Attachment_J.2_-_SUMMARY_OF_POLITICAL_ECONOMY_ANALYSIS_(PEA).pdf

[Month Year]

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development.

It was prepared independently by <list authors and/or organizations involved in the preparation of the report>.

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE

DELIVERY CAPACITY

MAY 2016

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Democracy International, Inc.

Prepared under Cooperative Agreement No. AID-306-A-00-09-00522.

Submitted to:

USAID/Afghanistan

Prepared by:

Democracy International, Inc.

7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1010 Bethesda, MD 20814 USA Tel: +1.301.961.1660 Email: info@democracyinternational.com mailto:info@democracyinternational.com

POLITICAL ECONOMY

ANALYSIS OF

AFGHANISTAN’S CAPACITY

TO IMPROVE GOVERNMENT

SERVICE DELIVERY

May 2016

The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS ........................................................................................... I

ACRONYMS .......................................................................................... II

METHODOLOGY

SUPPORTING SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFGHANISTAN

A CRUCIAL MOMENT

CONCLUSIONS

ENDNOTES

ANNEX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWS ................................................ A-1

ANNEX B: USAID’S POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

FRAMEWORK .................................................................................... B-1

ACRONYMS

4A Assistance for Afghanistan's Anticorruption Authority

AERCA Advancing Effective Reforms for Civic Accountability

AFTEL Afghan Telecom

AGO Attorney General's Office

AISA Afghanistan Investment Support Agency

ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy

ATRA Afghan Telecom Regulatory Authority

CBR Capacity Building for Results

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CSC Civil Service Commission

DI Democracy International

G2C Government to Consumer

GAAC General Administration of Anti-Bribery and Corruption

HOO High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption

IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Com-mission

ICTAWG International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group

ISIS Islamic State of Syria and Iraq

MEC Independent Joint Anticorruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

MIS Management Information System

MoCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology

MOE Ministry of Economy

MOF Ministry of Finance

MoI Ministry of the Interior

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MRRD Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NPA National Procurement Agency

NSP National Solidarity Programme

NUG National Unity Government

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

SAO Supreme Audit Office

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

UNCAC UN Convention Against Corruption

UNDP

ACT

United Nations Development Programme Accountability and Transparency Project

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 4

METHODOLOGY

This analysis was guided by the new USAID Political Economy Analysis Framework, which is attached as An-nex B. DI utilized the Framework’s sample questions to inform a discussion with USAID/Kabul staff about how to target the analysis to glean the most useful information. As part of adapting the Framework to the specifics of Afghanistan and USAID’s desired focus on government service delivery, DI developed a desk study of four ministries providing a variety of commonly utilized services.

From January 20 through February 4, 2016, DI fielded a PEA team to Kabul. Assembled in consultation with USAID/Kabul and on the basis of the initial efforts summarized above, DI’s multi-disciplinary team included a former Country Representative for the Asia Foundation’s programs in Afghanistan, an expert in government service delivery reforms and information technology, a former executive director of the Afghanistan Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, and a local expert in Afghan civil society and elections. Supporting the team were several Afghan staff from DI’s AERCA project.

Upon arrival in Kabul, the team held a workshop with Afghan AERCA staff on the nature and focus of the PEA. The team discussed the PEA Framework’s major factors (e.g., foundational conditions, institutional ar-rangements, developments that constitute the relevant “here and now”), prior international efforts, major recent initiatives, and the ‘status’ of the political settlement reached during August 2014 following the heavily contested 2014 presidential elections.

Subsequently, the team conducted more than 50 interviews of more than 100 experts and stakeholders.

These included high political authorities, ministry leadership, and ministry ‘line’ staff engaged in providing cer-tain services to the public. The team also spoke with independent international and Afghan experts and a wide variety of Afghan civil society organizations. A list of interviews is included as Annex A.

In keeping with the goal that USAID’s Applied Political Economy Analysis Framework be a ‘light touch,’ rapid-ly-deployable tool, there are necessarily limits in the depth of the analysis. In addition, while the PEA analyzes political and economic factors affecting the Afghan government, it does not include a deeper process-focused analysis of particular services. Such analysis is anticipated prior to beginning any service delivery reform efforts.

This PEA reflects DI’s understanding of these issues at the time of writing. USAID and DI anticipate that this PEA will be updated periodically to maintain a current analysis.

QUESTIONS ASKED

At the request of the USAID Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, Democracy International (DI) undertook this po-litical economy analysis to inform work to be performed under the Advancing Effective Reforms for Civic Ac-countability (AERCA) project. This analysis was guided by the new political economy analytic framework de-veloped by USAID’s Cross Sectoral Programs Division in the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in USAID/Washington.

USAID/Kabul sought to understand the political contestation and popular attitudes that might impact new good governance reform initiatives. Specifically, the Mission asked for an analysis of possible entry points to support existing reform efforts, notably those involving delivery of government services to ordinary Afghans.

This report summarizes the significant investment USAID and other donors have made in promoting good governance and combatting corruption as well as the widely held view that many such reforms failed to

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 5

achieve their intended goals. As USAID noted, the international community recognizes the need for further investment in improving Afghan governance and desires that any new commitments be informed by analysis.

This PEA is one of several efforts being undertaken by a variety of actors to provide the analytical foundation for new initiatives.

LIMITATIONS

As with all assessments, there were certain limitations that affected data collection and analysis through the process of this PEA. Specific constraints in this case included the following:

1. The timeframe for this assessment required a narrowed, focused approach to data collection. The team used purposeful selection of key respondents to ensure the most knowledgeable respondents and in-depth re-sponses for the data desired as well as a range of perspectives on the issues being investigated. DI was able to conduct some follow-up interviews with key respondents and key institutions and organizations to ensure more complete data collection. The team also employed data triangulation methods to minimize bias intro-duced by the selective respondent list and strengthen the validity of assessment findings.

2. The security environment in Afghanistan limited the geographic scope of this assessment. While the team conducted a significant number of interviews across government institutions, civil society organizations, and Afghan experts in Kabul, this analysis did not include interviews in locations outside of Kabul. This narrow scope limited the collection of perspectives of governmental and non-governmental actors and citizens locat-ed in provinces regarding government service provision and corruption. In order to mitigate this limitation and represent additional perspectives on corruption and service provision in Afghanistan, DI’s analysis also includes external research and survey data.

3. Although few requested interviewees declined to participate in the assessment, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those respondents who chose to participate might differ from those who did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions, socio-demographic characteristics, and experience, among other factors. In anticipation of this limitation, the team ensured that interviewees were made aware of the independence of the process and the confidentiality of their responses.

4. There is a known tendency among respondents to under-report socially undesirable answers and alter their responses to approximate what they perceive as the social norm (halo bias). The extent to which respond-ents are prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some questions that call upon respondents to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on whom they depend for the provision of services, funding, or job security. When asking sensitive questions of government officials regarding the quality of ser-vices provided by a ministry or the quality of the work of their colleagues, this bias may be present. To miti-gate this limitation, the team provided respondents with confidentiality guarantees, conducted interviews in settings where respondents felt comfortable, and aimed to establish rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. The team also asked questions of multiple government institutions, experts, and donors to better corroborate sensitive information such as perspectives on the performance of a specific minister or ministry.

5. While DI endeavored to collect representative and diverse perspectives on the issues under investigation, the team’s ability to ensure an ethnically representative and gender-balanced selection of respondents was limited by the nature of government appointments and government hiring processes and gender norms that continue to affect women’s positions in government and society in Afghanistan.

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 6

6. In order to develop an understanding of the range of political and social issues that affect government service, DI’s team met with stakeholders responsible for an array of issues and government services. DI will facilitate deeper, process-focused analyses of selected government services and citizen satisfaction with those services following this PEA.

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 7

SUPPORTING SERVICE

DELIVERY IN AFGHANISTAN

The impact, nature, and prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan have received enormous attention but the problem continues to metastasize. The large volume of effort put toward combatting and reducing the vul-nerability to and impact of corrupt practices has yielded some benefits. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has reported, the incidence of bribery has fallen.1 Also, recent procurement reforms have garnered international praise as a significant positive step.2 However, the ‘problem’ of corruption is broader than specific reforms or the actual incidence of corrupt practices. The Afghan public continues to prioritize their concern over corruption and report that they perceive the situation they face as unchanged. Citizens overwhelmingly do not even bother to report bribery solicitations as they do not believe that their complaint will matter.

Rightly or wrongly, blame for this situation inures to the current gov-ernment. The perception of a growing corruption problem and an inef-fective government undermines public confidence in government, wid-ening an existing gulf between citizen and state and negatively affecting government legitimacy. Whether citizens regard government agencies and personnel as legitimate affects their willingness to participate in and cooperate with government actions.3 Citizen responses vary from res-ignation to emigration, but of increasing concern is the fact exposure to corruption is positively and strongly correlated with the perception of sympathy for armed opposition groups.4

Watching the growth of this citizen-state legitimacy divide with concern, and taking into account prior programs and a growing evidence base, USAID hypothesizes that focusing on improving service delivery might help ameliorate the situation. USAID is not alone in this assessment, as the World Bank, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, and Transparen-cy International have each concluded recent research on the failings of Afghanistan’s public sector to effectively deliver vital services to the public.

The ability of government to meet the needs of its citizens is fundamental to the authority that government claims to conduct and enforce social order in a society. Unpacking how and why governments and citizens interact is the subject of years of political science and public administration research. The ability of states to deliver services and maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizen publics is correlated with how fragile – or resilient – the state may be, or remain.5 Since 2004, the World Bank has strongly pushed on the role im-proved public services can play in achieving better development outcomes.6 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also recognized the importance of government service delivery in the state-citizen relationship.7 And, USAID’s own programming lessons reinforce this conclusion, as does experience in developed countries.8 Among the most important aspects of improved service delivery per-

“President Ashraf Ghani literally wrote the book on fixing failed states and fully recognizes that corruption is sapping his government’s legitimacy, yet his administration has been ineffective so far in fighting corruption in a way that is convincing to the Afghan public.”

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE

FOR PEACE, DECEMBER 2015

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 8

formance for both state and citizens is visibility. Seeing services (the actions of the state) and receiving the benefits of such actions can have “acute value in everyday life.”9

To enhance this potentially virtuous circle, USAID has commissioned this political economy analysis to better understand the constraints and current openings to improve the capacity for Afghan government entities to deliver services and engage citizens. It seeks to respond to the question of the current incentives at work, which ascertain what incentives for better public sector performance can work in the Afghan context. Simpli-fying complex business procedures and replacing manual systems with electronic ones, for example, make services more effective and also remove opportunities for corruption by eliminating unnecessarily lengthy processes.

In addition, USAID will endeavor to capitalize on the achievements Afghan civic organizations have had advo-cating for and supporting adoption of improved practices. Evidence indicates that citizens prioritize the quality of the service experience and that improving service delivery is not a simple question of how government provides the service in question.10 A variety of constituencies ranging from the general voting public to the end users of particular services (e.g., patients in the government-provided health care setting or vehicle opera-tors in the case of government-provided drivers licenses) have a role to play in how services are defined, pro-vided, and measured. As USAID noted in its 2013 Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, “increased accountability for effective government service delivery” is fundamental to improving government performance. USAID’s prior programming experience emphasizes that supporting improved communication to, and participation in ongoing improvement by, citizens can enhance service delivery. Thus, this political economy analysis will also provide a starting point for efforts to catalyze social accountability collaboration and engagement by and between Afghan nongovernmental organizations and the Ghani administration.

Our analysis begins with understanding how past experience colors current status and future expectations.

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BACKGROUND

Over the past 14 years, the international community has pursued an agenda of increasingly intensive devel-opment in Afghanistan. Although development aid numbers have fallen in recent years, there has been and continues to be significant investment, especially since the US civilian and military surge in 2009. Many pro-grammatic components of this effort have included initiatives aimed at improving overall government perfor-mance and service delivery. At least 17 USAID programs across a variety of sectors including governance, health, education, and justice had goals related to improving the delivery of government services. Many have sought to strengthen the institutional systems and human capacity of local and national government authori-ties, from municipal offices and courts to health clinics and schools.

Unfortunately, public perception surveys reveal that the Afghan people regard the government agencies in these sectors as among the worst public service providers and among the most corrupt, e.g. courts, munici-palities, health services, and public schools. However, few of these efforts actually targeted corruption specifi-cally as part of their programmatic efforts; instead, the focus was on capacity building and institutional

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 10

strengthening of core governance institutions, with a primary goal of demonstrating to Afghans that govern-ment could provide services, deterrence to corrupt practices, and robust oversight.

In theory, concerns over corruption were on the radar early in Afghanistan’s transition. The Afghan Transitional Authority led by Hamid Karzai signed the UN Convention against Corruption on February 2004.

Also that year, the Law on the Campaign Against Bribery and Administrative Corruption was enacted even before the country had a constitution.11 The law created the General Administration of Anti-Bribery and Corruption (GAAC) to comply with mandates contained in the Afghan government’s accession to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

GAAC was responsible for government policy on the fight against corruption, creating an information center to register the properties of public servants, establishing exchanges with similar offices of friendly states and international organizations, introducing corruption suspects to face prosecution, and inspecting offices and contracts where officials were suspected of committing crimes.12 The GAAC had more than 80 technical staff members, half of whom had some investigatory role. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime fielded a limited effort to support the GAAC. Unfortunately, GAAC leadership chose to concentrate on investigations, neglecting other mandates related to awareness raising and public education. Provincial offices described in the law were never established, and detractors questioned GAAC’s legitimacy because it was created before the constitution and before most integrity institutions were operational or functioning at full strength.13 Eventually, GAAC’s impact suffered as a result of poor staff capacity, rivalries, and an unwillingness among its staff to anger high-profile and well-connected individuals or groups in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption.14 Tensions with the Attorney General over investigative powers and confusion about GAAC’s role vis-à-vis other agencies also hindered its impact.15

Projects with the primary goal of addressing corruption took center stage beginning in 2006 as observers of Afghanistan struggled to understand the lack of progress after the first five years of intensive development effort. Between 2006 and 2008, the Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme Court led a committee appointed by President Karzai to devise an anticorruption strategy for the country. The resultant Azimi Strategy was too general to be a viable roadmap for fighting corruption. The UNDP ACT program (2007 – 2009) in the Ministry of Finance helped further this effort by developing a broader anticorruption strategy within the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Subsequently, the Law on Overseeing the Implementation of the Anticorruption Strategy (2008) established the High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption (HOO). ACT then sought to help the Afghan government understand what types of interventions could successfully combat corruption by piloting anticorruption initiatives in key public institutions, namely the Ministries of Finance and Justice. In addition, the project sought to develop diagnostics to assess government integrity and raise public and government employee awareness of the issue. These goals were part of a sustainability plan to encourage both the civil service and the public not to tolerate petty corruption. ACT also supported the HOO.

It was envisioned that the HOO would organize and lead the fight against corruption across all of government. More than a government-wide coordinating body—and similar to the GAAC—the HOO would have investigative powers. But it would also possess the capability to require asset registration by high officials. This new asset registry would make instances of (especially larger scale) corruption more readily identifiable. HOO would work hand-in-glove with the Office of the Attorney General to investigate and prosecute instances of corruption. USAID backed the new agency with a support package, the Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anticorruption Authority (4A project), which ran from 2010 to 2013. The project sought to provide significant technical and institution-building assistance to the HOO, including developing human capital procedural manuals, new recruitment and hiring policies, and performing a desk audit of the HOO’s

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 11

payroll. In addition, 4A sought to improve HOO’s on-line asset registration capacity, conduct vulnerability to corruption assessments in government agencies, and draft a whistleblower protection law.

Despite some early successes—namely, establishing the office as well as a complaints hotline and conducting an anticorruption awareness campaign—the promise of the HOO was never realized. This is due to a number of factors, including in-fighting between the AGO and HOO. There was little political authority behind the HOO’s most difficult tasks of verifying assets, investigating corruption, and ensuring prosecution of corruption cases. But, perhaps most devastatingly, the HOO quickly became part of the corruption problem itself through patronage hiring practices. Some observers described the agency Tashkeel (organization chart) as little more than a family tree. Allegations that some employees sought to use HOO’s authority to attack political enemies further weakened the agency.

By the end of 2010, the international community again pushed the Afghan government to establish an independent body to monitor and evaluate anticorruption efforts. For its part, the Afghan government argued that the international community contributed to the problem with its high salaries and poorly monitored spending in Afghanistan. This contention resulted in the international community and the Afghan government agreeing at the International Conference on Afghanistan in London in 2010 to establish a new body, the Independent Joint Anticorruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC).

Established by Presidential Decree in 2011, the MEC comprised three international and three Afghan anticorruption experts, supported by a permanent secretariat in Kabul. The internationals traveled to Afghanistan every three months to evaluate international and national anticorruption efforts. The MEC firmly established its reputation and independence with the publication of the Kabul Bank report in the fall of 2012.16.But the MEC too had limits, and its work never realized the desired concrete results in the fight against corruption. The MEC lacks the legal authority to acquire documents or to demand implementation of its recommendations. It is more of a research oversight body; though frustrated by its passive role, the MEC could do little more than identify and report on corruption vulnerabilities and anticorruption efforts. The power to implement the MEC’s recommendations remained with the Afghan government, which was then looking ahead to the planned presidential elections.

The capacity and willingness of the Afghan government’s commitment remained a concern. At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference, evidence emerged of the international community’s frustration over a perceived lack of sincerity of the Afghan government to fight corruption. In response, President Karzai issued Presidential Decree 45 shortly thereafter, intending to convey that his government was indeed serious about reform. The Decree’s 164 articles directed 33 government entities to develop strategies and plans to deal with corruption. The Office of Administrative Affairs was to monitor implementation. However, PD 45 was largely procedural in nature, requiring the submission of a plan or a report, but not actual implementation of any specific change. MEC reports in 2013 highlighted this problem, and in 2014 reported that OAA stopped monitoring PD 45 commitments in August of 2013, “claiming that most of the articles had been implemented and there was no reason to continue monitoring them.”17

Despite the institutions described above, the Afghan government lacked a comprehensive, consolidated approach to improving government integrity and combating corruption. The National Transparency and Accountability Priority Program developed under the Kabul Process was the only National Priority Program not endorsed by the President (some argued, as a result of differing perspectives on the viability of the High Office of Oversight). The international community’s commitment to this effort also lacked coherence, despite warnings of the need for a plan from MEC and other organizations. A coordinating forum, the International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group (ICTAWG), was established, but

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it has remained a relatively passive venue of limited information sharing where no substantive work is completed.

Perhaps ironically, the institution often viewed as effective at identifying and pursuing corruption in Afghanistan is not an Afghan institution at all, but the the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which is tasked with pursuing malfeasance in US government contracting. This perception is relevant, however, for anticorruption approaches taken by Afghan agencies, as it highlights the benefits of an assertive, public approach.

Overall, anticorruption efforts are widely perceived to have failed. Observers, participants, and analysts cite several reasons. The weakness of the High Office of Oversight and the lack of real commitment from President Karzai’s administration ensured that there was not the sufficient political will to support the fight against corruption and efforts to do so languished. Even worse, the very same organizations that were expected to provide oversight or investigate corruption became corrupted, including the High Office of Oversight, Supreme Audit Office, and, worst of all, the Attorney General’s Office. Almost every agency entrusted with investigative powers used those powers to extort bribes. In addition, there has never been an agreed upon strategy for fighting corruption.

These past efforts to combat corruption provide an experiential reservoir to guide future programs. Foremost among these, as highlighted in our programmatic recommendations, is the importance of understanding those factors and problems susceptible to donor and implementer influence, and those that are beyond reach.

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A CRUCIAL MOMENT

The relationship between Afghans and their government is at a difficult point. Their fledgling national unity government is beset by infighting and uncertainty of direction. Tired of seemingly never-ending new initiatives and frustrated by the continued omnipresence of corruption and incompetence, Afghans are losing faith in their government in ever larger numbers.

And, Afghanistan’s economic woes are compounding this problem.

During a few of the recent years (2007-2008 and 2011-2012), Afghanistan’s economic growth was strong for its challenges.

Agriculture and aid dependent, Afghanistan is highly vulnerable to economic and political shocks, and reductions in international troop strength and growing insecurity have had a deleterious impact. Its population continues to grow and its burgeoning young population is at risk: each year the labor force growth easily outstrips job growth. 18

Some of these young people opt to flee abroad—ironically, aided by Afghan government success in reforming the delivery of a crucial service, providing passports—in search of new economic opportunities and safer living conditions. Afghan civil society leader Shaharzad Akbar wrote on Al Jazeera America, “Young people in Afghanistan are looking for opportunities, hope, and inspiration.

And if they can’t find those things, they will leave.”19 Others are giving up on playing by rules that do not seem to apply consistently. Donors and advocacy organizations are equally frustrated.20

FOUNDATIONAL FACTORS

The factors broadly affecting Afghanistan’s environment and opportunities for improving service delivery are daunting. Continuous and rising violent conflict, weak governing by legacy institutions without a sense of ser-vice, increased economic hardship which has caused many to flee the country, and a fledgling coalition gov-ernment beset by infighting and uncertainty of direction all make change difficult. In each of the many conver-sations held with government officials, international observers, and civil society advocates, these core issues were cited as fundamental to Afghanistan’s ability to delivery services to its people currently. In addition, these issues were also framed as exerting significant influence on Afghanistan’s current trajectory politically, demographically, and economically.

Afghanistan is not post-conflict

Afghanistan has been in a continuous state of violent conflict for 38 years, the longest running armed conflict of any country in modern history.21 This ongoing conflict has ravaged the country’s physical, economic, “By the end of 2016, if major steps are not taken to punish corrupt individuals and remove them from places of power, I think we’ll have [run out of] time to recover...This one year is a defining year...People cannot wait for so long.”

SOURCE 043, POSITION 042

INTEGRITY W ATCH

AFGHANISTAN

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN’S SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY 14

political, and human capital and has had the most profound impact on the efforts of the past decade to establish stable governing institutions capable of delivering corruption-free public services in Afghanistan.

The start of the current conflict can be dated to April 1978 when a military-backed communist coup overthrew the government of President Daoud Khan. The radical social and economic reforms subsequently implemented by the communist regime provoked an immediate armed resistance prompting the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 to prop up the faltering government. The Soviet invasion led to a decade-long struggle that left over one million dead or injured, and about three million refugees living in Pakistan and another two million living as refugees in Iran.

After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 the Afghan communist government struggled on until 1992 when it ultimately fell to the mujahideen, the Islamic resistance fighters. A civil war ensued among the mujahideen for control of the country from 1992 until 1996, when the Taliban emerged with Pakistani support to take Kabul and force a coalition of former mujahideen groups—the Northern Alliance—into an armed stalemate in a few far Northern districts of the country.

U.S. forces entered Afghanistan in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and soon forced out the Taliban. However, a growing armed resistance to the presence of international forces and the progressive changes implemented by the government elected as part of the internationally-brokered Bonn Agreement has continued up to the present day. In 2015 the highest levels of Afghan civilian and military casualties to date were incurred.22 Afghans left the country in unprecedented numbers, with 2000 passports being issued per day in Kabul, a six-fold increase over 2014.23 In 2015 the Taliban had gained control over approximately 30 percent of the country and had taken control of the provincial capital of Kunduz for two weeks. Additionally, a competing transnational terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), had established an operational presence in the Eastern districts of Nangahar Province and Al-Qaida had re-established the “largest training camp found in the 14-year war” in Kandahar Province.24

The conflict has an ongoing deleterious effect on Afghanistan’s government. Historically, government in Afghanistan has been a means of retaining power initially obtained through conflict, not providing effective public services. Afghanistan has never had a functional and omnipresent central system of government; the central government’s power did not stem from a social contract with citizens, but from its ability to bargain for the passive or active support of the leaders of tribal, religious, and military factions. In this context, government has existed for most citizens primarily at the municipal level and has operated according to local norms and practices. During the Soviet occupation and mujahideen period, this system of governance became largely associated with the leaders of various armed groups. The underlying premise of governance during this period until 2001 was based on control through violence.

From this starting point, the negotiations leading to the Bonn Agreement in 2001 and the resulting governing structures necessarily relied on co-opting military leaders who could act as spoilers to a peaceful future. The Bonn process converted the warlords from the past into politicians of the modern era.

The subsequent focus of the Karzai regime on retaining buy-in from former combatants and power brokers legitimized and strengthened these local power brokers, enabling increasing degrees of impunity. International coalition forces and the donor community also contributed significantly to this process. Coalition militaries worked with former mujahideen elements to remove the Taliban and continued to rely on local power brokers to maintain stability outside of Kabul.

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Also, military and donor interventions in the earliest days of Operation Enduring Freedom targeted “quick-impact, quick-win” projects in an attempt to influence local populations. These projects further strengthened local power brokers and the lack of attention to accountability helped maintain this informal system at the expense of then-fledgling governance structures. This process of pacifying key groups with power quickly spread to the country’s new government agencies. Patronage appointments and nepotism helped some groups claim ministries and fraudulent procurement helped secure control over resources.

Insecurity and corruption: “the new normal”

Given the above history, the relationship among insecurity, corruption, and a weak state is not surprising.

Security incidents have increased dramatically from 2014 to 2015 and national surveys show that two-thirds of Afghans fear for their personal safety – the highest level of such concern since 2006.25 Also in The Asia Foundation’s Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People, 90 percent of Afghans reported that corruption was a problem in their daily lives (the highest level ever reported) and 91 percent of respondents reported that corruption was a problem in dealings with local government officials. Survey participants also stated that accessing public services was the third largest problem they faced behind unemployment and insecurity. Those survey participants who said they experienced corruption when obtaining some public services most often faced corruption at the local municipality or district governor’s office (66%), the judiciary and courts (63%), state electricity supply (55%), and public healthcare service (53%), followed by public schools (43%). The overall level of satisfaction with government service delivery has fallen in 2015 compared to 2014.26

What is notable about these figures is the consistency with which respondents reported that this cycle of fear, insecurity, corruption, and lack of adequate services has begun to define Afghans’ expectations for the future.

The country has been on a wartime economic footing for so long that younger Afghans (about 64 percent of the population is under the age of 25) do not know what regular economic rules look like, and are attracted to emigrating where those rules are in force and opportunities for education, employment, and stability are available.

As a result, these concerns—insecurity, corruption, and the weakness or absence of state services—are becoming the new normal for Afghans. The proportion of Afghans who say that the national government is doing a good job has fallen from 75 percent in 2014 to 58 percent in 2015. Reported satisfaction with provincial, municipal, and district government has also declined. Most notably, satisfaction with provincial government has decreased from a high of 80 percent in 2012 to 57 percent in 2015.27

The Afghan public recognizes these three issues as interrelated and correlated. Respondents to another recent survey conducted in 12 Afghan provinces revealed that the most important consequences of corruption in public services were: a decline in trust of the government, a waste of development resources, and an increase in insecurity.28 A provincial council member estimated that 40 percent of the reported security forces in Helmand province do not exist, while a former provincial deputy police chief said the actual number was far less than the 31,000 police on the registers. An Afghan lawmaker claimed the government is not responding to the crisis because a number of allegedly corrupt parliamentarians are benefiting from the “ghost” security forces’ salaries.29 Not surprisingly, government corruption and ineffectiveness is a common theme in Taliban social media recruitment propaganda and, perhaps more alarmingly, a recent survey of Afghan National Police found that 72 percent believed that armed resistance by the people is justified against those in government found to be corrupt. 30

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Political Instability

One respondent, a high level official who has served in various roles in both the Karzai and current National Unity Government, stated that, “nothing has worked satisfactorily.” Corruption and effective service delivery has been an ongoing critical issue for the last 13 years and little progress has been made despite the introduction of laws, strategies, and institutions aimed at combatting corruption and improving public service delivery. Another respondent said that the issue is less a question of “political will” (especially in the current NUG) than a function of implementation that looks beyond donor-funded programs.31 For example, several interviewees noted that both President Ghani and CEO Abdullah campaigned to address corruption and improve service delivery if elected. In the view of several respondents summarized by the executive director of an Afghan research and strategy institute, “the NUG itself is a manifestation of corruption having stolen the vote to obtain office” and “casts doubt on the legitimacy of anyone [in government] who advocates for good governance.”32 Despite being tainted with the “original sin” of election fraud, several respondents concurred that both the President and the CEO are themselves “clean.”33 Although they may be surrounded by corrupt supporters, they nevertheless take the obligation to reduce corruption and improve the services provided to the Afghan people seriously.

What these observers and participants point to instead is the NUG’s slow start and lack of progress on these goals. Expressing concern over the NUG’s stalled progress, they note that too much has been promised and not enough delivered.34 Many worry about an impending loss of confidence of average Afghans in the NUG.35 According to a government official who works closely with the Council of Ministers and the Cabinet, progress has been slow because of the infighting between the President and the CEO who “cannot work together.” Much of the NUG’s first year in office was spent fighting over the allocation of positions between supporters of the President and the CEO.

Additionally, many are discomfited by the new president’s style. Several respondents contended the President has centralized too much authority in his office and passed on characterizations of him as a micro-manager who will not delegate power to his own Ministers to make necessary changes. All decisions have to go through the President’s office which can take weeks. One high level Afghan official remarked, “The President’s own Ministers cannot get access to him when they need to make urgent decisions.” Because of this, there is frustration among ministers and their deputies who are otherwise ready to lead reforms in service delivery.36

This centralization has led to paralysis, uncertainty, and confusion between the Office of the President and that of the CEO where there seems to be an redundancy of functions in an attempt to accommodate roles for the many supporters in each competing camp. For example, there is much overlap between the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers as well as the many advisors reporting directly to either the President or the CEO. This fragmentation is sometimes replicated in the ministries when the minister is from one camp and the deputy from another.37

Another factor impeding reform is the plethora of legacy institutions created at one time or another to deal with some aspect of corruption but whose efforts are often uncoordinated and roles overlapping. The HOO, the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee MEC, the Supreme Audit Office (SAO), the Ministry of Interior, and the AGO all have some role to play in anticorruption activities but coordination between them is not well-defined. Some of these legacy institutions are themselves troubled by corruption.38 The SAO auditors take bribes to produce favorable audit findings and the AGO anticorruption unit is itself corrupt. 39

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The President, the CEO, and their advisors all have different ideas about how to approach anticorruption.

The HOO has had its staff downsized by one third, its budget reduced, and its mission curtailed by the President.40 At the same time the President has “endorsed” the MEC’s anticorruption monitoring tool as the roadmap for the fight against corruption and the Council of Ministers has made a formal resolution directing all Ministers to be responsive to the MEC.41

Despite the fact that the NUG has brought in capable Ministers and Deputy Ministers, some of whom are eager to lead reform, there is still resistance to change at the lower levels of most ministries and a demand to reap the benefits of corruption because of low salaries and an environment of increasing insecurity and uncertainty.42 There is no sense of customer service and an attitude that government is there to provide employment, not service. It is difficult to fire anyone because of the patronage networks that many employees used to get their jobs in the first place.43 The ministries are a legacy of outdated organizational structures and processes from the Soviet era. There is no desire to change at the lower levels and a lack of capacity to make changes.44 In addition, the reality of foreign aid delivery also has an impact, as the salaries and opportunities available in the assistance architecture draw Afghanistan’s best and brightest away from government service creating a parallel civil service of Afghans employed in embassies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Low government wages have also provided motivation for Afghan civil servants to seek bribes at the point of service delivery to subsidize low wages. Attempts to enhance the capacity of the Afghan civil service have only recently demonstrated potential to make a significant impact on the effectiveness of service delivery.

INSTITUTIONAL RULES OF THE GAME

The 2014 electoral campaign promised change to Afghanistan and its people. Based on his technocratic reputation, Afghans believed that the newly-inaugurated President Ghani would establish an era of significant public administration modernization. Early positive sign, such as the presentation of the National Unity Government’s reform agenda at the 2014 London Conference only a few months after the government was formed, reinforced this perception. However, as noted above, the gulf between promise and delivery has now become a defining characteristic of public perception and expectations of the Afghan government.

The NUG struggles with an existential security crisis that takes all of its attention. The perception that well-intentioned NUG leaders don’t have their eye on other matters is widespread. “Good governance is a luxury of a political class that is just trying to survive, especially with ISIS at the very gates of Nangarhar.”45 While Afghanistan’s government has come a long ways since the Bonn Agreement (as well as since previous eras of the Taliban and the Soviet occupation), vestigial practices remain. Informal allegiances are still seen as the true centers of powers, and many old practices have been cemented into the manner in which the NUG operates.

Most feel that 2016 is a critical year for the NUG and Afghanistan. Challenges range from security, declining economic growth, and pressing political issues, including parliamentary elections and a constitutional Loya Jirga to ratify the Dr. Abdullah’s CEO position. In the view of one observer, “If the NUG doesn’t change now, it won’t exist.”46

A new Government not governing

The negotiated settlement created rival factions within government and senior officials have focused too much time on an territorial squabbles to establish parameters for a division of labor between the Ghani and Abdullah camps. The result has been logjams and delay at critical policy and process decision points. It took weeks to assign roles and responsibilities for the President vis-à-vis the Chief Executive Officer and to

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determine who would make which appointments. Filling the cabinet took so much time that it was not until March 2015 that one could speak of an actual government. Still, senior ministerial leaders focus on the transactional politics of political survival, sending a message that the NUG is not durable enough to govern.47 Additionally, some crucial ministries continue to lack leadership, including the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Office of the Mayor of Kabul.48 One of the President’s senior advisors put it bluntly: “No progress has been made because of the infighting between the President and the CEO.”49 Others describe the NUG as politically “self-destructive.”50

The frozen conflict thawed near the end of 2015, and 2016 has been relatively calm. One observer has noted that “CEO Abdullah and President Ghani have been able to work together after appointments were made despite many who believed that they would not.”51 Some indicate that the two have found a way to work together and that the government may be on a better track after its initial rough start.52 However, other respondents expressed concern over improvements that have involved centralization of powers under presidential authority. Crucial government authorities such as public procurement have been quickly centralized. President Ghani’s advisors note that the weaknesses in the system required immediate action.

Several officials note that the centralization of authority seemed to with the result of an inability to delegate and too little faith in the process of power sharing.53

This centralization process further weakened CEO Abdullah and the ministers loyal to him. Indeed, in addition to centralized decision making, President Ghani has also focused on what observers characterize as micro-issues that would normally be on the desk of a deputy minister, not the head of state. The conclusion reached by too many in government has been that authority only exists at the top, which has led to paralysis.

Ministers and their deputies expressed frustration at their inability to “to…