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NATO UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR/KFOR/ISAF /AUSTRALIA
NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
~June 2003 MC 362/1 (Military Decision)
SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
MILITARY DECISION ON MC 362/1
NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1. MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement, which is at Enclosure, was endorsed by the Military Committee on 27 June 03, and is forwarded for approval by the North Atlantic Council. On approval by Council, MC 362/1 will supersede MC 362 (FINAL), 11 Jan 00.
2. This document is releasable to Partner nations, the European Union, SFOR/KFOR, the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) and Australia.
3. This document clears IMSWM-058-03, 07 Feb 03 and SDs thereto.
FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:
Enclosure
1. MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement Copy To SOL Z, IS/DPAO, IS/PA Action Officer Capt Bull, OPS,(5498)
G:\OPS 2003\DOCS\MC's\MC 362_1\MC 362_1 Draft Military Decision.doc
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
j/11/2_
SIR PAUL HADDACKS
Vice Admiral, UKNA Director International Military Staff
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR/KFOR/ISAF/AUSTRALIA
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFORIISAF/AUSTRALIA
MC 362/1
NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFOR/ISAF/AUSTRALIA
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFOR/ISAF/ AUSTRALIA
MC 362/1 -NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
PART I - INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
1. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the authorisation for, or limits on, the use of force during military operations. Formulation of ROE is influenced by a variety of factors. ROE first must be lawful. International law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during military operations. National law may further limit the use of force by member States in certain types of military operations or in certain situations.
Within this legal framework, the North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Committee (NAC/DPC) provides political direction for the conduct of military operations, including authorisations for, and limitations on, the threat or use of force or actions which might be construed as provocative. ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence.
DEFINITION
2. ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime and operations prior to commencement of an armed conflict, which may include declarations of counter surprise or counter aggression, ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led forces to use force. The use of force, and in particular, the authority to use deadly force by NATO/NATO-led forces to accomplish a mission receives detailed scrutiny and attention by the NAC/DPC.
Every member of the NATO/NATO-led force who may be required to use force in self-defence or to accomplish a mission must receive appropriate training on the ROE and its supporting doctrine. After the commencement of an armed conflict ROE generally limit the otherwise lawful use of force.
PURPOSE
3. This document contains a compendium of strategic and operational ROE and NATO policy for approving and implementing these rules for all NATO/NATO led military operations.
APPLICABLE LAW
4. International Law.
a. The conduct of military operations is circumscribed by international law, to include the applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict and human rights law. NATO ROE, and the application of them, never permit use of force which violates applicable international law.
b. NATO nations have a responsibility to train their forces to respect and abide by the law of armed conflict, when it is applicable, and by other international conventions and treaties which may affect military operations.
These standards are not restated in this document.
c. Where some NATO nations, but not others, have ratified relevant conventions and treaties, every effort will be made to ensure, consistent with the obligations assumed by those who have ratified, and respecting the rights of those who have not ratified, that a common approach is adopted by Member States for the purposes of military operations.
5. National Laws.
The armed forces of nations participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must also adhere to their own national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations, which would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, it is recognised that nations will issue restrictions and/or amplifying instructions in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national restrictions and/or instructions must not be more permissive than the use of force authorised for the operation. When national laws are at variance with NATO ROE included in the ROE for an operation, nations must inform the NAC/DPC and the Strategic Commander of any inconsistencies, as early as possible.
6. NATO/NATO-led forces may find themselves in situations where the military objectives include protecting persons to whom the provisions of self-defence, even extended self-defence, do not apply. These situations may include humanitarian operations aimed at countering ethnic cleansing, protecting refugees or non combatant evacuation operations. Likewise, other military operations may include amongst their military objectives the protection of property, e.g. safeguarding humanitarian relief supplies. Other military operations may require certain critical property in order to succeed. Examples of such property may be vital medical, communications or transportation equipment. To effectively deal with all these situations such NATO/NATO-led forces may require the ability to use force to protect certain persons or property. Such an ability is provided for in the ROE dealing with Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) or Property with Designated Special Status (PROSS). Some nations' laws do not permit the use of force or deadly force to protect property and commanders must be aware of any resulting national restrictions.
PART II - SELF-DEFENCE
7. Self-Defence. It is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. ROE do not limit this right. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. The following definitions apply:
a. "Necessary" means that use of force is indispensable for securing self-defence.
b. "Proportional" means a response commensurate with the perception of the level of the threat posed. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary for self-defence and no more.
c. "Imminent" means that the need to defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming.
d. With respect to self defence, "Attack" is the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel.
8. Extended Self-Defence. In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from attack or imminent attack.
9. In circumstances during peacetime and operations, prior to commencement of an armed conflict, and where the use of force is not justified by self-defence, force may only be exercised within the constraints of and permissions authorised by ROE. Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in self-defence and extended self defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins (see Appendix 1 to Annex A (Hostile Intent and Hostile Act) for details). In cases of inconsistency, ROE within a given operation shall not be interpreted as limiting the right of self defence.
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PART Ill- PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE USE OF FORCE
USE OF FORCE DURING PEACETIME OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONS
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT
1 0. During NATO/NATO-led military operations, the following general principles apply:
a. ROE applicable during peacetime operations draw their authority from the NAC/DPC and are in compliance with international law. They consist of a standard bank or menu of authorisations and restrictions that commanders may use to direct, control and order the use of force to achieve an assigned mission in support of broad NATO interests, or to protect NATO-led or non-NATO forces/ personnel. Member states may issue national restrictions.
b. A period of tension or crisis may exist prior to the commencement of armed conflict when diplomatic relations are so strained that violence, conflict or hostilities may erupt. Periods of tension or crisis may last for hours, days, months or possibly years before reverting to normal peacetime conditions or escalating to sustained armed conflict. To address potential threats during these periods, and to enhance survivability of NATO/NATO-led forces during the crisis, the ROE applicable in peacetime provide for the regulation of offensive measures.
c. Reasonable and prudent effort should be made to control a situation without the use of force. When time and conditions permit, the potentially hostile forces should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions, and further warned that NATO/NATO-led forces will take action, as necessary. The on-scene commander should consider actions that do not involve the direct application of force to warn potentially hostile forces.
d. With respect to mission accomplishment, the degree of force used must be no more than that necessary to carry out duties and accomplish assigned objectives of the mission. Force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective.
e. Use of force may be authorised within the ROE to defend non-NATO forces/personnel.
f. NATO/NATO-led forces may take reasonable and necessary actions to defend their national property, and the property of other NATO/NATO-led forces.
The degree of force used depends upon the ROE, the circumstances, national law, and the nature of the property.
g. Unless specifically directed otherwise, a NATO/NATO-led force being subjected to harassment, intrusion, or other interference should continue exercises and operations to the maximum extent possible in order to achieve all assigned objectives. No NATO/NATO-led force should yield to any effort to impose such interference upon its movement. However, in most peacetime missions, such as humanitarian assistance, NATO/NATO-led forces generally should avoid action which might be perceived as provocative or aggressive. Should actions to counter such interference be deemed necessary, they must be authorised by ROE.
11. Civilian law enforcement is not a NATO function. During NATO/NATO-led military operations the situation may arise, however, where NATO/NATO-led forces, when specifically directed by the NAC/DPC in accordance with an international mandate (e.g. a UNSCR), may become involved in support or the conduct of civilian law enforcement functions. In such exceptional circumstances, the extent of the NATO/NATO-led forces' involvement will be determined by the political direction given by the NAC/DPC, and specified in the NATO Strategic Commander's (SC's)
OPLAN/ROE.
THE USE OF FORCE FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT
12. Following commencement of armed conflict, which may include declarations of counter-surprise or counter-aggression, involving NATO/NATO-led forces as combatants, the law of armed conflict applies. The NAC/DPC and NATO commanders will continue to use the policies and procedures in this document to authorise and implement required ROE after a commencement of armed conflict. In such cases, ROE generally limit or restrict the otherwise lawful use of force in accordance with law of armed conflict. Care must be taken in such situations to ensure that any ROE requested and authorised do not unduly restrict, beyond the restrictions imposed by international law, the commander's ability to effectively carry out the mission and obtain Military Advantage. In lieu of requesting ROE, consideration should be given to seeking further political direction and guidance from the NAG as and if required, or issuing appropriate operational and tactical direction and guidance through the chain of command to ensure appropriate control of the situation.
PART IV- POLITICAL DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES
13. The NAC/DPC will give SC, through the Military Committee (MC), direction on the goals to be achieved when undertaking a mission. The direction may include, as appropriate, limitations, authorisations, or restrictions on the scope of the military action a commander may take to achieve his mission. Specific instructions on the degree of force permitted, or restrictions on the use of force, will be reflected in the ROE authorised for the mission. These must be succinct and unambiguous, leaving the commander and his subordinates with no doubt as to the limits or restrictions on the degree of force that they may use.
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFORIISAF/ AUSTRALIA
14. The NAC/DPC will provide ROE authorisations that reflect political policy.
The NAC/DPC will also provide succinct narrative guidance on its political policy to enable commanders to respond appropriately as a situation develops in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS). The PPS will be explained in plain language and reflect the overall policy aim to frame the authorised ROE in the proper context for the mission. The PPS may change as mission objectives and ROE authorisations mature to reflect changes in policy. The PPS will be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPis) which clarify the trends regarding the foreseeable or expected development of the situation. These PPis are divided into 3 categories X, Y and Z according to the following criteria:
XRAY - De-escalation
Political/military strategy is to minimize NATO involvement in the crisis to that necessary to achieve the aim. An example would be a NEO where the objective is to rescue NATO entitled persons but without becoming involved in the resolution of any local crisis.
YANKEE - Maintain status quo
Political/military strategy is to use NATO forces to maintain current regional balance or return to previous status quo following destabilisation. Significant use of force to support specific objectives may be authorised under PPI Yankee. PPI YANKEE would be appropriate for enforcement of agreed UN sanctions.
ZULU - Risk of Escalation is Acceptable
Political/military strategy is to authorise the use of force to support achievement of the grand strategy including change of the status quo ante to generate a more favourable environment. Implicit in the approval of PPI ZULU is political recognition that military action may lead to escalation of the crisis. PPI ZULU would be appropriate for a crisis on the scale of the Gulf Conflict 1991.
PARTV-ROESTRUCTUREANDPROCEDURES
STRUCTURE
15. The ROE in this document are written as a series of prohibitions and permissions applicable to activities in a wide range of military operations. When issued as prohibitions, the rules are orders to commanders not to take the designated action(s). When issued as permissions, they define the limits of the threat or use of force, or of actions which might be construed as provocative, that commanders may take to accomplish their mission. The ROE listed in this document are, however, only a menu of possible options. The specific circumstances of each operation may require that nations or commanders propose for approval ROE not listed in this document.
16. The ROE are listed in multiple series in Annex A. Each series may contain up to ten rules. Each rule is numbered. When multiple rules with the same number are requested during an operation, the SC will add consecutive letter suffixes (i.e., A, B, C, ... AA, 88, CC, ... ) for each proposed rule. Some rules have the indicator "(SC)" at the beginning of the rule, which highlights those ROE which may be implemented by the SC. To the maximum extent possible ROE should be developed for a joint environment. However, where it is required to limit a ROE to a specific component, that limitation will be made clear in the text of the ROE.
17. The "DESIG" element of each requested and authorised rule must be completed. Where further clarification of a rule is required, this may be achieved through the addition of an amplification line.
APPLICABILITY
18. During NATO/NATO-led military operations, these policies and procedures are applicable to all NATO/NATO-led forces operating under a NATO commander at all times and in all places. The rules in this document are designed to be used for all types of operations and forces. In order to achieve the objectives of an operation, it may be necessary for commanders to issue clarifying ROE guidance, or to further limit the use of force. Such guidance must never exceed the authority to use force provided by superior Headquarters and the NAC/DPC. Certain roles or operations will require standing ROE that may be modified from time to time, as required.
19. In situations where units or forces under different NATO commanders co operate or operate in proximity to each other, SC will ensure that their respective ROE are compatible and disseminated.
20. NATO/NATO-led forces occasionally operate in conjunction with forces under national, European Union (EU), or other command. When this occurs, the ROE of NATO/NATO-led and non-NATO forces must be compatible and disseminated (to the extent possible consistent with NATO procedures) to ensure operational cohesion and the optimum employment of forces. All commanders should understand the authorisations and limitations of the various ROE in effect.
PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING, AUTHORISING AND IMPLEMENTING ROE
21. ROE shall be authorised by the NAC/DPC. The ROE staffing and approval process may be independent from the staffing of an OPLAN. However, it is important that ROE are staffed parallel with and linked to the development or revision of the relevant OPLAN. Use of Force guidance is also an integral part of an OPLAN Annex E and as such this guidance is reviewed and approved by the NAC/DPC during the OPLAN approval process.
22. Based on the OPLAN, the mission and tasks, and the development of the situation the SC will consider the appropriate ROE to be implemented in support of mission accomplishment. The SC requests ROE from the NAC/DPC via the MC through a ROE Request message (ROEREQ). The NAC/DPC will, based on MC advice, authorise all or part of the requested ROE and forward its decision to the SC through a ROE Authorisation message (ROEAUTH). The SC will implement the authorised ROE through a ROE Implementation message (ROEIMPL).
23. ROE with the indicator "(SC)" are authorised, but the SC must immediately notify the NAC/DPC when such ROE are implemented. If time permits, such notice should precede implementation. Guidance on the use of ROE messages is at Annex E.
24. Dormant ROE allow the SC to plan, prepare orders, training and materiel to be used once the dormant ROE become operative. Dormant ROE are approved by the NAC/DPC but only operative at a particular milestone. Such ROE are useful in rapidly evolving operational environments. The NAC/DPC must also take into account the naturally uncertain circumstances of military operations. Therefore, a milestone that describes the circumstances under which a dormant ROE may be declared operative must be formulated in terms of detailed and objective criteria.
The NAC/DPC may set an expiry date/event after which the dormant ROE may not be implemented. The operative date/event or contingent nature of this ROE must be clearly set out in all references to such ROE. The SC must notify NAC/DPC through the MC, immediately when dormant ROE becomes operative.
25. When implementing ROE for forces, a commander must act within the ROE authorised, but is not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised ROE. If superior authority later withdraws or restricts ROE previously implemented, commanders must immediately update their direction to subordinates in order to comply with the updated ROE. Even within implemented ROE, it remains the commander's responsibility to ensure that forces use only that degree of force which is lawful under the circumstances.
26. Nations may translate the ROE into their own language to facilitate understanding. All commanders are responsible for ensuring that all personnel act within the bounds of the ROE.
SECURITY
27. The classification of the ROE for an operation will be determined by the prevailing political and operational circumstances. All ROE messages will ordinarily take on the same classification as the OPLAN. Occasionally, the NAC/DPC may deem it appropriate to release ROE to others. Any amendment to the classification of the ROE necessary because of release of ROE will be authorised by the NAC/DPC at the same time.
PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY
28. Authorisation of rules by the NAC/DPC should be accompanied by guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.
Annexes A. Compendium of Rules of Engagement B. Guidance on the use of ROE in Air Operations C. Guidance on the use of ROE in Land Operations D. Guidance on the use of ROE in Maritime Operations E. Guidance on the use of formatted ROE messages F. Definitions and Amplifying Guidance on the Meaning of Terms
Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)
COMPENDIUM OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
International law and national law govern the lawful limits for the use of force in military operations. ROE never limit the right of self-defence, but provide political, legal and policy direction for the conduct of military operations. Even if no rule from a particular series is included, the relevant principles of law apply.
A-1
INDEX OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
SERIES RULES PAGE
10 GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES A-3
11 RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES A-3
12 SPARE
13 PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE A-4
OF CIVILIAN PROPERTY
14 INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES A-5
15 WARNINGS A-6
16 DIVERSIONS A-6
17 BOARDING A-7
18 DETENTION OR SEIZURE A-8
19 SPARE
20 SPARE
21 SPARE
22 INFRARED AND VISUAL ILLUMINATION A-9
23 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL TARGETS PRIOR TO A-9
ENGAGEMENT
24 EXERCISING IN THE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL A-10
ENEMY
25 THE CONDUCT OF SIMULATED ATTACKS A-10
26 SPARE
27 SPARE
28 DESIGNATION OF TARGETS A-11
29 HARASSMENTANDCOUNTE~HARASSMENT A-11
30 SPARE
31 SPARE
32 USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS A-12
33 USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS A-13
34 SPARE
35 PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC A-14
WEAPONS IN DESIGNATED CIRCUMSTANCES
36 INFORMATION OPERATIONS A-15
37 USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES A-16
38 MINES A-17
39 ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS A-18
40 SPARE
41 SPARE
42 ATTACK A-19
43 SPARE A-20
A-2
RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORJKFORIISAF/ AUSTRALIA
10 GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES
Purpose: To apply geographical limitations to operations by NATO/NATO-led forces.
100. (SC) Entry to DESIG geographic area and/or airspace and/or territorial waters is prohibited.
1 01. (SC) Entry into territorial seas and/or archipelagic waters, internal waters, national airspace, and territory for combat search and rescue operations is authorised.
102. Entry into DESIG geographic area and/or airspace and/or territorial waters for DESIG purposes is authorised.
103. - 109. Spare.
11 RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES
Purpose: To apply relative positioning limitations on operations by NATO/NATO led forces.
11 0. (SC) Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces closer than DESIG range of DESIG forces is prohibited.
111 . Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces relative to DESIG forces is unrestricted.
112.- 119. Spare.
12 SPARE
A-3
13 PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE OF CIVILIAN
PROPERTY
Purpose: To authorise actions to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or property and to control the use of force in those operations.
130. (SC) Use of force to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or other property is prohibited.
131. (SC) Physically obstructing to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or other property is authorised.
132. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or property is authorised.
133. - 139. Spare.
NOTES:
1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless rohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.
A-4
14 INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
Purpose: To authorise intervention in non-military activities and to control the use of force in such intervention operations.
140. (SC) Intervention in DESIG non-military activities is prohibited.
141. Intervention in DESIG non-military activities to implement NATO direction of, and/or to take military control of DESIG trade and/or services, is authorised.
142. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene to implement NATO direction of DESIG trade and/or services is authorised.
143. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene to take military control of DESIG trade and/or services is authorised.
144. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene in DESIG non-military activities by DESIG actions is authorised.
145.- 149. Spare.
NOTES:
1 . Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35 or 38.
A-5
15 WARNINGS
Purpose: To authorise the passing of warnings and to control the means that may be used for warning purposes.
150. (SC) Passing of warnings to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is prohibited.
151. (SC) Passing of warnings to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons by DESIG means in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
152. - 159. Spare.
NOTES:
The means that may be used for warning purposes may include the use of warning shots/bursts as described in ANNEX B Para 8 and/or ANNEX D Para 14.
16 DIVERSIONS
Purpose: To authorise the ordering of diversions and control the use of force during those operations.
160. (SC) Ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is prohibited.
161. Ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
162. Use of minimum/DESIG force to compel compliance with the ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
163. - 169. Spare.
NOTES:
1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
A-6
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.
17 BOARDING
Purpose: To authorise boarding operations and control the use of force during those operations.
170. (SC) Boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft, or vehicles is prohibited.
171. (SC) If unopposed, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft, or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. (See Annex D for maritime boarding)
172. (SC) If non cooperative, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. Use of DESIG force is authorised. (See Annex D)
173. If opposed, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. Use of minimum/DESIG force is authorised. (See Annex D for maritime boarding)
174.-179. Spare.
NOTES:
1 . Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under series 32, 35 or 38.
A-7
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18 DETENTION OR SEIZURE
Purpose: To authorise and define the scope of detention or seizure in military operations.
180. (SC) Detention or seizure of vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s), personnel, goods, cargoes or equipment is prohibited.
181. Detention and/or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s), personnel, goods, cargoes or equipment in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
182. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicle(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
183. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG person(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
184. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s) and their personnel in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
185. Use of minimum/DESIG force to seize DESIG cargo(es), goods, or equipment in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
186. Use of minimum/DESIG force to seize DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
187.- 189. Spare
NOTES:
1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under series 32, 35 or 38.
19-20-21 SPARE
A-8
22 INFRARED AND VISUAL ILLUMINATION
Purpose: To control the use of infrared or visual illuminants.
220. (SC) Illumination of DESIG forces is prohibited.
221. (SC) Illumination of DESIG forces by DESIG means is authorised.
222.- 229. Spare.
NOTE:
These rules do not preclude the use of hand-held methods of illumination, (e.g.
flashlights/torches) nor do they apply to illuminants required for SAR operations.
23 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL TARGETS PRIOR TO AN ENGAGEMENT
Purpose: To define the criteria to identify potential targets.
230. (SC) Engagement without prior positive visual identification is prohibited.
231. (SC) Identification is to be established visually or by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit), electro-optic, electronic warfare support measure, track behaviour, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, acoustic intelligence, or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit prior to an engagement.
232. (SC) Identification is to be established visually or by one or more of the following means: IFF (or other systems requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit), electro-optic, electronic warfare support measure, track behaviour, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, acoustic intelligence, or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit prior to an engagement.
233. - 239. Spare.
A-9
24 EXERCISING IN THE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL ENEMY
Purpose: To authorise and control exercising in the presence of a potential enemy.
240. (SC) DESIG exercising in the presence of DESIG unit(s) is prohibited.
241. (SC) DESIG exercising in the presence of DESIG unit(s) is authorised.
242.- 249. Spare.
25 THE CONDUCT OF SIMULATED ATTACKS
Purpose: To authorise the conduct of overt simulated attacks.
250. (SC) Conduct of simulated attacks against DESIG unit(s) is prohibited.
251. Conduct of simulated attacks against DESIG unit(s) by DESIG actions in a DESIG area is authorised.
252. Conduct of simulated attacks is authorised.
253. - 259. Spare.
26-27 SPARE
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28 DESIGNATION OF TARGETS
Purpose: To control means of target designation.
280. (SC) Designation of targets is prohibited.
281. (SC) Designation of targets by DESIG means is authorised.
282. - 289. Spare.
29 HARASSMENT AND COUNTER-HARASSMENT
Purpose: To authorise actions in response to harassment and control the use of force when conducting counter-harassment and harassment operations.
290. (SC) Harassment is prohibited.
291. (SC) Warning off DESIG units/elements engaged in harassment against DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is authorised.
292. (SC) Riding off DESIG units/elements engaged in harassment against DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is authorised.
293. Counter harassment to a similar extent and degree to that experienced by any unit/element in the DESIG area(s) is authorised.
294. Counter harassment to a higher extent and degree to that experienced by any unit/element in the DESIG area(s) is authorised.
295. Harassment which does not result in physical damage is authorised.
296. Harassment which may result in physical damage is authorised.
297.-299. Spare.
30-31 SPARE
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32 USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
Purpose: To regulate the use of riot control agents either as a use of force aside from controlling riots or in the context of riot control.
320. (SC) Use of DESIG riot control agents is prohibited.
321. Use of DESIG riot control agents for DESIG purposes, subject to DESIG restrictions is authorised.
322.-329. Spare
NOTE:
The use of certain riot control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited under "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" of 13 January 1993. Some nations consider the use of riot control agents of a gaseous nature in Peace Support Operations to be a violation of domestic law.
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33 USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS
Purpose: To authorise the use of force under specified circumstances in designated operations.
This series is intended to be applied primarily to the peculiar conditions that may arise during operations such as peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid, etc.
330. Use of force to prevent DESIG interference with NATO/NATO-led personnel during the conduct of their mission is prohibited.
331. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent interference with NATO/NATO-led personnel during the conduct of their mission is authorised.
332. Use of minimum/DESIG force to defend DESIG non-NATO forces in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
333. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent the taking possession of or destruction of DESIG property is authorised.
334. Use of minimum/DESIG force to defend against intrusion into DESIG areas is authorised.
335. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent the escape of DESIG detained person(s) is authorised.
336. Use of minimum/DESIG force to secure the release of DESIG personnel, vessel(s), aircraft, vehicles(s), or installation(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
337. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent commission of DESIG crimes that are occurring or are about to occur in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
338. Use of minimum/DESIG force for DESIG purposes in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
339. Spare.
NOTES:
1. Minimum force includes, by definition, the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.
2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.
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34 SPARE
35 PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS IN
DESIGNATED CIRCUMSTANCES
Purpose: To prohibit or restrict the use of designated weapons, including non lethal weapons not including riot control agents addressed in Serial 32.
This series is intended to be applied primarily to the peculiar conditions that may arise during operations such as peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid, and riot control situations (by means not addressed in Serial 32).
350. Use of DESIG weapons in DESIG circumstances is prohibited.
351. Use of DESIG weapons in DESIG circumstances is subject to DESIG restrictions.
352. - 359. Spare.
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36 INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Purpose: To authorise and control the use of Information Operations. (See also Annex A, Appendix 2)
360. (SC) Use of DESIG Information Operation is prohibited.
361. Control of DESIG suspected adversary military information distribution mechanisms with the intent of utilizing DESIG abilities to influence and persuade DESIG audiences is authorised.
362. Control of DESIG civilian information distribution mechanisms with the intent of utilizing DESIG abilities to influence and persuade DESIG audiences is authorised.
363. DESIG response against adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged NATO computers, computer networks, or information in NATO computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into DESIG intermediary systems or networks and damage to DESIG adversary systems or networks are authorised.
364. DESIG response against adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into NATO computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into DESIG intermediary systems or networks and damage to DESIG adversary systems or networks are authorised.
366. Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against DESIG adversary computers or computer systems in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
367 - 369 Spare.
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37 USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES
Purpose: To authorise and control the use of Electronic Countermeasures
(ECM).
370. The use of ECM is prohibited.
371. Use of ECM against underwater sensors & communications/non-satellite VHF or UHF communications/search & acquisition radars/missile & fire control radars is authorised.
372. Use of ECM against DESIG communications/broadcasts is authorised.
373. Use of ECM against DESIG navigation/positioning systems is authorised.
37 4. Unrestricted use of ECM is authorised.
375. Employment of ECM against DESIG communication, DESIG information systems, DESIG non-communication sensors, DESIG navigation aids, and/or DESIG weapons systems is prohibited.
376. Employment of ECM against DESIG communication, DESIG information systems, DESIG non-communication sensors, DESIG navigation aids, and/or DESIG weapons systems is authorised.
377. - 379. Spare.
NOTES:
1 . These rules do not constrain the use of self-protection ECM sub-systems.
2. The DESIG within requests for ROE 372 may also be drafted to include civilian communications or broadcasts.
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38 MINES
Purpose: To control the use of land and maritime mines.
380. (SC) Laying of DESIG mines in DESIG area(s) is prohibited.
381. Use of DESIG mines in DESIG area(s) for DESIG purposes, subject to DESIG restrictions is authorised.
382. - 389. Spare.
NOTES:
1. With respect to land mines, each State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 3 December 1997 (Ottawa Convention) has undertaken never under any circumstances:
a. to use anti-personnel mines;
b. to develop, produce , otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c. to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention.
2. States Not Party to the Ottawa Convention have stated that they retain the right to employ Anti-Personnel Mines/Mixed Munitions on a national unilateral basis during a NATO operation. The actions of States Not Party to the Ottawa Convention must take into account that States Party Forces have to be in compliance with obligations of the Ottawa Convention and their national legislation.
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39 ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS
Purpose: To authorise and control the prosecution of submarine contacts.
390. (SC) Tracking of DESIG submarine contact(s) within DESIG area(s) with DESIG sensors is prohibited.
391. (SC) Tracking submarine contact(s) within DESIG area(s) with DESIG sensors is authorised.
392. DESIG action(s) against DESIG submarine contact(s) within DESIG area or DESIG range of DESIG unit or force is authorised.
393. Prosecution to destruction against DESIG submarine contacts within DESIG area is authorised.
394. - 399. Spare.
40-41 SPARE
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42 ATTACK
Purpose: To authorise and control attack(s) to accomplish NATO missions during NATO/NATO-led operations. These authorisations and controls are distinct from (and hence do not overrule or in any way effect) the definition of "attack" as that term is used concerning self-defence in Part II, paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.
420. (SC) Attack on DESIG force(s) or targets is prohibited.
421. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).
422. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this
ANNEX).
423. Attack against DESIG person(s) or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against DESIG forces or personnel is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).
424. Attack against DESIG person(s) or DESIG target(s) committing or directly contributing to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against DESIG forces or personnel is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).
425. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s), which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack, is authorised (See Note 2).
426. DESIG Commanders are authorised to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.
427. Attack on DESIG military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, and unit(s) which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens DESIG force(s), person(s) or property is authorised.
428. Attack on DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s), which make an effective contribution to the conduct of hostile military operations against DESIG force(s), or persons or property with designated special status is authorised.
429. Attack on DESIG force(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.
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NOTES:
1 . Some nations may need to issue clarifying guidance to their commanders to clarify the differences between national and NATO definitions of the terms "hostile act" and "hostile intent" whenever Rules 421, 422, 423 and/or 424 are authorised.
See Appendix 1 to this Annex for further discussion.
2. Rule 425 shall never be used as a retaliatory measure. Its purpose is to prevent the continuation of hostile actions by units which continue to pose a potential threat and have shown the will to attack NATO/NATO-led forces.
3. A response based solely on self-defence (as discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the main body of this document) must be measured by what is necessary and commensurate with the threat. See Appendix 1 to this Annex for further discussion.
43 SPARE
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RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR!KFOR/ISAF/ AUSTRALIA
HOSTILE INTENT AND HOSTILE ACT
Appendix 1 to Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)
(Amplifying Guidance for use with Rules 421, 422, 423 or 424)
INTRODUCTION
1. Military personnel may respond to an attack, or an imminent attack, under the principle of self-defence, as defined at Paragraphs 7 and 8, under the heading 'Self Defence' within the main body of this document. There are many instances of action by a potential enemy which, though not rising to a level of threat requiring self defence measures, nevertheless clearly pose a threat to NATO/NATO-led forces or persons with designated special status (PDSS). Under such circumstances, a military commander may need to respond to these actions. The authorisation of rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 provides the military commander with clear authority to respond as he deems necessary in such circumstances.
2. Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins; the authorisation or non-authorisation of Rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 are without prejudice to such national rights of self-defence.
Authorisation of rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 helps assure the commander of a combined force that the forces under his command will respond uniformly to the actions of a potential enemy.
HOSTILE INTENT (NOTCONSTITUTING AN IMMINENT ATTACK)
3. Rules 421 and 423 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who demonstrate hostile intent against NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or personnel. "Hostile intent" is a likely and identifiable threat recognisable on the basis of both the following conditions:
a. capability and preparedness of individuals, groups of personnel or units which pose a threat to inflict damage and,
b. evidence, including intelligence, which indicates an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage.
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4. The capability and preparedness to inflict damage can be taken to exist when certain tactical events occur. These may include manoeuvring into weapons launch positions, whether within effective range or not, the deployment of remote targeting methods and the use of shadowers or tattletails to provide picture compilation.
Evidence may also come from non-tactical events such as increased indications of mobilisation or warlike gestures revealed in public or gained from intelligence, increased movements of ammunition and the requisition of transportation. The weight of evidence and intelligence indicating intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage must demonstrate a clear and substantial threat. Isolated acts of harassment, without intelligence or other information indicating an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage, will not normally be considered hostile intent.
HOSTILE ACT (NOT CONSTITUTING ACTUAL ATTACK)
5. While self-defence permits the use of force to defend NATO/NATO-led forces against an imminent or actual attack, Rules 422 and 424 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who commit or directly contribute to any intentional act causing serious prejudice or posing a serious danger to NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or personnel. The status of the crisis, the political situation at the time and, if known, the intent of the perpetrator (e.g., a defecting pilot) all play a part in determining if indeed a hostile act has occurred. Specific examples of hostile acts include, but are not limited to:
a. one or more unit conducting mine laying operations imposing restrictions upon the movements of NATO/NATO-led forces or PDSS;
b. military aircraft penetrating NATO airspace or airspace over a secure area and refusing to comply with interception instructions;
c. intentionally impeding NATO/NATO-led military operations; or
d. breaching or attempting to breach the security of a NATO/NATO-led military installation or restricted area.
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Appendix 2 to Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)
INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Info Ops)
1. This Appendix establishes Info Ops related policies and procedures. Further policy guidance is contained in MC 422/1, "NATO Military Policy on Information Operations," dated 19 September 2002. Info Ops must be synchronized with air, land, sea, space, and special operations and conducted in conformity with political and diplomatic NATO efforts.
2. Info Ops should be an integral part of the Alliance's overall means for reaching objectives, whether in crisis or routine circumstances. Info Ops plans are an essential force-multiplier and provide the Alliance with the potential to avoid or to shorten conflict. At the strategic level, Info Ops are coordinated actions to influence political or military decision makers and information-dependent processes, whether human or automated, in support of NATO political and military objectives. At the operational level, Info Ops are coordinated plans and activities targeted toward key decision makers or the information/information systems of those decision makers.
These plans are developed in support of and linked closely with strategic Info Ops objectives. At the tactical level, Info Ops are actions taken to influence decision makers by affecting their information, information based processes, C2 systems and Communications and Information systems (CIS) while exploiting and protecting one's own information and/or information systems.
3. All aspects of Info Ops related information dissemination must be coordinated and synchronized. Operational and tactical commanders must carefully manage the synchronization and harmonising of all activities and especially Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Information (MPI) and Psychological Operations functions to preserve the integrity and credibility of each of these disciplines as well as the separation of target audiences where necessary. In addition, Info Ops often involves complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review. Legal advisors should be consulted to ensure that activities are consistent with International and Domestic law. 1 All Info Ops target audiences must be legitimate military objectives and must offer a definite military advantage. Any incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, caused by the use of Info Ops against these targets must not be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage to be gained.
4 . NATO Commanders must plan for and conduct protective, defensive, and restoration measures for both classified and unclassified information systems and
Some nations have a more restrictive approach to some issues; they cannot be involved in operations that go counter to their position.
A-2-1 processes under their control, including systems that…
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