Attachment 24. PWS TE 09 Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan.pdf

CUI

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Standard Form 901 (11-18) Prescribed by GSA/ISOO | 32 CFR 2002

Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan

July 2021

Directorate of Public Works

Controlled by: USD(I&S) Controlled by: IMCOM CUI Category: Critical Infrastructure Limited Dissemination Control: FEDCON POC: BJ Tomlinson, 915-568-6514

Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan

July 2021

AMIM-BLP (210-20a3)

Prepared with support from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Concurrent Technologies Corporation under contract with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy & Sustainability.

PNNL #PNNL-28496.

Intentionally Blank

Unclassified

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HQ, UNITED STATES ARMY GARRISON, FORT BLISS

Fort Bliss, TX 79916 1 Jul 2021

Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan

History. The summary of changes reflects the portions affected by this revision.

Summary. This is the initial release of the Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan.

Applicability. This regulation applies to all Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard organizations, and DA Civilians assigned or attached to Fort Bliss. It also applies to all Department of Defense organizations, other Federal organizations, state and local, and privately owned organizations resident on Fort Bliss.

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The proponent of this publication is the Directorate of Public Works.

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Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to DPW, Fort Bliss Texas 79916.

AMIM-BLP (210-20a3)

OFFICIAL:

JAMES A. BRADY

COL, IN

Commanding

ALFREDO J. RIERA, P.E.

Director of Public Works

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CUI export controlled technical information or other scientific, technical, and engineering information will still use distribution statements. Export controlled information must also be marked with an export control warning as directed in DoDI 5230.24, DoDD 5230.25, and Part 250 of Title 32, CFR. This publication is only available in electronic media.

iv v

Summary of Change

Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan

17 Jun 2019, This is the initial release.

1 Jul 2021, Revision

- Added page iv after the signature page an Operations Security (OPSEC) review confirming that the document is to be marked CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION (CUI).

- Changed office symbol on signature page to AMIM-BLP

- Added ARIMS number 210-20a3 vi

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

1 AD 1st Armored Division AA assured access AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Command ACSIM Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management AD Armored Division ADN application delivery network A-DACG Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group AEWRS Army Energy and Water Reporting System AR Army Regulation ASA IE&E Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and

Environmental ASP ammunition supply point BAAF Biggs Army Airfield BAS building automation system BCT Brigade Command Team BEI baseline element of information BOCC Building Operations Control Center CAB Combat Aviation Brigade CDC child development center CDD cooling degree days CIP capital improvement plan CMRR Critical Mission Risk Reduction CMS critical mission sustainment COA course of action CY calendar year DCI defense critical infrastructure DES Directorate of Emergency Services DFAC dining facility DoD U.S. Department of Defense DPGDS Deployable Power Generation and Distribution System DPTMS Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security DPW Directorate of Public Works E&W energy and water ECM energy conservation measures EEDRS Enterprise Energy Data Reporting System vii

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EM Emergency Management EO Executive Order EOC emergency operations center EPE El Paso Electric EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center EPW El Paso Water EPW El Paso Water ERCIP Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program ERP emergency response plan ESPC energy savings performance contract ESTCP Environmental Security Technology Certification Program EUI energy use intensity FBWSC Fort Bliss Water Services Company FEDS Federal Energy Decision System FY fiscal year GC Garrison Commander GIS geographic information system GSCE government-should cost estimate HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck HQ headquarters HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning IBCT Infantry Brigade Command Team IC infrastructure condition ICS industrial control system IEWP Installation Energy and Water Plan IMCOM Installation Management Command IRP integrated resource plan IRR installation risk reduction ISR-MC Installation Status Report – Mission Capacity IT information technology JAA Jet-A with Additives JTF Joint Task Force JTF-N Joint Task Force North LAMPS Large Advanced Mobile Power Sources LED light-emitting diode LF linear feet LNG liquefied natural gas viii

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LOE line of effort LP liquid propane LRC Logistics Readiness Center MDMS Meter Data Management System MFGI mobilization force generation installation MGD million gallons per day MILCON military construction MOU memorandum of understanding NEC Network Enterprise Center NIPS Noticed Interruptible Power Service NMGC New Mexico Gas Company O&M operations and maintenance OCA Original Classification Authority P priority critical PDISE Power Distribution Illumination System, Electrical PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants PV photovoltaics QUTM utilities modernization R&R repair and replacement RGEC Rio Grande Electric Cooperative S secondary critical SCG security classification guide SED Sustainability & Energy Division SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SIR savings to investment ratio SO system operation SRM sustainment, restoration, and modernization TQG tactical quiet generator UESC Utility Energy Savings Contract UFC Unified Facilities Criteria UMCS Utility Monitoring and Control Center UP utility privatization WBAMC William Beaumont Army Medical Center WUI water use intensity ix

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Contents

Summary of Change ................................................................................................................................. iv Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... vi

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Critical Mission Overview

3.0 Risk Assessment

3.1 Critical Mission Sustainment

3.1.1 Electricity

3.1.2 Natural Gas

3.1.3 Water and Wastewater

3.2 Critical Mission Risk

3.2.1 Electricity

3.2.2 Natural Gas

3.2.3 Water and Wastewater

3.3 Installation Risk

3.3.1 Energy

3.3.2 Water

4.0 Implementation Plan

5.0 Tracking Progress .......................................................................................................................... A.1 Appendix A – Planning Process ........................................................................................................... A.2 Appendix B – Critical Facilities ...............................................................................................................B.1 Appendix C – Baseline Conditions and Risk Assessment .................................................................C.1 Appendix D – Courses of Action Considered ..................................................................................... D.1 Appendix E – CLASSIFIED Findings

Figures

Figure 1. Fort Bliss Energy Use Intensity Performance Figure 2. Fort Bliss Energy Utility Costs Figure 3. Fort Bliss Water Use Intensity Performance Figure 4. Fort Bliss Water Utility Costs x

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Tables

Table 1. Count of Critical Facilities by Category Table 2. Critical Facilities Assessed and Supporting Critical Missions Table 3. Electricity System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions

Affected Table 4. Natural Gas System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical

Missions Affected Table 5. Water and Wastewater System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and

Critical Missions Affected Table 6. Deficiencies Defined by FY18 ISR-MC Energy Measures Table 7. Deficiencies Defined by FY18 ISR-MC Water Measures Table 8. Fort Bliss Energy & Water Security Implementation Plan

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

1.0 Introduction

The Fort Bliss Installation Energy and Water Plan (IEWP) provides a roadmap for achieving increased security, resilience, readiness, and mission assurance, while also meeting federal and Department of Defense (DoD) requirements. This IEWP provides the goals, strategies, tasks, timeline, and responsible parties for the next 5 years of energy and water (E&W) management at Fort Bliss. The planning process and resulting roadmap follow Army and DoD guidance.

The primary goals of the Fort Bliss IEWP are as follows:

• Ensure the ability of Fort Bliss to sustain critical missions in the event of an energy and/or water service disruption

• Reduce the risk to all critical missions from E&W (including wastewater) disruptions, with priority given to the Mobilization Force Generation Installation (MFGI) mission

• Reduce use of E&W resources

• Increase operational efficiency

In pursuing these goals, Fort Bliss leadership has stated the importance of strategies that consider the following:

• Provide cost-effective alternatives to generators (e.g., storage, photovoltaics [PV], demand-response)

• Help to manage responses from the electric utility to reduce load under an interruptible tariff notice

• Leverage alternative funding to support project implementation

• Leverage Privatized Utility Capital Improvement Plan projects for smart modernization

• Consider the operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements of recommended solutions

This document is organized to concisely present the installation’s plan. The plan provides an overview of the critical mission facilities at Fort Bliss, the E&W security baseline and deficiencies identified, and strategies for achieving installation goals and addressing those deficiencies. Priority tasks aligned with these strategies are summarized in an installation implementation plan. The assessment process is described in Appendix A; facilities supporting critical missions are found in Appendix B; findings from the assessment of baseline conditions and deficiencies are found in Appendix C; and detailed courses of action considered are summarized in Appendix D. Appendix E contains classified findings from the assessment and is maintained separately by the Directorate of Public Works (DPW).

The Fort Bliss IEWP is a living document, structured around a prioritized list of tasks over a 5-year planning horizon. The Fort Bliss DPW has primary ownership of this plan but requires the assistance of other Fort Bliss directorates and mission owners to ensure tasks are completed.

Fort Bliss will review the IEWP each year and provide an addendum summarizing planning changes. A full plan update will occur every 5 years as recommended in the IEWP Guidance.

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

2.0 Critical Mission Overview

Fort Bliss, Texas, is the second-largest U.S. Army installation in land area. It is the home to the 1st Armored Division (1 AD), 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the 6th Brigade, the 31st Brigade, the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and other units. The post has 1.12 million acres of land that stretches from the western tip of Texas north into New Mexico. The main cantonment area is in El Paso, Texas. It is home to 39,000 military personnel and another 39,000 family members and employs 13,000 civilians.

As a Strategic Deployment Platform, the Fort Bliss mission is to enable rapid and efficient unit deployment and re-deployment operations. Serving as both a MFGI and power projection platform, the garrison’s top priority is to provide facilities and services that enable unit readiness and maintenance of the airport for combat brigade deployment. Fort Bliss has defined six critical mission areas required to sustain readiness: Train, Sustain (Supply), Maintain, Mobilize, Protection, and Personnel.

To establish the garrison’s ability to sustain its critical missions with E&W resources, and to manage risk of E&W utility disruptions, critical mission areas are mapped to facilities and infrastructure. For this mapping, key facility definitions are as follows:

• Critical – A facility that is directly tied to a critical mission and requires energy and/or water to support that mission. Critical facilities can be of two types:

– Priority Critical – A facility that requires energy and/or water service to continue with no or minor (e.g., less than an hour) disruptions.

– Secondary Critical – A facility that can tolerate short (e.g. a few hours) energy and/or water service disruptions but the potential for sustained disruptions to influence critical missions make them a priority for risk mitigation.

• Non-critical – A facility that is important to overall installation operations, but utility interruption would not have a significant impact on critical missions.

A total of 360 facilities comprise the critical facilities list at Fort Bliss (Table 1). To focus the assessment, 183 of these critical facilities were targeted for detailed facility-level reviews for deficiencies and opportunities during the development of this IEWP. These were identified through initial discussions with mission owners and other stakeholders and a review of facility data. The list included those most dependent on E&W resources (the biggest users) and excluded some redundant facility types (e.g., dining facilities, access control points) with relatively predictable/consistent E&W demand and use patterns, and functions that can be easily moved during an outage. Also, it should be noted that the new William Beaumont Army Medical Center (WBAMC) was excluded from this detailed assessment because the facilities currently operating on Bliss will be closed and replaced by the new East Bliss campus in the year ahead.

Based on feedback from a Higher Headquarters Assessment (HHA) that included a Water System Vulnerability Assessment (WSVA), it was noted by assessors that the number of identified ‘critical facilities’ seemed too numerous. It was noted that many identified critical facilities were pumps, tanks, or other utility infrastructure versus buildings that would house mission critical functions. Fort Bliss leadership wished to revisit the number of critical facilities in order to ensure that the need for the designation is verified and to be able to prioritize within the

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

critical list for scarce resources to rectify identified risks. Review of the critical list and priorities will become part of the annual review of this plan.

Table 1. Count of Critical Facilities by Category

Category of Facility Included in 2018 Assessment

Not Included in 2018 Assessment Total

Priority Critical 75 65 140 Secondary Critical 108 112 220 All Critical 183 177 360

Table 2 maps all critical facilities selected for this assessment to the six critical mission areas. A complete list of critical facilities and maps can be found in Appendix B.

Table 2. Critical Facilities Assessed and Supporting Critical Missions Train Sustain Maintain Mobilize Protection Personnel

DPTMS

Training:

•Sim Centers:

20187, 20188, 20189, 20190, 30052

•ASP (LRC):

9903, 9904, 9909, 9958 •Ranges (including Digital Ranges):

8338, 8383, 8475, 8491, 8706, 8798, WBAMC

(Hospital, Mendoza, SFMC, Dental Clinic):

7777, BSL-3,

2496, 2489, 2954, 6077, 11156, 11334, 11335, 21227

DMPO/Finance:

21000, 503, 505, 1008, FMWR (CDCs):

1730, 2012, 3505, 3509, 5036, 11896, 11898, 20707

LRC Supply

(SSMO, POL):

8243, 8604, 9485, 11027, 11111, 13466, 23005

DPW & PRIDE:

777, 13481, 11175

NEC: 56, 492,

2455, 3719, 5806, 8017, 8102, 8354, 8714, 8740, 8770, 8787, 9150, 9502, 9600, 9816, LRC

Transportatio n: (Motor Pool): 2607

LRC Mx Shops •Packing/ Storage: 1106

DPTMS

Mobilization:

•SRRC / SRP:

•Base camps

• MOB HQ &

Billeting: 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1007, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1031, LRC

Transportatio n:

•Railhead:

3636, 3621, •ADACG:

11055 •Vehicle Freight: 2527, BAAF

•Airfield:

11205, 11267 •Base Ops:

11210 •Flightline/ATC : 13488

LRC Supply

(CIF/TMP):

DES: 54,

7311, 9539, 11211, A8104, 11240, 11681, 20709

DPTMS AT-

FP: 11685

HQ, 32d

AAMDC:

JTF-North:

11603, 11676

204 MI:

11108, 11115, 11176

EPIC: 11339

JMC: 2, 1044,

1092, 1093, ATEC / OTC:

1656, 1660, 1 AD: 11685

1st SBCT:

21200

2nd ABCT:

20500

3rd ABCT:

20400

Sustainment

BDE: 20100

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Train Sustain Maintain Mobilize Protection Personnel 11253, 11270, 11271, 13480, 18502, 20669, 20708, 21104, 30101, 30104

RGEC (electric) •Various substations

Texas Gas •Various regulator stations

FBWSC: 1252,

1318, 1364, 1780, 1998, 2456, 2950, 3027, 3695, 3696, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3796, 3797, 3798, 4318, 7094, 7242, 8101, 8265, 8283, 8363, 9482, 9872, 11180, 11241, 11602, 11620, 11636, 18536, 20588, 20930, 130100, 11603C, 14000, 9431A, FOB-LS

1107, 1008, 1109, 1113, DIVARTY

BDE: 21100

CAB: 11203,

11212,11236, 11250, 11308, 13400, A11224

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

3.0 Risk Assessment

This IEWP is based on a detailed assessment of the installation’s operational requirements, baseline conditions, deficiencies/opportunities and associated risk, and potential solutions to manage those risks. Following the Army’s draft Installation Energy and Water Security Assessment Guide (see Appendix A), the risk assessment identified E&W security and resilience gaps, deficiencies, and opportunities in three key areas:

• Critical mission sustainment (CMS) – This establishes onsite resource availability to sustain critical missions for the duration established by the Senior Commander. The CMS minimum duration for Fort Bliss is considered to be 14 days based on the draft HQDA EXORD 065-19, Total Army Unit Movement Readiness, which defines a Primary and Active MFGI as “capable of mobilizing designated forces within 14 days of the notification of alert.”

The 14-day minimum duration is also required by Army Directive 2017-07. The inability of priority critical facilities to meet this requirement is considered a deficiency.

• Critical mission risk – This establishes the risk to critical missions from deficiencies related to infrastructure condition, lack of redundancy, and infrastructure exposure specifically in or directly connected to all critical facilities (priority critical and secondary critical).

• Installation risk – This establishes general risk to the installation from inadequate operational procedures and plans, overall E&W infrastructure condition, and availability / access to E&W resources to support installation-wide needs. The installation risk assessment uses Fort Bliss Installation Status Report – Mission Capacity (ISR-MC) ratings as proxy. Because efficiency plays an important role in resilience, inefficient use of E&W resources in all installation facilities (both critical and non-critical) is also considered a deficiency and therefore an installation risk.

The specifics of each risk assessment are described, in the order listed above, in the following subsections (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) and are organized by utility. Note that all counts of critical facilities with deficiencies represent the minimum number of facilities affected, since only a subset (183 of 360) of the critical facilities were assessed for deficiencies.

3.1 Critical Mission Sustainment

The CMS risk analysis was conducted to evaluate the installation’s onsite resource availability to sustain critical missions for a long-term disruption. The 14-day CMS target (validated by mission owners) is only applicable to the priority critical facilities at an installation. The assessment team conducted the CMS risk analysis for 75 priority critical facilities identified at Fort Bliss; 65 priority critical facilities were excluded from this analysis. CMS risk analysis results are summarized in this section, details on the risk assessment process are provided in Appendix A, and detailed results are provided in Appendix C.

3.1.1 Electricity

Key risk factors for meeting the CMS requirement for electricity include 1) the availability of a backup or continuous power source to the priority critical facilities, and 2) the availability of adequate fuel or energy storage to supply the power source for the 14-day CMS period. To meet the fuel storage requirement when generators are used, the fuel must be available onsite or firm plans for refueling the generator must be in place for the facility.

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

At Fort Bliss, 45 of 75 of the priority critical facilities assessed (60%) have generators in place, and none have an alternative source providing continuous long-term power. Of those with generators, most will run just 4 to 5 days before available onsite fuel stores are depleted.

Currently, only 2 of the 75 priority critical facilities assessed can meet the long-term CMS requirement with onsite fuel storage. None of those facilities without adequate onsite storage had firm plans in place for refueling to ensure 14 days of continuous runtime.

An estimated 60,000 gallons of diesel fuel is required to meet the CMS requirement for all 75 priority critical facilities assessed. There is currently no bulk diesel storage dedicated to generators at Fort Bliss. It should be noted that 16 of the generators on priority critical facilities run on natural gas. While these have the potential to sustain operations with a continuous flow of gas, they do not meet the CMS requirement as defined in the policy due to the lack of onsite gas storage. See Appendix C, Section C.3.5, for details.

3.1.2 Natural Gas

The key risk factor for meeting the CMS requirement is the lack of natural gas storage onsite at Fort Bliss. Natural gas is used for backup power in 16 priority critical facilities, which would require gas storage for 14 days or dual fuel capable equipment to meet the CMS requirement.

Natural gas is also used for backup generators at 11 S facilities, and for building heat and hot water in both critical and non-critical facilities.

While the probability of occurrence is low, in the event of a concurrent power and natural gas outage at the installation, the priority critical facilities that rely on natural gas backup generators would also experience power outages. As a result, this is considered a CMS deficiency. (See Appendix C, Section C.4.5 for details on this analysis.)

3.1.3 Water and Wastewater

Key risk factors for meeting the CMS requirement for water include the availability of the following:

• Sufficient onsite water to support priority critical facilities

• Onsite supplies, equipment, and staff to treat the water to ensure that water is potable at priority critical facilities

• Backup power or a continuous power source (e.g., PV with energy storage) at all water supply, distribution, and treatment facilities and wastewater pumping facilities to run for 14 days

• Fuel and fueling capabilities onsite to refuel any backup power sources that serve water supply, distribution, and treatment equipment, and wastewater pumping facilities; refueling plans that aren’t documented and exercised annually are considered a deficiency

Water systems are heavily dependent on power for supply, distribution, and treatment of drinking water and pumping wastewater. Lack of power to water system equipment can result in lack of water and wastewater services to critical facilities. Subsequent lack of water to any facility at the installation can result in mandatory building closures in as little as 2 hours, based on interviews with environmental health professionals, which is consistent with installation building occupants’ reports following recent water outages at Fort Bliss. In addition, sewer backups or overflows in buildings due to inoperable lift stations can also result in immediate

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

mandatory building closures, according to Fort Bliss Water Services Company (FBWSC).

Mandatory building closures are the result of unsanitary and unsafe working conditions due to lack of drinking water and/or restroom facilities and are determined regardless of building criticality.

Based on the assessment of 183 critical facilities (including pieces of water infrastructure) it was determined that an external power outage at Fort Bliss is more likely to result in water unavailability to critical facilities than an external water outage. In the event of a power outage, Fort Bliss does not have sufficient onsite power, fuel storage, and refueling capabilities to power the supply, distribution, and treatment of drinking water to priority critical facilities for 14 days. In some areas of the installation, backup power to the water supply and distribution systems is lacking entirely.

A power outage would also affect wastewater pumping. The lift station that serves the majority of installation’s buildings is served by a generator with an estimated runtime of 5.1 days. In the event power is available but external water sources to Fort Bliss are cut off, Fort Bliss does have enough water supply to provide water to its priority critical facilities for 14 days. (See Appendix C, Section C.5.5 for details on this analysis.)

3.2 Critical Mission Risk

The critical mission risk analyses were conducted for the 183 critical facilities identified at Fort Bliss for inclusion in this analysis, including 75 priority critical facilities and 108 secondary critical facilities. Key risks for E&W disruptions to critical missions come from deficiencies in infrastructure condition, lack of redundancy, and exposure when that infrastructure directly supports a priority critical or secondary critical facility. When coupled with the prevalent natural hazards described in Appendix C, Section C.2, and other threats or hazards that may be identified through the critical infrastructure risk management process, these deficiencies create critical mission risk.

3.2.1 Electricity

Risks to critical missions from electricity infrastructure deficiencies at Fort Bliss are summarized in Table 3. The count of critical facilities with each deficiency and missions affected by these deficiencies provides some indication of the extent of the risk. The association of specific critical facilities and deficiencies is treated as CLASSIFIED and is detailed in Appendix E, CLASSIFIED Findings.

As shown in the table, a significant number of facilities on the main cantonment have unknown electrical system redundancy. Circuit maps and one-line diagrams were not available to verify where redundancy of circuits and feeders currently exists, and whether transformer sizes are adequate for interconnection. The lack of redundancy on the ranges was validated, however.

Power quality issues on Doña Ana were verified with utility reports and are a concern as power spikes and sags can place sensitive mission equipment at risk for damage. The lack of backup power to critical facilities, including to critical water infrastructure that requires power for chlorination to meet potability requirements, is a deficiency affecting a significant number of facilities. For facilities with backup, refueling plans are lacking. Finally, the Main Fort Bliss substation is near capacity with connected loads, posing a risk to a number of critical facilities.

However, this will be alleviated when the new Northeast substation is constructed in FY20.

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Table 3. Electricity System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected

Deficiency

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

A

D H

Q

A

D

S B

C T

1A D

/3

A B

C T

A

D D

IV

A

R

TY

D S

U

ST

B D

E

A

D C

B

4t h M

I nd

A A

M D

C

B A

A F

B al fo ur

B ea tty

D

ES

FA

S/ D

M

PO

PT

M S

M ob ili za tio n

D

PT

M S

Tr ai ni ng

PW

EP

IC

FB

W

SC

Fi re

D ep t.

JM

C

JT

F

N or th

LR

R (C

D s)

N

EC

O

TC

A

TE

C

Pr id e

W B

A

Refueling plan is lacking for all generators (maintained by both Pride and Fort Bliss Water)

40 43 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Mission facilities are affected by critical potable water infrastructure lacking backup power

0 16 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Lack of backup power

30 63 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Redundancy of circuits is unknown (one-line diagrams not available)

50 97 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Insufficient capacity at Main Fort Bliss substation

20 60 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Feeders on West Bliss in poor condition

9 41 X X X X X X X X X

Lack of redundancy at McGregor, Doña Ana, Oro Grande, and Range 50 due to single utility feeds and/or single onsite circuits

24 12 X X X X X

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Missions Affected

Deficiency

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

A D

D

S B

C T

1A D

/3

A B

C T

A

D D

IV

A

D S

U

ST

B D

E

A

D C h M

I nd

A A

M D

C

B A

A F

B al fo ur

B

S/ D

M S

M ob ili za tio n

D

PT

M S

Tr ai

D

N

R (C

D

A

TE

C

Pr id e

W B

A

Persistent power quality issues at Doña Ana

3 5 X X X X X

3.2.2 Natural Gas

The most critical function that natural gas supports on the installation is backup generation at 27 facilities, including backup for water pumps. While the probability of a simultaneous gas and electric outage may be low, the lack of onsite gas storage to supply these generators is considered a deficiency. Other deficiencies include single gas mains, dead-end gas distribution lines, and distribution lines that are both in poor condition and exposed to the elements. These risks to critical missions from natural gas infrastructure deficiencies and lack of natural gas backup sources are summarized in Table 4. Specific facilities affected are treated as CLASSIFIED information and can be found in Appendix E, CLASSIFIED Findings.

Table 4. Natural Gas System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected

Deficienc y

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

AD

AD

S

BC

T 1A

D 2/

AB

CT

D

IV

AR

S

US

T

BD

E

AD

h

M I nd

A

AM

DC

BA

AF

al fo ur B

DE

S

DF

AS

/D

M

S M ob ili za tio n D

PT

M

S Tr ai

DP

D

N

R (C

NE

AT

Pr id e W

BA

Natural gas generators are susceptibl e to a natural gas outage; no natural gas storage onsite

15 12 X X X X X X X

Single natural gas supply mains from offsite supplier at

20 42 X X X X X X X X X X X X X

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Tobin Field, Railhead, Logan Heights, and McGregor Critical facilities are served by dead-end natural gas distribution lines

17 29 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Critical facilities are served by bare steel distribution lines, in poor condition

19 29 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

3.2.3 Water and Wastewater

Risks to critical missions from a lack of backup power for water and wastewater infrastructure and other infrastructure deficiencies at Fort Bliss are summarized in Table 5. Specific facilities affected are treated as CLASSIFIED information and can be found in Appendix E, CLASSIFIED Findings.

General deficiencies affecting most missions include the lack of backup power to critical pieces of water infrastructure that supply potable water to facilities, and a lack of plans to provide potable water and portable toilets to critical facilities should a water or wastewater outage occur.

The condition of wells and booster stations supporting numerous critical facilities has been identified as poor and fair, and distribution line condition for portions of the installation is not known, representing a risk. Key wastewater system deficiencies include several lift stations without bypasses to prevent sewer overflows, backups, and subsequent building closures.

Table 5. Water and Wastewater System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected

Deficiency

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

AD

S

BC

T 1A

D 2/

CT

D

IV

AR

S

US

T

BD

E

AD

h

M I nd

A

AM

BA

AF

al fo ur B

DE

S

DF

AS

/D

M

S M ob ili za tio n D

PT

M

S Tr ai

DP

D

N

R (C

NE

AT

Pr id e W

BA

No plan to provide water and portable toilets to critical facilities

55 73 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Missions Affected

Deficiency

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

A

D

D

S B

C T

1A D

/3

A B

C T

A

D D

IV

A

D

S U

ST

B

D E

A

D C h

M I nd

A A

M D

C B

A A

F B al fo ur B

S/ D

M

S M ob ili za tio n D

PT

M

S Tr ai

D

N

R (C

D

A

TE

C Pr id e

W B

A during a water outage

Critical potable water infrastructur e (including wells, booster stations, chlorination equipment) lacks backup power

46 73 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Various lift stations lack bypasses, including main lift station

37 48 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Line condition in portions of installation other than East Bliss is unknown

38 63 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Various wells and booster stations in fair or poor condition (per Fort Bliss Water 5-year plan, 2018)

24 35 X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Critical facilities are served by dead-end potable water distribution lines

3 4 X X X X X

Critical facilities discharge to septic systems/lag oons with unknown conditions

3 2 X X

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Missions Affected

Deficiency

Count of Priority Critical

Facilities

Count of Seconda ry Critical

Facilities

A

D

D

S B

C T

1A D

/3

A B

C T

A

D D

IV

A

D

S U

ST

B

D E

A

D C h

M I nd

A A

M D

C B

A A

F B al fo ur B

S/ D

M

S M ob ili za tio n D

PT

M

S Tr ai

D

N

R (C

D

A

TE

C Pr id e

W B

A

Equipment and power redundancy are not known for offsite infrastructur e serving East Bliss, McGregor, and Oro Grande

24 14 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

West Bliss (Tobin and Pike) and Doña Ana only served by onsite wells

19 43 X X X X X X X X X X X X X

No redundant chlorination equipment at West Bliss (Tobin and Pike) and Doña Ana

19 43 X X X X X X X X X X X X X

McGregor and Oro Grande each served by one connection to offsite water supplier

6 2 X X X

East Bliss water distribution only served by two connections to one offsite main

15 10 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Critical facilities on main containment sensitive to

HVAC

outages have cooling towers with water requirement s

3 0 X X X

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

3.3 Installation Risk

The ISR-MC indicates an installation’s level of risk exposure to an energy or water disruption, as well as the capability of an installation to sustain critical mission activities during a disruption.

The report is categorized across four attributes defined in Army Directive 2017-07, Assured Access, Infrastructure Condition, System Operation, and Critical Mission Sustainment. Each attribute has multiple measures, which can be rated as green+ or green (best), amber, red, or black (worst).

ISR-MC measures rated as amber, red, or black are considered an installation risk. A complete list of ISR-MC measures, possible measure responses, Fort Bliss responses, and a more detailed explanation of deficiencies can be found in Appendix C, Section C.3.4.

A second indictor of installation risk for E&W resilience is E&W use efficiency in all installation facilities. Performance against historical installation-level E&W reduction targets and utility cost trends are also presented below.

3.3.1 Energy

Of the 47 ISR-MC energy metrics reported in FY18, Fort Bliss had deficiencies in 26 areas, shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Deficiencies Defined by FY18 ISR-MC Energy Measures Energy

Attribute Measure # Measure FY18

Response

A ss ur ed

A cc es s

MS416-1a Frequency of interaction with the electric utility provider Red MS416-1b Frequency of interaction with the natural gas provider Red MS416-2b Duration of unplanned power interruptions originating off-post Amber

MS416-3a

The electricity supplier(s) has: a) dual, non-collocated feeds to the installation, b) tie-in from different (independent) substations, and c) each feed sized to meet the full capacity supply for the installation.

Amber

MS416-3b The natural gas supplier(s) has at least dual, non-collocated feeds to the installation that each meets the full capacity supply for the installation.

Amber

MS416-3c

The installation has the respective supply contracts in place with providers to meet the full capacity supply for the installation’s use of propane, diesel, wood chips, fuel oil, coal, etc. as a primary energy source.

Amber

MS416-4c Max daily natural gas use compared to the current max potential Amber

MS416-4d Anticipated max daily natural gas use in 5 years compared to current max potential Amber

MS416-5 Annual electricity consumption supplied by onsite sources Red MS416-6 Installation onsite electricity generation designed to island Red

In fr as tr uc tu on di tio n

MS417-1a Unplanned power interruptions >15 minutes originating on-post Black

MS417-1b Total duration of the installation's electric distribution system unplanned power interruptions Black

MS417-2 Frequency of power quality issues Red

MS417-3 Ability of installation’s electric system to automatically control loads and redistribute electric energy Red

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Energy Attribute Measure

# Measure FY18 Response

MS417-5b Third party electrical provider contracts require appropriate cybersecurity controls Red

MS417-5i Installation natural gas distribution system privatized with sustainment contract (but critical system deficiencies exist) Amber

MS417-5j Third party natural gas provider contracts require cyber security controls Red

MS417-5l Overall functionality of the installation’s onsite gas distribution systems Amber

Sy st em O pe ra tio n

MS418-1

Documented and up-to-date plans:

• Energy Security Plan – yes (this IEWP)

• Emergency Response Plans – yes natural gas (2017);

no electricity (updated 2010)

• Continuity of Operations – no for DPW/DES; yes for specific missions

• Generator Refueling Plan – no

• Energy Vulnerability Assessment – yes

• Real Property Master Plan – yes

• Capital Improvement Plan – no natural gas; yes electricity

• Service Restoration Plan – no (updated 2010)

• Utilities Master Plan – no (updated 2010)

• Installation Utilities Management Plan – no

• Installation Energy Plan – yes (this IEWP)

Red

MS418-2

Energy security planning addresses the following components AND components have been implemented:

• Roles and responsibilities/staffing – yes

• Required training – no

• Active risk management – no

• Communication with mission owners – yes

• Tenants and utilities – yes

• Necessary MOUs and mutual aid agreements – no

• Exercises to be conducted – no

• Updated annually and approved by Commander – yes

• Coordination with other planning efforts – yes

Red

MS418-3 Unacceptable energy security vulnerabilities that are unaddressed Amber

MS418-6

Annual exercises of energy systems emergency operations plans and/or periodic energy system emergency restoration exercises

Amber

C rit ic al

M is si

Su st ai nm en t

MS419-2a Energy requirements have been determined and coordinated for critical missions and supporting facilities and infrastructure Amber

MS419-3

ALL facilities supporting critical missions have backup energy sources available to remain fully operational when the grid is down

Red

MS419-5a The installation has the ability, technology, and equipment available ONSITE to supply the energy needed to support ALL critical missions for 14 days

Black

MS419-5b The installation has backup generator fuel storage capacity of 14 days or more to support critical missions Black

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Energy efficiency performance is measured in terms of energy use intensity (EUI), or kBtu of energy consumed per square foot of building space. Current and past executive orders (e.g., 13834, 13693, 13514) have specified EUI reduction targets or requirements to implement measures that reduce costs. Figure 1 shows progress toward historical reduction targets of 2.5% per year from FY06-15 and future targets of 2% per year from FY15-25. While the current executive order does not specify annual targets, Fort Bliss continues to strive toward these aggressive goals to improve its operational and resource efficiency. Figure 2 shows progress toward energy cost reduction goals. Fort Bliss is on track with EUI reduction, but utility cost reduction is shown to be a risk.

Figure 1. Fort Bliss Energy Use Intensity Performance

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Figure 2. Fort Bliss Energy Utility Costs

3.3.2 Water

Of the 38 ISR-MC water measures reported in FY18, Fort Bliss had deficiencies in 12 areas as shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Deficiencies Defined by FY18 ISR-MC Water Measures Water

Attribute Measure # Measure FY18

Response

A ss ur ed cc es s

MS313-

2a

Installation’s current Overall Water Risk (AQUEDUCT Water Risk Atlas) Red

MS313-

2c

Permanent record containing existing documentation establishing water rights Amber

MS313-

4b Documented access to any contingency water supplies Amber

In fr as tr uc tu di tio n

MS314-

2a

Number of permanent connections from a water source to the installation’s potable water treatment plant Amber

MS314-

2b

Number of permanent connections from potable water supplies to the installation potable water distribution system Red

MS314-

3a Onsite installation water system infrastructure privatized Amber

Sy st em pe ra tio n

MS315-

1a

Emergency operations plan or planning process implemented with required elements:

• Staffing water program roles – yes

• Training water program staff on emergency response – no

• Planning for water service continuity of operations – no

• Exercising water service disruption emergency response

– no

Red

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Water Attribute Measure

# Measure FY18 Response

• Water service restoration procedures – no

• Communication with mission owners, tenants, and utilities for water service disruptions and restoration – yes

• Documenting MOUs and mutual aid agreements – no

• Plan updated in the last 2 years – yes

MS315-

2a Unacceptable water system vulnerabilities that are unaddressed Amber

MS315-

3b

The installation has an inventory or immediate access to an adequate supply of critical components for ALL portions of its water system (distribution, storage, and treatment, if applicable), particularly long lead time components such as large pipes/fittings and chlorinator parts

Amber

MS315-4

Annual exercises of the water components of any existing emergency operations plans and/or water system emergency restoration exercises

Red

MS316-2 Water requirements have been determined for critical missions and supporting facilities and infrastructure Amber

MS316-

3b

Does the installation have the ability, technology, equipment, and energy sources available ONSITE to supply the water VOLUME needed to support critical missions for a minimum of 14 days?

Red

MS316-

3d

Does the installation have the ability, technology, equipment, and energy source available ONSITE to supply the POTABLE water needed to support critical missions for a minimum of 14 days?

Red

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The water resilience posture at Fort Bliss is also measured by the operational efficiency with which water is used. Past executive orders have specified potable and non-potable water use intensity (WUI) reduction targets (measured in thousands of gallons [kgal] per square foot of building area). While the current executive order does not specify annual targets, Fort Bliss continues to strive toward these aggressive goals to improve its operational and resource efficiency. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show progress toward reduction targets of 2% per year from FY07-25; WUI targets are exceeded but costs have increased, representing a risk.

Figure 3. Fort Bliss Water Use Intensity Performance

Figure 4. Fort Bliss Water Utility Costs

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

4.0 Implementation Plan

To achieve the E&W security goals outlined in Section 1 and address the specific deficiencies identified in Section 3, Fort Bliss has defined an implementation plan around four broad strategies:

1. Enhance operations and plans – Actions that reduce overall installation risk from E&W service disruptions through preparedness and improved data quality

2. Reduce demand – Actions that reduce overall installation risk from E&W disruptions and increase the efficiency with which E&W resources are used

3. Improve infrastructure condition – Actions that reduce risk of disruption at critical facilities through improvements to reliability, redundancy, and exposure

4. Increase capacity – Actions that enable longer-term sustainment of priority critical facilities and reduces risk of disruption at all critical facilities through onsite generation and/or increased supply of E&W utilities

Specific tasks and subtasks have been defined for each strategy and range from low/no-cost to capital-intensive activities. These tasks have been prioritized for implementation based on their contribution to risk reduction, demand reduction, operational efficiency, and specific criteria of importance to installation leadership (e.g., ability to leverage utilities privatization [UP] contracts), as outlined in Section 1.

Table 8 presents the full list of tasks, accountable parties, potential funding types, and a timeline for implementation over the next 5 years. The tasks address the highest priority deficiencies for the installation. Many of these tasks relate to specific courses of action considered during the analysis. Numbers referenced in the table below (e.g., #O1, #E14) help direct the reader to a corresponding course of action that is described in more detail in Appendix D.

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Table 8. Fort Bliss Energy & Water Security Implementation Plan

Task # Task Title Responsible Party Funding Type Task Start:

Year

Task Start:

Qtr

Task End:

Year

Task End:

Qtr

1 Enhance Operations and Plans

1.1 Establish Generator Refueling Plans DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2020 4

1.1.1 Update and maintain generator list (#O1) DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.1.2 Develop generator refueling protocols and identify supporting infrastructure

(#O2) DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.1.3 Update emergency preparedness plans with refueling for critical mission facilities prioritized (#O8)

DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.1.4 Coordinate plans/priorities with Pride and FBWSC (#O5) DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.1.5 Conduct readiness testing and exercises with mission owners, Pride, and refueling contractors (#O7) DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2020 1 2020 4

1.2 Ensure Cyber Security of Utility Control Systems (#O6) DPW- Electric/Water/Gas O&M Budget 2019 2 2023 4

1.2.1 Review existing UP contracts for cyber security provisions (#O6) DPW- Electric/Water/Gas O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 3

1.2.2 Develop cyber security requirements amendments to UP contracts DPW- Electric/Water/Gas O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 3

1.2.3 Establish cost of addressing cyber security provisions in control systems DPW- Electric/Water/Gas UP Contract 2019 2 2019 4

1.2.4 Add cyber security controls to existing privatized utility contracts DPW- Electric/Water/Gas UP Contract 2019 3 2019 4

1.2.5 Monitor cyber security controls implemented by each utility on a periodic basis DPW- Electric/Water/Gas UP Contract 2020 1 2024 1

1.3 Augment Deployable Backup Power Systems DPW-Electric 2019 2 2020 4

1.3.1 Determine priority facilities best supported with mobile backup sources (#O4) DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.3.2 Procure and install mobile power equipment and connections (#O4) DPW-Electric SRM 2019 4 2020 1

1.3.3 Determine ability to leverage tactical power systems, personnel, and equipment for contingency power (#O3) Mission owners O&M Budget 2019 4 2020 1

1.3.4 Update ERP to reflect new mobile and tactical capabilities as they are added (#O8)

DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 4 2020 1

1.3.5 Coordinate and exercise plan with mission owners and Pride (#56, O7) DPW-Electric 2020 1 2020 4

1.4 Prepare ERPs and Conduct Readiness Training Exercises DPW-

Electric/Water/Gas 2019 2 2020 4

1.4.1 Develop and maintain ERPs for each utility (#O8) DPW-

Electric/Water/Gas O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 4

1.4.2 Add water curtailment and water stations plan to ERP (#O9) DPW-Water SRM 2019 3 2019 4

1.4.3 Coordinate with utilities on ERPs (#O5) DPW-

Electric/Water/Gas O&M Budget 2019 4 2019 4

1.4.4 Conduct ERP exercises and readiness training (#O7) DPW- Electric/Water/Gas SRM 2020 1 2020 4

2 Improve Infrastructure Condition

CRITICAL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Task # Task Title Responsible Party Funding Type Task Start:

Year

Task Start:

Qtr

Task End:

Year

Task End:

Qtr

2.1 Improve Electric System Infrastructure RGEC/Fort Bliss

Water 2019 3 2020 4

2.1.1 Repair and replace feeders per capital improvement plan (#E14) RGEC UP Contract 2019 4 2020 1

2.1.2 Install generators and/or hybrid systems on water system (#E12) FBWSC UP Contract or

ERCIP 2019 3 2019 4

2.1.3 Address power quality and disruption issues (#E11) DPW- Electric/RGEC/EPE SRM 2019 3 2020 4

2.2 Improve Water System Infrastructure FBWSC 2019 4 2020 4

2.2.1 Complete well repairs identified in 5-year capital improvement plan (#W9) FBWSC UP Contract 2019 4 2020 2

2.2.2 Complete lift station upgrades (#W8) FBWSC UP Contract 2020 1 2020 4

2.2.3 Complete water line condition assessment (#W1) FBWSC UP Contract 2019 4 2020 3

2.2.4 Install redundant chlorination equipment (#W3) FBWSC UP Contract 2020 1 2020 4

2.3 Leverage substation project to enhance capacity (#E13)

2.3.1 Discuss with RGEC feasibility of modifying current design to accept generators DPW-Electric O&M Budget 2019 2 2019 2

2.3.2 Conduct cost-benefit analysis of substation vs.