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SDA-PS-22-02 Tranche 1 Tracking Layer Bidder’s Library Index This document provides an overview of the documents contained in the T1 Tracking Layer Bidder’s Library.
| Filename |
| Classification / |
Distribution
| SDA Encryption Requirements Document.pdf |
| CUI/ Distribution C |
| SDA Encryption Requirements Document |
| Overview of SDA encryption requirements. |
| LE-S-002_SIS_Rev_C_Final_20170616.pdf |
| CUI/ Distribution C |
| Launch Systems Enterprise Directorate Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Standard Interface Specification |
| The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Standard Interface Specification (SIS) defines the standard payload (PL) interface between the EELV Payload and the EELV System in accordance with the EELV System Performance Requirements Document (SPRD). The EELV SPRD defines the functional and performance requirements of the EELV System, and together with the SIS provides a complete view of the EELV system capabilities to support National Security Space (NSS) launches. The SIS supports assured access to space by fostering competition for launch of NSS PLs, facilitating compatibility of NSS PLs with multiple EELV Launch Service Providers (LSPs), and enabling rapid re-manifesting of selected NSS PLs. |
| 520048p.PDF |
| CUI |
| DoD Instruction 5200.48 Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) |
| In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 and the December 22, 2010 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance: |
• Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for CUI throughout the DoD in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13556; Part 2002 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Sections 252.204-7008 and 252.204-7012.
• Establishes the official DoD CUI Registry.
| 850001_2014.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| DoD Instruction 8500.01 |
| This instruction: |
a. Reissues and renames DoD Directive (DoDD) 8500.01E (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) pursuant to the authority in DoDD 5144.02 (Reference (b)) to establish a DoD cybersecurity program to protect and defend DoD information and information technology (IT).
b. Incorporates and cancels DoDI 8500.02 (Reference (c)), DoDD C-5200.19 (Reference (d)), DoDI 8552.01 (Reference (e)), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII))/DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) Memorandums (References (f) through (k)), and Directive-type Memorandum 08-060 (Reference (l)).
c. Establishes the positions of DoD principal authorizing official (PAO) and the DoD Senior Information Security Officer (SISO) and continues the DoD Information Security Risk Management Committee (DoD ISRMC).
d. Adopts the term “cybersecurity” as it is defined in National Security Presidential Directive-54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23 (Reference (m)) to be used throughout DoD instead of the term “information assurance (IA).”
| 851001p.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| DoD Instruction 8510.01 Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT) |
| This instruction: |
a. Reissues and renames DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01 (Reference (a)) in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.02 (Reference (b)).
b. Implements References (c) through (f) by establishing the RMF for DoD IT (referred to in this instruction as “the RMF”), establishing associated cybersecurity policy, and assigning responsibilities for executing and maintaining the RMF. The RMF replaces the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and manages the life-cycle cybersecurity risk to DoD IT in accordance with References (g) through (k).
c. Redesignates the DIACAP Technical Advisory Group (TAG) as the RMF TAG.
d. Directs visibility of authorization documentation and reuse of artifacts between and among DoD Components deploying and receiving DoD IT.
e. Provides procedural guidance for the reciprocal acceptance of authorization decisions and artifacts within DoD, and between DoD and other Federal departments and agencies, for the authorization and connection of information systems (ISs).
| afspcman91-710v3.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Air Force Space Command Manual 910710, Volume 3. RANGE SAFETY USER REQUIREMENTS MANUAL VOLUME 3 – LAUNCH VEHICLES, PAYLOADS, AND GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS |
| Establishes the system safety program requirements, minimum design, test, inspection, hazard analyses, and data requirements for hazardous and safety critical launch vehicles, payloads, and ground support equipment, systems, and materials for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) ranges, including the Eastern Range (ER) and Western Range (WR). |
| Attachment 1 - T1 OandI Statement of Work (Amendment 002).pdf |
| CUI/ |
Distribution D
| Tranche 1 Operations & Integration Statement of Work and Technical Requirements Document |
| The T1 Operations and Integration (O&I) effort will establish an integrated ground segment and provide operations and sustainment support for the Tranche 1 system |
| Attachment 1 - T1DES Statement of Work.pdf |
| CUI/ |
Distribution D
| Tranche 1 Demonstration and Experimentation System (T1DES) Statement of Work and Technical Requirements Document |
| SDA will utilize T1DES to demonstrate capabilities and concepts of operation targeted for potential proliferation in future Tranches |
| Attachment 1 - T1TL Statement of Work_OTA_Final Amendment3.pdf |
| CUI/ Distribution D |
| Tranche 1 Transport Layer Statement of Work and Technical Requirements Document |
| The T1 Transport Layer (T1TL) will provide low-latency, high-throughput global communications for the Initial Warfighting Capability Tranche of the National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA). |
| CCSDS - Overview of Space Communications Protocols.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Overview of Space Communications Protocols |
| This document is a CCSDS Report that contains an overview of the space communications protocols recommended by CCSDS. |
| CCSDS 141.0-B-1.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Optical Communications Physical Layer |
| This document is a CCSDS Recommended Standard for the Physical Layer of signals to be used in optical communications systems of space missions. |
| CCSDS 142.0-B-1.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Optical Communications Coding and Synchronization |
| This document is a CCSDS Recommended Standard for the channel coding and synchronization of signals to be used in free space optical communications systems of space missions. |
| CFR-2010-title3-vol1-eo13526.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Executive Order 13526 - Classified National Security Information |
| This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism. |
| CFR-2011-title32-vol6-part2001.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| 2001: Classified National Security Information |
| CJCSI 6510.02B Cryptographic Modernization Plan.pdf |
| Distribution A, B, C, J |
| Cryptographic Modernization Plan |
| This instruction sets policy for the modernization of cryptographic equipment held by all DOD components specified in paragraph 3, reference a. |
| CNSSI no 4005 amendment.pdf |
| U//FOUO |
| Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4005, 27 May 2014, (U) Amendment, Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC) Facilities and Materials |
| Prescribes the minimum national requirements for the construction, approval, and security of facilities wherein the primary purpose is generating, storing, repairing, or using communications security (COMSEC) material. This CNSSI also establishes the minimum national requirements for safeguarding and controlling COMSEC material. These requirements apply to all COMSEC material controlled within the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS), regardless of where it is used |
| CNSSI no 4005.pdf |
| U//FOUO |
| Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4005, 22 Aug 2011, (U) Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC) Facilities and Materials |
| Prescribes the minimum national requirements for the construction, approval, and security of facilities wherein the primary purpose is generating, storing, repairing, or using communications security (COMSEC) material. This CNSSI also establishes the minimum national requirements for safeguarding and controlling COMSEC material. These requirements apply to all COMSEC material controlled within the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS), regardless of where it is used. |
| CNSSI_1253_Final_20140512_Admin_Edit.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems |
| Provides all Federal Government departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices with guidance on the first two steps of the Risk Management Framework (RMF), Categorize and Select, for national security systems (NSS). |
| CNSSP_12_6_Feb_2018.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Cybersecurity Policy for Space Systems used to Support National Security Missions |
| The primary objective of this policy is to help ensure the success of NSM that use space systems, by fully integrating cybersecurity into the planning, development, design, launch, sustained operation, and decommissioning of those space systems used to collect, generate, process, store, display, transmit, or receive National Security Information (NSI), as well as any supporting or related infrastructure. |
| Cybersecurity-Test-and-Evaluation-Guidebook-Version2-change-1 |
| U |
| Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation Guidebook Version2 change 1 |
| The purpose of this updated guidebook is to promote data-driven mission-impact-based analysis and assessment methods for cybersecurity test and evaluation (T&E) and to support assessment of cybersecurity, systems cyber survivability, and operational resilience within context by encouraging planning for tighter integration with traditional system T&E. Cyber security T&E starts at acquisition initiation and continues throughout the entire life cycle. |
| DI-EMCS-81543.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Data Item Description Spectrum Supportability Risk Assessment |
| This DID contains the format and content preparation instructions for data resulting from a solicitation for the preparation of an SSRA. It is intended for S-D systems and equipment, including commercial items (CIs) and non-developmental items (NDIs) that are S-D, employed on airborne, sea, space, and ground platforms and systems. |
| DoD 5200.08.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Department of Defense Instruction 5200.08 |
| This Instruction: |
1.1. Reissues reference (a) as a DoD Instruction according to the guidance in reference (b) and updates policy on the security of DoD installations and resources.
1.2. Authorizes commanders to issue regulations for the protection or security of property or places under their command, according to reference (c).
1.3. Continues to authorize the publication of reference (d) according to reference (e), to establish consistent minimum standards for protecting DoD installations and resources.
1.4. Incorporates and cancels Directive-type Memorandum 08-004 (reference (f)).
| DoD Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA).pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance |
| A Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) is a systematic, metrics-based process that assesses the maturity of, and the risk associated with, critical technologies to be used in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). |
| DoDI 4650.01.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Department of Defense Instruction 4650.01 |
| This Instruction: |
a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 4650.1 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction in accordance with the guidance in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5025.01 (Reference (b)) and the authority in DoDD 5144.02 (Reference (c)).
b. Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides instructions for management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum in accordance with Reference (c).
c. Implements section 305 and chapter 8 of title 47, United States Code (Reference (d)); Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Part 2, Sec. 33.4 (Reference (e)); and the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Radio Frequency Management (Reference (f)).
| DoDI 8560.01.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Department of Defense Instruction 8560.01 Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring |
| In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5144.02, this issuance implements National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Directive (NTISSD) No. 600 by establishing policies and assigning responsibilities for conducting COMSEC monitoring of DoD telecommunications. |
| DOD Zero Trust Reference Architecture |
| U |
| Department of Defense (DOD) Zero Trust Reference Architecture |
| “Zero Trust is the term for an evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move defenses from status, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. Zero Trust assumes there is no implicit trust granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks versus the Internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned).” 1Zero Trust requires designing a simpler and more secure architecture without impeding operations or compromising security. The classic perimeter/defense-in-depth cybersecurity strategy repeatedly shows to have limited value against well-resourced adversaries and is an ineffective approach to address insider threats. |
| EELV Rideshare Users Guide.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Rideshare User's Guide |
| The Rideshare User’s Guide (RUG) provides guidelines and information for preliminary spacecraft design, launch vehicle (LV) integration, and mission planning for auxiliary payloads (APLs) seeking access to space via Rideshare Standard Service (RSS). |
The RSS is offered only on Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) LVs certified to launch National Security Space missions; hence, APLs must not violate EELV requirements documented in the EELV Standard Interface Specification (SIS) and/or System Performance Requirement Document (SPRD). APL requirements are not addressed in the SIS but their requirements are derived from the SIS.
| en_30230701v010401p.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); Second generation framing structure, channel coding and modulation systems for Broadcasting, Interactive Services, News Gathering and other broadband satellite applications; Part 1: DVB-S2 |
| The present document: |
• gives a general description of the DVB-S2 system;
• specifies the digitally modulated signal in order to allow compatibility between pieces of equipment developed by different manufacturers. This is achieved by describing in detail the signal processing principles at the modulator side, while the processing at the receive side is left open to different implementation solutions. However, it is necessary in the present document to refer to certain aspects of reception;
• identifies the global performance requirements and features of the System, in order to meet the service quality targets.
| Final_CNSSI_1200_2014.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| National Information Assurance Instruction for Space Systems used to National Security Missions |
| The primary objective of this instruction is to help ensure space system planners, developers, operators, Authorizing Officials (AO), Security Controls Assessors (SCA), program managers/information system owners, and information assurance practitioners both understand and ensure information assurance (IA) is adequately integrated into all components of space systems falling under the purview of Reference b. |
| GPD_TEE_SystemArch_v1.2_PublicRelease.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| GlobalPlatform Technology TEE System Architecture Version 1.2 |
| This document explains the hardware and software architectures behind the TEE. It introduces TEE management and explains concepts relevant to TEE functional availability in a device. |
| LE-S-001_SPRD_Rev_B_20170619.pdf |
| Distribution C |
| Launch Systems Enterprise Directorate Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program System Performance Requirements Document |
| The System Performance Requirements Document (SPRD) translates the Capability Production Document (CPD) into performance and functional requirements for the EELV System. |
| MIL-STD-461G.pdf_safe.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment |
| This standard establishes interface and associated verification requirements for the control of the electromagnetic interference (EMI) emission and susceptibility characteristics of electronic, electrical, and electromechanical equipment and subsystems designed or procured for use by activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD). Such equipment and subsystems may be used independently or as an integral part of other subsystems or systems. This |
standard is best suited for items that have the following features: electronic enclosures that are no larger than an equipment rack, electrical interconnections that are discrete wiring harnesses between enclosures, and electrical power input derived from prime power sources. This standard should not be directly applied to items such as modules located inside electronic enclosures or entire platforms. The principles in this standard may be useful as a basis for developing suitable requirements for those applications. Data item requirements are also included.
| MIL-STD-883-1.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Department of Defense Test Method Standard Environmental Test Methods for Microcircuits Part 1: Test Methods 1000-1999 |
| Part 1 of this test method standard establishes uniform test methods for the basic environmental testing of microelectronic devices to determine resistance to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military operations. |
| MIL-STD-883L.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Department of Defense Test Method Standard: Microcircuits |
| This standard establishes uniform methods, controls, and procedures for testing microelectronic devices suitable for use within Military and Aerospace electronic systems including basic environmental tests to determine resistance to deleterious effects of natural elements and conditions surrounding military and space operations; mechanical and electrical tests; workmanship and training procedures; and such other controls and constraints as have been deemed necessary to ensure a uniform level of quality and reliability suitable to the intended applications of those devices. |
| MIL-STD-3053_NOTICE-1.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERFACE STANDARD SATELLITE SYSTEMS NATURAL AND NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT STANDARD |
| MIL-STD-3053, The Satellite System Natural and Nuclear Environment Standard (SSNS-E), is a classified (SECRET//RD//CNWDI) document with controlled distribution. To receive MIL-STD-3053, you must demonstrate need-to-know and verify that you can receive and store SECRET//RD//CNWDI information. Example verification would be a Visit Authorization Request (VAR) on file with DTRA/SCC-WMD. Also, identify how the classified information should be transmitted to you: SIPRNET, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), or Compact Disk (CD) via Certified U.S. Mail. |
| MMO_SV_IRD Template.docx |
| CUI |
| Interface Requirements Document of Multi-manifest Satellite Vehicles |
| Template for the Interface Requirements Document (IRD) to be provided by the vendor for use with NSSL launches |
| MRL_Deskbook_2018.pdf_safe.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) |
| Manufacturing status and risk evaluations have been performed as part of defense acquisition programs for years in a variety of forms. These evaluations, while often highly structured and well managed, did not use a uniform metric to measure and communicate manufacturing risk and readiness. They were not conducted on technology development efforts or in early acquisition phases. Furthermore, the frequency of these types of evaluations has declined since the 1990s. Paralleling this decline, manufacturing-related impacts on cost and schedule have grown. |
| N_PR_8705_004A_.doc |
| Distribution A |
| Risk Classification for NASA Payloads |
| This directive defines (1) the criteria for Mission Directorates to define the risk tolerance classes for NASA missions and instruments, and (2) the corresponding Agency-level assurance expectations that drive design and analysis, test philosophy, and common assurance practices |
| NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules |
| This standard specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information (hereafter referred to as sensitive information). |
| NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy, Rev. 2 |
| This publication specifically addresses assessment and analysis of security control effectiveness and of organizational security status in accordance with organizational risk tolerance. |
| NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations |
| This publication provides agencies with recommended security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI when the information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations; when the nonfederal organization is not collecting or maintaining information on behalf of a federal agency or using or operating a system on behalf of an agency; and where there are no specific safeguarding requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI prescribed by the authorizing law, regulation, or government wide policy for the CUI category listed in the CUI Registry. |
| NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information |
| This publication provides federal agencies with recommended enhanced security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI: (1) when the information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations; (2) when the nonfederal organization is not collecting or maintaining information on behalf of a federal agency or using or operating a system on behalf of an agency; and (3) where there are no specific safeguarding requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI prescribed by the authorizing law, regulation, or government-wide policy for the CUI category listed in the CUI Registry. |
| NIST.SP.800-137.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations |
| This publication describes the Risk Management Framework (RMF) and provides guidelines for applying the RMF to information systems and organizations. |
| NIST.SP.800-171r2.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations |
| This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information systems and organizations and a process for selecting controls to protect organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation from a diverse set of threats including hostile cyber-attacks, natural disasters, structural failures, and human errors. |
| NIST.SP.800-172.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations |
| This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for information systems and organizations to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation from a diverse set of threats and risks, including hostile attacks, human errors, natural disasters, structural failures, foreign intelligence entities, and privacy risks. |
| NSA CSS Policy Manual 3-16 20200124.pdf |
| U//FOUO |
| NSA/CSS Policy Manual 3-16, Control of Communications Security Material, 24 January 2020 |
| Prescribes the minimum standards, procedures, specifications, and guidance for safeguarding and control of Communications Security (COMSEC) material in accordance with NSA/CSS Policy 3-16, “Control of Communications Security Material” |
| nspd-54.pdf |
| Unclassified |
| National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-54 |
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-23 Cybersecurity Policy
| ntia_manual_september_2017_revision.pdf |
| Unclassified |
| Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management |
| Procedures for the management of the radio frequency spectrum |
| R-REC-P.618-13-201712-I!!PDF-E.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Propagation data and prediction methods required for the design of Earth-space telecommunication systems |
| This Recommendation predicts the various propagation parameters needed in planning Earth-space systems operating in either the Earth-to-space or space-to-Earth direction. |
| R-REC-P.676-12-201908-I!!PDF-E.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Attenuation by atmospheric gases and related effects |
| This Recommendation provides methods to estimate the attenuation of atmospheric gases on terrestrial and slant paths using: |
a) a method in Annex 1 to estimate the gaseous attenuation computed by a summation of individual absorption lines that is valid for the frequency range 1-1 000 GHz;
b) two simplified approximate methods in Annex 2 to estimate the gaseous attenuation that are valid in the frequency range 1-350 GHz; and
c) other propagation effects that can be computed by a summation of functions of individual absorption lines.
| R-REC-P.840-8-201908-I!!PDF-E.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Attenuation due to clouds and fog |
| This Recommendation provides methods to predict the attenuation due to clouds and fog on Earth-space paths. |
| SDA NEBULA Standard v3.0.pdf |
| CUI / Distribution C |
| SDA Network Established Beyond the Upper Limits of the Atmosphere (NEBULA) Standard |
| This document specifies the protocols and behaviors for the space network service provided by the T1 NDSA. This document’s scope focuses on SDA Tranche 1 but is intended to form a basis with which future variants will be backward-compatible. |
| SDA OCT Standard v3.0.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| SDA Optical Communications Terminal Standard |
| The purpose of this document is to provide the framework and protocol definitions for optical communications systems employed by the Space Development Agency (SDA) and its partners. The scope of optical communication links supported includes space-to-space (S2S, a.k.a. Optical Intersatellite Links or OISLs), space-to-air (S2A), space-to-maritime (S2M), and space-to-ground (S2G) optical communications. |
| (CUI) SDA SCG 0008 Tranche 1 Program 20220118 |
| CUI / Distribution D |
| Security Classification Guide |
| To provide instructions and guidance on the classification of information involved in the Tranche 1 (T1) Transport Layer Program using an unclassified identification of the effort. Use this reference for T1 Enterprise or T1 Transport Layer program related classification guidance. SDA plans to release an updated Tranche 1 Program SCG that will supersede this reference. |
| SDA Tranche 1 Networking Encryption Interoperability Test Plan.pdf |
| CUI / Distribution D |
| SDA Tranche 1 Transport Layer Networking and Encryption Interoperability Test Plan |
| This test plan defines the set of networking and encryption tests that will be performed between the T1 vendors to ensure that the systems are interoperable |
| SDA Tranche 1 OCT Interoperability Test Plan.pdf |
| CUI / Distribution D |
| SDA Tranche 1 Transport Layer Optical Communications Terminal Interoperability Test Plan |
| This test plan defines the set of interoperability tests that will be performed between the T1 vendors to ensure that the Optical Communications Terminals are interoperable |
| SMC-S-010 (2013).pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Technical Requirements for Electronic Parts, Materials, and Processes used in Space Vehicles |
| This standard defines the Government's requirements and expectations for contractor performance in defense systems acquisitions and technology developments |
| Space Enterprise Cryptographic Roadmap 27 Jan 2020 Final.pdf |
| Unclassified / FOUO |
| Space Enterprise Cryptographic Roadmap (SECR) |
| The SECR is intended to guide the transition of cryptographic solutions (embedded and standalone) from legacy (those still in use today) and transitional (those still being fielded and developed) to the next generation of cryptographic solutions (those that leverage the latest and future technologies and standards). |
| SS-US-800.pdf |
| Unclassified / FOUO |
| Modernized Precise Positioning Service (PPS) User Segment (US) Specification |
| The purpose of this document is to provide program offices with a parent specification as a baseline in creating GPS User Equipment product specification documents. These are the minimum requirements to ensure compliance with incorporating modernized GPS User Equipment (UE). The product specification will require the addition of several product specific requirements and potential refinement of the below requirements. |
| SS-US-800_Appendix_B_RSAM_Requirements_Rev_11.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| Appendix B - RSAM Implementation Standards |
| The intention of this addendum to SS-US-800 is to codify a set of standard GPS user equipment requirements originating from the Resiliency and Software Assurance Modification (RSAM) program for the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE). These standardized RSAM requirements are meant to serve as a starting point for future GPS user equipment programs to help in writing their specifications in RSAM related areas. |
| T1 Tracking Layer System Security Accreditation Appendix 15MAR22 |
| CUI |
| RMF Security Controls for the T1 Tracking Layer NOVA Ground System |
| TCG_D-RTM_Architecture_v1-0_Published_06172013.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| TCG D-RTM Architecture |
| This specification describes the architecture and implementation examples for a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (D-RTM) used for measured platform initialization without a hardware platform restart. |
This specification extends the TCG PC Client specification (See (1)).
| TCG-EFI-Platform-Specification.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| TCG EFI Platform Specification |
| This document is about the processes that boot an EFI platform and boot an OS on that platform. |
Specifically, this specification contains the requirements for measuring boot events into TPM PCRs and adding boot event entries into the Event Log.
| Trusted-Platform-Module-Library-Family-2.0-Level-00-Revision-1.59_pub.zip |
| Distribution A |
| TCG Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 Library |
| usg_orbital_debris_mitigation_standard_practices_november_2019.pdf |
| Distribution A |
| U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, November 2019 Update |
| Provides U.S. Government standard practices for orbital debris mitigation |
The following documents are referenced in this solicitation and are available at the links specified.
| Link |
| Classification / Distribution |
| Title |
| https://aaf.dau.edu/aaf/aaf-pathways/ |
| Distribution A |
| Technical Reviews and Risk Assessments |
| https://www.iso.org/standard/66510.html |
| Distribution A |
| ISO/IEC 11889: Trusted Platform Module Library |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/as5553/ |
| Distribution A |
| AS5553C: Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/as6081/ |
| Distribution A |
| AS6081: Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition - Distributors |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/arp6178/ |
| Distribution A |
| ARP6178: Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Tool for Risk Assessment of Distributors |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/as6462/ |
| Distribution A |
| AS6462C: AS5553C, Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/as6171/ |
| Distribution A |
| AS6171A: Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts |
| https://www.sae.org/standards/content/as6301/ |
| Distribution A |
| AS6301: Compliance Verification Criterion Standard for SAE AS6081, Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition – Distributors |
| https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/21/2020-27698/national-industrial-security-program-operating-manual-nispom |
| Distribution A |
| National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) |
| https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm |
| Distribution A |
| Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 1253 (plus all attachments), 27 March 2014, (U) Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems |
Space Development Agency