Attachment_3_-_Technical_Exhibit_5_-_IIR_Format.pdf

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Fort Leonard Wood, Initial Impressions Report, Tornado (31 December 2010) i

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Foreword from the Commanding General

Although the devastation that occurred from the EF3 tornado that hit Fort Leonard Wood on 31 December 2010 was immense, there were many blessings associated with the event. Due to the timing, there was no scheduled training and many Soldiers in training, permanent party, families, and civilians were not on post. Those who were on post, fortunately, had excellent emergency plans; this, coupled with early warning systems undoubtedly saved lives. In addition, pre-established collaborative training programs and strong mutual aid agreements enabled first responders—communities, outside agencies, Soldiers, units, and staffs—to activate quickly and effectively. In addition, our Army Community Services, Staff Judge Advocate, and other support teams were incredibly responsive, innovative, and readily available, which helped our affected families cope. We are grateful that there were only a few minor injuries and are grateful for our Fort Leonard Wood and community teams.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, your senior leaders and I couldn’t be more proud of the team here and the collective response put forth.

We have many blessings and many “sustains” in terms of our response and recovery efforts, such as those I mentioned; however, it is important to take time and reflect upon the events in their entirety. It is also worthy of our time to discuss observations, lessons learned, and recommendations that can even better prepare us and others in the event that a similar circumstance should arise.

We should document some of the challenges we addressed and the new insights we gained in areas such as: the loss of power to the affected housing area and other critical locations; our installation emergency operations center; the scarcity of back-up power sources; the command and control and garrison/mission staff responsibilities; information engagement and the role of social media and the Web; and recovery cost assessment methods.

My intent is for this document to serve as a succinct, written initial impressions report that will capture the key elements that worked to our favor and those which could be improved.

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Table of Contents Introduction 1 Key Leader Visits 3 Background 4 Early Warning Systems 5 First Responders 6 Accountability 8 Safety and Security 9

Command and Control (C2) 9

Immediate Needs 11

Utilities 12

Information Management 13

Damage Assessments and Cost Estimates 15

Claims 16

Installation Readiness 18

Family Readiness 20

Recovery Operations 22

Points of Contact 23

Note: Any publications referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system. They are also available online at <http://www.apd.army.mil>.

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Introduction The New Year’s Eve tornado of 2010 was met by an extraordinary response by the Fort Leonard Wood (FLW) community team of teams. These true professionals did not wait for a call, but ran to the point of greatest need. It was difficult to detect where systems and plans did not respond as designed, since many gaps were filled by selfless and duty-driven Soldiers, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, and Family members. The fact that the installation’s operations and daily life returned to nearly normal so quickly after the storm is a testament to the strength and resilience of the FLW community.

Even before the dust had settled, an organizational planning team was assembled to document the lessons of the response and recovery. This report captures 36 observations in 13 key subject areas, which are based on a compilation of after-action review comments, interviews, research, and reflection by those who participated in the tornado recovery efforts.

This report highlights and captures the best practices and the key issues requiring further study by Army organizations. It also focuses on key observations that were collected to help other military installations effectively prepare for the emergency response of a natural disaster. Building “safer, stronger, and smarter” communities for future generations begins with reflecting on these lessons learned.

Our thanks goes to those who contributed to this report. Their willingness to invest their time and insights made this publication possible.

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Key Leader Visits

Less than a week after the series of tornados touched down across Missouri, the Secretary of the Army, key members of the Missouri congressional delegation, and the Army Chief of Staff toured the damaged training and housing areas on FLW, MO.

Secretary of the Army, John McHugh visiting with service members and their families in damaged housing areas on Fort Leonard Wood.

Secretary of the Army, John McHugh toured the damaged training and housing areas on FLW, visited with families, and received updates on recovery initiatives. “The damage really took my breath away … if there’s anything this experience has shown, it’s that in times such as this, the Army family knows how to put our arms around each other and begin to build for the future,” stated McHugh.

General George W. Casey Jr. visiting Fort Leonard Wood to view the extensive damage.

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Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr. also visited FLW to view the extensive damage, speak with family members who lost their homes, and give hope to the community as it rebuilds. “I don’t remember an Army installation getting hit by a natural disaster of this magnitude,” Casey said.

“As I went around, I was amazed at the resilience of our Soldiers and families and amazed at the teamwork, not only on the installation, but from local communities.”

Background

Path of the EF3 tornado that struck the Fort Leonard Wood, MO on Friday, 31 Dec 10 at 0942hrs.

On 31 December 2010, at approximately 0942, FLW was hit by an EF3 tornado that traveled from the southwest to northeast. It cleared a 2-mile path of destruction that damaged or destroyed 304 facilities/structures, which included the destruction of 40 homes. The EF3 tornado first hit Ranges 401, 33, and 31 on the southwest side of post. It then crossed and stayed just east of south FLW 1 (Range Road), which runs from the South Gate past the airfield, and impacted Ranges 6, 5, and 4. The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Equipment Concentration Site 66 (ECS 66) warehouse was destroyed. The tornado also destroyed Training Area (TA) 211 (Military Bridge training site) which is southwest of Forney Army Airfield. It then struck the facilities on TA 206 and damaged roofs, windows and heating, ventilation, and air

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For Official Use Only conditioning (HVAC) systems on one advanced individual training (AIT) dining facility and five AIT Rolling Pin Barracks (1000 area across the road from Brown Hall). Next, it caused substantial damage to six two-story World War II (WWII) buildings and damaged two other WWII museum buildings;

the main museum was not damaged. The tornado then crossed the road and stayed south of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) gas station. It hit TA 204 (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC] training site), the water treatment plant (taking off the entire roof and destroying the perimeter fence) and, finally hit and destroyed 40 residential homes and displaced 100 families.

Many of the installation’s Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines were on holiday block leave during the storm. Undoubtedly, this prevented further injuries. Only 25 families were actually occupying their homes at the time of the storm, and only 4 minor injuries were reported. All were treated and immediately released from the Fort Leonard Wood hospital. No deaths or serious injuries occurred as a result of this storm.

Initial Impressions

Early Warning Systems

Initial Observation 1: Tornado watches and warnings were communicated in advance across the installation by activating mass notification systems (siren and giant voice) designed by Acoustic Technology Incorporate (ATI), combined with other forms of emergency alert notifications.

Discussion: The Installation Operations Center (IOC) watch desk activated early warning notifications at least 15 minutes in advance of the tornado by initiating the siren combined with the giant voice and the cable television (TV) override systems. The cable TV issued an alert message at the bottom of the screen on every channel to all FLW cable TV subscribers. Personnel with satellite TV did not receive alert messages, and some individuals reported not hearing the sirens (which could be attributed to siren speakers deteriorating over time). “Desktop alerts” (Network Alert System) were not initiated because the power failed before the watch officer could activate them. When desktop alerts are activated, only FLW and Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC) domain users receive them. All other non Fort Leonard Wood domain users (such as Dental Activity [DENTAC], U.S. Air Force [USAF], U.S. Navy [USN], U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], U.S. Army Reserve [USAR], Army National Guard [ARNG], and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [USACE]) cannot.

Recommendation: Conduct a digital mapping survey of the sirens and giant voice ATI systems to measure speaker deterioration and audio “dead space.”

Research network software programs that integrate direct communication with cross domain servers.

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First Responders

Initial Observation 1: First responders included neighbors within and around the impacted area and official emergency response personnel.

Discussion: Nearby individuals were the first to arrive on the scene minutes after the tornado struck the housing area. These individuals took immediate action, searching for survivors in extremely hazardous weather conditions and without concern for their own personal safety, to render timely and much-needed assistance to trapped families. Some dangers included downed power lines, gas leaks, debris, and unstable structures. A rescued family member explained, “The exploitation, extraction, and evacuation were done professionally and with watch-like precision to such an extent that observers were moved to ask if they (the three Soldiers) were a trained urban search and rescue team.” The official emergency responders were in control of the situation as they came through the area identifying and marking homes that had been searched and cleared. For example, an “X” and/or a number system “3/0” meant that three occupants resided in the house and zero were in the house after it was searched. The Boone County Fire Protection District sent a search and rescue team that arrived within several hours. Each home was searched at least twice by the responding fire departments.

First responders take immediate action searching and clearing impacted areas.

Recommendation: Provide urban search and rescue training and equipment for the FLW Fire Department to enable faster, more thorough search and recovery operations of collapsed structures.

Initial Observation 2: Collaboration, teamwork, and available resources aided response efforts and enabled quick, efficient emergency operations.

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Discussion: Emergency medical services (EMS), the Directorate of Emergency Services (DES), quick-reaction forces (QRFs), utility teams (water, gas, and electric), activated units, and several neighboring civilian agencies and non local communities superbly mitigated the impacts of this storm. Chaplains were on scene within 15 minutes to provide ministry support. Teams searched through the damaged areas, quickly sifted through the rubble and debris, and pulled residents and personnel to safety. Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) assessed casualties quickly, and two additional ambulances from the county were staged outside the main gate for patient transfer, if needed. Utility teams reported within an hour to identify issues and begin working to quickly restore gas and electric utilities to non damaged areas.

Emergency response teams search through damaged areas.

Recommendation: Continue training, drills, and exercises with first responders, units, and local partners. Maintain and exercise current, functional mutual-aid agreements and community relationships.

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Accountability

Initial Observation 1: Alert rosters need to accurately reflect current personnel and their duty titles, including all permanent party Soldiers, trainees, students, and civilian personnel.

Discussion: Units first began accounting for military personnel and families in housing, followed by military and civilian workforce. It took personnel more than four (4) days to account for all civilian employees. A few organizations were unable to account for all civilian personnel quickly because of a perceived union rule preventing supervisors from requiring personal contact information from civilian employees. In accordance with, AR 340-21, paragraph 4-2, any personal information requested by the agency must be accompanied by a Privacy Act Statement, which allows the employee to make an informed choice about whether to provide the information or not. Included in the Privacy Act Statement is the legal basis for requesting that information as well as a warning about what may happen should the employee choose not to disclose the information (for example, cannot process pay documents or personnel records). Management can request personal telephone numbers, but employees cannot be required to provide them. There is no statutory or regulatory basis upon which to require employees to provide that information or for management to take disciplinary action should employees choose not to provide the information.

Recommendation 2: Maintain and publish updated alert rosters and verify that all numbers are correct. The Army Disaster Personnel Accountability and Assessment System (ADPAAS) is another means to account for civilian employees.

Initial Observation 2: Outdated Crisis Action Team (CAT) rosters.

Discussion: The notification of CAT members takes place by manually activating the NXT Communicator (telephonic alert system that sends out a message to a predestinated call roster when activated). When the installation lost power the system was inoperable due to no battery backup power.

Phone activation was initiated, but a printed copy of the call roster was not maintained and some organizations and CAT members were not listed on the CAT roster. Thus, all members didn’t receive notification.

Recommendation: Identify different categories of CAT members for particular events (for example, snow and ice removal [SNAIR] events or severe weather), and adjust membership accordingly. Upgrade the NXT Communicator to allow for personnel to individually register and edit their phone numbers and connect the system to battery backup power. Ensure that hard copies of call rosters are kept on hand in case of power failure.

Initial Observation 3: Untrained CAT members.

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Discussion: Some personnel reporting for CAT duty were untrained and unfamiliar with the systems and standing operating procedures (SOP) of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

Recommendation: Solidify CAT procedures and responsibilities, assign the right people for CAT membership, and ensure that they attend training and exercises.

Safety and Security

Initial Observation 1: Some key and essential personnel who were attempting to respond reported that they were denied access at the gates to the installation.

Discussion: Not all hospital staff/personnel who responded to the emergency were allowed on the installation. Some were told that their hospital badges were not enough to show that they were critical personnel, while others were granted access. There were also reports of gate guards turning away Soldiers recalled for security duty.

Recommendation: Review and revise the emergency access control process for allowing required personnel to enter the installation.

Issue: Securing the damaged housing area.

Discussion: Access to the North Piney Hills housing area was denied to nonessential personnel including onlookers. During the town hall meetings, the deputy director of DES explained procedures to gain access through control points for affected residents. Vehicle placards were issued to residents for speedy access. As recovery and relief efforts progressed, checkpoints were withdrawn to enable better traffic flow.

Recommendation: Sustain.

Command and Control (C2)

Initial Observation 1: Early and effective establishment of the incident command post (ICP).

Discussion: The ICP effectively controlled the operations of all emergency response efforts in the affected area and successfully established immediate communications to higher headquarters, which provided the information needed for making decisions. It also enabled the installation and garrison commanders to focus the priority of effort on the safety of those directly impacted by the storm. The EOC was unable to maintain a situational understanding due to the lack of electricity and no pre-established reporting frequency or format from the ICP. The EOC was depended on verbal reports during EOC updates from the ICP.

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Recommendation: Establish reporting formats and procedures for the ICP to the EOC.

Initial Observation 2: C2 lines of effort were not clearly identified and established to provide effective task management.

Discussion: Everyone wanted to help; however, tracking systems left some requests unanswered. Some units reported receiving “hey you” missions from different organizations, which conflicted with their originally directed mission. The EOC also lacked a comprehensive list of resources available for each unit and directorate on the installation.

Recommendation: Identify the roles and responsibilities of the G Staff and directorates during emergency operations. FLW Regulation 10-1 is currently be revised to delineate and deconflict these functions. Assign responsibility for the production of operation orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), and task management. Revise contingency plans (CONPLANs) with specific task and purpose checklists and a list of available resources for each organization. Pre-establish an N-hour sequence of events, reporting and briefing formats, and a decision support template (DST).

Initial Observation 3: The WebEOC Common Operating Picture (COP) was ineffective.

Discussion: The WebEOC is the software program used by the EOC for battle tracking and task management. WebEOC did not have a layered Geographic Information System (GIS) capability. The lack of a COP produced multiple products of the same areas for different purposes.

Recommendation: Obtain and maintain a layered GIS to be used as a COP.

Initial Observation 4: Communications network management.

Discussion: The amount of information that was pouring into the EOC (via phone calls, EOC e-mails, personal e-mails, and WebEOC) was overwhelming. Maintaining communication and task management using the WebEOC was ineffective. The installation Military Police (MP) desk was also initially overwhelmed with incoming calls. Some personnel resorted to personal cell phone use as their initial, primary means of communication.

The Land Mobile Radio (LMR) communications network was not widely used since it was designated as the alternate means of communication in the EOC emergency plan in the event that phones didn’t work.

Recommendation: Pre-establish non emergency call center phone numbers and reroute calls to a response team that is equipped to answer questions and provide information. This will enable key and essential personnel to focus priorities. Recommend using LMRs as an additional means of communication during emergencies for rapid information sharing between key personnel and

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Immediate Needs

Initial Observation 1: Family Assistance Center operations.

Discussion: Within the first hour after the tornado, 20 families (some of which were in need of minor medical attention) arrived at the initial emergency shelter (Davidson Fitness Center). Within 2 hours, emergency supplies (food and water) were delivered. These families and other displaced personnel were transported to temporary lodging within the first 12 hours. Army lodging was instrumental in opening their doors to displaced families until a solution was found because it is an Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) - operated activity. Once privatized, the responsiveness may be reduced without emergency lodging agreements. The Family Assistance Center (FAC) was set up within the Army Community Service (ACS) center the next day. The ACS staff, chaplains, military and family life consultants, Red Cross volunteers, and staff judge advocates (SJA) claims adjusters provided assistance to affected family members at the FAC. The local identification (ID) card office opened and processed ID cards on the following Sunday (within 48 hours).

Recommendation: Ensure that medical support is deployed and emergency supplies are pre-staged at the designated family emergency shelter. Sustain the “one stop shop” of the ACS as the FAC for family needs since many families were without transportation. Once Army lodging is privatized, emergency lodging agreements should be addressed and/or established.

Initial Observation 2: The garrison command sergeant major (CSM) and the housing division maintained the housing status of all affected families.

Discussion: The housing status list was used as a database to help identify families with varying levels of needs. This list was maintained to ensure that the right people were receiving the proper support. Some families with destroyed homes and vehicles were in need of nearly everything. Other families were without power for a few days, received lodging, and submitted claims for perishable food items, but did not sustain damage to their home or property.

Recommendation: Sustain maintaining a housing list to ensure that appropriate support is provided to fulfill the varying needs.

Initial Observation 3: The donation management process was successful at managing a large amount of donations and volunteers.

Discussion: Installation agencies were flooded with questions about donations. The United Service Organization (USO) quickly became the donation center, with support from the ACS, even though it was not part of

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The United Service Organization (USO) donation center on Fort Leonard Wood.

Recommendation: The USO management of receiving and distributing non monetary donations and volunteers is recommended as a best practice.

Include the USO and ACS in emergency operations planning. Pre-establish a hotline to field questions and publish the number on social Web sites in phone books, and on public announcements to answer questions about donations.

Include the Red Cross in donation management.

Utilities

Initial Observation 1: Fast response by privatized utility companies.

Discussion: Privatized gas and electric utility infrastructure reduced the Army’s liability cost for repair during the disaster. Utility infrastructure damage and repair status were reported in estimated time of repair and percentages only. Utility companies worked diligently to restore utilities;

however, the installation utility manager for gas, electric, phone, and/or cable were unable to manage the repair effort.

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Recommendation: Develop a pre-established means of communication and reporting system for utilities to communicate the affected areas so that the utility manager can modify priorities of work.

Information Management

Initial Observation 1: Family and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (FMWR) marketing evolved as the emergency information source for affected families.

Discussion: FMWR collected information and published a tornado booklet that was distributed at town hall meetings to the affected families. The booklet was quickly updated and printed daily, leveraging a resource that is accustomed to communicating to families.

Recommendation: The incident specific emergency information and contact list booklet produced by the FMWR marketing department is recommended as a best practice.

Initial Observation 2: Garrison conducted daily town hall meetings, with installation command presence, for affected families.

Discussion: Town hall meetings were effective in disseminating information and addressing concerns with affected families. This forum also enabled families to communicate other areas of concern to the command. Topics included utility restoration status, traffic control point procedures, claims information, lodging information, transportation and food services, donation hours, and procedures for gathering household goods from their damaged homes. Senior command presence gave family members the assurance that their needs were receiving the highest priority possible. Kids on Site (KOS) child care was provided for each town hall meeting by Child, Youth and School (CYS) Services trained staff.

Recommendation: In emergencies where families are affected, town hall meetings are recommended as a best practice.

Initial Observation 3: Use of social media to communicate to the community.

Discussion: The MSCoE commanding general and garrison commander have informative social media sites on Facebook and Twitter (the two most used during this event). FMWR also provided and posted information via social media sites and e-mail notifications. As more and more people sought information from online sources versus internal networked sites, families turned to social media networks and the FLW Web site for information. The FLW Web site was not updated initially because the webmaster (who was on leave) was not contacted. Once the webmaster was notified, she was able to update the site remotely.

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Recommendation: Continue to use and improve social media sites as tools to communicate to the community. Create redundancy in permissions and skills sets so that the number of personnel who can update the FLW official web site is increased.

Tornado booklet published by FMWR.

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Damage Assessments and Cost Estimates

Initial Observation 1: MSCoE G-8 and the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) were the respective mission and garrison tornado damage and response cost estimate proponents for the installation.

Discussion: All units/organizations were contacted for assessments; one-on-one interviews were conducted face to face or by telephone to assess storm costs with tenant activities. This ensured that all damage was evaluated consistently and that all costs estimates were centrally consolidated.

Recommendation: Interviewing tenant units by G-8 and DRM for consistent and comprehensive cost estimates is recommended as a best practice.

Initial Observation 2: Two facility replacement and repair cost assessment tools were used.

Discussion: The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) facility assessment team conducted assessments using a Military Construction Army (MCA) cost estimate tool. This tool is used to estimate the reconstruction cost based on the gross square footage of a building. The Directorate of Public Works (DPW) facility assessment teams used a Service Repair Maintenance (SRM) tool (RSMeans) to assess facility damage costs. This tool is used to estimate the reconstruction cost based on the actual value of component replacement. This caused a discrepancy in cost assessments for damaged facilities between USACE and DPW teams.

Recommendation: Use one standard costing assessment tool for facility replacement and repair to ensure that cost estimates are consistent.

Initial Observation 3: Facility assessment teams lacked a standard marking system for the structural assessment of buildings other than the marking system used by first responders in the housing area.

Discussion: Once buildings were inspected by the facility assessment teams, they lacked a building marking system to identify structurally sound facilities as “safe” or structurally unsound facilities as “too dangerous to enter,” which delayed unit property and information technology (IT) infrastructure assessments.

Recommendation: Facility assessments teams adopt a marking system so that units and other organizations know whether buildings are structurally safe to retrieve property and conduct further assessments.

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Claims

Initial Observation 1: The early activation of SJA claims teams were effective in getting claims services to Soldiers and families in the field.

Discussion: Housing, personal, and government claims processing began three days after the tornado touched down. Few families came to the claims office initially; instead, claims teams sought out potential claimants at their homes, temporary lodging, or in the field. This enabled SJA to quickly evaluate and access claims on site. Two-person teams proved highly effective during this process.

Recommendation: Include the early activation of claims teams and active versus passive claims service as a best practice. When possible, initiate SJA recall rosters and have claims teams in the neighborhood within 24 hours after search and rescue operations cease.

Initial Observation 2: The Personal Claims Act (PCA) does not cover Soldiers in privatized housing.

Discussion: AR 27-20 specifically exempts residents in privatized housing from the PCA. In this case, an exception to policy under AR 27-20 was approved by the U.S. Army Claims Service to pay claims to Soldiers.

Recommendation: Amend AR 27-20 to alleviate the need for this exception.

Initial Observation 3: Bureaucratic claims presented challenges for processing catastrophic losses in quarters.

Discussion: Claims took too long to document and inventory on the DD Form 1844 (List of Property and Claims Analysis Chart) for those who lost everything. The Army claims service created a Catastrophic Loss Accelerated Settlement Procedure (CLASP) to service this need, saving Soldiers time, aggravation, and paperwork.

Recommendation: Use CLASP for all Soldiers who suffer catastrophic losses and have no insurance.

Initial Observation 4: Soldiers whose vehicles were destroyed did not have necessary finances for car rentals.

Discussion: PCA does not pay for rental car expenses even if a Soldier’s vehicle is damaged or destroyed on post. This left many families stranded without transportation. The United States Army Claim Services (USARCS) authorized rental car funds under the PCA for up to 14 days. This duration was necessary due to the large number of vehicles damaged and the few number of automobile repair companies available in the area.

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Recommendation: Sustain.

Initial Observation 5: Soldiers needed money to pay for evacuation costs.

Discussion: Evacuated Soldiers and their families were reimbursed based on the Joint Travel Federal Regulations (JFTR) and All Army Activities (ALARACT) message dated 15 February 2010. This included lodging per diem. The mandatory evacuation order issued by the installation commander is essential for reimbursement.

Recommendation: Sustain.

Vehicles damaged or destroyed on post.

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Installation Readiness

Initial Observation 1: Lack of storm shelters.

Discussion: The affected families occupied homes that were built on concrete slabs, which offered minimal protection from a tornado. The families’ perception is that designated storm shelter areas are too far from the housing areas to enable them to seek immediate shelter. Few ranges and TAs have adequate shelter from severe weather.

Tornado damaged, Fort Leonard Wood, MO on post housing.

Recommendation: Review storm shelter plans for housing, ranges, and training areas. Recommend building storm shelters or safe rooms in homes, especially those without a basement.

Initial Observation 2: Emergency fuel distribution capability and capacity.

Discussion: Due to the power outage, emergency vehicles could not initially refuel at the Transportation Motor Pool (TMP). Initially, the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) used their fuel trucks to fuel generators and light sets. The Directorate of Logistics (DOL) has no organic bulk fuel distribution vehicles.

Recommendation: Develop an emergency fuel distribution plan, which may include emergency backup power and/or gravity feed from fuel distribution points.

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REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA

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Initial Observation 3: Backup generator power failed to adequately power all critical areas during the commercial power loss.

Discussion: There is no backup power generator for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The backup battery power was connected to limited pre-designated areas within the building. The Telephonic Alert System (TAS) — “Communicator” was not activated due to the lack of redundant power supply. This computer-based system could have delivered automated voice messages to identified CAT members. The backup generator for the MP desk did engage, but was not initially tripped to trigger power transfer. This was thought to be the cause of connection disruption from the MP desk to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The prolonged loss of IDS was not caused by a lack of power to the MP desk, but a power loss to the communications that supports the most of the IDS telephone lines. This hut was not identified as a priority for power restoration, which would have brought the IDS alarms up days earlier and freed up Soldiers who were used for guard duty and security checks.

Recommendation: Critical systems need to be identified from the source to the end user. Emergency power being supplied to those systems and/or a predetermined set of critical, single points of failure should be identified and set as priorities. Emergency power distribution and readiness must include EOC, MP desk, initial family emergency shelter, a dining facility (DFAC), and IT communications nodes (including cooling systems for those nodes). Ensure that preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) are conducted on generators routinely and on-duty personnel are trained on how to initiate power transfer.

Initial Observation 4: Power was continuous for the hospital.

Discussion: While other backup generators failed to engage, the hospital generator functioned properly. The hospital has three agencies that maintain the backup diesel generators. The electrical portion is handled by the hospital internal maintenance crew. In-house maintenance also changes the batteries every year. The generators are serviced monthly by an outer agency. The generators are housed in a controlled environment with a set temperature.

A full operating load test is performed each month; generators run for 30 minutes. Each year the manufacturer sends a certified diesel mechanic to take fluid samples and perform a full service check. The hospital is required to keep all maintenance and test records for three years. The last test performed on the generators was two days before the tornado hit post.

Recommendation: Other installation agencies should adopt some of the hospital best practices in maintaining backup generators.

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REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA

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REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA

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Family Readiness

“I’m truly indebted and appreciated seeing the strength, compassion, discipline, and outstanding teamwork of those young Soldiers and Army Civilians springing into action without hesitation to assist an Army Family in distress. Their selfless service is the true mark of professionalism and a positive example that clearly defines the intent of our Army Family Covenant.”

—CPT Russell, a Soldier who survived while crouched down in a closet with his wife, son, and family dog as their house was destroyed during the tornado.

Initial Observation 1: Family emergency plans were essential in saving lives.

Discussion: Most of the families interviewed had an emergency plan for natural disasters. For one family, the plan included yelling the emergency code word “closet” while gathering their son, pet, and emergency items as they went to the center closet as soon as sirens sounded. The emergency drill normally consisted of taking emergency items such as a blanket, a battery-operated emergency radio, cell phones, and a flashlight. The family kept a supply of non perishable foods (including dog food), water, and clothes for emergencies. On the morning of the tornado, the family executed the emergency drill using the code word “closet.” That family’s house was completely destroyed in the tornado. The roof of their home was blown off, and the door and walls of the closet where they sought cover collapsed around them (see the photo of their home on page 21). Another family confessed that they never actually practiced their plan, but they kept their important documents filed away and essentials on hand in preparation for an emergency.

Recommendation: The recommendations for emergency disaster plans is that all families should (1) have an emergency code word which is practiced with all family members, (2) have a disaster kit which consists of a first aid kit, food, water, extra clothing, battery-operated radio, and flashlight (with extra batteries), (3) ensure that all family members are in the same place within the house (such as the closet) during an emergency, (4) have important documents stored in a fireproof/waterproof container, and (5) take a cell phone, ID card, and camera with them if time permits when seeking shelter.

The camera is essential for documenting a claim after the storm. Above all, practice the plan! Recommend that the installation issue weather alert radios to all personnel living in housing and unaccompanied enlisted personnel house (UEPH).

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REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA

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Emergency personnel clearing damaged or destroyed family housing.

Initial Observation 2: Emergency preparedness for family housing, UEPH, and lodging.

Discussion: Most of the families interviewed had an emergency plan for natural disasters; however, an international student and his family did not. One international family did not have an emergency plan because they claimed their country is free from most natural disasters due to its geographical location.

Recommendation: Because the installation is in an area where there is a high threat of tornados, all personnel arriving to the installation should be briefed on the emergency actions to take before, during, and after a tornado and during emergency signals. International students should have the same information added to the International Student Education Preparation Course.

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Recovery Operations

Tornado damaged Engineer Bridging Training Area

Initial Observation 1: The amount of DPW projects have doubled due to the tornado damage.

Discussion: The damage from the storm may cause a 3 to 12 month delay in SRM projects.

Recommendation: Request additional design and contracting support to offset facility repair and replacement SRM load.

Initial Observation 2: Police call.

Discussion: The garrison CSM led common-area cleanup efforts with post details. Units were accountable for their designated areas of responsibility.

Soldier labor was utilized in common and unit areas. All major items were cleaned up by the DPW facility maintenance contractors.

Recommendation: Sustain. Improve the identification of hazardous debris, train on how to handle debris, and make personal protective equipment (PPE) available for cleanup crews.

Initial Observation 3: Large amounts of inorganic and organic debris.

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REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA

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Discussion: The DPW environmental office designated dump sites for inorganic and organic debris. They contracted outside sources to have the recyclable debris sorted and recycled. This helped the installation achieve its goals of diverting 50 percent of its waste from the landfills.

Recommendation: Sustain. Installations should recycle storm debris as much as possible.

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri on post housing tornado damage.

Points of Contact

Lesson Learned Program Quality Assurance Office

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473