J.8_-_OTI_15_Year_Report.pdf

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

1994–200915YEARS

Cover photos from top to bottom: OTI/Sudan; OTI/Iraq; OTI/Afghanistan

OFFICE OF TRANSITION

INITIATIVES:1994–2009

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

EVOLUTION

METHODOLOGY

PARTNERSHIPS

INITIATIVES

LEGACY

MAPS

i

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVESii

O T

I/ A fg ha ni st an

“ Windows of opportunity—brief, critical junctures in a nation’s history in which the actions of citizens and public servants can lead directly to either peaceful political development and stability or backsliding into further conflict and crisis—tend to be fleeting.”

1994–2009 1

INTRODUCTION

Since it was created 15 years ago, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has grown from a small experimental office managing $10 million in program funds in two countries to an office managing $100 million in program funds in 10 to 12 countries a year.

OTI programs specialize in quick-impact opportunistic interventions designed to create or preserve po-litical space and help set the stage for more profound longer-term change.

With a focus on the short-term po-litical context, OTI programming differs from traditional development through its operational modality, wide geographic presence, flexible resources, tactical approaches, and unique organizational culture.

OTI often enters countries on the cusp of change before traditional develop-ment programs can take hold. By generating positive momentum through an array of high-visibility activities, OTI programs provide tangible ben-efits of peace and buy time for longer-term political and economic reforms.

Although in recent years the world has witnessed fewer major conflicts between nations, fragile states are increasingly threatened by destabilizing forces that draw on extremism, ethnic tensions, poverty, and child combatants. Local conflict undermines their economic, political, and social development. Their internal instability threatens neighbor-ing states and provides opportunities for extremism to grow and spread, threat-ening the entire world community.

Indeed, the events of 9/11 made it clear that unstable states can serve as incuba-tors for extremist movements that can export terrorism well beyond a country’s borders. U.S. foreign policy has given top priority to fighting terrorism and extremism and has intensified efforts to tackle core issues of fragile states that, left unaddressed, could directly threaten U.S. interests around the world.

When OTI was created in 1994, the challenges facing the world were very different. The end of the Cold War coincided with an outbreak of local conflicts brought on by ethnic tensions, nationalist movements, and long-sim-mering tribal and religious hostilities.

In the 1990s, historical enmities were reignited. The decade saw a resurgence of bloody localized wars character-

OTI MISSION STATEMENT:

To support U.S. foreign policy objectives by help-ing local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis.

Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assis-tance targeted at key politi-cal transition and stabiliza-tion needs.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES2

ized by widespread atrocities, massive population displacements, state col-lapse, and economic disintegration.

In many regions today, the threats to peace are increasingly complex. Extrem-ism has spread in parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Higher food and fuel prices have raised tensions and further constrained economic oppor-tunity. Armed combat is more likely to be carried out by insurgent groups than by states, and often unarmed civilians are the victims. The large numbers of persons displaced by conflict increase the burden on local authorities to provide basic needs and further exacerbate the inability of weakened governments to stabilize, develop, and prosper.

Unaddressed, threats to stability and peace pose significant challenges to longer-term development. Yet even where there is instability and violence, there are always local agents of positive change whose efforts can be amplified by creative application of assistance.

OTI was established in 1994 to bolster these positive change agents at critical junctures of a transition, engaging in countries in crisis during brief windows of opportunity and getting resources to those promoting peace and democracy.

With 47 engagements in 40 countries and over 14,000 grant activities in 15 years, OTI has helped hundreds of thousands of people engage in indi-vidual efforts, community action, and national movements to bring about positive change and increase their chances for a stable and peaceful future.

OTI’s mission and vision directly link helping local partners with larger U.S. foreign policy objectives:

To support U.S. foreign policy objec-tives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority coun-tries in crisis. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key politi-cal transition and stabilization needs.

With foreign policy increasingly focus-ing on conflict, stability, and fragile states, OTI contributes to this larger government effort through expanded ap-plication of its programming methodol-ogy on the ground and through engage-ments with country Missions and other government counterparts to better plan and conceptualize innovative activities that address core causes of conflict. With 15 years of experience and having man-aged $1.3 billion in programs, OTI has directly contributed to more cohesive and operational approaches for USAID and the U.S. Government (USG), and to the building of a common organizing to framework and strategy to program-ming in conflict, crisis, and fragile states.

OTI’s mission is essentially political and short-term rather than humanitar-ian or developmental. It uses its tools to preserve political space and advance positive change in the midst of political transitions. OTI identifies issues that positively influence the transition and funds activities that spark or reinforce broad-based change. These themes are reflected in its programs—from combat-ing violence against women through local civil society groups in Darfur to weakening insurgency by employing tens of thousands of people in Iraq;

from helping traditionally excluded indigenous communities participate in electoral processes in Bolivia to combining humanitarian relief with ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

Fifteen years after its creation, OTI remains a relatively small office within USAID, using less than one half of 1 percent of the entire USAID budget.

Yet it plays a crucial role in meet-ing foreign policy objectives in criti-cal countries experiencing a cessation from conflict, political transition, or a sudden break from past tyranny.

O T

I/ N ep al

1994–2009 3

LESSONS IN TRANSITION PROGRAMMING: 1994–2009

• Coordination within USAID and with other U.S. Government agencies is critical to success.

• Funding flexibility and staff deployment-readiness are essential for quick program startups.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES4

Jo se

A ze l/ A ur or a Ph ot os

“ By keeping individual grants small — typically $5,000 to $50,000 —OTI limits the exposure and risk of each activity.”

1994–2009 5

EVOLUTION

“ One of the results of the change in the nature of conflict over the past decade or so has been the creation…of new programs and bureaus to manage the complicated and still little understood tasks of helping countries emerging from crisis and conflict with reconstructing political insti-tutions and social reconciliation. USAID, in its major innovation of recent years, was the first to create such a program, housed in the new Office of Transition Initiatives.”

—Transforming Foreign Aid by Carol Lancaster, 2000

FROM IDEA TO

INSTITUTION

Traditional USAID missions did not always possess the tools, flexibility, or institutional culture to effectively respond to complex post-Cold War challenges. A lengthy budgeting cycle, tightly focused earmarked budgets, and a procurement system not well suited to crisis response made it extremely difficult for the Agency to find even small amounts to respond quickly and flexibly to political crises in developing countries. Moreover, within an institu-tional culture that saw the Agency as a technical organization, many in USAID questioned the kind of opportunistic, short-term, and often overtly political activities that OTI employs to preserve the peace in a postconflict environment.

Lawrence Eagleburger, Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, however, recognized that such activi-ties are critical to USAID’s survival. As he left office in 1993, Eagleburger urged USAID to find ways to move more quickly to address foreign policy priorities and stay relevant to national security decision-making. Thirty years earlier, Eagleburger had created the impetus for establishment of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) when he urged the U.S.

Government to improve its capac-ity to respond to natural disasters.

Incoming USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, who served under President William Clinton, was already familiar with the difficulties USAID faced in addressing post-communist transitions and rose immediately to the challenge.

In August 1993, three months after his confirmation, Atwood sent to Capitol Hill a proposal for a USAID Office of

Office Of TransiTiOn iniTiaTives6

Crisis and Transition Management. Its mission would be to respond to urgent, short-term requirements that humani-tarian relief, peacekeeping operations, and long-term development programs were ill-equipped to address, such as simple confidence-building initia-tives, conflict mitigation, reconcilia-tion and reintegration of demobilized combatants, restoration of basic infra-structure, and the promotion of civil society and electoral reform. To carry out these activities, the Administrator proposed a special crisis-waiver author-ity as well as core funding and staff.

In response, Congress approved the inclusion of language allowing OFDA funds to be used for “reconstruction” and added $10 million to OFDA’s budget for “transition” activities in the next fiscal year. This was the first step toward the creation of the Of-fice of Transition Initiatives. The first year of funding was used to launch programs in Haiti and Angola.

THE EVOLUTION

OF TRANSITION

PROGRAMMING

A group of five political transition pio-neers drew up OTI’s first strategic plan, hired a handful of staff, and conducted assessments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Angola, Liberia, and Haiti. The plan defined the four criteria for engage-ment, which remain in place today:

• Is the country important to U.S. national interests?

• Is there a window of opportunity?

• Can OTI’s involvement sig-nificantly increase the chances of a successful transition?

• Is the operating environ-ment sufficiently stable?

With the OTI mission of bringing “fast, direct, and flexible assistance to the acute needs of priority nations emerg-ing from political, economic, and/or social distress,” the new office moved quickly, launching its transition pro-grams in Angola and Haiti in 1994.

Over the next six years, through 2000, funding managed by OTI grew from

Total Funding—including supplementals Total Staff—Washington, DC

Total Funding—including supplementals Total Staff—Washington, D.C.

(Dollars in Millions)

OTI Growth: 1994 to 2008 Program Funds and Staffing Levels

Africa

Latin America & the Caribbean

Asia & the Middle East

Europe & Eurasia

Millions

$306

$644

Total: $1,216 million

$114

$152

OTI Funding by Region: 1994 to 2008

1994–2009 7

$10 million to over $60 million a year, funded by OFDA and other accounts.

Funding for OTI programs expanded quickly as the U.S. Government in-creasingly targeted conflict and post-conflict priorities. In FY 2001, con-gressional appropriators established a separate “Transition Initiatives” budget line item, for the first time provid-ing specific statutory authority for transition activities. Transition Initia-tives (TI) funds may be used to:

“ support transition to democracy and long-term development of countries in crisis,” including “assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve demo-cratic institutions and processes, revi-talize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict.”

One misperception of OTI among de-velopment specialists is that its programs are fast and flexible only because of the “notwithstanding any other provision of law” authority that comes with TI fund-ing. OTI uses notwithstanding authority very rarely, and non-TI funding that carries no special authority (such as the Economic Support Fund) has been the predominant source of program fund-ing for OTI in the past several years.

While the TI budget line is subject to budget constraints and evolving foreign policy priorities, it has generally ranged from $40 to $50 million since 2001, supporting programming in 10 to 12 priority countries each year. In addi-tion to its own TI budget, OTI receives funds from other accounts, such as Development Assistance, Economic Support Funds, the U.S. Department of Defense’s 1207 authority, and special supplemental appropriations.

Such transfers have at times more than tripled OTI’s core program budget. For example, the large supplemental ap-propriation for Iraq in FY 2004 brought OTI’s total budget that year to $226 million. Although these funds come with restrictions that do not apply to TI funding, the fact that they can be used for OTI activities demonstrates that funding type alone does not define programming possibilities in conflict and postconflict settings. In total, OTI has programmed over $1.2 billion in TI and non-TI funds since 1994.

O T

I/ Su da n–

D ar fu r

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES8

Iz ze t K er ib ar /I

M L

/A ur or a

Ph ot os

“ People in postconflict countries often have high hopes and little confidence, or high expectations and little patience.”

1994–2009 9 mEtHoDologY

“ In order to facilitate sustainable security, planners and executors alike need to be able to get at the root causes of the conflict at hand, properly define the mission, and continually evaluate progress.…Planning should reflect the unpredictable nature of conflict.”

Joint DARPA and CSIS Workshop on Pre- & Post-Conflict Stability Operations, 2004

Political transition Programming Fifteen years of programs in postconflict, transitional, and stabilization environ-ments have shown that people in post-conflict countries often have high hopes and little confidence, or high expec-tations and little patience. Invariably, na-tional and local governments, hampered by the effects of prolonged conflict, lack full capacity to meet the basic needs of the population, and the higher expecta-tions of the population inevitably lead to disappointment. Such states in transi-tion are inherently fragile. Windows of opportunity—brief, critical junctures in a nation’s history in which the ac-tions of citizens and public servants can lead directly to either peaceful political development and stability or backsliding into further conflict and crisis—tend to be fleeting. Through its unique operat-ing methodology, OTI capitalizes on these windows of opportunity by rapidly identifying and supporting key actors and critical processes. OTI seeks to bol-ster progress, build public confidence, and diminish the likelihood of a return to conflict by identifying make-or-break issues that could determine the direc-tion of a transition, then finding creative ways to help address them in the short term until longer-term political, security, and economic reforms can take place.

aPProacH In 15 years OTI has endured its own transition from a small collection of inspired professionals on a journey to create a new type of assistance program-ming to a far more institutionalized USAID office, with established systems and procedures that add structure to new programs based on lessons learned.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES10

Maintaining a program that is flexible, high-yield, and responsive to changing political dynamics demands hands-on, operationally intense program manage-ment. Unlike many long-term devel-opment programs that delegate daily program management responsibilities to intermediary grantees or contractors, OTI establishes a seamless working rela-tionship with the implementing partner to ensure that the program responds quickly and effectively as conditions change. OTI and the implementing partner operate as a single team char-acterized by daily interaction, informa-tion sharing, and collaborative strategic planning and decision making, with OTI’s intensive oversight and guidance.

In this way OTI is an operational rather than a supervisory develop-ment enterprise unit. Where security permits, OTI representatives, with implementing partners, play a direct role in all aspects of grant implementa-tion, from identifying and facilitating activities and acting as community organizers to opening lines of commu-nication between elected officials and their constituents. OTI personnel are housed within the USAID Mission, and through regular interface and updates with Mission and Embassy staff they can readily translate current U.S. policy into action. Meanwhile, they regularly provide Mission and Embassy staff with insights and analysis generated from local activities that can be used to guide future U.S. policy and programming.

STRATEGIC PLANNING,

MONITORING, AND

EVALUATION

Before launching any new program, OTI first conducts an in-country, con-text-specific assessment, which is integral to defining programmatic assumptions and strategic objectives. By addressing both the political and developmental appropriateness of engagement, OTI assessments inform higher-level deci-sion-making related not only to OTI’s own potential engagement but also to future or changed engagements by other bureaus and offices within USAID.

Normally conducted over a two-week period, the OTI assessment reviews the four criteria for engagement: (1) Is the country important to U.S. national interests? (2) Is there a window of op-

O T

I/ Su da n

1994–2009 11 portunity? (3) Can OTI’s involvement significantly increase the chances of a successful transition? (4) Is the operat-ing environment sufficiently stable?

OTI engages key counterparts while conducting the assessment, including the USAID Mission, the Embassy, and the Regional Bureau. It also meets with host-country government officials and nongovernmental interlocutors repre-senting local communities, civil society, the media, and international organiza-tions. Where the assessment team deter-mines that OTI engagement is appro-priate, it will also recommend an initial strategy. Once external stakeholders in USAID and the State Department have reviewed, provided feedback on, and approved the assessment, OTI provides a report to Congress five days before ini-tiating a new program of assistance. This provides another critical check as well as serving as a source of strategic feedback.

The initial strategy, however, is just the starting point for the program. OTI’s unique approach to programming requires constant reassessment of strat-egy, tactics, and activities, because the environments in which it operates are fluid and unpredictable. This means the process of program analysis and retarget-ing of objectives must be continuous. To manage this process of rolling analysis throughout the entire program cycle, OTI has developed flexible approaches to monitoring implementation and evaluating outputs and impact. These include regular assessments and reassess-ments of OTI country programs at the strategic (political analysis), program (design, priorities, and tactics), and proj-ect (implementation and impact) levels.

In-country analysis mechanisms that allow OTI to more effectively adapt program design and activities as political circumstances emerge or change within the country include

• Daily contact and weekly and month-ly program meetings with local staff to discuss what is being done and new ideas, challenges, and opportunities;

• Periodic (generally quarterly) strategy meetings during which country pro-gram staff conduct a formal analysis of the program at the three analytical levels, with OTI Washington regional team staff usually in attendance;

• Management reviews of OTI and implementing partner management systems carried out by senior OTI staff, who identify good practices and areas for improvement; and

• Program Performance Reviews that link the ongoing process of political analysis and decision-mak-ing in the field with peer review and evaluation at headquarters.

Just as continuous analysis of strategy and program design takes place at a macro level, the same process is done daily at the micro level. Changes in program activities may result from (1) focus groups, polling, or subjective analysis indicating that certain activities are having more impact than others;

(2) sudden changes in the political climate; and (3) evolving U.S. govern-ment priorities. OTI program strategy thus continues to target new windows of opportunity; the tactics used to address them also evolve as events mandate.

In high-profile, high-pressure envi-ronments, OTI’s reputation for rapid response leads to expectations for rapid reporting on the results of individual activities. Every OTI program needs to be able to demonstrate impact of the overall program; impact is impossible to capture if program staff do not effec-

OTI’s unique approach to programming requires constant reassessment of strategy, tactics, and activi-ties, because the environ-ments in which it operates are fluid and unpredictable.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES12

tively record project outcomes at various stages of the grant cycle. Good informa-tion management requires that each member of OTI’s country program team records relevant information (notes, site visit accounts, budgets, anecdotes, and photos) in the activity database where colleagues can easily find and use it. At a minimum, two data points are moni-tored and evaluated: the implementa-tion process (outputs) and the impact of the grant (outcomes); the database has specific fields for each. When an activity is completed, two final write-ups are generated and incorporated into the database: the grantee report, which gives the local counterpart’s perspec-tive on the activity, and a final evalua-tion, which looks at whether the grant’s initial aims were met and any positive or negative impacts that resulted.

A final evaluation, usually performed by an external firm during the closeout phase, critiques program effectiveness and determines how well the program met its goals. Finally, programs benefit from an after-exit review (AER), a tool

OTI uses to critique the operations and management of its programs and iden-tify best practices and lessons learned.

AERs focus on the relationship between OTI and the implementing partner, how it helped or hindered the effective-ness of the program, and how lessons can be applied to future programs.

ACTIVITY DEVELOPMENT

AND IMPLEMENTATION

In its approach to grant-making, OTI often seeks out promising new leaders and organizations in the host country that can become engines of reform and positive change. While these potential partners—fledgling nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), informal student groups, local entrepreneurs, and rural villagers, for example—demonstrate that they have the creativity and energy to make a difference for their communities, they often lack the capacity to effectively seek out and administer donor support.

They also generally lack the accounting systems that donors require to ensure fiscal responsibility and reporting.

Le i G on g

1994–2009 13

Instead of waiting to be approached for assistance or for proposals to come for-ward through a time-consuming formal grant solicitation process, OTI person-nel and implementing partner staff are expected to reach out and identify local agents of change and work with them to translate good ideas into quick and effective action plans and projects.

The proposal process is therefore ab-breviated but highly interactive, with OTI and implementing partner staff working with prospective grantees to draft two to three-page activity descrip-tions that serve as the basis for new grants. Funding decisions are normally made within days, not weeks or months.

Once an activity proves successful, its scope and scale may be expanded through successive rounds of funding.

This partly explains why OTI is able to award hundreds of small grants in each country program every year to new grantees that would otherwise not have access to donor support. By deploying activities in ways that are strategic and catalytic, OTI strives for maximum impact from limited resources while minimizing bureaucratic hurdles.

Because country programs often re-quire working with untested leaders and groups, rather than giving cash grants OTI generally offers in-kind material support, in effect a package of goods and services that might include office equipment, construction sup-plies, and training. This approach both reduces risk and allows the grantee to focus on the activity’s objectives rather than on financial accounting. Most activities are implemented through a grants-under-contract mechanism in which OTI and its implementing partner collaborate closely on the design and implementation of each grant. By keeping individual grants small—typi-cally $5,000 to $50,000—OTI limits the exposure and risk of each activity.

OTI encourages staff empowerment at all levels and, as far as possible, delega-tion of authority and decision-making to the field. It gives its country representa-tives great flexibility: they are authorized to approve grants of up to $100,000.

But activity design and approval are not conducted in a vacuum. Both to avoid duplication of effort and imple-mentation of problematic or ineffective activities, new project ideas are often “ground-truthed” by country repre-sentatives through consultations with Mission colleagues, the Embassy, and the OTI country team in Washington.

MECHANISMS

The mechanisms that permit OTI to determine the appropriateness of en-gagement and begin operations in a new country quickly and effectively include an experienced and highly adaptable human resource pool, tailored instru-ments for designing and implementing programs, and an integrated system of knowledge management tools.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Perhaps the most critical element in addressing immediate crises is the abil-ity to deploy personnel and resources in the quickest possible time, often in tenuous security conditions. OTI’s pool of professionals consists of seasoned development experts with a wide range of experience in conflict and post-conflict settings around the world.

Both field and Washington staff are responsible for designing programs that take into account the political factors on the ground. Staff design a strategic approach that articulates OTI’s initial decision to engage in a country. Country

OTI often seeks out promis-ing new leaders and organi-zations in the host country that can become engines of reform and positive change.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES14

representatives are, at the same time, venture capitalists: they must be able to effectively consider scope and scale to determine how large and intensive a pro-gram must be in order to have signifi-cant impact. Weighing the consequences of error against those of inaction, they are encouraged to experiment with new approaches and take calculated risks.

With only a limited number of direct hire personnel, OTI has a high ratio of temporary personal services contrac-tor staff (USPSCs). This uncommon staffing pattern has both positives and negatives. One of the benefits to the U.S. government of this structure is the surge capacity that OTI has demon-strated in larger programs like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. USPSCs allow for more management flexibility as staff can be more readily hired and deployed;

they are selected because the specific skills and experience they already have means they need little training be-fore deployment. However, USPSCs do not have clear longer-term career path options compared to permanent hire staff, there is less agency commit-ment to their retention, and they have less employee authority and status within the government structure. OTI and other USAID offices in the same situation have been working to ad-dress these issues in order to improve USPSC working conditions and status.

A critical component of OTI’s rapid-deployment capacity is its “bullpen.”

This group of development specialists is staffed by USPSCs on intermittent con-tracts so that OTI can use their services as needed. Bullpen personnel conduct rapid assessments, help shape OTI country strategies, and support country teams in both Washington and the field.

The bullpen has proven to be par-ticularly flexible and effective. Immedi-ately before or within days of an official request by USAID, the State Depart-ment, the National Security Council, or an Embassy to initiate a TI program, a bullpen team, usually accompanied by a member of the OTI Washington office, deploys to the field to conduct the initial assessment. If the decision is

O T

I/ Su

1994–2009 15 made to initiate a new program, bullpen personnel often lead start-up activities in country as acting country representatives until the process of hiring a longer-term USPSC to fill the position is complete.

The bullpen and the unique staffing pattern allow OTI to rapidly ramp up or scale down staff and program resources to respond to urgent USG priorities.

Most members of the bullpen, who in-clude former USAID Mission Directors and others with significant management background, have experience working on OTI programs. Many have particular expertise in conflict-prone environments and are familiar with the special chal-lenges of transition programming. Col-lectively, the bullpen brings to bear over 300 years of conflict-related experience.

CHOOSING AN

IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

The success of an OTI program de-pends in large part on its implementing partner on the ground. The partner will have specialized expertise and capa-bilities that OTI deems instrumental in reaching out to target audiences, accessing key regions, and providing tailored programming that addresses unique needs during a country’s transi-tion. Depending on the type of partner needed, there are three primary means by which OTI can select implementing partners to manage grant administra-tion, logistics, staffing, and financial management for its country programs.

Partnerships with development con-sulting firms are organized through OTI’s in-house contracting mechanism, SWIFT—“Support Which Imple-ments Fast Transitions.” SWIFT is an indefinite quantity contract (IQC) that permits OTI to access the services of prequalified contractors through a com-petitive process that results in the award of country-specific task orders. Imme-diately after the task order is issued, the implementing partner works with OTI on programmatic and operational details for the particular program, fields expa-triate staff, begins hiring local staff, and sets up an office. The SWIFT mecha-nism allows OTI to rapidly establish offices, mobilize local program person-nel, and begin approving activities and disbursing grants to local organizations.

There are currently seven firms, includ-ing one small business, that hold the SWIFT IQC: AECOM, International Resources Group, Casals & Associates, Chemonics International, Develop-ment Alternatives, Inc., Development & Training Services (a woman-owned small business), and Creative Associates.

OTI also employs two USAID “as-sistance” mechanisms—cooperative agreements and grants—to support work by international organiza-tions, nonprofits, and U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that meet OTI engagement criteria.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

AND KNOWLEDGE

MANAGEMENT

Fast-paced, flexible transition program-ming requires timely local analysis.

OTI has therefore evolved well-tailored operations and knowledge manage-ment tools that provide timely, accurate, detailed, and centralized data so that all personnel assigned to a particular pro-gram are working from the same base of information. Both OTI and implement-ing partner field and home office per-sonnel are trained to use these systems at the outset of each country program.

OTI’s worldwide activity database is a simple and effective information system that serves as a program management, tracking, and reporting tool. In each

The bullpen and the unique staffing pattern allow OTI to rapidly ramp up or scale down staff and program resources to respond to urgent USG priorities.

O T

I/ Su

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES16

country, the database serves as the main instrument for chronicling the life cycles and outcomes of individual activi-ties and is the primary library of data from which working documents and internal and external reports are gener-ated. Evaluators, peer review teams, and others who need to research active or past OTI programs use it to read the story of a program through its lifecycle.

It also allows staff at headquarters to provide immediate, up-to-date infor-mation to audiences in Washington without needing to query field teams.

The high yield of its country opera-tions meant that OTI needed a cor-ollary information system with the capacity to manage equally intensive operational and financial processes in Washington. The process of bring-ing the TOMAS (“Transition Office Management and Accounting System”) to fruition involved combining over 20 previously separate systems into one fully integrated management system covering budget, finance, procurement, travel, and emergency contact informa-tion. Both the activity database and TOMAS were developed internally, with no external IT consultants, us-ing licensed agency software and OTI practitioners as the primary designers.

OTI continues to look for ways to make programs more effective and expand the level of communication and collabora-tion both within OTI and with external partners. Promoting tight integration and information-sharing among staff around the globe with virtual discus-sions, blogs, shared visualization tools, document stores, and other new tech-nologies enhances the capabilities of in-country staff. Over the past three years, for example, OTI has incorpo-rated global information systems (GIS) capabilities into its activity database and is now able to easily generate accurate maps and geographic information relat-ed to its programs. While OTI is still in the process of mainstreaming “geospatial thinking” and web-based GIS tools as integral elements of its strategic analy-sis, it will continue to incorporate new technologies as a matter of principle.

CULTURE

OTI’s organizational culture and philosophy values innovation, prob-lem-solving, speed, and a degree of risk tasking. These essential ingredients explain its impact to date as much as its mechanisms and approach. From the beginning, OTI sought an organiza-tional ethos shaped by innovation and political dexterity, with a staff that could navigate through uncharted develop-ment contexts and excel in high-pres-sure conflict environments. As a small operational unit within USAID, OTI can foster a more participatory spirit;

fewer bureaucratic levels in a relatively horizontal management structure give it more programmatic latitude.

From the beginning, OTI sought an organizational ethos shaped by innovation and political dexterity, with a staff that could navigate through uncharted develop-ment contexts and excel in high-pressure conflict envi-ronments.

Le i G on g

1994–2009 17

At headquarters all OTI personnel, regardless of grade, area of expertise, or breadth of experience, may actively participate in strategic decision-making, contribute to the design of OTI’s operations manuals and systems, and offer constructive criticism to senior management. OTI also has increased efforts to train new staff members on its culture and approach, in recent years focusing increased resources on staff training and mentoring.

The same OTI culture is readily applied in the field. While the primary responsi-bility for strategic direction and tactical implementation of each OTI program falls to the country representative, the most successful programs establish con-sultative, inclusive processes that feed into grant design from the outset. This in turn encourages program staff to rep-licate this approach during grant imple-mentation as it relates to the participa-tion of local partners and communities.

Ultimately, OTI’s culture, approach, and mechanisms are intended to contrib-ute to two overarching programmatic objectives: to respond strategically to evolving U.S. foreign policy impera-tives, and to have a visible, positive impact on the lives of local communi-ties as part of the movement toward peace and democracy. By targeting funding strategically at key actors and key areas at the opportune time, OTI programming aims to facilitate the most change possible with available resources and in doing so to assure skeptical or conflict-impacted populations that the risks of change are worth taking.

O T

I/ Su

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES18

O T

I/ Le ba no n

“ [OTI] programs may take the form of traditional development—civil society, media, rule of law—but they are adapted and executed at a pace resembling emergency programming.”

1994–2009 19

PARTNERSHIPS

“ OTI…provided the much-needed bridge between the start of our projects and the site prepa-ration, which saved us several weeks of project time and countless millions of dollars. Ad-ditionally, OTI [programs were] a tremendous injection into the economy, as it meant jobs across most of the city.”

—Colonel Kendall Cox, Army 1st Cavalry, on the collaboration between OTI and U.S. military forces

The OTI cultural approach is reflected in its partnerships with a variety of intra-agency and other U.S. Government stakeholders, local and international organizations, academic institutions and think tanks, nonprofit and private development firms, and military enti-ties. OTI personnel share information and coordinate with colleagues from the fellow bureau offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Conflict Manage-ment and Mitigation, and Democracy and Governance, with Regional Bu-reaus, and with other USAID units.

Where appropriate, OTI engages with the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to assist in its efforts to coordinate U.S. Government stabilization assistance. Collaboration between OTI and S/CRS has involved transition programming initiated by

OTI that is later part of follow-on or supplemental technical support by S/ CRS. Such was the case in Haiti, where S/CRS provided $20 million in fund-ing to continue TI activities through implementing partner International Organization for Migration (IOM) after the OTI Haiti program ended in 2006.

OTI works with bilateral donors and international organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and their affiliates to leverage small-scale OTI assistance with larger institutional efforts. In addition to its seven inter-national development partners institu-tionalized through the SWIFT IQC, OTI also has operational partners with which it often collaborates through grants and cooperative agreements, such as IOM, Internews, the National Democratic Institute, and the Interna-tional Republican Institute. Think tanks

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES20

and academic institutions that serve as common external sources of political analysis and new thinking about foreign assistance include the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for a New American Security, the Brookings Institution, the United States Insti-tute of Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Carter Center.

PARTNERSHIP

IN ACTION:

COORDINATION WITH

THE MILITARY

Donors operating in areas experienc-ing armed conflict often find it too dangerous to reach the people living in the most desperate circumstances. As it increasingly engages in highly unstable countries, OTI has faced the challenge of implementing projects in marginal-ized communities while minimizing staff exposure to violence and danger. Coor-dination with military organizations has been crucial in meeting this challenge.

OTI program personnel have worked with international peacekeeping, host country, and USG military forces in countries ranging from Haiti and Colombia to Afghanistan and Iraq. In Haiti, OTI worked alongside MINUS- TAH, the U.N. peacekeeping force, to implement projects in gang violence-rav-aged slums like Cité Soleil and Bel Air in Port-au-Prince in order to establish a secure environment for residents, fund-ing rapid community-based projects to reduce tensions and build social cohe-sion. OTI has coordinated extensively with Colombia’s civilian government and military to ensure that its projects are in line with government strategy and objectives, identify sufficiently secure areas to operate in, and work out the logistical details of delivering projects in insecure locations. This partnership has been critical to the program’s progress to date and is indicative of OTI’s suc-cess at civilian-military partnerships.

The OTI program in Iraq established a close working relationship with the U.S. military and other coalition forces deployed in volatile areas. For example, OTI worked with the U.S.

Army’s 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions to identify priority areas and projects in Bagh-dad. OTI worked with its military counterparts to find jobs for young Iraqis, employing some 40,000 to 60,000 men at a time. The 1st Calvary ultimately posted a transition liaison officer full-time with the OTI team to facilitate planning and programming.

In these partnerships the respective roles of OTI and its military counterparts are well defined, and on-site coordination is emphasized as the primary shared benefit of any collaboration. Military partners help insulate OTI staff from combat situations and provide valuable recommendations for new programming initiatives in advance of OTI site visits.

In extremely insecure environments military units on patrol are able to inde-pendently monitor OTI-administered projects. While the military might share the same goals, OTI maintains the programmatic lead with its guiding prin-ciple of supporting peaceful transition.

As it increasingly engages in highly unstable countries, OTI has faced the challenge of implementing projects in marginalized communities while minimizing staff expo-sure to violence and danger.

1994–2009 21

INITIATIVES

Flexible formats make possible a wide range of activities to address critical needs in unstable regions and bolster the efforts of local groups to build positive change.

OTI supports the efforts of forward-thinking governments, fledgling local organizations advocating on transition issues, and energetic emerging lead-ers representing marginalized groups.

Its programs may take the form of traditional development—civil soci-ety, media, rule of law—but they are adapted and executed at a pace re-sembling emergency programming.

Within a compressed timeframe and with investments that are by design limited in scale, OTI’s responses must be rapid and opportunistic. They address critical transition priorities through tangible projects—a rebuilt school, a rehabilitated bridge to connect com-munities, a refurbished market that had been destroyed by armed insur-gents—that help reconcile rival groups or help fragile governments better respond to citizen needs. Tailored media and public communications strategies inform decision-making, dispel false rumors, and promote positive changes in public perceptions. These and similar activities demonstrate new ways to address local issues or disputes, replac-ing past divisive, abusive practices.

The underlying objective can often be even more important than the actual project. A rebuilt market’s immediate impact is to allow local women to sell agriculture products, but the longer-term impact is bringing rival ethnic groups to one place to work produc-tively. A short-term works project for young ex-combatants generates imme-diate income, but it also buys time for peace to gain a footing and encourages productive behavior for young men at risk of resorting to violence. Support for rehabilitating a local school improves education opportunities for children and may also foster closer dialogue and understanding between the local govern-ment and the community in identifying local priorities and applying resources to them. While many of its activities can be categorized as traditional devel-opment programs–micro-enterprise, income generation, education, com-munity development, etc.–OTI designs its activities through the prism of the

O T

I/ A fg ha ni st an

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES22

anticipated positive impact on resolving or reducing local disputes and conflict.

BUILDING DEMAND FOR

PEACEFUL CHANGE

In many countries where OTI operates, civil society institutions are historically weak or were purged during periods of political repression and armed conflict.

OTI empowers NGOs to play a mean-ingful role in the political process and promotes an environment in which groups both new and existing can thrive. In close coordination with local project staff, OTI identifies promising formal and informal organizations and community groups. Whether provid-ing basic office equipment, supporting innovative project ideas, sponsoring workshops and conferences, or building new alliances and coalitions, OTI helps these partners develop the professional-ism and confidence to conduct effective advocacy and advance peaceful change.

In the wake of the prodemocracy Cedar Revolution in early 2005 and the end of the month-long Lebanon War in

August 2006, OTI saw an opportunity to address long-standing tensions in Lebanon that threatened to destabilize the democratic system of an important U.S. ally in the Middle East. OTI activi-ties directly address the root causes of tensions between rival ethnic, religious, and political factions by encouraging co-operation between hostile local groups.

One recent activity brought together farmers from seven villages in Lebanon’s deep South. They shared stories of their agricultural successes and challenges in a series of workshops designed to improve cooperation between Shia, Sunni, and Christian communities in the segregated region. Led by the Scientific Research Foundation (SRF), a local NGO, the inter-village workshops helped farmers who have traditionally not interacted to discover the value of their neighbors’ knowledge. “I could not have imagined it possible that Christians and Muslim farmers could come together to share their stories like this,” said Shamam Al Nasser, a workshop participant from the village of Bustan. He also said that bringing farmers together was a ground-breaking way to enhance agricultural productivity and address the needs of an area still recovering from the dam-age inflicted during the 2006 war.

Two months of violence triggered by the December 2007 elections led OTI to launch a postconflict initiative in Ke-nya, a country that had been a success story for stable, democratic governance in a region where war, poverty, and exclusion have been the tragic rule. After quickly establishing positive relation-ships with a number of community-based organizations and individuals involved in peace-building and reconcil-iation efforts, OTI launched a series of activities designed to engage and build bridges among Kenya’s ethnic groups.

Through one of the new projects, OTI is working to alleviate interethnic ten-sions in the town of Eldoret, which was a scene of major ethnic violence between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu peoples during and after the elections and is widely believed to have significant potential for renewed conflict.