MQ-1_MQ-9_CY16-18_JA_(APPROVED_04_OCT_14)_Reda.pdf

CLASS JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL (J&A) FOR OTHER THAN

FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

I. CONTRACTING ACTIVITY

AFMC (AFLCMC/WIKBA)

235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB GA 31098-1670

PCO: Dale Dalrymple

DSN: 468-8381

PR Numbers: FX2399-16-00102; FX2399-16-00104; FX2399-16-00103

II. NATURE AND/OR DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION BEING PROCESSED

This J&A for Other Than Full and Open Competition (FAR Part 6.302-1, “Only One Responsible

Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements”) supports the Air

Force Life Cycle Management Center, the Medium Altitude Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Division, and its delegates. This document provides authority to the aforementioned organizations to award new Sole Source Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) sustainment contracts in support of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper Weapon Systems for Calendar

Years (CY) 16 through 18. This J&A follows the authorities initially granted under Class J&A

WIIK-11-01A, approved 17 Feb 12, relative to Operations and Maintenance. The weapon systems include the Air Vehicles, the Ground Control Stations (GCS), the Multi-spectral

Targeting System (MTS), Airborne Cueing and Exploitation System Hyper-spectral System

(ACES HY) and Satellite Communication (SATCOM) equipment, engines and new systems subsequently incorporated onto the aircraft. Authorities granted under this J&A are applicable, whether executed at the Medium Altitude UAS Division, Program Office at Wright-Patterson

AFB OH, or at AFLCMC/ WIILR, at Robins AFB GA, or at any AFMC location approved by the

Medium Altitude UAS Division. This flexibility is required due to the Quick Reaction

Capability (QRC) requirements of the system which is needed to meet changing operational mission requirements.

This Class J&A shall only be applied to those contracting actions wherein a Market Research

Report concludes the Government cannot competitively award a CLS sustainment contract. Due to the restrictive factors surrounding data rights, to include ongoing validation of asserted restrictions in technical data and computer software, limited competition between the sources is not envisioned.

Upon combining the Sustainment Strategy Business Case Analysis (SBCA) recommendations and the most recent information gathered, the program office continued its plans for the Organic

Repair Early Induction Program. During the 2nd quarter of FY13, the program office determined the current repair data did not adequately support the existing comprehensive depot activation strategy, and a modification to that strategy was warranted. The original strategy had a limited number of components planned for organic depot activation. The updated strategy is expanded and includes all program of record Line Replaceable Units / Shop Replaceable Units

(LRUs/SRUs) with an acquisition cost of $1000 or greater and three or more failures per year.

The updated strategy was briefed and approved by program office leadership, on 30 May 13.

The new approach will establish four separate Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) contracts for

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated (GA-ASI), L-3 Communications Systems

West (L-3 Com), Honeywell, and Raytheon to perform LSA on all depot- level components for

MQ-9. The MQ-1 was not included in these efforts as the Air Force plans to divest within the

FYDP. The LSAs will give the program office the necessary analyses to ensure the most appropriate sustainment strategies are executed for weapon system components. Each LSA effort is planned to be a 24 month period of performance. This analysis includes each MQ-9

LRU/SRU program of record configuration that has an acquisition cost of $1000 or greater and three or more failures per year. The deliveries are planned to be incremental and continue through early FY17. The analysis will include delivery of recommendations for each LRU/SRU on level of repair analysis, maintenance task analysis, provisioning, support equipment recommendation data, commercial in lieu of organic analysis, training, automatic test equipment solution, depot technical order lists, configuration management plan, test program set/test requirements determination, computer resources, manpower/personnel, and facilities. Once the analysis deliverables are approved by the Government, a determination will be made on viable candidates for establishment of organic depot repair capability. Once these organic candidate determinations are made, future contractual actions, providing depot activation funding is available, will be taken to procure the needed requirements (tools, test equipment, etc.) to actually establish organic repair capability. Sole source support will be needed until organic depot activation transition has been completed.

The program office has continued efforts to transition depot-level repair activity from the current

Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) to an organic/contractor mix source of repair in compliance with 10 USC 2464 (Core). There are MQ-1 components that have been activated as part of the Early Induction effort. Currently, MTS-A/B sensors are repaired organically under a

Public Private Partnership (PPP). In addition, 11 MQ-1 components and 7 MQ-9 components are also under contract as part of the Early Induction program. All of these components will be activated by Apr 15. The MQ-1 is not anticipated or funded for full depot activation.

With regard to MQ-9, depot-level repair capability for the MTS-B sensor was activated at the

Fleet Readiness Center-South East in the 4th Quarter FY13. The goal is to continue moving towards organic, to the maximum extent possible for the MQ-9 and additional weapon system components will be evaluated for organic activation based upon LSA results and funding availability. Further determination will be made as LSA data becomes available to the

Government, again with all best efforts made to maximize organic capability. In the interim and during any organic transition, CLS contracts will continue to provide sustainment support for the

MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems. Future PPPs and/or additional early organic stand-up will be pursued in future sustainment contracts subject to the outcome of the LSA and future organic capacity. The program office will report annually at Service Acquisition Executive-level meetings (e.g. Configuration Steering Board, Fall Program Review, and Spring Program Review, etc.) on its continuing efforts to maximize future competition for the MQ-9, with a specific focus on the competition of sustainment activities not planned for organic depot.

Currently, CLS sustainment is provided to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems as follows: GA-

ASI (air vehicle), GCSs (data links), and MQ-1 (engines); Raytheon (sensors); L-3 Com (reach back ground terminal SATCOM capability); and Honeywell (Aerospace-MQ-9 engines).

Starting on 1 Jan 16, this J&A applies to the following OEMs:

1. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI)-OEM for the

MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon system

14200 Kirkham Way, Poway CA 92064

CAGE Code: 0YJB5

2. Raytheon Company-OEM for MTS-A/B and ACES HY system integrator

2501 W. University Dr., McKinney TX 75071

CAGE Code: 96214

3. L-3 Communications (L-3 Com)-OEM for SATCOM terminals (Reachback), for

MQ-1 and MQ-9 datalinks and other communication components that are part of the

MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems

640 N. 2200 W., Salt Lake City UT 84116

CAGE Code: 06401

4. Honeywell Aerospace-OEM for the MQ-9 engine and for the Embedded Global

Positioning System/Internal Navigation System (EGI) for both MQ-1/MQ-9.

111 S. 34th

St., Phoenix AZ 85284

CAGE Code: 99193

The Period of Authority for contract award for this Class J&A is 1 Jan 16 through 31 Dec 18. The total estimated value for this effort is $1,873,400,000. The periods of performance are based upon calendar years. Completion of tasks initiated on non-severable CLINs may extend beyond 31 Dec

2018; however, no additional or new work may be initiated beyond the calendar year.

AFLCMC/WII expects to award a stand-alone contract to Honeywell for repair of MQ-9 engines during the 3 year period of this J&A authority. LSA will identify the data, materials, and equipment necessary to accomplish organic standup and, if possible, a PPP will be awarded to accomplish this.

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE SUPPLIES/SERVICES REQUIRED TO MEET THE

AGENCY ’S NEEDS

This J&A provides authority for other than full and open competition for procurement of CLS for the sustainment of MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems. There are currently 145 MQ-1, 165 MQ-9, and 193 GCSs stationed at 37 sites worldwide which support 64 Combat Air Patrols. Supplies and services supporting these systems will include: program management, repairs and spares, Contractor Field Service Representatives, sustaining engineering, software maintenance, reliability and maintainability improvements, configuration management, data management, contractor inventory control point, depot supply support, technical manuals, and depot maintenance for these systems. Repairs are based on flying hours which fluctuate based on operational demand. In addition, CLS efforts are frequently used to support QRC requirements based on real-world need. Supported organizations include Air Combat Command, Air National

Guard, Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Education and Training Command and various CONUS and OCONUS locations.

The total estimated value for this effort is $1,873,400,000. The following table identifies the total estimated funding by CY for the three-year J&A period for all OEMs. The funding estimates were derived from the FY15 CLS brochure for MQ-1 and MQ-9. The brochure is developed and managed by the Program Office responsible for the weapon system management with input from Lead Commands (ACC, AFSOC, ANG). It documents the programmatic sustainment requirements for a weapon system, which includes a narrative describing and costing each support task for the system. The provided data is used to substantiate budget submissions.

Brochure estimates are as follows:

CY16 CY17 CY18 TOTAL

3400 CLS Contract Cost $M $563.2 $599.1 $711.1 $1,873.4

IV. STATUTORY AUTHORITY PERMITTING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN

COMPETITION

The statutory authority, which permits other than full and open competition for this acquisition, is 10 USC § 2304 (c) (1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1. Only the responsible sources

(GA-ASI, Raytheon, L-3 Com, and Honeywell Aerospace) will satisfy agency requirements.

V. DEMONSTRATION THAT THE CONTRACTOR’S UNIQUE QUALIFICATIONS

OR NATURE OF THE ACQUISITION REQUIRES THE USE OF THE AUTHORITY

CITED ABOVE (APPLICABILITY OF AUTHORITY)

The MQ-1 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration contract was competitively awarded to

GA-ASI in 1994. Following award, GA-ASI became the sole designer, developer, manufacturer, and depot-level source of repair of the MQ-1 weapon system. GA-ASI was awarded a contract to build 10 systems and then a subsequent effort for four additional systems. GA-ASI subcontracted with Raytheon, Honeywell, and L-3Comm, for specific program sub-systems. Since inception, the MQ-1 has proven to be an even greater asset than the warfighter originally envisioned. As a result, requirements for MQ-1 increased significantly to meet increased operational demands and

Overseas Contingency Operations to include Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

The MQ-9 Program began in Oct 01 as a Big Safari QRC Program, which procured MQ-9 aircraft from GA-ASI and then later developed the GA-ASI MQ-9 into a Hunter-Killer remote piloted aircraft (RPA). Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed concurrent development and production early in the program. An interim combat capable version of MQ-9 was fielded to provide initial war fighting capabilities while a more capable MQ-9 system was developed during the System Development and Demonstration phase. Incremental fielding of

MQ-9 was further accelerated in Mar 06 at the request of the Commander of the Air Combat

Command.

The original approved support strategy for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 Programs was CLS for Life and technical data were not purchased. In accordance with 10 U.S. Code § 2464, the MQ-1 and MQ-

9 were designated as Core, or essential for the national defense that the DoD maintain a core logistics capability that is Government-owned and Government-operated. For this reason, significant focus was placed upon the stand up of organic repair capability and in 2009, the program office pursued the procurement of a Technical Data Package (TDP) and received a

Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) from GA-ASI to develop the data packages for the MQ-1, MQ-9, GCS, ground data terminal and automated test equipment.

In Sep 2012, the program office received a proposal from GA-ASI which included TDP information for Line Replaceable Units (LRU) under the FY13 MQ-9 production contract.

GA-ASI provided bids on for the re-procurement packages and for the data rights. The remaining LRUs were designated not for sale by the contractor.

The program office also received a TDP cost for the Block 50 GCS. The re-procurement package

The Government completed extensive market research in 2009-2012 in order to determine what companies were capable of providing the expertise and capability the MQ-1/9 platform or subsystems. Based on industry responses and the Government’s analysis, the Government identified that there were instances in which the Government could contract directly with the sub-system OEMs for development, retrofit, and sustainment for the MQ-1/9 Aircraft. As a result, the following companies were determined to be the only viable sources which could support the

MQ-1/MQ-9 program: GA-ASI, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and Honeywell.

1. GA-ASI: Detailed description of requirement for sole source is stated above.

2. Raytheon Company: Raytheon is the developer and sole provider of the MTS-A/B for

MQ-1 and MQ-9 operations. While Raytheon has delivered limited commercial source control drawings that are helpful for purposes of developing organic depot maintenance, Raytheon did not deliver a technical data package capable of supporting competition.

Therefore, MQ-1/MQ-9 engineering has determined that it would be very high risk to conduct a future competition for sustainment of Raytheon components. In addition, Raytheon has stated that they consider the MTS-B and the Electronics Unit (EU) for the

MQ-9 Reaper a critical part of their Technology Portfolio and would not consider selling

Raytheon documentation or rights for software.

Although an "alternate design" solution is conceivable, this would present a major duplication of acquisition costs to develop, integrate, test, document, train and establish logistical support for an alternate MTS source. The delays to develop a feasible sensor design from an alternate vendor would significantly impact the program's ability to deliver fully mission capable RPAs to meet Air Combat Command's current CAP requirement. Additional support/sustainment and cost issues would be affected by the length of the transition window for which the program would have to operate and support both the current and alternate source sensor configurations. On one hand, a long and protracted transition window implies a major cost burden for the USAF to operate and maintain multiple sensor configurations which affects both field and depot operations; while on the other hand, an aggressive transition schedule implies an unnecessary replacement of current MTS sensors well prior to the end of their usable life. There would also be additional logistical complications anticipated with setting up and maintaining an alternate sensor supplier and associated field and depot maintenance provisions which would factor in as additional schedule and cost risks.

In summary, the cost, schedule and operations/sustainment implications to the program to switch over to an alternative supplier would be substantial. It would take approximately 3-4 years to complete just the collective set of acquisition steps necessary to achieve a fully integrated and validated system and to establish the various logistics infrastructure and associated requirements to ensure a readiness for operations/sustainment. This schedule could further be affected by other factors associated with an open competition and getting the developmental and production contracts underway. The costs to establish an alternate supplier could be on the order of

$10-30 Million as a first order approximation, but highly contingent upon the degree of changes required to modify and adapt a competitor's product to meet program capability and performance requirements, RPA upgrades, GCS interfaces and software requirements. Once an alternate design/supplier has been established there would then be a transition period of certain duration in which we would be supporting a mixed fleet of sensor configurations and carrying dual support, training and other infrastructure.

3. L-3 Communications: Manufactures and maintains satellite communications terminals for MQ-1/MQ-9 and is a major subcontractor to GA-ASI for the GCS and portions of the MQ-1/MQ-9 aircraft. L3 Communications, Salt Lake City Division, is the prime contractor for the development, production and sustainment of several primary command and control elements of the MQ-1/MQ-RPAs. Most of these components are unique to the MQ- l/MQ-9 Programs and are critical for flight operations and controlling aircraft over extended lines of communication known as Remote Site

Operations (RSOs). These assets are designed and produced to meet specific data link performance requirements in addition to meeting stringent size, weight and power

(SWaP) limitations.

The contractor produces and sustains the MQ-1/MQ-9 Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data link which is comprised of both airborne and ground based components. The current version is uniquely configured to meet legacy waveform and SWaP limitations.

There are no other vendors who can readily produce and deliver similar components without a costly and lengthy development activity to identify, develop and package protocols, software and communication hardware into a form factor usable to the program. The contractor produces the ground communications segment for RPA's GCS and Predator MODEM Assembly (PMA) supporting MQ-1/MQ-9 RSO architecture.

The GCS segment and its paired PMA are uniquely designed to support the RSO network and are based on the RPA’s proprietary command and control and timing synchronization schemas. The RSO network is extensive and covers multiple CONUS and Outside CONUS locations. L-3 Communications is the only supplier of this hardware and it is exclusively used by the MQ-1/MQ-9 Programs. Any substitute hardware will require development, testing and possible retrofit of existing systems to ensure compatibility.

The contractor produces satellite communication terminals for MQ-l /MQ-9 that host

RSO hardware and supports the RSO network. The terminals are also used by other

USAF and Army programs. The MQ-1/MQ-9 assesses continued procurement of these terminals as a program risk reduction effort by maintaining parity with other programs and current inventory. Keeping the same terminals reduces our logistic footprint and enables further development and retrofit activities.

The Government requested bids for technical data packages for specific L-3 items in the

FY13 MQ-9 Production and Block 50 GCS RFPs.

The Government will continue efforts to procure data with the appropriate rights from the OEM in the future; however, the near term focus will be on completing and reviewing LSA data in order to standup depot repair at an organic facility.

4. Honeywell: Major subsystems subcontractor to GA-ASI as the OEM for the MQ-9 engine and for the Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System for both MQ-l /MQ-9. Honeywell will continue as a subcontractor to GA-ASI; however, AFLCMC/WII expects to award a stand-alone contract to Honeywell for repair of MQ-9 engines during the 3 year period of this J&A authority.

The Government requested bids for technical data packages for specific Honeywell items in the FY13 MQ-9 Production RFP. . The

Government will continue efforts to procure data with the appropriate rights from the

OEM in the future; however, the near term focus will be on completing and reviewing

LSA data in order to standup depot repair at an organic facility.

As a result, the Government approved Class J&A WIIK-11-01A, on 17 Feb 12, for GA-ASI, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and Honeywell for the development, production, upgrade and sustainment efforts for the MQ-1/9. This CY16-18 J&A, for MQ-1/9 sustainment only, follows the authorities initially granted under Class J&A WIIK-11-01A. Further, the Government intends to contract directly with each of these OEM vendors to cover sustainment for the specific components each supports, to include planning and support for organic depot activation efforts.

Doing so will avoid unnecessary pass-through fees associated with a prime vendor sustainment approach.

In order to move from Sole Source CLS sustainment to organic depot repair (as recommended in the SBCA) and competitive sustainment (eg., procurement of replenishment spares), the

Government must have the rights to a TDP and delivery of the necessary data. The program office, through the Data Rights Team (DRT), continues to methodically verify contractor data rights assertions by analyzing the assertions, requesting additional data, researching the basis for the assertions and, in certain circumstances, developing a basis for potential challenge of contractor assertions. This process has resulted in the contractor acknowledging the Government possesses greater technical data rights than the contractor initially asserted. The program office has recently received updated computer software assertions where Government purpose rights are delineated for a number of Computer Software Components (CSC). The OEMs have also acknowledged the Government has unlimited rights to certain CSCs. While the program office continues to verify data rights, to date, there has not been funding approved to procure TDPs from the OEMs.

Due to the lack of technical data and funding mentioned above, an evaluation of the necessary actions required to obtain TDPs was conducted. It is estimated to take a minimum of approximately 8-years and cost approximately $1.6B dollars ($400M for MQ-1 and $1.2B for MQ-

9). These figures are based upon engineering estimates drawn from prior appropriation expenditures, Independent Research and Development investment by the contractors, and an approximation of 4,615 man years for task performance. Moreover, any new contractor using the

TDP would be required to conduct significant verification and testing activities which would add additional cost and time to the overall effort. The DoD’s operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities would be degraded if there were any break in sustainment support for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems.

Based on these results, the program office believes that award to sources other than GA-ASI, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and Honeywell would result in substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition and will result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling Air Force requirements. These firms are capable of providing the supplies and services described in Section III without the U.S. Air Force experiencing substantial duplication of cost that could not be expected to be recovered through competition.

This J&A applies only to the procurement of sustainment supplies and services from GA-ASI, Raytheon, L-3 Com, and Honeywell in support of the MQ-1 and MQ-9 Program from CY16 through CY18. While the Air Force plans to divest MQ-1within the FYDP (per the FY15 PB), the MQ-9 end of life is not until 2044.

VI. DESCRIPTION OF EFFORTS MADE TO ENSURE THAT OFFERS ARE

SOLICITED FROM AS MANY POTENTIAL SOURCES AS DEEMED PRACTICABLE

Source Sought Synopses were posted to Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) on

20 Nov 13, as a part of market research. Only two contractors responded (both non-incumbents)-

Northrop Grumman Technical Services and Battlespace Flight Services. The Government analyzed their responses and determined that the businesses could not fulfill the requirement (see

Section VIII). This requirement will again be synopsized on the FedBizOpps web page as required by FAR 5.201. It is anticipated that sources having an interest in subcontracting may be identified through synopsis. Although the Government does not yet own data to support acquisition of sustainment support from any other source, any source who responds to the

Government as a result of this synopsis will be identified to the prime contractor as a potential source for subcontracting possibilities.

VII. DETERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTING OFFICER THAT THE

ANTICIPATED COST TO THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE FAIR AND REASONABLE

The overall cost of this acquisition will be fair and reasonable to the Government. In accordance with FAR 15.403-4, the contractors will be required to provide certified cost or pricing data to be used in supporting the Government’s evaluation of the proposed costs. The proposed skill mix of labor, labor hours, types and quantities of material, other direct costs, and direct and indirect rates will be negotiated by the Government based on recommendations from Defense Contract Audit

Agency and expert technical personnel supporting the program. The contract prices will be negotiated in accordance with the procedures in FAR Part 15 ensuring the ultimate cost/price to the Government is fair and reasonable.

VIII. DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET RESEARCH CONDUCTED AND THE

RESULTS, OR A STATEMENT OF THE REASONS MARKET RESEARCH WAS NOT

CONDUCTED

Market research was conducted pursuant to FAR Part 10; details are cited further below.

Sources Sought Synopsis was posted on FedBizOpps on 20 Nov 13. Only two contractors responded: Northrop Grumman Technical Services and Battlespace Flight Services. The

Government reviewed the responses submitted by these two contractors and determined that they do not possess the capability to provide sustainment support to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon system because they do not own the required data. Analysis confirmed that those contractors who do not possess a TDP are incapable of providing sustainment support to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon systems. Any potential contractors wanting to compete for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 sustainment workload or any portion thereof would require production level technical data presently owned by individual vendors. As stated previously, the Government does not have this data to provide.

Based on industry responses and the Government’s analyses, the following companies were determined to be the only viable sources which could provide sustainment support and services to the MQ-1and MQ-9 Program:

1. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI)-OEM for the

MQ-1and MQ-9

2. Raytheon Company-OEM for MTS-A/B sensors and ACES HY system integrator

3. L-3 Communications (L-3 Com)-OEM for SATCOM terminals (Reachback) for MQ-1 and MQ-9

4. Honeywell Aerospace-OEM for the MQ-9 engine and for the EGI for both

MQ-1 and MQ-9

IX. ANY OTHER FACTS SUPPORTING THE USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND

OPEN COMPETITION

The original RQ-1 Program, later to become the MQ-1 Predator, was competitively awarded in

January 1994. The sustainment effort for the MQ-1 was determined to be supported via CLS for the duration of the system’s life cycle, based on the best cost determination at that time. The

MQ-9 Program began as a QRC Program in October 2001, also with a CLS sustainment strategy for the life of the program. While efforts are currently being made to acquire data, or rights to data, the Government does not currently possess sufficient data to compete any part or portion of the MQ-1/MQ-9 sustainment requirements.

Additionally, this is a dynamic and fast evolving program with updates, upgrades, and mission changes resulting in an environment where, in the time it takes to evaluate and award a competitive contract action, the resultant outcome would likely be obsolete before completion. Also, if there were any break in sustainment support for the MQ-1 and MQ-9, the DoD's operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities would be severely degraded.

QRC implications and operational impacts are inherent to the mission and do impact the ability to openly compete portions of the program.

X. LIST OF SOURCES, IF ANY, THAT EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE

ACQUISITION

Two non-incumbent contractors responded to a Sources Sought Synopsis posted on FedBizOpps on 20 Nov 13: Northrop Grumman Technical Services, Herndon, VA and Battlespace Flight

Services, LLC, North Las Vegas, NV. The government reviewed the responses submitted by these two contractors and determined that they do not possess the capability to provide sustainment support to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 weapon system. Analysis confirmed that those contractors who do not possess a TDP are incapable of providing sustainment support to the MQ-

1 and MQ-9 weapon systems. Neither respondent provided an adequate plan to overcome this barrier. The Government does not possess the rights in technical data that are necessary for sustainment and support of MQ-1/-9 weapon system. Any potential contractors wanting to compete for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 sustainment workload or any portion thereof would require production level technical data presently owned by individual vendors. As stated above, the

Government also does not have this data to provide.

XI. A STATEMENT OF THE ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE AGENCY MAY TAKE TO

REMOVE OR OVERCOME ANY BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BEFORE MAKING

SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITIONS FOR THE SUPPLIES OR SERVICES REQUIRED

Obtaining Data Rights

To facilitate efforts to move away from Sole Source CLS contracts, the program office stood up a

Data Rights Team (DRT) in April 2011 with the authority to address all phases (development, production, and sustainment) of the program, is working to ensure appropriate data rights and technical data packages are obtained in order to maximize organic depot repair capabilities and competitively awarded sustainment contracts. The DRT focuses on baselining the technical data currently available, identifying additional required technical data, the ability to procure additional technical data, the estimated costs to develop/procure the necessary technical data to support organic depots and competitive contracts, and assists the program teams in developing strategies to secure data rights and the technical data itself.

The program office has developed a technical data strategy to capture technical data requirements and ensure the correct data will be identified, acquired, and delivered. The DRT is leading the execution of this strategy. These technical data efforts will be used in supporting the following:

1. Ongoing organic depot stand-up decisions made through the Depot Source of

Repair process.

2. Working with the program teams to identify the parts and systems that could potentially be competed.

3. Continuing to verify contractor data rights assertions by analyzing, requesting additional data, researching the basis, and challenging of contractor assertions.

4. Identifying and acquiring computer software deliverables and associated intellectual property rights.

5. Request delivery of the source code and documentation for a specific CSC item.

The program office will continue to pursue all appropriate data rights and technical data to include procurement of those rights and data as funding allows. Any disagreements regarding data rights will be addressed by the cognizant contracting officer and in accordance with applicable DFARS.

Depot Activation Activities

The program office continues its long term sustainment plan to move away from Sole Source CLS activities and is pursuing the establishment of organic depot repair capabilities through the Depot

Maintenance Activation Working Group (DMAWG) and competitive sustainment contracts. It is important to note, however, that while this J&A is asking for approval to proceed with CLS support for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 concurrently, the Air Force plans to divest the MQ-1within the

Future Years Defense Plan/Program (FYDP) (per the Fiscal Year [FY]15 President's Budget [PB]).

As stated above, the DMAWG is an ongoing effort designated to define those actions and activities necessary to establish organic depot repair capability at the identified Acquisition Logistics

Centers. The DMAWG and LSA analysis efforts will continue the long term sustainment plan to move away from sole source CLS activities and is pursuing the establishment of organic depot repair capabilities to the greatest extent possible and as follows:

1. Continuing implementation of the Early Induction Program.

2. Provide data to ensure most appropriate sustainment strategies are implemented including: Determining/updating; depot-level support capabilities, level of repair analysis, depot repair analysis (commercial in lieu of organic), training, Automated Test Equipment solution recommendation, Test Procedure

Set/Technical Repair Document source development data, Level II Repair Data, depot repair manuals, manpower/personnel, computer resources, facilities, etc.

3. Identify items that are viable candidates for organic depot repair.

4. Identify items determined not to be viable candidates for organic depot repair that will be considered for repair under a PPP or OEM contract repair.

5. Review of the components and accompanying data packages for potential competition and corresponding request for OEM data packages.

Future Contracts

Priced options for TDPs and data rights for specific LRUs were part of the FY13 MQ-9

Production Request for Proposal (RFP). The FY15 Production RFP also contained options for

TDPs and data rights for specified LRUs. Further, the Block 50 GCS Low Rate Initial Production

RFP will contain a requirement for the procurement of a TDP and data rights.

However, the program office did not have the funds to procure TDPs from the OEM. The program office has obtained a priced option for the Ground Data Terminal that, if acquired, will provide the ability to compete further production lots. The limiting factor has and will likely continue to be funding for the procurement actions. In most cases the program has not budgeted to make TDP procurements.

Future development and production efforts will be evaluated for data rights requirements and, when applicable, the RFP will include options for TDPs and data rights. Multiple system modifications and development activities the program office is working will include: Technical data contract clauses, Statement of Work updates, tailored data item descriptions, and associated

Contract Data Requirements Lists.

XII. CONTRACTING O FFICER’S CERTIFICATION

The contracting officer’s signature on the J&A signature page evidences that he has determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief. (FAR

6.303-2[b] [12)]).

XIII.TECHNICAL/REQUIREMENTS PERSONNEL’S CERTI FICATION

As evidenced by their signatures on the J&A signature page, the technical and/or requirements personnel have certified that any supporting data contained herein is to the best of their knowledge and belief both accurate and complete. (FAR 6.303-2[c]).