F10AK029805_03.11_0502_a.pdf

FINAL REVISION 1

RISK ASSESSMENT/PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

DECONTAMINATION AREAS A AND B

FORMER FORT GLENN

UMNAK ISLAND, ALASKA

FUDS #F10AK029805

February 2012

Prepared for:

U. S. Army Engineering and Support Center

Huntsville, Alabama and

U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District Elmendorf AFB, Alaska

Contract No. W912DY-09-D-0061 Task Order: 0002

Prepared by:

12120 Shamrock Plaza, Suite 300

Omaha, Nebraska 68154

16170581

J4ENGRAR

Typewritten Text F10AK029805_03.11_0502_a 200-1e

J4ENGRAR

Typewritten Text

Risk Assessment / Probability Assessment i Decontamination Areas A and B, Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, AK I:\Fort Glenn\4. Deliverables\4.6 CSS and CSP\4.6.3 Probability Assessment\Revised Final\PA_Decon Areas_Revised Final

Table of Contents Section 1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1-1

Section 2.0 History of Decontamination Areas A and B ............................................... 2-1

Section 3.0 Probability of Encountering CWM ............................................................. 3-1

Section 4.0 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................... 4-1

Section 5.0 Historical Information ................................................................................. 5-1

5.1 Site-Specific Work to Date Summary ........................................... 5-1

5.2 References ..................................................................................... 5-1

Section 6.0 Photographic Analysis - Historical Documentation and Maps ................... 6-1

List of Tables

Table 1 Mishap Risk Management Process Probability Categories

Table 2 Mishap Risk Management Process Severity Categories

Table 3 Standardized Army Risk Matrix

Table 4 Risk Matrix Codes and Descriptions

Risk Assessment / Probability Assessment ii

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASR

CAIS

CELMS

CSP

CWM

Archive Search Report

Chemical Agent Identification Set

Corps of Engineers, St. Louis

Chemical Warfare Materiel Site Plan

Chemical Warfare Materiel

DOD

FUDS

Department of Defense

Formerly Used Defense Site

RAC

RI

TEC

USACE

Risk Assessment Code

Remedial Investigation

Topographic Engineering Center

United States Army Corps of Engineers

Risk Assessment / Probability Assessment

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Risk Assessment/Probability Determination

Decontamination Areas A and B Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska

December 2011

1.0 Introduction

1.1 This document details the risk assessment/probability determination performed for Decontamination Areas A and B at the former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska. An environmental response (i.e., Remedial Investigation) is planned at these sites. This assessment has been completed in accordance with Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses and Related Activities, Interim Guidance (1 April 2009) Section 3-3 Probability of Encountering CWM Determination:

“Installation or district commanders will conduct an assessment of the probability of encountering Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) prior to conduct of ground disturbing (e.g.

construction) or other intrusive activities (e.g., range clearance activities, environmental responses), other than a CWM response, at CWM sites or sites where previous encounters with CWM have occurred or where there is evidence (e.g., historical or physical) that CWM may be present. This assessment will be documented and approved by the commander. The procedures follow:

a. Determine the scope of proposed activities.

b. Determine whether the site is listed on Department of Defense (DOD’s) inventory of CWM sites.

c. Review or conduct Munitions Response Historical Records Review or Archive Search Report (ASR) to determine the probability of encountering CWM during ground disturbing or intrusive activities. The probability will be documented per DA PAM 385- 30 [Mishap Risk Management, 10 October 2007].

d. If the probability of encountering CWM is categorized as “Seldom” or less, the commander or a designated representative may accept the risk of conducting activities as a non-CWM site. However, the safety and health plan for the response will include contingency plans for an explosives or munitions emergency response should CWM be encountered. CWM contingency plans will be approved by the commander or a designated representative.

e. If, during site activities, a munition with an unknown liquid fill or CWM is encountered, all intrusive response activities will be halted until such time as the fill is determined.

f. If the filler is determined to be CWM, the commander, in coordination with United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), will evaluate the circumstances and determine whether:

(1) The activity should be continued:

(a) As planned; or

(b) With modifications to address the potential to encounter additional CWM.

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(2) A CWM response is required prior to continuing.”

1.2 Table 1 identifies the risk management process probability categories.

Table 1. Mishap Risk Management Process Probability Categories Key phase

Term-keyword

Symbol Single item/activity Fleet or inventory of items-multiple activities

Individual Soldier All Soldiers exposed to the hazard

Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence greater than 10 -1 in that life

Continuously experienced

Occurs very often in the career.

Expected to occur several times during mission or operations. Always occurs

Occurs continuously during a specific mission, operation, or during a career

Likely B Will occur several times in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -1 and greater than 10 -2 in that life

Will occur frequently

Occurs several times in the career.

Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally often.)

Occasional C Likely to occur some time in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -2 and greater than 10 -3 in that life

Will occur several times

Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific mission or operation, but not often

Occurs several times in a career

Seldom D Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -3 and greater than 10 -6

Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur

Possible to occur some time in a career, but rarely.

Not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs rarely within the exposed population as isolated incidents

Unlikely E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -6

Unlikely to occur, but possible

Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur during a career. Can assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incident may occur over a career.

Notes:

1. Service life and career are defined as a period of 20 years unless specific as other.

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1.3 Severity approximates the amount of potential harm, damage, or injury associated with a given hazard scenario or mishap occurring. Severity and probability are independent of each other. In other words, determining severity has no relationship to determining the probability.

Determining an objective amount or cost for the hazard's outcome may be difficult. Therefore, severity ranges have been established to aid in this process. These severity ranges delineate a range of mishap outcomes. Table 2 identifies the mishap risk management process severity categories.

Table 2. Mishap Risk Management Process Severity Categories

Severity Symbol Quantitative Value Quantitative Value

Definition

Catastrophic I 1 or more deaths or permanent total disabilities

Loss exceeding $1M

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent total disability (accident risk). Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property (facility) damage.

Unacceptable collateral damage

Critical II 1 or more permanent partial disabilities or temporary total disability resulting in more than 3 months lost time

Loss exceeding $200K but less than $1M

Significantly (severely) degraded mission capability or unit readiness.

Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).

Extensive (major) damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property. Significant collateral damage

Marginal III 1 or more injuries or illnesses resulting in less than 3 months lost time

Loss exceeding $20K but less than $200K

Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, or property.

Lost days due to injury or illness not exceeding 3 months (accident risk)

Negligible IV 1 or more injuries or illnesses requiring first aid or medical treatment

Loss less than $20K

Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical treatment (accident risk).

Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable.

Little or no property damage

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1.4 Using the Army’s standard risk assessment matrix in Table 3, probability and severity for each identified hazard are converted into a standard level of risk. The resultant risk assessment code (RAC) and description is found by using Table 4. For example, a site with a ‘Likely’ (B) probability and a ‘Marginal’ (III) severity yields a standardized matrix value of M (3) and a RAC of 3 (moderate).

Table 3. Standardized Army Risk Matrix Probability

Severity Frequent A Likely B Occasional C Seldom D Unlikely E Catastrophic I E (1) E (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) Critical II E (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) L (4) Marginal III H (2) M (3) M (3) L (4) L (5) Negligible IV M (3) L (4) L (4) L (5) L (5)

Table 4. Risk Matrix Codes and Descriptions Risk Assessment Code (RAC) Description

1 Extremely High 2 High 3 Moderate 4 Low 5 Low

1.5 Risk Summation. The following categories are derived using the Risk Matrix.

a. Extremely High - Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or the mission produces extremely severe outcomes. This implies that the risk associated with this mission, activity, or event may have severe consequences beyond those associated with this specific operation or event. The decision to continue must be weighted carefully against the potential gain to be achieved by continuing this course of action. This decision must then be approved at an appropriate level of command.

b. High - Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, high potential for serious injury to personnel, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards occur during the mission. This implies that if a hazardous event occurs, serious consequences will occur. The decision to continue must be weighted carefully against the potential gain to be achieved by continuing this course of action. This decision must then be approved at an appropriate level of command.

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c. Moderate - The ability to complete the mission will be slightly degraded in the event this hazard occurs. If a hazardous event occurs, the event will only slightly impact on the mission, result in only minor injury or loss, and not affect overall readiness.

d. Low - Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. Injury, damage, or illness will be minor and have no long-term impact or effect.

1.6 This assessment is applicable to any intrusive activity (i.e., subsurface disturbance), which would include trenching, grading, borings, or well installations as examples. This assessment, however, does not cover and is not applicable for above grade work, facility repairs, or routine maintenance that does not involve intrusive ground disturbing activities.

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2.0 History of Decontamination Areas A and B

2.1 The CWS Decontamination Area A is located northwest of the main runway at N 53º 22′ 50.3″ W 167º 55′ 03.4″, and the CWS Decontamination Area B is located near the northeast end of the main runway at N 53º 23′ 20.3″ W 167º 52′ 25.3″ according to the Corps of Engineers, St. Louis (CELMS 2001). According to the ASR (CELMS 2001), the CWS Decontamination Areas A and B were used as personal decontamination stations. Historical drawings showed the typical layout containing showers, air locks, and decontamination rooms; and the remaining features found during site reconnaissance associated with the ASR corresponded to the historical drawings.

2.2 A site visit was conducted at the former Fort Glenn on June 18 and 19, 2003, to evaluate the site conditions and confirm the findings of the ASR. This site visit is documented in the CWM Scoping and Security Study Report (Parsons 2006), as follows:

• At CWS Decontamination Area A – “The site contained remnants of a wooden structure that had been built atop a concrete foundation, numerous metal water pipes and relatively large wooden reservoir, estimated at approximately 1,500 gallons. No visual evidence of chemical agent containers, residual agent, or degraded environment resulting from chemical agent decon practices was evident at the site.”

• At CWS Decontamination Area B – “The site was very similar to CWS Decontamination Area A in that it included dilapidated remnants of a wooden structure that had been built atop a concrete foundation, numerous metal water pipes and remnants of a relatively large wooden reservoir. The apparent differences between the two decon areas were that Area B was more intact, and contained much lumber and metal roofing debris still remaining at the facility. No visual evidence of chemical agent containers, residual agent or degraded environment resulting from chemical agent decon practices was evident at the site.”

2.3 Further reconnaissance was done in July and August, 2004 as part of the CWM Scoping and Security Study Report (Parsons 2006). This reconnaissance at the CWS Decontamination Area A resulted in discovery of one building foundation, two metal canisters (3-feet long and 2-feet in diameter, labeled “Chemical Warfare” and “Edgewood Arsenal”), and a large pipe sticking out of the ground to the south of the building foundation that seemed to be connected to a solid floor in the ground. CWS Decontamination Area B reconnaissance produced similar results, including discovery of a building foundation and no evidence of burial pits. No evidence of CWM or ordnance contamination was found at Decontamination Area A or Decontamination Area B (Parsons, 2006).

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3.0 Probability of Encountering CWM

3.1 Based on historical information, personal decontamination occurred at these sites.

Historical records and site reconnaissance for the entire Fort Glenn facility have documented that CWM and Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) were present at the former Ft.

Glenn. None of the historical documents reviewed or previous site reconnaissance has indicated that either chemical or conventional munitions were buried in either Decontamination Area A or in Decontamination Area B.

3.2 The planned Remedial Investigation (RI) fieldwork will involve soil borings around the former building foundations. Based on historical information, soils at the storage bunkers may contain residual chemical agent dispersed within the soil matrices.

3.3 The hazard probability of encountering CWM or CAIS in this area is judged to be ‘Unlikely’ (E) based on historical site use. The severity of encountering CWM or CAIS is judged to be ‘Critical’ (II) based on the potential for work disruption and worker exposures.

The resultant RAC is ‘Low’. Based on a ‘Low’ RAC score, intrusive work will not require a Chemical Warfare Materiel Site Plan (CSP)..

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4.0 Summary and Conclusion

The conclusion is based on the information provided above, and the Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses and Related Activities, Interim Guidance (1 April 2009) and DA PAM 385-30, Mishap Risk Management (10 October 2007). The hazard probability of encountering CWM or CAIS in the Decontamination Areas A and B is judged to be ‘Low’.

However, the planned soil boring activities should take into account the possibility of encountering soil contaminated with chemical agent, to include mustard and potential CAIS-related chemicals. Work at these areas can be conducted under a work plan and without a CSP. If an intact CWM item or CAIS is identified in the field, work will stop and a contingency plan will be initiated.

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5.0 Historical Information

5.1 Site-Specific Work to Date Summary

• 2001 historical records review and site reconnaissance detailed in Archive Search

Report (ASR), by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers St. Louis (CELMS).

• 2003 site reconnaissance detailed in CWM Scoping and Security Study Report, by Parsons, 2006.

• 2004 site reconnaissance detailed in CWM Scoping and Security Study Report, by Parsons, 2006.

• 2004 historical aerial photo analysis detailed in the Special Assessment GIS-Based Historical Photographic Analysis by the Topographic Engineering Center (TEC).

5.2 References

• CELMS 2001. Archives Search Report Findings for Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska. September.

• Ferris and Bivens 2002. SSG Tom Ferris & SGT John Bivens. 24-29Jul02 Combined Incident to Kodiak and Fort Glenn, Alaska. July.

• Parsons 2006. Site Specific Chemical Warfare Materiel Scoping and Security Study Report, Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) Site Inspection Report: Fort Glenn.

Draft Final Revision 2. August 20.

• U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Topographic Engineering Center. 2004. Fort Glenn – Umnak Island, Alaska: Special Assessment GIS-Based Historical Photographic Analysis. June.

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6.0 Photographic Analysis - Historical Documentation and Maps

1. Fort Glenn Army Airfield. (Parsons 2004)

2. Ft Glenn, AK, Potential Hazard Areas, Map A.

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3. Ft Glenn, AK, Potential Hazard Areas Overview Map.

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4. 1942 CWS Headquarters and Decon Bldg, (ERDC-TEC, 2004).

5. CWS Decontamination Area A. Photograph shows Decontamination Area A.

(Parsons, 2006)

1942 CWS DECONTAMINATION BUILDING(S) - ASR

Prepared By:

John Heinicke Project Manager URS, Inc.

Concurrence:

Risk Assessment/Probability Determination for the Former Fort Glenn Areas Decontamination Areas A and B

3-6-2012 Date

Carles Twing 1-7; - ;l.D(~

Chief, Chemical Warfare D si n Center U.S. Army Corps of Engine s, Huntsville Center

Concurrence:

Prog m Manager U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District

~ 'V/~ Reinhard W. Koenig Colonel, U.S. Army U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District

Risk Assessment I Probability Assessment DecontaminatIon Areas A and B, Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, AK Q:116 11\OS81IProbability AssessmentIRoy;,td Fin~1P A_Decon Ar..,Jin'LRev2.

Date

~~t2- Dt-I

Date

POA STAFF ACTION SUMMARY 1. CONTROL# 2. Suspense 2012-03-28

PM-12-039 3. Today's Date 2012-03-07

4. Subject Former Fort Glenn-Umnak Island Risk Assessment/Probability Assessment Final Revision Fl0AK02980S

5. Office Symbol 6. Action Officer 7. Telephone # 8. E-mail

PM-ESP-FUDS Carey Cossaboom (907)753-2689 carey .c.cossaboom@usace.army .mil

COORDINATION

9. Division 10. Name 11. Concur/Nonconcur 12. Comments 13. Date l~m __ m..J DC COL Reinhard W. Koenig r;J 3 Atll'l -

I~ ___ m __ ; DDC LTC James R. Stone ~- 1- (/tP.c. Il

[~ __ mm_: DPM Larry McCallister I":

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0 EA -_ . ...... ____ ,. __ J

0 EN -

D CO -

14. Routing [g] DC [g] DOC [g] DPM 10 EN 10 co

15. For: Information 01 Read-Ahead 0 1 Decision 0 1 Approval 0 T Signature [g]

16. PURPOSE/BOnOM LINE/DISCUSSION:

1. PURPOSE: To assess the likelihood that hazardous chemical warfare materiel (CWM) will be encountered in the field while conducting fieldwork at the Fort Glenn FUDS.

2. BOTTOM LINE: At the Ammunitions Storage Area, the risk of encountering hazardous CWM is high. Therefore, a Chemical Siting Plan (CSP) which includes full monitoring and mitigation support will be required to conduct work here. The risk of encountering hazardous CWM at the Possible CWM Storage Area and the Decontamination Areas A and B is low and will not require that work be done under a CSP. IfCWM is encountered at these areas, work will stop and a contingency plan will be initiated.

3. DISCUSSION: A former Ordnance Officer at Fort Glenn (he is also a retired university professor) recalled burying CWM at Fort Glenn in 1942. Geophysical investigations in 2004 revealed magnetic anomalies in the subsurface of the Ammunitions Storage Area that could be caused by a cache of ordnance that was described by the former Ordnance Officer. These magnetic anomalies have not yet been investigated. The plan is to investigate them in 2013.

4. RESOURCE IMPACT: None. Huntsville USACE (HNC) has issued a contract to create the CSP and conduct this work.

5. ROUTING: PM»ESP»Smith»OC»DPM»DDC»DC

6. Control Number: PM-12-039

17. Releaser: Clare Jaeger ~j ofCh-~~

18. Recommendation: The Colonel should sign the three G:a"babilh? Assessments for Fort Glenn.

19. Action: 1 Approved 0 1 See Me o 1 Other

POA FORM 1-R, APR 2010 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

PROPONENT: DE

VERSION 1.0