1 CSP Monthly Contextual Report - February 2020 - USAID.pdf

Burma Community Strengthening Project (CSP) Monthly Contextual Report Covering period 25 December 2019 - 24 January

CONTRACT NO. AID-72048218C00003

DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents 2

Table of Figures 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

National 4

Peace Process 4

Governance 5

Rakhine State 7

Security Trends 7

Governance 8

Livelihoods and Market 9

State of Essential Services 10

Kachin State 12

Security Trends 12

Governance 12

Livelihoods and Market 13

State of Essential Services 14

Shan North 16

Security Trends 16

Governance 17

Livelihoods and Market 17

State of Essential Services 19

References 20

TABLE OF FIGURES

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State (Dec 2019 - Jan 2020) Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State (Dec 2019 - Jan 2020) Map 3: Conflict Map of Northern Shan State (Dec 2019 - Jan 2020)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 8, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories held a Joint-Ceasefire Implementation Coordinating Meeting (JICM) and agreed to eight points, including a decision to hold the fourth session of the Union Peace Conference this year. There have been no corresponding developments among the non-NCA signatories, but government meetings with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Northern Alliance are expected to resume after the Chinese New Year.

On January 23, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Myanmar must follow four provisional measures in relation to the ongoing genocide case against Myanmar. Although the government’s public statement did not state how the provisional measures would be implemented, the government has confidentially indicated that it intends to cooperate with the ICJ and hopes to make a positive report on efforts it will make over the next four months.

The Tatmadaw has said that it will follow the civilian government’s lead. Both the Tatmadaw and the government also welcomed the Independent Commission of Enquiry’s (ICOE) report, which concludes that war crimes, not genocide, were committed in Rakhine State.

In Rakhine State, fighting between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw continues; the National League for Democracy (NLD) chairman for Buthidaung Township is among recent casualties. However, the AA released the Chin NLD MP who had been taken hostage on November 3. The AA’s abductions have led to a directive that all government workers must obtain authorization to travel in Rakhine State. The AA has announced its intention to establish a Rakhine People’s Assembly and begin collecting taxes, measures designed to assert its status as the legitimate governance authority in Rakhine State. Civil society groups estimate that there are now around 100,000 IDPs in Rakhine State; both IDPs and non-displaced communities are facing shortages of food and other necessities. The Departments of Immigration and of Health have continued to use mobile teams to issue documentation to Rohingya in Sittwe Township and a joint scholarship project has enabled students from Rakhine State, including Rohingya and members of other ethnic communities, to attend university in Yangon.

In Kachin State, a dispute over the proposed Jinghpaw language terminology for the Kachin State Day festival highlighted tensions among the ethnic groups, resulting in postponement of the festival. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar triggered renewed community concerns that a decision would be made regarding the suspended Myitsone Dam, but no decision has been announced. Disputes continue over the amount of compensation to be paid for land confiscated for use in the Namjim Special Economic Zone. The Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee expects to resettle 3,000 IDPs in the first part of the year.

In Shan State, ongoing clashes between the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Tatmadaw have displaced around 500 people. There has also been fighting between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Tatmadaw. The UWSA has allowed 52 of the Baptist churches closed in September 2018 to reopen. In response to President Xi Jinping’s visit, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy issued a statement highlighting the need for local approval of infrastructure projects, particularly criticizing the fact that there had been no discussion of the Muse-Mandalay railway in the Shan State Hluttaw. Local communities have also raised concerns about the appearance of marker stones along the proposed route of the railway and the lack of information about compensation for land used for the project.

NATIONAL

● JICM agrees to hold the next Union Peace Conference in 2020

● ICJ releases decision on provisional measures with government likely to cooperate with implementation

● Two constitutional amendment bills submitted to parliament

Peace Process

There have been several developments regarding the peace process. Most notably, the Joint- Ceasefire Implementation Coordinating Meeting (JICM) was held on January 8.1 Eight points were agreed to at the meeting, the most notable concerning commitments to hold the next Union Peace Conference in April 2020; work on joint definitions of key NCA terms; efforts to bring more ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) into the peace process; and hold Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) and Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) meetings within the coming two months.

Most of the EAOs were happy with the meeting’s outcome.2 The RCSS also had positive bi-lateral meetings with both the State Counsellor and the Commander-in-Chief, following which the RCSS expressed renewed willingness to work with both the government and the Tatmadaw.3 In contrast, the KNU appeared less happy with the decision, and even during the discussions did not participate as much as the RCSS and Pa-O National Liberation Organization representatives.4 However, they have not publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the outcomes.

Local political analysts, however, remain skeptical about the potential for actual progress in the peace process. They highlight the lack of preparations and trust building measures necessary for a productive UPC. They also express doubts about meaningful decisions or implementation resulting from the UPC, as political parties and EAOs would be likely to maintain the status quo until November 2020 election results are known.

There is similar skepticism regarding how the non-NCA signatories can be brought into the process. The NCA signatories announced that they will invite non-signatories to attend a preparatory meeting before the next Union Peace Conference.5 The non-signatories met with the Chinese Special Envoy, who reportedly urged further efforts to make peace.6 However, peace negotiations between the government and the Northern Alliance have not resulted in any progress over the last month, with a planned meeting now postponed until February.7 Although official reports say that the Chinese Envoy also urged the Arakan Army (AA) to de-

Figure 1: JICM Meeting escalate the conflict in Rakhine State, some sources close to the AA say that it has formed good relations with the Chinese and expects them to turn a blind eye to illegal arms smuggling.

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) have appeared to reverse their previous willingness to sign the NCA, positing reasons not to sign. One such justification includes complaints about the no-longer-extant Myanmar Peace Center’s role in drafting the text. Despite these difficulties, they have agreed to meet with the Peace Commission again after the Chinese New Year.8

Governance

On January 23, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision on the Gambia’s request for provisional measures against Myanmar, imposing four of the provisional measures requested by the Gambia. The court ruled that:

• Myanmar must prevent genocidal acts;

• Myanmar must ensure that any military, paramilitary or other armed units under the control of the military do not commit genocide;

• Myanmar shall not destroy or render inaccessible any evidence of genocide; and

• Myanmar must submit a report on its progress within the next four months and submit regular updates every six months thereafter.

Following this decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brief statement, taking note of the decision, stressing the character of provisional measures as a preventative and precautionary step rather than a finding on the substance of the case, reiterating Myanmar’s position that no genocide had occurred, and hoping that the ICJ would recognize this in its final decision.9 The statement also made reference to the findings of the Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE)

- which had submitted its report on January 2210 - that genocide had not occurred, although war crimes had. This public statement does not make clear how the government plans to respond to the ICJ decision; sources close to the government suggest that the government intends to continue cooperating with the process and hopes to be able to submit a good report to the ICJ in four months.

It is expected that government efforts in this regard are likely to focus on improving access to education, healthcare and livelihoods for Rohingya communities. The Tatmadaw has indicated that it will follow the civilian government’s lead on the question of cooperation with the ICJ and will carry out further investigations if these are warranted following a full consideration of the ICOE’s report.11 Many local civil society organizations have welcomed

Figure 2: The ICOE presents its report the decision and expressed hope that the government would continue to cooperate with the ICJ.12 Nevertheless, social media commentators have expressed their concerns about the potential of ultra-nationalist groups using the events to advance anti-Muslim and anti-foreign intervention narratives.

On January 27, the Charter Amendment Committee submitted its first two amendment bills to parliament. The bills focus on the following:

• Reducing the military’s share of seats in parliament to 15 percent in the 2020 elections and decreasing the seats by five percent at each subsequent election.

• Removing the line in the constitution that “the commander-in-chief is the supreme commander of all armed forces.”

• Repeals Article 59(f) which bars Aung San Suu Kyi, or any other person with foreign spouses or children, from becoming president.

• Decreases the threshold of parliament members needed to amend the constitution from 75 percent of all parliament members to two-thirds of elected representatives.

The two bills each have 351 signatories from eight political parties; this is well over the 20 percent of MPs required for a constitutional amendment bill to be considered.13 Members in the minority have criticized the process as only supporting NLD amendments; two Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) members and three other minority political party members resigned from the Charter Amendment Committee in protest, which only served to increase the imbalance to favor the NLD.14,15 The Tatmadaw has taken every opportunity to criticize the committee and the process; the amendments cannot pass under the current rules without their support.

On January 2, the NLD announced the expansion of its Ethnic Affairs Committee to include representatives of all states and regions.16 NLD members acknowledged that a major driver for this decision was the desire to improve the NLD’s chances of competing with ethnic political parties in the 2020 general elections, further displeasing ethnic parties who were once NLD allies.17 In contrast, the ethnic political parties appear to be moving towards greater cooperation among themselves, with the announcement that the two main alliances, United Nationalities Alliance and Nationalities Brotherhood Federation, hope to merge.18 This is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the elections, but could become relevant once MPs take their seats, especially if no one party gets a majority.

Meanwhile, former President Thein Sein made a speech urging voters to support candidates who would protect the Tatmadaw as well as race and religion, a glimpse of what the USDP’s campaign messaging will focus on.19 Other politicians, as well as civil society representatives, were critical of this speech, but did not think it would have a significant impact.20 In a particularly unusual development, the Chairman of the USDP reportedly offered the Chairman of the RCSS a place on the USDP ticket, even suggesting he could be considered for Shan State Chief Minister.21

RAKHINE STATE

● Death of NLD Chairman of Buthidaung Township and release of Chin NLD MP

● Increased tensions between ethnic Khumi/Chin and Rakhine communities

● AA to establish Rakhine People’s Authority for tax collection

● Rohingya students begin classes at Yangon University East

Security Trends

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State, Dec 2019 - Jan 2020

The AA and the Tatmadaw clashed at least 60 times between December 16, 2019 and January 21, 2020,22 including in Ann, Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Myebon, Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, and Sittwe23 Townships in Rakhine State, as well as in Paletwa Township in Chin State. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor noted that, in 2019, landmines have been used for the first time in Buthidaung, Kyaukphyu, Maungdaw, and Paletwa Townships.24 Most casualties of these landmines are villagers who search for food and supplies in the forests, migrant workers who are unfamiliar with the area, and farmers and farmworkers.25 Five incidents of mine/IED explosions have injured at least 13 people, including six children, in the past month alone.26 There were also three separate explosions in Manaung Township in advance of the arrival of the State Counsellor to the township to attend the opening of solar power plant on December 19.27

There have been several recent high-profile abductions by both the AA and the Tatmadaw.

These incidents have included three Department of Immigration officials taken from a commercial passenger boat on December 24;28 16 drivers of the Road Transport Administration Department abducted on December 26;29 and two border guard forces from Thazin Myaing Village Border Guard Post in Buthidaung Township detained by the AA for their alleged involvement in the drug trade.30 Two Mytel Telecommunications Company staff members also went missing on December 27. The Tatmadaw claimed they have been abducted by the AA but the latter has not confirmed the allegation.31 Of these abductees, only the 16 drivers have since been released.32 The Tatmadaw has also taken approximately 18 villagers - two from Maungdaw Township and sixteen from Ann Township - to serve as guides;

at least 14 have since been released.33

The most prominent casualty during this period has been the death of the NLD Chairman of Buthidaung Township. The chairman had been abducted by the AA two weeks prior to his death, after attempting to organize a demonstration in support of the State Counsellor’s defense of Myanmar at the ICJ on December 11.34 According to the AA, the chairman was killed by artillery fired by the Tatmadaw at the AA’s outpost in Buthidaung Township.35 The Tatmadaw claims that the AA tortured and killed the chairman while interrogating him.36 A member of the Arakan National Party37 and at least one other human rights activist38 said that it is difficult to ascertain responsibility for the death, but the NLD,39 some youths, and some human rights activists blame the AA. Some activists even asserted that the AA’s failure to protect its detainees makes the group as bad as the Tatmadaw.40

The Chin NLD MP, who was abducted by the AA early November last year, was released on January 21.41 In its statement, the AA insisted that it “had” to detain the MP without elaborating any reasons and that his release was done to facilitate reconciliation between the Rakhine and the Chin communities. There have been significant tensions between the two communities in the past month, particularly involving the Khumi ethnic group.

There is a longstanding debate between the Rakhine and the Chin communities about which state should include Paletwa Township within its administrative borders. A statement by the Chin National Party calling for the removal of AA bases in Paletwa Township42 appears to have reignited this discussion.43 Furthermore, the Khumi Affairs Coordination Council (KACC) denounced the AA for committing acts of violence, specifically sexual violence.44 The KACC, with the backing of Khumi45 and Chin46 social media users, argue that the Khumi are members of the Chin ethnic community, rejecting the AA claims that Khumi is a sub-ethnic group of Rakhine. 47 In response, Rakhine commentators blamed Khumi leaders for aggravating tensions between the Rakhine and the Chin48 and said the KACC’s allegations against the AA are unfounded.49

Governance

Curfews across the conflict-affected townships are ongoing. The 6pm – 6am curfew in Paletwa Township has been extended for two more months following its expiration on January 8. In Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Ponnagyun, and Rathedaung Townships of Rakhine State, the 9pm – 5am curfew has been ongoing since April 2019.50

In response to the frequent abduction of government officials and personnel by the AA, the Ministry of Border Affairs issued a directive that all government workers must obtain authorization to travel in Rakhine State. In parallel, the AA has requested that the government provide prior notice regarding its travel plans.51 This is seemingly in line with its attempts to assert itself as a legitimate governance authority in Rakhine State. Furthermore, the AA announced its intention to establish a Rakhine People’s Authority, which will conduct taxation activities to fund its military and its political arm, the United League of Arakan (ULA), as well as potentially monitor or regulate police and government workers.52 Although the government refutes the fact that the AA has full control of the remote areas in ten conflict-affected townships, activities in these townships are currently being conducted as if there were two administrative bodies.53

Livelihoods and Market

The on-going clashes in northern and central Rakhine have affected the agricultural and tourism industries. Over 10,000 acres of paddy fields and farmlands across seven of the conflict-affected townships remain unharvested. Even where it might be safe to harvest crops, farmers complain that they are unable to find sufficient workers due to security concerns.54 Crops will become unfit for use unless these fields are harvested soon. In addition to challenges to this season’s harvest, 35,000 acres were uncultivated during the last monsoon season.55 This situation increases the risk of food insecurity, not just for those residing in conflict areas but for all who benefit from the crops grown in Rakhine State.

Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Ponnagyun Townships have been restricted for tourists since December last year.56 Many residents, especially in Mrauk-U Township, rely on tourism for their income. This ban will undoubtedly impact their already diminished livelihoods. In contrast, seaside hotels in Ngapali Beach in southern Rakhine State continue to receive visitors and hotel and restaurant owners report that occupancy is approximately 50 percent higher than this time last year.57

Previously,58 the AA announced that it will begin collecting taxes this year from large businesses and infrastructure projects. It is also considering imposing a 50 percent income tax on police and MPs. Rakhine businessmen have stated they will not pay any taxes to the armed group, as businessmen in northern Rakhine State have already suffered from a significant decline in income due to the frequent clashes.59 This sentiment is notably reflected in public statements by Rakhine businessmen, to avoid complications from the government. However, some large businesses in Thandwe, Kyaukphyu, and those involved in construction in central and northern Rakhine have made “donations” to the AA. They do not refer to these payments as “taxes,” as they argue they are made voluntarily. Small business owners do not make such payments, in line with AA statements that it will not tax small businesses.

Although the AA threatened India with the disruption of its Kaladan Multi-Modal Project if the Indian government refused to pay taxes to the AA, it is notably more accommodating towards China. The AA claimed that it will not impede development of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), since Beijing has duly acknowledged the existence of the AA.60

Following President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar on January 17 and 18,61 both countries agreed to improve cooperation on projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including the Kyaukphyu SEZ.62 However, there remain questions about community support for the project. Chinese news agencies claim that community members wholeheartedly welcome the development of the SEZ,63 but local media reveals a more cautious stance. A Kyaukphyu SEZ watch group requested that the government share all relevant information, including on land compensation and measures to provide job opportunities, with local communities, while also calling for a Strategic Environmental Assessment.64 These demands reflect local concerns about the transparency of the project and its impact on the environment and society.65 Going further, the Arakan Natural Resources and Environmental Network called on the government not to sign any agreement until the conflict in the region has been resolved and a federal system has been put into place to guarantee equal rights for communities.66

State of Essential Services

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rakhine State has reached over 100,000 people.67 However, government figures only list the 40,00068 that reside in formal IDP camps.

This discrepancy affects the distribution of aid, as international relief groups in particular rely on the government’s data when providing assistance. Furthermore, all humanitarian organizations are required to secure government permission to deliver supplies, which further restricts access; civil society organizations especially struggle with receiving the necessary access permits.69

Communities in active combat zones, including approximately 500 residents of two villages in Buthidaung Township, have been suffering food shortages since November 2019, frequently due to military blockades of access points in and out of villages. In the case of the two villages described above, Tatmadaw soldiers are reported to monitor all traffic through the one bridge which accesses the village, with villagers stating they are not allowed to transport any goods.

The Tatmadaw claims that transport of food is allowed, if the villagers present written permission from their village administrator or community leaders.70 Similarly, the river ferry in Paletwa Township has halted operations after one of its passenger ferries was hit by an artillery shell on December 10; residents of the township used the transport service to purchase food and other necessary items from neighboring Kyauktaw Township. Although small private boats still travel on the Kaladan River, civilians are restricted to carrying only 20 bags of rice per boat when previously they had transported 200 bags.71 Such situations contribute to a situation of growing food insecurity.

Mobile teams from the Department of Immigration and the Department of Health have been issuing birth certificates, household lists, National Verification Cards (NVCs), and citizenship documents to Rohingya in Sittwe Township. As of January 14, a total of 4,202 birth certificates, 765 household lists, 629 NVCs, and 821 citizenship documents were issued across 16 locations (including IDP camps and villages) in Sittwe Township.72

A joint scholarship project between the Myanmar government, the Danish government, the Norwegian government, and a local civil society organization, has secured higher education opportunities for 47 Rohingya and 49 non-Rohingya students from Rakhine State. Of the Rohingya students, 45 received the necessary documents to pursue their education at Yangon University East, while the other two are studying at different universities. Local authorities, with the support of the Office of the State Counsellor, facilitated issuance of these students

Figure 3: Mobile team conducts Citizenship Verification Process in Sittwe required NVC documents and travel authorizations to Yangon. The students began classes at the university in the third week of January 2020.

Despite the ongoing Tatmadaw – AA fighting, the local CSO Center for Diversity and National Harmony was also able to organize a community clean-up campaign in Maungdaw Township.73 Around 1200 people from all communities participated, highlighting the opportunities and space that remain for efforts to implement inter-communal activities through joint activities.

Figure 4: Students from Rakhine State register to attend Yangon University East

KACHIN STATE

● Dispute over name of Kachin State Day reflects inter-ethnic tensions

● Ongoing disputes over land in Namjim and Hukawang Valley

● Government to re-categorize IDP-owned land in Bhamo as farmland

● Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee expects 3,000 IDPs to resettle before April

Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State, Dec 2019 - Jan 2020

There have been at least three clashes between the Tatmadaw and the KIA in northern Shan State in the past month (see below, Shan - Security). No clashes have been reported in Kachin State itself, although a Tatmadaw aircraft was reported to have spent two hours flying over the KIA headquarters in Laiza.74 The KIA is reported to have sent its annual request for ‘taxes’ to businesses.75 It remains to be seen whether this will lead to renewed inter-communal tensions with communities who resist payment, as was the case last year with the Shan-Ni community. Landmines continue to represent a danger to security and an impediment to IDP resettlement; 76 at least one person was killed and two injured in the past month, all of whom originated from Madu Village, Momauk Township.77

Governance

The January 10 celebration of Kachin State Day was complicated by multiple disputes over the organization and the title of the event. As in previous years, debate ensued over whether the event should be referred to as “Jinghpaw Mungdaw Nhtoi” or “Kachin Mungdaw Nhtoi” in the Jinghpaw language.78 Although the first is the term that has traditionally been used, some Kachin ethnic sub-groups feel that it is not inclusive of all Kachin.79 On December 22, the KIA sent a letter to the Kachin National Consultative Assembly – the group responsible for organizing the event this year – and the Peace-talk Creation Group expressing their support for the use of “Jinghpaw Mungdaw Nhtoi”.80 The following day the Kachin State government stated that efforts to change the event’s name would require too much time before the scheduled event, and therefore only the Burmese language terminology would be used for the event.81 The ensuing controversy resulted in the entire event being shortened from eight days to one day.82 However, leaders and members of the Kachin Literature and Culture committees refused to attend the event in protest over the use of the term “Jinghpaw,”83 while local community members expressed dismay over the Kachin State government’s decision not to fly the Kachin flag at the event grounds.84 Because of this controversy and the participation of the State Counsellor at the event,85 some community leaders perceive the event to be a government-orchestrated - rather than community-driven - ethnic celebration.86 This issue further highlights the resentment that the smaller ethnic groups perceive as a tendency to consider Jinghpaw and Kachin as interchangeable and reflects their increasingly forceful assertion of independent ethnic identities.

The tensions between groups may also become relevant in the context of the 2020 general election. The Kachin State People’s Party, which was formed from the merger of three ethnic Kachin parties, has now been joined by a fourth party, the Union Nationalities Federal Democracy Party (UNFDP).87 The UNFDP positions as a multi-ethnic party catering to various ethnic groups; however, its leadership is fully comprised of ethnic Kachin politicians.

Parties representing other Kachin ethnic groups, such as the Lisu, Rawang and Lahu have not joined the merger.88

Paul Lu, the last of the youth activists imprisoned for organizing an event marking the eighth anniversary of the resumption of hostilities between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in June 2019, was released on December 16 and stated that he will continue to fight against injustice.89,90 Despite the release of these activists, there are continued challenges around the right to peaceful assembly in Kachin State. For instance, one lead protester was fined 30,000 MMK for violating Article 19 of the Peaceful Assembly and Demonstration Act for organizing a protest on the naming of Kachin State Day, as elaborated upon above.91

Livelihoods and Market

On December 16, 2019, the Amyotha Hluttaw approved a proposal put forward by two MPs from Kachin State on the regulation of banana plantations. In response, the Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigations stated that the ministry has drafted standard operating procedures for banana plantations.92 Two further developments also suggest a desire among some of the authorities to increase control of the trade relationship with China.

On December 16, 2019, the Department of Mines, under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, announced that Myanmar had suspended the export of rare earth minerals to China due to environmental damage and conflicts caused by Chinese miners’ unregulated operations; however, there has thus far not been any enforcement on the ground.93 This was followed by an announcement on December 27, that from March 16, 2020, the Kachin State Consumer Affairs Committee will take action against illegally imported agricultural products, specifically fertilizer and pesticides.94 In an attempt to address the problem of illegal trade, the Kachin State Ministry of Natural Resources announced that a jade market will be built in Hpakant Township.95 The hope is that providing a legal avenue for trade will reduce the incentives to sell jade on the black market. There will be no restrictions on the quality of jade sold to encourage the use of the market. What impact any of these developments will have on the ground remains to be seen; meanwhile, the death of a jade picker in a landslide on January 21 serves as a reminder that some aspects of the trade show little sign of changing.96

The visit of President Xi Jinping brought renewed attention to the Chinese infrastructure and investment projects in Myanmar, including those in Kachin State.97 Fifty-two Kachin CSOs, 14 political and social organizations from all parts of the country, and religious leaders called on the president to use the opportunity to announce the cancellation of the Myitsone Dam.98 In contrast, the KIA issued a statement welcoming the visit, and asked the president to consider the different opinions of ethnic groups and civil society organizations.99 This aligns with the KIA’s established position that it does not oppose the dam but thinks that the views of the Kachin people on the matter should be respected. Only one of the agreements made during the president’s visit explicitly refers to Kachin State, an “Exchange Letter for the Feasibility Study on the China-aided Resettlement Project for Internally Displaced Persons in Kachin State;” no details have been released pertaining to its content.

Although not mentioned in the course of President Xi Jinping’s visit, development of the Namjim economic zone is continuing.100 Following previous announcements that compensation would only be paid to the small number of farmers who had proof of their land ownership, the Kachin State Land Record Department has now clarified that compensation will be paid to all farmers for the loss of crops.101 However, only those with documentation of land ownership will be paid for the land. Local farmers’ respond by stating they would prefer to receive other land instead of compensation.102

There is another ongoing land dispute in the Hukawang Valley area. The latest development in a long-running dispute between villagers and the Yuzana company, which owns tapioca, sugarcane and cassava plantations in the area, focuses on the attempt of community members to establish a graveyard to avoid having to pay burial fees for the use of graveyards in other villages.103 Community members report that they informed the Yuzana Company of their chosen location, but received no response until company staff removed the signposts set up to mark the location.104

State of Essential Services

The Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee (KHCC) has announced that it hopes to help around 3,000 IDPs from Ah Kyae in Myitkyina Township, Tarlawgyi and Shwe Nyaung Pin IDP camps in Waingmaw Township, Kyauk Sakhan IDP camp in Bhamo Township, and Mung Hkawng IDP camp in Mansi Township resettle before April 2020.105 The KHCC has identified ten villages which it believes are safe for the villagers and where the committee can provide support.106 KHCC also stressed that it will continue to support IDPs who do not wish to resettle at this time;107 many IDPs continue to express concerns about security and feel that it will not be safe to resettle until there is a ceasefire between the KIA and the Tatmadaw.108 At the same time, poor living conditions, lack of security and difficulty accessing livelihoods in the camps,109 as well as concerns about loss of land, serve as factors accelerating some returns.110 In this context, it is a positive development that the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation has been collecting data on land ownership among IDPs from Mung Deinpa Village in Mansi Township with a view to re-designating IDP-owned lands currently labelled as vacant, fallow, or virgin as farmland.111 While this initiative will only benefit those able to prove land ownership, it is a first step towards acknowledging and addressing the concern of IDPs that their lands will be lost or confiscated without compensation.

In Hpakant Township, communities have welcomed the move by the Kachin State government

– under instruction by the Union Government – to take direct responsibility for clearing the sediment from Uru Stream to minimize the risk of flooding, rather than leaving this task to private companies as in previous years.112 Another positive development in Hpakant has been the Kachin National Development Foundation’s establishment of a workshop to train women recovering from drug addiction to cut jade and make value-added jade products.113

SHAN NORTH

● Ongoing clashes between TNLA and Tatmadaw, and between KIA and Tatmdaw

● Markers for Muse-Mandalay railway laid, but communities lack information

● UWSA allows some churches to reopen

Map 3: Conflict Map of Northern Shan State, Dec 2019 - Jan 2020

Between December 16, 2019, and January 24, 2020, there were at least 35 clashes between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw, with the largest number occurring in Namhsan Township. The TNLA also reported one clash with the RCSS, in Kyaukme Township. There was at least one clash between the MNDAA and the Tatmadaw, reportedly triggered by Tatmadaw soldiers entering MNDAA-controlled areas in Muse Township.114 Somewhat surprisingly, this incident occurred during the visit of President Xi Jinping,115 despite previous meetings between Chinese representatives and EAOs aiming to ensure peace in the border regions during the President’s visit116 and a statement by the Tatmadaw that fighting should cease during the visit.117

There have also been at least four clashes between the KIA and the Tatmadaw during this period118 and on January 15, the Tatmadaw seized a large cache of weapons which are believed to belong to the KIA.119 Although there had been a few clashes between the KIA and the Tatmadaw towards the end of last year, these were mostly in Kachin State with the KIA pointedly staying out of the fighting in northern Shan between the Brotherhood Alliance and the Tatmadaw.120 These incidents thus represent both an increase in number and a shift in focus. An escalation in the fighting could both further complicate negotiations around ceasefires between the members of the Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw and increase insecurity on the ground.

Two civil society organizations, the Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO) and the Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand (KWAT), have published reports highlighting the impact that the fighting had on civilians in 2019.121 KWAT focuses on a number of specific cases, highlighting the lack of accountability for violence and mistreatment of civilians by the Tatmadaw.122 Meanwhile, TWO provides an overview of the number of incidents they have recorded, highlighting the increase in the number of victims in the second half of the year.123

Landmines continue to be a concern, with reports of casualties in Namhsan and Kyaukme Townships especially common.124 Communities in these areas blame the TNLA for laying the mines and claim that the group at times demands payment for the cost of the mine from the landmine victims or even executes those wounded by landmines to prevent the spread of information on their use.125

In a more positive development, the UWSA has permitted the re-opening of 52 of the Baptist churches and schools which it forced to close in September 2018.126 However, all Catholic churches and schools and some of the Baptist ones remain closed.127 The churches were closed because the UWSA claimed that it was investigating possible extremist activities that would destabilize the region, although analysts suggested it was more concerned with preventing conversions and responding to Chinese concerns about the possible presence of western missionaries.128 The UWSA now says that it is allowing churches to re-open where the investigations are completed, but that those where there are ongoing investigations remain closed.129

Governance

On January 15, the TWO reported that the village administrators of six villages in Namhsan Township were arrested by the Tatmadaw and questioned under torture about the TNLA, while livestock belonging to villagers was shot.130 Separately, a GAD official was shot and injured in Kyaukme Township on January 22.131 The perpetrators have not been identified. In Hsipaw Township, at the end of December the bodies of three unidentified men were found;132 their killers and the motive for their deaths has not been made public. These incidents reflect a general lack of rule of law. The targeting of village administrators and GAD officials also risks disrupting local administration in these areas.

On January 19, the families of two teachers raped and murdered in Muse Township in 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of their deaths amongst renewed calls for justice.133 The Kachin Baptist Convention stressed that one of the problems in investigating the case was that community members were afraid to say what they knew.134 The inaction of the police and the unwillingness of the Tatmadaw to take action against its personnel - widely believed to be responsible for the killings - were also mentioned.135

Livelihoods and Market

Among the 33 Memoranda of Understanding signed during the Chinese President’s visit to Myanmar were seven of relevance to Shan State:

• Handing over of the Muse-Mandalay Feasibility Report;

• Handing over and Receipt of Detailed Feasibility Reports of Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse

Expressway and Kyaukphyu-Naypyitaw Highway;

• MoU on Accelerating Negotiation on the Framework Agreement on the China-

Myanmar Muse-Ruili Cross Border Economic Cooperation Zone;

• Protocol on Plant Inspection and Quarantine Requirements for Exporting Rice from

Myanmar to China;

• Protocol on Quarantine Health Requirements for Slaughtering Bovine to be exported to China from Myanmar;

• Exchange Letter for the Project of Agricultural Product Quality Control Centre;

• MoU on Local Cooperation under the Framework of Joint Building China-Myanmar

Economic Corridor (CMEC) between the Yunnan Province and Mandalay Region.136

The agreements relating to export and agricultural quality control are not limited to Shan State, but are likely to be welcomed given the volume of trade which passes through the border posts at Muse and Chinshwehaw and the fact that farmers and traders in Shan have long called for greater efforts to regularize and support their trade. An agreement on the cattle trade may be particularly welcome, as cattle trucks have tended to be a target for EAOs wishing to ‘tax’ the illegal trade which has led to a number of deaths when drivers refused to pay, including one in January.137 Cattle traders have also complained about price manipulation by Chinese buyers, coinciding with border closures that limit the options for the Burmese, who must either pay for the upkeep of their cattle while waiting for the border to reopen or accept whatever price is offered.138 In this context, it should be noted that none of the agreements provide a solution to the issue of irregular border closures at Muse.139 A planned border closure from 24 to 26 January was expected to coincide with the Chinese New Year.

However, in the run up to this closure, trade was running smoothly with melon growers reporting good prices for their fruit.140

Despite the priority given to the Muse-Mandalay railway and road,141 reflected in the fact that the feasibility study for the former was formally handed over during the ceremony for signing the MoUs,142 there are some indications that China is looking at alternative trade routes, particularly those using waterways, which might be less susceptible to disruption due to fighting between EAOs and the Tatmadaw.143 Meanwhile, the agreements on the Muse- Mandalay railway and expressway raise more concerns; communities along the planned route of the railway report the appearance of route markers, but say that they have received little or no formal information about the project, the planned route, or compensation for lands used for the project.144 In response to these concerns, a group of 20 CSOs, led by the local environmental group Heartland Foundation, have set up a team to monitor the transparency, and social and environmental impacts of the project, and to raise awareness among community members.145

The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) has also raised concerns about both this specific project and the broader questions of transparency and local involvement in decisions on projects.146 An SNLD statement stressed the need for projects to gain local approval and the approval of the Shan State Parliament.147 The latter is significant due to the prominence of the SNLD in the Shan Parliament and may reflect an element of positioning for the 2020 general election in contrasting the SNLD’s concern for the wellbeing of local communities with the union level- and specifically the NLD’s- apparent disinterest. A lack of government transparency is a pressing concern, especially as the government had requested that copies of the 33 bilateral agreements between Myanmar and China be removed from all media posts and pages.148

State of Essential Services

Following fighting on the border of Lashio and Namtu Township on December 16 and 19, 500-600 persons have been displaced to Manghsu Monastery in Lashio Township.149 Many were displaced twice, initially fleeing to Enai Village Monastery on the 16th.150 A severe shortage of supplies at the monastery and the belief that the fighting had ceased led many to return home the following day, before being displaced again on the 19th.151 The IDPs continue to face shortages of blankets, clothing and food.152 These problems were highlighted by the death of an infant from exposure.153

Separately, from January 13 to 15, the RCSS held a meeting with Shan CSOs on the problem of drug use.154 The RCSS plans to present the outcomes of the meeting at the fourth Union Peace Conference (see National - Security) and hopes it will lead to the adoption of a new anti-drug policy.155

REFERENCES

1 “Govt, EAOs Reach Eight Agreements at 8th JICM in Nay Pyi Taw,” State Counsellor’s Office, January 9, 2020, https://bit.ly/38GjVeW; Nyein Nyein, “At Myanmar Peace Talks, State Counselor Urges All Parties to Put Country First,” The Irrawaddy, January 8, 2020, https://bit.ly/30QeiIH.

2 Interviews with sources close to the EAOs, January 2020.

3 Interviews with sources close to the RCSS, January 2020.

4 Interviews with sources close to the peace process, January 2020.

5 “NCA-Signatory EAOs to Invite Non-Signatory EAOs to Peace Process Meeting,” Network Media Group, January 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/38KlU2d.

6 “What Will Xi Jinping’s Visit Mean for Myanmar’s Future?,” The Irrawaddy, January 19, 2020, https://bit.ly/2RMMPn4; “Chinese Special Envoy Meets Armed Ethnic Groups,” Eleven Media Group, January 12, 2020, https://bit.ly/2uyKC6A.

7 “Meeting between Govt. and Northern Allies Postponed to Feb,” Eleven Media Group, January 16, 2020, https://bit.ly/2RRnmsr.

8 Interviews with sources close to the peace process, January 2020.

9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Statement on the Decision by the ICJ on ‘Provisional Measures’ in the Case Brought by The Gambia against Myanmar,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, January 24, 2020, https://bit.ly/2NT1EDt.

10 “Press Release on the Final Report of the Independent Commission of Enquiry,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, January 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/2GlQToX.

11 “Tatmadaw Releases Statement on ICOE’s Final Report,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, January 23, 2020, https://bit.ly/2TV4rQh; Roseanne Gerin, “UN Top Court Issues Ruling on Provisional Measures to Protect Myanmar’s Rohingya.”; “လတွလ်ပ်ေသာစံစုမး်စစေ်ဆးေရးေကာ်မ�ငှ(်ICOE)၏ အ�ပီးသတအ်စရီငခ်စံာ�ငှ့စ်ပ်လျဉ်း၍

တပ်မေတာ်၏သေဘာထား ထတုြ်ပနခ်ျက,” Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, accessed January

25, 2020, https://bit.ly/37sCmDZ.

12 “ICJ က ြမနမ်ာ�ိငုင်မံ ှအာဏာအသံးုချ ြပစမ်�ကျူးလနွသ်မူျားကိ ုအေရးယမူ� ြပညတ်ငွး်အရပ်ဘကအ်ဖဲွ� ၁၁၄ ခကု

ေထာကခ်�ံကိုဆိ,ု” Khit Thit Media, January 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/36mHVCB; Kyaw Lwin Oo, “Myanmar’s Ruling

Party Says No Special Measures Required After ICJ Ruling.”

13 “More Than Half of Parliamentarians Back NLD Charter Amendment Bills.”

14 “Myanmar’s Main Opposition Party Quits Charter Amendment Committee.”

15 Htet Naing Zaw, “Myanmar Military Slams NLD ‘Tyranny’ on Charter Change Committee,” The Irrawaddy, December 23, 2020, https://bit.ly/2TXWIRl.

16 Nyan Lin Tun, “NLD Forms Ethnic Affairs Committee (Central),” Eleven Media Group, January 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/2uBajU3; San Yamin Aung, “NLD Expands Ethnic Affairs Committee Ahead of Myanmar Election,” The Irrawaddy, January 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/38HtIBN.

17 San Yamin Aung, “NLD Expands Ethnic Affairs Committee Ahead of Myanmar Election.”

18 Nyan Lin Tun, “Plans Afoot to Merge UNA and NBF,” Eleven Media Group, January 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2NYHx6I; “Ethnic Political Parties Suggest Alliance Merger,” Network Media Group, January 9, 2020, https://bit.ly/37rPY2g.

19 San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Ex-President Tells Voters to Protect Race, Religion, Military in 2020 Election,” The Irrawaddy, January 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Rq7Jt9.

20 Nayrein Kyaw and Roseanne Gerin, “Myanmar Ex-President’s Call to Defend Army From Human Rights ‘Neocolonialism’ Draws Scorn,” Radio Free Asia, January 9, 2020, https://bit.ly/37qwaMP.

21 Information from sources close to the peace process and to the USDP, January 2020.

22 Numbers aggregated from various sources, including the Arakan Army, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, and local news agencies.

23 There has only been one reported clash in Sittwe Township, in July 2019.

24 Thazin Hlaing, “Landmines Spreading Across Myanmar: Monitoring Report,” The Irrawaddy, December 20, 2019, https://bit.ly/38DyArl.

25 Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Tatmadaw, Ethnic Armed Groups Urged to Stop Using Landmines,” The Myanmar Times, December 20, 2019, https://bit.ly/2usRwun; Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Four Children Killed in Landmine Blast in Myanmar’s Rakhine,” The Myanmar Times, July 1, 2020, https://bit.ly/2GmT5fZ.

26 Numbers aggregated from independent monitoring of various sources, including the Arakan Army, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, and local news agencies.

27 Sit Htet Aung, “Myanmar State Counsellor Visits Rakhine Town despite Explosions,” The Myanmar Times, December 19, 2019, https://bit.ly/2NZlpcn; Sit Htet Aung, “Explosions near Rakhine Airport Ahead of State https://bit.ly/2RMMPn4 https://bit.ly/2uBajU3 https://bit.ly/2NYHx6I

Counsellor Arrival,” The Myanmar Times, December 19, 2019, https://bit.ly/2tGfAKf; Agence France Press, “Small Blasts Hit Rakhine Town as Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Visits,” Voice of America, December 19, 2019, https://bit.ly/38Fhj1a;

Nay Myo Htun, “Mine Explosions Don’t Deter Myanmar Leader’s Visit to Solar Power Plant,” Radio Free Asia, December 19, 2019, https://bit.ly/2RocPpL.

28 Ministry of Home Affairs, “ဘးူသးီေတာင�်မို �နယ၌် AA ေသာငး်ကျနး်သအူဖဲွ� မ ှလဝကဝနထ်မး် ၃ ဦးအား ဖမး်ဆးီ

ေခါ်ေဆာငသ်ာွးမ�,” accessed January 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/2TY703V; “Immigration Officials Abducted in

Rakhine,” Mizzima Myanmar News and Insight, December 26, 2019, https://bit.ly/2NULCc8; “3 Immigration Staff Abducted by Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Xinhua News, December 26, 2019, https://bit.ly/2NWqims.

29 “ေ◌မာင္ေ◌တာေ◌ဒသ ◌ျပ����က�ေံ◌နရာခထ်ား◌ျခင္◌းလပု�န္◌းစ�ဥ�င္ တာ၀��မ္◌းေ◌ဆာင�ည◌့္

ကန္ု◌းလမ္◌းပိေု႕ဆာင္ေ◌ရးဦးစးီဌာနမ ွ ၀��မ္◌း ၁၆ ဦးအား AA အၾကမ္◌းဖက္ေ◌သာင္◌းကန္်◌းသ ူ အဖဲြ◌႕က

ေအၾကာင္◌းမဲ ့ဖမ္◌းဆးီေ◌ခေၚဆာင္,” Office of the…