NUWCDIVKYPT 5510.2.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

N AV AL UN DE RS E A W AR F AR E CE N TE R D IV IS IO N

6 1 0 D O W E L L S T R E E T K E Y P O R T , W A S H I N G T O N 9 8 3 4 5 - 7 6 1 0

NUWCDIVKPTINST 5510.2

NUWCDIVKPT/C105

NUWCDIVKPT INSTRUCTION 5510.2B CH-1

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Keyport

Subj: PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM

Ref: (a) DoDM 5200.02, of 3 April 2017

(b) SECNAVINST 5510.30C

(c) NAVSEAINST 5510.1C

(d) Security Executive Agent Directive, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines 4 of 8

June 2017, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines

(e) Security Executive Agent Directive 6 of 12 January 2018, Continuous Evaluation

(f) NUWCDIVKPTINST 5510.1J

(g) NUWCDIVKPTINST C3300.1

(h) DoDD 5105.42 of August 2010

(i) DoD 5220.22-M of 18 May 2016

(j) SECNAV M 5210.1

1. Purpose. To issue policy, identify responsibilities and provide guidance for implementation of

Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Division, Keyport’s Personnel Security Program (PSP) per references (a) through (j).

2. Cancellation. This directive cancels and supersedes NUWCDIVKPTINST 5510.2B

3. Applicability. This directive applies to all personnel assigned to or employed by any element of

NUWC Division, Keyport, including those at the Echelon five level. Personnel are individually responsible for compliance. All NUWC Division, Keyport personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) and visitors/guests, inclusive of the NUWC Division, Keyport Detachments will comply with Personnel Security policies and measures contained in this instruction and cited higher directives.

4. Records Management. Records created, as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, must be managed per reference (j).

5. Review and Effective Date. Per OPNAVINST 5215.17A, NUWC Division, Keyport will review this directive annually on the anniversary of its effective date to ensure applicability, currency, and consistency with Federal, Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), and Navy policy and statutory authority. The annual review must be documented and approved via an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) 5215/40, Instruction Review form. The approved

OPNAV 5215/40 form will be maintained by the Command Directives Manager for a minimum of one year.

J. H. MORETTY

CHANGE / REVISION HISTORY

Change Issue Date Brief Description of Change

N/R 10 Aug 07

Chapter 1 – Update No. 9 (d)

Add No. 11. Government Contract Oversight

Update Exhibits 1B and 1E

Add Clearance Due Process Exhibit 1F;

Update to Supervisor’s Security Checklist – Employee Termination or Transfer NUWC Division, Keyport 5510-3/F3

Update to Request/Notification for Access to Classified Material

NUWC Keyport 5510-14/F-1

A 18 Dec 08

Renumbered forms:

NUWC Keyport 5510/02-1 International Student/Project Security

Brief

NUWC Keyport 5510/02-2 Work Location Security Training

NUWC Keyport 5510/02-3 Supervisor’s Security Checklist –

Employee Termination or Transfer

NUWC Keyport 5510/02-4 Request/Notification for Access to

Classified Material

Chapter 2 – No. 6 (a) Adding JPAS SMO information for receiving

Visit Requests

A Chg-1 8 Dec 11 Minor editorial changes

A Chg-2 23 Dec 14

Changed Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility

(DoN CAF) to Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications

Facility (DoD CAF). Changed security office code from 00SO to

105.

A Chg-3 15 Jan 18 Updated the definitions of clearance types.

A Chg-4 09 Oct 19 Updated Change/Revision History Change column from numerical to alpha. SECNAVINST 5215.1

B 19 May 20 Rewrite of local instruction to meet new guidance in SECNAVINST

5510.30C

B Chg-1 05 Nov 20 Add Reporting of Preliminary Investigations

PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM MANUAL

NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER

DIVISION, KEYPORT

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION INTO PERSONNEL SECURITY .......................................... 1-1

1. Purpose. ............................................................................................................................. 1-1

2. Responsibilities. ................................................................................................................ 1-1

CHAPTER 2 NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS .................................................... 2-1

1. Purpose. ............................................................................................................................. 2-1

2. Federal Investigative Standards (FIS). .............................................................................. 2-1

3. Reinvestigation. ................................................................................................................ 2-1

4. Emergency Appointments. ................................................................................................ 2-2

5. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). .................................................................. 2-2

6. Interim Eligibility or Temporary National Security Eligibility ........................................ 2-3

CHAPTER 3 PERSONNEL SECURITY REPORTING/SELF-REPORTING .......................... 3-1

1. Purpose. ............................................................................................................................. 3-1

2. Responsibility. .................................................................................................................. 3-1

CHAPTER 4 SECURITY EDUCATION ................................................................................... 4-1

1. Purpose. ............................................................................................................................. 4-1

2. Scope. ................................................................................................................................ 4-1

3. Responsibilities. ................................................................................................................ 4-1

CHAPTER 5 CONTINUOUS EVALUATION .......................................................................... 5-1

1. Purpose. ............................................................................................................................. 5-1

2. Process. ............................................................................................................................. 5-1

3. Responsibilities. ................................................................................................................ 5-1

APPENDIX A DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................... A-1

APPENDIX B FORMS............................................................................................................... B-1

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION INTO PERSONNEL SECURITY

1. Purpose. To provide basic guidance for Personnel Security Program (PSP) functions, procedures, and responsibilities applicable to Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC)

Division, Keyport personnel.

2. Responsibilities. The PSP sets objectives and procedures for investigations of individuals seeking eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position, hereafter, referred to as national security eligibility. The PSP facilitates continued national security eligibility for those persons whose loyalty, reliability, judgement, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting them with access to classified information or assigning them to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

a. Commanding Officer (CO): The CO is responsible for the effective management of the

PSP within the command. Authority delegated by this instruction to the CO may be further delegated, unless specifically prohibited.

b. Security Manager (SM): The SM is designated, in writing, by the CO, per reference (b) and (f), to manage the Information Security, Industrial Security, Personnel Security, Continuous

Evaluation (CE), and Security Education, Training, and Awareness Programs, and to ensure alignment of policies and processes with requirements of higher authority. The SM serves as the

CO’s advisor and direct representative in program policy matters, and:

(1) Oversees the implementation of the PSP per references (b) and (f), ensuring the program is inclusive of contractor employees.

(2) Oversees the implementation of the CE Program per requirements and limitations of reference (b), ensuring controls are in place to safeguard investigative information.

(3) Maintains liaison with the Command Special Security Officer (SSO) concerning information and personnel security policies and procedures.

(4) Suspends or restricts access to classified information and assignment to sensitive duties, as directed by the CO, when an individual is the subject of allegations or information while denial/revocation of clearance is being considered.

c. The Personnel Security Program Manager (PSPM):

(1) Assigned as the Assistant SM.

(2) Provides direct contact for implementation of the PSP with input, guidance, and support from the SM, CO, and Detachment Designated Security Coordinators (DSC).

(3) Ensures Command responsibilities for preparation, submission, and follow-up of

Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) are fulfilled per reference (b).

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(4) Reports adverse information to the SM, CO, and Department of Defense

Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF), via the Joint Personnel Adjudication System

(JPAS) and Defense Information System for Security (DISS).

(5) Provides information on suspended or restricted access actions to the supervisor and the Human Resources Office.

(6) Ensures that the PSIs, clearances, and accesses are properly recorded per reference

(b).

(7) Ensures all personnel execute a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement

Standard Form (SF) 312 prior to granting initial access to classified information.

(8) Ensures all personnel are continuously evaluated for eligibility for access or assignment to sensitive duties per references (a) and (b). This is accomplished through security education and positive reinforcement of reporting requirements in the form of management support, confidentiality, and employee assistance referrals.

(9) Provides oversight of personnel security functions to NUWC Division, Keyport and

Detachments.

(10) Consults with employee, employee’s supervisor, and the Human Resources Office

NUWC Division, Keyport concerning adverse information.

(11) Prepares an Emergency Appointment memorandum when a delay in appointment may be harmful to national security, if regulatory requirements and mission-essential functions or responsibilities cannot be met. This is only done when no other cleared, or otherwise qualified, personnel are available to do the work during the projected final clearance processing time. The CO’s justification for the emergency appointment will be recorded in writing.

(12) Prepares an Interim Clearance memorandum when an emergency appointment has been established and the review of the PSI request questionnaire and locally available records are favorable. Justification must specifically address the operational need for the interim eligibility determination. The SM will sign the memorandum and the PSPM will retain it with personnel records.

(a) If, after authorizing interim eligibility, the Command becomes aware of adverse or questionable information representing a security concern of reference (d), interim eligibility will be reassessed and then withdrawn if the individual is deemed an unacceptable risk to national security.

(b) If, after authorizing interim eligibility, the Command receives a DoD CAF Notice of Intent to deny the individual’s National Security Eligibility, the CO must immediately withdraw the Interim National Security Eligibility and suspend access to classified information, as well as the eligibility to occupy a sensitive position.

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(13) Debriefs civilian employees who no longer have access to classified information based on adverse information determination.

(14) Conducts routine debriefs for employees and military personnel who are terminating, transferring, or retiring, and who no longer require access to classified information.

Individuals must complete a Security Termination Statement and a SF312 debrief.

d. DSCs perform personnel security functions at the local level, consulting with the SM and/or PSPM on complex issues, as needed.

e. The NUWC Division, Keyport Building Access Control Center representatives coordinate access by communicating with NUWC Division, Keyport and Naval Base Kitsap

Security personnel, verifying the need for access, and that the required level of access

(investigation/clearance) is authorized and documented.

f. Labor & Employee Relations Office NUWC Division, Keyport directs all employee adverse action(s) and provides action status to the PSPM and cognizant supervisor.

g. Human Resources Office NUWC Division, Keyport provides new employees’ proof of citizenship and security forms to the PSPM.

(1) Informs the PSPM, SM, and SSO of personnel reassignments requiring sensitivity level changes/updates and investigation requirement changes.

h. Department Heads (and/or Employee Supervisors):

(1) In coordination with the SM and/or PSPM, determine security requirements for their functions and ensure personnel under their supervision understand the security requirements for their particular assignment. On-the-job training is an essential part of command security education and supervisors must ensure that such training is provided.

(2) Determine and designate the sensitivity of each civilian position overseen, ensuring each Position Description (PD) or Level Descriptor Addendum (LDA) contains the appropriate sensitivity level. Periodic re-evaluations are essential.

(3) Notify the PSPM when access requirements change.

(4) Report any adverse or potentially adverse information, or concerns regarding loyalty, to the CO, SM, or PSPM. Take steps to remove an employee’s name from access rosters, change security container combinations and passwords, retrieve keys, etc. when directed to do so by the

CO, SM, or PSPM. Depending on the severity of the adverse information reported, the CO may suspend access to classified information.

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i. Employees and Military Personnel:

(1) Provide proof of citizenship (original or certified documents) and completed investigation forms, and cooperate with the PSPM by providing required information (and fingerprints, if necessary) for the PSI process.

(2) Continuously evaluate other employees for issues that could potentially affect eligibility for access or assignment to sensitive duties and report adverse information to the cognizant supervisor, PSPM, SM, or CO.

j. Provide government oversight of contracts. Task Order Managers and government contracting officials will ensure:

(1) All contracts include the requirement that NUWC Division, Keyport positions are, at a minimum, designated as Non-Critical Sensitive (NCS) with a positive adjudication of a Tier 3

(T3)/Tier 3 Reinvestigation (T3R) (formerly National Agency Check with Law and Credit

(NACLC)). In the case where a contractor may be granted privileged access to a NUWC

Division, Keyport network or system (e.g., Domain Administrator, position it will be designated as a Critical Sensitive position) and require positive adjudication of a Tier 5 (T5)/Tier 5

Reinvestigation (T5R) (formerly Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI), SSBI-Periodic

Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR). The NUWC Division, Keyport Information Assurance Manager is the primary point of contact for privileged access position designation determinations.

(2) Any revocation of a contractor's security clearance or the positive adjudication of a background check is reported back to the government immediately upon determination.

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CHAPTER 2 NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

1. Purpose. Investigations are conducted to commensurate with position sensitivity and duties, fiduciary responsibilities, and the Information Technology (IT) requirements of the position.

2. Federal Investigative Standards (FIS) for Civilian, Military, and Contractor Personnel.

FIS provides consistent standards for investigations, to facilitate reciprocity across the government, and to ensure cost-effective and efficient protection of national interests. The standards apply to investigations used to determine eligibility for access to classified information, to hold a National Security position, for physical and logical access, and for suitability for government employment. The FIS established a new tier and naming system for

Background Investigations (BI). The scope of a personnel security investigation may be neither raised nor lowered without the approval of the Department of Naval Intelligence. The tiered

National Security investigations authorized for use within the Department of the Navy (DON) are as follows for civilians, military, and contractor personnel:

a. T3: Investigations conducted to this standard are for positions designated as NCS and/or requiring eligibility for access to confidential or secret information. This is the lowest level of investigation acceptable for access to classified information, using SF 86, questionnaire for national security positions.

b. T5: Investigations conducted to this standard are for positions designated as critical sensitive, special sensitive, and/or requiring eligibility for access to Top Secret (TS) or Sensitive

Compartmented Information (SCI), using SF 86, or its successor form.

3. Reinvestigation. A reinvestigation updates a previous investigation and is authorized only for specific duties and access. All military members will undergo Periodic Reinvestigation (PR), maintain a favorable eligibility, and be subject to continuous evaluation. Civilian and contractor personnel will undergo PRs to the extent the investigative coverage is proportional to the sensitivity level of the duties and/or access required. Reinvestigations may be performed at any time after National Security Eligibility has been granted. Additionally, DON employees in

National Security positions and contractor personnel performing national security duties without access to classified information will be subject to reinvestigation on a recurring basis. There are two tiered National Security Reinvestigations:

a. T3R: T3R is the reinvestigation required for military, civilian, and contractor positions designated as NCS, and/or requiring eligibility for access to confidential or secret information, or assignment in a NCS position, respectively. T3Rs are also conducted at 10-year intervals for collateral positions or five-year intervals for personnel with Secret Security Clearance in Special

Access Programs (SAPs) and those performing Explosive Ordnance Disposal or Personnel

Reliability Program (PRP) controlled duties. The reinvestigation will be initiated no later than five years from the close date of the previous investigation.

b. T5R: T5Rs are conducted every five years on military, civilians, and contractor personnel occupying special sensitive, critical sensitive positions, or requiring continued

National Security Eligibility at an equivalent level. The T5R investigative elements include: a

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National Agency Check (NAC) (except that a technical fingerprint check of Federal Bureau of

Investigations files is not conducted), a subject interview, a credit check, an employment check, neighborhood interviews, local agency checks, interviews of employers, developed character references, an ex-spouse interview, and additional investigation when warranted by the facts of the case. Reinvestigations will not be initiated more than 30 days prior to the due date (the date the previous equivalent or higher level BI closed).

4. Emergency Appointments. If the appointee does not have the necessary investigative basis for appointment, they may be placed in a NCS position only as an emergency measure. The CO must determine the delay in appointment would be harmful to national security (not to exceed

180 days), after the T3 has been requested, a favorable fingerprint result has been received, and a check of locally available records is found favorable, the CO must be briefed. The CO's justification for the emergency appointment will be recorded in writing. The Command Security

Office will maintain a central file of all emergency appointments for review during Security and

Personnel Management evaluations.

a. The record of emergency appointments will include:

(1) Identifying data on the appointee to include full name, social security number, date and place of birth, and position or job title.

(2) Organizational location of the position.

(3) Position sensitivity and designation criterion.

(4) Certification and justification by the CO that an emergency appointment is necessary.

(5) A statement that a check of locally available records was favorable.

(6) The date that the required BI was requested. For a CS position, the record will also include the date of the T3 forming the basis for emergency appointment.

b. To keep emergency appointments to the absolute minimum, activities must anticipate the need to fill a sensitive position and request the required investigation sufficiently in advance of the desired date of appointment.

5. SCI

a. The investigative requirement for access to SCI is a favorably adjudicated T5. A T5R must be submitted every five years. The requirements for SCI access are established under

Director of National Intelligence authority. When military personnel are ordered to billets requiring SCI access, the transfer orders will identify the requirement. The losing command's

SM/SSO must ensure the required investigative requests are submitted promptly prior to transfer.

If an individual is indoctrinated for SCI access, the CO may not administratively lower the individual's security clearance below the TS level without approval of the DoD CAF.

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b. SSO is responsible for opening, reviewing, submitting, and monitoring investigations for individuals requiring SCI eligibility and/or access.

c. SSO will notify PSPM of changes to personnel to include changes in PD/LDA, and reassignments or termination of employees from the SCI program.

6. Interim Eligibility or Temporary National Security Eligibility

a. In the absence of adverse information, COs may grant Interim Eligibility (also referred to as Temporary Eligibility) to individuals pending completion of full investigative requirements and pending establishment of Security Eligibility by the DoD CAF.

b. Interim Eligibility is an exception to the requirement for a completed investigation and eligibility determination prior to access. Interim Eligibility is a stopgap measure taken to minimize operational impact, but it requires compensatory security measures to only consider this option if no issue information is present as follows:

(1) The CO or designee may only authorize Interim Eligibility. The CO or designee must review the SF 86 to ensure no adverse information exists prior to granting an Interim National

Security Eligibility.

(2) Interim National Security Eligibility may be reciprocally accepted throughout the

DoD and DON.

(3) An Interim Secret or Confidential clearance is valid for access to the level of eligibility granted. Access to Restricted Data (RD), Communications Security (COMSEC), and

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) information is not authorized.

(4) An Interim TS clearance is valid for access to TS information. Access to RD, COMSEC, and NATO information at the secret and confidential level is authorized if the individual has final Secret National Security Eligibility.

(5) Interim SCI eligibility is granted by the DoD CAF.

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CHAPTER 3 PERSONNEL SECURITY REPORTING/SELF-REPORTING

1. Purpose. Establishing basic guidance for personnel on the Personnel Security Reporting and self-reporting procedures.

2. Responsibility

a. Any person becoming aware of any of the following activities must report it to the PSPM or SM immediately:

(1) Possible acts of sabotage, espionage, international terrorism, deliberate compromise, or other subversive activities.

(2) Questionable contacts with any individual, regardless of nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the individual’s official activities.

(3) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.

(4) Employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of exploitation by any entity.

(5) Suicide or attempted suicide by an individual who had access to classified information (Security Office must report to Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and

DoD CAF).

(6) Unauthorized absentee status of an individual who has access to classified information.

(7) Death or desertion of an individual having access to classified information.

b. Personnel Security Program Manager (PSPM) will report via DISS, all preliminary investigations at the willful and negligent culpability level per references (d) and (f).

Preliminary investigations at the “inadvertent” culpability level will be reviewed at the local command level and determinations will be made on reporting further. The Information Security

Program Manager will provide all applicable documentation for tracking and reporting purposes.

c. Foreign travel for official Temporary Duty (TDY) must be reported to Security. Travel orders will not be processed until the individual(s) traveling to Out of Continental United States have met the annual Antiterrorism training requirement (see NUWC Division, Keyport’s

Security webpage for details). Destination(s) must be reported prior to each trip to give Security

Office the opportunity to provide country-specific briefings, as required.

d. Personal travel reporting is required to the Security Office, preferably to the PSPM, prior to travel. The NUWC Division, Keyport Security webpage also provides a link to the Foreign

Clearance Guide.

https://keyportal.kypt.nmci.navy.mil/sites/Command/Security/Lists/Training%20Requirements/AllItems.aspx

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e. The NCIS office will accept or decline investigative cognizance of a reported issue. If

NCIS assumes cognizance, command investigative efforts are subordinate to NCIS.

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CHAPTER 4 SECURITY EDUCATION

1. Purpose. The development of fundamental security habits is a natural element of every process within the work environment, ensuring personnel understand the need and procedures for protecting classified or sensitive information.

2. Scope. This enclosure applies to all NUWC Division, Keyport personnel (military members, civilian employees, and contractor employees in a visitor status) with access to classified information or material.

3. Responsibilities

a. The SM or PSPM:

(1) Conducts indoctrination and orientation briefing to new personnel after reporting for duty.

(2) Conducts annual antiterrorism training for all personnel per reference (g).

(3) Provides foreign travel briefings as required for official travel per reference (g).

These briefings are available for personal travel as well as a briefing for family members.

Detachments should contact their local area SM for training procedures.

(4) Provides annual refresher and continuing security awareness training to all personnel via the NUWC Division, Keyport’s Security Training Quarterly Bulletin (STQ), posted each quarter on the Workforce Development System portal. Articles are provided by all security program managers for inclusion in the STQ. Security administrative support will format and prepare bulletin for distribution.

(5) Schedules adequate sessions of Counter-Intelligence (CI) briefs to cover the annual requirement of the workforce with the local NCIS office. Operational Security (OPSEC) training is given in conjunction with the CI briefs. The OPSEC program manager will give this training.

(6) Per references (h) and (i), advises visiting contractors, assigned to NUWC Division, Keyport’s workspaces, of security training opportunities and encourages attendance or provides access to security education materials. (NUWC Division, Keyport is not required to maintain accounting records of training attended by contractors.)

(7) Debriefs cleared personnel: at the time of termination (i.e., retirement, transfer, resignation, or reassignment), using Security Termination Statement, OPNAV 5511/14; at the expiration of a Limited Access Authorization; when a security clearance is revoked for cause;

when a security clearance is administratively withdrawn; or when inadvertent access to classified information by an individual ineligible to receive it has occurred.

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b. Supervisors:

(1) Ensure personnel under their supervision are familiar with the security requirements unique to their particular work assignment(s) and comply with security education requirements.

The Security Training Requirements webpage identifies all required security training and how it is accomplished.

(2) Ensure all personnel with access to classified information receive an annual security refresher and continuing security awareness training. The NUWC Division, Keyport STQ is the primary method used to meet these training requirements. It provides articles on a wide variety of security subjects to keep security awareness high, and is available as on-line training in the

Workforce Development System (WDS) (which gives credit for reading). Each new issue is announced in an “All-Hands” email.

c. NCIS:

(1) Provides counterintelligence briefings. All NUWC Division, Keyport personnel who have access to Secret (or above) classified information must physically attend an NCIS

Counterintelligence Briefing at least once a year. These briefings are given at least six times a year at the Naval Undersea Museum located in Keyport. NUWC Division, Keyport Detachment personnel receive NCIS training online. Personnel are responsible for signing the attendance roster or getting their Common Access Card scanned upon arrival. This data is used to record compliance in personnel training records.

(2) Conducts foreign visitor briefings on a case-by-case basis (need is determined by

NCIS) to educate individuals working with foreign nationals, Continental United States, or abroad.

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CHAPTER 5 CONTINUOUS EVALUATION

1. Purpose. The PSP establishes the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP) to ensure individuals with national security eligibility are subject to CE per requirements and limitations of references (a) and (b). The reports are submitted to the DoD CAF when information is developed, suggesting an individual may no longer be in compliance with personnel security standards.

2. Process

a. The CEP employs a process of initial and periodic BIs to review the background of individuals and, through CE, leverages technology to conduct automated records checks of commercial databases, United State Government databases, and other information lawfully available to security officials, to supplement BI processes.

b. Information obtained via a BI, and through CE activity, is evaluated against the national security adjudicative guidelines of reference (d), which establish common criteria for individuals who require initial or continued national security eligibility.

c. The DoD CAF is the adjudicating agency for the DoD and is responsible for evaluating adverse or questionable information in the context of the “whole person”. This adjudicative process involves the totality of the individual’s conduct and relevant circumstances, to include previously reported information from a separate organization, if available. The process focuses on whether the individual, even though a security concern is present, is an acceptable security risk.

d. The goal of the CEP is to supplement PSI processes to maintain a trusted workforce and to bring about early identification of potential security concerns.

3. Responsibilities. Leadership, management, supervisors, co-workers, and individuals have a personal responsibility to expeditiously report behaviors or situations they observe or commit that may be relevant to a determination of initial or continued national security eligibility.

a. Supervisors and managers play a critical role in the success of the CEP, and are in a unique position to recognize problems early and react appropriately.

b. Supervisors and managers must monitor employee actions and behavior; promptly and appropriately address misconduct and offenses and assess employee circumstances; and refer the employee to the Civilian Employee Assistance Program Hotline or to the SM, if circumstances have the potential to develop into a security concern under the CEP.

c. Naval Sea Systems Command field activities are obligated to report to the DoD CAF any questionable or unfavorable information that falls within the national security adjudicative guidelines of reference (d). Command reports of locally developed information representing a security concern of references (a) through (f), must be reported without attempting to apply or consider any mitigating factors that may exist. Whether or not disciplinary action is taken by the

5-2 supervisor due to an employee’s conduct or involvement in an incident that may represent a security concern, the national security adjudicative guidelines are not a mitigating factor with respect to the CEP reporting requirement.

d. The SM and/or the PSPM will ensure DoD CAF reports are inclusive of locally developed information representing a security concern resulting from inquiries and investigations conducted by CEs and NCIS, and will provide objective quality evidence of reports to the DoD

CAF, when required by CEs or NCIS. If PSPM receives reportable information and forwards it to the DoD CAF electronically in JPAS and DISS, the PSPM becomes the liaison between the

DoD CAF and command personnel to work through the reporting process and follow-up.

e. NUWC Division, Keyport’s Security Office has established a pamphlet emphasizing the individual’s responsibilities for self-reporting, CE, and reporting avenues available within the command. Pamphlets are given to all new hires and available to employees through their management and/or the security department.

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APPENDIX A DEFINITIONS

Access: The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. An individual, in fact, may have access to classified information merely by being in a place where such information is kept, if the security measures that are in force do not prevent the individual from gaining knowledge of such information. NUWC Division, Keyport grants access based on

DoD CAF security clearance eligibility determination.

Adverse Information: Any information that adversely reflects on the integrity or character of an individual, or which suggests that the individual’s ability to safeguard classified information may be impaired or that the individual’s access to classified information may not be in the best interests of national security.

Clearance: A formal determination by a designated authority that a person meets the personnel security standards and is eligible for access to classified information, OTHER THAN THAT

PROTECTED IN A SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM, at the Confidential, Secret, or TS level.

(Clearance does not authorize access. Supervisors must determine access based on need-to-know.)

Command: Term for the organizational entity and includes a ship, laboratory facility, activity, unit, squadron, etc.

Commanding Officer (CO): Generic term for the head of any DON command and includes commander, commanding general, director, and officer in charge.

Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF): Entity responsible for making final adjudication decisions on an individual’s eligibility to classified information.

Final Clearance: Final clearance is granted after all investigative requirements have been met.

Foreign National: Any person not a U. S. citizen or U. S. national. American citizens representing foreign governments, foreign private interests, or other foreign nationals are considered foreign nationals for purposes of this manual, when acting in that capacity.

NACI: National Agency Check, a credit check and written inquiries.

Need-to-Know: A determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in the performance of a lawful and authorized government function essential to the fulfillment of an official United States Government program. Knowledge, possession of, or access to, classified information will not be afforded to any individual solely by virtue of the individual’s office, rank, position, or security clearance eligibility.

Periodic Reinvestigation: A reinvestigation updates a previous investigation and is authorized only for specific duties and access. The extent of the investigative coverage for reinvestigations is proportional to the sensitivity level of the duties and/or access. There are two scopes for reinvestigations: the Tier 5R (formerly SSBI Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)), completed to

A-2 update requirements for TS/SCI and other sensitive duties; and the Tier 3R (formerly National

Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC)/Access National Agency Check with Inquiries

(ANACI) reinvestigation), completed to update requirements for Secret or Confidential eligibility.

Sensitive Compartmented Information: Classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to be handled within formal access control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Sensitivity Levels: Any position whose occupant could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, an adverse effect on national security. There are three sensitivity levels:

Special Sensitive (SS) – Potential for inestimable impact and/or damage.

Critical Sensitive (CS) – Potential for grave to exceptionally grave impact and/or damage.

Non-Critical Sensitive (NCS) – Potential for some to serious impact and/or damage.

Sensitive Security Officer (SSO): Responsible for the administration of SCI eligibility and/or access.

Suitability: Suitability adjudications are based on standards and criteria established by Office of

Personnel Management, contained in Title 5 CFR 731, and are a command responsibility.

Security determinations are made subsequent to favorable suitability adjudications.

Temporary Access (Interim Clearance): A local determination to allow temporary access to classified information based on the favorable minimum investigative requirements, pending the completion of the full investigative requirements. Temporary Access can be granted to qualified personnel at the time that the investigation is requested, proof of citizenship has been provided, and the local record check is favorable. Effective for six months, but may be extended in six-month increments while the investigation is pending. (Interim access to SCI cannot be granted locally; it must be requested from DoD CAF via the SSO.)

Tier 3/3R (T3/T3R): T3/T3R investigations are being implemented as part of the phased approach for implementation of the federal investigative standards. As a result, the investigation types NACLC and Access National Agency Check with Written Inquiries plus Credit Check

(ANACI) are being replaced with the Tier 3 investigation when Confidential or Secret access to classified information is required.

Tier 5/5R (T5/T5R): T5/T5R investigations are being implemented as part of the phased approach for implementation of the federal investigative standards. As a result, the investigation types Background Investigation (BI), Periodic Reinvestigation (PRI), Single Scope Background

Investigation (SSBI), SSBI-Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR), or the Phased Periodic

Reinvestigation (PPR) are being replaced with T5/T5R investigations when TS access to classified information is required, a position sensitivity is designated as Critical Sensitive, or when a position is IT Level I/Privileged access.

B-1

APPENDIX B FORMS

1. The following forms are available for download from the U.S. General Services

Administration Forms Library website (https://www.gsa.gov/portal.forms):

a. Standard Form (SF) 312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement

b. Optional Form (OF) 306, Declaration for Federal Employment

c. Standard Form (SF) 85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions

d. Standard Form (SF) 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions

e. Standard Form (SF) 86C, Standard Form 86 Certification https://www.gsa.gov/portal.forms