Crisis_in_the_Baltic_Sea_Region_(30Jun2016).pdf

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THE CRISIS IN THE

BALTIC SEA REGION

30 June 2016 ii

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Caveat

This scenario document was produced by International Solutions Group, Limited (ISG) under ACT Purchase Order 154001429 for Support for Key Leader Training Exercises (IFIB- ACT-SACT-13-07) and specifically in support of exercises STEADFAST PYRAMID/

STEADFAST PINNACLE 2016 (SFPDPE16).

It has been developed to provide the geo-strategic setting and the sequence of major events enabling SFPDPE16 participants, syndicate facilitators, supporting staff and subject matter experts to conduct learning activities and practical work to achieve the SFPDPE16 exercise objectives and desired learning outcomes.

Request for copies of this document and/or other SFPDPE-related training materials should be forwarded to HQ SACT JFT JETE E&IT, Attention: CDR Brian Hodges, SACT JFT JETE E&IT, Tel: +1 (757) 747-3741.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Evolving Crisis Situation………………………………………………………………………...1 Ethnic Unrest and Violence Erupt in Estonia

Increase in Organised Armed Violence

The Emergence of Armed Pro-Bothnian Militias

Police Struggle to Restore Law and Order

Increasing Evidence of Bothnia’s Involvement

Bothnia Puts Pressure on Estonia

Increase in Cyber Attacks

Escaping Ethnic Violence

The International Response

Estonia Considers a State of Emergency

Estonia Invokes the EU Solidarity Clause

NATO Consultation

Bothnia Threatens to Intervene

The Major Actors…………………………………………………………………………………….10 Bothnia

The Baltic States

Arnland

Framland

Osto

The Russian Federation

The European Union

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

NATO

Annex A – Map of The Baltic Sea Region…………………………………………………….....A-1

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Ethnic violence spreads in Estonia…………………………………………..1

Figure 2 - Attack on Supreme Court in Tartu

Figure 3 – Pro-Bothnian Militia in Ida-Viru

Figure 4 - Pro-Bothnia Unrest in Maardu

Figure 5 - Dockworkers Strike in Paldiski

Figure 6 - Captured Weapons Caches

Figure 7 – Increase in Illegal Trafficking

Figure 8 – Displaced Populations Head for Safety

Figure 9 – Bothnia’s A2/AD Capability

Figure 10 - XIX Century Bothnian Empire

Figure 11 - Bothnia-Speaking Minorities

Figure 12 - Klaipeda LNG Terminal

Figure 13 - Inčukalns UGS Facility

Figure 14 - European Dependence on Bothnian Natural Gas file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559169 file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559172 file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559173 file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559174 file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559175 file:///C:/Users/Operations/_ISG%20Business/_ISG%20Contracts/___ISG450-499/ISG459_SFPD&PE%202016/11_ISG%20Deliverables/MPC%20Documents/Crisis%20Document/PDPE16-01%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20v0.5%20(MPC).docx%23_Toc452559176

THE CRISIS IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

THE EVOLVING CRISIS SITUATION

Ethnic Unrest and Violence Erupt in Estonia

1. The unanimous decision by Estonia’s Supreme Court on 14 April 2016 to ban the People’s Unity Party for openly advocating the creation of autonomous ethnic Bothnian regions within Estonia with closer relations to the Bothnia sparked a wave of protests and ethnic unrest among the ethnic Bothnian communities in Estonia. Small protests by a hard core of pro-Bothnian activists in Tallinn gradually grew into mass, often violent, demonstrations, inciting widespread public disorder and attacks on government buildings and public facilities. Confrontations with Police quickly erupted into violence, sparking further protest and an increasing spiral of violence resulting in several deaths, countless injuries, extensive damage to property and numerous arrests.

2. Several thousand pro-Bothnian demonstrators, organised by the Association of Bothnians in Estonia (Botnialaste Eestis), remain encamped in Raekoja Plats, the town square in the Old Town of Tallinn, close to the Bothnian Embassy. Demonstrators clash regularly with the Police who have showed restraint in containing the demonstrators and preventing them from erecting barricades. Demonstrators carrying Bothnian flags have declared their solidarity with the Bothnian World (Maailman Botnian) and called for a referendum on autonomy for ethnic Bothnian regions. By mid-May, ethnic unrest and violence had spread to other cities and regions in Estonia with large ethnic Bothnian populations, particularly in and around Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Tartu and Parnu.

Figure 1 - Ethnic violence spreads in Estonia

Increase in Organised Armed Violence

3. Since July there has been a spate of attacks by unnamed perpetrators against government officials and facilities, especially Police, critical infrastructure and public figures who have spoken out against the Pro-Bothnian movement. These attacks have gradually become more sophisticated and more daring in the use of automatic weapons and military grade explosives, including the PVV-5A plastic explosive manufactured in Bothnia.

4. After several days of rioting by Pro-Bothnian militants in Tartu, a group calling itself the Uku (god of thunder) Special Battalion claimed responsibility for the 25 August attack on the Riigikohus, Supreme Court of Estonia, in retribution of the Court’s decision to ban the pro- Bothnian People’s Unity Party. The attack killed a Supreme Court Judge, two security guards, and nine innocent civilians as well as injuring many others.

Figure 2 - Attack on Supreme Court in Tartu

The Emergence of Armed Pro-Bothnian Militias

5. On 25 August, armed groups, claiming to be part of the Viru Patriotic Brigade seized municipal buildings in Jöhvi, the capital of Ida-Viru County, jailed the Governor and the head of Municipal Government, and installed a new Peoples Governor to represent the county’s 70% majority ethnic Bothnian population. The new Governor has declared his intention to take control of the shale oil mines and power plants in Ida-Viru which provide nearly 90% of the electricity to Estonia and call for a referendum for political autonomy.

6. In the following days local workers backed by armed groups from the Viru Patriotic Brigade seized the power station and Eastman chemical factory In nearby Kohtla-Järve, the 5th largest city in Estonia (after Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Parnu). Another group of armed workers has since taken over the Ahtme Power Plant. A number of senior plant managers are being held by the militiamen.

Figure 3 – Pro-Bothnian Militia in Ida-Viru

7. Pro-Bothnian demonstrators backed by masked gunmen in Maardu stormed the town hall and the police station on 29 August, where they are still holding six police officers. Dock workers from Muuga Harbour, the largest cargo port in Estonia, have gone on strike in support of the demonstrators, ransacked the Muuga Border Guard station and blocked access to the port facilities leaving two cargo ships and one tanker stranded with two others standing by off-shore.

Figure 4 - Pro-Bothnia Unrest in Maardu

8. A group calling itself the Arnold Meri Regiment, in honour of the celebrated communist wartime hero, has seized control of the Iru Thermal Power Plant and are holding the plant staff from Eesti Energia hostage. They have threatened to cut off electricity and heat to Tallinn.

9. In Paldiski, workers at the Northern Port and the South Harbour have responded to the appeals made on the local station, MTÜ Paldiski Raadio, to show solidarity with their comrades in Muuga by declaring their own strike, shutting down the ports and blocking access to the port facilities, including the natural gas terminal for the underwater Baltic Link located at the South Port. MTÜ Paldiski Raadio is operated by the Bothnian owned Baltic Media Alliance which has been promoting the idea of ethnic Bothnian unity in the Baltics.

Figure 5 - Dockworkers Strike in Paldiski

Police Struggle to Restore Law and Order

10. The Estonian Police have increasingly struggled to maintain public order in the face of widespread ethnic unrest and the organised use of force by armed pro-Bothnian groups across northern Estonia as well as in other areas. Police from the Southern and Western Prefectures have reinforced the Northern and Ida Prefectures to protect government facilities and critical infrastructure from further seizures.

11. In the Northern Prefecture Police have managed to contain the demonstrators in Old Tallinn and prevent them from barricading Raekoja Plats. They have contained the striking dockworkers at Muuga Harbour and established a Police cordon around the Iru Thermal Power Plant. However, they have not attempted to retake control over any of the facilities.

12. In the Ida Prefecture the Police have struggled to contain the heavily armed groups in Jöhvi and Kohtla-Järv who have superior fire power over the Police. Police operations have been constantly disrupted by persistent cyber-attacks against Police networks and jamming of their tactical communications, making it impossible to coordinate effectively with the Police and Border Guard Board and the Ministry of Interior in Tallinn.

Increasing Evidence of Bothnia’s Involvement

13. The Police and Border Guards have had some successes in identifying and interdicting pro-Bothnian networks engaged in organising and supporting illegal armed groups operating in the area of Harju and Ida-Viru Counties. Police counter-terrorism raids on the headquarters of the Bothnian Foundation (Botnia Fond) and the Bothnian League (Bottenhavet Ligan), which are Bothnian NGOs operating in Estonia, uncovered computer records which revealed their involvement in orchestrating pro-Bothnian activism and armed violence in Estonia.

These records led to the discovery of several caches of weapons and explosives, some of which have been traced back to Bothnia, as well as the identity of a number of operatives. Police subsequently arrested several Bothnian nationals, including two members from the Bothnian Embassy believed to be Federal Security Service (FSS) operatives, as well as staff from Botnia Fond and Bottenhavet Ligan.

Figure 7 – Increase in Illegal Trafficking

14. In recent weeks the Border Guard stations in Paldiski, Tallinn, Muuga, Kunda, and Sillamäe have been reported suspected arms trafficking by sea and have intercepted several illegal arms shipments off Harju and Ida-Viru counties. Manufacturing details and payment trails have been traced, with the help of EUROPOL, back to criminal organisations

Figure 6 - Captured Weapons Caches in Bothnia, in particular the Kallio Brotherhood (Kallio Veljeys), known to be used by the Bothnian FSS. The Kallios’ criminal network extends into Osto and Russia giving them a number of routes into Estonia. Several Border Guards have recently reported being approached with bribes to relax their control of certain entry points.

15. Most recently, a raid carried out by the Estonian Police, including K-Commando, to rescue 12 hostages being held by members of the Viru Patriotic Brigade in Jöhvi led to the capture of two Bothnian intelligence agents, five foreign volunteers and a large cache of weapons of Bothnian origin.

Bothnia Puts Pressure on Estonia

16. Bothnia has stepped up its media campaign against the Government of Estonia and blames the escalating crisis on its policy of discrimination against its ethnic Bothnian minority and its crackdown on pro-Bothnian political and cultural activities. Bothnian state media is providing continuous coverage of “Crisis in Estonia” with live broadcasts of pro-Bothnia demonstrations and clashes with Police, as well as interviews with members of the “people’s militias” protecting government buildings in Jöhvi and the new Peoples Governor.

17. President Olamao has expressed his support for the ethnic Bothnian minority in their struggle for identity and a political voice in Estonia. He has warned Estonia against the use of force against its Bothnian minority and reminded the international community that he has a constitutional obligation to protect ethnic Bothnians abroad if their safety is threatened.

He has offered to help mediate the crisis.

18. Bothnia is also putting its case against Estonia’s treatment of its ethnic Bothnian minority to the international community. Its Ambassador to the UN has succeeded in raising the issue in the Security Council through the Russian Federation which is sympathetic to Bothnia’s concerns. It has also placed the matter before the OSCE as a growing threat to regional peace and security.

19. On 1 September, Bothnia announced a series of economic sanctions against Estonia and suspended the supply of natural gas to Estonia, which in turn denies supplies downstream to Latvia and Lithuania. Cutting the supply of natural gas to the Baltic States will disrupt the build-up of reserves in the underground gas storage (UGS) facility at Inčukalns, Latvia, which Estonia depends on to meet peak winter demands. Without access to these reserves Estonia would have only 3 days of reserves of its own.

Increase in Cyber Attacks

20. As the crisis has continued to escalate so have the number and severity of cyber-attacks against government and commercial websites and on-line services increased. Since August a number of pro-Bothnian social media websites have been appealing to patriotic “hacktivists” to join in a cyber war against Estonia and provide useful technical information to target specific government websites, pro-western media outlets, and major banks. The internet and social media are now being inundated with pro-Bothnian messages, blogs and websites blaming Estonia for human rights abuses against ethnic Bothnians. Hackers have managed to penetrate several government public websites and plant links to bogus information and fake websites designed to discredit the government.

21. A series of sophisticated distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks by robot networks (botnets) have shut down several public service websites and on-line banking for up to 12 hours. However, even more worrying are the recent ‘malicious manipulation’ cyber-attacks against the SCADA systems1 that control the gas regulating and monitoring stations (GRS/GMS) along the main Tallinn - Viresi Latvia gas pipeline causing pressure blow-outs which have required segments of the grid to be shut down for repair. A similar attack against the Elering A.S, the Estonian electricity Transmission System Operator (TSO) on 7 September required an emergency shutdown of the grid serving Tallinn. Together these attacks have added to the growing public sense of alarm and uncertainty about the future.

22. Estonia has placed its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) under a special regime and reinforced by the Cyber Defence League and non-governmental specialists. The Estonian Information Security Agency (EISA) now claims to have forensic evidence linking the Bothnian Business Network (BBN), which is one of the world’s most capable cybercrime organizations, with a number of these attacks. BBN is known to have connections to the Bothnian Federal Security Service (FSS).

Escaping Ethnic Violence

23. Armed pro-Bothnian militias in and around Jöhvi and Kohtla-Järv have increasingly targeted the local ethnic Estonian and Ostonian minorities forcing significant numbers to flee to safer areas, mainly Tallinn and Tapa. It is estimated that some 3,000 residents have already fled to Tallinn and hundreds more are arriving daily.

Figure 8 – Displaced Populations Head for Safety

24. So far local authorities effectively handled the influx of people and families seeking safety. However, this is adding further pressure on public services and the level of anxiety over the continuing crisis and its impact on daily life.

The International Response

25. The international response to the situation in Estonia reflects the alternative narratives offered by Bothnia and the international media. The EU member nations generally

1 Supervisory control and data acquisition systems which exchange coded signals over communication channels to monitor the status of remote equipment and control the performance of certain functions.

empathise with Estonia and appreciate the sensitive nature of the problem. Arnland and Osto in particular support an active role of the EU in resolving the crisis peacefully and avoiding any possible pretext for Bothnia to intervene militarily.

26. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has issued a statement on the situation in Estonia condemning the extremist violence while praising the Estonian Government’s measured response in maintaining public order. She pledged EU support across its range of competencies to assist Estonia in restoring the rule of law and called upon Bothnia refrain from interfering in Estonia’s internal affairs.

Estonia Considers a State of Emergency

27. On 21 September the Prime Minister of Estonia acting on behalf of state and local authorities, formally notified the President and the Commander of the Defence Forces in accordance with the State of Emergency Act that the level of violence against state institutions and the use of force by armed militias to seize local areas, government buildings and critical infrastructure posed a clear threat to the constitutional order of Estonia. The Government has established a crisis committee to assess the situation and the President has convened the National Defence Council to provide advice. In the meantime, the President has publically addressed the nation and called on those engaged in and giving support to illegal acts of violence and public disorder to immediately cease such unlawful activity and engage in a peaceful dialogue to express any grievances.

28. In the absence of any signs of improvement in the situation in the coming days, the Riigikogu is expected to declare a state of emergency. This will allow the Government to place elements of the Defence Forces and, or the Defence League under the Ministry of Interior to prevent further attacks against government institutions and vital facilities as well as to counter unlawful activities by illegally armed groups within Estonia.

Estonia Invokes the EU Solidarity Clause

29. The EU has contributed significant finance to the economic development of the region. Its goals are to promote and support regional stability in the region, to prevent crisis and conflict occurring, and to prevent further deterioration. On 22 September, Estonia invoked the “solidarity” clause under Article 222 of the EU treaty. In an Emergency meeting of the European Council Estonia presented its request for EU assistance in protecting its democratic institutions and its civilian population from terrorist attacks. In response, the Council agreed to establish an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) and consider assistance that could be provided by the European Commission and its Directorates, in particular COMM (Communication), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), ENER (Energy) and HOME (Migration and Home Affairs) as well as EUROPOL (European Police Office), ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) and FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU). Council also agreed that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would lead EU diplomatic efforts to bring an end to Bothnia’s interference in Estonia’s internal affairs and oversee the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis.

NATO Consultation

30. Estonia also invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and asked for consultations on possible security assistance from NATO to counter external interference in provoking ethnic conflict within its territory and supporting armed proxies which carry out acts of armed force against the State. On 24 September, NATO's 28 member states met as the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Council agreed that the evidence presented by Estonia clearly indicated Bothnia’s involvement in inciting, organising and sustaining the use of force by armed groups in Estonia. While noting that Bothnia’s actions do not constitute an armed attack against NATO under Article 5, they do constitute an armed aggression which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Estonia. On this basis Council agreed to conduct a full political and military estimate of the situation as a basis for determining an appropriate response.

Bothnia Threatens to Intervene

31. Bothnia was quick to respond to press statements from the EU and NATO, rejecting Estonia’s allegation of Bothnian involvement in Estonia’s ethnic problems as pure fabrications to divert its own blame. President Olamao admonished Estonia for dragging the EU and NATO into problems of its own making and warned that Bothnia would consider any NATO military involvement in Estonia against ethnic Bothnians as a threat to Bothnia and trigger an appropriate military response.

32. In view of the military capabilities of Bothnia and its increasingly aggressive posture toward NATO in recent months, these warnings were taken seriously by NATO. In the last three months alone, NATO air policing fighters have scrambled at least 50 times to intercept Bothnian aircraft violating NATO airspace over the Baltic States. These have included Bothnian SU-34 FULLBACK fighters, TU-22M3 BACKFIRE and TU-160 BLACKJACK bombers and A-50 MAINSTAY surveillance aircraft, as well as multi-aircraft packages in attack formations. The most recent in the series of close encounters between Bothnian and NATO forces operating at sea and in the air over the Baltic Sea was an incident last week when a Bothnian Su-24 Fencer buzzed a NATO naval warship on exercise in the Baltic Sea.

33. Bothnia’s recent deployment of technically advanced, long range SA- 21 GROWLER surface to air missiles (SAM), SS-26 STONE tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) and SS-N-27 SIZZLER anti-ship cruise missiles (ACSM) on Gotland and in the vicinity of Brehea, near the coast of the Gulf of Finland, give Bothnia an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability that covers most of the Baltic Sea, all of Estonia and significant portions of Latvia and Lithuania. In the event of a time-sensitive, collective defence situation, these systems would pose a serious threat to NATO’s strategic lines of communications and entry into the Baltic States, especially Estonia.

34. In addition, Bothnia has continued to invest in the readiness of its armed forces for regional power projection.

During the last strategic “snap readiness” exercise called by President Olamao, Bothnia demonstrated its capability to deploy a joint reaction force of over 60,000 troops, including three modernised brigades as well as naval and amphibious task groups in six days. This demonstration gives substance to President Olamao’s threat to intervene if required to protect ethnic Bothnians in Estonia.

THE MAJOR ACTORS

Bothnia

Resurgence as an Energy “Super State”

35. The dissolution of the Bothnian Empire, which for centuries dominated the Baltic Sea Region, left Bothnia in a state of economic, political and social decline and powerless to resist the extension of the European Union (EU) and NATO into its historic spheres of influence. However, since gaining power in 2003, President Franz Olamao and the Bothnian National Party have systematically consolidated and centralised the authority of the state within a small political elite composed of former colleagues from the Bothnian security services and oligarchs from energy, industry and banking sectors. This so-called power vertical exercises total authority over all aspects of the corporate state with full control over the different state institutions as well as Bothnia’s national capital and energy resources, which they have used to rebuild the economy, revamp the armed forces, improve social welfare and promote Bothnian ultra-nationalism.

Figure 9 – Bothnia’s A2/AD Capability

36. President Olamao has made natural gas the fulcrum of Bothnia’s return to power in the region and influence on the world stage. Under the Olamao doctrine the corporate state manages the natural resources of the state as an instrument of national power for economic growth, social welfare, regional influence and national security. By investing state revenues to develop the Barents Sea natural gas fields, which are estimated to contain to 3.7 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, and infrastructure for the transmission and distribution of gas to Northern and Central Europe, President Olamao has transformed Bothnia into an “energy super-state” using natural gas as an instrument of national power.

37. Having established his autocratic authority and restored much of Bothnia’s power in its near-abroad, President Olamao is now committed to further developing Bothnia as a regional and global power by re-establishing Bothnia’s historic privileged interests in the Baltic Sea Region and preventing any further expansion of the EU and NATO. However, the recent glut in global oil and gas markets and surge in renewable energy sources have caused a dramatic fall in Bothnian energy revenues. Faced with a hard choice between preserving social welfare and continuing to modernise the armed forces, President Olamao has banked on the power of state media to preserve his popularity at home by parading its new military might that will restore Bothnia’s place as a regional power and as a global actor on the international stage.

Bothnia’s Compatriot Policy

38. A key component in Bothnia’s efforts to re-establish its sphere of influence in the Baltic Sea Region is to formalise the connection between Bothnian-speaking minorities living abroad and the Bothnian homeland. According to its revised Compatriot Policy as laid out by President Olamao in 2010, Bothnia is responsible for promoting and preserving the Bothnian language and culture, and has a moral duty as well as a legal responsibility to protect Bothnian-speaking minorities abroad.

39. Implementation of this policy focuses on building organised communities of Bothnian "compatriots" through a global network of state funded compatriot organizations, such as the Bothnian Foundation (Botnia Fond), Bothnian World (Botnia Maailma) and the Bothnia House (Botnia Talo) network, which operate under the oversight of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture. Their activities abroad are coordinated through local Compatriots’ Coordination Councils under the direction of each Bothnian Embassy as instruments of “soft power” for achieving Bothnia’s strategic interests;

especially in the Baltic Sea Region.

Non-governmental Organisations

40. The Bothnian government sponsors a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to promote Bothnian interests in neighbouring countries, especially in the Baltic

Figure 10 - XIX Century Bothnian Empire

States where there are large Bothnian–speaking communities. Officially, the purpose of these NGOs is to provide information and coordinate activities designed to preserve and promote Bothnian culture, ethnic identity and language under its Compatriot policy. In practice however, their main focus is on promoting Bothnia’s political agenda by mobilising Bothnian-speaking minorities to influence the social and political environment in favour of Bothnian interests.

41. In recent years Bothnia has increased state funding for these NGOs as instruments of soft power to build up networks of pro-Bothnian groups including youth movements, political activists and human rights advocates to promote Bothnian interests in neighbouring states.

The most influential Bothnian NGOs operating in the Baltic States are the Bothnian Foundation, which focuses on social and political engagement and the Bothnian League (Botnia Ligan) which promotes political activism and sponsors the Youth League (Nuoriso Ligan). Youth League summer camps are popular among Bothnian-speaking youth and offer military “adventure” training. Bothnian Foreign Intelligence Service operatives are known to use Bothnian NGOs to provide covert support to certain extremists groups, including the far right “Night Watchmen” (Öövalvurid) and its youth group, “Voice of the Young” (Nuorten Ääni), as well as the far left Constitution Party (Perustuslaki Puolue).

42. Bothnian NGOs also promote and fund local political parties and candidates sympathetic to Bothnia’s views and in favour of closer ties with Bothnia. The most prominent of these are the Centre Party in Estonia and the Harmony Party in Latvia, which captured 24.8% and 23% respectively in the most recent elections. The success of these parties was in large measure helped by Bothnian media broadcasts encouraging Bothnian-speakers to support these parties. Both parties have close relationships with President Olamao’s Bothnian National Party and typically support his ambitions in the region.

State Controlled Media

43. Bothnian state-owned and commercial media broadcasts in the Baltic States have become highly influential tools for promoting Bothnia’s strategic message and narrative of events especially among the large Bothnian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Most Bothnian-speakers get their information from Bothnian media outlets and put more trust in them. In addition to increasing the funding for state and commercial broadcasting into the Baltic States, Bothnia has helped in funding the purchase of local broadcasting companies, which deliver Bothnia’s political message and promote a pro-Bothnian strategic narrative while denigrating Bothnia’s opponents. Local broadcasting companies such as the Baltic Media Alliance’s First Baltic Channel (PBK) has been closely associated with the Centre Party and played a key role its success during the latest election. PBK owns and operates a number of local radio stations broadcasting to Bothnian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia.

Natural Gas as an Instrument of Power

44. President Olamao considers natural gas as an instrument of national power to be used by the state in pursuit of its strategic interests. NorraGas acts as the primary commercial entity of the state for managing the development and exploitation of Bothnia’s natural gas resources, including the extensive infrastructure for extraction, transmission, storage and distribution to markets in the Baltics and Europe. The state owns 62 per cent of the shares in NorraGas and another 18 per cent are held by oligarchs with close connections to the President. Since his election in 2003, President Olamao has personally selected all of the

Chairmen of NorraGas from his inner circle and moved them in and out of high level political appointments.

45. NorraGas wholly owns 52 foreign subsidiaries and is a major shareholder in 41 other enterprises in the energy sector including all the major natural gas companies in the region.

NorraGas is the largest share owner of Eesti Gaas. It is also the second largest shareholder in Latvijas Gāze, the Latvian natural gas company, and Lietuvos Dujos, the Lithuania natural gas company, which have monopolies on the transmission, storage and sales of natural gas in Latvia and Lithuania respectively. In addition to its claim to ownership of the original Baltic Gas Grid, which was built by Bothnia in the 1970s, NorraGas is a joint owner of most of the new supply, transmission and distribution infrastructure developed in the region since 2004.

46. With the opening of the new Trans-Bothnian twin pipeline from the Barents Sea gas fields, the NorraGas Unified Gas Distribution System (UGDS) comprises a network of 62,000 km of gas pipelines with 76 compressor stations capable of distributing 71 billion cubic metres of gas directly to markets in Europe. The recently completed joint underwater Baltic Interconnector Link project with Estonia now connects the Trans-Bothnian pipeline terminal at Inga, Bothnia, with the Estonian pipeline at Paldiski, Estonia, and the Baltic Gas Grid. Given the overall scarcity of storage facilities in the region, NorraGas has also been working jointly with Latvijas Gāze to develop additional UGS capacity at Inčukalns in Latvia.

47. NorraGas gives Bothnia President Olamao significant control over critical strategic infrastructure for the supply and distribution of natural gas to Baltic States and Europe.

Therefore, the EU requirement for member states to break up national gas monopolies as part of the EU policy for energy security will significantly impact NorraGas’ influence over the Baltic gas grid and energy markets. Bothnia has taken the matter to the International Court of Justice and reserves its right to protect state resources from unlawful seizure if required.

Bothnian Military Power

48. Bothnia’s approach to the use of military power in the 21st century has been shaped by the “shock and awe” effects of conventional missile strikes and “electronic knockdown” seen during the 2003 Gulf War and the effects of media, especially social media, used as a means for mobilising popular uprisings during the “Arab Spring”; as well as lessons learned from its 2012 invasion of Framland. Bothnia now sees the fusion of conventional and special operations forces, armed proxies and internal opposition as well as information and other means in hybrid operations throughout the entirety of an opponent’s territory to neutralise its security forces and collapse state authority. These hybrid forces enable Bothnia to carry out seamless and unrecognisable operations to achieve significant, but limited, political and military objectives in a “strategy of ambiguity”. Key components supporting this strategy are:

Sustained, long-term information campaign abroad to control narratives, foment dissent, create confusion, denigrate opponents, sow fear and weaken opposition;

Mobilisation of Bothnian-speaking communities to influence the political and social environment abroad in favour of Bothnia’s political interests;

Instigation of subversive activity by manipulating Bothnian-speaking minorities and extremists to create instability, provoke violence and overwhelm state security forces;

Positioning of large conventional forces, poised for intervention, to protect Bothnian-speaking minorities and deter action against subversives;

Providing covert support to subversive groups, including training, equipment and “volunteers”, to build formations capable of seizing and holding key terrain;

Leveraging ambiguity and strategic flexibility using deception, disinformation, diplomacy and deterrence to divide the international community and prevent a coherent response;

Leveraging European dependence on Bothnian gas for economic coercion to divide EU and NATO Allies;

Intervening directly to secure an area where state authority has collapsed to present a fait accompli from which to control escalation and negotiation.

49. President Olamao has increased defence spending by 31 per cent since 2009 to reorganise and modernise Bothnia’s conventional and nuclear forces with a further 43 per cent increase planned over the next five years. Defence spending, which now equates to four per cent of GDP, continues to have public support thanks to public perception of the growing military threat to Bothnia from Europe and North America. Strategic priorities enabling hybrid operations include:

Streamlining the military command structure under the order of the President;

Developing high readiness and highly flexible reaction forces, including airborne/air assault and amphibious forces, with a strength of 65,000 troops;

Increasing the capabilities of the Gotland Defence Command to control the Baltic Sea in time of crisis including the acquisition of Russian SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles;

Upgrading strategic air defences through the acquisition of Russian SA-21 surface to air missile systems;

Achieving enhanced operational-tactical missile strike capabilities with acquisition of Russian SS-26 surface-to-surface missiles;

Enhancing nuclear deterrence capabilities.

50. Since 2010 President Olamao has ordered “snap” military exercises to test the readiness of Bothnian armed forces to deploy rapidly on short notice by air, sea and rail over distances of up to 1500 km. These unannounced combat readiness tests are specifically organised with the participation of President Olamao and provide a visible demonstration of Bothnia’s ability to project significant military power within the region with little or no warning.

Bothnian Cyberwarfare Capabilities

51. With considerable technical assistance from experts in Russia and China, Bothnia has developed a robust cyberwarfare capability which it demonstrated during its brief war against Framland in 2012. Bothnia’s cyber capabilities serve as tools for ‘Information Warfare’ designed to suppress opposing command and control, navigation and communication systems, as well as to undermine public moral using cyber means. Bothnia’s cyberwarfare components belong to the Federal Security Service (FSS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Military Intelligence Directorate. They include an extensive network of cybercriminals who can be called upon to organise ‘hacker-patriots’ and conduct more sophisticated cyber-attacks on behalf of the state. Among these, the most notable is the Bothnian Business Network (BBN) identified by international security and law enforcement communities as the major source of the most advanced persistent threats (APT) to the global cyberspace.

The Baltic States

Independence and Membership in the EU and NATO

52. The Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – became EU members as part of the fifth enlargement in 2004 and were granted membership in NATO the same year. Having gained their independence from the Bothnian Empire, the Baltic States are concerned by the resurgence of Bothnia and its efforts to reassert its influence in the Baltic Sea Region.

These concerns are heightened by their geographic proximity to Bothnia, Bothnia’s manipulation of their Bothnian-speaking minorities, and their dependence on Bothnian natural gas as well as their separation by up to 600 km from the rest of Europe and some 2000 km from the centre of the EU.

Bothnian-Speaking Minorities

53. Bothnian-speaking minorities constitute approximately 28 per cent of the population in Latvia, 25 per cent in Estonia, and 6 per cent in Lithuania. In certain areas around Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda the percentage can be more than 50 per cent. The legacy of these large Bothnian-speaking communities since the dissolution of the Bothnian Empire has posed certain challenges for the Baltic States regarding citizenship, social integration and relations with Bothnia. While each succeeding generation of Bothnian-speakers has been more inclined to adopt a European identity, the older generations and certain segments of the young, including extremists, continue to emphasise their separate Bothnian identity which Bothnia promotes.

54. Efforts by the Baltic States to address these challenges have been undermined by Bothnia’s 2010 Compatriot policy which aims at promoting a separate identity for Bothnian-speaking communities and strengthening their patriotic bonds with Bothnia. President Olamao uses this special relationship to influence the attitudes and behaviour of these communities, to include creating ethnic tensions and internal unrest in pursuit of his political agenda in the Baltic States, while reminding them that Bothnia reserves the right to intervene if necessary to ensure the safety of the Bothnian-speaking minorities.

Figure 11 - Bothnia-Speaking Minorities

Challenges to Energy Security

55. Despite the determination of the Baltic States to integrate more closely with the rest of Europe and minimise their dependence on Bothnia, the reality is that they will continue to depend on Bothnia for natural gas. The Baltic Gas Grid depends on critical infrastructure for the transmission and distribution of gas from Bothnia via the Baltic Interconnector Link at Paldiski to the main Tallinn – Karksi line to the Inčukalns UGS facilities and then the main line from Riga to Vilnius.

56. The pipeline grid, originally constructed by Bothnia in the 1970’s, only allows the flow of gas in from north to south. A reverse flow from the single connection to European Pipeline System through Poland is not possible. Consequently the Baltic States will remain an energy island, with no alternatives to Bothnian natural gas until at least 2020 when the EU plans to interconnect the Baltic and Europe gas grids. While the opening of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal at the port of Klaipeda at the end of 2014 provides an alternative source of natural gas for Lithuania, supplies cannot be pumped upstream to Latvia and Estonia due to the lack of reverse flow capabilities of the existing pipelines. Lithuania is increasingly concerned about the security of this facility and the LNG tankers.

57. The volume of gas flow through the Baltic Gas Grid is insufficient to meet peak demands of the Baltic States in winter.

However, with Latvia’s relying on its gas from its UGS facility at Inčukalns, near Riga, there is just enough capacity in gas flow to supply Lithuania and Estonia. It is therefore necessary to fill the Inčukalns gas storage facility during the summer in order to build up essential reserves to meet peak winter demands. In the event of any disruption, Estonia would have only 3 days of reserves.

Arnland

58. Arnland joined the EU with the Fourth Enlargement and has maintained positive relations with the other Baltic Sea States. Although Arnland depends on Bothnia for all of its natural gas, its geographic position on the Skagerrak with a bridge to Denmark allows closer economic cooperation with the rest of Europe, reducing its economic dependence on Bothnia. In addition, the Bothnian-speaking minority in Arnland is quite small and well integrated.

59. Arnland recognises that all the states in the Baltic Sea Region share similar security concerns and supports regional cooperation on security matters. Although Arnland chose not to join NATO, it is a NATO partner and contributes to NATO Reaction Forces. Since Bothnia’s invasion of Framland, Arnland’s security and defence policy has been revised to

Figure 13 - Inčukalns UGS Facility

Figure 12 - Klaipeda LNG Terminal reflect the changing security environment in the region as well as its commitments to other EU members under the mutual defence and solidarity clauses in the Lisbon Treaty.2

60. Arnland has adopted the EU ‘solidarity declaration’ in its national defence legislation which declares that Arnland will not remain passive if a disaster or an attack should afflict another EU member state, and that Arnland expects these countries to act in the same manner if it is ever attacked. Further to this, the legislation requires Arnland’s armed forces to be prepared to both provide and receive military assistance.

Framland

61. Framland, formerly part of the Bothnian Empire, has maintained close relations with Bothnia and depends on Bothnia for all of its natural gas, which accounts for 38% of its energy supplies. In exchange for discounted gas supplies, Framland has allowed Bothnia a long-term lease of its naval base at Sundsvall as well as access to its commercial seaports at Gavle, Soderhamn, Sundsvall and Ornsköldsvik for trade and transportation links across the Gulf of Bothnia. Ethnic Bothnians account for more than 34 per cent of population.

62. Relations with Bothnia deteriorated after the 2010 elections which brought the Framland Democratic Party into government riding a wave of popular support for democratic reform and closer cooperation with the EU. As viewed by Bothnian President Olamao, this was another “coloured” revolution orchestrated by the west. Despite his repeated warnings that Framland’s future prosperity and security depended on maintaining friendly relations with Tyr, Prime Minister Rita Kolbeinson continued to push for closer cooperation with the EU and a road map for eventual EU and NATO membership.

63. After months of negotiations failed to persuade Framland to drop its bid for EU membership, NorraGas announced a new fluctuating price structure and doubled the price of gas being pumped to Framland. When Framland publically protested, Bothnia cut off the flow of gas for 2 weeks in January 2012. With virtually no gas storage capacity in Framland, industrial production fell by 22 per cent, workers were laid off and factories closed. By April NorraGas claimed that Framland owed over $2 billion in unpaid gas debts -- nearly 2% of Framland’s GDP. Incidents and demonstration involving Bothnian-speaking communities erupted in Gavle and Sundsvall and became violent. As the crisis escalated Framland appealed for international assistance in mediating the conflict and for loans to pay off its gas debt.

64. On 20 September 2012, Bothnian Forces entered Framland at the direction of President Olamao to protect the ethnic Bothnian communities and secure the Sundsvall naval base until Framland was able to pay its gas debts and negotiate a settlement. While cyber-attacks took down the government websites and email servers, Bothnian air and naval forces prevented any organised response by Framland’s meagre armed forces and allowed Bothnian air assault and amphibious forces to secure key air and seaports and rapidly isolate the capital of Sundsvall.

65. Having suffered damage to the economy, the psychological effects of being invaded and isolation from the international community, Prime Minister Kolbeinson had no choice but to accept President Olamao’s conditions for the withdrawal of Bothnian forces. Framland’s bid for closer cooperation with the EU and eventual membership were effectively taken off

2 See Paragraph 75 below.

the table. The pro-Bothnian political opposition won the 2013 elections and Framland joined Bothnia as a member of the Baltic Sea Economic Community.

Osto

66. Osto joined the EU during the Fourth Enlargement following the dissolution of the Bothnian Empire. However, in the interest of maintaining good relations with Bothnia and Russia, Osto decided not to seek NATO membership, but entered the NATO Partnership for Peace programme at the same time as Russia, in 1994. Osto contributes operational capabilities to NATO Reaction Forces and has increased practical cooperation with NATO members since Bothnia’s invasion of Framland. Bothnia is concerned about Osto’s closer military cooperation with NATO and has warned Osto that its membership in NATO would be seen as an unwise political decision and a military threat.

67. Geographically, Osto is the most remote and isolated EU member state in the Baltic Sea Region. Its infrastructure interconnects only with Bothnia and Russia which has hindered closer integration with EU. It remains totally dependent on Bothnia for natural gas which accounts for 11 per cent of its energy supplies.

68. Osto is concerned by Bothnia’s increased air and naval activity in the Suomenlahti (Gulf of Finland) and has declared publicly that Osto strongly adheres to the EU solidarity and defence clauses of the EU Lisbon Treaty. Its defence policy commits Osto to provide military assistance to other EU member states in the region in the event of a disaster or an attack.

However, given its extended borders with Bothnia, Osto will avoid any provocations.

69. Osto’s population is largely homogeneous with only a small ethnic Bothnian minority of around one per cent. However, Osto’s long wilderness borders with Bothnia and Russia are difficult to control and pose other security concerns, especially related to criminal trafficking between Russia and Bothnia through Osto.

The Russian Federation

70. Russia has remained officially neutral in the current crisis but shares Bothnia’s concerns regarding NATO and EU expansion. Russia takes a similar view to Bothnia as regards its right to protect ethnic Russians living abroad. In addition, Russia is itself a major consumer of Bothnian natural gas. As a permanent member on the UN Security Council, Russia would likely block any Council resolutions that would infringe on Bothnia’s actions with respect to these issues and veto any measures against Bothnia.

The European Union

EU Engagement in the Baltic Sea Region

71. The EU’s Fourth and Fifth Enlargements in 1995 and 2004 extended the EU’s reach into the Baltic Sea Region and increased the number of EU member states to eight of the 11 countries that share interests in the Baltic Sea for their economic prosperity, livelihoods and recreation.