3 CSP Monthly Contextual Report - April 2020 - public.pdf

Burma Community Strengthening

Project (CSP) Monthly Contextual Report

Covering period 25 February - 24 March 2020

CONTRACT NO. AID-72048218C00003

DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 1

National 2

Peace Process 2

Governance 3

Rakhine State 4

Security Trends 4

Governance 6

Livelihoods and Market 7

State of Essential Services 7

Kachin State 9

Security Trends 9

Governance 9

Livelihoods and Market 10

State of Essential Services 10

Northern Shan State 12

Security Trends 12

Governance 13

Livelihoods and Market 13

State of Essential Services 14

Endnotes 15

Table of Figures

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State (February - March 2020)

Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State (February - March 2020)

Map 3: Conflict Map of Shan State (February - March 2020)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peace Process and Governance

Armed confrontation between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the

Tatmadaw threatened to disrupt peace discussions. However, the RCSS went on to attend a scheduled meeting of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the two parties subsequently reached an agreement regarding the RCSS holding a National Political

Dialogue in Shan State; no date was set due to the COVID-19 crisis. At the Pyidaungsu

Hluttaw, voting from March 10 to 20 on constitutional amendments resulted in only four minor proposals being passed. Voting was conducted by secret ballot, but it can be assumed that the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the Tatmadaw and Union Solidarity and

Development Party (USDP) voted in blocs in support of their own proposals and against those of the opposing party. The Pyithu Hluttaw also passed a proposal to allow residents who have been living in an area for more than 90 days to vote in that township for upcoming national elections.

Rakhine State

The Myanmar Government announced the designation of the Arakan Army (AA) as a terrorist organization, with the result that any persons in contact with the group may be prosecuted under Section 15(2) of the Unlawful Associations Act. Fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw continued to cause mass casualties, displacement, and the destruction of property in Chin and Rakhine States. Rumors that some among the more than 4,000

Rakhine students who failed to sit their matriculation exams joined the AA, and about recent activity by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), added to heightened community perceptions of insecurity.

Kachin State

Border closures in Kachin State negatively impacted economic activities, including the jade industry. The reopening of crossings on March 20 and the subsequent entrance of Chinese trucks and workers raised concerns about the potential spread of COVID-19, especially in migrant areas and internally displaced persons camps. As of April 1, border crossings are open for trucks and commodities, although increasingly imposing restrictions have resulted in small numbers of trucks passing.

Northern Shan State

In northern Shan State, the economy gradually picked up after the reopening of the borders with China and restarting of Chinese factories. Myanmar migrant workers crossing the border were permitted to fill in requisite health questionnaires in the Burmese language rather than in Chinese language, as was previously the case. As of April 1, no individual travel across the border is permitted and the transport of goods is heavily restricted.

The Tatmadaw seized large numbers of drugs from production centers in Kutkai Township.

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) clashed with the Pan Say People’s Militia

Force (PMF) when the former entered the latter’s territory to burn poppy fields. Hundreds of villagers were displaced, while clashes also continued between the TNLA and the

Tatmadaw.

Figure 1. UPDJC Meeting, March 10, 2020

NATIONAL

● Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee meeting held.

● Designation of Arakan Army as a terrorist group disrupts peace process.

● Voting on constitutional amendment proposals; four minor proposals pass.

Peace Process

Clashes between the RCSS and the Tatmadaw in Mongkaing Township, southern Shan State, between February 27 and March 71 raised concerns about potential impact upon the peace process. Nonetheless, the RCSS ultimately attended the UPDJC meeting and, following a bilateral meeting with the Tatmadaw on March 19, agreed to attend a JMC meeting on

March 30 and 31.2 However, the meeting was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Given the current restrictions on gatherings due to COVID-19, some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) asked that further peace meetings be suspended.3

Meetings of the Union Peace

Dialogue Joint Committee

(UPDJC) and of UPDJC

Secretaries were held on March 10 and 12 respectively,4 contributing to a sense that the peace process was once again moving forward.5 The most significant agreement reached in the period was that the

Restoration Council of Shan

State (RCSS) would hold a national political dialogue in

Linkae Town, Shan State, before the next Union Peace

Conference.6 The Shan national political dialogue has long been a source of tension among different actors in the State, with debates particularly over the location and the participation of the State authorities. The present agreement reflected a compromise by both the RCSS, which agreed to hold the event at its headquarters in Linkae, rather than at the state capital Taunggyi, and the Tatmadaw, which had previously blocked the entire event. The RCSS subsequently announced that the event would be postponed due to the COVID-19 crisis.7

Developments among NCA non-signatories were less positive during the reporting period.

No meeting could be organized between the Northern Alliance (NA) and the Peace

Commission due to questions over the venue.8 The announcement on March 23 that the

Arakan Army (AA) was designated a terrorist organization (see Rakhine State - Security)9 raised doubts about the viability of future peace meetings between the NA and the

Government, and between the broader WA-led Federal Political Negotiation and

Consultative Committee (FPNCC) and the Government. It is unlikely that the other members of these alliances will abandon their links with the AA in response to the new designation.10 Further, the implicit threat carried within the designation and the potential for it to be expanded to apply to other EAOs are likely to undermine trust in the government and willingness to participate in peace meetings.11

Governance

Following heated debates from March 10 to March 20,12 the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw voted on proposed amendments to the constitution.13 Only four proposals received the support of more than 75 percent of MPs and so passed.14 Three related to the terms used to refer to persons with disabilities in Section 32(a) and (b),15 and 344;16 and to Section 262(a) in relation to deletion of text stating that State or Region Ministers can be persons “from among the Region or State Hluttaw representatives or from among persons who are not

Hluttaw representatives,” leaving only a statement that persons appointed must have the qualifications prescribed in the constitution.17

Voting was carried out by secret ballot,18 but the results indicated that the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the Tatmadaw and Union Solidarity and Development Party

(USDP) MPs largely voted as blocks, supporting only the amendments put forward by their own groups.19 The results, while unsurprising, highlighted that the constitutional amendment process had failed to build consensus and cross-party support, even for less politically-charged proposals.20 It was notable that the NLD appeared to have voted against amending

Section 261 to allow the election of state and regional chief ministers,21 reflecting the greater importance it attached to limiting the Tatmadaw’s general role and influence over such matters.22 Ethnic parties appeared to follow the same approach as it seemed that only a few ethnic MPs voted in favor of the proposal on this occasion.23

The debate around constitutional amendments and the ways in which parties have presented the outcomes foreshadow how they may campaign for the general election. The

USDP described the blocking of proposals to amend Section 59(f) of the Constitution as a defense of sovereignty,24 a position echoed by nationalists in demonstrations25 and social media postings.26 The party also accused the NLD of trying to slander the Tatmadaw and of failing to compromise.27 Meanwhile, there were suggestions from NLD sources that the outcome was a win, in that the results demonstrated Tatmadaw intransigence and unwillingness to compromise.28

At the Pyithu Hluttaw, a provision passed to allow migrants to vote in their township of residence after being formally registered as residents for 90 days,29 despite the objections of ethnic political parties concerned that the change would favor the larger national parties over State-based ethnic parties.30

The Union Election Commission (UEC) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) each confirmed that they were discussing the possibility of holding elections in the four UWSA-controlled townships - Panghsang, Mong Mau, Pang Wai and Nah Parn Townships.31 These locations did not participate in the 2010 and 2015 general elections as the UEC said at the time that it was not in a position to ensure free and fair elections at the sites.32 The UWSA and the Wa National Unity Party cautioned that a number of issues needed to be resolved before a final decision on the matter could be made.33 Nevertheless, the move indicated an increasing willingness by the UWSA to engage with the Myanmar authorities. According to some analysts, this is likely part of ongoing efforts by the UWSA to achieve recognition for a

Wa State to replace the region’s current status of Self-Administered Zone.34

Figure 2. School in Sittwe Town where Tatmadaw was rumored to set up camp, March 2020

RAKHINE STATE

● Reports of increased ARSA activity in Maungdaw District.

● Tatmadaw drops lawsuits against The Irrawaddy and Reuters.

● Over 4,000 students failed to sit matriculation exams.

Security Trends

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State (February - March 2020)

The AA and the

Tatmadaw clashed at least 74 times in the period from February

19 to March 15.35 The majority of the clashes took place along the

Kaladan River valley, primarily in Kyauktaw and Paletwa

Townships. Rumors that AA forces were present in Kyauktaw town36 and that the Tatmadaw had set up camps at schools in Sittwe37 heightened perceptions of insecurity.

A cumulative total of 105 civilians were injured and 35 killed by stray fire (including artillery explosions) during the clashes.38 More than 100 houses in Kyauktaw, Minbya, Rathedaung, and Paletwa Townships burned down,39 while the loss of cattle and goats impacted residents’ livelihoods.40 In addition, the Tatmadaw reported the destruction of a bridge on the Nyaung Chaung–Sa Tae Pyin Road in Buthidaung Township41 as well as the use of nails by the AA along the Yangon–Sittwe Highway.42

The Tatmadaw received a greater share of public criticism, particularly for casualties and destruction of personal property resulting from the use of airstrikes and heavy artillery.43

However, it was notable that some Rakhine social media users also castigated the AA for alleged human rights violations against residents of Paletwa Township. Despite still expressing regard for the AA, commentators warned against actions that would bring notoriety to the armed group and called on the group’s leaders to hold its soldiers responsible for rights’ violations.44 The alleged violations included forced recruitment, causing villagers to flee their areas.45

The AA abducted 30 Tatmadaw soldiers following clashes in Kyauktaw and Paletwa

Townships on March 10 and 11.46 Subsequently it publicly cited international law to attempt to justify the detentions.47 The Tatmadaw remained firm in its stance that it would not negotiate with the AA and did not respond to the latter’s request to discuss the handover of its injured prisoners.48 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the first time referred to the AA as “taung kyan thu,” implying that it was a terrorist organization.49

Subsequently the Ministry of Information declared that the AA was officially so designated,50 and that any persons in contact with it were liable for prosecution under Section 15(2) of the Unlawful Associations Act.51 The Tatmadaw simultaneously pressured the Kachin

Independence Organization (KIO), through the intermediary of the Peace-talk Creation

Group (PCG), to no longer accept the AA in KIO-controlled areas, and disregarding this order would justify Tatmadaw attacks on KIO-controlled areas.52 However, the KIO highlighted the unfairness of pressure on the group, as it claimed the AA’s headquarters were located in the Wa Self-Administered Region rather than in KIO-controlled areas.53

In response, many Rakhine denounced the change and expressed skepticism about the government-led peace process (see National - Peace Process).54 Some Rakhine community leaders posited that the armed conflict would intensify as a result.55 Local analysts note that the Karen National Union was also officially designated as a terrorist organization until signature of the NCA, and suggest that this designation would not overly affect any eventual discussions if both parties were willing to engage in political dialogue.

Certain indications suggesting increased activity by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army

(ARSA) emerged this month. The Buthidaung Township Administrator alleged that ARSA members were the perpetrators of the murder of the Pan Zi Village Administrator on

February 29.56 In Maungdaw Township on March 3, a reported shootout between the

Border Guard Police and ARSA left two members of the latter dead.57

During the reporting period, there were several positive developments regarding social cohesion initiatives. On February 23, 140 women representatives - approximately half of whom were Rakhine, a quarter Rohingya, and the remaining quarter representative of other ethnic minorities - from across Rakhine State attended a workshop in Yangon on ‘Enhancing

Women’s Social Cohesion Roles in Rakhine State.’ The five-day event was co-organized by the Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor, the National Reconciliation and Peace

Center (NRPC), and a local non-governmental organization.58 On March 10, local women’s groups organized simultaneous anti-hate speech campaigns in each of the 17 townships.

This was the first statewide and simultaneous anti-hate speech campaign conducted in

Rakhine State, and the events were attended by a total of over 6,000 persons.59 While some social media users expressed hopes that such campaigns would lead to a positive change in mindsets,60 others were highly critical of the campaign organizers. At least one commentator stated that the non-governmental organization behind the event was

“manipulating locals for its own gain.”61

Governance

Since February 26, the Tatmadaw detained more than 70 persons, at least 18 of whom were not explicitly identified as having ties to the AA or connected to the ongoing armed conflict.62 The majority of detentions occurred on March 16, when the Tatmadaw took 50 residents of Tin Ma Village, Kyauktaw Township, for interrogation. Forty of the detainees were released later that day, while ten remained in detention.63 The Tatmadaw’s detention of two youths at the Kyauk Tan checkpoint in Sittwe Township64 was criticized by Rakhine social media users, who interpreted the incident as evidence of Rakhine residents’ lack of freedom of movement65 and related to the Tatmadaw’s abuse of power at checkpoints.66

Community members reportedly remained skeptical about the willingness of the Myanmar

National Human Rights Commission to address their grievances, particularly with regard to civilian detentions and casualties.67

Nine students in Yangon were charged under Section 19 of the Peaceful Assembly and

Peaceful Procession Law following a February 23 demonstration staged without a permit against the ongoing Internet suspension in nine townships of Chin and Rakhine States.68

Participants face a maximum sentence of three months; many Rakhine commentators likened the charges to situations under military rule.69 A youth activist who participated in similar protests in Rakhine State remarked it was ironic that the NLD-led government was arresting students despite the State Counsellor’s frequent exhortations for youth to become politically engaged.70 There was further condemnation of the government after a later protest against the initial case resulted in the police beating student demonstrators.

One Rakhine commentator called on the Bamar to collaborate with the AA in “wiping out” the dictators.71 Other social media users supported the government, claiming that the demonstrators had violated official procedures and calling for the students to be sent to

Insein Prison for violations under Section 124(a) of the Penal Code (inciting disaffection towards the government).72

Two cases filed by the Tatmadaw under Section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Law were particularly notable. The law prohibits the use of telecommunications to defame persons and carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment.73 The first case concerned a lawsuit filed in April 12, 2019, against the editor of the Burmese edition of The

Irrawaddy, for an article on the consequences of clashes at Mrauk–U town. 74 On March 16, the case was accepted at Kyauktada Township court in Yangon.75 The second case was against Reuters news agency, for a January 25 report on the death of two Rohingya women in Buthidaung Township.76 Mediation by the Myanmar Press Council resulted in the withdrawal of both cases on March 18.77 However, the lawsuit against a Buthidaung MP cited in the Reuters article remained on file.78

Livelihoods and Market

Security forces seized almost five million methamphetamine pills since February 21.79 At least one seizure occurred in Toungup Township;80 the others took place in Maungdaw and

Sittwe Townships. A Tatmadaw press briefing stated that Rakhine State was a drugs export hub, with illegal traders using three main land and maritime routes to transport the goods from production centers in Shan State. The routes include: Mandalay–Magwe–Minbu–Padan;

Yangon–Pyay–Pandaung–Toungup; and Pathein–Nga Thaing Chaung–Gwa.81

On March 9, a project commenced extending the runway of Thandwe Airport.82 It is slated for completion in 2021 and is expected to draw more tourists to Ngapali Beach, a primary tourist attraction. Meanwhile, COVID-19 fears have resulted in more than 60 percent of hotels being empty.83

The China-owned CITIC Group Corporation Ltd. was scheduled to open bidding for an independent consultant to conduct the required Environmental Impact Assessment of the

Kyaukphyu deep sea port. The firm must then submit information on the winning bidder to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, prior to conducting the assessment.84

More than 30 Rakhine social media users expressed doubts about the February 17 announcement of the discovery of a new gas field offshore by the South Korean company, Posco International Corporation.85 Skepticism was accompanied by complaints that the government had not addressed poverty in the region,86 echoing past grievances concerning lack of compensation from the Shwe Natural Gas Project.

State of Essential Services

As of March 23, news agencies reported that the number of internally displaced persons

(IDPs) in Chin and Rakhine States had reached 156,000.87 Two-thirds were presumed to be living in informal settlements, while around 50,000 persons resided in IDP camps.88 Food and water shortages were a primary concern, especially for residents and IDPs in Paletwa

Township where transport routes have been blocked by the AA since early February 2020.89

Although the AA reportedly gave permission for the transport of 6,000 bags of rice to the township during the week of March 9,90 a Chin civil society organization (CSO) postponed the delivery due to security concerns. The AA had allegedly demanded that deliveries must be conducted without Tatmadaw escorts, but the CSO was worried that the AA would steal the goods en-route without any security accompaniment.91

New worries about the potential spread of COVID-19 in Rakhine State were exacerbated by rumors that a number of Rakhine migrant workers had returned home from working in

China while avoiding screening procedures for the virus. A prominent Rakhine politician noted that most people in the region were not taking the pandemic seriously and were more concerned about ongoing clashes.92 Besides calling for a lifting of the Internet ban to allow public access to information related to COVID-19 (see Rakhine State - Governance), the Rakhine Ethnic Congress highlighted communities’ lack of knowledge about the virus and measures for prevention.93

More than 4,000 students in Rakhine State were unable to sit their matriculation exams during the period from March 11 to 20.94 This was due in part to security concerns, as well as an inability to afford the cost of transportation from villages or IDP camps to exam centers. Some CSOs in Mrauk-U Township assisted approximately 370 students from IDP camps to travel to the designated exam center. Reports did not emerge about similar arrangements by the government.95 Community leaders raised the risks of students being disadvantaged when seeking future employment and turning to the AA for opportunities.96

The latter concern was highlighted in a rumor shared by over a thousand social media users that claimed many Rakhine teenagers who had been unable to take their matriculation exams had joined the AA.97 Meanwhile, some students who managed to reach exam centers were disturbed by the sound of helicopters and artillery while writing their exams.98 Both the AA and the Tatmadaw had stated that they would not initiate attacks during the examination period, but those statements were followed with subsequent statements that they would continue to defend themselves should the other party attack.99

Up to March 16, mobile teams of the Department of Immigration and the Department of

Health continued to process and issue birth certificates, household registration documents, National Verification Cards (NVCs), and citizenship documents to Rohingya in IDP camps and villages across Sittwe Township.100 The process was temporarily suspended following the government’s announcement prohibiting gatherings of over 30 persons to prevent the potential spread of COVID-19.101 For the same reason, a planned visit of the Ministry of

Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MSWRR) to the Kyauktalone IDP camp this month was postponed.102

There was progress with the resettlement of persons displaced to Maungdaw Town from seven village tracts in the district following the violence of 2017. The MSWRR provided each of the approximately 200 Rohingya families with 250,000 MMK to rebuild their houses on their original lands. There was a brief hiatus when local authorities suspended the house constructions, claiming villagers had been attempting to build more lavish buildings than what was feasible in terms of cost and urban planning; the suspension was lifted by the

Union Government. Other villagers successfully completed the construction of their houses on their lands and expressed happiness at being allowed to do so.103

KACHIN STATE

Public protests reopened border crossings for banana trucks.

Kachin State Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development of the Kan Paik Ti Business Park.

Food shortages in Chipwi and Tsawlaw Townships.

Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State (February - March 2020)

Two IDPs were seriously injured by landmines while attempting to reach their farmlands near Kasung Village, Mogaung Township.104 Such incidents reinforce IDPs’ reservations about resettlement or return to their original villages without comprehensive preparation and demining. Following a series of landmine casualties in the past few months, villagers from Nam San Yang in Waingmaw Township renewed requests to the Tatmadaw and

Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to remove the landmines.105 Both the Kachin State

Security Minister and a Tatmadaw spokesperson said that landmines could only be removed after the KIA had signed the NCA.106

Governance

The Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP), a merger of five Kachin ethnic parties aiming to strengthen their performance in the upcoming general election, held its first conference on

March 3 – 4 .107 However, four ethnic Kachin political parties - Law Waw National Unity and Development Party, Kachin State Democracy and Development Party, Lisu National

Development Party, and Kachin National Congress (KNC) - did not join the new party, leaving the potential that the ethnic vote will be split to the advantage of the NLD and

Figure 3. Banana trucks at Kan Paik Ti Border, March 2020

USDP.108 The KSPP and the KNC were among the most vocal protesters against the changes in the residency requirement for voting (see National - Governance), with the

KNC organizing a protest against the amendment.109

On March 4, the Kachin State Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development of the Kan Paik Ti Business Park as a joint venture, split 70-30 between a

Chinese and a Myanmar company. The directors of the Myanmar company are sons of the founders of the New Democratic Army – Kachin, the Tatmadaw-aligned militia which controls the area.110 The government had not yet informed residents in the area about the project, which is expected to displace some residents.111 The Kachin State Parliament also discussed constructing a station in Kan Paik Ti Town where goods being transported across the border with China may be exchanged. This proposal was in response to concerns that trucks crossing the border were destroying the road and that most of the jobs as truck owners and drivers were going to Chinese nationals.112

Livelihoods and Market

In an ongoing legal battle over the use of land for banana plantations, Generation Star Co.

Ltd has sued residents from Muk Chyik Village, Waingmaw Township, for 120 million MMK in compensation after the Government ordered the company to cease working on some plots. However, the residents allege that the company has expanded its plantations beyond the land that it bought.113

In March, the General Administration Department (GAD) in Hpakant Township began issuing permits to residents wishing to mine small blocks as part of a government policy to regulate the mining industry and promote small scale mining. Applicants are required to present an ID and a Household List showing residence in Hpakant. They must also pay a deposit of 500,000 MMK, a 1,000 MMK application fee, a 3,000 MMK registration fee, a

5,000 MMK processing fee, and a 100,000 MMK “donation” for local development.114

Payments are made to the GAD, although there is speculation that the GAD is acting on behalf of the Kachin State Resources and Environmental Conservation Ministry, who will be the ultimate recipient of the funds. Each applicant can request a maximum of three plots.

The move opens formal access to mining for small scale miners, though the costs involved are likely to remain a barrier for many.

State of Essential Services

On March 20, the border crossing at Kan Paik Ti Town reopened after a three-week closure instigated by Chinese authorities in response to the

COVID-19 outbreak in China.

Around 200 banana trucks were estimated to be crossing each day since the reopening, many bringing workers from China. This led to protests in Waingmaw and

Myitkyina Townships, with residents calling for the temporary closure of border gates due to fears that the current health checks would not be sufficient to stop the spread of

COVID-19.115 Subsequently the State Hluttaw wrote to the Union President requesting that banana trucks be banned from entering Kachin State.116

As of April 1, the border gates are formally open, but most traffic has ceased as the Kachin

State Government is requiring all those entering via the Kan Paik Ti border crossing, including truck drivers, to stay in quarantine for fourteen days. The truck drivers must also provide proof that their companies are able to cover the cost of this quarantining. These new measures have led most of the companies to cease sending Chinese truck drivers across the border. A small number of trucks (10-15 a day compared to the normal 50-60 a day) continue to cross in the other direction and unload their cargoes on the Chinese side of the border. The Kachin State Government is imposing fewer restrictions at the Lwegel border crossing, as there has been less public demand for restrictions in this part of the

State, but the Chinese are limiting entry to one driver per truck and not permitting anyone entering from Myanmar to stay in China for more than 24 hours. Both border crossings are now closed to individuals.

These border developments are likely leave many workers on banana plantations unpaid.117

Day laborers, IDPs, and migrant workers faced increased food insecurity from the economic fallout of COVID-19. The lack of job opportunities due to the economic impact of COVID-

19 in Kachin State may make some people desperate enough to look for alternative forms of employment. This may put them as risk of human trafficking and lead to increased irregular migration could further risk the spreading of COVID-19 in ways that are hard to trace and contain.

Food shortages were already being reported in remote areas of Chipwi and Tsawlaw

Townships which generally rely on imports from China. Although the Tatmadaw was reportedly transporting rice to these areas,118 ensuring adequate supplies poses logistical challenges which would require cooperation between the Tatmadaw, the Union and State

Governments, and armed groups and militias operating in these areas. More generally, concerns continued over the authorities’ preparations to respond to an outbreak of

COVID-19. The government acknowledged the difficulty of carrying out screening and testing in non-government-controlled areas and, following a one-day workshop on preparedness, UNICEF highlighted the need for more support.119

The Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) continued with its plan to resettle IDPs, taking over the lead of a project initiated by the Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee with the support of Japan’s Nippon Foundation.120 The KBC reported that it had identified more than 1,000 families who wished to be involved, although it currently only has capacity to resettle half that number.121 It remains to be seen how the risk of COVID-19 transmission will impact the returns and resettlement process in Kachin.

NORTHERN SHAN STATE

Ongoing fighting between Tatmadaw and Ta’ang National Liberation Army.

Clashes between Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Pan Say Militia Force.

Massive drug seizures in Kutkai Township.

Map 3: Conflict Map of Shan State (February - March 2020)

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Tatmadaw-backed Pan Say People’s

Militia Force (PMF) clashed in five locations in Namkham Township on March 15.122

According to the TNLA spokesperson, the clashes occurred when the TNLA entered PMF-controlled areas in order to destroy poppy fields.123 The TNLA claimed that the PMF was supported by artillery fired by the Tatmadaw from nearby bases. Two people were killed, one of whom was identified as a PMF soldier, several TNLA soldiers were injured, and hundreds of villagers were displaced because of the fighting.124

In addition, ten clashes were reported between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw in Kutkai and

Mongmit Townships in March.125 The fighting in Mongmit displaced around 100 persons.126

Local sources note that Tatmadaw clearance operations have been increasing in recent months, raising the likelihood that displaced persons will not be able to return to their original villages for an extended period of time.127

Fighting between the RCSS and the Tatmadaw in southern Shan State did not directly affect the northern part of the State. However, the Tatmadaw’s decision to close the Mong

Nawng–Kehsi Road in response to the clashes impacted travel to Lashio and Kutkai.128

Figure 4. Muse Border Gate, March 2020

Governance

Between February 28 and March 12, the Tatmadaw seized over 200 billion MMK (100 million USD) worth of drugs, precursor chemicals, and equipment from three drug production facilities in Kawng Kha and Lwekham Villages, Kutkai Township.129 No arrests were initially announced, although the names of the building owners were said to be known.130 The area is mostly controlled by the Kawng Kha Militia, which has denied involvement in the drug trade. Analysts believe that the militia likely provides security to drug producers and traders, even if it does not run the factories.131

Livelihoods and Market

The situation at the border crossings to China remained inconsistent. Since the second week of February, some border trade resumed at Muse, with

Chinese traders coming to

Shwe Li Town to buy goods, particularly melons, rice,132 and sugar.133 However, trade volume remained significantly lower than normal; when the border first reopened it was estimated that 30–40 trucks were passing in a day, compared to 500–600 in normal times.134

As of April 1, truck drivers from

Myanmar are being permitted to cross, but must go through rigorous health checks and may not stay in China for more than 24 hours. Melon farmers were especially hard-hit as the border closures came at peak harvest time and the fruit could not be stored for a prolonged period. As of mid-March, it was estimated that the melon industry suffered a loss of about 65 million USD.135 Small farmers and traders, as well as the day laborers employed in the border trade were also badly affected. The latest closure due to COVID-19 exacerbated the ongoing suffering of these groups. The situation was further worsened by the depreciation of the Chinese Yuan against the Myanmar Kyat, so that even those who succeeded in selling their goods were earning less than anticipated.136

On February 24, factories in China began to reopen137 and migrant workers from Myanmar were permitted to cross the border to resume work. An initial requirement to fill a health questionnaire in the Chinese language was changed so that the document could be provided in Burmese, following interventions by the Chinese Consular General, the Myanmar police, and local immigration officers. However, as of April 1, no individual travel is allowed through the border crossings at Muse or Chin Shwe Haw. Trucks are still permitted to pass at present, although with increased restrictions. However, some cross-border movement remains possible via informal routes. The situation at the border remained tense and subject to change without warning. Workers were reported to be choosing to cross the border despite the risk of infection due to the lack of employment opportunities in Myanmar and the lack of social support or savings.138

State of Essential Services

Humanitarian groups, including the KBC, expressed concern about the lack of government measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in IDP camps, where residents live in close proximity and have limited access to health services. The camps had yet to receive instructions from the Ministry of Health and Sports about preventing or responding to cases of COVID-19.139

ENDNOTES

Nang Seng Nom, “Burma Army, RCSS Clash Nearly 20 Times—After Peace Meeting,” Shan Herald Agency for

News, March 7, 2020, sec. News, https://bit.ly/2vMRUVo; Nang Seng Nom, “RCSS Withdraws From Mong

Kung Camp After Burma Army Clashes,” Shan Herald Agency for News, March 3, 2020, sec. News, https://bit.ly/2QKvPOs.

Interviews with sources close to the RCSS and peace process, March 2020.

Interviews with sources close to the EAOs, March 2020.

“UPDJC Secretaries Prepare Report for 12 March Meeting,” Global New Light of Myanmar, March 11, 2020, sec. National, https://bit.ly/2JaB8ml; “State Counsellor Attends 18th Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee

Meeting,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, March 12, 2020, sec. State Counsellor, https://bit.ly/3aj48US.

Interviews with sources close to the peace process, March 2020.

Hom Hurng, “ဧပ ြီလအတငွ ်း သျှမ ်းအမျ ်းသ ်းအဆင န ိုင ငရံ ်းရဆ်ွးရန်ွး ွွဲကျင ်း မည ဟို RCSS/SSA ရ ” [RCSS:

Shan National Level Political Dialogue to Be Held in April], Shan Herald Agency for News, February 26, 2020, sec. သတင ်း, https://bit.ly/2UzaI2X.

Sai Wunna, “RCSS Postpones Shan National Dialogue amid COVID-19 Fears,” The Myanmar Times, March 12, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bhDLPc.

“Peace Talks Location between Govt and Northern Alliance Still under Negotiation,” Eleven Media Group, March 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vQY9HS. Interviews with sources close to the Peace Commission in mid-March confirmed that at that stage there were ongoing negotiations around possible locations for a meeting.

However, the decision to designate the AA a terrorist group derailed these discussions.

Ministry of Information, “Declaration of Terrorist Group,” Facebook, March 23, 2020, https://bit.ly/33FvoKC;

Ministry of Information, “Declaration of Terrorist Group,” Facebook, March 23, 2020, https://bit.ly/2UzcUHw.

Interviews with sources close to the EAOs, March 2020.

Interviews with sources close to the EAOs, March 2020.

San Yamin Aung, “Angry Exchange Between Military MP, Speaker Mars First Day of Myanmar Charter

Debate,” The Irrawaddy, February 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bgbHf3; Moe Moe, “Myanmar Parliament Speaker to

MPs: Act Civil or Face Lawsuits,” The Irrawaddy, February 28, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xXNXhs; Swan Ye Htut and

Myat Thura, “MPs Reminded No Shouting, Protests Allowed in Myanmar’s Union Hluttaw,” The Myanmar

Times, March 4, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xcesiI.

For a day-by-day breakdown of the voting, see the reports published in the Global New Light of Myanmar, Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Continues Voting on Proposals for Constitutional

Amendment,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, March 12, 2020, https://bit.ly/3ac615u; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye

Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Vote on Proposals for Constitutional Amendment,” Global New Light of

Myanmar, March 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/2QAmVmz; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

Rejects Amendments to 14 Provisions of 2008 Constitution,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, March 13, 2020, https://bit.ly/3a6J7g4; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Category (4) of Constitution Amendment Proposals

Falls Short of Required Votes,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, March 14, 2020, https://bit.ly/2WwT5Df; Aung Ye

Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Category (1) Proposals to Amend Constitution Not Passed,” Global New Light Of

Myanmar, March 17, 2020, https://bit.ly/2QwPEsI; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

Discusses Bills, Votes on Constitutional Amendment,” Global New Light of Myanmar, March 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xcDwpN; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Approves Single

Constitutional Amendment,” Global New Light of Myanmar, March 19, 2020, https://bit.ly/3b98MEO;

“Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Concludes Voting on Proposed Amendments to Constitution,” Global New Light of

Myanmar, March 2020, sec. National, https://bit.ly/2UgOh3G.

Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Vote on Proposals for Constitutional

Amendment”; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Approves Single Constitutional

Amendment.”

Nyan Hlaing Lin, “အရ ြေြေဥံ ရေ င ဆင ရ ်း ထမရ တ အြေ ်းကဏ္ဍ ိုေ မမျ ်း မွဲြေွွဲ တငွ ရ ံ်း” [Bills Seeking to

Reduce Military’s Political Power Fail in Parliament], Myanmar NOW, March 10, 2020, https://bit.ly/33y2Liz; San

Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Military Retains Important Political Role as NLD’s Key Charter Reforms Fail to Pass,”

The Irrawaddy, March 10, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xaWkps; Myat Thura and Swan Ye Htut, “NLD Fails to Reduce

Military’s Role in Govt,” The Myanmar Times, March 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/2U8UbUs.

https://bit.ly/2UzaI2X https://bit.ly/2vQY9HS

San Yamin Aung, “The Untouchable Articles in Myanmar’s Constitution,” The Irrawaddy, March 23, 2020, sec.

Burma, https://bit.ly/39d2SBb.

San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar Parliament Approves Amendment to Constitution’s Language on State, Regional

Minister Appointments,” The Irrawaddy, March 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xguesM.

Nyan Hlaing Lin, “Parliament to Vote Next Week on Changes to Military’s Charter,” Myanmar NOW, March

4, 2020, https://bit.ly/3a6ThgI; “Myanmar Parliament Vote to Amend Charter Set for next Week,” The

Myanmar Times, March 5, 2020, https://bit.ly/2QvVbQ4.

See Footnote 2 for links with the number of votes for each proposal.

San Yamin Aung, “NLD’s Bid to End Myanmar Military’s Constitutional Grip on National Security Voted

Down,” The Irrawaddy, March 19, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/39hXk8H.

Thiha Tun and Thet Su Aung, “Myanmar’s Ruling NLD Votes Down Bill on Ethnic Chief Ministers,” Radio

Free Asia, March 17, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xhzJaB; San Yamin Aung, “NLD, Ethnic Parties Vote Down Myanmar

Military’s Charter Amendment Proposals,” The Irrawaddy, March 17, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bdu7wY.

Thiha Tun and Thet Su Aung, “Myanmar’s Ruling NLD Votes Down Bill on Ethnic Chief Ministers”; San

Yamin Aung, “NLD, Ethnic Parties Vote Down Myanmar Military’s Charter Amendment Proposals.”

San Yamin Aung, “NLD, Ethnic Parties Vote Down Myanmar Military’s Charter Amendment Proposals.”

Khaymani Win and Thiha Tu, “Aung San Suu Kyi Speech, Legislative Setback Underscore Dominance of

Myanmar Military,” Radio Free Asia, March 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/3brtqjU; San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi

Still Barred From Presidency as Proposed Charter Change Fails,” The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/2QJwr78.

Htet Naing Zaw, “Nationalists Protest in Naypyitaw Against Constitutional Amendments,” The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/2WFoCDa.

ိုေမ ၅၉(စ) ယ္ဖ က္ကြင ္ ္မရျြေင္္်းသည္ တစ္္ ္ိ္ု ငငလံံို်း၏ ရ္အ ငငပွ္ဲ ျဖစ္ရ္ၾက င္္်း ္ျ ည္ြ ္ ငၿဖ ်း ါတြီအမတ္

ဦ်းရ္သ င္္်း ရ္အ်း ရ္္ျ ဆိ္ု , “People Media - Posts,” Facebook, March 11, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1365389113644404&id=1120229281493723&__tn__=-

R. The responses provide an indication of the kinds of comments being made.

Khaymani Win and Thiha Tu, “Aung San Suu Kyi Speech, Legislative Setback Underscore Dominance of

Myanmar Military,” Radio Free Asia, March 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/3brtqjU; Htet Naing Zaw, “Myanmar’s Failed

Charter Reform Will Soil Military’s Image: Military Proxy MP,” The Irrawaddy, March 12, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/3dBHucq; Htet Naing Zaw, “Myanmar’s Military MPs Accuse NLD of Smear Campaign After

Constitutional Amendment Failure,” The Irrawaddy, March 18, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/2JdMUMA.

Htet Naing Zaw, “Myanmar’s Failed Charter Reform Will Soil Military’s Image: Military Proxy MP,” The

Irrawaddy, March 12, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/3dBHucq.

“14 Political Parties Oppose Amendment to 180-Day Residence for Voters Outside the Constituency,”

Eleven Media Group, February 26, 2020, https://bit.ly/2U9oJVK; Lawi Weng, “Myanmar’s Ethnic Parties Fear

Loss of Vote Share as Lower House Approves Eased Residency Rules,” The Irrawaddy, February 26, 2020, https://bit.ly/2J65o1G.

“ရ္ ႊရေ္ျ င္္်းမ ်း က္ ၉၀ ရ္ ထ ိုင္႐ံုံို္ျဖင ္ ္ ရ္ က္ ရ ရ္ တတင္ မွဲရ္ ်းန ိုငမယ္ ္ ္ဥရ ေက ို က ႔္ကြကဆ ၵၿ ”

[KNC Against Voting Rights For Guest Workers], Kachin News Group, March 10, 2020, https://bit.ly/2WwPSUd; “ရရ ွှေ့ရ င ်း အလို သမ ်းမျ ်း ရ က အ တငွ မွဲရ ်းြေငွ က ို ကြေျင ါတြီ

ဆနဒ က ကကွ ” [Allowing Voting Rights For Domestic Migrant Workers Weakens Ethnic Parties, Kachin

Party Says], Network Media Group, March 9, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Wz9FSX; “14 Political Parties Oppose

Amendment to 180-Day Residence for Voters Outside the Constituency”; Lawi Weng, “Myanmar’s Ethnic

Parties Fear Loss of Vote Share as Lower House Approves Eased Residency Rules.”

Nan Lwin, “Wa Army Says It’s Willing to Work With Myanmar Govt to Hold Voting in Its Territory,” The

Irrawaddy, March 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/3b7aeHU.

Nan Lwin.

“UWSP ထ ်းြေျ ယ္ ရ မ ရ ွ်းရက က ွွဲ ကျင ်း ရ ်း ည န င ်းစ မျ ်း ရ ရ ရသ” [‘Many Issues to Be Negotiated’

Before Elections Will Be Considered in Wa Territory], Network Media Group, March 4, 2020, https://bit.ly/3a6DE92; Wai Mar Tun, “‘ဝ’ ရေသမ ရ ွ်းရက က ွွဲ ကျင ်း န ိုင ရတ မလ ်း” [Myanmar’s Wa Region https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1365389113644404&id=1120229281493723&__tn__=-R https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1365389113644404&id=1120229281493723&__tn__=-R to Take Part in 2020 Elections: UWSA], Radio Free Asia, March 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/33HCOgA; “UEC and Wa

Discuss Holding an Election in UWSA’s Controlled Areas,” Eleven Media Group, March 4, 2020, https://bit.ly/2wtIgHs.

Nan Lwin, “Wa Army Says It’s Willing to Work With Myanmar Govt to Hold Voting in Its Territory”;

“UWSP ထ ်းြေျ ယ္ ရ မ ရ ွ်းရက က ွွဲ ကျင ်း ရ ်း ည န င ်းစ မျ ်း ရ ရ ရသ.”

Numbers aggregated from various sources, including the Arakan Army, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, and local news agencies, February 19 to March 15, 2020.

Ye Moe, “ရ္က က္ရ္တ ္္ၿမ ေလယ္္ရ္ြေါင္ ရ္က င္္်းရ္ ွေမ ွ က ်း ၿ ြီ်း ဖို ္္်းရ္္ျ ရ္ တို ္္်း

ရ္ ကြေင္္်းရ္ၾက င္ရ္တ င္ ရ္သ တနွဲက စၿ ြီ်း လအူို နွဲက ဝ ိုင္္်းဖမ္္်းၾကတယ္ဆ တွဲ အဓ ၸါယ္ြ ၿမ ေထွဲမ ွ

သ ူို ္ရ္တတ အမ ်းႀကြီ်း ြေ ိုရ္ တယ္ဆ တွဲ အဓ ၸါယ္္ရ္ ါ ,” Facebook, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2J9Z8pt.

Information from local sources, March 2020.

Numbers aggregated from local news agency sources, February 19 to March 15, 2020.

Numbers aggregated from local news agency sources, February 19 to March 15, 2020.

Min Aung Khine, “AA Claim Seizure of Myanmar Battalion Commander After Heavy Fighting,” The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020, sec. Burma, https://bit.ly/33Ehjx8.

“ဘ်ူးသြီ်းရ္တ ငၿမ ေ ယ္္ ရ ရ္ည င္ရ္ြေ င္္်း-ရ္စတြ္ီ ျ ႔္င ္်း က ်းလမ္္်းရ္ ၚ ွ သကံတူကနြ စ္ တတံ ်းအ ်း AA

အၾကမ္္်းဖက္ရ္သ င္္်းက ္္်းသ ူအပဖွဲေက မ ိုင္္်းပြေွဲဖ ကဆ ြီ်း,” Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services

(blog), March 15, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bl6SB3; “AA Mine-Blasts a Bridge in Buthidaung: Army,” Eleven Media

Group Co., Ltd, March 16, 2020, https://bit.ly/2UvZqwd.

“Army Convoys Hit by AA Mines in Rakhine,” Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, March 17, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bxD6td.

LAY MRO - Minbya CJ News, “A Woman Died after Shooting a Small Weapons near Minbya Bridge near

Minbya City.,” Facebook, February 28, 2020, https://bit.ly/2QGBJjU; Khit Thit Media and နြ ္ရ္ြေတ္စ္, “တရ မတ ္္က စြတ္တ္္ျဖတြွဲ သည္ဆ ္ ရ္သ ဦ်းရ္မ င ်းတလင္ရ္သဆံို်းမႈ ရအ ၚ ဇ ြီ်း ငရယ္မြေ ရ္္ျ ၾက ်းြေ က,္”

Facebook, March 2, 2020, https://bit.ly/33G5lmB; Than Tun, “သတူ ိုကျဖစၾက ံ္ို,” Facebook, March 15, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bjmMMn; Development Media Group, “အသက ္ (၅၆)္ ္စွအ ရရယ္္ ရ္ေၚသ ္္်းရ္အ်းၾကည္မရ

လည္ပင္္်းတတင္ ေဏ္္ ွ တသ ်းသျဖင ္ ္ရ္ဆ်းကိုသမႈြေယံ္ရူ္ စဥ္ ရယ္ က မတလ ၁၄ က္ရ္ က၊ ံက ္၅ ြီြေ ္ကတတင္

ရ္သဆံ္ ိ္ု ်းတသ ်း္ျြေင္္်း္ျဖစ္ည္။ အသက ္ (၄၀)္ ္စွအ ရရယ္ ္ ရ္ေၚ ္ယ္္္ ္ယ္္ဦ်းမ ွလည္္်း ဦ်းရ္ြေါင္္်းတတင္

္ျ င္္်းထရန ေဏ္္ ွ တသ ်းသျဖင ္ ္ ရ္ဆ်းကိုသမႈြေယံ္ရူ္ စဥ္ ယ္မ ္ရ္ က ရည ၁၀ ြီြေ ္ကတတင္

ရ္သဆံ္ ိ္ု ်းတသ ်း္ျြေင္္်း္ျဖစ္ည္ဟ မ သ ်းစိုဝငမ ်းထကံ သ သည္။,” Facebook, March 14, 2020, https://bit.ly/39fiHaL;

Kyaw Hlamyint, “တက္ ္ရ္တ ္္သည္ ရ္က က္ရ္တ ္္ၿမ ေ ယ္္ သ စည္ရ္က ်းရရ မ ွ ဇ တ ္ ျဖစပါသည္။,”

Facebook, March 16, 2020, https://bit.ly/3aiovl8; ြေ ိုင္္ျ ည ္ရ္စ င ္ ္ တဆ ်းရ္ြေ , “ ြေ ိုင္လမူ ်းတ ို ွဲေဘဝ,” Facebook, March 16, 2020, https://bit.ly/3diMbYi; Myanmar Now, “တ မရတ စြေ ်းတစ ြေိုက ို AA က အင အ ်းသံို်း

ဝ ိုင ်း တ တ ဆ ို စ ြေတ သည အတကွ မလ ွဲမရရ င သ လည စ ြေတ ြေွဲ သည ဟို တ မရတ က ဆ ိုသည ,”

Facebook, March 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vLbjGn; Tang Nang Sian Thawn, “စစ ရ မစ င သ ို မဟိုတ

လက ဝ ွ သ ်းမျ ်း,” Facebook, March 17, 2020, https://bit.ly/2wpQZuy; Salai Isaac Khen, “ကြီမ ိုရ္တ င္ရ္္ျြေမ ွ ြေ င္္်းရ္တတ ရ္တသ်း စ ္္်းြေွဲ ါၿ ြီ။,” Facebook, March 14, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bpBD8b;

Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, “Further, How Many People Will Die by Making Inhumane Actions from Tatmadaw in

Northern Rakhine and Paletwa in This Year?,” Facebook, March 16, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vPoLck; Htay Lwin Oo, “ကမၻ က ြေရ ို ွဲက အလို မ ်းရ္ ြေ ္ အ ြေင ္ ္ရအ ်းယ္ၿူ ြီ်း ရ ိုရ္တတက ို သတ္ရ္ တွဲ ရ္က င္ရ္တတ

အရဆ ါင္္်းမ ်း စ ္ျ ္ရ္ ်းဆ မ္ယ္္။,” Facebook, March 2, 2020, https://bit.ly/3aefEAF; Nyi Nyi, “ကမၻ က

ြေရ ို ွဲက အလို မ ်းရ္ ြေ ္ အ ြေင ္ ္ရအ ်းယ္ၿူ ြီ်း ရ ိုရ္တတက ို သတ္ရ္ တွဲ ရ္က င္ရ္တတ အရဆ ါင္္်းမ ်း စ

္ျ ္ရ္ ်းဆ မ္ယ္္။,” Facebook, March 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/3988gpi; Narinjara, “တ ိုကကပွဲထွဲမ ွလကနကၾကြီ်းက ည္ြ ၍

ရ္္ျမ က္ဦ်း္ျမ ေ ယ္္္္ ရ္္ျမ င္္်းရ္တဘတတင္ အ မအြေ ေမြီ်းရ္လ င္၊ ဘ်ူးတလံ္ ိ္ု ်းရ္က ်းရရ တတင္ လကနကၾကြီ်းက ည္ြ ၍

မဆူလင္ ၄ ဦ်းရ္သျ ြီ်း ၅ ဦ်းေဏ္္ ,” Facebook, February 29, 2020, https://bit.ly/2UDfU5Y; Aung Tin, “ ြေ ိုင ည သရူတကွရတ အရတ ရလ်းက ို ြေစံ ်းရ ပ ြီ စစ ရမ င န မရ ။,” Facebook, March 4, 2020, https://bit.ly/3alxsKw; Kyaw Nay Min, “ယ္ရ ၆/၃/၂၀၂၀မ က ၈:၂၀ြေ က ဖစ ြေွဲ ရသ ြေ ိုင တ ိုက ွွဲမျ ်းအတက ်း

ဗံို်းသြီ်းမျ ်းထ မ မရူတက င ရ ိုဟင ဂျ ကရလ်း၇ဦ်းထ ြေ ိုက တဦ်းရသ” [8:20 Today at 6/3/2020 Am Between the Last

Rakhine Battle Due to the Bombshell 7 Rohingya Children Died], Facebook, March 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/2xnPFYV.

Kyaw Linn, “AA ရ္ြေါင္္်းရ္ဆ ငတ္ ရ္အ ကရ္္္ျြေက ို ထ ္္ ်းတက ္ ြီ်းဖ ိုက..လ ိုရ္ လ ိုက မၾက မၾက

ရ္ဝဖ ရ္္္ျ ြေဖူ်းယ္င္္ ။,” Facebook, March 5, 2020, https://bit.ly/2J88Usg; Kyaw Linn, “ဧ ဝတြီသတင္္်းဌ က

ရ္္ျမ က္ဦ်းမ ွ ရ္သ တ္ စ္ြေွဲ တို ္္်းကလည္္ ်း ရ္ ်းြေွဲ ဖူ်းလ ိုက ရ္ ်းတွဲ သကူ ို တ ္မရ္တ ္္က တ ်းပစွဲတ ္ ္စွ္

တ္လည္မၾက ရ္သ်း ါဘ်ူး,” Facebook, March 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/2UKw8dB.

Information from local sources, March 2020.

မင ်းရအ င ြေ ိုင , “ကိုလ ်းတ မစ ရတက င ်းတ ိုက ွွဲ တ င ်းမ ်း အ ါအဝင သံို ်း ၂၀ ဖမ ်းဆြီ်း မ ဟို AA ထိုတ ,”

The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020, sec. သတင ်း, https://bit.ly/2xgnSd3; “Breaking News,” Arakan Army (blog), March

11, 2020, https://bit.ly/2yato1v.

Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Myanmar’s Arakan Army Seizes 30 Soldiers in Chin Fighting,” The Myanmar Times,…