ADVANCE_Evaluation_report.pdf

FEBRUARY 2009

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Democracy International, Inc.

NIGERIA

NIGERIA ADVANCE PROGRAM

MIDTERM EVALUATION

Prepared under Task Order Number 19 under the Democracy and Governance Analytical Ser-vices IQC, Contract Number DFD-I-00-04-00229-00.

Submitted to:

USAID/Nigeria

Prepared by:

Kevin C. Rubio Chijioke Kelechi Iwuamadi

Contractor:

Democracy International, Inc.

4802 Montgomery Lane, Suite 200 Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: 301-961-1660 www.democracyinternational.com http://www.democracyinternational.com/

NIGERIA ADVANCE PROGRAM

MIDTERM EVALUATION REPORT

FEBRUARY 2009

DISCLAIMER

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Nigeria ADVANCE Program Midterm Evaluation Report

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary of Findings on Programming, Management and Implementation

Recommendations For 2009 -2010 Advance Programming

I. INTRODUCTION

Structure/Political Environment

Political Reforms

State Reforms

Socio-Economic Reforms

The ADVANCE Program

Evaluation Approach

Advance Program Recommendations

II. CREATING EFFECTIVE NIGERIAN NETWORKS AND COALITIONS

III. PROMOTING SUBNATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES

IV. FOCUSING NATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES

V. PROMOTING SYNERGIES ACROSS USAID PROGRAM AREAS

Education

Health

Economic Growth

Connecting Cross Sectoral Civil Society Efforts to Policy

Synergies with Multilateral and Bilateral Donors

VI. ELECTORAL REFORM WORK

VII. STRENGTHENING CSO CAPACITY FOR DIRECT FUNDING

VIII. MEASURING PROGRAM IMPACT

IX. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

ANNEX A: Key Informants Interviewed

ANNEX B: Compendium of Documents Reviewed

ABBREVIATIONS

AAIN ActionAid International, Nigeria ABGREMO Akpabuyo Bakassi Green Movement (aka known as Green Concern Movement) ADVANCE Advocacy, Awareness and Civic Empowerment BTAN Budget Transparency Network CAPP Community Action for Popular Participation CISLAC Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center CLEEN Center for Law Enforcement Education CRAI Citizens Rights Awareness Initiative CSO Civil Society Organization CSP Country Strategic Plan DG Democracy and Governance DRG Debt Relief Gains EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EG Economic Growth EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EU European Union FCT Federal Capital Territory FEC Federal Executive Council FOIA Freedom of Information Act FOMWAN Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria GON Government of Nigeria IAGGA International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices Commission IFES International Foundation of Electoral System IMC Interfaith Mediation Center INEC Independent National Election Commission IRI International Republican Institute JDPC Justice Development and Peace Commission LMS Leadership Management and Sustainability ISO Intermediary Service Organization MDG Millennium Development Goals MER Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting MULAC Muslim League for Accountability NBA Nigerian Bar Association NDI National Democratic Institute NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy NGO Nongovernmental Organization NPC National Planning Commission NPWP National Procurement Watch Platform NLC Nigeria Labor Congress NUJ Nigerian Union of Journalists OSIWA Open Society Initiative for West Africa P/DG Peace and Democratic Governance PABA People affected by AIDS PPA Public Procurement Act PPDC Public & Private Development Centre

PWYP Publish What You Pay Coalition RFTOP Request for Task Order Proposal SEEDS State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy SRIP Support to Reforming Institutions Programme SO United Stated Agency for International Development Strategic Objective USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government WANGONeT West Africa Nongovernmental Organization Network ZCC Zero Corruption Coalition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy In-ternational (DI) conducted an evaluation of the USAID-funded Advocacy, Awareness and Civic Empowerment (ADVANCE) civil society program in Nigeria. The ADVANCE program, implemented by Pact/Nigeria, was initiated on May 23, 2005 and is scheduled to conclude on May 22, 2010. This evaluation was intended to assess pro-gram performance by reviewing ADVANCE’s programming, management and imple-mentation approaches, to present lessons learned, and to provide recommendations to im-prove program implementation. The evaluation was to specifically address the following queries, outlined in USAID’s Request for Task Order Proposals (RFTOP):

Whether the program has achieved its specific program goals;

The extent of the program’s contribution to the broader USAID/Nigeria Peace and Democratic Governance (P/DG) strategy, including synergies with other P/DG programs;

Potential changes to the program for its remaining years to better meet its pro-gram goals, strengthen its contribution to a broader peace and democratic governance strategy, and to promote greater synergy with other mission pro-grams; and

How the program is contributing to broader civil society efforts to hold gov-ernment accountable.

In addition, 13 specific questions were posed directing this inquiry to assess the partner-ships, synergies and unintended consequences of the program. These questions are indi-vidually addressed below in section IX.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON PROGRAMMING, MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

Despite the changes in Country Representatives and key technical staff, Pact has largely done well implementing ADVANCE given the resource limita-tions, obstacles and geographically and socially diverse environment it faces.

Its success is particularly visible in its approach to providing institutional ca-pacity building training and mentoring to its subgrantees, with most ADVANCE Nigerian partners lauding Pact’s unique skills and supportive mentoring approach.

Pact has been successful in adjusting its operations, management and pro-gramming to accommodate changes in the operating environment and the need to incorporate additional programmatic activities.

Inclusion of training and technical assistance to religious NGOs (Interfaith Mediation Centre) and networks (MULAC) in the northwest geopolitical area has yielded an increased positive perception of engagement with Pact and in-ternational donor activities among these groups. This has also yielded impres-sive results in strengthening the internal institutional capacity for those organ-izations, both in their operations and in designing and implementing pro-gramming involving religious leaders in democracy building activities (e.g.

civic education around the elections).

While institutional subgrantees have praised strengthening activities for sup-porting substantial development in their organizational capacity, these activi-ties have been narrow in scope and have concentrated primarily on building those administrative, financial and management skills needed for ADVANCE subgrant project implementation.

Activities that focus on working with coalitions and networks to understand their roles and to engage and strengthen their constituencies have not been in-cluded within ADVANCE’s CSO institutional strengthening activities. In dis-cussions with Pact it was evident that this type of analysis or work has not been considered.

ADVANCE non-service-delivery NGOs (e.g. public policy and watchdog groups) working on budget transparency and anticorruption issues struggle to connect their work to constituencies.

Coalitions and networks focused on budget transparency and anticorruption largely serve the interests of their more established members. These networks and coalitions do not reach out to or actively engage with other segments of civil society (e.g., religious groups, professional associations, youth groups) which have overlapping interests and could support their efforts.

There is a general consensus among Nigerian civil society stakeholders and this evaluation team that more must be done to “reach down” to larger seg-ments of the population to involve them in advocacy.

It was difficult for this evaluation to verify with any degree of certainty the ef-fects of ADVANCE programming and the ADVANCE credited successes (e.g. ADVANCE’s role in the FY 2007 passage of the Fiscal Responsibility, Public Procurement and NEITI laws). As with other civil society programs aimed at improving various dimensions of governance, it was difficult to fol-low the causal connection between ADVANCE assistance and identified suc-cesses in Nigeria, or to determine what would be observed from Nigerian civil society advocacy activity in the absence of the ADVANCE program. A true impact evaluation would require a more rigorous Monitoring and Evaluation design from the start of the program.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2009 -2010 ADVANCE PROGRAMMING

The following recommendations are discussed in more detail in Sections II through VIII of the report. The recommendation topics reflect USAID/Nigeria Mission requests for information on distinct program dimensions, as well as evaluation team suggestions for other areas of need not originally identified by the Mission. In making these recommen-dations, the evaluation team acknowledges that the ADVANCE program has been ongo-ing since May 2005 and is entering its final full year of program implementation, with financial resource constraints and ongoing momentum in its programming. This midterm evaluation comes late in the program implementation cycle, during a period when USAID P/DG is also looking at ADVANCE programming in light of opportunities for complementary funding from a public-private partnership. In this period, data from a forthcoming consultant report on state-level opportunities and priorities for USAID/Nigeria programming is also expected to inform decision making regarding re-source and programming allocation across states.1 In the absence of this expanded infor-mation, the evaluation team recommends a few targeted adjustments to ADVANCE pro-gramming in the following areas:

More Effective Networks and Coalitions

Provide additional training and mentoring assistance to networks and coali-tions on roles and fundamentals of these types of institutions.

If financial resources are available, provide institution-building grants to the existing ADVANCE coalition and network partners to develop systems and services.

Support the efforts of coalitions and networks to broaden their constituency base and network more effectively across states and across social and tech-nical sectors.

Collaborate with Oxfam-NOVIB in providing institutional strengthening sup-port to Publish What You Pay (PWYP) as its newly elected leadership moves past difficult leadership and transparency issues and strives to rebuild credibil-ity and effectiveness with its members and donors. This collaboration should focus on the improvement of internal management, strategic planning and campaign programming.

The above-mentioned training, mentoring and grants should be streamed to networks and coalitions by selecting an issue for intensive subnational focus, which would serve as a vehicle to connect national level NGOs with civil so-ciety and citizens at state and local levels. One way to accomplish this goal might be to work with the stakeholders frequently mentioned in the context of

NEITI.

Work with existing ADVANCE coalition and network partners.

Sub-National Initiatives

Increase subnational level activities by continuing to strategically leverage and support ongoing ADVANCE anticorruption and budget advocacy activi-ties (particularly NEITI).

1 The report will be written by Dr. Darren Kew.

Link with USAID/Nigeria partners and other partners carrying out parallel ini-tiatives.

Consider budget tracking and advocacy as areas in which to increase ADVANCE subnational work.

Integrate and coordinate ADVANCE state-level activities with any new USAID local governance initiatives. State and local governments operate a joint account. It is therefore essential that any USAID local governance initia-tives working on budget transparency issues also coordinate activities with budget transparency initiatives on the state level.

Seek to complement other donor efforts (e.g. EU-EDF and EIDHR program-ming; UNDP) by working in the same regions as these programs or on similar anticorruption and transparency issues.

Support Nigerian NGOs’ subnational efforts to connect with and include in-formal civil society and individual citizens.

National Initiatives

As programming increases on the subnational level, it should be reduced at the national level. ADVANCE financial and human resources are finite, and an increase in subnational work also dramatically affects the time involved in management and oversight of activities in geographical areas outside of Abu-ja.

National level activities must focus on fewer issues. Key issues should be chosen from either advocacy for new legislation (e.g. Whistleblower act, FOI) or monitoring the implementation of recently passed laws (e.g. NEITI, Fiscal Responsibility). In interviews, program stakeholders expressed that they had difficulty understanding the dynamics between the Yara’dua government and ADVANCE advocacy activities around the passage of bills such as FOI. The evaluation team therefore recommends that the focus of activities be on the implementation of recently passed laws as a way of solidifying some good governance successes.

Cross-Sectoral Work

Increase cross-sectoral work with other USAID/Nigeria implementing part-ners, in conjunction with the above-mentioned strengthening of network and coalition activities and increasing ADVANCE subnational programming. Op-portunities for and identification of this cross-sectoral work will only come from an increase in ADVANCE interaction with other programs and imple-menting partners outside of P/DG. Interaction is currently limited to P/DG implementing partners.

There are potential opportunities for these cross-sectoral linkages, including collaboration on budget tracking and advocacy initiatives with USAID educa-tion and health programs, that should be considered.

Electoral Reform Work

As ADVANCE has experience working with NGOs focused on election civic education and advocacy activities, it should serve in a limited capacity as a nexus between these groups and implementing partners in Nigeria that con-duct pre- and post-electoral programming. ADVANCE should discontinue its work with any election-focused programming to avoid the further diversion of resources away from previously planned ADVANCE activities.

Direct Contracting with Nigerian Institutions

USAID/Nigeria P/DG should develop a five-year plan for moving toward the goal of directly funding Nigerian P/DG civil society organizations (CSOs).

ADVANCE should help in this process by first learning from other USG pro-grams and other implementing partners about the approaches to preparing Ni-gerian institutions to receive direct funding. Then ADVANCE can help to es-tablish a structured process to identify and mentor Nigerian CSOs working in P/DG program.

CSO institutional capacity building Objective 1 activities should be broadened and considered strategically. They should also be introduced as not only an extension of and means to support anticorruption, electoral reform and budget advocacy activities, but also as a way to build the direct contracting capacity of Nigerian institutions based upon the process developed in coordination with USAID/Nigeria P/DG.

Measuring Program Impact

Greater emphasis should be placed on impact evaluation. With little more than a year of the program remaining, measuring impact should be focused in a limited fashion on new or nascent ADVANCE activities such as those rec-ommended in this report. Good targets for measuring program impact include the development of networks and coalitions, the success of building verti-cal/horizontal linkages in coalitions and networks, and the value of cross sec-toral synergies, to cite a few.

Support should be requested from the new USAID/DCHA/DG evaluation ini-tiative, which is available to help missions design new programs to allow for more rigorous evaluations.

I. INTRODUCTION

Structure/Political Environment

The emergence of democratic political processes in Nigeria in 1999 created a space for civil society involvement in democratic governance and in promoting people-centered development. This period has been described as a critical juncture for civil society groups in Nigeria. While civil society organizations fought for and helped to entrench democrat-ic rule, they unfortunately lacked adequate capacity to continue to engage the democratic process. This created an urgent need to build the capacity of civil society, especially in the areas of legislative advocacy and engagement with various government reform pro-grams. ADVANCE has played a critical role in building and strengthening the capacity of civil society to drive this process.

Three offices play key roles in fostering the executive agenda on issues related to civil society in Nigeria. These offices are the office of the Special Adviser to the President on Civil Society Relations, the office of the National Orientation Agency (NOA), and the National Planning Commission (NPC). Civil society organizations work with these gov-ernment agencies to ensure public consultation and input in the delivery of government services and programs.

Nigeria has witnessed a number of significant government reforms, particularly before the inauguration of the present administration in May 2007. In 2005 the Paris Club grant-ed debt relief amounting to 70 percent of Nigeria’s $36 billion in external debts. These debt relief gains (DRGs) were channeled to the development of socio-economic projects across the country. To ensure the proper utilization of these funds, civil society was en-gaged in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of projects executed with the DRGs. In 2006, Pact/USAID and DFID, in collaboration with Nigerian government, supported a capacity-building workshop for civil society engagement in the M&E of DRGs projects.

The current structure and political environment of Nigeria can be understood within the context of three streams of reform activities. These activities have affected the institu-tionalization of democracy and good governance in different sectors, and include state reforms (e.g. anticorruption, judicial reforms, privatization, pension reform, and due pro-cess, among others); socio-economic reforms (e.g. health, education, banking sectors, trafficking, and telecommunication); and political reforms (e.g. political parties, elec-tions, the INEC, and a failed constitutional amendment to permit then-President Obasanjo to run for a third four-year term in office). Interestingly, civil society organizations played a watchdog role by monitoring these reforms’ effect on the public. CSOs moni-tored and tracked the implementation of these reform programs, with some social critics and civil society activists arguing that most of the reforms were ill-motivated and de-signed to protect the selfish political and economic interests of the ruling class.

The effectiveness and future of these reforms became a major concern for a large seg-ment of civil society due to the manner in which the present regime operates. The Yara’dua government does not appear to be building on the strengths of the reform struc-tures of its predecessor. Civil society expected the present administration to address the weaknesses and the autocratic implementation of some of the previous reforms in order to strengthen institutional capacities to deliver good governance. Regrettably, as most civil society activists have argued, Yara’dua’s regime appears to have little direction or focus with regard to reforms. Though the administration claims to be pursuing a rule-of-law agenda, there is a widespread perception that reforms are being instituted in an un-democratic and nontransparent manner. For instance, the dramatic change in the antigraft war and the failure of the FOI and other pending bills in the National Assembly are among the major concerns of civil society.

POLITICAL REFORMS

Civil society organizations played a significant role in political reform programs. Their engagement and interventions in the political reform process, with the support of a group at the National Assembly known as 2007 Movement, is one of the major successes of CSOs within the period under review, especially regarding their opposition to the third-term agenda of President Obasanjo. The failure of Obasanjo’s bid to extend his tenure for a third term led to the complete disruption of the constitutional amendment process at the National Assembly on May 6, 2006. CSO activities included intensive and massive advo-cacy and “sticking to issues” campaigns that were channeled toward thwarting a third-term bid by Obasanjo. Despite his failure to retain power, Obasanjo succeeded in orches-trating an April 2007 election widely perceived as unfair. Using the state apparatus and political machinery at his disposal, in the end he was able to impose on Nigerians his candidate for the presidency.

Civil society organizations were vocal in raising critical concerns regarding the April 2007 elections. Among the issues were whether the election would be free and fair con-sidering the political situation in the country, which included political and extra-judicial killings. Other issues of concern included the credibility of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which civil society organizations perceived to be under the control of the Obasanjo’s administration and poised to steal the election through the so-called direct capturing voting machine. Likewise, the voter registration exercise and the screening of political candidates exposed the unpreparedness and administrative laps-es of the INEC in the conduct of elections.

In a bid to improve the future administration of Nigeria’s elections, the current govern-ment constituted an Election Reform Committee (ERC), which includes civil society rep-resentatives on its oversight committee and aims to look critically at Nigeria’s electoral system and support the implementation of best practices. The committee successfully completed its work and submitted its report in December 2008. As civil society organiza-tions patiently wait for the government to adopt and implement the recommendations of the ERC, they also need to re-strategize their approach to engaging the National Assem-bly, as it prepares to review the 1999 constitution later this year.

STATE REFORMS

In his speech for the observance of Nigeria’s 46th year of independence in 2006, former President Obasanjo expressed the need to enhance the functional capacity of state institu-tions. In the same vein, the then-Chief Justice of Nigeria Alfa Belgore expressed regret over the state of the Nigerian judiciary and called for far-reaching reforms. Among the state reforms so far have been the activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Com-mission (EFCC). Some analysts allege, however, that the agency has been used to single out perceived critics of the government. Nonetheless, the agency has received numerous internal and external commendations. The present administration’s removal and dismissal of the EFCC’s former head, Nuhu Ribadu, from the police force is an ongoing conten-tious issue and seems to have created a divide between those in civil society who argue for and against Ribadu’s dismissal from the force.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORMS

Nigeria continues to witness sluggish economic growth and increasing poverty, despite the huge funds invested in the country to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the health sector, there have been successes in the areas of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), in polio vaccination, and in the fight against fake drugs. The edu-cation sector has also seen improvements, though much of civil society strongly opposed the privatization of unity schools. Due to its importance for human and state development and the attainment of the MDGs, education attracted extensive financial support from both government and donor agencies, making the education sector one of the critical sec-tors for civil society budget tracking and monitoring.

Civil society intervention in the budgetary process in Nigeria evolved after a major civil society summit on budget monitoring in 2001, which was supported by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) in collaboration with Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), Socio-Economic Rights Initiatives (SERI), Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC). This meeting created an entry point for the international donor community to become involved in Nigeria’s budgetary process. The USAID Promoting Stakeholders’ Participation in Economic Transition (PROSPECT) program facilitated the formation of the Budget Transparency Network (BTN), which included involvement by USAID ADVANCE.

It is vital to note that USAID ADVANCE played a role in the socio-economic reform programs in Nigeria within the year under review, including activities in 2006 of ADVANCE subgrantee CISLAC that were key to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill. The NEITI and Public Procurement bills were also bills enacted with support of ADVANCE and other donor agencies, though these bills have yet to be implemented.

The above three reform areas serve as a window into the dimensions of the political and social environment of Nigeria between 2005 and 2008. In conducting this midterm evalu-ation of the USAID ADVANCE program, the evaluation team collected feedback from the field which reveals that CSOs are profoundly concerned about the overall direction of the present Yara’dua regime. For most civil society activists, this administration appears to lack direction in terms of either sustaining the reforms of the previous regime or com-ing up with its own approach. Among activists’ major concerns are the failure to enact the FOI bill and the inability - or unwillingness - to implement NEITI and other Acts that have been passed by the National Assembly. More important, the perceived collapse of the war on graft has made CSOs lose confidence in the present regime. Still, there remain great opportunities for civil society involvement and genuine engagement with the gov-ernment in fostering democratic governance in Nigeria. The government’s perception of civil society organizations, and particularly of NGOs that provide services and implement programs for international donors and institutions, is still one of contention and suspicion, coupled with feelings that these organizations are propaganda tools for the donor com-munity. CSOs have to work both individually and in a group effort toward assuaging the-se concerns by increasing productive partnerships with the government and conducting their activities in a constructive and transparent manner.

THE ADVANCE PROGRAM

The ADVANCE program contributes to USAID CSP 2004-2009 Strategic Objective (SO) 11: Strengthened Foundations for Democratic Governance. It has been implemented over a four-year period (to be completed in May 2010) and has overlapped with and been involved in many of the major political, socio-economic and state reform events outlined above. By working with civil society to affect demand-side approaches to improve demo-cratic governance, the program is expected to contribute to measurable improvements in transparency and accountability, good governance, access to information, budget trans-parency and increased rule of law. It was anticipated that these broad improvements in governance would also have an effect on sector-specific change, bringing about policy reform in areas such as education, health, and economic development. The three outcome areas are delineated into training, technical assistance and subgrants for strengthening civil society institutional capacity, increasing CSO capacity for effective advocacy, and strengthening CSO/GON partnerships to fight corruption.

Strengthening CSO Institutional Capacity

The ADVANCE program has largely focused on enhancing CSO institutional capacity by supporting each partner organization’s ability to program and manage resources more effectively and efficiently. However, the evaluation team felt that the institutional capaci-ty agenda and activities have focused too much on those administrative, financial and management skills needed to successfully implement a USAID subgrant. Instead, the program should provide a more robust curriculum that would support improvements in key operational areas, with targeted programming being implemented as activities under the other two outcome areas. Those implementing partners interviewed lauded Pact/Nigeria’s ability to augment their skill sets in an effective format which includes a strong mentoring component. However, none discussed other aspects of institutional ca-pacity building, some of which were outlined in the original cooperative agreement, which would serve to strengthen CSOs’ capacity to effectively support Outcomes 2 and

3. These might include areas such as leadership development, strategic management of CSOs, developing partnerships intra- and cross-sectorally, board development, and con-stituency-building.

Increased CSO Capacity for Effective Advocacy

Under Outcome 2, the ADVANCE program has supported CSOs and their networks and coalitions to develop and hone their advocacy skills. ADVANCE advocacy skill devel-opment has provided technical and financial support to national and subnational activities in three areas: advocacy for the passage of policy reforms and/or monitoring their imple-mentation; understanding, tracking and advocating for improvement in government fund-ing processes; and to a lesser degree, in earlier stages of program implementation, over-sight and review of judicial independence. These three accountability and transparency issues outlined in the original program design continue to be the central focus of ADVANCE programmatic activity. During the in-country portion of the midterm evalua-tion, the evaluation team had the opportunity to attend a multiday advocacy Kaduna train-ing to observe the training format and content, and in subsequent days to follow up with participants on their impressions of the training. The evaluation team’s observations matched participant comments in their positive impression of the ADVANCE staff mem-bers (and NGO guest trainers) and of the content and process of training. The challenge for the remaining implementation period is for Pact/Nigeria and its more mature partners to modify those training programs for new audiences, including both national and subna-tional GON institutions and with a wider swath of the Nigerian civil society community.

Strengthened Civil Society and Government of Nigeria partnerships to fight corruption

The ADVANCE program has also worked to develop CSO-GON linkages in order to im-prove transparency and accountable governance. ADVANCE has provided subgrants and technical support to CSOs for activities focused on engaging public agencies to address policy, electoral, and budgetary issues, among others. The GON change in regime from Obasanjo to Yara’dua, which has overlapped with the implementation timeline of ADVANCE, has complicated the environment for CSO-GON partnerships to develop.

This situation has left ADVANCE partners with the complex challenge of developing new relationships with policy makers while tailoring their advocacy efforts to fit new in-dividual and institutional agendas. ADVANCE support of GON-CSO partnerships on the state level has faced a mixed bag of challenges, successes and opportunities. Those ADVANCE program participants interviewed in states such as Cross River cited relative-ly greater receptiveness among state officials to partnerships aimed at curbing corruption and improving government transparency. One strategy to better develop the CSO-GON partnerships would be to focus on issues of high societal relevance and interest that poli-cymakers feel less threatened addressing, in a way that involves many and varied institu-tional partners. ADVANCE has followed this approach in the past with its support of the disabled (particularly JONAPWD) during and around the election period and with its support of NGOs working on policy issues and service delivery for HIV/AIDs, and the program should continue this approach.

EVALUATION APPROACH

This midterm evaluation consisted of two general streams of analysis. The evaluation team first conducted a review of secondary source materials that included ADVANCE program progress reports, workplans and other documents; publications generated from subproject initiatives; USAID Nigeria DG documents; third party assessments of Nigeri-an civil society; and select applications from subgrantees (see Annex B for a list of doc-uments). The evaluation also included meetings and roundtables across Nigeria over a two-week period (see Annex A for list of key informants interviewed). The evaluation team interviewed approximately 29 different ADVANCE and other democracy and gov-ernance stakeholders in Abuja and three other geopolitical areas (Southwest, South-South and Northwest). This included a small nonscientific sample group of six NGOs and net-works not working directly with ADVANCE but working on budget transparency, anti-corruption, election related civic education and civil society institutional strengthening issues. While the in-country stage of the evaluation included meetings with a variety of different stakeholders, including GON institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors, in-ternational implementing partners and civil society organizations, opportunities for a wider and more balanced engagement of stakeholders were limited by the Nigerian holi-day Eid, travel delays and restrictions, and the violence in Jos. The majority of those in-terviewed were CSOs, networks and coalitions, including some not working directly with ADVANCE program initiatives. The team had less success meeting with government representatives and with other international implementing partners engaged in P/DG and other activities.

The evaluation team was composed of three experts with diverse backgrounds, including an expert from within the Nigerian NGO community, an international civil society expert, and a USAID/Washington Democracy and Governance Fellow. The team’s variety of professional backgrounds provided opportunities to guide this inquiry toward meetings with the individuals and organizations best poised to provide insights into ADVANCE activities and Nigeria civil society issues in general. It also provided an opportunity to draw upon comparative program experience of civil society strengthening initiatives, par-ticularly those focused primarily on the public policy and watchdog subsectors.

There were several important strengths and weaknesses embedded in the methodology employed for this evaluation. Strengths of the methodology included the ability to gauge the mood of ADVANCE implementing partners and beneficiaries of the program con-cerning its value and effectiveness. The Pact staff members were very open to construc-tive criticism and new ideas, but on the whole they believe that their work has gone well.

Encouragingly, the evaluation team did not sense unease on the part of Pact or any ten-sions between USAID and its implementing partner. Praise for Pact was almost universal among those who had worked with the program and among actors who had knowledge of but had not worked with the program

Criticism was limited and confined to problems within the Publish What You Pay cam-paign. Although this suggests that the program has generally been well managed, it says little about the effect of the program on the development of Nigerian civil society. What this evaluation can suggest about programming impact is that Pact was in the right place at the right time. Three major reforms—public procurement, fiscal responsibility, and NEITI—were recently passed by the National Assembly with the involvement of civil society, and the ADVANCE program was involved with each one. It is not possible to say what how outcomes might have differed without the program, but Nigerian civil soci-ety and Pact deserve credit for having the strategic vision to engage these crucial issues where progress was possible. Pact and its partners are also active on issues that have not yet seen the same kind of success, such as freedom of information (FOI).

This methodology does not enable us to determine to what extent the ADVANCE pro-gram deserves credit for successful reforms, or whether there were programmatic short-comings that, if corrected, could have led to even more positive outcomes. The in-country phase of this evaluation spanned only two weeks. The synthesis of information that led to many this report’s conclusions and the recommendations outlined here came after con-ducting stakeholder meetings and roundtables. These evaluation team review sessions were meant to discuss the meetings and come to consensus on salient points. This left no in-country opportunity for follow-up with each stakeholder (with the exception of Pact) to further explore the conclusions.

As with USAID DG programs around the world, convincing answers to questions of pro-gram impact require evaluation design, monitoring and information-gathering efforts that were not in place in the case of the ADVANCE program. In response to this global short-coming, USAID/DCHA/DG has launched an evaluation initiative to help interested mis-sions design new programs in a way that will allow for more rigorous evaluations.

ADVANCE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

The ADVANCE program recommendations in Sections II through VIII below are based on evaluation team members’ consensus about the most important program areas to be strengthened and about the decisions regarding the allocation of resources that need to be made. They are reasonable interventions given the time and resources available to the ADVANCE program and USAID/Nigeria P/DG. The recommendations are also intended to serve as an outline for a civil society strategy for USAID/Nigeria that integrates civil society activities and resources across program areas, builds indigenous institutional ca-pacity, and anticipates tracing the impact of a limited number of ADVANCE initiatives.

These recommendations are summarized as follows:

Pact should increase its activities to strengthen coalitions and networks (Sec-tion II).

Civil society work should reach below the national level and be integrated at the state and local levels (Section III).

Civil society work in Nigeria already cuts across USAID sectors, and should be understood and approached in an integrated fashion through a dialogue among USAID partners that leads toward a plan to work cooperatively (Sec-tion V).

Coalitions and networks should connect cross-sectoral civil society work from the bottom up. At the national level, these coalitions, along with particularly effective individual CSOs, should engage with the legislative and executive branches to influence policy and oversight outcomes (Sections II and V).

ADVANCE should not focus on electoral reform programming, as it detracts from other activities which are more central to its three core objectives (Sec-tion VI);

USAID/Nigeria P/DG should have a five-year plan for directly funding Nige-rian CSOs that begins under the ADVANCE program (Section VII).

Impact evaluation should begin with new or nascent ADVANCE activities, and support should be sought from USAID/DCHA/DG’s new evaluation initi-ative (Section VIII).

II. CREATING EFFECTIVE NIGERIAN NETWORKS

AND COALITIONS

The ADVANCE program has worked with and provided resources for Nigerian policy change, watchdog and service-providing networks and coalitions including PWYP, the National Procurement Network, the Zero Corruption Coalition and the National Pro-curement Watch Platform on anticorruption, electoral reform and budget transparency initiatives. While support has included programmatic and institutional capacity develop-ment, more can be done to strengthen internal capacity, which could significantly im-prove performance and efficacy. The typical Nigerian P/DG network or coalition acts more like an individual NGO involved in the programming of its own activities and in pursuit of individual financial interests, rather than providing the broad-based platform needed for members to effectively work together toward a common goal. This evaluation recommends an increase in activities to strengthen these institutions’ ability to effectively support and engage their client/member institutions, increase their members, find the proper level of institutionalization to best support their goals, and improve their financial strategies. A critical issue for coalition and network development is to create the type of coordinating process and structure to fit the particular network or coalition, its collabora-tive aims, and its context. As seen with the recent example of PWYP, a poorly adminis-tered network (campaign) can be more difficult to resolve and create larger obstacles to improvement than a single CSO because its constituent parts consist of diverse institu-tions with varied mandates and constituencies. Networks and coalitions, when successful, enable citizens to amplify their voices and achieve greater influence and impact in enact-ing and implementing policy, democratic governance and social change. This nexus be-tween ADVANCE partner NGOs and grassroots-level organizing and awareness-raising with individual citizens is largely lacking in ADVANCE program initiatives. Many of the ADVANCE partner networks and coalitions operate in a limited social and operational sphere that has hindered their ability to look for and include diverse institutional partners.

This has particularly excluded those service-providing civil society groups and profes-sional organizations that could help increase and expand the scale of their programs and provide new skills, thereby improving the quality of services and impact of the ADVANCE partners’ work.

Civil society networks and coalitions, like individual organizations, find it difficult to achieve their aspirations without sufficient financial resources. This is the case with the Nigerian networks and coalitions interviewed. Yet external funding, such as that which networks and coalitions usually pursue, provides little to strengthen the institution as a wholeand usually serves as a weak kind of “glue” for the network or coalition.

ADVANCE should work with coalitions and networks to look for funding strategies that build cohesiveness around the central goal. Instituting membership dues and applying for funding in collaboration with member institutions are two such strategies.

Some networks begin with informal cooperation among groups of organizations and then evolve into more formal institutions. Others begin as formal network institutions. Institu-tionalization can bring valuable assets to a network, such as enhanced legitimacy, a legal identity, more effective coordination and the capacity to receive grants directly. Yet there are several drawbacks. It is not uncommon for the process of institutionalization to change the quality of the network experience for its members. Some active members may lament the change, see an increase in competition for status and funding, and even drop out because they valued a more informal and spontaneous network. New formal positions can create incentives for internal competition and weaken collaborative relationships.

Administrative aspects of formal institutions, such as meetings, record-keeping, and fi-nancial management, can balloon to the extent that the network comes to feel like a bu-reaucracy and stifles the very initiative it needs to make it effective. While continuing to work with formal networks and coalitions, ADVANCE should look for opportunities to support ad hoc, informal and temporary coalitions and networks. Finally, developing ef-fective networks and coalitions with more broad-based support can strengthen the per-ceived legitimacy of civil society among Nigerian policy makers and other GON employ-ees, many of whom are skeptical about the role and activities of civil society in Nigeria.

ADVANCE should develop a training support agenda for partner networks and coalitions to improve:

Linkages that facilitate communication and learning among groups and organ-izations with similar programs.

Platforms to coordinate the programs, activities and resources of multiple groups and organizations to achieve shared policy or program goals.

Legitimacy, with government and donors as accountable (especially to the Ni-gerian people), cost-effective vehicles for implementing social development policies and programs that reach the poorest, most isolated or marginalized communities.

Jointly governed bodies for managing coordinated program implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

One problem with civil society work in Nigeria is that while coalitions and networks look good on paper, with impressive member lists which include diverse organizations, they do not adequately capture the combined strength of their membership. Instead, the secre-tariat is more likely to behave as if it represents a single NGO rather than a coordinating body. The secretariat can claim to speak and act on behalf of the entire membership, but the real coordination is scant and the impact therefore diminished.

Coalitions need to better reflect the diverse ideas, concerns and perspectives of their members. This can be promoted by working both with secretariats at the national level and with member organizations at all levels—especially subnational. Pact has considera-ble global experience building coalitions and should be able to bring that experience to bear in the Nigerian context. In theory, this will make its work more effective and even more relevant to Nigerian citizens.

III. PROMOTING SUBNATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES

Citizen participation in state-level planning can improve local authorities’ ability to re-spond to the needs of the community and allows for better targeting of resources based on the articulated needs and priorities of the population, which can lead to more efficient use of resources. Creating channels and conditions for citizens to exercise voice and to de-mand accountability can also lead to greater transparency in local government affairs.

ADVANCE has supported varied transparency and anticorruption activities on the subna-tional level and should increase these activities in the last year of implementation.

ADVANCE state-level activities should be integrated and coordinated with any new USAID local governance initiatives. State and local governments operate a joint account.

It is therefore paramount that any USAID local governance initiatives working on budget transparency issues must also coordinate activities with budget transparency initiatives on the state level. Attention should also be paid in complimenting other donor efforts (e.g.

EU-INSIDE program; UNDP).

When planning subnational work, a variety of locations throughout the country should be considered. Pact’s representatives viewed Lagos and Baylesa as potential states for in-creasing subnational work because of their perceived higher level of political will. Since this work is feasible throughout Nigeria, USAID’s P/DG civil society program is in a po-sition to react to mission-wide strategic decisions regarding geographic focus. It is most important that the civil society program promote the vertical linkages from Abuja down to the states and below. In the future, the geographic scope of the work should be ex-panded if the model proves to be effective.

IV. FOCUSING NATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES

As subnational level activities under ADVANCE increase, national level initiatives must necessarily decrease. ADVANCE program staff members will have to increase time spent on travel and logistics for oversight of program partners’ activities outside of Abuja. If these subnational initiatives incorporate the dual and complementing recommendations of

(a) increasing training and mentoring for networks and coalitions, and (b) channeling network and coalition work vertically to connect with state-level actors—including those working in other USAID/Nigeria program areas—then an increased effort will be needed.

National level initiatives should therefore be more targeted and should focus on those ini-tiatives where program partners can develop a clear plan of action ADVANCE national level program initiatives include advocacy for new legislation or monitoring the imple-mentation of recently passed laws. Despite the passage of key anticorruption and trans-parency legislation during the early period of ADVANCE, successes have stalled under the new administration. Both program partners (including CISLAC and IPC) and other non-ADVANCE partner NGOs (such as CLEEN) expressed difficulty understanding leg-islative dynamics under the Yara’dua government. The FOI bill is a case in point. Pact pointed out in discussions that in the year that FOI passed, civil society had “more money and less hostile legislators,” and “now it’s the opposite.” Given this lack of clarity on ad-vocacy strategies, national level work should focus on monitoring the implementation of recently passed laws (e.g., NEITI, Fiscal Responsibility).

V. PROMOTING SYNERGIES ACROSS USAID

PROGRAM AREAS

There are diverse and vibrant programs to engage civil society throughout the Mission.

Every CSO works with civil society in its own way, and each approach brings something useful to the table.