BAA_13-05_Amendment_0004.pdf

BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT (BAA)

Explosives Division (EXD) BAA 13-05

Advanced X-ray Material Discrimination

White Papers Due: See Anticipated Schedule of Events in paragraph 4.6 Full Proposals Due: See Anticipated Schedule of Events in paragraph 4.6

April 10, 2013

Amendment 00004

Table of Contents

1 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Agency Name

1.3 Research Opportunity Title

1.4 Program Name

1.5 Research Opportunity Number

1.6 Solicitation and Response Approach

1.7 Response Dates

1.8 Research Opportunity Description

1.8.1 Background

1.8.2 The Problem

1.8.3 BAA Overview

1.8.4 Technical Areas of Interest

1.8.4.1 Key Technologies

1.8.4.2 DARPA KECoM Program Technology

1.8.5 Statement of Work

1.8.5.1 Task Area 1: X-ray Test Bed Prototypes

1.8.5.2 Task Area 2: Supporting Analytical Tasks

1.8.5.3 Task Area 3: Test and Evaluation Support

1.8.5.4 Task Area 4: Architectural Components

1.8.5.3 Task Area 5: X-Ray System Architectural Design Concepts

1.9 Government Representatives

2 AWARD INFORMATION

2.1 Available Amount of Funding Expected to be Awarded Through this BAA

2.2 Limitation of Funds

2.3 Anticipated Number of Awards

2.4 Anticipated Award Types

3 ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION

3.1 Federally Funded Research & Development Centers

3.2 Nonprofit Organizations, Educational Institutions and Small Business Set Aside

3.3 Organizational Conflict of Interest

4 APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INFORMATION

4.1 BAA Package Download

4.2 Application and Submission Process

4.3 White Paper Format and Content

4.4 Full Proposal Format and Content

4.5 Protection of Information Uploaded to BAA Website

4.6 Significant Dates and Times

4.7 Submission of Late Full Proposals

4.8 Further Assistance Needed for this BAA

4.9 BAA Contractual and Technical Questions

5 EVALUATION INFORMATION

5.1 Evaluation Criteria

5.2 Evaluation Panel

5.3 Feedback

6 AWARD ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION

6.1 Reporting

6.2 Project Meetings and Reviews

6.3 Additional Deliverables

7 OTHER INFORMATION

7.1 Foreign Government Participation

7.2 Government Furnished Equipment, Government Furnished Information and Facilities

7.3 Security Classification

7.4 Information for White Paper and Full Proposal Respondents

7.5 SAFETY Act

7.6 Subcontracting Plan

7.7 Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data

7.8 Solicitation Provisions and Clauses

7.9 Acronym List

Appendix A Technology Readiness Levels

Appendix B DARPA KECoM BAA-10-38

Appendix C Selected Technical References

Appendix D Material Threat List

Appendix E SCR, PDR, CDR Summary Review Guidelines

Appendix F DHS S&T Collaboration Classification Solicitation Example

Appendix G X-ray Test Bed Description

Appendix H Guidelines, Considerations and Goals for the X-ray System

Appendix I Sample White Paper in “DHS S&T EXD Project Proposal Form” Format

Appendix J WBS per Task Area and Individual Tasks

Appendix K Sample DHS S&T Explosives Division “Monthly Project Status Reporting Form”

Appendix L Acronym List

1 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Introduction

This solicitation is a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) issued under the provisions of paragraph 6.102(d)(2) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to provide for the competitive selection of research proposals. A formal Request for Proposal (RFP) will not be issued. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate is soliciting white papers which will be evaluated in accordance with this BAA.

From the submitted and evaluated white papers, participants may be invited to submit full proposals under this BAA. Contracts based on responses to this BAA are considered to be the result of full and open competition and in full compliance with the provisions of Public Law (PL) 98-369, “The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.” Awards under this BAA are planned in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. Currently no funds are committed for any contract awards that may be selected pursuant to this BAA. No contract awards will be made until appropriated funds are available from which payment for contract purposes can be made.

1.2 Agency Name

Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate Explosives Division Washington, DC

1.3 Research Opportunity Title

Advanced X-ray Material Discrimination

1.4 Program Name

Checked Baggage and Checkpoint

1.5 Research Opportunity Number

BAA 13-05

1.6 Solicitation and Response Approach

The Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) will not issue paper copies of this announcement. DHS S&T reserves the right to select for award and fund all, some, or none of the submissions received in response to this solicitation. No funding for direct reimbursement of white paper or proposal development costs will be allowed. White Papers, Full Proposals or any other material submitted in response to this BAA will not be returned. However, DHS S&T will adhere to FAR policy on handling source selection information and proprietary proposals in accordance with any and all markings on the proposal. It is the policy of DHS S&T to treat all proposals as sensitive competitive information and to disclose their contents only for the purposes of evaluation. All submissions should be unclassified. Documents containing sensitive information that are not suitable for uncontrolled public dissemination should be marked

“For Official Use Only” (FOUO). When transmitted electronically, FOUO proposals should be sent with password protection.

Award type is anticipated to be in the form of a Cost Reimbursement type contract or other transaction agreement, if authorized at time of award. In the event an Offeror or subcontractor is an FFRDC, Department of Energy National Laboratory, or other Federally funded entity, DHS S&T will work with the appropriate sponsoring agency to issue an interagency agreement pursuant to the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1531) or other appropriate authority.

A two-step proposal selection process will be used for this solicitation to minimize the cost and effort for prospective offerors. Step 1 will consist of the solicitation, receipt, and evaluation of White Papers using a standardized DHS S&T Explosives Division “Project Proposal Form” template from offerors (see Appendix I). Entries in the various sections of the Project Proposal Forms (and White Paper) should be concise and conform to the specified formatting limitations. No formal transmittal letter is required for the Step 1, White Paper submission.

An evaluation process will be conducted by DHS S&T and the Step 1 White Paper selectees will be encouraged to participate in Step 2, which will consist of the solicitation, receipt, and evaluation of a Full Proposal. The Full Proposals will be page limited depending upon the Task Area as noted in section 4.4. The page count limit excludes the proposer’s Formal Transmittal Letter, Cover Page and Table of Contents. The page limit exclusion also applies to resumes/biographical information, Teaming Agreements, Letters of Intent (LOI) and Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)/Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Assertion of Data Rights if and only if the main proposal write-up (within the page limitation) makes reference to the respective aforementioned items by referring to the appropriate appendix section containing the items.

1.7 Response Dates

White Paper Proposals Due: See Anticipated Schedule of Events in paragraph 4.6 Full Proposals Due: See Anticipated Schedule of Events in paragraph 4.6.

1.8 Research Opportunity Description

1.8.1 Background

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) states that DHS S&T will “support basic and applied homeland security research to promote revolutionary changes in technologies; advance the development, testing and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland security technologies; and accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that would address homeland security vulnerabilities.”1

1 6 U.S.C. § 187(b)(3)(A-C)

The DHS S&T Checked Baggage and Check Point Programs invest in the development and maturation of advanced screening technologies that demonstrate a potential to deliver solutions that address TSA’s capability gaps for screening checked baggage and personal carry-on items. Specifically, the programs pursue technologies that:

Significantly improve the capability to detect current and emerging improvised explosive threats

Demonstrate the potential to deliver improved probability of detection (Pdet) and reduced probability of false alarm (Pfa) for an expanded improvised explosive library of threats, improve system reliability, and provide higher screening throughput with 0.5 m/sec as a goal.

Reduce both procurement and lifecycle costs and require minimal modification of existing TSA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for deployment

TSA’s system requirements along with their cost and operational models must be met as new technologies are developed. TSA has a Mission Needs Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and Functional Requirements Documents (FRD) for EDS2 and AT3 systems that will guide and frame the technology development on this BAA in order to successfully transition technology developed on a future system development acquisition and BAA. Access to the TSA documents will not be required by Performers on this BAA; DHS S&T will provide the technical direction on key technologies and needs to the Performers.

1.8.2 The Problem

The emergence of improvised explosive threats and their use by terrorists has placed many challenges on the aviation security screening layers. EDS and AT X-ray equipment have been presented with considerable challenges in developing a broad detection capability for improvised explosive threats during security screening of checked bags and carry-on items.

Technologies are needed that increase the measurement or mathematical discrimination between improvised explosive threats and stream-of-commerce clutter in checked baggage and carry-on items. Conventional EDS utilizes two basic discriminating signatures:

effective atomic number and density of screened objects. R&D is needed to identify additional discriminating signatures between improvised explosive threats and stream-of-commerce clutter to improve detection capability with reduced false alarm rates.

2 EDS: Explosive Detection System; TSA term for equipment used in Checked Baggage Screening utilizing X-rays and employing 3-D Computed Tomography. http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/security-technologies#eds 3 AT: Advanced Technology; TSA term for equipment used in the Checkpoint employing X-rays to screen carry-on items and typically has only a few views unlike EDS that has many views representing the objects scanned. For more detail on the TSA Passenger Screening Program, see http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/recovery/tsa_recovery_passenger_screening_program.pdf

1.8.3 BAA Overview

This BAA will advance aviation security and improvised explosive threat detection by providing enabling technology for subsequent incorporation into EDS and AT screening equipment by future development acquisitions as illustrated in Figure 1.

The primary technical focus is significantly enhancing capabilities for improvised explosive threat detection by reducing false alarm rates on multiple improvised explosive threat classes with improved probability of detection, while increasing screening throughput, supporting TSA's risk-based screening, and reducing equipment life-cycle costs.

This BAA seeks new system solutions employing revolutionary technologies capable of offering significant enhancement to the overall detection capability metrics. Minor or incremental improvements are not of interest for this BAA. Transition periods of 4-5 years are anticipated; however S&T has interest in technologies that may offer nearer term retrofit capability into the deployed EDS and AT platforms.

Achieving revolutionary enhancements in improvised explosive threat detection requires new techniques for distinguishing the stream-of-commerce bag clutter from improvised explosive threats.

Towards these goals, this BAA solicits responses to the following five task areas:

1) Task Area 1: X-ray Test Bed Prototypes

2) Task Area 2: Supporting Analytical Tasks

3) Task Area 3: Test and Evaluation Support

4) Task Area 4: Architectural Components

5) Task Area 5: X-Ray System Architectural Design Concepts

A specialized X-ray test bed employing new signature measurement techniques will be utilized to perform improvised explosive threat and clutter characterization. Additional characterization of stream-of-commerce clutter will occur from data collection at airports.

The measured data, supplemented with airport-collected, stream-of-commerce data will be provided to multiple teams performing system architecture design, information theory analysis and algorithm development. Vendors’ EDS and AT equipment will also be used for signature data collection and evaluation on broad improvised explosive threat classes to thoroughly assess areas for improvement and provide insights to guide all task areas.

DHS S&T expects to make multiple awards for each Task Area (Task Areas 1-5) under this

BAA.

Figure 1, Technology Development Strategy and Relationship to Planned System Development BAA for Transition

Validate signature discrimination technique

Validate signature discrimination & technology in viable equipment platform

Validate system is certification capable with new capabilities

Informs new TSA detection standards

Define next generation architecture & performance

Planned DHS S&T System Development BAA

Scope:

• Transition BAA 13-05 technology to

EDS/AT platform

• Extensive DT&E with Certification

Future DHS TSA Acquisition

OT&E, Procurement Acquisition, Deployment

BAA 13-05

Advanced X-ray Material

Discrimination 24 months with options

Scope:

Technology Development

• Technology for enhanced discrimination

• Technology verification

• EDS/AT next generation system architecture and PDR

Procures to new detection standards

The R&D results will drive system innovation leading to a new generation of equipment capability and also the potential for retrofitting enhancements into deployed systems.

The task areas will be described in more detail below. This BAA will enable the DHS enterprise to move forward on acquiring more optimized EDS/AT solutions in terms of detection performance, throughput, size, weight, power, reliability, maintainability, procurement costs and lifecycle costs.

A single R&D organization or equipment manufacturer has not yet demonstrated the requisite knowledge, skills, experience, and manufacturing capability to successfully undertake the required technical and equipment objectives and advances of this BAA.

Therefore, DHS S&T anticipates that successful responses to this BAA will include collaboration of many, multi-disciplinary research and development teams to achieve the desired end goals for S&T and TSA.

The Government anticipates that candidate team members may consist of, but are not limited to, TSA equipment manufacturers, DHS S&T sponsored-research university and industry teams, synergistic DARPA sponsored research performers, medical sector researchers and suppliers, and other third party innovators of algorithms and component manufacturers in the supply chain.

Strong multi-disciplinary teams will provide the needed fundamental and applied research results to define technologies and architectures that are transitionable by equipment manufacturers to TSA to be deployed in aviation security. Successful products from this program are also expected to find utility in a range of other Federal markets, including Federal Protective Services, the U.S. Secret Service and Customs and Border Protection.

1.8.4 Technical Areas of Interest

Central to this BAA are tasks to develop new discriminating X-ray signature approaches in robust test bed prototypes along with characterizing stream-of-commerce clutter (baggage) data collected at airports. The new improvised explosive threat signature techniques and characterized stream-of-commerce clutter will enable researchers from multi-disciplinary fields including mathematics, X-ray physics, explosive materials and chemistry, information science, and equipment developers to lay out a technical framework for significantly enhanced EDS and AT systems.

Furthermore this BAA seeks to evaluate and leverage synergistic emerging technology from other agency R&D initiatives, for example the DARPA KECoM4 program, as applicable in order to reach BAA program goals and metrics.

4 KECoM: Knowledge Enhanced Compressive Measurement; BAA is available here:

https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=02a0f656dab936171f23d7cbcbef6a22&tab=core&_cv iew=0

1.8.4.1 Key Technologies

Some key technical areas of interest that may assist in improving the overall detection capability are discussed below. They are at various technology readiness levels (TRLs5) and relate to all tasks in the BAA SOW. Offerors should consider the key technologies and their relevance to proposed work for the Task Areas; relevance should be reflected in the proposer’s solutions and corresponding SOW. Key technologies are:

a) Signatures. The goal of obtaining chemical identification from X-ray measurements is of paramount importance. As an example, DHS S&T has high interest in problems related, but not limited to, enhanced discrimination for:

1. Objects with density near “1” in traditional CT measurement space6, which includes many commercial and organic materials

2. Liquids and powders

3. Thin objects with large aspect ratios, e.g. thin material sheets

4. Threats and clutter via chemically-specific identification to reduce false alarms

DHS sponsored research results indicate X-ray diffraction spectra provide additional chemical identification discriminators. Other research has shown that coded-apertures may assist the discrimination, as well as techniques that provide object phase measurements. Highly accurate phase measurements may also enhance object segmentation accuracy and therefore enable improved disambiguation and object size estimates.

Sponsored research has demonstrated pencil beam and fan beam coded aperture X-ray scatter imaging along with compressive X-ray tomography that may apply to EDS and AT systems.

DHS S&T has interest in the above technologies and other potential discriminators that may provide significant reduction in the false alarm rate and enhanced threat detection in terms of reduced false alarm and probability of detection on multiple improvised explosive threat classes.

b) Sources and detectors. Conventional X-ray sources providing dual energy have entered the EDS equipment market. Research has been sponsored by DHS S&T and industry for new X-ray sources and detectors. Some examples are carbon nano-tube, E-beam and optically driven X-ray sources. Various types of detectors are available including energy integrating and energy discriminating or photon counting. Architecture questions remain such as the required quantity, mix of types and performance levels for EDS and AT architectures. Other devices utilized in the optical path or in signal acquisition that has a high impact on discrimination may also be of interest, for example low noise detectors.

5 See Appendix A for TRL definitions 6 Traditional CT measurement space near one similar to water or hydrogen peroxide

c) Architectures. High-impact approaches that may be suitable for retrofit into existing EDS or AT baselines as well as game-changing de-novo architectures.

Compressive measurement has been validated in several modalities with transitioned products and the fundamental mathematical theory applies across the electromagnetic spectrum. DHS S&T has ongoing sponsored research in compressive measurement and signature enhancement for X-ray systems to provide insight into trade-space questions such as the required numbers of sources, optical path(s), coded apertures, detector types and exposures to provide enhanced detection, classification including image quality for On-Screen Alarm Resolution Protocol (OSARP) given an aperture size (tunnel) and throughput speed.

Tasks on this BAA will serve to further investigate alternative architectures to obtain additional signatures by exploiting low angle coherent scattering and high angle Compton scattering simultaneously.

New architectures may benefit from consideration of novel use of sources, detectors and coded apertures utilized in an adaptive compressive measurement scheme that jointly addresses the acquisition of data or conditioning the electromagnetic field along with the desired post processing objectives. In general, initial experimental results are promising and indicate:

1. Signature separation and acquiring 3-D spatial information from a single snapshot exposure is possible

2. Less acquisition hardware (sources and detectors) may be needed to obtain the required image resolution

3. The acquisition process may be faster than in current systems

4. Chemical specificity may be improved

5. Compressive measurement may provide a path for reduced cost EDS and enhanced AT (while maintaining or improving image quality and detection specificity)

Given the significant performance/cost difference in EDS and checkpoint AT systems, it may be useful to explore a trade space of compressive measurement and coded apertures for EDS and AT; e.g. a more capable AT with a somewhat increased cost and/or a reduced cost EDS.

Compressive measurement may provide better image resolution with a shorter signal acquisition time and specificity may be improved with incoherent and coherent scatter information obtained by coded apertures, unique placement of energy sensing detectors and possibly phase signatures. The techniques may enable a convergence of EDS/AT platform architectures or common building blocks of components or modules. Scalable or modular platforms with some common modules benefit from economies of scale and may reduce lifecycle costs enabling market expansion in U.S and overseas security markets.

d) Algorithms. Algorithms have been developed by multiple industries such as medical, DoD, and DHS TSA-S&T for aviation security that may contribute to the goals of this BAA. DARPA has sponsored significant research in algorithmic areas indicating that task specific priors7 may enhance detection performance. Given the large data sets from scanned checked baggage, various “big data” approaches obtaining computationally simple descriptions from complex data sets8 may have merit for providing visualization techniques and classification improvement. Other algorithmic work along the lines of robust principal components analysis (PCA) and geometric multi-scale, learned dictionaries may provide avenues for better discrimination. The iterative reconstruction technique has shown promising results in reducing artifacts. The DHS S&T is interested in emerging and new algorithmic techniques that can be combined with new signatures measurement techniques to significantly enhance the state-of-the-art in delivered detection capability (defined as reduced Pfa with improved Pdet and while maintaining or improving throughput).

e) Information theoretic measurement framework, informed measurement.

Generation of an information theoretic measurement framework is a central theme in this BAA in order to establish scientific rationale for cohesive research directions and priorities across task areas by establishing fundamental limits of performance and metrics for achievable goals in deployed systems retrofits and future de-novo architectures. The DHS enterprise will use the results and analysis to drive strategy, investment and priorities for aviation security technology for equipment development and test article development. Some technical references are provided in Appendix C.

X-ray scanning systems acquire (sample) the electromagnetic spectrum in order to obtain information about “objects” in the field-of-view (FOV). The threat detection and classification occurs as a post-data capture, processing activity, e.g. the electromagnetic field information impinges upon detectors that measure or sample converting analog information to digital data and subsequently algorithmic processing takes place to determine threats.

Compressive measurement mathematics and demonstrated applications suggest joint optimization of sensing or measurement and processing, e.g. jointly designing the electromagnetic sampling strategy with the signal detection/classification processing objectives, may provide significant system performance advantages.

7 Priors: From the DARPA KECoM program, priors may be viewed from a perspective (a) signal classes, (b) task requirements, and (c) adaptation and their incorporation into the measurement process. See Appendix B.

8 Singh et al. Topological methods for the analysis of high dimensional data sets and 3D object recognition.

Eurographics Symposium on Point-Based Graphics. Prague – September 2007.

The field of compressive measurement9 has shown that natural systems generally may be sampled at reduced rates (less than Nyquist), capturing essential information with minimal error in reconstruction, classification and detection. For example, some experiments have shown a MSE10 of reduction of only 3 percent with only using 1/10th of the original data.

Additionally, other research has shown adapting the measurement while the measurement process is ongoing (sampling of the electromagnetic spectrum) may reduce the total time required to acquire the information and also may improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the desired measurement.11 Numerous approaches are under investigation by university and industry researchers, for example by performers on the KECoM program, to make informed measurement under various metrics and maximize mutual information from sampling processes for detection and classification.

The research suggests significant enhancements may be possible for X-ray screening systems. When viewing a checked bag screening system from an information theoretic perspective, numerous questions may be considered that may have significant benefit to equipment architecture and operational use.

A goal of this BAA is to define innovative measurement system architectures that jointly optimize the physical measurement system and mathematical processing framework to provide a unified or jointly designed acquisition, processing, detection, classification and reconstruction architecture or measurement system.

A measurement system proposed in response to this BAA should consider the emerging KECoM program developed technology including real-time, adaptive measurement and prior information that may optimize the joint measurement strategy based on specific tasking and also TSA’s risk-based screening strategy.

Joint measurement strategies including decision analytics residing in multiple sensors of differing modalities are also of interest.

Research and development performed on this BAA should answer the fundamental questions that follow:

1) Given the threat and clutter space, constrained by aperture size (equipment tunnel size) and required throughput, what is the number of unique or orthogonal signatures required to provide a significant enhancement of the ROC curves while maintaining or improving throughput?

9 See, for example: Baraniuk, Candes, Nowak and Vetterli “Compressive Sampling” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 25, Issue 2 pp 12-13, March 2008. And Donoho “Compressed Sensing” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory vol. 52, No. 4, pp 1289-1306, Apr. 2006.

10 MSE: Mean Square Error 11 See Gehm et al. "Adaptive feature specific spectroscopy for rapid chemical identification," Opt. Express 19, 4595-4610 (2011)”

2) How much information (views or scans) is required for adequate reconstruction of objects and to provide adequate object segmentation and ultimately automatic detection and classification? Are conventional data processing approaches optimal?

3) Is it possible to provide feature specific detection and classification at enhanced Pdet and Pfa without image reconstruction and only employ object image reconstruction as an operator aid for spatial location in alarm resolution?

4) What are optimal or near optimal information measurements from a physical and mathematical implementation and how can prior information influence the actual measurement process adaptively in real-time?

5) With TSA’s move to risk-based screening, can dynamically adaptive sensors and measurement processes provide operational benefit? What are the risk-based decision policies and can data be provided to inform TSA decision policies? Can other information external to the specific sensor be provided a priori to inform the measurement and detection process for improved Pdet, Pfa (such as passenger information or biometrics)? What are key priors, either external dynamic, external static information that may assist in enhanced Pdet, Pfa and/or improved screening throughput?

6) Research has progressed with active learning supporting enhanced classification in multiple applications. Can the body of research be applied to aviation security screening systems and does active learning have merit for X-ray systems given the volume of stream-of-commerce data? If so, what is the improvement and how is “system qualification or certification maintained” if active learning is employed?

7) Can other modalities and fusion be employed and effectively integrated into EDS or AT platforms at affordable cost to significantly enhance detection?

If so, how are additional modalities incorporated into joint optimization of sensing?

8) Threat detection algorithms often focus on characterizing the threat with less research emphasis on clutter characterization and its reduction or removal.

Is it possible to inform the measurement process of clutter objects (in situ or from a prior library) and subsequently improve the measurement process in real-time, hence reducing the clutter impact during classification processes to achieve improved Pdet, Pfa? Can clutter knowledge or characteristics be used as a prior and affect the measurement process or conditioning of the electromagnetic field to achieve a detection/false alarm benefit?

f) Test article development. Test articles to support this BAA and future DHS S&T DT&E need to be developed to ensure that the technologies being developed by this BAA can be adequately evaluated especially for the new signature measurement technology as described in this BAA. The test articles need to offer configurable, scalable approaches so that users are able to easily change the test items from simple, low clutter tests to the complexity of full stream-of-commerce articles.

Test article concepts and development should also support future EDS and AT vendor algorithm development and refinement at the contractor's facility in preparation for the traditional CRT12 testing. The motivation is a reduction of time and cost to deploy new capabilities to the DHS enterprise and the nation's airports. Typically CRT and certification testing require significant resource investment and time by vendors and DHS to achieve deployment-ready equipment. Methods and technologies enabling a reduced time and cost of equipment certification while maintaining high-quality test and evaluation standards is a goal of this BAA.

A top-level progression of planned phases, metrics and test environments are shown in Table 1. Given the state of the emerging technology, proposers are encouraged to develop and offer additional and refined metrics during the task execution as informed by performers’ research and collaboration.

Item 24 months

Period

Period 1 Period 2

Signature Metric

Notional example: Show distinguishable signatures with a 3x (TBD) vector distance improvement over clutter at a TBD SNR of (X)13.

An order of magnitude improvement in signature discrimination14

Threat List Measurement and identification of list in Appendix D

Measurement and identification of list in Appendix D

Complexity Simple to moderate clutter and threats, full‐sized articles.

High clutter and threat complexity.

Full‐sized, GFE test articles.

Test Environment

Lab Lab and complex improvised explosive threat testing at Government site.

Comments Show mathematical measurement framework and experimental evidence to meet metrics. Determine appropriate mathematical basis set.

Measure full 3‐D data cube with new signatures.

Measure full 3‐D data cube with new signatures. Provide data sets to other Task Area Performers.

Table 1, Threat Clutter Discrimination Progression

12 CRT: Certification Readiness Testing performed by a Government laboratory typically TSL and a preceding qualification step in order to enter full certification test and evaluation.

13 Notional example shown in Table 1. Detailed signature metrics shall be developed as part of mathematical measurement framework and subject to Government approval at formal design reviews under this BAA.

14 An order of magnitude improvement in signature discrimination from traditional effective atomic # and density measurements for selected threats, Appendix D.

1.8.4.2 DARPA KECoM Program Technology

The following narrative excerpts from the KECoM BAA introduce relevant technology to this BAA. X-ray scanner measurements are central to the detection capabilities desired in by TSA and DHS S&T. In general, because the capabilities of any sensor (e.g., sensitivity, resolution, dynamic range, etc.) are directly related to the deployed measurement resources/cost (e.g., size, weight, power, etc.), traditional sensor systems experience a tradeoff among competing performance capabilities resulting in an information bottleneck.

The goal of the KECoM program is to pursue a novel unified mathematical formalism that will change the nature of measurement and thereby alleviate the measurement information bottleneck15. The KECoM program seeks to revolutionize the measurement process and thereby drastically improve the quantity and quality of acquired information while simultaneously reducing the cost of deployed measurement resources.

Compressive measurement focuses on making relatively few information-rich measurements, rather than many information-poor measurements; exploiting the prior knowledge that natural signals (e.g., images, chemical spectra, etc.) are nearly always sparse/compressible in some domain (e.g., wavelets, principal components, etc.). The KECoM technology will amplify the benefits of compressive measurement by incorporating into the measurement process additional prior knowledge concerning (a) signal classes, (b) task requirements, and (c) adaptation. Incorporation of signal priors can be used to ensure that measurements do not waste resources measuring something that we already know; whereas, the inclusion of task priors facilitates extraction of only that information most important to the exploitation task. Adaptation promotes an increasingly efficient measurement process, incorporating knowledge from earlier experience or measurement.

The KECoM program kick-off was in January 2011 and is a three year program. The KECoM BAA (DARPA-BAA-10-38) is referenced in Appendix B and https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=02a0f656dab936171f23d7cbcbef6a22&tab=core &_cview=0 .

15 From DARPA KECoM goals

1.8.5 Statement of Work

The following Statement of Work (SOW) sets forth the requirements to accomplish a variety of specific activities related to enhancing X-ray detection of improvised explosive threats applicable to the DHS S&T Checked Baggage and next Generation Passenger Checkpoint programs. The identified requirements presented herein have a direct impact on meeting the requirements outlined in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Public Law 107-71. This project will develop enabling threat detection technology for subsequent incorporation into aviation security EDS and AT screening equipment through a planned follow-on system development program and targeted BAA.

In order to develop significantly enhanced improvised explosive threat detection solutions, the clutter from stream-of-commerce bags and improvised explosive threats must be jointly measured and characterized from new discriminating signature and information theory advances. Architectures and algorithms informed by such measurements and recent information theory innovation hold promise for new generations of equipment and the potential to retrofit deployed systems. EDS and AT equipment and specialized X-ray test bed(s) will be utilized to perform the necessary measurements and the measured signature data will be provided to performers and organizations selected by DHS S&T in support of this BAA.

To achieve the goals, the project will be composed of five major Task Areas:

1. X-ray Test Bed Prototypes. Specialized test bed prototypes incorporating new signature measurement techniques will be used to characterize stream-of-commerce clutter and improvised explosive threats. Data collected from the test bed prototype(s) will inform information theory analysis, algorithm development, and architecture development tasks.

2. Supporting Analytical Tasks. These tasks will advance information theoretic analysis of signature and clutter data to define fundamental limits and determine measurement strategies, analyze stream-of-commerce bag data sets from EDS/AT X-ray equipment, develop and test classification algorithms on the collected data sets, provide automated decision aid algorithms for TSA screening operations, and apply adaptive, compressive measurement techniques. This task will also include data collection and provide software algorithm tool kits to assist transition for TSA deployment.

3. Test & Evaluation Support. Specialized test articles/bags will be developed to support the test bed prototype and traditional EDS/AT equipment data collection and algorithm classification tests. Detection standard metrics will be established and measured on the prototype test beds and algorithms to validate the required enhancement goals using test articles.

EDS and AT equipment from vendors will also be used for data collection to thoroughly assess technical detection challenges and provide insights to guide architecture concepts and algorithm development. EDS and AT equipment vendors will also analyze the CRT process and offer recommendations that may reduce time and cost for deployment, while also enhancing the ability to deliver high-quality, system baseline improvements in response to new improvised explosive threats.

4. Architectural Components. Hardware component technology will be developed, such as sources and detectors that will be used to support test bed prototypes and future architecture development. This task will serve to identify key new components and also provide a head-start on potential “long-lead” items for the future system development solicitation.

5. X-Ray System Architectural Design Concepts. This task area will lay the foundation for future system architectures by collaborating with other BAA performers, analyzing and incorporating the technology and results from other BAA tasks supported by trade-off studies and limited experimental prototyping.

Next generation X-ray system architecture concepts will be developed meeting the stated goals and focus of this BAA to provide a viable, TSA certifiable equipment design(s). The results will be presented at a Preliminary Design Review at the end of the period of performance.

A notional summary-level task area workflow and schedule is shown in Figures 2a and 2b.

Task descriptions follow for the 5 task areas. Note that in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest, a proposer on the Test & Evaluation Support task area 3, task 3.2, Test Articles, will not be permitted to propose or participate on other tasks and proposers on other tasks may not propose or participate in task area 3, task 3.2, Test Articles.

Figure 2a, BAA Task Area Workflow and Schedule Overview

Figure 2b, Schedule Overview

All tasks will have various types of formal reviews, ranging from System Concept Reviews (SCRs) to Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs), Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) and Signature Metric and Test Reviews depending on specific BAA SOW task requirements.

The following table frames the work performed and reviews should address the items enumerated and expand as appropriate.

Table 2, Key Review Items Addressing Signature Techniques Viability

# Item Activity and/or Parameter 1 Validate unique signatures, orthogonal information & data

a) Goal: reduction of Pfa to less than 10% for current Pdet standard

b) Produce discrimination data on targets of interest, compare to traditional CT measurement for same threat or clutter. Use multiple signature data sources (GFI and data collected on this BAA) and relate to internal signature measurements. Demonstrate detection capability (Pdet, Pfa) and ROC curves.

2 Characterization of macro threat properties

c) Develop measurement data on target critical properties including critical diameter, max and minimum target thickness, addressing thin sheets.

d) Demonstrate effects of targeted material containment.

3 Characterization of non‐ target background

e) Demonstrate rejection of clutter

f) Include non‐target and non‐threat materials and artifacts inherent to measurement approach (e.g. metal objects with conventional CT)

4 Characterization of threat target variability

g) Develop signature information related to variances in target chemistry and material handling to show new method provides enhancement in detection capability

5 Information theoretic measurement framework, real‐time adaptive measurement

h) Define innovative measurement system architectures that jointly optimize the physical measurement system and mathematical processing framework to provide a unified or jointly designed acquisition, processing, detection, classification and reconstruction architecture or measurement system.

i) Generate a mathematical basis set for joint acquisition and classification. Show real‐time, adaptive measurement concept.

Demonstrate the use of priors16 to improve detection capability.

Quantify the benefit.

6 Develop projected performance characteristics for candidate transitioned equipment or product

j) Estimate size, weight, power, throughput, detection capability (Pdet, Pfa) and ROC curves.

k) Provide description of sensors, source, detectors, and other critical elements along with operational constraints, safety issues.

16 In reference to the DARPA KECoM program, a prior or library of priors should be generated from a perspective (a) signal classes, (b) task requirements, and (c) adaptation and their incorporation into the measurement and classification process.

1.8.5.1 Task Area 1: X-ray Test Bed Prototypes

Task 1.1 X-Ray Test Bed Prototype Design, Build and Test

This task will consist of two phases; a design through CDR and, at the option of DHS S&T, an option to build, test and evaluate the test bed prototype. DHS S&T is considering alternatives for a test bed prototype and will consider the merits of any proposed solution with current state-of-the-art and upon review of progress and proposed capabilities at the CDR, may choose to not exercise the build and test phase.

Task 1.1.1 Test Bed Prototype Design Base Period: Months 1-7 A Test Bed Prototype incorporating new signature measurement techniques will be designed by the Performer. At the Government’s option the Performer will build, test and integrate the test bed prototype in the Performer’s facility and with a subsequent option, the Performer will support testing at a Government selected test site.

The signature measurement technology will include X-ray as a primary measurement technique. A range of non-traditional X-ray alternative technologies may also be considered with approval by DHS S&T at the system concept review. Alternative technologies may also be proposed but the commercialization and cost must be considered.

The design of the test bed will consider the enhanced discrimination of improvised explosive threats and stream-of-commerce clutter as the primary goal. The design shall include and consider compressive measurement and adaptive compressive measurement as appropriate and other techniques to provide enhanced discrimination, higher screening throughput and reduced lifecycle costs.

The test bed prototype is not intended to transition to a product but the measurement approach must be commercially viable for use in other systems. The test bed prototype must provide a robust experimental measurement tool to collect signature data, verify notional architecture elements in the optical path and acquisition channel. Extensive signature data will be collected and provided to other DHS S&T selected performers. The experimental data and signature data will be used to inform EDS and AT architectural development activities along with new detection and classification algorithm development.

The test bed prototype will have the capability to measure and characterize full-sized stream-of-commerce checked baggage in accordance with relevant TSA standards for EDS.

The test bed prototype will be used to collect the equivalent of full 3-D CT data fully characterizing objects to include clutter and improvised explosive threat materials in the tunnel.

The test bed will permit other types of measurement with insertion of additional devices in the optical path as well as multiple source types, multiple detector types and multiple placements for sources and detectors. For example, the test bed prototype will incorporate additional signature measurement techniques such as, but not limited to, coded apertures, phase measurements and various types of X-ray scatter phenomena (coherent and non-coherent).

The test bed prototype will incorporate a variety of sources and detectors, varied placement and types of detectors to assist architectural trade-offs and trade-space analysis to guide optimized architectures for EDS and AT equipment. The design shall be modular and support a third party placement of devices in the optical path after the test bed is built.

Mechanical drawings and interface control drawings will be generated to sufficient accuracy and quality to permit third party design teams to design devices and place devices in the test bed.

The test bed will have the ability to take measurements on the full-volumetric (geometric) data cube of the baggage under test and fully characterize stream-of-commerce clutter and improvised explosive threat materials in a 3-D data cube at a minimum measured isotropic resolution of 0.5 mm. Alternative resolutions may be considered at PDR subject to Government approval.

The collected or sampled data will be transferred in raw format from the focal planes and detectors for off-line data processing. The test bed will interface to an IT system of sufficient capacity and speed to provide hard disk drive media for distribution of the collected data. Industry standard interfaces will be used in transferring the data to the IT system and disk drive to maximize the interoperability and ease of use for the anticipated users of the collected data.

All pertinent collected meta-data will be appended to the raw data collected from the test bed to permit, simulated (off-line) re-scan or simulated acquisition off-line. The collected raw data will be used for a variety of tradeoff and analysis related tasks such as information theory analysis, algorithm development and system architecture and component analysis.

Additionally the data may be used for more conventional preprocessing, reconstruction, segmentation and classification.

The Performer will design a test bed prototype in this baseline task. The baseline task will culminate in a CDR and documentation as noted in the following section. The Performer will perform various analysis, modeling, simulation, experimental measurements and trade studies as part of the test bed design activity. The Performer will generate a specification of the test bed prototype for review at CDR. Based on the specification and state-of-the art in X-ray measurement systems, the Government may exercise the option to build and test the prototype.

Optional Task 1.1.2 Test Bed Prototype Build and Test (Optional task, exercised at DHS S&T’s discretion) Optional Task Period: Months 7-13

The Performer will build, test and demonstrate the Test Bed prototype at the Performer’s lab. Testing will include both non-clutter and clutter measurements. Tests will be performed based on a written and approved test plan provided by the Performer. A test plan will be prepared and submitted to DHS S&T Explosives Division prior to conducting final experimental measurements. The test plan will outline the materials, objects, test patterns and scenarios to be evaluated (estimated to be about 125 types), along with measurement equipment, processes and procedures. The testing will progress from simple signature tests to complex signature testing with stream-of-commerce clutter and explosive analogs or simulants. The Performer will prepare test articles per the approved Test Plan.

Additionally DHS S&T will provide test articles in test bags per Table 12 (page 53), and a list of compounds for testing. The list of compounds will be less than 125 items.

This task will culminate with a review of the experimental measurement results and analysis in a Signature and Performance Metrics Review. The Performer will hold a Signature and Performance Metrics Review as a critical performance milestone near the end of the Performer’s lab/facility testing and also at the end of the Government Lab testing. The first Signature and Performance Metric Review will be held by month 14 (a proposer may provide an earlier or later date with rationale). The reviews will include statistical analysis of system performance in terms of specificity of multiple improvised explosive threat classes (via surrogates), sensitivity and discrimination in terms of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves as well as real-time demonstrations confirming system metric and discrimination goals.