RFP 72062321R00003 - LLS.pdf

RFP No. 72062321R00003 – Locally Legitimate Stabilization (LLS) for USAID/Somalia

Solicitation Issuance Date: February 25, 2021 Closing Date/Time for Questions: March 11, 10 a.m. Nairobi time Solicitation Closing Date/Time: April 1, 10 a.m. Nairobi time

Subject: Request for Proposals (RFP) No. 72062321R00003 – Locally Legitimate Stabilization for USAID/Somalia

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is seeking proposals to implement the Locally Legitimate Stabilization (LLS) contract as described in the attached Request for Proposals (RFP). USAID anticipates awarding one Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) type form contract with a period of performance of 5 years at an estimated cost range of between $44 million and $49 million. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for this acquisition is 541990. The authorized geographical code is 937.

This procurement will be conducted under full and open competition procedures, pursuant to Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (48 CFR Chapter 1). Please refer to Section L for information regarding proposal requirements. Offerors should take into account the expected delivery time required by the proposal transmission method they choose, and they are responsible for ensuring proposals are received at USAID. Failure to comply with the submission date will deem any submission unacceptable and it will not be reviewed or evaluated. Faxed proposals are not acceptable, nor will they be reviewed or evaluated. Section L of the RFP sets forth all instructions for the preparation and submission of required proposal contents. Section M states the criteria by which proposals will be evaluated. Oral explanations or instructions given before award of the contract will not be binding.

This RFP in no way obligates USAID to award a contract nor does it commit USAID to pay any cost incurred in the preparation and submission of a proposal. Award of a contract under this RFP is subject to availability of funds and other internal USAID approvals.

This RFP can be viewed and downloaded from https://beta.sam.gov/. USAID bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from transmission or conversion processes. Further, be aware that amendments to solicitations are occasionally issued and will be posted on the same website from which you downloaded the solicitation. USAID advises to regularly check the above website for amendments.

Prospective Offerors must submit questions about this solicitation to Mr. Sam Kraegel at skraegel@usaid.gov and Mr. Aziz Alibhai aalibhai@usaid.gov by the time and date indicated above.

Thank you for your interest in USAID programs.

Patrick Kollars, Supervisory Contracting Officer, USAID Kenya and East Africa https://beta.sam.gov/ mailto:skraegel@usaid.gov mailto:aalibhai@usaid.gov

72062321R00003

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD

4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER

7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than Item 7)

ORDER UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

SEALED BID (IFB)

5. DATE ISSUED

1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED RATING PAGE OF PAGES

2 136

C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

EXT.NUMBERAREA CODE

B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS)A. NAME

10. FOR

INFORMATION

CALL:

CAUTION: LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

(Date)(Hour) local timeuntildepository located in copies for furnishing the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in Item 8, or if hand carried, in the

SOLICITATION

9. Sealed offers in original and

PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

INSTRS., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

CONTRACT CLAUSES

PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

I

J

K

L

M SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

PACKAGING AND MARKING

DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT

SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSESPART I - THE SCHEDULE

H

G

F

E

D

C

B

A

SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) DESCRIPTION SEC. (X)

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

18. OFFER DATE17. SIGNATURE

SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE.

IS DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE - ENTER

15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS

EXT.NUMBERAREA CODE

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER

(Type or print)AND

ADDRESS

OF

OFFEROR

CODE FACILITY

16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER15A. NAME

DATEAMENDMENT NO.DATEAMENDMENT NO.

and related documents numbered and dated):

amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of

14. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AMENDMENTS

CALENDAR DAYS (%)30 CALENDAR DAYS (%)20 CALENDAR DAYS (%)10 CALENDAR DAYS (%)

(See Section I, Clause No. 52.232.8)

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT

designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror)

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

28. AWARD DATE

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

CODE 24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7)

ITEM

(4 copies unless otherwise specified)

23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN

41 U.S.C. 253 (c) ( 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c) (

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION:

21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION20. AMOUNT19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED

AWARD (To be completed by government)

CODE

02/25/2021 X

720623

American Embassy Nairobi

USAID/KEA

United Nations Avenue, Gigiri P.O.Box 629 – 00621, Village Market Nairobi 00000

1000 C 04/01/2021

Aziz Alibhai +25 2711 aalibhai@usaid.gov

402-0721

PAGE(S)

Patrick Kollars

AUTHORIZED FOR LOCAL REPRODUCTION

Previous edition is unusable

STANDARD FORM 33 (Rev. 9-97)

Prescribed by GSA - FAR (48 CFR) 53.214(c)

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within _____0_________ calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted

Table of Contents

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE AND SERVICES

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

B.4 PRICE SCHEDULE

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

B.6 COST REIMBURSEMENT

B.7 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK

SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING

D.1 AIDAR 752.7009 MARKING (January 1993)

D.2 BRANDING STRATEGY, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND MARKING PLAN

SECTION E – INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

E.2 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

SECTION F – DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

F.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

F.2 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

F.3 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

F.4 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

F.5 KEY PERSONNEL AND REQUIRED POSITIONS

F.6 REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES

F.7 DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES

F.8 FEE SCHEDULE FOR DELIVERABLES

SECTION G – CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

G.1 CONTRACTING OFFICER

G.2 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE (COR)

G.3 CONTRACTOR’S PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT

G.4 AIDAR 752.7003 – DOCUMENTATION FOR PAYMENT (NOV 1998)

G.5 PAYING OFFICE

G.6 ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

G.7 CONTRACTOR'S PAYMENT ADDRESS

G.8 TECHNICAL DIRECTION/RELATIONSHIP WITH USAID

SECTION H – SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

H.1 302.3.5.19 USAID-FINANCED THIRD-PARTY WEB SITES (AUGUST 2013)

H.2 302.3.5.22 SUBMISSION OF DATASETS TO THE DEVELOPMENT DATA LIBRARY

(OCTOBER 2014)

H.3 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL COMPENSATION

H.4 AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

H.5 AUTHORIZED WORKDAY/WEEK

H.6 AAPD 17-01 REVISION 2 - DEFENSE BASE ACT (DBA) INSURANCE FOR 2015-2021

(NOV 20, 2020)

H.7 LOGISTIC SUPPORT

H.8 LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

H.9 AAPD 02-04 - EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORISM FINANCING (MARCH 20, 2002) .. 64

H.10 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES . 64

H.11 AIDAR 52.245-71 - TITLE TO AND CARE OF PROPERTY

H.12 NONEXPENDABLE PROPERTY PURCHASES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

RESOURCES

H.13 LIMITATION ON ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (DEVIATION

NOS. M/OAA-DEV-FAR-18-2C AND M/OAA-DEV-AIDAR-18-2C) (APRIL 2018)

H.14 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

H.15 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED FACILITIES OR PROPERTY

H.16 COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 508 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AS

AMENDED

H.17 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEM

H.18 AAPD 16-02 REVISION 2 (R2) - RESTRICTIONS AGAINST DISCLOSURE (MAY 2016) .. 68

H.19 AAPD 16-02 REVISION 2 (R2) - ELECTRONIC AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

ACCESSIBILITY (APRIL 2018)

H.20 AAPD 16-02 REVISION 2 (R2) - CLOUD COMPUTING (APRIL 2018)

H.21 INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY

H.22 GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT (GUCs)

H.23 SPECIAL PROVISION FOR SOMALIA REGARDING THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS

CONTROL (OFAC)

SECTION I – CONTRACT CLAUSES

I.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

I.2 FAR 52.204-1 APPROVAL OF CONTRACT (DEC 1989)

I.3 FAR 52.216-24 LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY (APR 1984)

I.4 FAR 52.216-25 CONTRACT DEFINITIZATION (OCT 2010)

I.5 FAR 52.217-9 – OPTION TO EXTEND THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT (MAR 2000)

I.6 FAR 52.222-35 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR VETERANS (JUN 2020)

I.7 FAR 52.222-36 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES (JUN 2020)

I.8 FAR 52.247-67 SUBMISSION OF TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS FOR AUDIT (FEB

2006)

I.9 FAR 52.252-2 CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

I.10 AIDAR 752.225-70 SOURCE AND NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTS (FEB 2012)

I.11 AIDAR 752.229-71 REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES (JULY 2007)

I.12 AIDAR 752.231-71 SALARY SUPPLEMENTS FOR HOST GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

(MAR 2015)

I.13 AIDAR 752.242-70 PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS (OCT 2007)

I.14 AIDAR 752.7005 – SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

DOCUMENTS (SEP 2013)

I.15 AIDAR 752.7013 CONTRACTOR-MISSION RELATIONSHIPS (M/OAA-DEV-AIDAR-20-

03c)

I.16 AIDAR 752.7027 PERSONNEL (DEC 1990)

I.17 AIDAR 752.7032 INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL APPROVAL AND NOTIFICATION

REQUIREMENTS (APR 2014)

I.18 AIDAR 752.7034 ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DISCLAIMER (DEC 1991)

I.19 AIDAR 752.7036 USAID IMPLEMENTING PARTNER NOTICES (IPN) PORTAL FOR

ACQUISITION (JUL 2014)

SECTION J – LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT J.1: BUDGET TEMPLATE

ATTACHMENT J.2: PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION (PPI)

ATTACHMENT J.4: SOMALIA LCP RANGE:

SECTION K – REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF

THE OFFEROR

K.1 NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 97

K.2 52.204-3 TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION (OCT 1998)

K.3 52.204-8 ANNUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS (MAR 2020)

K.4 52.204-20 PREDECESSOR OF OFFEROR (AUG 2020)

K.5 52.204-24 REPRESENTATION REGARDING CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT (AUG 2020)

K.6 52.204-26 COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES-

REPRESENTATION (DEC 2019)

K.7 52.209-5 CERTIFICATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (AUG 2020)

K.8 52.209-7 INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (OCT 2018)

K.9 52.209-11 REPRESENTATION BY CORPORATIONS REGARDING DELINQUENT TAX

LIABILITY OR A FELONY CONVICTION UNDER ANY FEDERAL LAW (FEB 2016) . 109

K.10 52.215-6 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE (OCT 1997)

K.11 52.222-22 PREVIOUS CONTRACTS AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS (FEB 1999)

K.12 52.222-25 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPLIANCE (APR 1984)

K.13 52.227-15 REPRESENTATION OF LIMITED RIGHTS DATA AND RESTRICTED

COMPUTER SOFTWARE (DEC 2007)

K.14 52.230-1 COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NOTICES AND CERTIFICATION (JUN

2020)

K.15 52.230-7 PROPOSAL DISCLOSURE--COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICE CHANGES (APR

2005)

K.16 INSURANCE - IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY

K.17 AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATORS

K.18 SIGNATURE

SECTION L – INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS OR

RESPONDENTS

L.1 NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

L.2 FAR 52.216-1 – TYPE OF CONTRACT (APR 1984)

L.3 FAR 52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (SEP 2006)

L.4 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

L.5 SUBMISSION AND DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

L.6 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

L.7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COST/BUSINESS PROPOSAL ... 125

L.8 WAIVERS UNDER FAR PART 4.2101 PROHIBITION ON COVERED

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SERVICES AND

EQUIPMENT (AUGUST 13, 2020)

SECTION M – EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

M.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

M.2 TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

M.3 COST/PRICE EVALUATION

M.4 SOURCE SELECTION

PART I – THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Contract is to provide services that fall within the Scope of Work (SOW) specified in Section C.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE AND SERVICES

This is a completion-form Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract. For the consideration set forth below, the Contractor will deliver the services described in Section C and F, in accordance with performance standards specified in Section E.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $TBD. The fixed fee, if any, is $TBD. The estimated cost-plus fixed fee, if any, is $TBD.

(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is $TBD. The Contractor must not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount in accordance with the Limitation of Funds Clause, FAR 52.232.22.

(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through TBD.

B.4 PRICE SCHEDULE

Description Amount

Total Estimated Cost (exclusive of Grants Under Contracts)

Grants Under Contract (GUCs) $9,000,000

Construction $6,000,000

Research Products $1,320,000

Short Term Technical Assistance $1,009,500

Total Estimated Cost $

Fixed Fee $

Total Estimated Cost-Plus Fixed Fee $

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

The contract clause entitled “Allowable Cost and Payment (JUN 2013)”, FAR Subpart 52.216-7, specifies that the indirect cost rates shall be established for each of the Contractor’s accounting periods which apply to this contract. Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs shall be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases:

Description Rate Base Type Period

[TBD] [TBD] 1/ 1/ 1/

[TBD] [TBD] 2/ 2/ 2/

[TBD] [TBD] 3/ 3/ 3/

1/ Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

2/ Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

3/ Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

B.6 COST REIMBURSEMENT

Allowable costs shall be limited to reasonable, allocable, and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, FAR 52.216-8, Fixed Fee, if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment.

B.7 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

FAR 52.216-8 - Fixed Fee (Jun 2011) (a)The Government shall pay the Contractor for performing this contract the fixed fee specified in the Schedule.

(b) Payment of the fixed fee shall be made as specified in the Schedule; provided that the Contracting Officer withholds a reserve not to exceed 15 percent of the total fixed fee or $100,000, whichever is less, to protect the Government’s interest. The Contracting Officer shall release 75 percent of all fee withholds under this contract after receipt of an adequate certified final indirect cost rate proposal covering the year of physical completion of this contract, provided the Contractor has satisfied all other contract terms and conditions, including the submission of the final patent and royalty reports, and is not delinquent in submitting final vouchers on prior years’ settlements. The Contracting Officer may release up to 90 percent of the fee withholds under this contract based on the Contractor’s past performance related to the submission and settlement of final indirect cost rate proposals.

(End of Clause)

A Fixed Fee Distribution Schedule must be approved by the CO before fee is paid. The final Fixed Fee Distribution Schedule is incorporated as an attachment to the contract, and any subsequent changes must be approved by the CO.

Prior to vouchering for the fee associated with a given Fee-Bearing Result or Deliverable, the Contractor must have written documentation of the inspection and acceptance of the Fee-Bearing Result or Deliverable by the appropriate USAID official.

END OF SECTION B

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 PURPOSE

The persistent presence of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), most notably al-Shabaab, remains the most significant obstacle to establishing the foundation needed for Somali communities to recover from decades of conflict and build greater systemic resilience to recurring shocks. VEOs violently obstruct efforts to establish state authority, create and exacerbate conflict in local communities, prevent humanitarian aid from being delivered during times of crisis, and undermine economic investments to improve people’s livelihoods. Creating the necessary conditions for communities to begin to address the structural causes of Somalia’s chronic instability first requires that the factors that allow al-Shabaab to destabilize local communities be reduced.

Operating in strategic, frontline communities recently recovered or having already been recovered but remain vulnerable to al-Shabaab, the goal of the Locally Legitimate Stabilization (LLS) program will be to support Somali communities in establishing the initial governance and safety conditions necessary to address the long-term social, economic, and political causes of Somalia’s instability by reducing the factors that enable violent extremist organizations to gain and maintain influence.

LLS will play a pivotal role in advancing U.S. foreign policy interests in Somalia by contributing to both interconnected objectives identified in USAID/Somalia’s 2021 - 2025 Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). These objectives are 1) Targeted local institutions govern in a more legitimate manner, diminishing influence of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), and 2) Enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses.

C.2 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Amid a continued lack of effective governance and near-continual armed conflict, Somalia remains one of the poorest and most conflict affected countries in the world, leaving communities dangerously vulnerable to recurring shocks and catastrophic levels of internal displacement. Addressing the systemic factors that cause Somalia’s chronic instability requires creating a foundation of responsive and inclusive governance and sufficient community safety.

The Contractor will use a flexible, small grants model that will support the shaping of stabilization operations and the initial recovery of communities from al-Shabaab rule. Recognizing that successful stabilization programs must connect the end of clearing operations to longer term development processes, The Contractor will also sequence small grant activities to create the governance and community safety conditions necessary to prepare communities to transition to longer-term development initiatives and processes.

Under the LLS contract, the Contractor will:

● Support a management team capable of managing up to 300 small grant activities during the life of the activity. Small grants will be primarily in-kind grants and can range from as little as

$1,000 to over $500,000. However, the average size of a LLS small grant is expected to be between $70,000 to $100,000 and last between 3 to 6 months;

● Identify innovative small grant activities that respond to the hyper-local contexts LLS will work in and that can assist in transitioning a community to longer-term development initiatives;

● Conduct research and regular contextual analysis into the program’s target areas. The

Contractor will be expected to provide up to 16 reports per year. The exact number and topics to be covered by each report will be determined in close consultation with the Contracting

Officer’s Representative;

● Provide Short term Technical Assistance Activities (STTA); issue firm fixed small scale construction subcontracts; and procure and distribute goods;

● Conduct regular pause and reflect sessions that reassess the program’s operating context and progress towards the program’s objectives and identify areas of possible program adaptation.

At least one pause and reflect session will be conducted during each year of implementation;

● Develop a monitoring, evaluation, and learning system that can examine the validity of and progress towards program objectives, small grant activity effectiveness, and program impact;

● Maintain an up to date small grant activity tracking system;

● Monitor program areas to identify when conditions allow LLS to begin small grant activities and when sufficient conditions exist for LLS to responsibly disengage from a community.

C.3 OPERATING AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been beset by a nearly three decades long civil war and continual clan conflict that has had devastating human and humanitarian impacts.

The Somali civil war has unfolded in three phases – the first phase of the Somali civil war (1991- 1995) saw the overthrow of the government by anti-government groups, and then spread to civilian-against-civilian fighting along clan lines, and general destruction, predatory looting and the exodus of people and businesses from Mogadishu. The conflict spread across southern Somalia and continued through 1991 and 1992, with clan-based militias fighting against one another for control of valuable neighborhoods, seaports, and towns. The humanitarian impact was dramatic and caught the world’s attention.

The second phase of the civil war period ran from the departure of the United Nations in 1995 until the mid-2000s. Bitter fighting between disparate groups and clans still continued in different parts of the country. Politically, there were numerous efforts to reconstitute a national government, and in parallel, attempts to reestablish local governance, most notably in Somaliland and Puntland in the northern parts of the country. Other similar attempts included local councils in Bay and Bakool regions, the Benadir administration, and most fatefully, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu in the early 2000s. It was local efforts to improve security that eventually fueled the rise of the ICU in 2006. The ICU was a union of Sharia courts that administered justice in a relatively consistent way and provided a modicum of security following the chaos of the 1990s.1

The third and ongoing phase of the conflict began when the ICU were identified as an Islamist threat and in 2006-7, the newly established Somali Transitional Federal Government deployed their forces against the ICU. Backed by Ethiopian troops, they entered Mogadishu in 2007 and deposed the ICU and their militia wing. Radicalized by the invasion of Ethiopia, a small faction within this militia wing

1 Expanding Access to Justice Program. 2020. Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu.

Nairobi, Kenya: Pact and the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative., 7.

split off from the ICU and became al-Shabaab, starting an insurgency against the Somali government that continues to the present.

C.3.1 The Persistence of al-Shabaab

Despite a decade or more of internationally backed military operations, al-Shabaab maintains a robust organization capable of generating revenue and recruits with minimal territorial control and the ability to provide security and dispute resolution to communities. While most major population centers and large district centers are now under nominal government control, al-Shabaab maintains the capability to intimidate populations and generate millions of dollars in revenue in these areas.2 There are a number of factors that have contributed to al-Shabaab’s resilience.

First, al-Shabaab continues to capitalize on the failure of Somali governing authorities to provide reliable and consistent security or fair and effective justice. The inability of the state to provide security to citizens leaves citizens vulnerable to violent reprisals from al-Shabaab if they do not cooperate with them or if they are seen as assisting the government. The lack of dependable security also leaves individuals and clans vulnerable to attacks from more powerful groups. In contrast, al-Shabaab is able to provide harsh, but predictable security to citizens in the areas they both control and do not control.3 al-Shabaab’s ability to provide security and protection creates powerful incentives for individuals and groups to collaborate with them.

At the same time, al-Shabaab provides equally harsh, though somewhat effective, dispute resolution and justice services. Unlike government administered courts, al-Shabaab courts and mediation processes are perceived as relatively clan-neutral and free of corruption as cases can be filed and heard without bribes being paid. As such, although al-Shabaab courts are only found in areas they control, because of their perceived effectiveness and relative fairness, citizens often prefer travelling to al- Shabaab controlled areas to use al-Shabaab administered courts instead of using government administered alternate dispute resolution centers or formal courts.

Al-Shabaab courts also operate very expediently as decisions are made on the same day as the trial, and judgements are executed immediately. This is in contrast to government courts where cases and judgements can lag for months, if not years. Rulings made by al-Shabaab are also violent, but effectively enforced. Most people comply with al-Shabaab rulings because they are afraid to be killed or arrested if they do not. Research indicates that most cases brought before al-Shabaab courts involve the mediation of localized disputes, although they have also gained some credibility among some communities for mediating high-stakes land and property disputes. 4 The reliance of citizens on al- Shabaab provision of dispute resolution and their brand of justice enables the group to position itself as a credible alternative to the government and serves as a powerful propaganda tool.

Second, al-Shabaab leverages existing inequities between clans to build a following among historically marginalized populations. Power and resources in Somalia tend to be heavily skewed towards the more powerful clans, thus excluding the smaller or less dominant clans. Consequently, al-Shabaab is able to

2 The Hiral Institute, The AS Finance System. July 2018., 7

3 Joanne Crouch, Counter-terror and the logic of violence in Somalia’s civil war: Time for a new approach.

SAFERWORLD, November, 2018., 9-10

4 Expanding Access to Justice Program. 2020., 14.

https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AS-Finance-System.pdf either directly subjugate or to easily co-opt these vulnerable clans and populations5 who pragmatically ally with al-Shabaab for protection and to safeguard their political and economic interests. In addition, al-Shabaab explicitly advertises that it defends marginalized and vulnerable populations. For instance, al-Shabaab courts and mediation processes, with their focus on immediate enforcement of judgments, their disregard for clan backgrounds, and clear cost structure, emerge as a welcoming and novel option.6

Al-Shabaab is also able to gain influence by exploiting the real and perceived grievances that divide communities. These grievances can be hyper-local and vary from region to region and community to community. For example, some grievances date back to the civil war, when clans with powerful militias expanded into territories belonging to less well armed clans, either displacing them or seizing their arable lands. Some grievances may be resource related, such as competition over water points, pasture, livestock theft, and others may be clan-related, such as settling old scores or revenge killings, failure to pay blood compensation or clan prestige. In more urban areas, the conflicts can be about land ownership and business dealings. Al-Shabaab has proven adept at manipulating these local grievances to keep communities fractured and divided, and to gain new recruits and allies. Understanding the core interests of clans, sub-clans, and marginalized population groups and how those interests shift and change over the course of The Contractor engagement with a community is critically important to designing and targeting small grant activities that can reduce the community fault lines that al- Shabaab exploits.

Third, al-Shabaab is able to leverage the predatory actions of security actors and lack of trust in them to keep communities from cooperating with hold or police forces. One of the most serious grievances against security forces is the high incidence of rape and Sexually and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) by security actors and non-aligned clan militias against women, particularly women from minority clans. The perpetrators are rarely brought to justice, often protected by military leadership and broader clan leaders, prompting the family members of SGBV victims to ally with al-Shabaab to gain revenge.

USAID research shows that youth from minority clans repeatedly cite the rape of their sisters or mothers as a main reason behind their support for al-Shabaab. The desire for revenge results in individuals actively cooperating in pro-al-Shabaab intelligence collection and using al-Shabaab produced IEDs and other weapons to target soldiers and units who are viewed as complicit in SGBV incidents.

Further, many units and leaders of security elements are simply deputized clan militias with problematic histories in the areas they operate in. Usually dominated by one powerful clan, hold forces often spark fears among communities that stabilization operations are a pretext for more powerful clans to seize land and other resources as has happened in the past. The lack of confidence in security actors leads to communities withholding support, resulting in weak and fragile security arrangements that are ultimately ineffective in preventing al-Shabaab from accessing and intimidating communities.

Fourth, al-Shabaab is able to raise the funding for their violent activities and operations through an extensive extortion system. Al-Shabaab has imposed a significant number of “taxes” on communities to generate income for themselves – these include charitable religious contributions (zakat), in-kind

5 Marginalization and minority status are not synonymous - marginalization does not always refer to clan dynamics and can mean that a community is displaced or excluded from a specific power structure (e.g., women, youth, IDPs). Similarly, minority status does not necessarily correlate with population and a minority group can be more numerous in a locality but still disadvantaged militarily and politically.

6 Expanding Access to Justice Program. 2020., 18.

percentages of agricultural production, fees on the sale of livestock, fees at checkpoints, fees for the transit of product and goods, rent fees for former state farms, and ad hoc extraordinary “taxes” on businesses. USAID research has shown that while business actors are not always happy about paying al-Shabaab “taxes” they dare not comply and also depend on the group as a guarantor for security and access to markets. Al-Shabaab continues to maintain the capability to extract resources in areas it does not control, such as Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab maintains a sophisticated and extensive taxation and extortion scheme.

Faced with an ineffective and corrupt government and the brutal and violent governance offered by al-Shabaab, most communities embrace neither. Instead, Somali’s adopt "hedging" strategies,” in which they simultaneously navigate and engage with both al-Shabaab and government systems.

Selectively participating in both systems often provides Somalis the best chance to protect their personal interests and provide for individual and group security. As long as hedging strategies continue to be the most effective survival strategy for Somalis, al-Shabaab will continue to endure.

C.4 GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND THEORY OF CHANGE

The goal of the Locally Legitimate Stabilization (LLS) program is to assist Somali communities in establishing the initial governance and safety conditions necessary to address the long-term social, economic and political causes of Somalia’s instability by reducing the factors that enable violent extremist organizations to gain and maintain influence. This will contribute to building a foundation for political, economic, and social development in conflict affected communities in Somalia.

Initial governance conditions refers to the establishment of formal government authority in a community and the creation of more inclusive governance processes that impact how political power and economic opportunities are allocated and decisions around community security are made. LLS makes a distinction between governance and government. Formal government at all levels in Somalia is limited. However, citizens have been governed by traditional and other informal systems and often have more confidence in those structures to represent them, provide services, rectify grievances, and regulate daily life. LLS looks wider than state, district, and local governing structures and will incorporate formal and informal governing elements into its programming approach. Given the prominence of dominant leaders and personalities in Somalia, blending of formal and informal governance structures is often the norm, not the exception.

Safety conditions refers to the absence of widespread violent conflict and attacks and the ability of citizens to move within their community and surrounding area securely. Establishing these conditions requires sufficient capacity of security actors which is not in LLS’s manageable interests to impact.

However, USAID/Somalia’s experience demonstrates that supporting community engagement in the planning of security arrangements such as the composition of police forces or the placement of checkpoints makes these processes more responsive to the needs of the communities and can have a positive impact on the safety of a community as well as on a communities willingness to cooperate with security providers who are often viewed negatively due to past predatory practices.

The end state LLS works towards is a community where basic security is provided, the possibility of the outbreak of violent clan or communal conflict is reasonably reduced, and decision-making processes more closely reflect the needs of all members of the community.

C.4.1 Theory of Change

The LLS theory of change is if citizens are more engaged in decision-making and a community is better able to manage conflict peacefully, that will reduce fears of marginalization and community conflict which create opportunities for al-Shabaab to destabilize communities, then al-Shabaab influence will decrease and the conditions will be created that allow communities to address the long-term structural drivers of instability.

C.4.2 Objectives

LLS objectives will focus on reducing those factors that the Contractor can most immediately impact that allow al-Shabaab to gain influence and destabilize a community. The specific objectives of LLS will be tailored to the context of a given area and the Contractor will be expected to develop individual strategies for the areas the Contractor operates in. The objectives in each area are expected to shift and change over the course of the program as contexts change, al-Shabaab’s strategy and tactics evolve, or through ongoing assessment and analysis of the program’s underlying assumptions.

Initial objectives of the program are expected to include:

● Citizen engagement in political, economic, and security decision-making increased:

the Contractor will support and create opportunities for citizens, particularly among traditionally marginalized groups, to engage in community planning and decision-making processes. The outcome of these small grant activities will result in increased perceptions of these processes as fairer and more representative, making it less likely citizens or communities will cooperate with al-Shabaab to protect their political and economic interests. This objective runs throughout LLS engagement with a community and contributes to establishing initial inclusive governance processes and safety conditions in a community.

As inclusive governance and safety increases, the Contractor will conduct small grant activities under this objective that can catalyze and assist a community's transition to longer term development efforts and processes. The Contractor will support inclusive community planning processes that convene key stakeholders including regional and state government leaders, civil society, and international donors to identify opportunities for communities to engage in and leverage other development initiatives. These planning processes may include the development of district development plans, disaster risk reduction plans, durable solutions plans, or other plans that guide development in the community.

It is expected that youth will be a particular focus under this objective as USAID research shows that youth join al-Shabaab, in part, to gain greater political agency in their community.

Increasing youth engagement in community decision-making processes will make them less vulnerable to recruitment by al-Shabaab because they will have a greater voice in their own community.

Illustrative activities include increasing citizen involvement in the planning of political and security arrangements such as the selection of local or district administrations or the composition of police forces, or any decision-making process that determines how economic resources are allocated within a community. Decisions around the allocation of economic resources could include a variety of processes such as what development projects are prioritized and where they are placed in a community, how decisions over the use and access to water are made, or even how decisions are made to allocate stalls in local markets. In some instances, the Contractor will support the outcomes of these processes under this objective through the direct provision of goods and services or through small-scale infrastructure projects that tangibly demonstrate the value of inclusive decision-making processes.

The Contractor is expected to coordinate activities that address economic marginalization with USAID’s upcoming Economic Growth activity, the Resilient and Inclusive Economic Development (RIED).

● Increase community’s ability to manage conflict peacefully: The Contractor will work to create platforms and mechanisms that can bring communities together to identify sources of conflict and conduct activities that increase social cohesion among competing groups in a community. LLS defines social cohesion as the degree to which citizens perceive themselves to be part of a shared community with all other members of the society. Greater social cohesion results in an increased ability of communities to manage conflict and an increased ability for communities to mobilize resources and engage in collective action on shared priorities.

Small grant activities under this objective will reduce community fault lines caused by clan and community conflict that al-Shabaab manipulates to gain the allegiance of marginalized clans or groups. Small grant activities may include supporting community members to interact and work together on community development projects, supporting dispute resolution training for community leaders, or supporting the establishment of district peace committees.

USAID supported dialogues with communities in newly recovered areas show that clan conflict over land distribution, political power sharing, and other resources is a primary concern for communities in the aftermath of clearing operations. Some of these conflicts extend back decades. Solving these conflicts -- most of which have been effectively suppressed by al-Shabaab -- is beyond the scope of LLS to meaningfully impact as they require Somali-led reconciliation processes, often involving national, state and other actors. LLS, however, will increase social cohesion and provide platforms that allow for dialogue and negotiation at the local level. These efforts will better prepare communities to deal with the tensions that arise when reconciliation processes over these sensitive issues proceed and will lay the foundation for longer-term solutions.

Small grant activities under this objective will be closely coordinated with USAID’s Expanding Access to Justice program which supports mechanisms to resolve grievances and feelings of injustice in priority stabilization areas.

The activities listed under each of the objectives are illustrative only. The Contractor will be responsible for developing creative, innovative approaches and activities that can be tested and evaluated and can advance the goals of LLS.

C.5 TECHNICAL APPROACH

USAID/Somalia’s approach to stabilization recognizes that stabilization programs must be a bridge to and catalyst for longer term development processes. The Contractor must both look ahead to identify new stabilization opportunities created by clearing operations while simultaneously looking back to ensure that al-Shabaab’s influence is sufficiently eroded so that longer term development processes can take root.

This approach will require the Contractor to implement and engage with communities recently recovered from al-Shabaab and in communities that may have been recovered for several years but remain vulnerable to al-Shabaab; and where opportunities exist to consolidate and expand stabilization gains. Given the historical pace of clearing operations in Somalia, it is likely that the bulk of LLS small grant activities will not be in recently recovered areas but in rural and semi-rural communities that have been recovered for several years but have relatively greater strategic importance to the advancement of USG goals and objectives. For more information on how The Contractor will determine which communities it will engage in see Section C.5.7.

C.5.1 LLS Connection to USG and USAID Goals

LLS will contribute to USG foreign policy interests in Somalia by contributing to both the USG stabilization goals through support to the objectives identified in USAID’s 2021-2025 CDCS. The USG stabilization desired end-state is: The expansion of credible, inclusive, responsive, transparent state authority, and the establishment of political agreements that peaceably respond to conflicts and provide the United States regional access and support.

USAID/Somalia directly contributes to this goal through its twin objectives identified in the 2021- 2025 CDCS that seek to 1) diminish the influence of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and 2) enable marginalized Somalis to more effectively withstand shocks and stresses. LLS will contribute to both of these objectives.

First, LLS will be USAID/Somalia’s primary mechanism to diminish the influence of al-Shabaab in rural, frontline communities. Specific LLS small grant activities will be based on an analysis of the local context in each area LLS operates in but are initially expected to follow the objectives described in Section C.4.2 which dovetail with the intermediate results for Objective 1 described in the 2021- 2025 CDCS. These intermediate results include increasing perceptions of fairness in governance institutions, increasing economic and social opportunities for marginalized populations, and supporting communities to more effectively manage conflict.

Second, LLS will also contribute to Objective 2 since diminishing the presence of VEOs assists the entrance of humanitarian aid actors into communities under al-Shabaab control and provides rural communities with better access to urban economies that are essential to improving an individual’s resilience to climatic shocks. As noted under Section C.5.7, a community’s relative resilience to climatic shocks will be a factor in choosing which communities the Contractor works with and the Contractor is expected to support communities and local administrations in developing disaster risk reduction plans and durable solutions plans in those communities the Contractor engages with when appropriate.

C.5.2 LLS Relationship to the Stabilization Assistance Review

In 2018 the USG released the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) which outlines a framework for ensuring that USG stabilization efforts have the greatest impact in pursuit of USG foreign policy interests. the Contractor will apply this framework to inform its program strategy and operating principles. Among the most notable aspects of this framework include:

Pursuit of Political Outcomes

The SAR describes stabilizations as “an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S.

Government efforts … toward supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.”7 the Contractor will embrace this tenet by implementing small grant activities that can create space for citizens, government actors, and other stakeholders to renegotiate more sustainable and stable relationships rather than small grant activities that tend to focus on delivering more output related objectives such as increasing the number of jobs or increasing literacy. Creating space for the renegotiation of relationships after a conflict allows for more indigenous and therefore lasting political arrangements to emerge. These political arrangements form the basis upon which longer-term development efforts can build upon and are an integral part of creating the conditions within a community that LLS endeavors to achieve.

Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

The SAR recognizes that USG stabilization strategy is most effective when diplomatic, defense, and development efforts are integrated to support USG national strategic interests in Somalia. All activities under LLS can be expected to be coordinated and sequenced to complement parallel military and political stabilization efforts. Much of the information and analysis driving LLS direction will be derived from USG inter-agency and inter-donor coordination. In some cases, the Contractor implementing staff will need to be comfortable with accepting direction from USAID without the full background, as it may be classified or highly sensitive.

C.5.3 Stabilization Continuum

USAID/Somalia categorizes the progress of communities from their initial recovery from al- Shabaab rule through their transition to longer term development efforts into four phases, recognizing that these phases may overlap and that a community’s progress through these phases is not linear and may move back and forth during the course of a stabilization program’s engagement.

The Contractor engagement with a community may start at any point in this continuum. These phases include:

a) Pre-Recovery Planning

USAID/Somalia’s experience demonstrates stabilization programs must engage in the shaping and planning of recovery efforts in order to deliver timely and effective support. Engaging with communities prior to recovery allows for the identification and therefore quick implementation of initial small grant activities and can inform the planning of clearing operations so that they are better designed to establish the security and access conditions needed for stabilization actors to begin work.

Activities to support communities during this phase may include conducting targeted contextual research and analysis into specific towns and regions to identify challenges and potential sources of conflict.

The Contractor will also organize dialogues between exiled community leaders and the government.

Pre-recovery dialogues give communities a chance to shape initial governance and security arrangements, build consensus on stabilization priorities once military operations are complete, and have proven successful at increasing cooperation between citizens and the government that is necessary to advance recovery efforts. In many instances planned clearing operations often fail to materialize. Although stabilization opportunities in newly recovered areas are expected to remain limited, the Contractor should be prepared to conduct pre-recovery planning small grant activities in more locations than are eventually cleared.

7 United States Government. Stabilization Assistance Review., 7 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/SAR-Final.pdf

b) Initial Recovery Response

During this phase, the Contractor will support inclusive decision-making processes that allow citizens to have a greater say in the recovery of their community. Activities in the initial recovery period must be driven by inclusive community processes to ensure marginalized groups are included in decision-making processes and benefit equally from stabilization projects. This is important to reduce fears of new or continued marginalization and thus decrease incentives for groups to ally with al-Shabaab.

Small scale infrastructure projects, identified by the community, that can improve community safety such as brush clearance or the provision of solar street-lights, or that support broader political goals of the program will also be implemented in this phase.

c) Consolidation

In USAID/Somalia’s experience, it is the consolidation of security gains after the initial recovery is complete that is often the most challenging and critical phase to engage in. Community grievances, effectively suppressed by al-Shabaab, re-emerge, negotiation for political and economic power reignites minority clan fears of being excluded, and community security arrangements…