Attachment 4 - Statement of Objectives.pdf

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

Enabling Cyber-Linked Physical Sensing Exploitation

(ECLPSE)

I. Background

The Multi-Domain Sensing Autonomy Division (RYA), Sensors Directorate (RY), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), conducts research, exploratory and advanced development focused on battlespace understanding necessary to close the loop around multiple, multi-domain mission effects chains (MECS). RYA is responsible for providing multi-domain sensing autonomy technologies for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), Strike, Electronic Warfare (EW), Cyber, command and control (C2) systems, and cyber-physical sensing and exploitation capabilities. This effort supports the understanding, exploitation and defense against effects inherent through complex interactions between the physical and cyber domains. A better understanding of how physical stimulus and kinetic attacks have secondary and tertiary effects requiring further exploration through research, development and testing can be achieved.

This effort will support research and analysis on cyber-physical sensing and EW-kinetic effects to enable understanding how cyber-connected devices interact with the physical environment found in manufacturing automation, utilities, transportation, agricultural, medical, and other common applications. Through kinetic attacks on cyber/EW-physical devices, it is possible to enable, deter or deny cyber operations such as limiting efficient exfiltration methods through channel herding. Understanding these interactions will enable commanders to induce kinetic effects through cyber or vice versa such as disabling bridges, airports, troop movement, etc. A better understanding of these interactions will also provide DoD with methods to help civilian authorities better protect domestic infrastructure such as dams, electric power grid and airports as well as help planning to improve the resilience of deployed bases.

This effort will also support research and analysis regarding the prevention and exploitation of information leakages similar to electromagnetic security (EMSEC) vulnerabilities in the cyber/EW-physical domain. For instance, using Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) against EM emissions, it is possible to produce actionable intelligence against emitting systems. AFRL Sensor Directorate describes Cyber-Physical-MASINT as an area being developed by the US Air Force involving phenomena transmitted through cyber-physical devices and the interconnected data networks to infer information through effects such as digital noise, bit errors or latencies. Similarly, actionable intelligence can be acquired by targeting devices available due to the cyber-physical infrastructure and disseminated through the cyber-domain. Cyber-physical sensing is exploiting the induced effect from the physical world through the cyber-domain. The effect only exists as a product of cyber-systems and their interactions.

Cyber/EW-MASINT is the ability to collect MASINT by measuring ancillary signatures induced in cyber/EW-physical systems by anomalous events reported through state-of-health (SoH) communications or as adverse signal noise in digital products. The information derived will come from a combination of sensors, controls, or secondary/tertiary system effects (e.g. noise, bit errors, etc). Examples of applications are fire detection using battery charging thermocouples or using the noise data from metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) transistors to detect radiation.

Commercial supply-chain and logistics processes will enable rapid, low-cost and reduced footprint deployment in new areas of interests (AOI).

II. Scope

The scope of this effort is to develop novel cyber-physical and EW-kinetic sensing and exploitation technologies. Research objectives involve systems analysis of behaviors, interactions, and vulnerabilities; lead to R&D, evaluation, test, and training for new and disruptive technologies; and provide insights and awareness for strategic, operational, and tactical decisions and vectors for continued development and analysis. The purpose is to generate knowledge and battlespace understanding of sensing effects across multiple domains (air, space, cyber, and ground) to include internet of things (IoT) and distributed sensing with traditional and ad hoc configurations. There is a definite and urgent need for the development, testing, and evaluation of operational cyber-physical, EW-kinetic, and related non-kinetic sensing capabilities in support of national military objectives. The majority of this effort is estimated to be applied research, but will support basic and advanced as required. In addition, while not included in the BAA Technical Objectives in Paragraph III below, there is a potential that this effort, which includes any contracts issued resulting from this BAA, may also include technical objectives for incidental Operations and Maintenance (O&M) work and funding and incidental Procurement work and funding.

III. Technical Objectives

Technical objectives include, but are not limited to:

a.) Understanding sensing effects across multiple domains: Perform research and development of the physics and phenomenology in regards to the interface between the physical world, i.e. objects and the environment, and the cyber realm, i.e. networked devices.

This specifically includes techniques by which objects and events can be sensed or manipulated via transducers and kinetic actuators on cyber-connected devices. This must also address challenges associated with adversarial or natural denial or degradation of the sensing/manipulation channel, as well as opportunities gained with geometric and spectral diversity of distributed and multi-phenomenology employments.

b.) Performance modeling, simulation, and analysis: Conduct cyber kinetic experiments and collections in order to inform and validate modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) efforts.

The representation of cyber kinetic concepts and effects within MS&A requires reasonable fidelity models. These models are built from statistically relevant sample sizes of research measurements across all relevant operating conditions. Provide for hardware–in-the-loop, Live- Virtual-Constructive simulation.

c.) Experiments, testing and evaluation: Design experiments to support developmental testing that enable AFRL Sensors Directorate’s research goals in understanding sensing effects across multiple domains (air, space, cyber, and ground) to include IoT and distributed sensing with traditional and ad hoc configurations. The range offers accessibility, configurability and flexibility that may not be either safe for the office environment (kinetic effects and radio frequency compatibility) or feasible to accommodate long-range sensors, kinetic effects, and sensors with large footprints.

d.) Small Unmanned Systems Exploitation (SUSEX): Conduct flight test experiments and data collections involving small unmanned systems to meet desired cyber-physical, EW-kinetic sensing, as well as distributed sensing research and analysis outcomes.

e.) Cyber research and development: Conduct experiments in support of research into the basic and applied principals and phenomena of cyber-domain information-processing, communication, and kinetic actuation systems. Conduct experiments in support of developmental cyber-domain capabilities to collect, process, and exploit information and derived knowledge from systems and components accessed via networked systems.

f.) Electronic Warfare research and development: Conduct experiments in support of research and development of electronic warfare techniques with an emphasis on multi-domain operations and on the basic and applied principals and phenomena of EW information-processing, communication, and kinetic actuation systems.

g.) Machine Learning: Apply machine learning to multiple sensors, INTs and domains to create mission essential knowledge (i.e., detections, tracks, IDs, patterns, behaviors, intents) for military applications. Investigate use of transfer learning, deep learning and other modern methods for knowledge generation in contested environments.

h.) Autonomy: Develop flexible approaches/techniques toward autonomous/automated reasoning, with respect to creating mission essential knowledge, e.g., approaches that enable peer-to-peer coordination, cognitive operations and task flexibility.

i.) Hard and Soft Information Fusion: Utilize combinations of both physics-based “hard” information (e.g., sensors, INTs) and human-based “soft” information (e.g., social media, human-generated reports) to create mission essential knowledge (i.e., detections, tracks, IDs, patterns, behaviors, intents).

j.) Multi-Level Fusion: Fuse information sources at multiple levels (e.g., decision, feature, signal) to create mission essential knowledge (i.e., detections, tracks, IDs, patterns, behaviors, intents). Information sources can be collocated or distributed; passive or active; and cooperative or non-cooperative.

k.) Novel Exploitation Products: Develop novel exploitation products, which enable and/or improve knowledge generation (i.e., detections, tracks, IDs, patterns, behaviors, intents).

IV. Management

Management includes maintaining clear government visibility into program schedule, performance, and risk while allowing the contractor maximum flexibility and innovation to manage the effort. This includes program schedule, cost, performance, risks, associate contractor agreements (as needed), subcontracts and data to meet contract objectives that satisfies all technical requirements.

a.) Kick Off Meeting: Host a kick-off meeting within 30 days of contract award. Program management reviews and technical interchange meeting will be required. Agenda for all meetings will be developed jointly.

b.) Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM): Host TIMs, as required.

c.) Quarterly Program Reviews (QPR): Participate in QPRs.

d.) Incidental Material, Supplies and Testing Assets: Procurement of materials if they are not available through government channels and are required for the performance of this program. The materials shall consist of Materials may include consumable and non-consumable test equipment, supplies, replacement and new parts, components and subassemblies related to any of the sensing and processing elements, manufacturer's literature, and manuals which are not available through government channels and/or not available in sufficient time to meet the urgency of requirements. Flight/ground testing requirements may involve the need for and use of contractor-owned/operated and/or government-owned/operated testbed aircraft.

V. Research Deliverables

Research deliverables include technical reports, research results, computer software prototypes and related computer software documentation, hardware prototypes and related documentation and algorithm performance characterization over various operating conditions (OCs). Computer software format to be source code. Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) Items: See BAA attachment.

VI. Flight Test (if applicable)

Comply with all the requirements of the AFRL test planning and approval process. This includes but not limited to Technical Review Board (TRB) and Safety Review Board (SRB) reviews, AFRL airworthiness reviews in addition to all Air Force policies, regulations, and instructions related to flight testing. Coordinate spectrum requirements for all META testing and conduct any required coordination with the test location (e.g. range requirements, airspace coordination, ground instrumentation, etc.)

VII. OPSEC Statement for AFRL/RY Contracts

General Operations Security (OPSEC) procedures, policies and awareness are required in an effort to reduce program vulnerability from successful adversary collection and exploitation of critical information. OPSEC will be applied throughout the life cycle of the contract. The Critical Information List (CIL) will be provided upon request by AFRL/RYOY Information Protection Office. While working on the government installation, OPSEC guidance will be provided by the AFRL/RYOY Information Protection Office.

VIII. Program Protection Plan

All DoD contractors (including subcontractors) shall supplement their current security practices by requiring any personnel involved in executing this contract where critical program information (CPI) has been identified to protect the CPI to the standards articulated in the Program Protection Plan and in accordance with DoDI 5200.39. Upon contract award, all identified DoD contractors (including subcontractors) shall acknowledge and meet the requirements stated by the Program Manager for the protection of CPI. The DoD contractor must immediately notify the U.S. Government upon the discovery of any nonconformance with CPI protection.