Atch 07 - FA2523-11-R-0001 CDRL CEV-15C Spill Prevention-Response Plan 1 July 09 Final

Contract

OPR:GRE

Chief of E

DSN 629

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No. FA2523

SPILL

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Environment 9-3840 ext. 2 des CDRL C

3-05-C-9001

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ATTACHMENT 07

CDRL CEV-15C Spill Prevention & Response Plan

Thule Air Base 3 1 July 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1.1 Security and Administrative Instructions

2 INFORMATION AND EMERGENCY CONTACTS

2.1 Emergency Phone Numbers

3 GENERAL

3.1 Purpose

3.2 Scope

3.3 Facility Description

3.4 Organizational Structure

3.5 Criteria for Spill Prevention and Response Planning

3.6 Deficiencies

4 ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 821 ABG/CC, Installation Commander

4.2 DLO, Danish Liaison Officer

4.3 GC/SE, Occupational Safety & Health

4.4 GC Fire Protection

4.5 GC/CEEE, Environmental Engineering

4.6 821 SFS, Security Forces Squadron

4.7 GC/CEOM, Operations & Maintenance

4.8 General Personnel

5 PERSONNEL TRAINING

5.1 HAZMAT Personnel Training

5.2 Spill Response Team Training

5.3 Personnel

5.4 Annual Spill Boom Training

5.5 Training Records

6 POTENTIAL SPILL SITES

6.1 Areas of Concern

6.2 Stationary Potential Spill Sites

6.3 Non-Stationary Potential Spill Sites

7 SPILL PREVENTION

7.1 General Information

7.2 Emergency Services

7.3 Facility Incident Commander (FIC)

7.4 Inventory of Potential Spill Sites

7.5 Initiatives at the Shop Level

7.6 Initiatives on the POL System

7.7 Worst Case Scenarios

7.8 Liquid Fuel Systems Maintenance and Inspections

7.9 Site Specific Contingency Plans

7.10 Fuel Transfer Safety Precautions

8 SPILL RESPONSE PROCEDURES

8.1 Immediate Notification and Reporting

8.2 External Notification

8.3 Additional Emergency Assistance Organizations

Thule Air Base 4 1 July 2009

9 CLEANUP ACTIONS

9.1 Probable Spill Route

9.2 Containment, Clean-up and Disposal

9.3 Material Safety Data Sheet

10 REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION

APPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS

APPENDIX 2: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT METHODS

APPENDIX 3: POTENTIAL SPILL SITES

APPENDIX 4: SITE SPECIFIC SPILL ROUTE MAPS AND EVACUATION MAPS

APPENDIX 5: ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

APPENDIX 6: SPILL RESPONSE AREA EQUIPMENT

APPENDIX 7: GENERATORS AT THULE AB

APPENDIX 8: 2009 REVIEW COMMENTS

APPENDIX 9: DISTRIBUTION LIST

Thule Air Base 5 1 July 2009

1 LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1.1 Security and Administrative Instructions

Title: The long title of this plan is “Spill Prevention and Response Plan”. The short title is SPRP, and this title will be used as reference throughout the entire document.

Classification: The document is unclassified.

Responsibilities: Greenland Contractors, Environmental Engineering (GC/CEEE) is the office of primary responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan. The instructions given in this plan are applicable to all organizations and tenant units on Thule AB. Organizations are authorized to extract and reproduce those portions of the plan that are essential in the accomplishment of necessary planning and in the preparation of supporting documents and reports.

References: References referred to in the SPRP do not appear in the plan, but they may be accessed through GC Environmental Engineering or the Air Force Electronic Publication Library

(AFEPL).

Reviews/changes: The SPRP is reviewed and updated annually IAW the CDRL and distributed accordingly.

A draft is submitted to the requiring office, 21CES/CEANN, by 1 Nov for review. Review comments, if any, will be provided by 21CES/CEANN within 60 days. Review comments received will be incorporated in the final version of the plan within 30 days; thereafter the document will be submitted to 821ABG/CC for signature. The signed plan will then be submitted as the Final edition.

Further, the plan is subject to change if any of the applicable laws, regulations, or requirements is altered.

Distribution: The plan will be distributed to the organizations shown on the distribution list in

APPENDIX 8.

Thule Air Base 6 1 July 2009

2 INFORMATION AND EMERGENCY CONTACTS

As Thule AB is a remote site, no immediate support from outside installation agencies may be expected in case of emergencies. If an emergency occurs and Thule AB is not capable of responding, 21st Space Wing must be contacted.

2.1 Emergency Phone Numbers

List of persons to be contacted in case of an emergency situation and their phone numbers:

Department: Extension

Main Base Fire Department or Ambulance 911

BMEWS Site I Fire Department or Ambulance 911

DET-3 Fire Department or Ambulance 911

821 SFS Security Forces 911

Storm Operations Center 2763/2764

Civil Engineering Service Call 2111

GC Environmental Responder on Call (Service Call) 2111

GC Chief of Environmental Engineering 2698

GC Safety Engineer 3250/3560

821 SPTS/SG Medical Liaison Officer 2696

821 ABG Safety Officer 2709

821 SPTS/CE Civil Engineering 3274

Danish Liaison Officer 2276/2206

Danish Police Inspector 2406/2280

21 CES/CEANN DSN 834-7727

Thule Air Base 7 1 July 2009

3 GENERAL

3.1 Purpose

The purpose of the plan is to assure that documented guidance regarding spill prevention and response is available to all installation personnel. The plan will describe the procedures, methods, and equipment being used to prevent spills at Thule AB, as well as procedures to be followed in case of releases, accidents, and spills. The goal is to achieve a full state of awareness throughout the installation and in this way enable personnel to:

- Be familiar with spill prevention and response procedures including related regulatory requirements.

Develop related planning documents (e.g. action plans) that will bring the installation into full compliance with regulatory requirements.

- Quickly and appropriately respond to spills in a manner that will greatly reduce or eliminate contamination, which is the overall purpose.

- Maintain a safe working environment at the installation.

3.2 Scope

The provisions of the SPRP apply throughout the whole installation and to all personnel. Certain responsibilities are specifically assigned to selected individuals identified in the plan. The SPRP limits its contents to spill prevention and response issues. Related plans have been developed to cover other functions and may need to be consulted. TABI 10-105 controls the Thule Response Group. This TABI is the overall response instruction for major spills and natural disasters.

Regulatory Overview In accordance with USAF policy, Thule AB is required to comply with the following public laws and their respective regulations:

US State Laws: Not applicable

USAF: AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations

Final Governing Standards for Environmental Protection by United States Forces in Greenland

Thule AB: EPC Decisions

Host Country: The Greenland Government (GG) Authority has the primary role for environmental protection in Greenland.

Thule Air Base 8 1 July 2009

3.3 Facility Description

Thule AB is located 695 miles North of the Arctic Circle (76 32' North latitude, 68 50' West longitude), and 947 miles south of the North Pole on the northwest side of the island of Greenland. It is approximately 550 miles east of the North Magnetic Pole.

The Thule Defense Area is a large land area that includes various base functions outside the Main Base area. Thule AB contains three distinct areas; the Main Base, BMEWS, and Det-3.

The areas of the base are divided into building areas designated as 100 through 900 areas. The Group Headquarters and other support functions are located in the 400 area of the base. The area identified as the goal for consolidation efforts is within the 100 and 200 areas (See Figure 4.1) together with flight line facilities in the 600 area. Also, some large facilities in the 500, 700, 800 and 900 areas, primarily with stand-alone heating systems, will remain.

Figure 4.1: Thule AB Main Base Area

Thule AB is located in the valley of a glacially fed stream called North River. This area is designated by the Danish government as the Thule Defense Area. The Main Base is located on a relatively flat plain near the mouth of the stream. The active landfill at Thule is located southeast of the main base (Figure 4.2, taken from Final Landfill Assessment and Operations Management Plan, 821st ABG, December 2005). DET-3 is located 3 miles east of the Main Base (Figure 4.3) and BMEWS located 12 miles northeast and 1,250 feet higher on a hill overlooking Wolstenholme Fjord (Figure 4.4). Lake Crescent is used for potable water production and is located 5 miles east of the main base (Figure 4.5)

Thule Air Base 9 1 July 2009

The base mission consists of BMEWS 12th Space Warning Squadron (12 SWS) and Detachment-3 (Det-3), 22nd Space Operations Squadron (Det-3, 22 SOPS) satellite tracking and control operation.

Figure 4.2: Thule AB Landfill area

Figure 4.3: Thule AB DET-3 area

Thule Air Base 10 1 July 2009

Figure 4.4: Thule AB BMEWS area

Figure 4.4: Thule AB Lake Crescent area

Thule Air Base 11 1 July 2009

3.4 Organizational Structure

The organizational structure at Thule AB involves several different organizations, including on-site USAF personnel and contractors. The on-site staff consists of military and civilian personnel from the following organizations: 821 ABG, 12 SWS, 22 SOPS DET-3, Harris Cooperation, BAE Systems, Air Greenland (GA) and Greenland Contractors (GC).

The organizations responsible for compliance with the development and implementation of the SPRP at Thule AB are summarized in the following table.

Functional Area USAF Contractor Off Site Spill site identification and evaluation

821 SPTS/CE GC/CEEE None

Secondary containment measure 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Spill response management 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Material compatibility program 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Inspection 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Preventive maintenance 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Housekeeping needs 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Pollution Prevention program 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Security 821 SFS/CC GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Monitoring requirements 821 SPTS/CE

821 SPTS/SG

21 ADOS/SGGB

GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None

Training 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None Plan reviews and update 821 SPTS/CE GC, BAE, HARRIS, GA None

3.5 Criteria for Spill Prevention and Response Planning

The criteria below, from Chapter 18 of the Final Governing Standards for Greenland (FGS), have been used for this edition of the Spill Prevention and Response Plan.

FGS Chapter 18.3 Criteria, Spill Prevention and Response Planning FGS ref Criteria SPRP section C18.3.2 Prevention Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7

App 3, 4 C18.3.2.5 Arrangements for Emergency Services 4.8 C18.3.2.6 Means to Contact Emergency Services 2 C18.3.2.7 Detailed Descriptions App 3 C18.3.2.8 Emergency Equipment App 3, 5, 6 C18.3.2.9 Evacuation Plan App 4 C18.3.2.10 Description of Deficiencies 3.6 C18.3.2.11 Written Procedures 5, 7.4, 7.5, 7,8 C18.3.3 Spill control 7, 8, 9, 10 C18.3.3.5 Roster for personnel 5.3, 8 C18.3.3.6 Notification 4, 7.3 C18.3.3.7 Assignment of Responsibilities 4.1, 8 C18.3.3.8 Surveillance Procedures 7,6, 7,8 C18.3.3.9 Prioritized list if applicable 6.1 C18.3.3.10 Other resources-include copies of agreements 8.3 C18.3.3.11 Cleanup Methods 9 C18.3.3.12 Disposal Procedures 9 C18.3.3.13 General Health, Safety, and Fire prevention 9.3 C18.3.3.14 Public affairs section 4.1 C18.3.4 Reporting Section 10

Thule Air Base 12 1 July 2009

3.6 Deficiencies

During the External ESOHCAMP 2009 the SPRP had a write up by the assessors, as inadequate and not meeting the requirements described in chapter 18 in the FGS. The deficiencies are listed below and GC/CEEE will work towards having these items included for the 2010 revision of the SPRP.

The plan would benefit from a major revision in order to have the various sections follow the order in the FGS more closely.

A number of potential spill locations do not have a spill route map, or the map needs to be improved.

A number of potential spill locations do not have a site specific contingency plan.

A list of deficiencies in spill prevention and control measures at potential spill sites, to include corrective measures required and procedures to be followed to correct the listed deficiencies and any interim control measures in place.

Procedures are lacking, or needs to be improved, on Worst Case Scenarios, Taking ASTs out of service and Clean-up of Small Spills.

Thule Air Base 13 July 2009

4 ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It is the responsibility of the personnel mentioned below to publish the procedures necessary for implementing this plan. Such procedures shall ensure adequate training of personnel and implementation of environmental protection and pollution abatement procedures in their areas of responsibility. The personnel will designate additional project officers and monitors as required ensuring an effective program. These designated individuals will continuously inspect the work areas under their individual areas of responsibility. The names and telephone numbers of the project officers and monitors will be posted in prominent locations at potential spill sites.

4.1 821 ABG/CC, Installation Commander The Installation Commander exercises the overall responsibility for the management of spill prevention and response planning at Thule AB. The 821 ABG/CC is the chairperson of the Environmental Protection Committee (EPC).

Public affairs including all notifications to the DLO and/or external offices must be accomplished by or coordinated with the Installation Commander prior to execution.

The Installation Commander, or designated representative, is the Incident Commander. The Incident Commander is responsible for directing and coordinating all spill response actions within Thule AB. The Incident Commander will have the authority to utilize the expertise and resources of the Spill Response Team (SRT), or any other office of expertise in determining and performing response actions.

4.2 DLO, Danish Liaison Officer

The Danish Liaison Officer serves as the official representative of Denmark, and Greenland Home Rule at Thule AB.

4.3 GC/SE, Occupational Safety & Health

This office will evaluate all safety procedures associated with a spill incident.

4.4 GC Fire Protection

The Fire Department at Thule AB is first responder to all incidents. Its responsibilities include responding, containing and assessing all incidents to ensure that the scene is a safe and controlled incident site. It is the Fire Chief’s responsibility to designate an entry control point based on the incident situation. The Fire Chief or Assistant Fire Chief on duty is the Facility Incident Commander (FIC).

4.5 GC/CEEE, Environmental Engineering

GC/CEEE has the responsibility of managing the Thule AB SPRP. In a spill situation, GC/CEEE is tasked to assist the Incident Commander or Fire Chief in evaluating the situation and provide guidance in spill containment, cleanup actions and restoration activities. If the spill exceeds the reportable quantity for the specific spilled material according to the FGS, GC/CEEE must notify 821 SPTS/CE and 21 CES/CEANN within 24 hours. GC/CEEE will manage a record of all spills at TAB.

Thule Air Base 14 July 2009

4.6 821 SFS, Security Forces Squadron During a spill situation, the Security Forces will:

Evacuate personnel from the scene, if needed, based on the decisions of the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief.

Secure the area as “Off Limits” to unauthorized personnel.

Coordinate the movement of specific personnel to assist at the incident scene.

Direct traffic.

4.7 GC/CEOM, Operations & Maintenance

The Spill Response Team (SRT) consists of designated members mainly from the Fuels Operation section, but personnel from other shops can also be appointed. The task of the SRT is to respond to spills when requested by the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief in order to perform spill containment, recovery, disposal, and restoration activities.

The SRT at TAB is limited in equipment and training, and is therefore not able to respond to all types of incidents. Peterson AFB will be contacted for assistance in case of an emergency that Thule AB is not equipped or otherwise able to respond to.

4.8 General Personnel

Each individual working at Thule AB including all seasonal contractors are tasked to report any spills to the Alarm Center ext. 911 and to take every reasonable precaution to prevent spills.

The Alarm Center will report all spills to GC/CEEE.

Thule Air Base 15 July 2009

5 PERSONNEL TRAINING

The personnel involved in spill response actions can be divided in two groups; HAZMAT personnel and the Spill Response Team (SRT). The HAZMAT team is the personnel who initially will respond to any spill situation and get it under control. The SRT will be notified by the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief and requested to initiate cleanup actions when the incident scene is considered under control and safe to enter, using appropriate personal protection if needed.

5.1 HAZMAT Personnel Training

The training requirements for the HAZMAT personnel are provided in the AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. The training must be given initially with annual refresher training through exercises.

First Responder Awareness First Responder Operations First Responder Technician

According to AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations the HAZMAT personnel may not require technician level training.

Response drills occur through participation in USAF incident drills. A list of the organizational positions that are participating in the drills are listed in section 5.3 below.

5.2 Spill Response Team Training

In order to provide the SRT with the skills needed to handle a spill situation, the training should include:

Safety training concerning emergency response information, measures to protect the employee from hazards associated with hazards materials, and methods and procedures for avoiding accidents.

Training in using MSDS information for relevant hazardous materials

Training in the use of respiration equipment.

Training in the use of the Spill Response Equipment.

Training in how to act at spill locations.

Training in management of the waste.

Performing a drill in cooperation with Fire Department and The Spill Response Team

The requirements for the SRT training is not specified in the AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations, but should as a minimum include what is mentioned above.

GC Environmental Engineering provides this training quarterly as a one-day course in cooperation with the Supervisor of the Spill Response Team, The Fire Department and OSH.

This training will be based on MSDS information on the general chemicals present at Thule AB and on site-specific conditions.

Thule Air Base 16 July 2009

If respiratory protection is used during cleanup actions, only personnel trained in accordance with SI.02.15.02.007 will be placed on the cleanup team. This training can be obtained through GC/SE, Occupational Safety and Health.

5.3 Personnel

Personnel that may be involved in spill response actions (including drills) consist of:

The Fire Department Environmental Engineering (GC/CEEE) Spill Response Team (GC/OPS) HAZMAT Personnel (GC/AMFO) Incident Commander Security Forces Civil Engineering (GC/CE) Operations (GC/OPS) Civil Engineering QAE (821 SPTS/CE) Base Health Director (GC Health Services) Safety Engineer (GC/SE)

5.4 Annual Spill Boom Training

GC/CEOM coordinates a training deployment of the spill boom once each year, immediately prior to the arrival of the annual fuel tanker and following fuel transfer operation. In order to supply the required manpower for a rapid deployment of the boom personnel outside the usual spill response team is called in for this exercise.

The Fuels QAE, GC Safety Engineer and Chief of Environmental Engineering are present for this exercise.

5.5 Training Records

Training records (AF form 55 or similar) are maintained at the GC Human Resources.

Thule Air Base 17 July 2009

6 POTENTIAL SPILL SITES

In order to initiate spill prevention and prepare for any spill response, it is important to realize and identify the spill scenarios that are possible at Thule AB. In addition, it is important to know what areas in particular are concerns according to section 6.1.

The identification of the potential spill site is based on site-specific conditions and surveys.

6.1 Areas of Concern

- Coastal Waters: The North Star Bay and Wolstenholme Fjord are very vulnerable areas in case of POL (petrol, oil and lubricant) spills during the tanker operations, or release of POL elsewhere at Thule AB. A spill may result in potential damage of the Arctic environment around Thule AB.

- Streams, rivers and Lakes: The many streams and rivers flowing through Thule AB lead to coastal waters, therefore any spill in these streams and rivers will eventually end up in the coastal waters. Of all the lakes in the area, Lake Crescent must especially be protected from any pollution, as this lake is used as TAB’s primary supply of potable water.

- Soil and Vegetation: In high Arctic areas, natural degrading of contaminated soils happens very slowly due to the harsh conditions. A spill may therefore ruin an area if this area is not properly cleaned up and reestablished.

6.2 Stationary Potential Spill Sites

The potential spill sites in stationary facilities at Thule AB consist of POL bulk storage tanks and piping as well as chemicals (hazardous materials and wastes) stored inside buildings. The potential spill sites from the POL storage tanks are listed in Appendix 3. A list of buildings holding large amounts of chemicals (hazardous materials and wastes) are provided in Appendix 3, which also contains tables for the regulatory compliance for all major POL tanks at Thule AB (Appendix 5). The tables can be used as reference material for the data on POL tanks.

6.3 Non-Stationary Potential Spill Sites

At Thule AB, the non-stationary potential spill sites consist of transportable tanks and the vehicle fleet including trucks, heavy equipment, and airplanes. The potential spill hazards include POL used for running the machinery and the cargo that is carried by the machinery.

Thule Air Base 18 July 2009

7 SPILL PREVENTION

7.1 General Information

A facility description and map for TAB is available in section 3.3. Vulnerable water resources include the North Star River, the North Star Bay, Wolstenholme Fjord and Lake Crescent. Lake Crescent is a critical water resource as the lake supply Thule AB with potable water.

The Thule Defense Area does not support activities unrelated to the military operations and recreational activities for base personnel.

7.2 Emergency Services

Emergency services will be contacted by telephone. The 24 hours number is 911. Fire protection and medical services are contracted with Greenland Contractors. Access control will be carried out by the base Security Forces.

7.3 Facility Incident Commander (FIC)

The FIC at Thule AB is the Fire Chief.

Title Responsibility

Duties

Telephone

DP / HP

Fire Chief Facility Incident Commander First Responder

Evaluate spill situation Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

3249 / 3149

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate FIC First Responder

Evaluate spill situation Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate FIC First Responder

Evaluate spill situation Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate FIC First Responder

Evaluate spill situation Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

Asst. Fire Chief, Operations

Alternate FIC First Responder

Evaluate spill situation Provide Guidance in spill containment, clean-up actions and restoration activities

GC/CEEE is tasked to assist the FIC and/or Assistant Fire Chief, Operations (AFCO).

Thule Air Base 19 July 2009

The FIC and/or AFCO will normally assume point of contact and act as Incident Commander until the area is safe and will:

Relay grid coordinates for the incident site to the Consolidated Communications Center

(CCC).

Establish appropriate cordons.

Establish Entry Control Points (ECP).

In case of fire, call additional firefighting equipment and position personnel and equipment UPWIND if possible.

In case of fire, a report will be submitted IAW AFI 32-2001.

If and when more firefighting equipment is needed, the FIC/AFCO will determine so upon arrival at the spill area.

Oil and water absorbent compound will be used to absorb the fuel and then be removed to a safe place. If foam is used, it must be cleaned up as soon as the hazardous condition is neutralized.

If there is no fire, and the spill is neutralized e.g. by covering with foam, Fire Protection's role is limited to standby actions. Fire fighting vehicles will not be used to remove or wash oil and hydraulic fluid spills. The operation will be given to the agency responsible for recovering and decontamination of the spill. Agency and time will be annotated in the CCC logbook.

7.4 Inventory of Potential Spill Sites

Potential POL spill sites are listed in Appendix 3, Tables A-E. Potential hazardous material spill sites are listed in Appendix 3; Table F. Appendix 3 also lists the available emergency equipment at each site. Maps of potential spill sites with flow directions are given in Appendix 4. Site-specific procedures should be maintained at each site on the facility where significant spills could occur.

There are no potential spill sites for pesticides or PCB containing oil on Thule AB. PCB is not used or stored at the installation. A complete PCB survey of transformers is included in CDRL CEV-12 PCB Replacement Plan and PCB containing materials are limited to cables and electronic components. Pesticides are present in very limited quantities in building 836 (cockroach boxes) in a locked cabinet. There is no risk for a spill incident for these boxes.

7.5 Initiatives at the Shop Level

At the shop level and for the day-to-day work assignments, all supervisors and superintendents, as well as personnel specifically appointed to work with hazardous materials, are provided “Chemical Hazard Communication Training”. This training provides the personnel with an understanding of how to safely handle hazardous materials, and how to read and understand Material Safety Data Sheets. All personnel handling hazardous waste receive “Hazardous Waste Handler Training”. The “Chemical Hazard Communication Training” and the “Hazardous Waste Handler Training” emphasize how to use the proper spill kits, in case of small spills that can be handled by the shop personnel without requiring assistance from the Fire Department.

Thule Air Base 20 July 2009

7.6 Initiatives on the POL System

The fuel distribution system within Fuels Management has been replaced from 1999 to 2004.

There is a new Hydrant System at Bldg. 614. The current plan is to demolish the old, unused Cluster 1.

For the fuel distribution system, the following changes have occurred:

All bulk storage tanks at the North Farm have been refurbished and new dikes established with double liner secondary containment.

Piping running from the pier through the North tank farm, to Power and Heating Plants, to Truck Fill stand and Hydrant System, has been replaced.

Truck Fill stand and Aviation Hydrant System, including 25K gal hydrant tanks have been refurbished. Dike with double liner secondary containment is installed.

20 plus bulk storage tanks have been demolished.

Future initiatives include a leak detection system for all pipes and an automatic water drainage system to remove water from the tank bottom. The project design is complete, funding for the construction project has been postponed until further notice.

As part of a Delong Pier renovation project scheduled for FY-09 the fuel pipelines will be replaced.

Funding for upgrading older single-walled organizational tanks is not available as no legal driver for secondary containment exists for tank with a capacity of less than 50,000 gallons in the FGS.

Work on an alternative driver is in progress.

Refurbishing and replacement of transportable tanks is ongoing. Two types of transportable tanks will be available, for stationary mobile equipment during projects and mobile tanks complying with ADR and DOT standards. The new program for transportable tanks is the responsibility for transportation, and maintenance of the tanks under one shop. Furthermore, the personnel transporting the tanks must be certified IAW Europe. Agreem./Internet. Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR).

7.7 Worst Case Scenarios

A disaster scenario at Thule AB would be if the tanker that delivers POL to Thule AB during the summer experienced a significant spill. Pumps are available to recover fuel from the ocean surface. Thule AB has the capability to deploy a spill boom. However, experiences from the annual exercises indicate that the engine power of the available push boat is insufficient to deploy more than 400 meters of boom due to the heavy current.

In case a weather warning for high wind speeds is issued the fuel transfer will be aborted temporarily. This minimizes the risk for a spill under conditions where the POL will enter open water fast and thus prevent outside assistance to arrive in time to avoid an environmental disaster.

A critical failure of a Bulk Storage Tank could potentially release more than 2 million gals. of fuel.

The procedure for containing such an event would be to pump the spill from the secondary containment to an empty bulk storage tank. There are currently no level alarms installed at the Bulk Storage Tanks at Thule AB. The probability for such a failure is very low.

Thule Air Base 21 July 2009

The fuel transfer lines between Tank Farm North and buildings and tanks pass over the North Star River. During high river flows or flooding these lines are potentially at risk. Even if the fuel transfer is aborted immediately following the detection of a leak, the volume of fuel in the pipelines is thousands of gallons.

At the present time there is no designated storage capacity to accommodate very large spills (i.e. from bulk storage tanks or oil tanker). The only inactive BST at Thule (TK 34) cannot safely be filled to capacity. It will be emptied for its current content of waste fuel, mostly tank bottoms, and is scheduled for demolition. Therefore such a spill would have to be contained in an active

BST.

A failure of one or both of the bulk storage tanks at BMEWS would endanger the Wolstenholme Fjord. The tanks are protected by secondary containment IAW the FGS and the probability for such a failure is very low. However, the fuel transfer pipes between the BSTs and the day tanks inside the BMEWS power point do not have secondary containment or shut-off valves.

7.8 Liquid Fuel Systems Maintenance and Inspections

Responsibilities of the Liquid Fuel Maintenance (LFM) section of Power & Heat Operations regarding POL systems include:

• Preventive maintenance IAW the established Recurring Work Program (RWP), including reporting of all discrepancies to Fuels Operations.

• In cooperation with the Fuels Quality Control Supervisor, Fuels Operation, Engineering and Resources & Requirements continuously update the Recurring Work Program IAW applica-ble reference documents and manufacturer's instructions.

• Annual leak and pressure tests, 5 year hydrostatic tests IAW UFC 3-460-03.

• Daily fuel system inspections, a joint effort between Fuels Operations and the LFM section of Power & Heat Operations.

• Completion of all Job and Work Orders regarding maintenance and repair on POL systems.

• Identification and purchase of spare parts required for maintenance and repair of all POL systems.

• Preparation and testing of bunker hoses. Reference is made to "Preparation of Fuel Hoses for Tanker Operation"

• Cleaning of bulk storage tanks. Reference is made to "Tank Cleaning".

• Calibration of pressure and thermal relief valves to include documentation and traceability

IAW UFC 3-460-03.

• Perform Quality Control of own work including leak and pressure tests as well as participa-tion in Quality Control of work performed by external contractors, hereunder support to the CCI/COTR regarding acceptance of POL projects as well as surveillance of POL systems under repair/modification.

• Maintain documentation of all tests, maintenance and repair IAW reference documents.

• Identification and scheduling of TDY enabling the LFM section of Power & Heat Operations to perform all assigned tasks on the POL systems.

Thule Air Base 22 July 2009

Operational Inspections and Reporting The following flowchart shows the process for operational inspections and reporting:

Thule Air Base 23 July 2009

RWP Inspections and Reporting The following flowchart shows the process for RWP inspections and reporting:

Note: Normal RWP reporting procedures regarding completion and Request for Deviation IAW Recurring Work Program remains in action even though discrepancies are reported to Fuels Operation.

Thule Air Base 24 July 2009

Completion of AFTO Form 39 The LFM Team, assigned with maintenance and repair of POL systems, are to complete the Maintenance Status section of AFTO Form 39 IAW T.O. 37-1-1, Chapter 3, Section 3-8, g.

The following information is to be annotated in pencil:

• Date maintenance action is initiated or status code is changed.

• Appropriate status code

• DM – Deferred for Maintenance

• DP – Deferred for Parts

• C - Corrected

• Initials of individual annotating the status code.

Quality Control Quality Control must be performed on all maintenance and repair work except ordinary RWP inspections. Control of materials, methods and the work itself must be performed by the LFM Team in the form of self-inspection IAW "Quality Control, Fuel Systems". Once the maintenance and repair work is completed, the Power & Heat Operations Supervisor will, based on the form completed by the LFM Team, perform Quality Control of the worksite, the work itself and the documentation. If accepted by the Power & Heat Operations Supervisor, an inspection of the worksite will be coordinated with the Fuels QC Supervisor.

Prior to release of the POL system, the Fuels QC Supervisor will inspect the work in cooperation with the Power & Heat Operations Supervisor. All QC checklists, welding approvals, leak tests and pressure tests and other documentation will be presented as required. If work is accepted, the Fuels QC Supervisor and the Power & Heat Operations Supervisor will cosign the release section of the "Quality Control, Fuel Systems" form.

Safety Procedures Civil Engineering Shop Safety establishes a set of guidelines and directives for all personnel assigned to Civil Engineering shops. Included are applicable safety and fire prevention procedures to ensure that potential safety and fire hazards are detected and appropriate corrective action is initiated as early as possible.

For detailed safety instructions regarding prevention of static electricity hazards, reference is made to UFC 3-460-03, Chapter 9 and NFPA 77.

In addition to the guidelines and directives established in above-mentioned Safety Instruction following instruction must be adhered to:

Fuel tanks and/or pipelines under repair or construction shall always be empty, safety-tested and flanged off, prior to start of work. The Power & Heat Operations Supervisor shall ensure that a fuel installation containing fuel is inspected on a daily basis, following the same procedures as active systems. If another contractor than GC accomplishes the repair or construction, the GC CCI will ensure that the other contractor follows the above procedure. If the construction contractor leaves the site (e.g. during winter) prior to completion of the project, the GC/CCI in cooperation with the Power & Heat Operations Supervisor will be responsible for checking the work site at intervals mutually agreed upon between the construction contractor, USAF and GC.

In case the fuel installation under repair or construction contains fuel, the work site must be inspected on a daily basis IAW "Quality Control, Fuel Systems".

Thule Air Base 25 July 2009

Training Requirements The LFM Team consists, for safety reasons, of no less than two individuals.

The leader of the LFM Team must have the following qualifications:

• LFM Technician or equal documented experience with fuel systems

• TCT, Tank Custodian Training

• AFTO 39 Training

• First Aid and CPR training

• TES, Tank Entry Supervisor Certification (preferable).

The rest of the LFM Team members must, as a minimum, have the following qualifications:

• TCT, Tank Custodian Training

• AFTO 39 Training

• First Aid and CPR training

7.9 Site Specific Contingency Plans

A contingency plan is a plan prepared for specific areas where hazardous materials and/or POLs are stored indoors and/or used. The purpose of such a plan is to address worst-case scenarios for accidental discharge.

The HWAP/HWSA managers or the shop supervisors also develop contingency plans. The plans should be posted in readily accessible areas at the applicable potential release sites so that it can be used by the personnel initially discovering a release to initiate containment procedures and by the Incident Commander to provide assistance in directing release response actions. For outdoor POL tanks, the contingency plans are available in central locations for fuel transfer (bldgs. 614, 617 and 1307) and all fuel trucks.

At a minimum, the information in a contingency plan should include:

The evacuation procedures to be initiated in the event of a release.

The initial release response actions that should be taken by individual(s) discovering a release. These actions should include all relevant release response and notification procedures, along with the location of valves and pump controls that could stop the release, as well as the location of, and procedures for using any readily available release response equipment, such as fire extinguishers, absorbents, and drain plugs.

The requirement that applicable Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) be kept available.

A list of special notification requirements and procedures including phone numbers.

The contingency plans will be inspected during annual visits from Environmental Engineering and quarterly inspections of HWAPs.

FGS 18.3.2 requires a list of all emergency equipment at each site where this equipment is required. This information is provided in appendices 3 and 6.

Some identified deficiencies in specific contingency plans are described in section 3.5

Thule Air Base 26 July 2009

7.10 Fuel Transfer Safety Precautions

The following requirements apply to the transfer of fuel from Tank Farm North to Buildings and Organizational tanks

• Never override or tamper with safety devices or level gauges.

• Only personnel who have successfully received hands on training from either Supervisor or assigned trainer will participate in fuel transfer operations.

• The "two person policy" will be strictly adhered to. The GC Site Manager or his/her repre-sentative must approve in writing any deviation from the "two person policy".

• Personnel assigned to fuel transfer operations will continuously monitor the fuel transfer. The operation will be terminated immediately in case a leak, regardless of size, or any other anomaly is observed.

• Personnel assigned to fuel transfer operations will not leave the site until after the transfer has stopped; the pump(s) has come to a complete stop, the applicable valve(s) closed, and the transfer lines inspected for leaks.

• Detection of any leak, regardless of size, will be reported immediately to the consolidated alarm center, ext. 911.

Thule Air Base 27 July 2009

8 SPILL RESPONSE PROCEDURES

8.1 Immediate Notification and Reporting

If a spill is of such a nature that the personnel on site cannot handle it, the following actions will be taken immediately:

• Restrict all sources of ignition

• Check causes and stop source of spill if possible without undue risk of personal injury

• Evacuate the area

• Notify the Alarm Center ext. 911

• Make the spill scene “Off Limits” to unauthorized personnel

When notifying the Fire Department, the following information should be provided:

• Name of individual reporting spill

• Location of spill

• Number of injured personnel and nature of injuries

• Substance spilled

• Amount spilled (estimated)

• Rate substance currently leaking (estimated)

• Time spill occurred (estimated)

• Extent to which the spill has traveled

• Any pertinent information (e.g. other potential hazards)

Small POL Spill (< 1 gal.):

If the spill is small and can be handled by the shop personnel, actions to respond, control and clean up the spill will be initiated. If a spill kit is used in the spill response action, this must be properly disposed of in accordance with the Hazardous Waste Management Plan or guidance provided by GC/CEEE.

GC/CEEE must immediately be notified. GC/CEEE keeps a file with all the reported spill incidents at Thule AB irrespective of the size of the spill.

Medium POL Spill (1 gal. – 25 gal.):

If the shop personnel can handle the spill, the above guidelines shall be used.

If the spill cannot be handled or occurs in areas of concern, the personnel on site will take the following action:

Notify the Alarm Center ext.: 911, who notify Security Forces, Fire QAE, Fuels QAE, 821

SPTS/CE, 821 ABG/SE, 821 SPTS/CC, GC/AMF, GC/CEEE, GC/CE, GC/OMUFM.

Area of Concern: Coastal Waters (North Star Bay and Wolstenholme Fjord), streams, rivers and lakes, soil and vegetation that cannot be properly cleaned up and reestablished.

GC/CEE must notify 21 CES/CEANN if the spill occurs in an area of concern. All reporting must be coordinated with 821 SPTS/CE and the Installation Commander.

Thule Air Base 28 July 2009

Large POL Spill (> 25 gal.):

The personnel on site will take the following action:

Notify the Alarm Center ext.: 911, who notify Security Forces, Fire QAE, Fuels QAE, 821

SPTS/CE, 821 ABG/SE, 821 SPTS/CC, GC/AMF, GC/CEEE, GC/CE, GC/OMUFM.

GC/CEEE must notify 21 CES/CEANN and all reporting will be coordinated with 821 SPTS/CE and the Installation Commander.

The reporting method to 21 CES/CEANN is by email.

Hazardous substance All Hazardous substance that exceeds the quantities in the FGS, table AP1.T4, must be reported to 21 CES/CEANN; reporting method is by email.

Files of all spills must be documented in the CEEE office. When CEEE is notified of a spill the CEEE office will issue a “Memo for Record Spill” within 24 hours. The CEEE Superintendent or alternate will approve the report and submit it to 821 ABG, DLO and/or 21 CES/CEANN.

The Memo for Record must contain the following items

• Name of installation

• Date and time of incident

• Actual damage or potential threats to human life, property, and plant or animal life

• Location of incident and the nature of the terrain

• Cause of incident

• Type and estimated amount of pollutant

• Corrective action to remove pollution source

• Assistance required

• Estimated completion date of remedial actions

• Anticipated or actual reaction by the news media and public to the incident

• POC

Spill incidents without Notification to the alarm center In case of a spill incident that is discovered as a result of a slow process (i.e. seeping and/or dripping) will often not have been called into the alarm center and treated as a spill incident as described above. In such cases it is the responsibility of GC/CEEE to request SPT assistance and recommend environmental clean-up projects as appropriate.

Thule Air Base 29 July 2009

8.2 External Notification

GC/CEEE must immediately notify and submit CDRL FU-3 IAW CDRL Distribution List when:

• The spill exceeds the reportable quantity (110 gallons for POL products). The reportable quantity for other chemicals is indicated in the Final Governing Standards (FGS), Appendix 1, Table AP1.T4

• A spill occurs inside Thule AB and cannot be contained within any required berm or secondary containment

• A water resource has been polluted

• The FIC determines that the spill is significant

Additionally, GC/CEEE will notify 21 CES/CEANN in case of an incident that Thule AB is not capable of responding to. The information that must be given includes:

• Name of installation

• Date and time of incident

• Actual damage or potential threats to human life, property, and plant or animal life

• Location of incident and the nature of the terrain

• Cause of incident

• Type and estimated amount of pollutant

• Corrective action to remove pollution source

• Assistance required

• Estimated completion date of remedial actions

• Anticipated or actual reaction by the news media and public to the incident

• POC

• GC/CEEE will prepare and distribute CDRL FU-3 using the format in AFI 23-201 Sup 1, App. 11

• For spills larger than 110 gallons notify IAW Environment Incident Investigation Board

(EIIB) Procedure Policy Memo (HQ AFSPC/A7CV Policy P06004V). Letter of November 7, 2007 waives the requirement to report sewage spills smaller than 110 gallons.

Thule Air Base 30 July 2009

8.3 Additional Emergency Assistance Organizations

A major peacetime accident may occur involving POL and/or hazardous materials. Actions required may range from simple suppression to highly complex and time-consuming operations with international and/or political implications. It is recognized that response may also be required to accidents occurring outside the Thule Defense Area. However, such responses must be coordinated through the Thule AB Danish Liaison Officer using appropriate Greenlandic and Danish official channels (Grønlands Kommando). Further details of actions to be taken during major peacetime accidents, including base evacuation, are outlined in Thule CEMP 10-2.

Additional emergency assistance or information may be required during or after a spill incident.

For this purpose, the following list contains contact numbers for various offices that may be of assistance. Contact to these offices will occur through 821 ABG/CC.

Name of Organization Assistance Available Telephone Number U.S. Forces Scott AFB or MAJCOM Additional Communication Support DSN 576-1110 (opr) HQ AFSPC Airlift Support Scott AFB Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC)

Airlift Support DSN 576- 4815/16/17/18/19 Commercial: (618) 256- 4815/16/17/18/19

Elmendorf RCC, Elmendorf AFB, AK

Emergency contact DSN 517 522-5375

Air Force Civil Engineering Services Agency (AFCESA)

Technical guidance and assistance DSN 970-1110

USAF Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory

(OEHL)

Sampling and analytical support for a complex spill

DSN 240-3305

Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC)

24-hour hot line warnings and limited guidance to OSC when spill product can be identified by either chemical or trade name

US 1(800) 424-9300

Environmental Technical Information Systems (ETIS)

State and federal regulations Directories of federal and state contracts

DSN 970-6167

Oil and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance Data System

(OHMTADS)

Computerized information on various hazardous substances

US 1(800) 424-8802

Canadian Forces Halifax RCC, Nova Scotia, Canada Emergency contact DSN 447-8200/2100/2102

RCC Comm. DSN 447-

Edmonton RCC, Alberta Canada Emergency contact DSN 620-4402/4403 Commercial:(405) 973-

Note: Edmonton RCC has primary responsibility for Canadian SAR in Northern Canada. They maintain a SAR response team on 24-hour alert.

Thule Air Base 31 July 2009

Name of Organization Assistance Available Telephone Number Trenton RCC, Ontario Canada Emergency contact DSN 827-3870/3875

(RCC) DSN 827-3765

(ATOC)

CFS Alert Emergency contact DSN 627-8011 ext. 201 via Ottawa operator

Danish Forces GLK (Grønlands Kommando) Contact through DLO

Emergency Contact DSN 268 3840 ext.2612

Others Greenland Fire Protection, Nuuk Ro-Clean Spill Boom, similar to Thule

AB Spill Boom Commercial: 32 10 56

Thule Air Base 32 July 2009

9 CLEANUP ACTIONS

When a spill incident is under control and it is safe to enter the spill area, it is very important to initiate containment and cleanup actions as quickly as possible to limit the damaging effects on the arctic environment.

9.1 Probable Spill Route

A major concern in a spill situation is the spill route. It is important as quickly as possible to determine if any vulnerable area might be adversely affected, e.g. coastal waters or Lake Crescent. If this is the case, the containment and cleanup actions must be emphasized here in order to avoid or reduce the damage of such areas. Site specific spill flow prediction maps for individual locations are included in appendix 4 of this plan.

9.2 Containment, Clean-up and Disposal

The Incident Commander or Fire Chief will notify the Spill Response Team (SRT). The SRT performs the cleanup with assistance from appropriate personnel if deemed necessary. Prior to any cleanup action all personnel participating must be briefed about the hazards associated with the spilled material and the personal protection equipment to wear if needed.

Depending on the spill situation, various actions for containment and cleanup actions may be initiated:

• POL can be reclaimed e.g. by pumping the POL into a secondary containment

• Temporary dikes can be constructed to contain and control POL spills (see Appendix 2)

• The cleanup operation can be accomplished using spill absorbent materials

• Polluted soil can be removed and handled at a later time (see CDRL CEV-15B Hazardous

Waste Management Plan for details).

9.3 Material Safety Data Sheet

The SRT must be familiar with the hazards associated with the specific materials and what kind of personal protection equipment is needed prior to the cleanup action. Fire Chief, GC/SE and GC/CEEE will evaluate the need for personal protection equipment based on the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) information and the site-specific conditions.

In any spill situation, the containment and cleanup actions must be coordinated with the Incident Commander or the Fire Chief, the SRT and Environmental Engineering personnel.

Thule Air Base 33 July 2009

10 REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION

GC/CEEE keeps a file with all the reported spill incidents at Thule AB irrespective of the size of the spill.