RFP 72062321R00003 LLS - Attachment J.5.pdf

RFP No. 72062321R00003 – Locally Legitimate Stabilization (LLS) for USAID/Somalia

RFP NO. 72062321R00003 – LOCALLY LEGITIMATE STABILIZATION (LLS) FOR

USAID/SOMALIA

ATTACHMENT J.5: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Political Inclusion

Somali government structures exist at the sub-district, district, regional, state and national levels – it will be important for all levels to send a signal to these newly-liberated communities that their voices are important and that their concerns will not be ignored. This is especially important for marginalized or minority communities who may not have political representation within these existing administrative structures.

While there are frequently efforts to reintegrate newly-liberated communities economically (through road construction, etc.), it is equally important to reintegrate them into the political fabric of the country. This means that they should have the opportunity to participate and to influence the decision-making processes relating to their well-being and future.

This kind of political inclusivity will make the local governance institutions more accepted and, in time, more trusted. Greater inclusivity will give local authorities greater standing and acceptability in playing a constructive role in local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts, including being respected mediators, effective guarantors and possibly trusted enforcers of enduring peace agreements. Ultimately, this will contribute towards addressing the communal grievances that al-Shabaab is able to manipulate to gain influence.

Women’s Role in Violent Extremism

Women, like men, play a variety of roles in promoting and preventing violent extremist ideology and action.1 Women directly support al-Shabaab by collecting intelligence for the organization and by performing important logistical support functions. USAID research shows that women are much more likely to be recruited by a female recruiter who tends to leverage their personal grievances due to clan marginalization or economic and social vulnerability. Voluntary or forced marriage is also a significant motivator for women’s active support of al-Shabaab. Women do appear to suffer more once inside the al-

Shabaab apparatus, including vulnerability to sexual slavery and other sexual violence. Female defectors have a more challenging time than males re-entering society due to the stigma of not only belonging to al-

Shabaab, but also because they were likely victims of sexual violence , hindering their re-acceptance into their family and social structure.

At the same time, women play important roles in mitigating the influence of VEOs. Although the female gender role in society is often limited by cultural norms, their influence in the home is prominent. This influence allows them to impact the most at-risk group for al-Shabaab recruitment: male youth. Parental influence is a significant factor in whether Somali youth join VEOs. Additionally, the home is where the

1 International Crisis Group. Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency. June 2019.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency first warning signs of radicalization can be detected. With many households being female-led, or with male parental figures working away from the home, the role of the mother in identifying and preventing VEO influence is crucial. Once radicalized, the role of the mother, sisters, and other female family members can be decisive in convincing and assisting radicalized family members to defect, return, and reintegrate.

Youth Role in Violent Extremism

USAID research shows that al-Shabaab disproportionately recruits youth from marginalized clans in the rural areas where LLS will operate. Somalia already has a young population with 55 percent of household members under 15 and 23 percent of the population between the ages of 15 to 29.2 With Somalia’s population estimated to spike in the next several years, the pool of marginalized and disaffected youth that al-Shabaab can potentially exploit is expected to grow.

USAID research into the motivations of Somali youth to join or sympathize with al-Shabaab reveal a complex and multifaceted interplay of causal factors. These factors include joining al-Shabaab for protection from personal attack, a lack of control or agency in personal decision making, perceived injustice and clan related grievances, economic opportunities, and an ideology that provides youth with a sense of identity and greater purpose. Social networks are also a significant predictor of whether youth join al-

Shabaab. Somali youth are often radicalized by specific individuals within their social network such as a family member or a friend. Influential individuals within a peer network can also be a positive influence that can diminish the appeal of al-Shabaab and reverse an individual's radicalization process.

While Somali youth are an important target for al-Shabaab recruitment, they have also proven to be powerful change makers and peacebuilders in conflict-affected communities.3 Engaging youth directly in their communities gives youth a sense of agency and purpose that can directly counter the appeal of al-

Shabaab. Harnessing youth’s potential to support and contribute to the recovery of their communities and reduce the influence of al-Shabaab in them will be an important focus of LLS small grant activities.

Stabilization and Resilience

Conflict and vulnerability to climate shocks are interrelated in Somalia. Conflict has contributed to a weakening of social, political, and economic systems, which is further exacerbated by recurring climatic shocks that affect wide swaths of Somalia’s population, changing resource dynamics and contributing to exposure to secondary shocks and stresses. These notably include drought, flood, and outbreaks of disease.

The resilience of Somalis to climatic shocks is based around diverse and unequal sets of capacities.

Individuals, households, and communities both accumulate and draw upon their resilience capacities as they manage problems over time. Examples of resilience capacities include social connections, political rights, environmental resources, and economic assets.

2 UNFPA. The Somalia Demographic Survey 2020., 21 3 World Bank. Youth as Agents for Peace. 2018 https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/FINAL%20SHDS%20Report%202020_V7_0.pdf http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/384401529488160361/pdf/Youth-as-Agents-of-Peace-Somalia.pdf

Marginalized Somalis are significantly disadvantaged in accumulating resilience capacities, and therefore are disproportionately unresilient to major disasters. This root issue of marginalization in Somalia is common for both resilience and stabilization efforts, resulting in a notable overlap in target populations that are most in need of resilience building and stabilization. The CDCS Focal Zone, detailed in Section 5.8, has an exceptionally high density of marginalized communities, and it is therefore no coincidence that this same zone was both the epicenter of the past two Somalia famines and a location where al-Shabaab has been able to maintain a consistent influence.

Past conflicts have eroded many of the structures that enable resilience capacities to flourish, but in response have also resulted in Somalis finding new resilience capacities in order to survive. Generally, resilience capacities are not infinite, they are diminished when used to manage shocks. Their use can therefore leave the population with less resilience capacities and more sensitivity to subsequent shocks and stresses.

Governing leaders are inevitably confronted with major climatic shocks, the most notable being droughts resulting in catastrophic levels of internal displacement. How proactively governing leaders manage these risks and how quickly they adjust to emerging events has varied widely. At times, al-Shabab has successfully negotiated major water sharing agreements that mitigate flooding and conflict over water access. But it has also been slow or helpless to react to major droughts, while blocking external aid from entering its controlled areas.

Suspicion of people traveling between al-Shabaab controlled rural areas and Federal Government controlled urban centers undermines one of the most important resilience capacities for rural Somalis: Connection to urban economies that are less sensitive to climatic shocks.

The lack of governance systems that can coordinate among a wide range of stakeholders to effectively plan for, mitigate, and respond to climatic shocks is a noteworthy gap and opportunity for Somalia stabilization efforts. Effectively preparing for and responding to climatic disasters is cost effective and appreciated by the local population when they need help most. Given the significant financial constraints of local governments in Somalia, such disaster preparedness and mitigation offers both a feasible and meaningful public service that can be used to increase legitimacy and show positive contrast to governance under al-

Shabaab. Further, by improving community safety and access conditions by reducing the influence of al-

Shabaab, LLS can assist local communities in providing greater accessibility for major humanitarian aid during disasters.

Stabilization and Countering Violent Extremism Programming

USAID stabilization programming provides USAID/Somalia with a targeted tool to advance the Mission’s larger strategy in Somalia to reduce the influence of VEOs in Somalia. Stabilization programs intervene in relatively higher risk, generally more rural, and extremely fluid environments that many USAID and other donor supported development programs are deliberately not designed to engage in. LLS small grant activities will not seek to address the deep seated political and economic reasons communities remain vulnerable to VEOs but to create the basic governance and safety conditions necessary for those problems to be addressed once stabilization programming is complete. USAID Somalia’s CVE strategy centers on reducing the structural conditions, such as poor governance, lack of justice, and exclusion from political, social and economic opportunities, that allow violent extremism to spread.

Consistent with USAID/Somalia’s CVE strategy, LLS will pursue a systems-based approach to preventing and countering violent extremism as described in USAID’s April 2020 Policy for Countering Violent

Extremism through Development Assistance. The Policy notes that pursuing CVE strategies that are

“designed to strengthen and influence local institutions and communities systemically is likely to have a greater effect on radicalization and recruitment to violence than programming designed to address a particular driver.”4

Operationalizing this approach will sometimes include small grant activities that target populations from certain clans or demographics that al-Shabaab is known to recruit from but may also entail working with people, such as clan elders, youth groups, or family members, or strengthening institutions that can act as a bulwark against al-Shabaab’s ideology and appeal. The Contractor should demonstrate an understanding of how to develop, execute, and measure a system based CVE approach through small grant activities in stabilization contexts.

4 USAID. Policy for Countering Violent Extremism through Development Assistance. 2020. P.7