to the MH-47-2 CMS shall emphasize commonality with the existing power supplies to the maximum extent practicable.

Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) sensitive assemblies and equipment The minimum requirements for ESD hardening of TPE, at the assembly or equipment inputs, outputs, and interface connection points shall be:

a. Assemblies: +/- 2,000 volts

b. Equipment: +/- 4,000 volts Materials Materials selected for the required CMS modifications shall meet the primary design requirements of their application and the following additional performance requirements:

a. Except in the case of consumable items, materials used in the construction of nonexempt equipment shall preclude deterioration in performance and appearance over the design service life of the equipment.

b. When it is commercially practicable, materials selected shall allow trainer-peculiar parts to be repairable by commonly applied commercial processes. For example, where a weldable metal will perform as well as a non-weldable metal in a part that could be repairable by welding, the selected material shall be the weldable metal.

c. Materials selected shall withstand, without deterioration, the effects of the environment in which the equipment will be operated, stored, and transported.

d. Materials selected shall preclude exposure of personnel, facilities, and the environment to toxic, explosive, and fire hazards throughout the life cycle of the equipment and thereafter.

e. Materials selected shall conform to restrictions peculiar to the installation site.

Flammable materials Materials shall be noncombustible or fire retardant in the most hazardous conditions of atmosphere, pressure, and temperature to be expected in their application. Non-permanent fire retardant additives shall not be used to achieve fire retardance.

Fungus-inert materials When the specified environment is conducive to fungus growth, the equipment shall be fabricated using fungus-inert materials.

Hazardous materials The equipment shall not expose personnel or the environment to excessive levels of toxic, carcinogenic, teratogenic, and otherwise hazardous materials as defined by OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). If hazardous materials must be used in order to meet the performance requirements of this specification, only Government-authorized materials shall be used, the hazardous items shall be suitably marked, and all due precautions shall be taken to prevent whatever harm the hazardous material may cause.

Metals Metals shall be corrosion-resistant, or shall be coated or metallurgically processed to resist corrosion. The environmental conditions to which the equipment will be exposed shall not cause corrosion and shall not cause deterioration of metal parts.

Processes Processes shall be in accordance with established industry standards (e.g., American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), ANSI, IEEE). The following additional requirements shall apply to the fabrication of TPE, unless otherwise specified.

Corrosion prevention The CMS modification hardware shall not be subject to corrosion and shall not be subject to other forms of physical deterioration in its intended use. The following is a list of characteristics that may contribute to such corrosion and deterioration, and shall be avoided:

a. Crevices susceptible to moisture collection

b. Galvanic metal couples over 100 mV potential difference

c. Moisture-tight designs without proper seals

d. Unprotected bearings

e. Untested adhesively bonded designs (stress and humidity tests)

f. Metallic construction where nonmetallic is suitable

g. Hardware requiring field maintenance for corrosion control Electromagnetic radiation Electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) All components installed shall operate in the electromagnetic environments (EME) described below without being a source of electromagnetic interference or a victim of site generated electromagnetic emissions, whether radiated or conducted.

Electromagnetic environment The electromagnetic environment (EME) expected at the installation site is a high electromagnetic noise environment for both radiated…

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