Attachment J.8 - Understanding Values, Norms and Behaviors.pdf

Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church, Principal, Besa and Professor of Practice, The Fletcher School

Teddy Atim, PhD, Visiting Fellow, Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University

Diana Chigas, Associate Provost for International Strategy, Tufts University

Understanding the Underlying Values, Norms and Behaviors Constraining the Implementation of Administrative Sanction in the Ugandan Public Service

Final Report February 7, 2020

Executive Summary

Why?

The Strengthening Uganda’s Anti-Corruption

Response (SUGAR) facility has been supporting the implementation of the 2009 Anti-Corruption Act for over five years. One aspect of this is their support to the government in its’ implementation of Section 46 of the Act, which provides for the removal of public servants convicted of corruption from the payroll and pension. Yet in 2018, 28 convicted officers were still on payroll, and four were receiving their pension. SUGAR had expended significant effort to support key government institutions in a range of technical capacities such as case support, development of a case referral mechanism, and improved processes with accompanying manuals. This inquiry was in response to the realization that these technical responses, while necessary, would not be sufficient to ensure implementation of Section 46.

What?

In the last quarter of 2019, SUGAR initiated an inquiry into the underlying norms and values that drive the resistance to the removal of public servants convicted of corruption in accordance with Section 46 of the Anti-Corruption Act.

Conducted by a three-person team with combined expertise in corruption, social norms, systems mapping, and Ugandan history and politics, the inquiry used participatory processes with JSC, ODPP, IG, and PSC officials to develop a visual representation of the problem using causal loop mapping. This approach is based on systems thinking and is uniquely effective at analyzing complex problems in a way that helps identify potential responses. The resulting map depicts the various factors that influence the implementation (or lack thereof) of Section 46 and the dynamics among them. These intersecting, self-reinforcing cycles are buttressed and often driven by social norms that make behaviors difficult to change. Key social norms have been identified and overlaid onto the map to show their influence on behavior.

What are Social Norms?

Social norms are the mutual expectations about what is typical and appropriate behavior within a group of people. They are held in place by positive reinforcement when one complies with the informal rule, and negative sanctions when one breaks the rule.

Social norms dictate behaviors but should not be equated with the behavior itself. They also differ from attitudes and values, which are individually held and derived, not dependent on what others think or do.

While they are not the only factor, or even always the most significant factor, social norms can exert a very powerful influence on behavior—so much so that in certain cases individuals will comply with the norm even when it is contrary to their personal value or attitudes on the matter.

What are Values?

Values are individually held standards of behavior regarding the right way to behave in a given situation. They transcend place and time.

They differ from social norms in that values are personally held, while social norms exist in relationship with others.

Why is Section 46 Not Consistently Implemented?

The challenges to implementing Section 46 are a complex web of interconnected factors. Some are related specifically to Section 46, while others are more general challenges within the public service as a whole that manifest in behaviors that undermine implementation of Section 46. It is the interaction of the social norms with institutional factors, values, and incentives that lead to the lack of consistent implementation of Section

46. We therefore analyze the problem in a holistic way, as no factor operates alone.

• Law and Policies: Implementing Section 46 is about applying the law, yet PSC perceives a discrepancy between the law and policy. This results in each institution having a different interpretation of the correct course of action. For consistent application of Section 46, however, multiple government institutions must act in a coherent manner. PSC’s stance is heavily influenced by their value of “treating people right” (i.e., humanely, with courtesy). Differing interpretations cause institutional friction and enable public servants to act in self-interested ways – a behavior that itself is influenced by the social norm common in the public sector: “protect your own”. As a result, cases are not concluded and there are few consequences for being corrupt, signaling to other public servants that the law is not a concern and thus no longer a deterrent.

• Lack of Communication and Coordination: The institutional friction caused by these differing approaches obscures the fact that the agencies are working toward the same goal. Failure to consider this key point catalyzes much bad behavior (e.g., suspicion and distrust) between agencies, diminishing much needed communication between the institutions. Without interaction, institutional friction worsens even more.

• Political Interference: The social norm “protect your own” also drives much political interference in the administrative sanction process, as powerful people act to prevent consequences for convicted public servants within their network. This inaction on administrative sanction is further exacerbated by the expectation within the public service to “not contribute directly to an administrative sanction process”

(another social norm). As files do not move forward, convicted individuals continue to work and are able to continue with corrupt behavior. Corruption is normalized, further reducing the notion that law is a deterrent and enabling greater political interference.

• Retribution: With convicted people remaining in the system, the likelihood that they will seek retribution against those who participated in either the court or administrative sanction process against them increases. This creates a climate of fear, which generates tension within institutions and further hinders action to remove the convicted people. Fear of retribution is increased when the politically powerful use administrative sanctions as a tool to ‘fast track’ a person out of their position who is at odds with the powerful person.

• Patronage-Driven Leadership: Appointment to senior positions of individuals who know how to work the system and are involved in corruption creates a vicious cycle. These appointees are beholden to the political godparent and extended network such that decisions become dependent upon connections. The social norm “serve your boss (even out of bounds)” that exists within the informal vertical hierarchy exacerbates this dependence. Knowing decisions are based on connections feeds a fear of victimization in the event one accidentally makes an enemy by making a “wrong” decision. The result is compromised decision-making. The influence of the social norms “serve your boss” and “protect your own” reinforces the dependence of choices on what will keep people aligned to their network, rather than what is the rule or what is right. People feel trapped—they have no choice but to comply—and thus are “forced” to engage in even more corrupt behavior, normalizing corruption. For many civil servants, this is an untenable environment, so they leave the public service or take positions without political sensitivities, thus diminishing the pool of potentially high-qualified candidates for appointments to senior positions.

• Limited Professional Development and Motivation: It is difficult to maintain motivation when promotions are not dependent upon merit, working conditions are poor, and salary levels are low. Low motivation is exacerbated by a prevalent mindset (mental model) of “don’t make life too hard” for yourself. This acts as an implicit filter that helps civil servants make sense of their environment and guides their decisions in the direction that requires the least effort. Without motivation to perform well, there is little emphasis on seeking out professional development – a factor that contributes to brain drain. With limited incentive or initiative to stay current with the law and changing procedures, existing practices become the go-to way for new staff to understand and stay abreast of what is required of them. Existing practices are also reinforced with the PSC, by their social norm of “consultation”. As many of these practices do not align with the official rules and procedures, cases get delayed and workload increases. A heavy workload and, as participants remarked, a culture of “laziness”, continue to demotivate public officials.

• Overarching Value: Cross cutting all these dynamics is a pervasive value among civil servants of “help your own”. Being of assistance to people in your network is widely accepted as the right way to behave. This value buttresses the social norm “protect your own”, making any related behaviors that much more entrenched.

Recommendations: Options to consider moving forward No one kind of program will induce consistent and authentic compliance with Section 46. The interaction of so many factors makes the system of non-implementation resilient to efforts to change it. This is why more direct technical interventions are unable to generate enduring behavior change, as they don’t respond to some of the more important drivers in the system.

A series of possible entry points have been developed for consideration. We believe that effective programming will need to be multi-faceted, linking work on the legal and administrative factors with work on social norms.

1. Address institutional and structural factors that make implementing Section 46 difficult. This responds to differing interpretations of laws and policies, as well as tensions and lack of communication that hinder cooperation.

1.1. Create an ongoing inter-institutional working group to harmonize and simplify processes and regulations.

Made up of senior and mid-level officials, we recommend that the group be ‘led’ by a skilled external facilitator with experience in dialogue, group dynamics, and conflict resolution. While the topics on the agenda of this working group will be technical, the primary purpose of this effort is to facilitate the development of robust cooperative relationships between civil servants in the different commissions. Improved relationships and joint problem solving among these officials will help diminish institutional friction, promote mutual understanding, and build communication channels and capacities for addressing problems jointly.

1.2 Extend the effort to harmonize and clarify processes and regulation beyond cases involving officials convicted under Section 46. We recommend expanding the effort to include pending or incomplete cases where an officer has been interdicted or under investigation, but not yet convicted or acquitted. While focusing on apparently easier cases of post-conviction sanctions has been a reasonable strategy for generating some quick successes, our analysis found that the issues are linked, and focusing only on completed cases could have unintended negative consequences, such as greater (and corrupt) efforts to prevent conviction.

1.3 Align laws and regulations (Section 46) more with existing social norms. Social norms research has suggested that laws can be a positive force in changing social norms by signaling that a practice is bad and encouraging social re-evaluation of it. However, if a law deviates too much from the social norm, research suggests that people will often ignore the law. And public discussion will also be foreclosed, undermining the possibility of norm change. There may be a window of opportunity following the 2021 election to develop ways to bring mechanisms for implementation of Section 46 closer to the values and social norms of those who are charged with implementing it, as well as the community at large. This would enhance the likelihood of consistent enforcement of Section 46 penalties.

1.4 Invest in ongoing professional development for officers. Professional development should not only include education on the content of the law, but also address how to make the law work, how to deal with challenges to implementation, and ethical and professional standards of conduct. It should also help reinforce the notion of a public servant’s role as serving the public, not just their boss. It is critical that professional development not be undertaken as a stand-alone initiative; without connection to other efforts it is unlikely to succeed.

2. Address Social Norms. Together with institutional initiatives, efforts should be made to address the social norms that both exacerbate the institutional factors hindering Section 46 enforcement and motivate or drive civil servants’ behavior. Without addressing the social norms, the institutional approaches are not likely to be sustainable.

2.1 Weaken vertical pressures: Constrain the power of senior officials to use professional sanctions to enforce social norms. This would help reduce the fears of retribution and harm of many public servants if they do not, for example, “serve their boss” or fail to follow the norm to “not contribute directly to an administrative sanction process”. Reducing the ability of supervisors to impose professional sanctions on subordinates for non-compliance with illegal or unethical (often serving their personal interest) demands or expectations could open possibilities for individuals to deviate from the social norm of “serve your boss” when they are expected to do something that is not in accordance with the law. We recommend developing avenues for more junior level officials to report pressure from their superiors without fear of repercussions, together with a review mechanism for such cases when they arise.

2.2 Change the norm of “avoid direct contribution to administrative sanction processes” by identifying and connecting “positive deviants”. Create a professional group of people who do not abide by this norm. There are several approaches, based on social norms research, that are relevant here: strengthening positive norms and values that contradict the direct norm to eschew direct, overt support to administrative punishment processes, and reinterpreting “indirect” norms, such as “do not cause trouble for one’s colleagues” or

“protecting one’s own” to exclude illegal behavior.

3. Engage at the broad public service level in a parallel, yet strategically linked process.

Changing public expectations of appropriate behavior by identifying and publicizing positive role models can help to transform people who are positive deviants into “trendsetters” who might create the perception that it is possible to behave differently. While this is not directly addressing Section 46, creating a sense of momentum that not everyone behaves without integrity, and that the norms may be weakening, can help open space for officials involved with Section 46 implementation to behave differently.

3.1 Consider support for “Integrity Idol”-type programming. This is media programming that highlights positive role models, especially for youth. This would be a helpful compliment to programming within the concerned government institutions, though not directly targeting Section 46 implementation.

3.2 Reinterpret meta-norms. Explore whether key current meta-norms, such as reciprocity and kinship, could be reframed and reinterpreted to support, rather than undermine, integrity. Experience in Rwanda suggests that there are opportunities to initiate dialogue on the nature of fundamental meta-norms of reciprocity and supporting one’s “own” to revive a more collective interpretation held traditionally that was grounded in pride in and accountability for the group’s behavior and reputation.

4. Share the analysis and recommendations

In order to ensure transparency and confidence in the process, and to promote continued engagement with the effort to implement Section 46, it is important that the report be shared with those who participated in the interviews and workshops, as well as with those who may be in a position to support implementation of the findings of the analysis (e.g., DFID, EU). In addition, we also recommend directly sharing the report with other stakeholders who may have directed their staff to participate in the analysis or who are managing the implementation of Section 46 (e.g., senior leaders in the public service, such as the Chairpersons of the

Commissions and Accounting Officers). This would be most effectively done through a presentation, meeting, or other form of direct communication.

Table of Contents A. Introduction

B. The Inquiry

1. Methodology

2. Key limitations

C. The System Behind Administrative Sanctions: A Causal Loop Map

1. Law and policies

2. Limited professional development and motivation

3. Lack of communication and coordination

4. Political interference

5. Patronage-driven leadership

D. Social Norms and Values

1. What social norms influence public servants’ behavior in relation to Section 46?

2. What values influence public officials’ behavior?

3. How do social norms and values fit together?

E. Recommendations

1. Addressing institutional and structural factors that make implementing the law difficult by creating ambiguities or conflict that open opportunities for people to pursue personal interest or follow social norms

2. Addressing social norms

3. Engage at the broad public service level in a parallel, yet strategically linked processes

4. Share the analysis and recommendations

Acronyms AO Accounting Officer

CLM Causal Loop Mapping

ESC Education Service Commission

IG Inspectorate of Government

HSC Health Service Commission

JSC Justice Service Commission

ODPP Office of the Directorate of Public Prosecution

MDA Ministry, Department or Agency

MOPS Ministry of Public Service

PSC Public Service Commission

SG Solicitor General

SUGAR Strengthening Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Response

TAF Technical Advisory Facility

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to extend their appreciation to the SUGAR staff for their support and engagement throughout this project. It was a productive collaboration, made all the better by the staff positive attitude and skillful contributions.

A. Introduction The Strengthening Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Response (SUGAR) facility was stood up by the United Kingdom’s

Department for International Development (UK DFID) in 2014 to support increased central government accountability. One pillar within this mandate has been to ensure that corrupt public servants are administratively sanctioned once criminally convicted.

Since 2016, SUGAR’s support has included the development of better processes and manuals for key functions in the disciplinary process, the convening of a case referral mechanism, the development of a closed case referral form, and contributing to the review of the Public

Service Standing Orders. SUGAR has also engaged with the recently established State House Anti-Corruption Unit to enlist their support.

Despite significant effort by SUGAR, convicted public officers still remain on the payroll. SUGAR has identified several contributing factors: lack of clarity within the various institutions as to appropriate process; conflicting perspectives on the right approach; rejection of the legality of the closed case referral form; resistance to accepting

SUGAR support on cases (i.e. PSC refuses access to cases); and, serious delays in actioning the process, including non-response.

While these issues contribute to the problem, SUGAR recognizes that the situation is complex, and the existing technical responses alone are unlikely to succeed.

In an effort to bolster their approach, in the early fall 2019, SUGAR initiated an inquiry into the underlying norms and values that define the resistance to removing corruption convicted officials from public service in accordance with Section 46 of the Anti-Corruption Act, 2009. This Act provides that a person who is convicted of an offence under the Act shall be disqualified from holding a public office for a period of ten years from his or her conviction.

B. The Inquiry The inquiry was conducted by a three-person team (bios available in Appendix 1) with a combined expertise in corruption, social norms, systems mapping, design thinking, and Uganda history and socio-politics. Conducted over the course of 2.5 months, the inquiry had three objectives:

a) To understand the norms and behaviours in key government offices that manage the administrative sanctions regime in the

Government of Uganda. Explore how these norms connect to the wider context and whether these norms and values explain the resistance to the implementation of sanctions against corruption.

b) To study the context and factors driving these norms and behaviours.

c) To develop recommendations for SUGAR on possible actions to influence social norms that stymie appropriate action around disciplinary procedures.

The Problem

According to SUGAR, at the end of 2018:

• 28 convicted officers were still on payroll

• 16 convicted officers were removed

• 4 convicted officers were still being paid their pension

Only Convicted Cases

In alignment with SUGAR’s work to date, this inquiry focused solely on those cases with corruption convictions.

1. Methodology The team adhered to a set of working principles which centred around collaboration (see Appendix 2) and informed the methodology development and implementation. The three-phase process consisted of preparation, participatory engagement, and analysis. The methodology utilized:

• Causal loop mapping (CLM): based on systems thinking, CLM is a tool that develops visual representations of complex problems such as the implementation of administrative sanctions within the Ugandan civil service. Causal loop mapping helps us understand how the system functions so that we can think strategically about how we might shift the system.

• Participatory engagement: generates information through facilitated discussion and was feasible given the resource constraints.

The team first conducted a participatory engagement to identify key factors in the system that creates inconsistent application of Section 46 with 22 participants from JSC, PSC, ODPP, IG, and MOPS. Having multiple representatives from each agency was an important aspect of the process because it ensured representation of a broad perspective. While one can still not generalize from this basis, the scale of participation does contribute to triangulation of the findings.

The team, with SUGAR’s support, took this initial information and generated a tentative analysis in the form of a causal loop map. This was reviewed by 12 participants from JSC, ODPP, and IG at the second full-day meeting, when we also did a deep dive into social norms. Unfortunately, PSC was not available to participate in the second day, instead opting for a one-hour group interview.

The mapping was a critical first step, as behaviours are driven by many different factors, social norms and values amongst them. Understanding how the various factors in the system relate to each other, identifying critical behaviours, and how they are influenced by norms and values is therefore key to developing contextually grounded recommendations.

2. Key Limitations The map should be understood as suggestive of the system and not a concrete depiction of the final system that creates inconsistent application of Section 46. There are several reasons for this caution. First, the PSC participants left the first day meeting in the early afternoon, which removed their perspective from the discussion and meant that one of the key themes identified in the morning – bureaucracy – was not analysed.

Furthermore, PSC did not have an opportunity to validate the draft causal loop map, once again removing their perspective from the final product. Finally, more time on the ground with knowledgeable people would have been informative. The map would have been further synthesized to depict a ‘core story’ that shows what is at the heart of the system, which offers more clarity on potential interventions.

C. The System Behind Administrative Sanctions: A Causal Loop Map In order to improve the consistent application of administrative sanction embodied in Section 46 of the Anti-

Corruption Act, it is important to explore what is driving and enabling the current situation. The team used causal loop mapping to develop an initial representation of how the various factors in the commissions and government offices interact to help or hinder application of sanctions.

Causal loop mapping is a tool that develops visual representations of complex problems like the implementation of Section 46 within the Ugandan civil service. It helps us understand how the system functions so that we can think strategically about how to shift the system.

There are many different factors found in a system; social norms are just one type. By starting with a causal loop map, we are able to identify if and where social norms play a role in perpetuating collective behaviours and if that role is significant when compared to other factors in the system.

As shown in Image 1: The System Behind Section 46, the factors that affect application of administrative sanctions reach far beyond the mere technical administration of the laws and policies and include patronage-driven leadership, political interference, as well as public servant development and motivation, and inter-agency communication. Victimization and retribution then act as a vicious cycle that reinforces the entire system. In effect, the map answers the question: Why do public servants convicted of corruption remain employed when Section 46 of the Anti-Corruption Act provides for dismissal?

Each loop of the map is examined below, starting in the middle with

Laws and Policies. Each factor in the loop and its relationship to the next factor is described and examples are provided. Brief mention is made of the role of specific social norms and values in driving behaviours, with detailed explanations offered in Section C.

While the specifics are broken out to make the complexities more accessible, to understand how the system functions, one must keep the complete map in mind. Finally, it is worth reiterating that the map is only an initial representation due to the limitations of the process.

The development of a map is not a truth-seeking process. There is no one perfect representation of the system that is being sought. Instead, the expectation is to develop a reasonable representation of the system that is accepted across a diverse group of people. When done well, CLM offers a number of benefits in comparison to traditional problem analysis forms, such as problem trees.

1. CLM can generate a holistic understanding of a shared problem among a diversity of actors.

2. CLM enables identification of atypical points of intervention, which breaks actors out of the usual modes of programming.

3. CLM allows for testing of the plausibility of theories of change for effectiveness and potential to do harm.

4. CLM sets up strategic program coordination between actors.

What is a complex problem?

Complex problems are characterized by a number of attributes, such as:

• The nature of the problem itself is contested. When people get together to discuss the issue or problem, they generally struggle to reach an agreement as to the nature of the problem itself.

• The system is robust and adaptive. The system exists for a purpose – which may be socially good or negative -- and actively works to revert back to its equilibrium in order to fulfil this purpose. This makes systems (or complex problems) highly resilient and, therefore, difficult to change.

• The factors within the system have nonlinear relationships to each other. Elements in the system impact each other as both causes and effects. This means that when one element is changed, it can lead to a set of reactions that reversely impacts – positively or negatively – the original element.

The System is Representative of Convicted Cases

In the course of the inquiry, it became clear that those cases with convictions were not the most challenging for those responsible for application of

Section 46. In fact, those cases where there was an acquittal or insufficient evidence for the government to proceed are more difficult as the process is less clear and thus more subject to interference.

We believe that the system as currently represented also applies to these cases but may not be comprehensive to that experience.

How to Read a Causal Loop Map

Causal loop maps provide a visual representation of the dynamic relationships among elements of a system and make explicit an analysis of the underlying structure that give rise to the patterns of behavior. The map consists of:

• Variables: factors which include structures, actions, perceptions, feelings, mental models (ways of framing or thinking about issues) and social norms that may determine behaviors

• Causal links: depicted as arrows, these show the relationship and direction of influence between variables. These can be in the same direction (continuous arrow) which means as one goes up (or down), the other factor goes in the same direction. Or, they can be opposing

(dotted arrow) meaning that they move in opposite directions which means as one goes up the other goes down.

1. Law and policies There is a perception within the PSC that the law and policies related to Section 46 are not harmonized. In particular, Article 42 of the

Constitution, which accords people appearing before an administrative official or body the right to be treated justly and fairly, and the related Solicitor General opinions are perceived to be inconsistent with Section 46. This perceived disharmony is informed by a belief that Section 46 is an “unfair law” because it creates

“administrative duplication” through the creation of two processes:

the court and the internal PSC process. The PSC firmly believes that

“the channel in which [a public servant] came in must be the same channel through which they exit”. Thus, PSC officers feel they cannot directly implement Section 46, regardless of the criminal conviction, without going through their own process as well to assure a “fair hearing”. This apparent distrust of the court ruling is not entirely unjustified. There is significant research, our own included, 1 that documents the extent of corruption in court proceedings. The additional process conducted by PSC is lengthy, which is burdensome for the individual under scrutiny.

Conversely, participants from ODPP, JSC, and IG strongly asserted that the law is clear: a convicted person “shall leave public office”. It was argued that insistence on a second hearing makes the PSC a de facto appellate court, which it does not have the standing to be. Given the strong legal consensus that the law is in fact clear, the disharmony is in fact a PSC perception, yet this perception informs the PSC reality.

What was not possible to ascertain was the basis of the perception that the laws are not aligned. Is it that PSC staff actually believe that the law and polices are not consistent? Or, is this simply being used as a convenient excuse to deflect pressure and proceed as they wish?

As the perception of disharmony in the Section 46 law and policies increases, the range of interpretations of the appropriate course of action broadens. The starkest example of this is seen in the far broader set of factors considered in internal PSC investigations, compared to what is considered ‘evidence’ in a court. Years of service, proximity to retirement, prior commendations or awards for performance, scale of the offense, and extenuating circumstances of the particular case itself are all taken into account in the PSC internal process.

There are many reasons why the PSC takes on a broader perspective, one of which comes from the belief that the law is unfair, as mentioned earlier. In this sense, the law is viewed as unfair because it demands the same consequences for all corruption convictions regardless of the magnitude or severity. A conviction for the diversion of one million shillings, for example, receives the same consequence as one hundred million shillings.

1 Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne and Diana Chigas, “Facilitation in the Criminal Justice System,” The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2016.

https://sites.tufts.edu/ihs/files/2018/02/Facilitation-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf

Cases Without Convictions

According to PSC, determining the appropriate way forward in cases in which the person is acquitted, interdicted and still under investigation, or where the government decides not to proceed with the case is more unclear. They assert there is confusion around the appropriate means of handling these cases and different offices are alleged to have different approaches and standards.

According to the PSC, these different approaches result in delay and losses to the institution, as the affected officer can neither be replaced nor continue to work.

The government continues to pay the officer a half salary but is not able to replace the position. And in case the interdicted officer succeeds in overturning the interdiction, the government loses a significant amount of money in compensation.

The team was not able to gather information from other

Commissions to triangulate these asserts.

The PSC offered a clear example of how they view cases in a broader light. They explained the case of a young engineer public servant who was convicted of diversion of resources for drilling a borehole in a different village than originally instructed. In the PSC investigation, they determined that there was no theft of money and that the engineer was simply following instructions that had been approved by the engineer’s Accounting Officer after receiving the request from a local Councillor. The PSC Human Resources Officer felt these circumstances were compelling and included them in the recommendation letter for the Board’s consideration.

The PSC Human Resources Officers also consider a wider range of consequences in their recommendations to their Board. Unlike JSC, where a convicted public servant receives immediate dismissal upon the receipt of the court ruling, and is not granted a separate process, PSC consider other options. The most common alternative appears to be “early retirement in public interest,” where the convicted individual is forced to retire against their wishes but remains able to draw a pension. PSC argues this is the humane thing to do, particularly when they perceive the severity of the offense to be inconsequential such as stealing a million Shillings. While

“retirement in public interest” allows the affected individuals to draw their pension and benefits, they cannot serve on any public board or commission. PSC’s perspective is that retirement in public interest is disgraceful, with huge social costs and consequences.

The varying interpretations of the law and policies do not lie solely with the PSC. This is an issue experienced to different degrees across the institutions responsible for implementing Section 46. For instance, the IG insists that the appropriate way to communicate a conviction is through a letter from their office and does not use the jointly created case referral form as they do not believe it has legal status. ODPP, on the other hand, has accepted the case referral form as an appropriate mode of communication.

The varying interpretations result in courses of action that are not what is expected by the other institutions

(i.e. IG, JSC, PSC, ODPP) involved in the administrative sanction process. The institutional friction that this creates diminishes the ability of the different institutions to work well together – a requirement for the anti-corruption sanction process to be implemented effectively. In a nutshell, disjointed action creates institutional friction, diminishing coordination, which reduces effective sanctioning. This friction does not exist solely between PSC and the more legally oriented institutions. It is found between all of the agencies. For instance, ODPP asserts that when they go to the IG for help on a case, help is not only withheld, but the interaction can be “aggressive and hostile”.

With the institutions not cooperating, the collective action necessary to effectively implement sanctions is difficult to accomplish. There is more room for public servants to act according to self-interest due to the gaps in the process and fewer eyes on the file. Self-interest is typically exhibited as protectionism: actions taken to protect a public servant who has been convicted of corruption and with whom the individual has a personal relationship (e.g., they know each other from school, church, or the same tribe, etc.). Though a less frequent phenomenon, public servants also can act according to self-interest by victimizing someone using the official processes. Victimizing implies the use of the sanction process to unfairly punish or attack another public servant, regardless of the facts of the situation. For instance, PSC mentioned that some Accounting Officers use the disciplinary measure of interdiction to fight personal battles against officers they do not like. In such cases, an AO will use their powers and office to delay the interdiction to the detriment of the affected officer, who is unable to be cleared of the case and get reinstated to his or her job. Further entrenching self-interested behaviour by public servants is the indirect social norm: “protect your own” (see pg. 16 for a detailed description).

The number of concluded cases is directly related to the degree to which individual public servants act according to self-interest. Protectionism – the dominant behaviour - increases the number of unconcluded cases (i.e., convicted public servants not being terminated or removed from payroll), as the file is purposefully not moved forward. In cases where self-interest demands victimization, the number of unconcluded cases decreases. These rare cases, which are pushed aggressively through the process. In many instances, these are not ‘success’ stories for the anti-corruption process. As the term victimization suggests, this is using the anticorruption laws and procedures to unjustly attack someone, not to appropriately implement Section 46.

With convicted criminals in their midst (i.e., those who are awaiting their internal PSC process to proceed) or receiving half pay on interdiction, public servants observe that there are no consequences for being corrupt.

As this perception strengthens, the belief in the law as a deterrent diminishes.

All of the factors described in this loop are influenced, in the case of PSC, by one of their strongly held values:

“treat people right”. Described in full on pg. 21, this value injects notions of humanity and courtesy into how they approach the law and relevant policies.

2. Limited professional development and motivation The range of interpretations of law and policy is exacerbated by a vicious cycle of limited professional development and motivation within the public service. Specifically, inadequate professional development means that it is difficult for public servants to keep current with legal and procedural changes. Without sufficient training, public servants look to existing practices within their institutions as guideposts for correct action. These practices may be based on formally agreed (i.e., written) procedures, but are equally as likely to be processes that informally developed over time regardless of the written instruction.

Within the PSC, a norm of consultation has developed, whereby extensive engagement is expected before recommendation letters can be drafted (see pg. 19). This emphasis on the way things are done maintains institutional habits and acts as a barrier to change. Given that existing practices may be out of sync with current laws and policies, cases end up being delayed as steps are taken that are not necessary or in line with the current law or policy.

As the volume of delayed cases increases, so too does the workload for those public servants. A workload that is already difficult to shift, given the general attitude of “laziness” that was asserted to exist within the public service. With increased workload comes a decreased motivation to perform well. Low salaries and poor working conditions in the public service further contribute to a motivation deficit. Low motivation, in turn, exacerbates the sense of laziness in a mini-vicious cycle. Those who are not motivated to perform well are also unlikely to seek out ongoing professional development and therefore rely on internal recommendations as to the ‘right’ way to proceed (i.e., existing practices)

This cycle, particularly the motivation, lazy, professional development portion, is heavily influenced by the mental model within the public service: “don’t make life hard”. A mental model is an implicit filter that individuals use to make sense of their world. Public servants are conditioned to approach situations from the perspective of making it easy and simple (i.e., “no stress”). This mindset is exemplified by the expression, “Who wants to burn their own hands?”.

Putting it all together, this cycle collectively results in poor quality public service performance in general. When looking specifically at administrative sanctions, this vicious cycle of low motivation fuels the varying interpretations of law and policies because current, accurate interpretations require effort, education, and bucking existing practices.

3. Lack of communication and coordination Institutional friction diminishes agencies’ ability to work towards a common goal. In an environment wrought with tension, public servants adhere to official mandates and procedures in a literal fashion. As these procedures do not explicitly instruct them to communicate or follow up on a case with each other, they do not do so, and justify this as not in their mandate. This literal interpretation ignores the fact that they have a common goal.

There were many references to institutions asserting ‘institutional independence,’ as people explained how things currently operate. An actor from one institution cannot ask for information or help from another, for instance, without receiving an assertive declaration of the recipient’s independence and refusal to assist. The

ODPP explained, for instance, that their mandate is to prosecute, not to communicate the conviction of an officer to other institutions. There is also a sense of competition between the IG and ODPP, with the ODPP believing the IG is duplicating their work, while being better facilitated (i.e. resourced).

As agencies disagree and jostle for position, rather than work towards a common goal, the amount of “bad behaviour” such as suspicion, “outright hostility,” and distrust increases. With negative sentiments dominating the environment, communication channels break down, resulting in little to no information flow between institutions. This delays, or even stops, the administrative sanction process from functioning as the case does not proceed to the next step, while offering even more opportunity for gaps in the process to be exploited. Without

Mental Model

Everyone uses mental models.

They are implicit mental schema that help us make sense of the world. Information is taken in and understood or filtered through a mental model to create meaning.

adequate communication, the institutional friction between the key anti-corruption institutions in the Uganda government is exacerbated.

4. Political interference Section 46 is regularly undermined by a cycle of political interference, which is partially driven by the social norm to “protect your own” (further explained on pg. 16). Officials, politicians, and/or ‘godparents’ intervene to delay or stop appropriate administrative action from being taken. Sometimes the intervention is done through informal means, such as a call to a friend who can exert influence to delay a process, but sometimes the interference is couched in the official process. For instance, Board Commissioners are directly appointed by the President and are the ones who make the final decisions on cases. This makes them highly susceptible to political pressure and influence from the highest levels of the government.

Inaction on administrative sanction is also influenced by the direct social norm which dictates that public servants should avoid contributing directly to any form of administrative sanction. As no action is taken, individuals who have been accused and even convicted are not removed from the public service. Without their removal, corrupt behaviour continues and, many asserted, increases, as the accused/convicted official develops a sense of being untouchable. This in turn normalizes corrupt practices, which undermines the law as a deterrent. Without the pressure of potential punishment through the law, there is even more room for political interference (a form of corrupt behaviour in itself).

The consequence of political interference is typically inaction on cases, but not always. In fact, while not as common, political interference can

“fast track” cases through the system. If one is seen to be an opposition supporter, politicians will use the anti-corruption mechanisms as a means to target and remove their opponents.

These actions typically align to the vertical hierarchy of the institution. The potential for a fast track approach is widely known within these institutions and feeds a fear of retribution if a public servant takes appropriate (as per the law) action against a well-connected individual.

In cases where political interference leads to inaction on administrative sanction, convicted individuals remain within the institution, setting the stage for acts of retribution against those colleagues who aided in the implementation of the sanction. For instance, if a civil servant has been a witness in the case of an accused colleague who is then not removed from the workplace, they have to continue to serve with each other after the trial. The public servants involved in this analysis asserted that it is just a matter of time before the individual who was not removed (and their network) will “make a move against you. They will wait for you to make one mistake and then take action;

frame you and try to fast track you out of the system.” Unlike the fast tracking used in political interference, this typically occurs in a horizontal manner between peers.

In both circumstances – inaction leading to non-removal and “fast tracking” cases – the fear of retribution is a powerful motivator for people to act with caution. As one public servant explained, “Staff don’t want to speak out against other staff, because what happens to you in the future? People don’t want to be responsible or blamed for other people’s problems or getting them in trouble, even if the person has been convicted of doing something wrong. If a public servant did anything that was perceived to have victimised a colleague, when that public servant gets in a bind, no one will stand up for them.”

This environment of fear and retribution creates significant internal tension and friction within an office.

Encouraging public servants to keep their head down and not do anything that could shine the light upon them.

The tension harms work processes and effectiveness diminishing even further any action on administrative sanction.

5. Patronage-driven leadership When it comes to leadership, corruption needs to be understood in the broadest sense of the term – it is not simply about illicit funds, but rather the normalization of a patronage system whereby loyalty is the only rule.

When corrupt behaviours become the regular way of operating, they become normalized throughout the institutions. An example illustrates this nicely: an older man who had recently joined the public service was given money to go to the field. He didn’t use all of the funds in the course of his work so returned the excess.

His peers and superiors ridiculed him, telling him to not do it again because it would set the precedent that one must return unused fieldwork funds. The next time he was sent to the field, he returned with a zero balance.

The resulting normalization of corruption creates an untenable work environment for some. As corrupt acts increasingly become the dominant practice, these people feel compelled to leave, thus contributing to brain drain. This exodus can involve leaving the public sector entirely, but it also sees people making strategic choices to protect themselves from undue pressure.

As one individual explained, “You move to sleep comfortably, you have to think of your family.” Several examples were given of competent individuals changing departments, despite incurring significant salary cuts, in order to have a role that did not place them in positions where they were susceptible to direct political interference and pressure. For instance, the story was told of a man who left a job of 10 million shillings in order to take a job for 2 million in the JSC to get “off the hook.” There is a notable caveat to this.

Not all of these moves are due to integrity challenges, as some lower paying jobs offer more opportunity for illicit financial gains.

With professionals opting out – out of public service or out of consideration for promotion – the pool of candidates to select from to appoint to senior positions becomes dominated by those who participate in the patronage system, and by extension, corrupt behaviours. As one individual noted, the public servant pool is full of “bootlickers” – individuals who are there to serve the regime.