Appendix H - MIL HNDBK 1013-1A.pdf

*INCH-POUND*

MIL-HDBK-1013/1A

15 DECEMBER 1993

SUPERSEDING

MIL-HDBK-1013/1

9 OCTOBER 1987

MILITARY HANDBOOK

DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

OF FACILITIES

AMSC N/A

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS

UNLIMITED

AREA FACR

MIL-HDBK-1013/1A

ABSTRACT

This manual provides guidance to ensure that appropriate physical security considerations are included in the design of facilities. The pre-design phase, including physical security threats, are discussed initially, followed by an overview of the design phase. Specific technical sections include exterior site physical security, building physical security, ballistic attack hardening, standoff weapon hardening, and bomb blast hardening.

ii

FOREWORD

This military handbook has been developed from an evaluation of facilities in the shore establishment, from surveys of the availability of new materials and construction methods, and from selection of the best design practices of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, other DOD services and Government agencies, and the private sector. It uses, to the maximum extent feasible, national professional society, association, and institute standards.

Deviations from this criteria, in the planning, engineering, design, and construction of facilities, cannot be made without prior approval of respective military departments.

Design cannot remain static any more than can the functions it serves or the technologies it uses. Accordingly, recommendations for improvement are encouraged and should be furnished to the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), Code ESC12, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4328, telephone (805) 982-9640.

THIS HANDBOOK SHALL NOT BE USED AS A REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR PROCUREMENT OF

FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION. IT IS TO BE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF FACILITIES

ENGINEERING STUDIES AND DESIGN (FINAL PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND COST

ESTIMATES). DO NOT REFERENCE IT IN MILITARY OR FEDERAL SPECIFICATIONS OR

OTHER PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS.

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PAGE iv INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES

CONTENTS

Page

Section 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Scope

1.2 Cancellation

1.3 Using the Handbook

1.4 Related Technical Documents

Section 2 PRE-DESIGN PHASE

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Objective

2.1.2 Design Team

2.1.3 Section Organization

2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and

Requirements

2.2.1 DoD Directive 5200.8-R: Security of DoD

Installations and Resources

2.2.1.1 Security System Elements and Performance

Objectives

2.2.1.2 Physical Security Threat and Prioritization of

Assets

2.2.1.3 Protective Design and Military Construction . . 4

2.2.2 MIL-HDBK-1190: Facility Planning and Design . . 4

2.2.3 DoD 5200.1-R: DoD Information Security Program

Regulation of 30 May 1986; DoD 5200.2-R: DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation of 16 December 1986; and DoD 5230.24: Distribution Statements on Technical Documents

2.2.4 DoD 4270.1M: Policy Guidelines for Installation, Planning, Design, Construction and Upkeep . . . 5

2.3 Establishing the Security System Design

Threat

2.3.1 Overview

2.3.2 Design Threat

2.3.3 Aggressor Characteristics

2.3.3.1 Aggressor Objectives

2.3.3.2 Aggressor Types

2.3.3.3 Aggressor Tactics

2.3.4 Design Threat Selection

2.3.4.1 Overview

2.3.4.2 Identifying Asset Types

2.3.4.3 Correlate Asset to Aggressor Types

2.3.4.4 Correlate Attack Type and Severity to

Aggressor Type v

Page

2.3.4.5 For Asset Category Determine Whether Threat

Ingress or Egress Denial Must be Provided by the Security System

2.4 Establishing Guard Force Operating Procedures

and Response Times

2.4.1 Purpose

2.4.2 Guard Types/and Operating Procedures

2.4.2.1 Fixed Location

2.4.2.2 Mobile

2.4.2.3 Reaction Force

2.4.2.4 Combinations

2.4.3 Estimating the Guard Response Time

2.5 Other Constraints and Requirements

Section 3 DESIGN PHASE

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Objectives

3.1.2 Design Team

3.1.3 Section Organization

3.2 Basic Integrated Security System Design

Concepts

3.2.1. Security System Functional Elements

3.2.1.1 Real-Time Operating Systems

3.2.1.2 Integrated Functional Performance

3.2.1.3 Deterrence Associated with a Security System . . 24

3.2.2 Real-Time Security System Operating Modes

3.2.3 Security Denial/Containment Zones

3.2.4 Balancing System Response and Intruder

Timelines

3.2.5 Barrier Penetration Performance

3.2.5.1 Forcible Entry Barrier Penetration

3.2.5.2 Ballistic or Standoff Weapon Barrier Penetration 29

3.2.5.3 Vehicle Barrier Penetration

3.2.6 Intrusion Detection

3.2.6.1 Exterior Detection Along the Site Perimeter. . . 29

3.2.6.2 Detection at the Building Surface

3.2.6.3 Detection Within Building Interiors

3.2.7 Entry Control

3.2.8 Threat Assessment

3.2.9 Security Lighting

3.3 Key Terms and Definitions

3.3.1 Introduction

3.3.2 Delay Time

3.3.3 Barrier Forced Entry Penetration Time

3.3.4 Ingress Time

3.3.5 Egress Time

3.3.6 Man-Passable Opening

vi

3.3.7 Intrusion Detection System

3.3.8 Restricted Area

3.4 Security Design Procedure

3.4.1 Overview

3.4.2 Design Approach

3.4.3 Design Procedure

3.4.3.1 Design Worksheets

3.4.3.2 Design Activity Chart

Section 4 EXTERIOR SITE-RELATED PHYSICAL SECURITY

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Exterior Site Work and Layout

4.2.1 Introduction

4.2.2 Installation-Wide Security Considerations

4.2.2.1 Existing Site Security

4.2.2.2 Collocate Facilities of Similar Asset Criticality

On Site

4.2.2.3 Routes of Travel

4.2.2.4 Security Area Designation

4.2.3 Facility-Specific Exterior Site Layout

4.2.3.1 Maintaining an Adequate Standoff Blast Zone for

Vehicle Bomb Threats

4.2.3.2 Limit or Blocking Against Direct Line-of-Sight

Weapons

4.2.3.3 Maximize Exterior Site Forced-Entry Threat

Ingress/Egress Distances

4.2.3.4 Maintaining Clear Zones for Guard and/or CCTV

Observation

4.3 Exterior Site Perimeter Barriers

4.3.1 Introduction

4.3.2 Security Fences

4.3.3 Vehicle Barriers

4.4 Exterior Site Entry Control

4.4.1 Introduction

4.4.2 Function and Location

4.4.3 Minimum Requirements

4.4.4 Gates to Perimeter Fences

4.4.4.1 Overview

4.4.4.2 Personnel Gates

4.4.4.3 Vehicle Gates

4.4.5 Entry Control Point (ECP) Layout and Traffic

Control

4.4.6 Types of Entry Control Systems

4.4.6.1 Overview

4.4.6.2 Personnel Access Control System for Explosives, Metal and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) Detection

4.5 Exterior Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems . 75

4.5.1 Introduction

4.5.2 Function and Location

vii

4.5.2.1 Overview

4.5.2.2 Exterior IDS Layout and System Compatibility. . . 78

4.5.3 Minimum Requirements for Exterior IDS

4.5.4 Exterior IDS Options for Detection Along Site

Perimeter Fences

4.5.4.1 Most Commonly Deployed Sensors

4.5.4.2 Other Exterior IDS Sensor Candidates

4.5.5 Exterior IDS Detection at Building Exteriors. . . 83

4.5.5.1 Ported Coaxial Cable Sensors

4.5.5.2 Vibration Sensors

4.5.5.3 Grid Wire Sensors

4.6 Exterior Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

4.6.1 Introduction

4.6.2 CCTV Function and Location

4.6.2.1 Threat Assessment

4.6.2.2 Surveillance

4.6.2.3 Location

4.6.3 Minimum Requirements

4.6.4 Elements of a CCTV Assessment System

4.6.4.1 Camera Types

4.6.4.2 CCTV Monitors

4.7 Exterior Security Lighting

4.7.1 Introduction

4.7.2 Function and Location

4.7.3 Standard Exterior Lighting Configurations

4.7.3.1 Continuous Lighting

4.7.3.2 Standby Lighting

4.7.4 Minimum Lighting Illumination Specification . . . 89

4.7.4.1 Guard Visual Surveillance

4.7.4.2 Lighting for CCTV Surveillance

4.7.5 Lighting Energy Considerations

4.7.5.1 Overview

4.7.5.2 Restrike Time

4.8 Maintaining Essential Security Support Functions.

4.8.1 Overview

4.8.2 Security Power Supply

4.8.3 General Installation Power Supply

4.8.4 Communications

4.8.5 Security Control Center

Section 5 BUILDING PHYSICAL SECURITY AGAINST FORCED AND COVERT

ENTRY

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Threat Severity Levels for Forced and Covert Entry

Design

5.2.1 Forced Entry

5.2.2 Covert Entry

viii

5.3 Integrated Security System Elements for the

Building

5.3.1 Overview

5.3.2 Building Layout and Barrier Design

5.3.3 Building Access Control

5.3.3.1 Introduction

5.3.3.2 Function and Location

5.3.3.3 Minimum Requirements

5.3.3.4 Personnel Identity Verification Systems

5.3.3.5 Materials Access Control

5.3.4 Building Located Intrusion Detection Systems . . 100

5.3.4.1 Function and Location

5.3.4.2 Minimum Requirements

5.3.4.3 Detection at the Barrier

5.3.4.4 Detection Within Building Interior Volumes . . . 102

5.3.4.5 Duress Switches

5.3.5 Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

5.3.5.1 Introduction

5.3.5.2 Function and Location

5.3.5.3 Minimum Requirements

5.3.5.4 Available Technology

5.4 Minimum Construction Requirements

5.4.1 General

5.4.2 Vaults

5.4.2.1 Class A Vaults

5.4.2.2 Class B Vaults

5.4.2.3 Modular Vaults

5.4.3 Strongrooms

5.4.3.1 Minimum Construction

5.4.3.2 Penetration Times

5.4.4 Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Facilities 110

5.4.4.1 Minimum Requirements for AA&E Facilities

5.4.5 Nuclear Weapons Facilities

5.4.5.1 Minimum Construction

5.4.5.2 Penetration Times

5.4.6 Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

(SCIF)

5.4.6.1 Minimum Construction

5.4.6.2 Penetration Times

5.5 New Construction Design

5.5.1 Introduction

5.5.1.1 Overview

5.5.1.2 Summary of Design Choices

5.5.2 Designing for the Very High-Severity Threat. . . 121

5.5.2.1 Sacrificial Areas

5.5.2.2 Barriers to Counter an Explosive Attack

5.5.3 New Wall Construction for Low- to High-Severity

Threats

5.5.3.1 Summary

5.5.3.2 Low-Severity Threat

ix

5.5.3.3 Medium- and High-Severity Threat

5.5.4 New Roof/Floor Construction for Low- to High-

Severity Threats

5.5.4.1 Summary

5.5.4.2 Low-Severity Threat Level

5.5.4.3 Medium- and High-Severity Threat Levels

5.5.5 New Door Construction

5.5.5.1 Summary

5.5.5.2 Personnel Doors

5.5.5.3 Vault Doors

5.5.5.4 Magazine Doors

5.5.5.5 Vehicle Doors

5.5.6 New Window Construction

5.5.6.1 Summary

5.5.6.2 Low-Severity Threat Level

5.5.6.3 Bars and Grills

5.5.7 Utility Openings for New Construction - Low-to

High-Severity Threats

5.5.7.1 Overview

5.5.7.2 New Construction Design Considerations

5.6 Retrofit Construction Design

5.6.1 Introduction

5.6.2 Considerations Related to the Very High-Severity

Threat

5.6.3 Wall Retrofit Construction for Low- Through

High-Level Threats

5.6.3.1 Summary

5.6.3.2 Low-Security Threat Level

5.6.3.3 Medium- and High-Security Threat Levels

5.6.4 Roof/Floor Retrofit Construction for Low to High

Threats

5.6.4.1 Summary

5.6.4.2 Low-Security Threat Level

5.6.4.3 Medium- and High-Security Level Threats

5.6.5 Door Retrofit Construction

5.6.5.1 Personnel, Vehicle, and Vault Doors

5.6.5.2 Magazine Doors

5.6.6 Window Retrofit Construction

5.6.7 Utility Opening Retrofit Construction

5.6.7.1 Overview

5.6.7.2 Hardening Utility Openings for Conventional

Buildings

5.6.7.3 AA&E Ventilation Openings

Section 6 BALLISTIC ATTACK HARDENING

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Ballistic Threat Characteristics

6.2.1 Caliber

6.2.2 Bullet Characteristics

x

6.2.2.1 Armor-Piercing (AP)

6.2.2.2 Ball

6.2.2.3 Other Characteristics

6.2.3 Ballistic Limit

6.2.4 Oblique Attack Affects

6.2.5 Projectile Energy

6.2.6 Multiple Impacts

6.3 Ballistic Threats

6.3.1 Low-Severity Threat

6.3.2 Medium-Severity Threat

6.3.3 High-Severity Threat

6.3.4 Very High-Severity Threat

6.4 Overview of Ballistic-Resistant Materials and Defeat

Mechanisms

6.4.1 Ballistic Resistance

6.4.2 Transparent Armor

6.4.3 Opaque Armor

6.4.3.1 Common Structural Materials

6.4.3.2 Fibrous Materials

6.4.3.3 Ceramic Composite Materials

6.4.3.4 Inorganic Nonmetallic Materials

6.4.3.5 Metallic Materials

6.5 Ballistic Hardening Option Recommendations . . . 201

6.5.1 Threat Severity Levels of Protection

6.5.2 Protection Measures: New Construction

6.5.2.1 Siting Measures

6.5.2.2 Building Measures

6.5.3 Protection Measures: Retrofit

6.5.3.1 Walls

6.5.3.2 Doors

6.5.3.3 Windows

Section 7 STANDOFF WEAPONS HARDENING

7.1 Introduction

7.2 The RPG Threat

7.2.1 RPG Characteristics

7.2.2 RPG Jet Formation

7.2.3 RPG Jet Penetration

7.3 RPG Defeat Mechanism

7.3.1 Material Density

7.3.2 Material Strength

7.3.3 Rebound Defeat Mechanisms

7.3.4 Oblique Attack Effects

7.3.5 RPG Defeat By Predetonation and Standoff

7.4 Hardening Design Options

7.4.1 New Construction

7.4.1.1 Site Layout

7.4.1.2 Sacrificial Areas

xi

7.4.1.3 Barrier Construction and Predetonation Screens . 218

7.4.2 Retrofit Construction

7.4.2.1 Retrofit of Walls

7.4.2.2 Retrofit of Roof and Floors

7.4.2.3 Windows

7.4.2.4 Retrofit of Doors

Section 8 BOMB BLAST HARDENING

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Design Threats

8.2.1 Stationary Bomb Threats

8.2.2 Moving Vehicle Bomb Threat

8.3 Standoff/Hardening and Protection Levels

8.3.1 Protection Levels for New Construction

8.3.2 Protection Levels Existing Structures

8.4 Design Approach

8.4.1 Introduction

8.4.2 Design of New Construction

8.4.2.1 Structure Hardening

8.4.2.2 Vehicle Barriers for Maintaining Moving

Vehicle Standoff

8.4.3 Retrofit Hardening of Existing Construction. . . 233

8.4.3.1 Required Standoff for Level of Building Protection 233

8.4.3.2 Vehicle Barriers

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A Physical Security Design Worksheets

FIGURES

Figure 1 Physical Security Threat Matrix (DoD 5200.8-R) 2 Resource and Asset Priorities (DoD 5200.8-R) 3 Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements 3 Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) 3 Checklist of Other Design Constraints and Requirements (Continued) 4 Integrated Physical Security System 5 Role of Barriers in a Physical Protection System Against a Forced Entry Attack 6 Defense Layers for Asset 7 Example of Forcible Entry Intruder Timeline 8 Ingress Time Between Barriers (from Barrier Technology Handbook, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 77-077 and MRC Report NSF/RA-770207) 9 Detailed Design Flowchart 10 Multiple Barrier Designs xii

11 Checklist of Minimum Site Work Protective Consideration 12 Example of Collocating Facilities of Similar Criticality 13 Exterior Site Blast Zone 14 Fabric With Barbed Wire Outriggers Fence Configuration (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 15 Security Fence Configuration for Nuclear Weapons (DoD C5210.41-M) 16 Optional Barbed Roll Topping for Nuclear Weapons (DoD 5210.41-M) 17 Concrete Culvert Grill (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 18 Removable Grating for Culverts (MIL-HDBK 1013/10). . . 67 19 Bar Grill Embedded in Concrete (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) . . 68 20 Large Culvert with Short Honeycomb Pipes (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 21 Turnstile (Rotational) Personnel Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 22 Single Wheel-Supported (V-Groove) Sliding Gate

(MIL-HDBK 1013/10)

23 Single Cantilevered Gate (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 24 Example Entry Control Point (MIL-HDBK 1013/10) 25 Nuclear Weapons Storage Site Entry Control Facility

(MIL-HDBK 1013/10)

26 Example Portal Structure for Access Control 27 CCTV Camera Components 28 Checklist of Minimum Building-Related Layout Considerations 29 Class 5 Vault Door Dimensions 30 Example Sacrificial Area Design For Very High Level Threats 31 Penetration Times For Solid Concrete Masonry Walls . . 125 32 Wood/Metal Composite Masonry Construction 33 Penetration Times For Conventional Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs 34 Penetration Times For Fiberous Reinforced Concrete Walls/Roofs 35 High-Severity Threat Level Penetration Times for Reinforced Conventional and Fibrous-Concrete Floors Based on an Upward Attack 36 Personnel Door Hinge Side Protection for Low- and Medium-Severity Threat 37 Personnel Door, Representative Medium-Security Hinge- Side Protection 38 Personnel Door Anti-Pry Strips For Medium-Security Applications xiii

39 Personnel Door, Auxiliary Rim-Lock Strike Reinforcement 40 Shrouded Key Operated Shackle Padlock Per MIL-P-43607. 148 41 Shrouded Hasp For Padlocks MIL-H-29181 42 Magazine Door Panel Cross Section For Very High- Severity Threat 43 Window Barrier System For High-Severity Threat 44 Example of Large Vent Pipe and Chases Rendered Non-Man-Passable by a Honeycomb of Welded Sections of Pipe of Non-Man-Passable Diameter 45 High Security Can Be Provided by Vent Frame Hardening as Shown 46 Ten-Gauge (3.4-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations

(MIL-HDBK-1013/5)

47 Nine-Gauge (3.8-mm) Hot-Rolled Steel Combinations

(MIL-HDBK-1013.5)

48 Polycarbonate Combinations (MIL-HDBK-1013/5) 49 Typical Gratings (MIL-HDBK-1013/4) 50 Retrofit Hardening Options For Hollow 8-inch CMU Wall Construction 51 Retrofit Hardening Options For Mortar-Filled 8-inch CMU Wall Construction 52 Hinge Side Protection Plan for Using a Pin-In-Socket Technique 53 Hinge Side Protection for Doors Using a Forward Doorstop with Angle 54 Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop 55 Hinge Side Protection for Hardening Typical Thick Doors by Using an Angle Stop 56 Riveted Steel Grating 57 Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Door Ventilator 58 Installation Details of Hardening a Typical Riveted Steel Grating and Shrouded Louver for Walls or Ceilings 59 Security Intrusion Protection Plan for Hardening a Typical Wall or Ceiling 60 Ballistic Limit Criteria 61 Distance to Penetrate 1 to 4 Inches (25 to 100 mm) Versus Angle of Obliquity Figure 62 Sightlines Blocked From Potential Vantage Points . . . 202 Figure 63 Wall Arrangement to Block Sightlines Figure 64 Walls to Block Sightlines at Doors Figure 65 Oblique Window Openings Figure 66 Example of High-Severity-Ballistic-Threat Bullet- Resistant Glass Cross Section xiv

67 Parapets to Block Sightlines 68 Example Antitank Grenade Launcher Weapon the Soviet

RPG-7

69 RPG Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Standoff Distance 70 ASP Walling System 71 Building Layout Example 72 Building Layout Example 73 Building Layout Example 74 Standard Sand-Grid Materials 75 Retrofit Hardening Concrete/Sand Thickness Versus Distance 76 Blast Wave Geometry 77 Pressure Levels Versus Standoff Distance 78 Reinforced Concrete Wall Design For 220-Pound (100-

kg) Explosive Effects (Army Security Engineering Manual) 79 Example Minimum Thickness [feet (meters)] of Thermal- Tempered Glass Glazing to Resist Reflected Overpressusre 80 Application of Traffic Obstacles 81 Security Barrier 82 Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Passive Barriers) 83 Moving Vehicle Impact Energy Versus Velocity (Active Barriers) 84 Repair Levels Versus Standoff Distance For Various Charge Weights

TABLES

Table 1 Design Threat Parameters 2 Asset Types 3 Checklist of Asset Categories and Potential Aggressor Types 4 Checklist of Design Threat for Aggressor Categories. . 15 5 Checklist of Asset Category Versus Security System Ingress or Egress Denial 6 Common Chain Link Fence Materials (MIL-HDBK-1013/10) . 62 7 Typical Exterior Sensor Types (Most Commonly Used Sensors are Underlined) 8 Minimum Lighting Criteria for Unaided Guard Visual Assessment 9 Relative Efficiencies and Restrike Times of Light Sources (From IES Lighting Handbook, J.E. Kaufman, ed.)

xv

10 Minimum Construction Requirements for Class A Vaults

(DIAM 50-3)

11 Minimum Construction Requirements For Class B Vaults (DoD 5200.1-R) 12 Minimum Construction Requirements For Strongrooms

(DOD 5200.1-R)

13 Minimum Construction Requirements For Risk Categories I Through IV (DoD 5100.76-M) 14 Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV Arms, and Non-Earth-Covered Magazines (DoD 5100.76-M) 14 Minimum Construction Requirements for Risk Categories II Through IV, Arms and Non-Earth Covered Magazines (Continued) 15 Security Risk Categories (DoD 5100.76-M) 16 Typical Magazine Doors Panels For Explosive Safety For Risk Categories I Through IV For Ammunition and Explosives 17 Minimum Construction Requirements For Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Facilities (DoD 5210.41-M) 18 Minimum Construction Requirements For Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities 19 Reinforced Concrete Wall Designs For Very High Threat Levels 20 Wall Construction Choices For New Construction 21 Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure 31, Reinforced Concrete Masonry Walls 22 Penetration Time Chart Index For Figures 33 and 34 . . 127 23 Penetration Time Chart Index For Figure 35 24 Personnel Door Penetration Times 25 Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Low Security 26 Personnel Door Frame Details, Low Security 27 Personnel Door Hardware Notes For Low- and Medium- Severity Threat 28 Personnel Door Panel/Edge Details, Medium Security . . 139 29 Personnel Door Frame Details, Medium Security 30 Vault Door Options and Penetration Times 31 High-Security Magazine Door 32 Very High-Security Magazine Construction 33 Vehicle Door Construction 34 Time and Number of Cuts Required to Open a Man- Passable Entry in Grills Composed of Various Size Bars and Bar Spacings 35 Recommended Glazing System Installed In a Low- Security Wall (Wood Frame) for a Low-Severity Threat Attack xvi

36 Recommended Glazing System Components Installed in a Medium-Security (CMU) Wall for a Medium-Severity Threat Attack 37 Existing Wall Construction Achievable Penetration Times 38 Steel-Ply Retrofit Installations for the High- Severity Level Attack 39 Representative Existing Stud-Girt Construction 40 Stud-Girt Construction Retrofit Options For Medium Threat Levels 41 Existing Roof/Floor Construction Achievable Penetration Times 42 Existing Roof/Floor Concrete Construction 43 Existing Roof/Floor Wood Construction 44 Maximum Penetration Times (Minutes) by Threat Security Levels, Existing Metal Roofs and Floors . . . 183 45 Firearm Ballistic Threats 46 Construction for Ballistic Resistance 47 Wall Construction Capable of Defeating the MIL-SAMIT Very High Threat 48 Transparent Armor Capable of Defeating the High- Severity Threat 49 Upgraded Walls for High-Severity Threat 50 Retrofit Construction Capable of Defeating the Very High-Severity Level 51 Example Operational Characteristics of an RPG (Soviet

RPG-7)

52 Predetonation Screen Effectiveness 53 Stationary Bomb Threats 54 Moving Vehicle Transported Bomb Threats

BIBLIOGRAPHY

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

INDEX

xvii

Section 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Scope. This handbook is to be used during the engineering design of Department of Defense (DoD) facilities to assure appropriate physical security is included. The guidelines are based upon the best currently available research and test data, and will be revised or expanded as additional research results become available. The contents include procedures for planning and designing an integrated physical security system for new facilities as well as the retrofit of existing facilities.

The focus is on construction choices for protection against forced entry, and ballistic and standoff weapons. Design procedures are also summarized for vehicle bomb blast protection, referencing appropriate sources for details.

1.2 Cancellation. This handbook supersedes Military Handbook

(MIL-HDBK) 1013/1, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based Facilities, dated 9 October 1987.

1.3 Using the Handbook. This handbook is divided into eight major sections and four appendices. Sections 2 and 3 contain procedures to follow during the planning and design phases of a project to assure adequate security. Sections 4 through 8 contain supporting detailed design data and instructions. The appendices contain physical security system design worksheets. The content of each major section is summarized as follows:

Section 2 - Pre-Design Phase: Specific requirements and criteria for the security system are established during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. This is followed by a procedure to establish: (1) the design threat, (2) the operating procedures and expected alarm response times of the security guard forces, and (3) other requirements and constraints that may affect the security system design.

Section 3 - Design Phase: The objective of this phase is to design an integrated physical security system that meets the requirements and criteria identified during the pre-design phase. The section begins with a discussion of the elements of a physical security system followed by the definitions of certain key terms. It then provides a step-by-step procedure for designing the security system for a new facility or the retrofit design of an existing facility using the detailed information in Sections 4 through 8.

Section 4 - Exterior Site-Related Physical Security: This section addresses the design of the outermost elements of the security system. The exterior area involved lies between the perimeter of the site and the facility containing the assets to be protected. Exterior physical security contributes to the effectiveness of an integrated security system design in the choice of: (1) site layout, including facility location relative to fences and vehicle barriers to enhance protection against forced entry, bomb blast, standoff weapons and ballistic threats; (2) access control at site points of entry to protect against covert entry threats; (3) exterior intrusion detection sensors or guards to detect perimeter crossover points; (4) closed-circuit television (CCTV) or guards to assess an alarm as a threat; (5) security lighting to support the threat detection and assessment function; and (6) other essential functions that must be maintained to support the above elements. Each of these elements is addressed referring to other sources for more details when appropriate.

Section 5 - Building Physical Security Against Forced and Covert Entry: This section begins with a description of the threat severity levels for forced and covert entry followed by an overview of the important elements required to achieve an effective integrated security system design including building layout, access control, interior intrusion detection system, and CCTV. Minimum prescribed DoD security construction requirements for vaults and strongrooms; sensitive compartmented information facilities; and arms, ammunition, and explosive (AA&E,) and nuclear weapons facilities are then provided, including related penetration delay times. For those cases where the minimum prescribed designs do not provide sufficient delay relative to guard response times, or when there are no prescribed designs for a given facility type, see Section 5.5 (for new construction) or Section 5.6 (for retrofit construction) for design options that achieve the required delays.

Section 6 - Ballistic Attack Hardening: This section begins with a description of the small arms and military ballistic threats and the general hardening mechanisms by which they can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented.

Section 7 - Standoff Weapons Hardening: This section begins with a description of the standoff Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threat and the general mechanisms by which RPGs can be stopped. Hardening design options available for both new and retrofit construction are then presented.

Section 8 - Bomb Blast Hardening: This section summarizes the design approach for hardening against vehicle-transported bomb blast effects for both new and existing construction.

1.4 Related Technical Documents. Use this handbook to address specific design problems relative to specific subject areas (doors, vehicle barrier, etc.). Related technical documents are identified appropriately within the text for each unique subject area.

Section 2: PRE-DESIGN PHASE

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Objective. The objective of the pre-design phase is to establish specific requirements and criteria for the design of a security system for either a new or retrofit facility. These requirements and criteria include:

(1) the design threat the security system must protect against; (2) the operating procedures, including response time, of the security guard force;

and (3) any physical, functional, or budgetary constraints associated with the site or building that can affect the security system design. These requirements must also consider the specific planning policies and procedures reflected in related military directives and instructions. Establishing security requirements during the pre-design phase allows security to be addressed early at the start of a project allowing it to be integrated into the total design of the building efficiently and cost effectively.

2.1.2 Design Team. The design team should include representatives from the intended facility users, as well as the designated military installation intelligence officers, operational officers, security or law enforcement officials, and engineering and planning personnel. The facility user can help identify special operational or logistical requirements as well as the relative criticality of the asset contained in the facility. Intelligence personnel can provide input on historical or projected future threats and their likely targets. Operations personnel can provide information on the criticality of assets from the overall installation or activity level.

Security personnel can help establish the response capabilities of the security guard forces as well as identify potential criminal threats.

Engineering and planning personnel should organize the effort and consolidate all facility information into the appropriate documents.

2.1.3 Section Organization. Paragraph 2.2 is a brief overview of DoD directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements. Paragraph 2.3 is a general discussion of the steps to be taken during the pre-design phase to establish the design threat.

Paragraph 2.4 addresses the response operating procedures and related alarm response time of the security guard force. Paragraph 2.5 presents other requirements and constraints that can affect the security system design.

2.2 Physical Security Planning Policy and Requirements. This section provides a brief overview of a number of DoD and other directives and instructions defining physical security related planning policies and requirements.

2.2.1 DoD Directive 5200.8-R: Security of DoD Installations and Resources. This directive prescribes minimum standards and policies related to the physical protection of personnel, installations, and assets of the DoD. The objective is to minimize damage or reduce loss or theft to assets, and to ensure that war-fighting capabilities are maintained. Specific areas addressed include what constitutes the DoD physical security program, the responsibilities for overseeing the program, security system elements and performance objectives, generic threat types, prioritization of assets, physical security planning and system acquisition, and protective design and military construction related policies. These general policies are followed by more specific policies related to facility access and circulation control, the security of weapons systems and platforms, bulk petroleum products, as well as communication systems and material, including controlled inventory items such as drugs and precious metals. The following briefly summarizes some key elements of this directive as it relates to this handbook.

2.2.1.1 Security System Elements and Performance Objectives. DoD 5200.8-R indicates that the objective of a security system is to preclude or reduce the potential for sabotage, theft, trespass, terrorism espionage or other criminal activity. The following functional elements of the security system must perform in an integrated manner to achieve these objectives:

1) Detection alerts security personnel to possible threats and attempts at unauthorized entry at or shortly after time of occurrence.

2) Assessment through use of video subsystems, patrols, or fixed posts, assists in localizing and determining the size and intention of an unauthorized intrusion or activity.

3) Command and control through diverse and secure communications ensures that all countermeasures contribute to preventing or containing sabotage, theft, or other criminal activity.

4) Delay, through the use of active and passive security measures, including barriers, impedes intruders in their efforts to reach their objective.

5) Response through the use of designated, trained, and properly equipped security forces. Detection and delay must provide sufficient warning and protection to the asset until the response force can be expected to arrive at the scene.

2.2.1.2 Physical Security Threat and Prioritization of Assets. The general threat types in DoD 5200.8-R are summarized in Figure 1. Prioritization of assets and related level of security are given in Figure 2. These threats and asset types are addressed further in par. 2.3.

2.2.1.3 Protective Design and Military Construction. DoD 5200.8-R specifies that MIL-HDBK-1013/1 or other approved security engineering guidance be used.

2.2.2 MIL-HDBK-1190: Facility Planning and Design Guide. This document indicates that physical security threat definition should be part of the Master Planning and Siting Criteria process (Chapter 3) and references DoD

+)))))))))))))0))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))0)))))))))))))))))))))))))),

* Threat Type * Threat Description * Threat Example * /)))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* * Individuals in organized and * Terrorists and special *

* Maximum * trained groups alone or with * purpose forces; highly *

* * assistance from an insider; * trained intelligence *

* * skilled armed and equipped * agents. *

* * intruders with penetration aids.* * /)))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* * Individual(s) working alone or * Highly organized criminal*

* Advanced * in collusion with an insider; * elements; terrorists or *

* * skilled or semiskilled without * paramilitary forces; *

* * penetration aids. * foreign intelligence *

* * * agents with access. * /)))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* * Individual(s) or insider(s) * Career criminals; *

* Intermedia * working alone or in small * organized crime; white *

* * groups; some knowledge or * collar criminals; active *

* * familiarity of security system. * demonstrators; covert *

* * * intelligence collectors; *

* * * some terrorist groups. *

* * Individual(s) or insider(s) * Casual intruders; *

* Low * working alone or in a small * pilferers and thieves; *

* * group. * overt intelligence *

* * * collectors; passive *

* * * demonstrators. * .)))))))))))))2))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))2))))))))))))))))))))))))))- Figure 1 Physical Security Threat Matrix ( oD 5200.8-R)

5100.76-M for arms, ammunition, and explosives and DoD 5210.41-M for nuclear weapons security.

2.2.3 DoD 5200.1-R: DoD Information Security Program Regulation of 30 May 1986; DoD 5200.2-R: DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation of 16 December 1986; and DoD 5230.24: Distribution Statements on Technical Documents. These documents provide operational security guidance associated with personnel and classified material. Minimum physical security requirements are also specified.

2.2.4 DoD 4270.1-M: Policy Guidelines For Installation, Planning, Design Construction and Upkeep. This Manual is written for installation commanders to help new facility construction as well as maintenance, repair, and renovation of existing permanent and temporary facilities so that the installation can accomplish its mission now and in the future. With regard to security, the Manual provides general policy guidance that protection is required against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and theft for facilities that include: aircraft shelters; ammunition and weapons storage facilities;

command and control facilities; communications facilities; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) facilities; and other facilities when a requirement is established by the responsible Military Department.

It is indicated that planning and design of military installations and facilities should consider the vulnerability to these threats, using the assessments of intelligence community agencies, and should provide installation land use, facility sites, site development, and facilities design appropriate to the assessed threat. In addition, the use of fencing to enclose military installations or to enclose and separate areas within a military installation should be limited to those conditions requiring physical security or protection of life, except as stipulated for family housing.

2.3 Establishing the Security System Design Threat

2.3.1 Overview. The "design threat" comprises the specific types of attacks and their relative severity levels which could be directed at the facility and assets during its life cycle. Based on historical patterns and trends, the general categories, characteristics, and relative severity levels of attacks shown in Table 1 have been compiled for use in this handbook.

Which of these apply to the facility being designed depends on the types of hostile aggressors in the area of the facility and their objectives. The following outlines the major factors one must consider in the selection of a proper design threat.

2.3.2 Design Threat. A clear distinction must be maintained between what is meant by a "design threat" (as shown in Table 1) and a threat "estimate."

As used here a design threat is inherently concerned with the broad range of attack possibilities over the life cycle of the facility. A threat estimate is a more focused prediction of the immediately probable. Threat estimates are essentially short-term predictions of the likelihood of particular threats based on recent "intelligence" information. They are relatively important to operational security personnel, particularly security guard commanders, because they relate to the desired state of readiness. Threat estimates are particularly important in situations where physical security has not previously been designed into a facility. If physical security has been properly implemented into a facility to meet an appropriate design threat, threat estimates are presumed included within the design threat selected.

The choice of design threat must be based upon the assets being protected. There is as much potential for diseconomies by selecting a design threat that is too severe as there is for selecting one that is much too low.

Choice of any design threat, particularly a severe one, will almost always influence the actual threat experience because the threat will respond to the physical security design, appropriately, in the personnel, equipment, tactics, and timing selected.

Table 1 Design Threat Parameters

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* Aggressor * Severity * Equipment/Weapons *

* Tactics * Level * * /))))))))))))) 3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* Forced Entry * Low * Limited hand tools - low observables *

* * Medium * Unlimited hand tools - limited power tools *

* * High * Unlimited hand/power/thermal tools *

* * Very High * 50-pound (lb) (22-kilogram (kg)) man-portable *

* * * explosives, unlimited hand/power/thermal tools* /))))))))))))))3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* Covert Entry * Low * Personnel *

* or * Medium * Personnel and contraband *

* Insider * High * Personnel, arms, contraband *

* * Very High * Personnel, explosives, arms, contraband * /))))))))))))))3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* Firearms/ * Low * ANSI/UL - Medium-power small arms (MPSA) *

* Ballistics * Medium * ANSI/UL - Super-power small arms (SPSA) *

* * High * Military high-power rifle *

* * * 7.62-millimeter (mm) (30-caliber) North *

* * * Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ball *

* * Very High * MIL-SAMIT - Military small arms multiple *

* * * impact threat * /))))))))))))))3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *Standoff * Very High * Rocket-propelled grenades *

* Weapon * * * /))))))))))))))3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *Stationary * Low * 50 lb (22 kg) *

* Bombs * Medium * 220 lb (100 kg) * *(Vehicle or * High * 500 lb (227 kg) *

* Package) * Very High * 1,000 lb (454 kg) * /))))))))))))))3)))))))))))3))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* Moving * Low * 50 lb (22 kg) trinitrotoluene (TNT), 4,000-lb *

* Vehicle * * (1,800-kg) car at 15 miles per hour (mph) (24 *

* Bombs * * kilometer/hr (km/h)) *

* * Medium * 220 lb (100 kg) TNT, 10,000-lb (4,540-kg) car *

* * * at 15 mph (24 km/h) *

* * High * 500 lb (227 kg) TNT, 4,000-lb (1,800-kg) truck*

* * * at 50 mph (80 km/h) *

* * Very High * 1,000 lb (454 kg) TNT, 10,000-lb (4,540-kg) *

* * * truck at 50 mph (80 km/h) * .))))))))))))))2)))))))))))2))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))-

In the most general case the selection of a lower limit for the design threat depends upon the asset being protected, the existence of similar assets representing alternative targets in the vicinity of the facility, and the degree of security provided at these alternative targets.

These alternative targets may exist in the civil sector off base or on the military installation or activity itself. Data on the historical threat precedent can be obtained from civil and military law enforcement officials.

Threat historical precedent data from such sources will likely represent situations below the proper design threat. In general, the lower limit of design threat is dependent upon the "supply" of the asset and the relative "risk" for obtaining or destroying the asset to a given aggressor type.

The upper limit of the design threat severity depends upon the perceived "degree of reward" resulting from a successful attack to the facility relative to the risk, which in turn depends upon the "demand" for the protected asset. This demand will vary with the objectives and degree of motivation of the threat, for example, a theft by an unsophisticated criminal as opposed to a dedicated terrorist threat against an AA&E storage magazine.

In this regard then, the design threat selection process must evaluate the major aggressor types (criminal, terrorists, protestors, etc.) and asset types. Each aggressor type has special motives against certain assets and will favor only certain types of the attacks shown in Table 1.

2.3.3 Aggressor Characteristics. Aggressors are people who perform hostile acts against military assets including equipment, personnel, or operations. Possible aggressor objectives and how they relate to the general categories of aggressor follow.

2.3.3.1 Aggressor Objectives. Possible aggressor objectives include:

1) Inflict injury or death on people

2) Destroy or damage facilities, property, equipment, or resources

3) Steal equipment, material, or information (espionage)

4) Create adverse publicity

2.3.3.2 Aggressor Types. DoD 5200.8-R categorizes the threat types into:

(1) Maximum, (2) Advanced, (3) Intermediate, and (4) Low, having the characteristics shown in Figure 1. The threat examples shown in this figure are as follows:

1) Criminals. Criminals fall into one of three possible groups based on their degree of skill. Unsophisticated pilferers and thieves;

sophisticated, organized career criminals; and highly organized criminal groups. The objective for all three is theft of assets.

2) Protestors. Protestors or demonstrators are considered to be an intermediate threat if active or violent, a low threat if passive. Active protesters include the two general groups of vandals/activists and extremist protesters. Both groups are politically or issue-oriented and act out of frustration, discontent, or anger against the actions of other social or political groups. The primary objectives of both groups include destruction and publicity.

3) Terrorists. Terrorists are ideologically, politically, or issue-oriented. They commonly work in small, well-organized groups or cells.

They are sophisticated, skilled with weapons and tools, and possess efficient planning capability. Terrorist objectives include death, destruction, theft, and publicity. Terrorist groups are identified based on their areas of operation. Those operating within the continental United States (CONUS) are typically political extremists consisting primarily of ethnic and white supremacy groups such as Macheteros (Puerto Rican) and Aryan Nations. They are considered intermediate-level threats. Terrorist operations outside the United States (OCONUS) are typically better organized and equipped, and their attacks more severe. Those operating in Europe, such as the Red Brigades, are less violent and may be intermediate to advanced. Groups operating in the Middle East and North Ireland have shown paramilitary capabilities and have used a broad range of military and improvised weapons. They have historically staged the most serious terrorist attacks, including suicidal attacks. They are frequently state-sponsored and include such organizations as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Islamic Jihad, and the Irish Republican Army. These are maximum- or advanced-level threats.

4) Subversives. Subversives include aggressors from foreign governments or from groups trying to overthrow the Government by force. They include saboteurs and spies (hostile intelligence agents at the advanced or maximum levels as well as covert or overt agents at the low and intermediate levels.)

2.3.3.3 Aggressor Tactics. Aggressors can employ a wide range of offensive tactics to achieve their goals. Categorization of these tactics allows facility planners to define threats in standardized terms usable by facility designers in the development of design solutions to resist the particular tools or weapons identified in Table 1. The primary tactics addressed in this manual follow.

1) Forced Entry. The aggressor enters a facility using forced entry tools. The aggressor uses the tools to create a man-passable opening in the facility's walls, roof, windows, doors, or utility openings. Small arms may be used to overpower guards. The aggressor's goal is to steal or destroy assets, compromise information, or disrupt operations.

2) Covert Entry. The aggressor attempts to covertly enter a facility or portion of a facility by false credentials, etc. Objectives are similar to the forced entry tactic above.

3) Insider Compromise. A person with authorized access to a facility, such as an "insider," attempts to compromise a security system and/or assets by taking advantage of that accessibility.

4) Ballistics Attack. The aggressor fires various small arms, such as pistols, submachine guns, and rifles, from a distance determined by the firearm's range. The aggressor's goal is to kill facility occupants or to damage or destroy assets.

5) Standoff Weapons Attack. Military weapons or improvised versions of military weapons are fired at a facility from a significant distance. These include direct and indirect line-of-sight weapons such as antitank rocket-propelled grenade weapons. The aggressor's goal is to injure or kill the facility's occupants, and to damage or destroy assets.

6) Moving Vehicle Bomb. An aggressor drives an explosives-laden car or truck into a facility and detonates the explosives. The aggressor's goal is to destroy the facility and kill people within the blast area.

7) Stationary Bomb. An aggressor places a package or parks an explosives-laden car or truck near a facility. The aggressor then detonates the explosives either by time delay or remote control.

2.3.4 Design Threat Selection

2.3.4.1 Overview. In selecting a design threat from Table 1, the designer must be concerned with the broad range of attack possibilities over the life cycle of the facility. The choice of design threat must consider the assets to be protected, and the presence and likely motivation of an aggressor in directing an attack of a given severity against the asset. In general, the designer must identify the types of assets to be protected, the potential aggressor types that might be interested in a given asset and, from these, the most likely attacks and severity levels that these aggressors might direct at the asset. It should be noted that more than one attack type and severity level shown in Table 1 may be directed at a given asset. The objective is to establish all the attack types and severity levels for all the assets likely to be associated with the facility.

2.3.4.2 Identifying Asset Types

1) Overview. The design team shall select the key assets in the facility requiring protection. Table 2 provides a list of general asset categories. This is intended to serve as a checklist to help the designer elicit the opinion of the sponsors or operational user of the facility. In general, the assets shown in Table 2 can be divided broadly into military-related assets funded by Congressionally appropriated funds, high-value assets purchased with nonappropriated funds, and military and civilian personnel. Each of these are addressed briefly in the following.

Table 2 Asset Types +)))))))))))))))))))))))))0))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))),

* Category * Examples * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *A. Pilferables * (Man-Portable) *

* /)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* * Merchandise, supplies, televisions, tools, *

* * personal, computers, typewriters, liquor, *

* * stereos * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *B. Money * Cash, other negotiable instruments * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *C. Drugs * Controlled substances, medically sensitive items* /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *D. Vehicles * Automobiles/motorcycles, aircraft, tactical *

* * vehicles, boats/ships * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *E. Arms, ammunition, * Rifles, small arms, bulk explosives, nuclear *

* and explosives (AA&E) * * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *F. Information * Classified records, personnel, records, *

* * financial records, inventory records, *

* * proprietary * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *G. Mission-critical * High-ranking officers/commanders; command, *

* personnel/officials * control, communications, and intelligence *

* * operators; weapons storage; area response force * /)))))))))))))))))))))))))3)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1 *H. Military/ * (Crowds or Groups) *

* Civilian personnel /)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1

* * Housing-family, unaccompanied, etc., recreation *

* * facilities, exchange/commissary, officer and *

* * enlisted clubs, schools,…