F10AK029805_03.11_0500_a.pdf

FINAL REVISION 1

RISK ASSESSMENT/PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

AMMUNITIONS STORAGE AREA

FORMER FORT GLENN

UMNAK ISLAND, ALASKA

FUDS #F10AK029805

February 2012

Prepared for:

U. S. Army Engineering and Support Center

Huntsville, Alabama and

U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District Elmendorf AFB, Alaska

Contract No. W912DY-09-D-0061 Task Order: 0002

Prepared by:

12120 Shamrock Plaza, Suite 300

Omaha, Nebraska 68154

16170581

J4ENGRAR

Typewritten Text F10AK029805_03.11_0500_aARIMS No. 200-1e

Risk Assessment / Probability Assessment i Ammunition Storage Area, Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, AK I:\Fort Glenn\4. Deliverables\4.6 CSS and CSP\4.6.3 Probability Assessment\Revised Final\PA_AmmoStorage_Final_Rev1

Table of Contents

Section 1.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1-1

Section 2.0 History of Ammunition Storage Area ............................................................... 2-1

Section 3.0 Probability of Encountering CWM ................................................................... 3-1

Section 4.0 Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................. 4-1

Section 5.0 Historical Information ....................................................................................... 5-1

5.1 Site-Specific Work to Date Summary ................................................. 5-1

5.2 References ........................................................................................... 5-1

Section 6.0 Photographic Analysis - Historical Documentation and Maps ......................... 6-1

List of Tables

Table 1 Mishap Risk Management Process Probability Categories

Table 2 Mishap Risk Management Process Severity Categories

Table 3 Standardized Army Risk Matrix

Table 4 Risk Matrix Codes and Descriptions

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASR

CAIS

CELMS

CSP

CWM

DMM

Archive Search Report

Chemical Agent Identification Set

Corps of Engineers, St. Louis

Chemical Warfare Materiel Site Plan

Chemical Warfare Materiel

Discarded Military Munitions

DOD

EOD

FUDS

HFD

MCE

MFD-H

ml mm

MMR

Department of Defense

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Formerly Used Defense Site

Hazardous Fragmentation Distance

Maximum Credible Event

Maximum Fragmentation Distance - Horizontal milliliter millimeter

Military Munitions Response

RAC

TEC

USACE

Risk Assessment Code

Topographic Engineering Center

United States Army Corps of Engineers

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Risk Assessment/Probability Determination Ammunition Storage Area

Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska December 2011

1.0 Introduction

1.1 This document details the risk assessment/probability determination performed for the Ammunition Storage Area at the former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska. An environmental response (i.e., Remedial Investigation) is planned at the Ammunition Storage Area. This assessment has been completed in accordance with Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses and Related Activities, Interim Guidance (1 April 2009) Section 3-3 Probability of Encountering CWM Determination:

“Installation or district commanders will conduct an assessment of the probability of encountering Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) prior to conduct of ground disturbing (e.g.

construction) or other intrusive activities (e.g., range clearance activities, environmental responses), other than a CWM response, at CWM sites or sites where previous encounters with CWM have occurred or where there is evidence (e.g., historical or physical) that CWM may be present. This assessment will be documented and approved by the commander. The procedures follow:

a. Determine the scope of proposed activities.

b. Determine whether the site is listed on Department of Defense (DOD’s) inventory of CWM sites.

c. Review or conduct Munitions Response Historical Records Review or Archive Search Report (ASR) to determine the probability of encountering CWM during ground disturbing or intrusive activities. The probability will be documented per DA PAM 385- 30 [Mishap Risk Management, 10 October 2007].

d. If the probability of encountering CWM is categorized as “Seldom” or less, the commander or a designated representative may accept the risk of conducting activities as a non-CWM site. However, the safety and health plan for the response will include contingency plans for an explosives or munitions emergency response should CWM be encountered. CWM contingency plans will be approved by the commander or a designated representative.

e. If, during site activities, a munition with an unknown liquid fill or CWM is encountered, all intrusive response activities will be halted until such time as the fill is determined.

f. If the filler is determined to be CWM, the commander, in coordination with United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), will evaluate the circumstances and determine whether:

(1) The activity should be continued:

(a) As planned; or

(b) With modifications to address the potential to encounter additional CWM.

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(2) A CWM response is required prior to continuing.”

1.2 Table 1 identifies the risk management process probability categories.

Table 1. Mishap Risk Management Process Probability Categories Key phase

Term-keyword

Symbol Single item/activity Fleet or inventory of items-multiple activities

Individual Soldier All Soldiers exposed to the hazard

Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence greater than 10 -1 in that life

Continuously experienced

Occurs very often in the career.

Expected to occur several times during mission or operations. Always occurs

Occurs continuously during a specific mission, operation, or during a career

Likely B Will occur several times in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -1 and greater than 10 -2 in that life

Will occur frequently

Occurs several times in the career.

Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally often.)

Occasional C Likely to occur some time in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -2 and greater than 10 -3 in that life

Will occur several times

Occurs some time in career. May occur during a specific mission or operation, but not often

Occurs several times in a career

Seldom D Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item or activity, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -3 and greater than 10 -6

Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur

Possible to occur some time in a career, but rarely.

Not expected to occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs rarely within the exposed population as isolated incidents

Unlikely E So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -6

Unlikely to occur, but possible

Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur during a career. Can assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation

Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incident may occur over a career.

Notes:

1. Service life and career are defined as a period of 20 years unless specific as other.

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1.3 Severity approximates the amount of potential harm, damage, or injury associated with a given hazard scenario or mishap occurring. Severity and probability are independent of each other. In other words, determining severity has no relationship to determining the probability.

Determining an objective amount or cost for the hazard's outcome may be difficult. Therefore, severity ranges have been established to aid in this process. These severity ranges delineate a range of mishap outcomes. Table 2 identifies the mishap risk management process severity categories.

Table 2. Mishap Risk Management Process Severity Categories

Severity Symbol Quantitative Value Quantitative Value

Definition

Catastrophic I 1 or more deaths or permanent total disabilities

Loss exceeding $1M

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent total disability (accident risk). Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property (facility) damage.

Unacceptable collateral damage

Critical II 1 or more permanent partial disabilities or temporary total disability resulting in more than 3 months lost time

Loss exceeding $200K but less than $1M

Significantly (severely) degraded mission capability or unit readiness.

Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability exceeding 3 months time (accident risk).

Extensive (major) damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property. Significant collateral damage

Marginal III 1 or more injuries or illnesses resulting in less than 3 months lost time

Loss exceeding $20K but less than $200K

Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or systems, or property.

Lost days due to injury or illness not exceeding 3 months (accident risk)

Negligible IV 1 or more injuries or illnesses requiring first aid or medical treatment

Loss less than $20K

Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical treatment (accident risk).

Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable.

Little or no property damage

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1.4 Using the Army’s standard risk assessment matrix in Table 3, probability and severity for each identified hazard are converted into a standard level of risk. The resultant risk assessment code (RAC) and description is found by using Table 4. For example, a site with a ‘Likely’ (B) probability and a ‘Marginal’ (III) severity yields a standardized matrix value of M (3) and a RAC of 3 (moderate).

Table 3. Standardized Army Risk Matrix Probability

Severity Frequent A Likely B Occasional C Seldom D Unlikely E Catastrophic I E (1) E (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) Critical II E (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) L (4) Marginal III H (2) M (3) M (3) L (4) L (5) Negligible IV M (3) L (4) L (4) L (5) L (5)

Table 4. Risk Matrix Codes and Descriptions Risk Assessment Code (RAC) Description

1 Extremely High 2 High 3 Moderate 4 Low 5 Low

1.5 Risk Summation. The following categories are derived using the Risk Matrix.

a. Extremely High - Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or the mission produces extremely severe outcomes. This implies that the risk associated with this mission, activity, or event may have severe consequences beyond those associated with this specific operation or event. The decision to continue must be weighted carefully against the potential gain to be achieved by continuing this course of action. This decision must then be approved at an appropriate level of command.

b. High - Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, high potential for serious injury to personnel, or inability to complete the mission to standard if hazards occur during the mission. This implies that if a hazardous event occurs, serious consequences will occur. The decision to continue must be weighted carefully against the potential gain to be achieved by continuing this course of action. This decision must then be approved at an appropriate level of command.

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c. Moderate - The ability to complete the mission will be slightly degraded in the event this hazard occurs. If a hazardous event occurs, the event will only slightly impact on the mission, result in only minor injury or loss, and not affect overall readiness.

d. Low - Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. Injury, damage, or illness will be minor and have no long-term impact or effect.

1.6 This assessment is applicable to any intrusive activity (i.e., subsurface disturbance), which would include trenching, grading, borings, or well installations as examples. This assessment, however, does not cover and is not applicable for above grade work, facility repairs, or routine maintenance that does not involve intrusive ground disturbing activities.

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2.0 History of Ammunition Storage Area

2.1 Historical documents found during the ASR Corps of Engineers St. Louis (CELMS 2001) refer to the transfer of 15 each Mustard Gas cylinders (1 ton containers), 38 Lewisite Gas cylinders (1 ton containers) and 75 millimeter (mm) HS filled projectiles (37 tons) from Fort Glenn. The Ammunition Storage Area (formerly known as the Ammunition Dump) is located in the north-central portion of Fort Glenn, approximately 1.5 miles north of the main airstrip, at N 53º 23′ 24″ W 167º 54′ 34″ (CELMS, 2001). This area was primarily used for storage of larger munitions, outdoors or in bunkers.

2.2 Dr. William Calkins, a Lieutenant Ordnance Officer at Fort Glenn in 1942, was interviewed in 2001 (Pastorick memorandum, 2001; CELMS 2004). Dr. Calkins recalled that around July 1942 there was concern that the Japanese might overrun the Aleutian Islands and possibly take control of Fort Glenn. He had received chemical munitions in addition to conventional items, and described the chemical munitions as something like “small bombs.” He remembered the munitions had a screw-in plug in the nose, and he believed that they contained mustard agent because something was leaking around the nose fitting. Because of concern that the chemical munitions could be captured or possibly contaminate conventional ordnance, he assigned Warrant Officer Guy Orsino to bury the chemical munitions. A burial pit was dug by hand, approximately 6 to 8 feet deep, and approximately 12 feet wide by 18 to 20 feet long. The pit was lined with canvas and wooden dunnage was placed on the canvas. The chemical munitions then placed on the dunnage and covered with canvas before backfilling the pit. This was done carefully to allow for recovery of the munitions after the danger passed. Dr. Calkins indicated he was moved from Fort Glenn after only 7 months, so he did not know if the chemical munitions were ever un-earthed.

2.3 A site visit was conducted at the former Fort Glenn on June 18 and 19, 2003 to evaluate the site conditions and confirm the findings of the ASR. This site visit is documented in the CWM Scoping and Security Study Report (Parsons 2006). Dr. Calkins was on this site visit team.

The site visit identified three discrete magnetic anomalies in the Ammunition Storage Area that were the approximate size and magnetic signature to be representative of the reported chemical munition burial pit. An empty Chemical Agent Identification Set (CAIS) metal shipping container (“pig”) was also discovered at the Ammunition Storage Area during the 2003 site visit.

The CAIS shipping container was located at coordinates N53 23.294 W167 54.797, and the immediate area around the pig was flagged off for safety purposes. Subsequent X-ray testing by the Ft. Richardson Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Team showed the shipping container to be empty. (Parsons 2004)

2.4 During the subsequent 2004 geophysical investigation, geophysical data identified 10 large pit-sized anomalies in the Ammunition Storage Area and 100 anomalies equivalent to the size of a single CAIS pig in the Ammunition Storage Area. (Parsons 2006) Based on further analysis of the geophysical data, it is currently believed that 11 pit-sized anomalies and 49 CAIS pig-sized anomalies exist at the site.

2.5 As part of the CWM Scoping and Security Study Report (Parsons 2006), an overall CWM site ranking was performed for Fort Glenn using the DoD Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol CHE Module. This ranking evaluation was based on the information collected at that

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I:\Fort Glenn\4. Deliverables\4.6 CSS and CSP\4.6.3 Probability Assessment\Revised Final\PA_AmmoStorage_Final_Rev1 time, including records review, site visits, and interviews. The following scores were given to the former Fort. Glenn (Parsons 2006):

• The presence and configuration of CWM was scored as a 20 based on the assumption that the CWM known or suspected of being present at the site are explosively configured CWM/Discarded Military Munitions (DMM) that have not been damaged.

• The potential of CAIS remaining at former Fort Glenn is based on the historical documentation of its use and storage at the facility. No records are available that document its offsite disposition or complete use; however an empty CAIS shipping container (“pig”) was found on the ground surface at the Ammunition Dump Area. The Information on the Location of CAIS is classified as ‘Suspected’ based on physical evidence with a score of 10.

• The information on the location of CWM remaining at former Fort Glenn is based on an eyewitness account of the burial. Geophysical data has been collected over the reported location. The data identifies large subsurface anomalies potentially representing buried munitions. The Information on the Location of CWM is classified as undamaged CWM in the subsurface with a score of 10.

• The former Fort Glenn is located on a remote island with only a small group of visitors every year. However, the site is undeveloped and no barriers exist to prevent access to all parts of the site. For all sites, the Ease of Access factor is scored as a 10 based no barriers to access.

• The former Fort Glenn is a formerly used defense site (FUDS) and owned by Alaskan Native Tribes, the BLM, and the ADOTP&F. The score for the Status of Property classification is 5 for non-DoD control.

• Based on the U.S. Census Bureau data for the 2000 census, the actual population density for Fort Glenn is fewer than 100 persons per square mile, resulting in a ranking score of 1.

• The number of occupied structures on and within two miles of the site is from one to five giving a score of 1.

• Residential and commercial activities are located on and near the former Fort Glenn giving the Types of Activities/Structures factor a score of 5.

• The former Fort Glenn is considered a historical site with ecological and cultural resources giving a score of 5.

• The sum of all of the various ranking scores for former Fort Glenn is 67 out of a maximum possible score of 100, which results in a Rating of ‘D’.

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3.0 Probability of Encountering CWM

3.1 Dr. Calkins (the Fort Glenn Lieutenant Ordnance Officer in 1942) recounted the burial of chemical munitions at the Ammunition Storage Area. Historical records of shipments from the island indicate that 75mm Mk II HS were shipped off the island in 1944. Based on that information, it is surmised that the chemical munitions referred to by Dr. Calkins were 75 mm Mk II HS projectiles. Dr. Calkins returned to the site in 2003 and the site visit team found three magnetic anomalies that could possibly be the burial pit. In 2004, additional geophysics identified 11 potential burial pit anomalies and 49 single anomalies that are suspect for the presence of CWM. The most likely CWM present at the site is a 75 mm MkII HS projectile.

3.2 Since an empty CAIS pig was found in this area, CAIS kit chemicals may be present if intact CAIS vials were buried and/or if CAIS were/are emptied onto the soil. CAIS are comprised of glass bottles or ampoules filled with various quantities of chemical agents and industrial chemicals. CAIS were used for training troops in the recognition of chemical agent and for decontamination training. Modern methods of subsurface detection including ground penetrating radar and metal detectors cannot reliably locate buried glass containers such as those associated with CAIS. Based on this information, sites documented to have CAIS cannot be determined to be completely clear of CAIS (Parsons 2006). Therefore; the following chemicals may be present at this site on account of CAIS kits:

• Neat carbonyl dichloride (CG)

• Cyanogen chloride (CK)

• Chloropicrin (PS)

• Adamsite (DM)

3.3 The hazard probability of finding CWM or CAIS in this area is judged to be ‘Likely’ (B), based on their historical presence at Fort Glenn, Dr. Calkins recollection of burial at the Ammunition Storage Area, the discovery of an empty CAIS pig, and geophysical data that identifies large subsurface anomalies potentially representing buried munitions. The proposed investigation at the Ammunition Storage Area will include hand digging with the assistance of earth moving machinery to characterize previously identified geophysical anomalies by visual identification and by sampling surrounding media (soils and groundwater). The severity of finding CWM is judged to be ‘Critical’ (II), based on the potential for work disruption and worker exposures. The resultant RAC is ‘High’. Based on the ‘High’ RAC score; intrusive work will require a Chemical Warfare Materiel Site Plan (CSP).

3.4 Based on the ‘High’ RAC score, air dispersion modeling is appropriate to determine the 1% lethality distance for safety of workers. Air dispersion modeling was completed by USACE using D2PC Version 2.0.4. The following two scenarios were modeled:

• Instantaneous release of mustard from a 75 mm Mk II projectile

• Instantaneous release of phosgene from a 40 milliliter (ml) glass ampoule

3.5 Based on the D2PC model, the maximum credible event (MCE) for the Ammunition Storage Area is the instantaneous release of phosgene from a 40 ml glass ampoule. The 1% lethality distance for this MCE is 16 meters (52.5 feet).

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3.6 Based on the explosives hazard from the 75 mm MkII projectile, the hazardous fragmentation distance (HFD) is 105 feet and the maximum fragmentation distance – horizontal (MFD-H) is 837 feet.

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4.0 Summary and Conclusion

4.1 The conclusion is based on the information discussed above, and the Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses and Related Activities, Interim Guidance (1 April 2009) and DA PAM 385- 30, Mishap Risk Management (10 October 2007).

4.2 The proposed investigation at the Ammunition Storage Area will include hand digging with the assistance of earth moving machinery to characterize previously identified geophysical anomalies by visual identification and by sampling surrounding media (soils and groundwater).

The hazard probability of finding CWM or CAIS in this area is judged to be ‘Likely’ (B) and the severity is judged to be ‘Critical’ (II). The resultant RAC is ‘High’. Based on the ‘High’ RAC score, intrusive work will be conducted under a CSP, which will require full CWM monitoring and hazard mitigation support for the protection of the public and workers.

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5.0 Historical Information

5.1 Site-Specific Work to Date Summary

• 2001 historical records review and site reconnaissance detailed in Archive Search Report

(ASR), by CELMS.

• 2001 interview with Dr. Calkins (the Fort Glenn Ordnance Officer in 1942), as detailed in a Memorandum by Jim Pastorick and in the ASR Supplement by CELMS.

• 2003 site reconnaissance detailed in CWM Scoping and Security Study Report, by Parsons, 2006.

• 2004 site reconnaissance and geophysics detailed in CWM Scoping and Security Study Report, by Parsons, 2006.

• 2004 historical aerial photo analysis detailed in the Special Assessment GIS-Based Historical Photographic Analysis by the Topographic Engineering Center (TEC).

5.2 References

• CELMS 2001. Archives Search Report Findings for Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, Alaska.

September.

• CELMS 2004. ASR Supplement for Fort Glenn. Military Munitions Response (MMR) Area Summary Range Name Suspect Burial Pit. November 26.

• Parsons 2006. Site Specific Chemical Warfare Materiel Scoping and Security Study Report, FUDS Site Inspection Report: Fort Glenn. Draft Final Revision 2. August 20.

• Pastorick 2001. Memorandum to Debra Caillouet, Subject: Dr. Calkins Interview.

December 12, 2001.

• U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Topographic Engineering Center. 2004. Fort Glenn – Umnak Island, Alaska: Special Assessment GIS-Based Historical Photographic Analysis. June.

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6.0 Photographic Analysis - Historical Documentation and Maps

1. Fort Glenn Army Airfield. (Parsons 2004)

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2. Ft Glenn, AK, Potential Hazard Areas, Map A.

3. Ft Glenn, AK, Potential Hazard Areas Overview Map.

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4. G-858G Bottom Sensor Fort Glenn (top) and G-858G Vertical Gradient Fort Glenn (bottom) (Parsons 2006).

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5. Photos of Ammunition Storage Area (Parsons 2006).

Photo 1: Ammunition Dump View from Mushroom Ridge

Prepared By:

Risk Assessment/Probability Determination for the Former Fort Glenn Areas

Ammunition Storage Area d-~:~'- 3-6-2012 Date

) -'1)- -ZD ( <-

Charles Twing Chief, Chemical Warfare D~n Center U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center

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I gram Manager U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District

'V(b Reinhard W. Koenig Colonel, U.S. Army U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District

Risk Assessment I Probability Assessment Ammunition Storage Area, Former Fort Glenn, Umnak Island, AK Q:\16 17\0581 \Probability Assessment\Revised FinaI\P A _ AmmoStorage_Final_Rev2

Date

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POA STAFF ACTION SUMMARY 1. CONTROL# 2. Suspense 2012-03-28

PM-12-039 3. Today's Date 2012-03-07

4. Subject Former Fort Glenn-Umnak Island Risk Assessment/Probability Assessment Final Revision Fl0AK02980S

5. Office Symbol 6. Action Officer 7. Telephone # 8. E-mail

PM-ESP-FUDS Carey Cossaboom (907)753-2689 carey .c.cossaboom@usace.army .mil

COORDINATION

9. Division 10. Name 11. Concur/Nonconcur 12. Comments 13. Date l~m __ m..J DC COL Reinhard W. Koenig r;J 3 Atll'l -

I~ ___ m __ ; DDC LTC James R. Stone ~- 1- (/tP.c. Il

[~ __ mm_: DPM Larry McCallister I":

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15. For: Information 01 Read-Ahead 0 1 Decision 0 1 Approval 0 T Signature [g]

16. PURPOSE/BOnOM LINE/DISCUSSION:

1. PURPOSE: To assess the likelihood that hazardous chemical warfare materiel (CWM) will be encountered in the field while conducting fieldwork at the Fort Glenn FUDS.

2. BOTTOM LINE: At the Ammunitions Storage Area, the risk of encountering hazardous CWM is high. Therefore, a Chemical Siting Plan (CSP) which includes full monitoring and mitigation support will be required to conduct work here. The risk of encountering hazardous CWM at the Possible CWM Storage Area and the Decontamination Areas A and B is low and will not require that work be done under a CSP. IfCWM is encountered at these areas, work will stop and a contingency plan will be initiated.

3. DISCUSSION: A former Ordnance Officer at Fort Glenn (he is also a retired university professor) recalled burying CWM at Fort Glenn in 1942. Geophysical investigations in 2004 revealed magnetic anomalies in the subsurface of the Ammunitions Storage Area that could be caused by a cache of ordnance that was described by the former Ordnance Officer. These magnetic anomalies have not yet been investigated. The plan is to investigate them in 2013.

4. RESOURCE IMPACT: None. Huntsville USACE (HNC) has issued a contract to create the CSP and conduct this work.

5. ROUTING: PM»ESP»Smith»OC»DPM»DDC»DC

6. Control Number: PM-12-039

17. Releaser: Clare Jaeger ~j ofCh-~~

18. Recommendation: The Colonel should sign the three G:a"babilh? Assessments for Fort Glenn.

19. Action: 1 Approved 0 1 See Me o 1 Other

POA FORM 1-R, APR 2010 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

PROPONENT: DE

VERSION 1.0