2 CSP Monthly Contextual Report - March 2020 - public.pdf

Burma Community Strengthening

Project (CSP) Monthly Contextual Report

Covering period 25 January - 24 February 2020

CONTRACT NO. AID-72048218C00003

DISCLAIMER: The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 1

National 2

Peace Process 2

Governance 3

Rakhine State 5

Security Trends 5

Governance 7

Livelihoods and Market 8

State of Essential Services 8

Kachin State 10

Security Trends 10

Governance 10

State of Essential Services 12

Northern Shan State 13

Security Trends 13

Governance 14

Livelihoods and Market 14

State of Essential Services 14

Endnotes 16

Table of Figures

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State (Jan - Feb 2020)

Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State (Jan - Feb 2020)

Map 3: Conflict Map of Northern Shan State (Jan - Feb 2020)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) conducted a series of formal and informal meetings with signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. However, there were concerns that increasing tensions between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National

Union (KNU) might impact the potential for future meetings.

The two constitutional amendment bills prepared by the Joint Committee on Constitutional

Amendment were submitted to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and were due to be debated between February 25 and March 5.

As part of preparations for the general election, the Union Election Commission (UEC) announced efforts to cooperate with Facebook to counter online hate speech and fake news during the election period.

The government set up two committees to work on implementing the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including through efforts to promote social cohesion in Rakhine State. In response to the report of the Independent Commission of

Enquiry (ICOE) the Tatmadaw announced it would start courts-martial in relation to alleged incidents in Maung Nu and Chut Pyin villages.

In Rakhine State, clashes continued between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw and spread to Taungup Township. An National League for Democracy (NLD) MP was abducted in Ramree Township. The increasing number of civilian casualties, including the injury of a primary school teacher and at least 19 students in Buthidaung Township, highlighted the ongoing impact on civilians and contributed to growing inter-communal tensions. On

February 3, the Internet ban was re-imposed on Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Myebon, Rathedaung, and Paletwa Townships, exacerbating challenges in the provision of humanitarian aid and risks of food shortages among displaced and non-displaced populations.

In Kachin State, two pastors were arrested, charged, and later released under the Unlawful

Association Act in connection with a play marking Kachin Revolution Day. In Hpakant the authorities began issuing permits allowing residents to engage in freelance mining. An illegal mine was closed in Myitkyina Township. In Tatmadaw-controlled areas of Tanai Township government inspectors faced difficulty carrying out mine inspections. Fear of the COVID-19 virus, and related movement restrictions within China, had a considerable impact on the economy, with border trade significantly reduced and large numbers of migrant workers returning from the neighboring country.

In Shan State, two civilians were killed during clashes between the Ta’ang National

Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Tatmadaw. Seven persons died in non-conflict related killings. Residents in Kutkai, Kyaukme, and Muse Townships complained that General

Administration Department (GAD) officials limited their work activities to urban areas. In

Muse Township, the authorities’ response to the COVID-19 virus won approval from the community. Border trade at Muse saw a massive reduction and the return of many migrant workers.

NATIONAL

● Positive meetings between NRPC and NCA signatories, but increased tensions between KNU and Tatmadaw

● Pyidaungsu Hluttaw set to debate constitutional amendment bills between February

25 and March 5

● UEC announces cooperation with Facebook to counter online hate speech and fake news during election period

Peace Process

Relations between the government and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) continued to improve following a Joint

Ceasefire Implementation Coordinating Meeting (JICM) on January 8. A series of subsequent formal and informal meetings in February focused on how to implement agreements reached and on narrowing gaps between the different parties’ positions.1 At a meeting held between February 16-18,2 discussions focused on steps to be taken to implement the NCA, federalism, and how the peace process would continue after 2020.3 The possibility of holding national-level political dialogues before the next Union Peace Conference was also raised.4

A Joint Ceasefire Monitoring

Committee (JMC) meeting was provisionally scheduled for March 10-12 with a view to improving trust between the EAOs and the

Tatmadaw.5 Tatmadaw delegates also agreed to hold bilateral meetings with EAOs to address their individual concerns.6 However, tensions continued between the Tatmadaw and the KNU in relation to the construction of a road near Hpapun in

Karen State.7 This was followed by two clashes on February 22 and 23.8 The NRPC is attempting to mediate between the parties, amid concerns that the situation could lead to the cancellation of planned peace meetings.9 In contrast, relations between the Tatmadaw and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) continued to improve. For the first time, Tatmadaw representatives, along with members of the NRPC, attended the Shan National

Day celebration hosted by the RCSS in Loi Tai Leng.10

A planned meeting with the Northern Alliance was cancelled due to concerns about the

COVID-19 virus. Among the other non-NCA signatories, the Shan State Progressive Party

(SSPP) reiterated its interest in signing the NCA, but only if other members of the Federal

Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC) did so at the same time.11

Figure 1: Meeting between Government and NCA signatories, February 2020

Governance

On January 23, the Joint Committee on Constitutional Amendment submitted two draft constitutional amendment bills to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.12 In line with normal procedures, both bills and the five constitutional amendment bills submitted by the

Tatmadaw and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) MPs in the past year were sent to a Joint Bill Committee,13 whose role is to ensure that the bills are technically correct.14 The Joint Bill Committee proposed that voting on the bills be secret15 and that the bills put forward by the Tatmadaw and the USDP be merged with the NLD proposals.16

Tatmadaw MPs opposed the latter proposal17 but were overruled.18 By February 18, a total of 282 MPs had requested to participate in the debate on the constitutional amendment bills, including 164 of the 166 Tatmadaw MPs.19 On February 21 it was announced that the debate would begin on February 25 and conclude on March 5.20 The number of participants was limited to 149, including 50 Tatmadaw MPs, 50 NLD MPs, and all 49 representatives of other parties who had registered to speak.21 Participants were due to be allowed eight minutes to contribute, rather than the usual six.22

In the lead-up to the debate, discussion of the proposals was focused on two points that were believed to be the NLD’s priorities: changing the requirement for the need for at least

75 percent of elected MPs to support amendments to the constitution, and gradually reducing the quota of seats set aside for the Tatmadaw.23 The NLD was criticized for failing to take into consideration the views of other political parties;24 all but one of the proposals included in the draft bills were proposed by the NLD.25 Ethnic political parties continued to be critical of the NLD’s failure to prioritize federalism, in the contexts of both constitutional reform and the peace process.26 Despite this, no ethnic political party chose to follow the route taken by the Tatmadaw and the USDP and submit alternative bills to the Pyidaungsu

Hluttaw.

The Union Election Commission (UEC) and local civil society groups expressed concerns about fake news and hate speech in the upcoming elections.27 The UEC announced that it was forming a committee to monitor election-related Facebook posts and would work with the company to remove harmful content,28 though the details of how this would be carried out were not clear.29 Some social media users expressed concern that a liaison between the

UEC and Facebook could be used to silence criticism of the NLD, since UEC members were directly appointed by the government. Other commentators and analysts expressed concern about the lack of transparency and consistency in Facebook’s approach to applying its community standards.30 Civil society groups also expressed concern about the possibility of further Internet shutdowns impacting campaigning for the elections.31 Meanwhile, the

UEC announced that campaigning would not be permitted in military cantonments,32 a decision that is expected to benefit candidates for the military-aligned USDP.33 The Pyithu

Hluttaw voted by 257 to 12534 in favor of a UEC proposal that military personnel and their families vote alongside civilians rather than having designated polling stations within military barracks.35 This move was seen as addressing concerns about direct and indirect coercion of military voters in relation to voting.36

Attention was also drawn to the ability to vote of members of religious orders and migrant workers. Under article 392(a) of the 2008 Constitution members of any religious order are banned from voting. On February 6, Charles Maung Bo, Archbishop of the Roman Catholic diocese of Yangon, called on the government to amend the provision.37 Meanwhile, the

UEC stated that Myanmar citizens resident abroad were permitted and would be enabled to vote through the embassy in their country of residence.38 However it was not clear how this would be carried out and many migrant workers may face legal and logistical difficulties accessing their embassy.39

As political parties continued to make elections preparations, the NLD announced that it expected to choose at least half of its current MPs as candidates.40 Former president Thein

Sein declared his intention to campaign for the USDP.41 The UEC estimated that around 78 parties would be campaigning across the country, with a further 21 campaigning only in specific states or regions.42 The proliferation of parties has provided an incentive for smaller groups to form alliances, the most recent of which is a coalition of nine (non-ethnic) parties formed since the 2015 general election.43 Labor and farmer’s unions in Yangon declared their intention to support six independent candidates, reportedly as a result of their disillusionment with the NLD and political parties in general.44

Following its January 23 decision on provisional measures in the genocide case brought against Myanmar by The Gambia, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced deadlines for the submission of initial pleadings; 23 July 2020 for the submissions by The

Gambia and 25 January 2021 for Myanmar’s response.45 The Myanmar Government declared its intention to cooperate with the provisional measures, including by submitting reports on steps taken to prevent genocidal acts and preserve evidence.46

Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw announced that it would investigate and launch courts-martial in relation to alleged mass killings in Maung Nu and Chut Pyin villages47 as outlined in the

Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) report published in January.48 The Office of the

Judge Advocate General (the head of the military justice system) said other incidents covered by the ICOE report were still being reviewed.49 International human rights organizations expressed doubts about the efficacy of the military justice system, particularly in relation to questions of systemic abuses and holding high-ranking officers to account.50

RAKHINE STATE

● Inter-communal tensions rise with increase in civilian casualties

● Internet suspension re-imposed in five conflict-affected townships of Rakhine and

Chin States

● AA blockade of lower Kaladan River detrimental to Paletwa residents’ access to livelihoods, food and services

Security Trends

Map 1: Conflict Map of Rakhine State (Jan - Feb 2020)

The AA and the Tatmadaw clashed at least 62 times in the period between January 24 and

February 18, with fighting taking place across nine townships of Rakhine and Chin States.51

An AA attack on a Tatmadaw truck on February 1352 was the first incident of fighting in

Taungup Township since late 2018. An NLD finance official was abducted in Ramree

Township,53 an area that has not seen armed clashes to date. The circumstances of the abduction remained unclear; however, it was reported that the official had received prior threats from the AA regarding his involvement in a demonstration on December 4, 2019, to show support for the State Counsellor in defense of Myanmar at the ICJ.54

The increasing number of civilian casualties because of clashes contributed to growing inter-communal tensions across the region as well as in social media commentary. Three trends were notable. First, there was significant anti-Tatmadaw sentiment, with implications for

Rakhine nationalism and anti-

Bamar narratives. Casualties resulting from artillery fire and the explosion of shells, especially where victims were women and children, heightened tensions and anger. The death of a woman in Kyauktaw Town on

February 3,55 the injury of a primary school teacher in

Rathedaung Township on February 356 and injuries of over 19 Khumi students in Buthidaung

Township on February 13,57 elicited particularly negative responses. Some Rakhine nationalists called the events evidence of “indiscriminate killing” by the Tatmadaw.58 By contrast, there were few comments pointing out civilian casualties caused by the AA.59 Most recently, AA soldiers shot at a helicopter transporting the Union Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement and the Rakhine State Chief Minister from Sittwe to Buthidaung

Township to meet with internally displaced persons;60 no casualties resulted. However, some Rakhine social media users opined that people could ultimately begin to resent the AA over the ongoing effects on civilians, whoever the perpetrator was of individual incidences.61

Second, tensions remained between the Rakhine and the Chin. On February 5, the AA confiscated the salaries of police and teachers of Paletwa Township. Meanwhile the Chin

National Front (CNF), a signatory of the NCA,62 reiterated arguments it made the previous month that Paletwa Township was part of Chin State territory and that the Khumi ethnic group were a subgroup of the Chin.63

Third, there was a proliferation of narratives highlighting victimization of Rohingya. The death and injury of Rohingya villagers, especially women and children, by stray artillery, and the burning of houses in Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships,64 were framed as

“continuations of genocide” by the Tatmadaw.65 A rumor emerged concerning the rape of a

Rohingya woman from Buthidaung Township on February 2,66 fueling allegations of discrimination against the Rohingya, whether by ‘the Bamar’ (the Tatmadaw) or the Rakhine

(the AA).67 The death of a Rohingya boy in Mrauk-U Township on February 1968 also increased Rakhine–Rohingya tensions. The subsequent death of a 14-year-old Rakhine boy was reported to be the result of a revenge attack69 but a local source asserted that the incident occurred because of a disagreement between Rohingya and Rakhine youths that devolved into violence. Village elders were reportedly containing the conflict as tensions between the communities remained.70

Figure 2: The helicopter shot at while carrying the Rakhine State

Minister and Union Minister on Social Welfare, Relief, and

Resettlement, February 2020

Meanwhile, the government acted to promote more social cohesion efforts in Rakhine

State. The Rakhine State

Central Coordination

Committee, chaired by the

Rakhine State Security Minister, granted permission for relevant activities to be conducted in accessible areas of Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and

Sittwe Townships. Activities conducted in the name of capacity-building, social cohesion, and peacebuilding were encouraged.71 A local nongovernmental organization, in cooperation with the

Maungdaw District Management

Committee, conducted a three-day event comprising a men’s volleyball tournament, a women’s relay tournament, a cooking contest, a concert, and a dinner party. The event brought together over 800 persons from various ethnic and religious backgrounds across the district, including community and youth leaders.72 In contrast, activities around mine awareness remained prohibited.

Governance

On February 3, the Ministry of Transport and Communications announced a three-month re-imposition of the ban on Internet access in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Myebon, Rathedaung, and Paletwa Townships.73 The suspension has received heavy criticism from residents, local government and parliament members,74 civil society and nongovernmental organizations,75 and international actors.76 Critics have cited the risk of further human rights violations and the increased difficulty of providing sufficient humanitarian assistance to persons affected by conflict. Some human rights activists posited that the ban was in response to an AA statement that it would share GPS evidence of mass graves following the Tatmadaw’s clearance operations in August 2017.77

On January 24, the Union Supreme Court rejected the special appeal to reconsider the sentences of Rakhine politician, Dr. Aye Maung, and writer, Wai Hin Aung.78 This was the final appeal available to the defendants who were sued by the Rakhine State Government in

January 2018 and subsequently charged by the

Sittwe District Court under Articles 122

[Treason Law] and 505(b) of the Penal Code.

An earlier release for the men is now only possible by presidential pardon. In response to the decision, some Rakhine claimed argued that the Union Government was failing to grant

Figure 3: Residents of Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships of different ethnicities enjoy a concert during a sports tournament, February 2020

Figure 4: Protest demanding an end to the

Internet shutdown, Yangon, February 2020.

justice and equal rights to ethnic minorities.79 The Arakan National Council, a political organization, claimed that the Court decision did not support efforts toward national reconciliation.80

Livelihoods and Market

News about the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) focused on the financial cost to

Myanmar of the deep seaport81 and the industrial zone,82 in reporting that followed the signing of a Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with Chinese President Xi Jinping the previous month. Civil society groups continued to call on the government to make transparent its plans to compensate residents for economic and social losses because of the proposed project.83

India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project remained at a standstill. Although the development of the Sittwe Port and the Paletwa Inland Water Transport Terminal has been completed, the Indian company Essar Projects Ltd had yet to secure terminal operators and maintenance contractors,84 potentially due to fears of Indian nationals being abducted by the

AA. A recent AA blockade of the lower Kaladan River (see Essential Services) prevented residents, let alone development actors, from traveling on the waterway.

The blockade impeded the transport of goods from Kyauktaw to Paletwa Township; the prices of rice and other commodities in Paletwa therefore increased. The renewed ban on

Internet access also negatively impacted border trade between Maungdaw District and

Bangladesh — traders remained unable to communicate with their counterparts across the border or to transfer money for business transactions.85

State of Essential Services

As of January 25, an estimated 106,614 persons were believed to have been internally displaced in the recent conflicts.86 Another approximately 40,000 persons from 40 villages in

Rathedaung Township subsequently fled their homes.87 Concerns around adequate shelter for IDPs were exacerbated when the Tatmadaw destroyed the temporary residences of

IDPs in Sa Hnyin Village, Myebon Township, and ordered them to evacuate the camp on

January 25.88 Some social media commentators accused the government of perpetuating

“genocide” against the Rakhine,89 following its instructions to local authorities preventing the establishment of new IDP camps and the expansion of existing ones in the conflict-affected townships of Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Myebon, and Rathedaung.90

An AA blockade of land and water routes between Kyauktaw and Paletwa Townships increased the risk of food shortages, especially for residents and IDPs in Paletwa

Township.91 Paletwa residents expressed concerns about the dwindling number of rice bags in the township.92 Security concerns prevented ferries from resuming operations, residents from traveling, and villagers from scavenging in forested areas.93 Overall, the difficult situation continued despite an AA statement that it would allow the transport of food to villages in Paletwa if persons presented recommendation letters from their respective

Village Administrators.94

Transportation route blockages in other areas also raised humanitarian concerns.

Approximately 40 ethnic Chin villages in Ann Township experienced food shortages due to

Tatmadaw restrictions on the amount of rations allowed to be transported to the area.95 In

Kyauktaw Township, the Tatmadaw blocked necessary routes to the hospital,96 with a requirement of authorization to bypass military checkpoints increasing the risk to civilians in need of urgent services.

Rakhine community members and MPs raised concerns about the education of resident and

IDP students, particularly considering the upcoming matriculation exam period between

March 11–20. According to the Rakhine State Education Office, a total of 49,002 students were registered to take their exams at 107 locations.97 On February 14 it was reported that 20 examination centers across the nine conflict-affected townships were expected to temporarily close for security reasons,98 in addition to the numerous schools already closed since fighting intensified.99 The Rathedaung Township MP called on the government and its agencies, including the National Education Policy Commission, the Department of

Alternative Education, and the Myanmar Literacy Resource Center, to formulate and implement a suitable policy for providing education to IDPs.100 The Union Deputy Minister of Education mentioned a plan to increase security for students in the lead-up to the matriculation exams, while simultaneously urging armed groups to avoid clashes near school areas.101

On January 21, the Rakhine State Government held a meeting to discuss the closure of the

Kyauktalone IDP Camp in Kyaukpyu Township,102 one of 18 remaining Rohingya camps that have been open since the communal violence in 2012. On February 4, the Union Minister of

Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement conducted a public consultation with residents of

Kyaukpyu Town,103 when some residents expressed unhappiness with the government’s plan to relocate IDPs to the area.104 The Ministry said it intended to conduct a second visit, together with an international expert, in mid-March 2020. The purpose of the visit will likely be to establish the facts of the situations at the camp and the proposed relocation site, to identify the area’s potential as a pilot project for the National Strategy on the Closure of

IDP Camps and to develop a suitable Action Plan.

Meanwhile, mobile teams of the Department of Immigration and the Department of Health continued to process and issue birth certificates, household registration documents, National Verification Cards (NVCs), and citizenship documents.105

KACHIN STATE

● Two pastors arrested, then released, in connection with Kachin Revolution Day celebration

● UNODC reports increase in opium cultivation

● No reported cases of COVID-19, but concerns remain high and authorities are taking precautions

Map 2: Conflict Map of Kachin State (Jan - Feb 2020)

On February 14, a resident of Nam San Yang village stepped on a landmine and lost his left leg.106 Since Nam San Yang is one of the villages to which IDPs were resettled last year, the incident added to IDP concerns about whether sufficient care is taken in choosing and preparing resettlement sites. IDPs in Long Sut Camp, Putao Township, highlighted security concerns which prevent them returning to their original villages, and they requested land to settle where they currently reside.107 The number of landmine incidents in Kachin State showed a slight decrease, from 21 in 2018 to 18 in 2019.108

Governance

The Manau Festival was postponed over disagreements over whether to use the word

Jinghpaw or Kachin and was rescheduled to February 5 to 12.109 February 5 was the 53rd anniversary of Kachin Revolution Day, which marks the founding of the KIA. February 12 was the 73rd anniversary of Myanmar Union Day. It was reported that the Kachin State

Government pushed for the last day of festival to coincide with Union Day.110 This may have contributed to already-held views that the festival had become a government-orchestrated event rather than a celebration by the Kachin people. Only half of the expected 2,000 stalls were rented, according to the Kachin National Association for Literature and Culture planning committee.111

The Kachin Revolution Day event held in Myitkyina was organized by the Kachin

Consultative Assembly and was attended by about 4,000 people.112 During the event, a play about the history of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was performed, with some actors wearing KIA uniforms without KIA insignia.113 Separately, that evening, two pastors held a fundraising event for their church,114 after which they were arrested and charged under

Section 17 (1) of the Unlawful Association Act, on the assumption that they were connected with the KIA.115 On February 11, they were transferred to jail.116 The Kachin National

Consultative Assembly, religious leaders, a lawyers’ network, and a peace group advocated for the pastors’ release. According to an Assembly spokesperson, the two events of the play and the church fundraising were unconnected, and the pastors had not attended the Kachin

Revolution Day celebration.117 The case was retracted, and the pastors were released on

February 20.118

In Thar Yar Kone village, Hpakant Township, residents reported the Village Administrator

(VA) to the authorities over alleged corruption. It was alleged that the village received 1,000 lakhs MMK from a mining company around three years ago, in exchange for mining rights near the village. The VA allegedly promised that the money would be spent on developing the village, including fixing the road, buying a car for village use, and supplying electricity.

However, in the period since the payment was received, the VA had allegedly only bought a fire engine. The Hpakant Township Administrator said an investigation was underway.119

Livelihoods and Market

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published its annual Myanmar Opium

Survey. According to the report, opium poppy cultivation in Kachin State increased by 15 percent in 2019 compared to the previous year.120 The majority of the opium was grown in

Tanai Township and in the border area east of Myitkyina controlled by a border guard force, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).121 The report reiterated the link between insecurity and opium cultivation and the need for long-term, sustainable alternative development programs.122 Following the report’s publication, the Kachin State Government announced plans to destroy 230 acres of poppy fields in 2020.123 Earlier in the month, the anti-drug organization Pat Jasan announced that it had destroyed 23 acres of opium fields in the east and west of Wa Ya Zut Village and north of Sha Htoo Zut Village in Hukawng

Valley.124

The State Resource and Environmental Agency announced that from February 17, people with IDs showing that they were residents of Hpakant Township and Kamaing Town and who were not affiliated with companies would be able to apply for day laborer permits enabling them to mine legally.125 There was an increase in female miners, both as freelancers and as employees, with some companies reportedly finding them more reliable than male counterparts who are more likely to engage in drug use.126

In Ngwe Pyaw Village, Myitkyina Township, the State Government put a halt to jade mining, which had led to the deforestation of over 10 acres of community forest and caused concerns about water pollution and the risk of landslides. In some gold and amber mining areas under the control of the Tatmadaw in Tanai Township, the government was unable to carry out mine inspections, leading an MP from Tanai to send a letter to the Commander-in-

Chief asking his assistance with government inspections so that freelance mining in the area could be regulated and taxed.127

State of Essential Services

Myanmar had no confirmed cases of the COVID-19 virus during the period,128 but people living in border towns near China were increasingly concerned about the risk of the virus reaching their areas.129 Thermal screenings were conducted at the border gates in Kanpaiti, Lwegal, and Panwah,130 and three Chinese nationals found to have high temperatures were refused entry.131 Despite requests from the Kachin State Government to close the border gates, the gates remained open, as did approximately 20 unofficial border crossings.132

Myanmar nationals have been returning from China due to fears about COVID-19 or the closing of their places of work.133 Some returning migrant workers reportedly faced discrimination from community members.134 Some did not receive their wages before leaving China.135 In addition, some workers on Chinese-backed banana plantations did not receive their wages as some Chinese owners and supervisors were unable to return due to restrictions on movement within China.136

NORTHERN SHAN STATE

● Two civilians killed in clashes between TNLA and Tatmadaw

● Increasing number of non-conflict related killings

● Restricted border trade due to COVID-19 virus

Map 3: Conflict Map of Northern Shan State (Jan - Feb 2020)

At least two clashes between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw occurred in the past month, representing a decrease from previous months. The January 28 clashes involved heavy artillery, leading to the deaths of two female civilians.137

Landmines remained a major concern, especially in Kyaukme and Namhsan Townships.

Mong Ngor sub-township in Kyaukme Township was particularly badly affected; CSOs reported that two villagers were killed and ten injured in the area since the start of 2020.138

On February 1, two residents of Pang Keng Village, Kyaukme Township, disappeared after hosting RCSS soldiers for dinner the previous night. Community members reported the fact that they were missing to the RCSS soldiers concerned, who blamed the TNLA.

Community members then reported the case to the RCSS Public Relations Office for

Kyaukme Township, which stated that the group would cooperate in looking for the villagers. It is unclear what, if any, action had been taken. Villagers were also demanding justice for five other community members who disappeared since 2019 without any known reason.139

Governance

The Mangpan People’s Militia Force (PMF) seized land from villagers in Nam Pao Village

Tract, Lashio Township, following previous seizures in 2016 and 2019 when Chinese farmers were brought in as cultivators. Farmers in the community complained that the incident came as a surprise and no compensation was paid, while also complaining that they had to pay taxes to the militia.140

People in Kutkai, Kyaukme, and Muse Townships complained that GAD officials were not carrying out activities in the rural parts of their areas.141 Community leaders from these townships as well as in Lashio and Hsipaw reported decreasing levels of trust in the local authorities because of alleged incompetence and inactivity.142 On the other hand, some community leaders in Muse noted that the authorities’ efforts to prevent the spread of

COVID-19 had slightly improved community members’ trust in them.143

Livelihoods and Market

The COVID-19 virus continued to affect border trade with China and migrant workers in northern Shan State. The Ministry of Commerce announced in early February that the

Chinese Government had shut down cross-border links since January 27 to control the virus. Some trade continued, but restrictions on movement within China also meant fewer traders buying goods and lower prices.144 The Ruili-Muse border trade zone remained closed on the orders of the Yunnan Province Government, according to representatives of the Muse-Namkham border trade association.145 As a result of the restrictions, the number of trucks crossing the border daily with loads of fruit dropped from around 400 to below

100.146 Fruit wholesalers in Muse and Namkhan Townships were requested to stop exports to China;147 government entities are working to develop alternative markets.148

State of Essential Services

In line with the Ministry of

Social Welfare, Relief, and

Resettlement’s Strategic Plan for Resettling IDPs and Closing

IDP Camps, discussions took place about the resettlement of

Kutkai Township’s IDP population.149 Interviews with representatives from Kar Lai, Mong See, and Pang Ku camps, and camps in Kutkai Town, highlighted the need to ensure basic services in any location where IDPs are resettled. Some

IDPs had bought lands on their own initiative to resettle, but they did not have documentation of ownership. The township GAD said that it had not checked if the lands were considered as vacant, fallow and virgin lands, which would impact on ownership issues.

Figure 5: IDPs in Kutkai Township discuss their concerns at a meeting with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, Resettlement, February 2020.

Many IDPs wished to continue or resume use of their original lands but were concerned about the risk of clashes and landmines.

IDPs also expressed concern over the risk of discrimination by host communities,150 in part because IDPs receive humanitarian aid while residents do not. Some residents have argued that IDPs could return home after the end of clashes; IDPs believe this reflected a lack of awareness of the ongoing side-effects of fighting.151 Residents in some villages in remote areas of Namkhan indicated their willingness to accept a limited number of IDPs who share their ethnicity.152

ENDNOTES

1 Interviews with sources close to the peace process, February 2020.

2 Ye Gaung Nyunt, “Government, NCA-S EAOs Make 8 Common Agreements after Three-Day Ceasefire

Talks in Yangon,” Global New Light of Myanmar, February 19, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SUm1D8.

3 Interviews with sources close to the peace process, February 2020.

4 Nyein Nyein, “Myanmar’s Arakan Liberation Party Seeks to Hold Rakhine National-Level Dialogue,” The

Irrawaddy, February 4, 2020, https://bit.ly/3a6vRYr.

5 Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Myanmar’s Union-Level Ceasefire Monitoring Committee to Meet Next Month,” The

Irrawaddy, February 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/32rdpH2.

6 Interviews with sources close to the EAOs, February 2020.

7 Nyein Nyein, “KNU to Myanmar Military: Stop Road Building Until Dispute Is Settled,” The Irrawaddy, February 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/2PmKLBM.

8 Interviews with sources close to the KNU, February 2020.

9 Interviews with sources close to the peace process, February 2020.

10 Nang Seng Nom, “Gov’t And Burma Army Attending Shan National Day,” Shan Herald Agency for News, February 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Tc8CW2; Aung Zaw, “Opinion | At Shan Army HQ, Another Twist in The

Tale of Myanmar’s Fragile Peace Process,” The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2VwbFLB.

11 Lawi Weng, “Shan Armed Group May Sign Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire,” The Irrawaddy, February 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/2PodmGT; “SSPP Pledges To Move Forward With Peace Process,” Network Media Group, February 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Vn3Jfo.

12 Nyein Nyein, “More Than Half of Parliamentarians Back NLD Charter Amendment Bills,” The Irrawaddy, January 24, 2020, https://bit.ly/30PZkSY; Htoo Thant, “Myanmar Parliament to Resume, Discuss Two Charter

Amendment Bills,” The Myanmar Times, January 27, 2020, https://bit.ly/2PcuLCi.

13 San Yamin Aung; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Hears Report of Joint

Committee on Constitution Amendment Process,” Global New Light Of Myanmar, February 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/32fiK4h.

14 San Yamin Aung, “Military MPs Oppose Merging Myanmar Charter-Change Proposals,” The Irrawaddy, February 10, 2020, https://bit.ly/2v6y7zP; Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Hears

Report of Joint Committee on Constitution Amendment Process.”

15 Aung Ye Thwin and Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Hears Report of Joint Committee on Constitution

Amendment Process.”

16 San Yamin Aung, “Military MPs Oppose Merging Myanmar Charter-Change Proposals”; Aung Ye Thwin and

Aye Aye Thant, “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Hears Report of Joint Committee on Constitution Amendment Process.”

17 San Yamin Aung, “Military MPs Oppose Merging Myanmar Charter-Change Proposals.”

18 San Yamin Aung.

19 “After Calling Process Unconstitutional, Nearly All Tatmadaw MPs Register to Discuss Amendment Bills,”

Myanmar NOW, February 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2HVb0vb; “Myanmar Military MPs to Debate Charter Reform

En Masse, Defend Political Power,” The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SKp1C2.

20 Htun Htun and Kyaw Myo, “Myanmar Parliament Sets Debate for Charter Reform, Caps Military

Participation”; Nyan Hlaing Lin, “Amendment Bill Debate to Finish by March 5.”

21 Htun Htun and Kyaw Myo, “Myanmar Parliament Sets Debate for Charter Reform, Caps Military

Participation,” The Irrawaddy, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vTph8S; Nyan Hlaing Lin, “Amendment Bill

Debate to Finish by March 5,” Myanmar NOW, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2wCKYdv.

22 Htun Htun and Kyaw Myo, “Myanmar Parliament Sets Debate for Charter Reform, Caps Military

Participation”; Nyan Hlaing Lin, “Amendment Bill Debate to Finish by March 5.”

23 San Yamin Aung, “Charter Amendment Committee Submits Two Bills to Myanmar Parliament Calling for

Reduced Role for Military”; Andrew Nachemson, “How Constitutional Reform in Myanmar Matters for the

Country’s Democracy,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2020, https://bit.ly/2Vao5Zi; San Yamin Aung, “Analysis |

Two Possible ‘Keys’ to Unlocking Charter Reform in Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, February 5, 2020, https://bit.ly/32jgY23.

24 Nachemson, “How Constitutional Reform in Myanmar Matters for the Country’s Democracy”; “Dateline | Is

Myanmar’s Ruling NLD Pushing Hard Enough on Constitutional Amendment?”

25 This observation is based on the author’s analysis of the report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional

Amendment and of the Bills put forward by the Committee. Available at http://constitutionnet.org/country/myanmar.

26 Nachemson, “How Constitutional Reform in Myanmar Matters for the Country’s Democracy”; Sai Wansai, “Shan National Day, Union Day and Constitutional Amendment,” Shan Herald Agency for News, February 2, 2020, https://bit.ly/39TGYDY; “Dateline | Is Myanmar’s Ruling NLD Pushing Hard Enough on Constitutional

Amendment?”; Swe Lei Mon, “Ethnic Parties Slam NLD for Lack of Federal Model,” The Myanmar Times, January 24, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SPcw8n; Phyu Phyu Khine and Roseanne Gerin, “Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi

Decries ‘Political Problems’ Behind Failure to Settle Ethnic Wars,” Radio Free Asia, February 12, 2020, https://bit.ly/39RPFhZ.

27 Saw Yi Nandar, “Forum to Focus on Role of Technology in Myanmar Polls,” The Myanmar Times, February

11, 2020, https://bit.ly/39VexFr; San Moe Tun, “Is Facebook’s Bias a Source of Concern for Myanmar’s 2020

Election?,” Eleven Media Group, February 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/2v0wEv8.

28 San Moe Tun, “Is Facebook’s Bias a Source of Concern for Myanmar’s 2020 Election?”

29 San Moe Tun.

30 For a range of both positive and negative responses to this announcement, see the comments on this post, “Facebook တငွ ် ရ ွွေးရကောကပ်ွွဲနငှ ် ပတသ်က်သည ်သတငွ်ေးတ၊ု သတငွ်ေးမေှာွေးမ ောွေးအောွေး ဖယရ်ေှာွေး နအ်တကွ ် Facebook

Team က ု အရကကောငွ်ေးကကောွေးသေွာွေးမည ် ဖဖစရ်ကကောငွ်ေး ဖပညရ် ောငစ်ရု ွွေးရကောကပ်ွွဲ ရကောမ်ရငှတ်ောဝနရ်ှ သ ူ ရဖပောကကောွေး,”

Facebook, February 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SUwgr6.

31 Saw Yi Nandar, “Forum to Focus on Role of Technology in Myanmar Polls.”

32 Thiha Lwin, “Myanmar Election Commission Says No Campaigning, No Polls Near Military Barracks,” The

Irrawaddy, February 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/32jUZbd.

33 Thiha Lwin.

34 “This Week in Parliament,” The Irrawaddy, February 22, 2020, https://bit.ly/2HJA8Vz.

35 Thiha Lwin, “Myanmar Election Commission Says No Campaigning, No Polls Near Military Barracks”; San

Yamin Aung, “Myanmar Lower House Votes to Scrap Polling Stations on Military Bases,” The Irrawaddy, February 20, 2020, https://bit.ly/38SjNK6; Min Min, “NLD Passes Law Requiring Soldiers to Vote at Civilian

Polling Stations,” Myanmar NOW, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/3bXcylT.

36 Thiha Lwin, “Myanmar Election Commission Says No Campaigning, No Polls Near Military Barracks”; San

Yamin Aung, “Myanmar Lower House Votes to Scrap Polling Stations on Military Bases.”

37 San Yamin Aung, “Members of Religious Orders Should Have Right to Vote, Myanmar’s Cardinal Bo Says,”

The Irrawaddy, February 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SQNoOd; John Zaw, “Let Religious People Vote Too, Says

Myanmar Cardinal,” UCA News, February 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/32uwiZR.

38 “Preparations for Myanmar General Elections Going Well: UEC,” The Myanmar Times, January 29, 2020, https://bit.ly/3c89jbi; “How Will Millions of Myanmar Migrant Workers Vote in the 2020 Election?,” The

Irrawaddy, January 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/2us54GG.

39 Ashley South, “Opinion | Ethnic Voters Face Disenfranchisement in Myanmar’s 2020 Election,” The Irrawaddy, January 29, 2020, https://bit.ly/38WudIL; “How Will Millions of Myanmar Migrant Workers Vote in the 2020

Election?”; Aung Min Thein, “Myanmar Citizens Living Abroad Allowed for Expat Voting or Home Voting in

2020 Election,” Eleven Media Group, November 30, 2019, https://bit.ly/2Vk0Xrh; “How Will Millions of

Myanmar Migrant Workers Vote in the 2020 Election?”; “Preparations for Myanmar General Elections Going

Well.”

http://constitutionnet.org/country/myanmar

40 “NLD to Choose Most of Current MPs for Upcoming Election,” Eleven Media Group, January 25, 2020, https://bit.ly/2SWqa9B.

41 “Ex-Myanmar President U Thein Sein to Campaign for USDP Ahead of This Year’s Election,” The Irrawaddy, January 27, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vdlxPq; Sit Htet Aung, “Myanmar Ex-President Comes out of Retirement to

Help USDP,” The Myanmar Times, January 27, 2020, https://bit.ly/3adnkTF.

42 Nay Yaing and Zeyar Tun, “About 100 Political Parties to Run for 2020 General Election,” Eleven Media

Group, February 7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2PlC7DA.

43 Zue Zue, “Nine Minor Myanmar Parties Form Electoral Pact,” The Irrawaddy, February 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/32nbfsd.

44 Tint Zaw Tun, “Labour Groups to Choose Six MP Candidates for November,” The Myanmar Times, February

7, 2020, https://bit.ly/2urmtPS; Aung Thiha, “Workers and Farmers to Run in Myanmar’s 2020 Election to

Promote Rights,” The Irrawaddy, February 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/2vXOsqJ.

45 “Press Release: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide

(The Gambia v. Myanmar) - Fixing of Time-Limits for the Filing of the Initial Pleadings” (International Court of

Justice, January 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/2vfzgFh.

46 Interviews with sources close to the government, February 2020. Myat Thura, “Govt Vows to Carry out ICJ

Measures in Rakhine,” The Myanmar Times, February 3, 2020, https://bit.ly/37XhcgL.

47 “Myanmar Military to Probe Two Alleged Massacres by Troops in Rakhine,” The Irrawaddy, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2wLifTZ; Nay Myo Htun et al., “Myanmar Army Says It Will Try Soldiers Over Killings of

Rohingya Civilians,” Radio Free Asia, February 21, 2020, https://bit.ly/2HOWaGr.

48 See December 16, 2019-January 24, 2020 Context Report.

49 “Myanmar Military to Probe Two Alleged Massacres by Troops in Rakhine.”

50 Nay Myo Htun et al., “Myanmar Army Says It Will Try Soldiers Over Killings of Rohingya Civilians.”

51 Numbers aggregated from various sources, including the Arakan Army, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of

Defence Services, and local news agencies.

52 “၂၀၂၀ ျ ပည ျ္ျ ျစွ္၊ ရျရဖဖောျ္ဝါ ီလ(၁၃) က္ ခ င္ုျ ပည္ ိုကကပွဲသတင္ျွေးမေ်ာွေး,” ARAKAN ARMY (blog), February

14, 2020, http://bit.ly/2VgYBcL.

53 “ မွ်ေးဗ ွဲဗမ ို ြို့နယ ်အနအ်ယလ်ဒ်ပီါတ ီဘဏ္ဍောရ ွေးမ ွေးက ုရအရအက ဖမွ်ေးဆွီေးသေွာွေးတယလ် ု ဆ ,ု” BBC Burmese, February

9, 2020, sec. ဘဘီစီ ီ ဖမနမ်ော | အ ွူေးသတငွ်ေး | ရနောကဆ် ွုေး သတငွ်ေး | ရနောကဆ် ွုေး ရခါငွ်ေးစဉ် သတငွ်ေး |ဖမနမ်ောသတငွ်ေး, https://bbc.in/3a0MjJu.

54 ဖဖြူဖဖြူခ ငု,် “ မွ်ေးဗ ွဲ NLD အဖွွဲြို့ဝငက် ု မဖမွ်ေးရကကောငွ်ေး AA ရဖပော,” Radio Free Asia, February 9, 2020, http://bit.ly/2uvDF6U; Khin Myat Myat Wai, “Arakan Army Denies Holding Myanmar’s Ruling Party Official,”

The Myanmar Times, February 10, 2020, http://bit.ly/32oiG2j; Development Media Group, “Armed Group

Detains NLD Official from Ramree Township,” Burma News International, February 12, 2020, http://bit.ly/2v2pYwz.

55 ရျအောငထ န္, “ရျကေ်ာက္ရျတောျၿ္မ ိဳ႕ ွဲ ပစခတမႈျ ဖစစပောွေး၍ ရကလွေးမ ခငစ္္ဦွေးရျသဆ ျျုွေးၿပီွေး

အမ် ိဳွေးသောွေးသ ျျုွေးဦွေးဒဏ္ရော ,” Development Media Group, February 3, 2020, http://bit.ly/2HN42YS; Kyaw Hlamyint, “ရျကေ်ာက္ရျတောျ္ၿမ ိဳ႕၌ ပစခတမမိဳျ ဖစ္ အမ် ိဳွေးသောွေး ၃ ဦွေးဒဏ္ရော ရကလွေး ၂ ဦွေးရအမ အမ် ိဳွေးသမွီေး ၁ ဦွေးဗပွဲခင္်ျွေးၿပီ ီွေးဆ ျျုွေး,”

Facebook, February 3, 2020, http://bit.ly/3a0SJZb.

56 Development Media Group, “ ခ င္ုျ ပညနယ္၊ ရ သ ရျတောငၿမ ိဳ႕နယ္၊ ၿပ န္ျွေးရျတောကနုန္္ျွေးရျကွ်ေးစ ောကတင္

တောဝနထမ္ျွေးရျဆောင္ရျနသည ျ္ မလူတန္ျွေးျ ပဆ ောမတစ္ဦွေး ရယန႔ ရျရဖဖောျ္ဝါ ီလ ရညန ၃ နော ီခွဲဖျက

ကည်ဆ မနွနေ္ာွေးရျသောရျၾကောင ျ္ ဒဏ္ရော ွ ကသောွေးသညဟို ဖခင္ျ ဖစ္ြူ ဦွေးက န္ျွေးရလမွောငက DMG သ ရု႔ျ ပောသည္။,”

Facebook, February 3, 2020, http://bit.ly/2T9zuWC; Min Aung Khine, “Teacher in Rakhine Injured by Myanmar

Military Shelling,” The Irrawaddy, February 5, 2020, http://bit.ly/2STKUyH; Khiang Kyaw Min, “သမွီေးလကွနုန္္ျွေးရျကွ်ေးစ ောမ ွ ရျန ီမ ွ လကနကၾကွီေး ပစခတခ သ ဖင ျ္ ငဘတက ိုျ ကည်္ရျဖောကက္ောွေး ခွဲ ရျသော

ရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးဆ ောမ ခင္ရျဌွေးဝင္ျွေး အောွေး ရကန်ောျ္တျု ႔ ‘ရျမယရုျဒသ ရျဖောင္ရျဒွေး ွင္ျွေး’အဖွဲဖျ႔ ျ ျငွ ျ္ တ ခောွေး

ချု ငလြူ႔မအူဖဖ႔ွဲစည္ျွေးမေ်ာွေးနွဲ႔ ပွူေးရျပါင္ျွေးျ ပီွေး လနူောကျု ကသောွေးရျ ောက္ သယယ ြူလွက်ရ မ ျ ပီွေး ရ သ ရျတောင္ျ မ ိဳ႕

ရျဆွေး ုွေးသျု ႔ ပျု ရ႔ဆောငလမက်ရ မ ရျန ပါသည္။,” Facebook, February 3, 2020, http://bit.ly/2HPZwsz.

57 “ဘွူေးသွီေးရျတောငၿမ ိဳ႕နယမမ အမက မကူလနစောသင္ရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးတစခို ွဲ လကနကႀကွီေးကည်္ ရက ်ောက္ရျပါကကက ွဲ၍

ရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးသောွေး ၂၁ ဦွေး ဒဏ္ရော ,” Narinjara, February 13, 2020, http://bit.ly/38Uab1f; “Students Injured in Shelling at School in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Al Jazeera, February 14, 2020, http://bit.ly/2VoJ36V; “AA’s Shell Hit a

Primary School in Buthidaung Injuring 20 Students,” Eleven Media Group, February 14, 2020, http://bit.ly/38VWP4K; Development Media Group, “ ခ င္ုျ ပညနယ္၊ ဘွူေးသွီေးရျတောငၿမ ိဳ႕နယ္၊

ခမရီျခေ်ာင္ျွေးရျကွ်ေးစ ော ရအျ ခခ ပညောမလူတန္ျွေးကလန္ရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးက ုရယန႔ ရျရဖဖောျ္ဝါ ီလ ၁၃ က္ရျန႔၊ န နက ္

၁၀ နော ီခန္႔က လကနကႀကွီေးကည်္ က ်ောက္ရျပါကက ွဲဖျသ ဖင ျ္ မလူတန္ျွေးရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးသောွေး၊ရျကေ်ာင္ျွေးသ ူ (၂၁)ဦွေး

ဒဏ္ရော ွ ကသောွေးသည္။,” Facebook, February 13, 2020, http://bit.ly/2Tc79Pf.

58 Development Media Group, “ ခ င္ုျ ပညနယ္၊ ရ သ ရျတောငၿမ ိဳ႕နယ္၊ ၿပ န္ျွေးရျတောကနုန္္ျွေးရျကွ်ေးစ ောကတင္

တောဝနထမ္ျွေးရျဆောင္ရျနသည ျ္ မလူတန္ျွေးျ ပဆ ောမတစ္ဦွေး ရယန႔ ရျရဖဖောျ္ဝါ ီလ ရညန ၃ နော ီခွဲဖျက

ကည်ဆ မနွနေ္ာွေးရျသောရျၾကောင ျ္ ဒဏ္ရော ွ ကသောွေးသညဟို ဖခင္ျ ဖစ္ြူ ဦွေးက န္ျွေးရလမွောငက DMG သ ရု႔ျ ပောသည္။,”

Facebook, February 3, 2020, http://bit.ly/2wITec6.

59 Information gathered through independent social media monitoring during the reporting period (January 25–

February 24). The post was originally located at https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=585226048728559, but has since been removed.

60 Radio Free Asia, “ဝနက်ကွီေးရဒါကတ်ောဝငွ်ေးဖမတရ်အွေးနွဲ ခ ငုဝ်နက်ကွီေးခ ိုပ်လ ကုပ်ါလောတွဲ ဟတယ်ောဉ် ပစခ်တခ် ,”

Facebook, February 19, 2020, http://bit.ly/2VoKOB3; Nayrein Kyaw, “AA Fires on Helicopter Carrying

Myanmar Government Officials in Rakhine,” Radio Free Asia, February 19, 2020, http://bit.ly/37WmTvf; Htet

Naing Zaw, “Myanmar Ministers Survive Attack on Military Chopper in Rakhine,” The Irrawaddy, February 19, 2020, http://bit.ly/3c3PfXL.

61 Radio Free Asia, “တပ်က ခ ငုတ် ကုပ်ွွဲမေှာ အတွွဲလ ကုဒ် ွုေးနွဲ ရဟောငဝ်စှဇ်ောရတသွ ွုေး,” Facebook, February 10, 2020, http://bit.ly/32maU97.

62 Subir Bhaumik, “Myanmar : Chin Rebels Oppose Arakan Army’s Paletwa Claim,” Northeast Now, January 27, 2020, http://bit.ly/39XzgIT.

63 See December 16, 2019-January 24. 2020 Contextual Report.

64 Nyein Nyein, “Analysis | Accountability Lacking as Civilian Casualties Mount in Myanmar’s Rakhine Conflict,”

The Irrawaddy, February 19, 2020, http://bit.ly/2Pl9JBH.

65 Ro Kyaw Myint, “ဘွူေးသွီေးရျတောငၿ္မ ိဳ႕နယ္ရျအောကပ္ င္ုျွေး ျရွျနရျသော (၅၅၁) တပ္ င္က လက္နက္ႀကွီေး

ရျကတပစျ္ ခင္ျွေးရျၾကောငျ္ ျ ဖင္ျ ကင္ျွေးရျတောငရ္ျကွ်ေးစ ောအုပ္စရုျ ောငစ္ ောရျနဦွေးမလဝဟီောမ တ္ဟရူျဆောင္

၏သမွီေး ျင္ွျ အ ခောွေးအ မ္တစ္လ ျျုွေး ွဲက (၈) ရျယောက္ဒဏ္ ္ော ျင္ွျ (၂) ရျယောက္ရျသဆ ျျုွေးကသောွေးတယ္လ ႔ုဖုန္

ျွေးဆက္ၿပီွေးရျျ ပောရျပွေးပါတယ။္,” Facebook, January 25, 2020, http://bit.ly/2w3QjtX; Zaw Lwin Aung, “ျ မနမောက

ICJ ခမ်တ္ွွဲ Provisional Measure ကျု စတငခ် ိဳ ွေးရျဖောက္ရျနၿပီ,” Facebook, January 25, 2020, http://bit.ly/32lG6W5;

“Shelling Rohingya Village ‘Expression of Anger’: Experts,” New Age Bangladesh, January 27, 2020, http://bit.ly/2wIOAuE; Ro Nay San Lwin, “ျ မနမောအစျု ျွေး ရအနနွဲ႔ ICJ က ခမ်တွလ ိုျ က္ွဲ

ၾကောွေးျ ဖတအ စအီမ ရျကတကျု…