A09_JAVELIN_SECURITY_CLASSIFICATION_GUIDE.pdf

i

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE, MISSILES AND SPACE (PEO MS)

JAVELIN WEAPON SYSTEM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

18 March 2013

CLOSE COMBAT WEAPON SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE

REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA 35898-5000

DISTRIBUTION D: DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND US DOD CONTRACTORS ONLY (TO

PROTECT TECHNICAL DATA THAT ADDRESSES CURRENT TECHNOLOGY IN AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY APPLICATION) (16

April 2008) OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE REFERRED TO THE PROPONENT.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: DESTROY BY ANY

METHOD THAT WILL PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF

CONTENTS OR RECONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENT

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION EXEMPT

FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE UNDER FOIA.

EXEMPTION 2 APPPLIES

This document shall be used as guidance for classifying and declassifying information and material related to the Javelin program.

This document supersedes the Javelin Security Classification Guide dated 29 March 1999.

Approved by Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space

~r:J Brigadier General, USA Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

AUTHENTICATION PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1: GENERAL

I. Purpose

2. Authority and Scope

3. Office of Primary Responsibi lity

4. Classification Challenges

5. Reproduction, Extraction and Dissemination

6. Determination of Classification

7. Public Release

8. Foreign Disclosure

9. Definitions

SECTION 2: OVERALL EFFORT

SECTION 3: PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES

SECTION 4: SPECIFICATIONS

SECTION 5: CRITICAL ELEMENTS

SECTION 6: VULNERABILITIES AND W EAKNESSES

SECTION 7: HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE

SECTION 8: NOTES

APPENDIX A: ACRONYM LIST

APPENDIX B: REFERENCES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page

Ill

I lll

SECTION 1. GENERAL

I. Purpose: To provide classification policy, guidance, and procedures for information and activities pertinent to the Javelin Weapon System program.

2. Authority and Scope:

a. This guide is issued pursuant to provisions of Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5200.1 -R Information Security Program, Army Regulation (AR) 380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program, and DoD Manual 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual. Information classified according to this guide, including operations and activities that reveal such information, shall be safeguarded in accordance with applicable agency security directives. This guide includes requirements established by Executive Order (EO) 13526, Classified National Security Information.

b. This guide constitutes authority and shall be cited as the basis for classification, re-grading and declassification of information and material associated with the Javelin Weapon System program. Changes in classification required by application of this guide are effective immediately. There is no retroactive requirement to re-mark classified Javelin Weapon System documents which were generated prior to the effective date ofthis guide. However, mark those documents generated under EO 13526, to comply with applicable agency policy directives for implementing the EO. The classification shown within this SCG is the highest level anticipated.

3. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR): CCWS has primary responsibility for overall management ofthe Javelin Weapon System program. Inquiries, challertges, suspected compromises of information and suggestions concerning this guide and its interpretation should be addressed to Javelin Engineering Division Chief, SF AE-MSLS-CWS-E-J, DSN 897-5858, Commercial 256-313-5858 or Javelin Security, SFAE-MSLS-CWS-SC, DSN 746-2131, Commercial 256-876-2131.

4. Classification Challenges: If there is substantial reason to believe the security classifications prescribed in this guide impose requirements that are impractical or, if thi s guide needs to be changed due to the technological changes in the state-of-the-art or progress attained in the effort, communicate such to the Javelin Weapon System security manager. Pending final decision, handle and protect the information at its current classification level or at the recommended change level, whichever is higher. Point of contact for challenge to classification decisions for information related to the Javelin program is CCWS Security Office, building 4505, Martin Road Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-8000. Commercial (256) 876-2131 or DSN 746-2131. Include sufficient description to permit identification of the specific information under challenge with reasonable effort. Include detailed justification outl ining why the information is improperly or unnecessarily classified.

5. Reproduction, Extraction and Dissemination: This document provides authority to reproduce, extract from and or disseminate the SCG as necessary to those supporting the effort, including industry. Reproduction, extraction and dissemination are limited to the restrictions of the Distribution Statement applied to th is SCG. Distribution authorized to DoD agencies and their contractors for administrative and operational use.

6. Determination of Classification: Generally, information requiring application of national security considerations within the Javelin Weapon System include: effectiveness, countermeasure susceptibility, vulnerability, limitations, and concepts for potential operational deployment and tactics. This information is classified up to and including the Secret level, and denoted as follows:

U - Unclassified

C - Confidential

S- Secret

In accordance with EO 13256, Classified National Security Information, applicable Javelin information will be classified for the fo llowing reason:

1.4g - vulnerabi lities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection relating to the national security; which includes defense transnational terrorism.

7. Publ ic Release:

a. The fact that this guide shows certain detai ls of information to be unclassified does not authorize automatic public release of such informat ion. Separate from classification, there are other reasons why information may not be releasable including national-level policy implications. Other important release restrictions are governed by the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Operation Security (OPSEC) and regulations that apply to technical or other export controlled data. FOIA requests shall be processed through established FOIA channels as described in DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, DoD Freedom of Information Act Program. Strictly control distribution of the material until reviewed and approved for public release by the US Army Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space (PEO MS).

b. Any proposed release into the public domain of information pertaining to the Javelin Weapon System from outside of CCWS or other PEO MS office, will be submitted through Commander, US Army Aviation and Missile Command Li fe Cycle Management Command (USAAMCOM LCMC), ATTN: AMSAM-PA, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5020, in accordance with Chapter 5, AR 360-1. Releases which require referral to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD (PA)) as set forth in DoD Manual 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual , DoD 5230.9, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, with Change 1, and DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, shall be submitted 60 days in advance to allow sufficient time for processing. No material will be released until clearance is granted.

c. All material proposed for public release will require an OPSEC review by Javelin Weapon System OPSEC personnel and technical review by a Javelin Weapon System subject matter/technical expert review before release to the general public. After OPSEC and technical reviews, material will be submitted to the PEO MS Security Office for final OPSEC review and approval.

d. The PEO MS Security Office is responsible for coordinating requests for public releases received from the US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AM COM) Public Affairs Office. The PEO MS Security Office will maintain a record of all public releases by PEO MS personnel.

8. Foreign Disclosure:

a. Release of any information on this program to any foreign government, foreign nationals, representatives of a foreign government · or nation, or US citizen residing in a fo reign country, is subject to the provisions of AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. Any government activity or defense contractor receiving a request for classified or unclassified official information pertaining to this program from any foreign government, foreign national, representative of a foreign government or nation, or US citizen residing in a foreign country shall advise the requestor to make an official request through hjs Embassy to the Department of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

b. For classified military information, the disclosure authority is the PEO MS Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) and the HQDA, 02.

Such material must be consistent and supported by an appropriate release mechanism (i.e., Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case or Delegated Disclosure Letter (DOL)).

c. Foreign military sales issues will be considered during the review of all classi fication guides and coordination for such issues will be made with foreign disclosure officers and security assistance/foreign military sales representatives.

9. Definitions:

a. Feature- A characteristic, extracted from sensor signals, which can be used to detect, discriminate, recognize, or identify a mi litary target.

b. Pattern- A group of features.

c. Detection - The determination that something, which may be a target, is present.

d. Discrimination - The determination of whether a possible target is real or false.

e. Recognition -The process of determining to which class of targets an object belongs; i.e. , tank, armored personnel carrier (APC), or truck, etc.

f. Identification- The determination that within a class of targets, the object detected is a particular type; i.e. , T72 or T80 tank.

g. Tactical Guidance Section - Consists of seeker head, guidance electronics unit, and software.

h. Source Software - includes SW listings (in any format) and SW documentation.

i. Software documentation- includes (regardless of physical format) SW design documentation, algorithm description documentation, SW requirements specifications, SW test descriptions, SW development fo lders, and other documents which contain specific descriptions of or references to the source S W design.

j. Executable SW- the actual executable SW code regardless of format.

SECTION 2: OVERALL EFFORT

ELEMENT CLASS DECLASSIFY REMARKS

2.1 Identi fication

2.1.1. Name u

2. 1.2. National Stock Numbers u

2.1.3. Model Designation u

2. 1.4. Nomenclature u

2.2 End Item

2.2.1 External Views of End Items, Support u

Equipment, and Components

2.2.2. Internal Views of End Items, Support

Only if classified performance s 24 Mar2024 characteristics or other elements of Equipment, and Components classified material are revealed.

Only if classified performance

2.2.3 PhotographsNideo s 24 Mar 2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

Only if classified performance

2.2.4 Reports and Drawings s 24 Mar 2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

Only if classified performance

2.2.5 System Specification s 24 Mar 2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

Only if classified performance

2.2.6 Test Data s 24 Mar2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

2.2.7 Training, Operator, and Maintenance u

Manuals

2.2.8 Depot Test Equipment u

2.2.9 Field Test Equipment u

2.2.1 0 Memory Loader Verifier (ML V) u

2.2.11 X-Rays u

SECTION 3: PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES

~.1 Tactical System Effectiveness

3.1.1 System Accuracy

3.1.1.1 Hit Point Distributions (actual or c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6. from simulation)

Actual Ph data or simulation studies shall be SECRET only

3. 1.1.2 Probability of Hit (Ph) (actual or s 24 Mar 2024 when the results reveal a system from simulation) vulnerability to CM. Otherwise the classification shall be Confidential.

See Notes 1, 3, 6.

3.1.2 Probability of Kill (Pk) s 24 Mar2024 See Notes I, 4, 5, 6.

3.1.3 Smoke and Weather Effects s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 1, 3, 6.

3.1.4 Maintainability u

3.1.5 Employment Time u

3. 1.6 Rate of Fire u

3. 1.7 ShelfLife u

3.1.8 Lethality s 24 Mar 2024 See Notes I, 4, 5, 6.

3.1.9 Maneuverability (Missi le) u

3.1.1 0 Antiaircraft Capabilities c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6.

3. 1.11 Ranges

3.1.11.1 Minimum and Maximum Range u Design Requirement

3.1.11.2 Maximum and Minimum Range u

Capability

Actual Ph data associated with ranges or simulation studies shall

3.1.11.3 Minimum and Maximum Range s 24 Mar2024

be SECRET only when the results

Capabi lity when associated with a Ph reveal a system vulnerabi lity to CM. Otherwise the classification shall be Confidential.

This includes minimum, average

3.1.1 1.4 Minimum Arming Distance u and maxjmum warhead arming distance ranges.

3.1.12 Reliability Both demonstrated and required.

3.1.12.1 Round u

3 .1.12.2 Command and Launch u Equipment

3.1.13 Operational Availability u

3 .1.14 Remote Launch Distance u

~.2 Tactical Missile Performance

3 .2.1. SpeedN elocity (Missile)

3.2.1.1 Maximum u

3.2.1.2 Velocity Time Profile u

3.2. I .3 Maximum Lateral Acceleration u

Capability

3.2. I .4 Flight Duration u

3.2.1.5 Trajectory (Altitude vs. u

Range/Time)

3.2. I .6 Terminal Missile Body Angle u

3.2.2 Flight Motor

3.2.2. I Performance Characteristics u

3.2.2.2 Propellant

3 .2.2.2.1 Type u

3.2.2.2.2 Burn Rate u

3.2.2.2.3 Bum Time u

Javelin propellant generic composition weight percentages

3.2.2.2.4 Composition c 24 Mar 2024 are CONFIDENTIAL; without weight percentages, the composition is UNCLASSIFIED.

3.2.2.2.5 Weight u

3.2.2.2.6 Thrust Time Profile u

3.2.3 Launch Motor

3 .2.3 .l Performance Characteristics u

3.2.3.2 Propellant

3.2.3.2.1 Type u

3.2.3.2.2 Burn Rate u

. 10

3.2.3.2.3 Burn Time u

3.2.3.2.4 Composition u

3.2.3.2.5 Weight u

3.2.4 Seeker

Generic spectral band is

3.2.4.1 Spectral Response c 24 Mar 2024

UNCLASSIFIED. Specific spectral response data is

CONFIDENTIAL.

3.2.4.2 Target Detection Range u

3.2.4.3 Target Recognition Range u

3.2.4.4 Target Identification Range u

3.2.4.5 CM/CCM s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 1, 3, 6.

3.2.4.6 Mission Time u Operating Time in a given mission

interval.

3.2.4.7 Cool down Time u

3.2.4.8 Reliability u

3.2.4.9 Useful Life u

3 .2.4 .1 0 Operating Time u

Only if classified performance

3.2.4.1 1 System Imagery s 24 Mar2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

3 .2.4.12 Gimbals Maximum Slew Rate u

3.2.4.13 Gimbals Maximum Angular u

Deflection

3.2.5 Auto Pilot

3.2.5.1 Lateral Acceleration Design u

Limits

3.2.5.2 Terminal Body Angle u

p.3 Tactical Warhead Performance

3.3. 1 Depth of Penetration s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 2, 4.

3.3.2 Hole Volume s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 2, 4.

3.3.3 Fuzes c 24 Mar2024 See Note 9.

3.4 CLU

3.4.1 Night Sight

Generic spectral band is

3.4.1.1 Spectral Response c 24 Mar2024

UNCLASSIFIED. Specific spectral response data is

CONFIDENTIAL.

3.4.1.2 Target Detection Range c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6.

3.4.1.3 Target Recognition Range c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6.

3.4.1.4 Target Identification Range c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6.

3.4.1.5 CM/CCM s 24 Mar2024 See Notes l , 3, 6.

3.4.1.6 Mission Time u Operating Time in a given mission

interval.

3.4.1.7 Cool down Time u

3.4.1.8 Reliability u

3.4.1.9 Useful Life u

3.4.1.1 0 Operating Time u

Only if classified performance

3.4.1.11 System Imagery s 24 Mar 2024 characteristics or other elements of classified material are revealed.

3.4.2 Visual Optic Sight (Day Sight)

3.4.2. 1 Performance Characteristics u

3.4.2.2 CM/CCM s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 1, 3.

3.5 Quantified differences of classified The fact that Javelin tactical performance parameters between U.S. Javelin system performance for FMS is and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Javelin, s 24 Mar 2024 different than that of the tactical system performance for U.S.

forces is UNCLASSIFIED.

SECTION 4: SPECIFICATIONS

~.1 System/Subsystem Design

4.1.1 Physical Characteristics (Length, u Weight, Diameters, etc.)

4.1.2 Mechanical Components u

4.1.3 Electronic Devices s 24 Mar 2024 See Notes 7, II.

4.1.4 Hardware Models (Wind Tunnel or u total dummy)

4.1.5 Round

4.1.5.1 Reliability u

4.1.5 .2 Launch Tube Assembly u

4.1.5.3 Missile Assembly u

4.1.5.4 Airframe u

4.1.5.5 Propulsion Subsystem

Javelin propellant generic composition weight percentages are

4.1.5.5.1 Flight Motor c 24 Mar 2024 CONFIDENTIAL; without weight percentages, the composition is

UNCLASSIFIED.

4.1.5.5.2 Launch Motor u

4.1.5.6 Guidance Electronics Unit u

4.1.5.7 Seeker

Generic spectral band is

4.1.5.7.1 Spectral Response c 24 Mar 2024

UNCLASSIFIED. Specific spectral response design data is

CONFIDENTIAL.

4.1.5.7.2 Total Field of View u

4.1.5.7.3 Instantaneous Field of u View (IFOV)

4.1.5.7.4 Minimum Resolvable u Temperature (MRT) difference

4.1.5.7.5 Minimum Trackable c 24 Mar 2024 Temperature (MTT)

4.1.5.7.6 Noise Equivalent u Temperature (NET)

4.1.5.7.7 Optical Transfer Function u (OTF) of system

4.1.5.7.8 Modulation Transfer u Function (MTF) of system

4.1.5.7.9 Boresight accuracy (Night u Sight to Seeker/Missile)

4.1.5 .7 .1 0 Specialized engineering c 24 Mar 2024 See Note 10.

design Information

4.1.5.7.11 Specialized manufacturing c 24 Mar 2024 See Note 10.

specifications and processes

4.1.5.7.12 Oetectivity (D*) u

4. 1.5.7.13 Quantum efficiency u

4.1.5.7.14 Thermal Time Constant u

CM/CCM Informat ion is SECRET.

4. 1.5.7.15 Optical layouts s 24 Mar 2024 Manufacturing and assembly drawings are UNCLASSIFIED.

4.1.5.7.16 Gimbals maximum slew u

rates

4.1.5.7.17 Gimbals maximum u angular deflections

4. 1.5.8 Control Actuator System

4.1.5.8.1 Fin/thrust vector servo u

4.1.5.9 Warhead Subsystem

4.1.5.9.1 Design description s 24 Mar 2024 See Note 8.

4.1.5.9.2 Lethal mechanism type s 24 Mar2024 See Note 8.

4.1.5.9.3 lnterstage time delay c 24 Mar2024 See Note 9.

4.1.5.9.4 Jet characteristics c 24Mar2024

4.1.5.9.5 Liner design and

dimensions

4.1.5.9.5.1 Precursor u

4.1.5.9.5.2 Main Charge u See Note 8.

4.1.5.10 Fuze

4.1.5.10.1 Contact/ crush switch

graze sensitivity (degree of c 24 Mar 2024 obliquity)

4.1.5.11 Safe and Arm c 24 Mar2024 See Notes 9, 11.

4.1.6 Command Launch Unit (CLU)

4.1.6.1 Electronics Assemblies u

4.1.6.2 Day Sight

4.1.6.2.1 Magnification u

4.1.6.2.2 Field ofview u

4.1.6.2.3 CM/CCM s 24 Mar2024 See Note 1.

4.1.6.3 Night Sight

Generic spectral band is

4.1.6.3.1 Spectral Response c 24 Mar 2024 UNCLASSIFIED. Specific spectral response data is CONFIDENTIAL.

4.1.6.3 .2 Fields of view u

4.1.6.3.3 Instantaneous field of u view

4.1.6.3.4 MRT difference c 24 Mar 2024

4.1.6.3 .5 NET difference c 24 Mar2024

4.1.6.3.6 OTF of system c 24 Mar2024

4.1.6.3. 7 MTF of system c 24 Mar 2024

4.1.6.3.8 Display characteristics u

4.1.6.3.9 Boresight accuracy u

(Night Sight to Seeker/Missile)

4.1.6.3.1 0 Reticle line width u

4.1.6.3 .11 Minimum focus range u

4.1.6.3 .12 Specialized c 24 Mar 2024 See Note 10.

engineering design information

4.1.6.3.13 Specialized

manufacturing specifications and c 24 Mar 2024 See Note 10.

processes.

4.1.6.3 .14 0* c 24 Mar 2024

4.1.6.3 .15 Quantum efficiency u CM/CCM Information is SECRET.

4.1.6.3.16 Optical layouts s 24 Mar2024 Manufacturing and assembly drawings are UNCLASSIFIED.

4.1.6.3.17 System maximum rate u

of fire

SECTION 5: CRITICAL ELEMENTS

5.1 Warhead

5.1. 1 Warhead Penetration s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 2, 4.

5 .1.2 System Kill Probability s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 2, 5.

5.2 Guidance (Missile Onboard Command and

Control)

5.2.1 Tactical performance (range vs. target c 24 Mar2024 See Note 6.

size and temperature contrast relationship)

5.2.2 Target Tracking Capabi lity c 24 Mar2024 See Note 7.

5.2.3 Terminal Dive Conditions u

5.2.4 Statistics of Missile Dive Angles c 24 Mar 2024 See Note 6.

5.3 Seeker/Night Sight Optics

CLU f# is classified

5.3.1 F Number (f#) c CONFIDENTIAL.

Seeker f# is UNCLASSIFIED.

CLU focal length is classified

5.3.2 Focal length c CONFIDENTIAL. Seeker focal

length is UNCLASSIFIED.

5.3.3 Non-CM/CCM Optical Layouts u

5.4 Seeker/Night Sight Detector Dewar

Assemblies

5.4. 1 Entrance Pupil Diameter u

5.4.2 Detector Size u

5.4.3 Configuration of Detector Elements u

5.4.4 Detector Operating Temperature u

5.4.5 Diode Current versus Voltage u

Characteri sties

5.4.6 Optically Sensitive Area of a Detecting u Element

5.4.7 Quantum Efficiency u

5.4.8 Thermal Time Constant u

CLU 0* is classified

5.4.9 D* c 24 Mar2024 CONFIDENT£AL.

Seeker D* is UNCLASSIFIED.

5.4. 1 0 Noise of Detecting Elements u

SECTION 6: VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

~.I Theoretical and Proven Vulnerabili ty of the s 24 Mar2024 See Notes I , 3, 6.

System to CM

~.2 Data revealing Electronic/Optical CCM features and capabilities which are inherent in the system design and provide only system operation s 24 Mar2024 See Notes I , 3, 6.

principles (i.e. , as in functional diagrams, schematics, operational description, etc.)

6.3 Studies and reports which indicate system

~ffectiveness against specific known or suspected s 24 Mar2024 See Notes I, 3, 6.

CM

6.4 Studies, reports, analyses, simulation data, or

est data which reveal specific system operational s 24 Mar 2024 See Note I.

weakness or vulnerability not associated with raditional CM

6.5 System Operator CCM Information c 24 Mar2024

6.6 Vulnerability/Susceptibility Analyses

''Weapon System)

6.6.1 Analyses s 24 Mar 2024 See Note 1.

See Counter Active Protection

6.7 Counter Active Protection System (CAPS) s System (CAPS) Security

Classification Guide, 22 Aug 08

6.8 Electromagnetic (EM) Environmental

Effects

6.8.1 EM Radiation (Intersystem)

6.8.1.1 Operational Susceptibility s 24 Mar 2024 See Note 1.

6.8.1.2 Hazards Susceptibility s 24 Mar 2024 See Note 1.

6.8.2 EM Interference (lntrasystem)

6.8.2.1 EM Compatibility u

6.8.2.2 Conducted

6.8.2.2.1 Susceptibilities u

6.8.2.2.2 Emissions u

6.8.2.3 Radiated Emissions u

6.8.3 Lightning u

6.8.4 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) u

6.8.5 Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) s 24 Mar2024 See Notes 1, 3.

SECTION 7: HARDWARE I SOFTWARE

7.1 Hardware

7.1.1 Missile

7.1.1.1 Seeker u See Note 11.

7.1.1.2 Guidance Electronics Unit u See Note 11.

7.1. 1.3 Control Actuator System u

7.1.1.4 Warhead Assembly u See Notes 8, 11.

7 .1.1.4.1 Maincharge Liner u

7 .1.1.4 .2 Precursor Liner u

7.1.1.5 Fuze

7.1.1.5.1 Contact u See Note 9, 11.

7.1.1.6 Safe and Arm u

7.1.1.7 Flight Motor u

7.1.1.8 Launch Motor u

7.1.1.9 Electronic Devices u See Note 11.

7.1.2 Launch Tube Assembly u

7.1.3 Command Launch Unit

7.1.3.1 Night Sight u See Note 11.

7.1.3.2 Visual Optic Sight (Day Sight) u

7.1.3.3 Electronics Assemblies u See Note 11.

7.1.3.4 Electronic Devices u See Note 11.

7.1.4 Trainers

7.1.4.1 Field Tactical Trainer u

7 .1.4.2 Missile Simulation Round u

7.1.4.3 Surrogate CLU!Basic Skills u

Trainer

7.1.5 Ground Support Equipment u

7.2 Software

7.2.1 Missile SW

7.2. 1.1 Source for Downloaded Missile c 24 Mar 2024 See Notes 7, 9, II. sw

7.2.1.2 Downloaded Missile Executable u sw

7.2.1.3 Source for missile resident non-

volatile SW (Source for missile u Programmable Read Only Memory)

7.2.1.4 Non-volatile missile resident u

executable SW

7.2.1.5 Missile resident manufacturing u

constraints

7.2.1.6 Built in Test (BIT) u

7.2.2 Command Launch Unit

7.2.2.1 Scanner Source S W u

7.2.2.2 Scanner Executable S W u

7.2.2.3 Control Data Formatted Source u sw

7.2.2.4 Control Data Formatter u

Executable SW

7.2.2.5 Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) u

SW (Source & Executable)

7.2.2.6 Operator Interface (OIF) SW u (Source & Executable)

7.2.2.7 Built in Test (BIT) u

7.2.3 Field Tactical Trainer

7.2.3.1 Source SW u

7.2.3.2 Executable SW u

7.2.4 Basic Skills Trainer

7.2.4.1 Source SW u

7.2.4.2 Executable SW u

7.2.4.3 Scenarios and Targets SW u

7.2.5 Compilers, assemblers, SW

development tools, and support SW u (excluding the simulations)

7.2.6 Memory Loader Verifier (MLY) u

Operating SW (Source & Executable)

7.2.7 Any information which reveals the SW

compression algorithms used to process the s 24 Mar 2024 executable binary format missile SW prior to storage in the CLU

7.2.8 The SW processing algorithms used to

process the missile SW stored in the CLU as s 24 Mar 2024 it is downloaded from the CLU to the missile

SECTION 8: NOTES

1. Discussions, reports, or studies of system or subsystem capabilities, specifications or limitations disclosing an enemy tactic likely to defeat the weapon system will be classified SECRET.

2. The association ofrange target by designation or description to a specific vehicle or location on the vehicle is classified SECRET.

3. Flight Test Data:

a. Test data which reveals CM susceptibility is SECRET, when it is associated with a quantified CM. Test data which reveals a CM/CCM capability is SECRET, when the CM and the response are quantified. A CM becomes "quantified" when specific scenario details are revealed (e.g., target/background signature, smoke density, deployment geometry, deployment timing, etc.). The fact that Javelin either hit or missed in a particular CM scenario is UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Some CM are self-evident or obvious from the image sequence on the telemetry or videotape and need not be "quantified" in order to become classified, if Javelin susceptibility is revealed. Examples of CM that are obvious or self-evident and need not be quantified are: Optical Augmentation (OA), rotating targets, gun flashes, simulated or actual artillery bursts, fires , and flares. For definition purposes in this security guide, a target partially or momentarily obscured by defilade, earthworks, terrain, etc. is NOT a CM scenario.

c. All other data about or resulting from individual flight tests are UNCLASSIFIED including: flight test plans, scenario definitions, log sheets, Flash Reports, target type, target speed, target range, target azimuth angle, target delta-T, still photographs, film and video, hit/miss data, warhead impact angle, and telemetry data. All missile telemetry data transmission in real-time is UNCLASSIFIED.

Databases or collections of flight-test information or statistical summaries of those flight tests are CONFIDENTIAL if either of the following types of information is revealed in association with Javelin performance: terminal hit point coordinates or terminal warhead angle. A database or statistical summary is defined to be a collection in any format of three or more flights.

d. The results of flight tests which include CM are UNCLASSIFIED when no description of the CM effect on system performance is included. Information becomes CLASSIFIED when the effect on system performance is revealed.

e. Databases or charts containing target type (i.e. tank, APC, Truck), range to the target, target azimuth, target delta temperature, or hit/miss results are UNCLASSIFIED. Databases or charts containing the above plus terminal hit point or terminal dive angle are classified CONFIDENTIAL.

4. Warhead Performance Data:

a. Warhead performance data (total penetration [including residual] and hole volume) against generic targets (rolled homogeneous armor, mild steel , concrete, etc.) are CONFIDENTIAL. If, however, the data or estimate is against a simulated threat target, the data or estimate must be classified accordingly (lethal mechanism performance against National (U.S.) or Senior National Representative Range Targets is SECRET). For lightly armored vehicles (BTR, BMP, etc.) and tanks through the T-62, the data is CONFIDENTIAL.

For T-64/72/80 and later tanks, the data is SECRET.

b. For lightly armored vehicles, and tanks through the T-72M/Ml without explosive reactive applique or additional passive applique;

warhead performance data and external vehicle photographs/videos from warhead tests, which do not define the total level of warhead penetration, are UNCLASSIFIED. For lightly armored vehicles, and tanks through the T-72M/M 1, internal vehicle photographs/videos from warhead tests are UNCLASSIFIED.

c. Photographs/videos of assembled targets and radiographs revealing detailed penetrator/target interaction mechanisms are classified at the target level. Individual target plates from disassembled threat targets which contain no reference markings are

UNCLASSIFIED.

5. Classification of System Kill Probability is dependent on target information. Pk data for lightly armored targets and tanks through the T-62 is classified CONFIDENTIAL whi le Pk data for T64/72/80 and later tanks is classified SECRET. The Pk requirements from specifications are classified CONFIDENTIAL. Pk given an engagement opportunity is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

6. Simulation Data and Flight/Field Test Data:

a. The following missile variables output from the tactical flight simulation are UNCLASSIFIED:

thrust vs. time or range acceleration vs. time or range velocity vs. time or range position vs. time or range

b. The following terminal condition mean values and statistical distributions from the tactical flight simulation are CONFIDENTIAL:

track point or aimpoint hit point miss distance (relative to target or aimpoint)

The above parameters (track point or aimpoint, hit point, miss distance) are UNCLASSIFIED for single tactical flight simulation runs if they are not associated with specific non-stationary target input scenario parameters (e.g. , target velocity, target heading, maneuvers). Simulation studies shall be SECRET when the results reveal a system vulnerability to CM.

c. Flight and field test data (video tapes, camera data, telemetry and image tracking data): video tapes, camera data, telemetry, and image tracking data from a single missile flight, a single captive flight, or a single ground engagement are UNCLASSIFIED unless associated with actual target/conditions such as target type, delta temperature, obscurant levels, in which case the data is CONFIDENTIAL. If the description ofCM employed is revealed or seeker/tracker vulnerability is apparent, the image tracking data is SECRET. Documents which reveal telemetry channel identification along with related scale factors are CONFIDENTIAL. The estimated mean values and the statistics of terminal track point, terminal aim point, terminal hit point, or miss distances are

CONFIDENTIAL.

d. Seeker and CLU data: Data tapes of imagery with a voice track defining ranges to the target and target-to-background delta temperatures are CONFIDENTIAL. Data tapes revealing a susceptibility to a CM are classified SECRET when the effect of the CM or tactic is obvious. Examples of CM defined to be obvious and NOT requiring quantification for any observed susceptibility are maneuvering targets, gun flashes, simulated artillery impacts, fire barrels, and flares.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WarnerLO Highlight

WarnerLO Highlight

WarnerLO Highlight

e. Seeker or CLU data tapes with a voice track that quantifies the smoke transmission, target ranges, a target-to-background delta temperature are SECRET. Data tapes with quantified weather effects; i.e., rain rate, or atmospheric transmission, target range, and delta temperatures are CONFIDENTIAL.

7. Generalized descriptions of feature and pattern recognition techniques are UNCLASSIFIED unless they contain sufficient information to reconstruct classified algorithms or data tables. SW concepts under development will remajn UNCLASSIFIED until sufficient detai l or explanatory information is included that would allow identification of system parameters, methodology or weaknesses (e.g., missile guidance, target acquisition/tracking, CM/CCM). The classification of algorithms and processors meeting the above criteria must be determined on a case-by-case basis consistent with Note 1.

8. Assemblies (warhead prototypes or laboratory test charges) or liners associated with individual shaped charge designs are UNCLASSIFIED if they contain or are simple conical, hemispherical, or trumpet liners; and/or the special mechanisms, or liner contours, etc. are such that uniquely improved performance is not implied or revealed. When significant improvements over unclassified conventional approaches are obtained or projected, the design features are classified CONFIDENTIAL unless classified to a higher level by other security classification guides. For a shaped charge, significant improvement is defined as penetration into rolled homogenous armor (RHA) of more than eleven charge diameters or superior performance against any range target. Lethal mechanism subcomponents are UNCLASSIFIED if these design details do not reveal penetrator improvements or other classified design information. If these subcomponents result in significant improvement the design features are classified SECRET.

9. The operational warhead delay time is CONFIDENTIAL. When the default warhead delay time contained in the electronic safe and arm fuze (ESAF) is the same as the operational warhead delay time, the default delay time will be classified CONFIDENTIAL;

otherwise the default delay time will be UNCLASSIFIED.

I 0. Special information is defined as the precise, uniquely developed steps or series of steps required to design, engineer, process, or manufacture focal plane array equipped seekers or sights for the Javelin. Only that information whjch can be associated with specific, unique Javelin performance requirements will be classified. Documents or discussions encompassing general descriptions of engineering or manufacturing processes for focal plane array equipped seekers or sights are UNCLASSIFIED. Documents or processes which identify and detai l specific activities that are used to achieve or improve unique Javelin performance requirements wi ll be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

11. Electronic devices, which contain classified parameters or software in nonvolatile form, will be classified to the same level as the parameter or software. The electronic devices themselves are UNCLASSIFIED when classified parameters are stored in them if these values cannot be discerned without special documentation (i.e., requirements and design documents, program design language, source code). Electronic devices, which contain accessible (i.e. discernible without special documents) classified SW in a volatile form, will be classified to the level of that SW when active and the SW is loaded.

AAO

AL

APC

APS

AR

ATOM

BIT

BLOS

BMP

BTR

CAPS

CCM

ccws

CEP

CLU

CM

COP

D*

DA

DCID

Del ta-T DoD

EM

EMP

EO

ESAF

ESD

f#

FLIR

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

Army Acquisition Objective Alabama Armored Personnel Carrier Active Protection System Army Regulation Antitank Guided Missile Built in Test Beyond Line of Sight Boyevaya Mashina Pehoti (Soviet Mechanized Infantry Vehicle) Bronetransporter (Soviet Armored Transporter) Counter Active Protection System Counter-Counter Measures Close Combat Weapon System Circular Error Probable Command Launch Unit Counter Measures Common Operating Picture Detectivity Department of the Army Director of Central Intelligence Directive Temperature Difference Department of Defense Electromagnetic Electromagnetic Pulse Executive Order Electronic Safe and Arm Fuze Electrostatic Discharge Optical F Number (focal length/optic diameter) Forward Looking Infrared

FMS Foreign Military Sales FUE First Unit Equipped FY Fiscal Year FY DP Five Year Defense Plan lAW in accordance with IOC Initial Operational Capability ISOO Information Security Oversight Office MLV Memory Loader Verifier MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture MRT Minimum Resolvable Temperature MTF Modulation Transfer Function MTT Minimum Trackable Temperature NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical NBCCS Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability NET Noise Equivalent Temperature NISPOM National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual OA Optical Augmentation OIF Operator Interface OSF Optical Sight Filter OTF Optical Transfer Function Ph Probability of Hit Pk Probability of Kill SAMM Security Assistance Management Manual SCG Security Classification Guide SW Software RHA Rolled Homogenous Armor USAAMCOMUS Army Aviation and Missile Li fe Cycle Management Command US United States

APPENDIX B: REFERENCES

AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs Program, 15 Sep 00

AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 Sept 00

AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives, 22 Jun 05

AR 380-86, Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability Information, 22 Jun 05

Department of Defense Directive, DoD 5230.9, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, 09 Apr 96, with Change I, 15 Jul99

Department of Defense Manual, DoD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), 28 Feb 06

Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program, Jan 97

Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5400.7-R, DoD Freedom of Information Act Program, Sep 98, with Change 1, 11 Apr 06

Director of Survivability Management Office Memorandum, Classification of the Javelin Command Launch Unit (CLU) and Lower Level Components due to the Built-in Far Infrared OSF Filter Technology, signed by Francis M. Manion, 26 Jun 92

Executive Order (EO) 13526, Classified National Security Information, 25 Mar 03

Security Classification Guide for Counter Active Protection Systems (CAPS), 22 Aug 08

Security Classification Guide for Laser Protection Materials, 11 Jun 92, publi shed by US Army Laboratory Command, Adelphi, Maryland

Javelin System Threat Assessment Report, dated Apr 2009