NS1-SMA-REQ-0002B_NS1 SMBA IMAR_04092025.pdf

Effective Date: April 01, 2025 Expiration Date: April 01, 2030

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NS1-SMA-REQ-0002, Revision B Near Earth Orbit Network (NEON) Series-1 Project, Code 473

Near Earth Orbit Network Series-1 Project Sounder for Microwave-

Based Applications Instrument Mission Assurance

Requirements

NOAA / NASA

Goddard Space Flight Center Greenbelt, Maryland

GSFC NEON Series-1 CMO

RELEASED

NS1 SMBA IMAR NS1-SMA-REQ-0002, Revision B ii Check the LPD TDMS Server at https://ipdtdms.gsfc.nasa.gov/frontmenu_dsp.cfm to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.

Near Earth Orbit Network Series-1 Project Sounder for Microwave-Based Applications

Instrument Mission Assurance Requirements

Review/Signature/Approval Page

Prepared By:

Brooke Greybeck SMBA Instrument Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer Mission Assurance NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Code 383

Reviewed By:

Gerd Fischer NEON Program Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer Mission Assurance NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Code 383

Approved By:

Jessica Knizhnik SMBA Instrument Manager LEO Programs Division NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Code 473

Roger Clason Deputy Program Manager NEON Program NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Code 470

Electronic Approval available on-line at: https://ipdtdms.gsfc.nasa.gov/frontmenu_dsp.cfm iii Check the LPD TDMS Server at https://ipdtdms.gsfc.nasa.gov/frontmenu_dsp.cfm to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.

Preface

This document is under NEON Series-1 (NS1) Project configuration control. Once this document is approved, NS1 approved changes are handled in accordance with Class I and Class II change control requirements as described in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Programs Division (LPD) Programs and Projects Configuration Management Procedure (CMP), and changes to this document shall be made by complete revision.

Any questions should be addressed to:

LEO/NEON Configuration Management Office

NASA/GSFC

Code 473 Greenbelt, MD 20771 iv Check the LPD TDMS Server at https://ipdtdms.gsfc.nasa.gov/frontmenu_dsp.cfm to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.

Change History Log

Revision Effective Date Description of Changes

Revision – February 7, 2023 This version incorporates 470-CCR-22-0371 which was approved by the SMBA ERB on December 22, 2022, and by the SMBA CCB on the effective date shown.

Revision A December 16, 2024 This version incorporates 470-CCR-24-0403 which was approved by the SMBA ERB on March 26, 2024, and incorporates NS1-CCR-0002 by the NS1 SMBA CCB on the effective date shown.

Update the phase A IMAR to incorporate changes to the Code 300 class C baseline MAR, dated 6/20/2024. There are editorial and requirement clarification changes. The Document number has changed from 473-SMBA-RQMT- 00005 to NS1-SMA-REQ-0002 as the document has transferred from the Management Information System (MIS) to the Technical Data Management System

(TDMS).

Revision B April 1, 2025 This version incorporates NS1-CCR-0006 which was approved by the NS1 SMBA CCB on the effective date shown.

This version incorporates changes to the DID format to align with SMBA CDRL and changes DID MA 1-1.

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Table of Deviations/Waivers

Item No. Deviation/Waiver Waiver Approved Effectivity vi Check the LPD TDMS Server at https://ipdtdms.gsfc.nasa.gov/frontmenu_dsp.cfm to verify that this is the correct version prior to use.

Table of TBDs/TBRs/TBSs

Item No. Location Summary Individual/

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Table of Contents

A. SCOPE, ORGANIZATION, AND CONVENTIONS

1 GENERAL

1.1 Systems Safety and Mission Assurance Program

1.2 Management

1.3 Requirements Flow Down

1.4 Identification of Project-Level Critical Items

1.5 Suspension of Work Activities

1.6 Surveillance

1.7 Government Mandatory Inspection Points

1.8 List of Sub-Tier Suppliers

1.9 Use of Inherited Products/Items

1.10 Protection of Flight Hardware

1.11 Risk Management

2 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

2.1 General

2.2 Supplemental Quality Management System Requirements

2.2.1 Control of Nonconforming Product

2.2.2 Material Review Board

2.2.3 Anomaly Reporting and Disposition

2.3 Orbital Debris Assessment Report and End of Mission Plan

3 SYSTEM SAFETY

3.1 General

3.2 Mission Related Safety Requirements Documentation

3.3 System Safety Deliverables

3.3.1 System Safety Plan

3.3.2 Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist

3.3.3 Instrument Safety Assessment Report

3.3.4 Hazard Analyses

3.3.4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

3.3.4.2 Operations Hazard Analysis and Hazard Verification Tracking Log

3.3.4.3 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis

3.3.5 Verification Tracking Log

3.3.6 Hazardous Procedures for Payload I&T and Pre-launch Processing

3.3.6.1 Lifting Device Safety Requirements

3.3.7 Mishap Reporting and Investigation

3.3.8 NASA Payload Safety Program Forms

4 RELIABILITY

4.1 Reliability Program Plan

4.2 Analysis of Design

4.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analyses and Critical Items List

4.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis

4.2.3 Reliability Calculations

4.3 Limited Life Analysis

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4.4 Parts Stress Analysis

4.5 Worst-Case Analysis

5 SOFTWARE ASSURANCE

5.1 Software Assurance Program

5.2 Surveillance of Software Development, Maintenance, and Assurance Activities

6 WORKMANSHIP

6.1 General

6.2 Electrostatic Discharge Control

6.3 Printed Circuit Boards

6.4 Lead-Free Control Measures

7 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) PARTS

7.1 General

7.2 Parts Control Board

7.3 Re-use of EEE Parts

7.4 Master EEE Parts List

7.5 Radiation Effects Mitigation

8 MATERIALS AND PROCESSES

8.1 M&P Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan

8.2 Materials Usage Agreement

8.3 Materials Identification and Usage List

8.4 Life Test Plan and Final Report for Lubricated Mechanisms

8.5 Additive Manufacturing Control Plan (AMCP)

8.6 AM Part Production Plan (PPP)

9 CONTAMINATION CONTROL

9.1 Contamination Control Plan

9.2 Material Outgassing

9.3 Foreign Object Damage/Debris Program

10 METROLOGY AND CALIBRATION

10.1 Metrology and Calibration Program

10.2 Use of Calibrated and Non-Calibrated Instruments

11 GIDEP ALERTS AND PROBLEM ADVISORIES

11.1 Government-Industry Data Exchange Program

11.2 Alert Disposition

11.3 GIDEP Reporting

11.4 Review Reporting

12 END ITEM ACCEPTANCE DATA PACKAGE

APPENDIX A DATA ITEM DESCRIPTIONS

APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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List of Tables

Table 4-1. GSFC FMECA RPN Table

Table A-1 Data Item Descriptions

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A. SCOPE, ORGANIZATION, AND CONVENTIONS

This document establishes a risk-based application of mission assurance requirements (MAR) for the Sounder for Microwave Based Applications (SMBA) instrument, a Class C instrument per National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8705.4. It is organized around the following safety and mission assurance (SMA) disciplines/focus areas, each with its own section:

Section 1 – General SMA Requirements Section 7 – EEE Parts Section 2 – Quality Management System Section 8 – Materials and Processes Section 3 – System Safety Section 9 – Contamination Control Section 4 – Reliability Section 10 – Metrology and Calibration Section 5 – Software Assurance Section 11 – GIDEP Alerts and Problem

Advisories Section 6 – Workmanship Section 12 – End Item Acceptance Data

Package

Each discipline/focus area is further decomposed into subsections associated with its individual SMA activities or deliverables (e.g.. Section 2.2, “Quality Management System,” subsection 2.2.2 flows down requirements for operating a Material Review Board (MRB)).

In this document:

1. A specific requirement, where contractor compliance is mandatory, is denoted by “shall,”

2. A good practice by “should,”

3. Permission for the contractor or Government is denoted by “may,”

4. An expectation by the Government is denoted by “will.”

The requirements in this document use the following identification (ID) convention:

SMA Discipline_Alphanumeric Identifier (e.g. QMS_01X).

Note: The contents of this MAR are the result of tailoring from a master set of requirements.

Consequently, there may be instances where jumps or gaps occur in the numbering sequence of requirement IDs and data item descriptions (DID). Due to the tailoring, there may also be sections that

Where the key is as follows:

SMA

Discipline

GEN – General SMA Requirements EEE – EEE Parts QMS – Quality Management System MAP – Materials and Processes SAF – System Safety CON – Contamination Control REL – Reliability MAC – Metrology and

Calibration SWA – Software Assurance GID – GIDEP Alerts and

Problem Advisories WOR – Workmanship EIA – End Item Acceptance

Data Package

Numeric Identifier A unique and sequential 2-digit number, with or without a character

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are not applicable, and have thus been marked “RESERVED.” This is done intentionally to preserve document organization and to facilitate tracking of data from implementation of requirements.

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1 GENERAL

1.1 Systems Safety and Mission Assurance Program

GEN_02: The contractor shall submit a mission assurance compliance matrix that identifies variance(s) and acceptance rationale for processes, procedures, and standards that are proposed as alternatives to those specified by the contract (DID 1-1). This includes identification of items and MAR for which relief is requested via the Inherited Item Risk Assessment (IIRA) process (see Section 1.9, “Use of Inherited Products/Items”).

1.2 Management

GEN_03a: The contractor shall designate a manager for assurance activities.

GEN_03b: The assurance manager shall not be responsible for project costs and schedules other than those pertaining to assurance activities.

GEN_04: The contractor shall ensure that the assurance manager has direct access to upper management that is independent of project management and with functional freedom and authority to interact with all elements of the project.

1.3 Requirements Flow Down

GEN_05: The contractor shall ensure flow down of SMA requirements in this document to all suppliers based on the work to be performed and establish a process to verify compliance, with the exception of those approved for relief via the IIRA process (see Section 1.9, “Use of Inherited Products/Items”).

GEN_06: The contractor’s contract review and purchasing processes shall indicate the method for documenting, communicating, and reviewing requirements with sub-tier suppliers to ensure requirements are met.

GEN_07: The contractor shall ensure that quality plans, processes, procedures, hardware, and software submitted by the contractor’s sub-tier suppliers are compliant with the requirements in this IMAR, as applicable.

1.4 Identification of Project-Level Critical Items

GEN_08: The contractor shall identify its critical items for incorporation into the Government project-level critical items (PCI) with development in accordance with NPR 8735.2C, Section 4.1.4.

Identification of critical items and processes should include the results of system safety and reliability analyses.

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1.5 Suspension of Work Activities

GEN_11: The contractor shall direct the suspension of any work activity that presents an unsafe work condition to personnel or imminent danger to property.

1.6 Surveillance

GEN_12: The contractor shall provide access to quality management system documentation, information systems and work products/artifacts to NASA representatives.

GEN_13: The work activities, operations, and documentation performed by the contractor and sub-tier contractors or suppliers shall be subject to evaluation, review, audit, inspection, and survey by NASA representatives at various points over the program/project development lifecycle.

GEN_14a: In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 46.103, 46.104, 46.202-

2, 46.4, and 46.5, the contractor shall grant physical and/or remote access to NASA representatives to conduct an on-site and/or remote audit, assessment, or inspection upon notice. A no later than 30-day notice will be provided to the supplier/contractor prior to the start of an assessment.

GEN_14b: The contractor shall supply personnel, documents, records, equipment, and an acceptable work area within the contractor’s facilities to assist with any audit, assessment, or inspection.

GEN_15: The contractor shall report the status of facility operations and quality metrics to

NASA on a quarterly basis. This should include the following data for 1st tier and 2nd tier suppliers of PCIs:

Quality escapes - Any product released by an internal or external supplier that is subsequently determined to be nonconforming to contract and/or product specification requirements.

First pass yield - A measure of quality in a process that reflects the percentage of product made correctly without any rework or corrective activity.

Supplier defect rate - The supplier defect rate measures the percentage of materials or product received from suppliers that do not meet required or compliance specifications.

Internal audit results.

1.7 Government Mandatory Inspection Points

GEN_16: The contractor shall provide a proposed Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIP) plan, which will be used by the Government in determining the final GMIPs that will be conducted. NPR 8735.2 may be used as a guide.

GEN_19: Prior to the start of manufacturing, the contractor shall provide work instructions, procedures, drawings, etc., that are required for performing the planned inspections.

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1.8 List of Sub-Tier Suppliers

GEN_20: The contractor shall provide a list of suppliers used for products produced under this contract (DID 1-2).

1.9 Use of Inherited Products/Items

Any products that will be build-to-print, rebuilt with modification, are commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), or were previously developed and exist (e.g., spares) may be considered as candidate inherited items, subject to review by the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Standard Components (SC) Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer (-CRAE). With this process, the Government reviews the history of the product or similar variants, the experience of the manufacturer, and any design changes to determine whether the item can be accepted as an inherited item. If an item is accepted as an inherited item, the SC-CRAE will perform an IIRA to determine which SMA requirements are unnecessary, and make recommendations to the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO). System Safety, Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR), and End of Mission Plan (EOMP) requirements are not affected by the inherited items process.

1.10 Protection of Flight Hardware

GEN_22: The contractor shall evaluate the potential for Ground Support Equipment (GSE) to damage flight hardware and use appropriate means to prevent such damage from occurring.

GEN_23: The approach to obviate GSE damage to flight hardware shall be presented prior to the start of testing and at subsequent review milestones.

GEN_24: Prior to performing work on flight hardware, the contractor shall identify a list of items, if any, that are sensitive to normal handling environments, such as presence of light, presence of metal objects (magnets), or presence of humidity outside of normal cleanroom and workmanship limits.

GEN_25: The contractor shall hold a meeting on the day work is to be performed, prior to the start of each shift, that includes a discussion of the list of items.

1.11 Risk Management

SMA activities should be tightly linked with the project’s Risk Management processes. For example, risks that evolve from reliability analyses that affect overall mission objectives should be managed in the project’s risk database when not eliminated or mitigated to noncredible likelihood levels.

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2 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

2.1 General

QMS_01: The contractor shall have a quality management system (QMS) that is compliant with the requirements of SAE AS9100, “Quality Systems - Aerospace - Model for Quality Assurance in Design, Development, Production, Installation, and Servicing.”

2.2 Supplemental Quality Management System Requirements

2.2.1 Control of Nonconforming Product

QMS_04a: The contractor shall have a documented closed loop system for identifying, reporting, and correcting product nonconformances.

QMS_04b: The system shall ensure that the adequacy of corrective action is determined by audit, inspection, or test, that objective evidence is collected, and that preventive action is implemented to preclude recurrence.

2.2.2 Material Review Board

QMS_06: The contractor shall have a documented process(es) for the establishment and operation of an MRB to process major non-conformances, which are those that affect form, fit, function, require a software change, involve the presence of foreign object debris (FOD), or those that the contractor determines involves elevated risk.

QMS_07: The contractor shall appoint a MRB chairperson who is responsible for implementing the MRB process and for appointing contractor representatives as MRB members.

QMS_09: The MRB process shall include a Government representative as a participating member on MRB actions involving major nonconformances.

QMS_11: The Government shall be provided notice and applicable documentation within 24 hours in advance of scheduled meetings for handling and dispositioning major non-conformances.

QMS_13: The MRB shall use the following disposition actions:

Scrap — the product is not usable Re-work/Re-test — the product will be re-worked/re-tested to conform to requirements

(sometimes referred to as “return to print”) Return to supplier — the product will be returned to the supplier Repair — the product will be repaired Use as is — the product will be used as is

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2.2.3 Anomaly Reporting and Disposition

QMS_14: The contractor shall have a documented process for the establishment and operation of an anomaly review board (ARB) to process (i.e., report and disposition) major anomalies, which are those that have resulted in hardware or software test failures and damage or potential damage to hardware.

QMS_16: Reporting of major anomalies shall begin with the first application of power at the component level, flight software acceptance testing, when interfacing with flight hardware, and the first mechanical operation.

QMS_19: The ARB (or equivalent function) shall permit a Government representative to be a participating member.

QMS_20: The Government shall be provided notice within 24 hours of a major anomaly event.

Applicable documentation in advance of scheduled ARB meetings.

QMS_21: Anomalies that cannot be duplicated, have unknown root cause, or cannot be verified shall be assessed for residual risk, declared as red flag problem failure records, and brought to the Government’s project risk board for disposition.

2.3 Orbital Debris Assessment Report and End of Mission Plan

QMS_22: The contractor shall provide the information necessary for the development of the ODAR and the EOMP deliveries per the content defined in NASA-STD 8719.14

(DID 2-1).

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3 SYSTEM SAFETY

3.1 General

SAF_01: The contractor shall document and implement a system safety program, support the Payload Safety Process as defined in chapter 3 of NPR 8715.7B, comply with launch service provider requirements, and comply with launch range safety requirements.

SAF_02a: The contractor’s system safety program shall incorporate three independent inhibits in the design (dual failure tolerant) if a system failure may lead to a catastrophic hazard. A pre-launch catastrophic hazard is a payload-related hazard, condition, or event occurring prior to launch that could result in a fatal injury to personnel or loss of a ground facility. A post-launch catastrophic hazard is a payload-related hazard, condition, or event occurring after launch and up to payload separation that could result in a fatal injury or loss of flight termination system.

SAF_02b: The contractor’s system safety program shall incorporate two independent inhibits in the design (single failure tolerant) if a system failure may lead to a critical hazard. A critical hazard is defined as a hazard, condition, or event that may cause severe injury or occupational illness or major property damage to facilities.

SAF_02c: The contractor’s system safety program shall adhere to specific detailed safety requirements in this document, including compliance verification that must be met for design elements with hazards that cannot be controlled by failure tolerance. The process by which safety is incorporated into these design elements (e.g., structures and pressure vessels) is called “Design for Minimum Risk”.

3.2 Mission Related Safety Requirements Documentation

SAF_03a: The contractor shall implement the launch range safety requirements that are applicable to the launch site.

SAF_03b: The contractor shall implement the most stringent safety requirement in the event there are conflicting requirements. The sections below include the applicable requirements documents for the pertinent launch ranges:

ELV Eastern Test Range or Western Test Range Missions

NASA-STD 8719.24 (with Annex) Kennedy NPR (KNPR) 8715.3 applicable at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) property, KSC-controlled property, and offsite facility areas where KSC has operational responsibility.

NPR 8715.7

Launch Site Facility-specific Safety Requirements, as applicable (e.g., Astrotech)

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Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) Missions

NASA-STD 8719.24 (with Annex)

GSFC-STD-8009

3.3 System Safety Deliverables

3.3.1 System Safety Plan

SAF_10: The contractor shall prepare a System Safety Plan (SSP) that describes the tasks and activities of system safety management and engineering required to identify, evaluate, and eliminate or control hazards to the hardware, software, and system design by reducing the associated risk to an acceptable level throughout the system life-cycle, including launch range safety requirements (DID 31).

3.3.2 Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist

SAF_11: The contractor shall document and implement a Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist to demonstrate that the payload complies with NASA and range safety requirements (DID 3-2).

3.3.3 Instrument Safety Assessment Report

SAF_12: The contractor shall generate an Instrument Safety Assessment Report (ISAR) to document the comprehensive evaluation of the risk being assumed prior to the testing or operation of an instrument. The spacecraft contractor will use the ISAR (DID 3-4ISR) as an input to the Safety Data Package (SDP).

3.3.4 Hazard Analyses

3.3.4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

SAF_15: The contractor shall perform a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) to obtain an initial risk assessment and to identify safety critical areas of a concept or system.

The PHA is based on the best available data, including mishap data from similar systems and other lessons learned.

SAF_16a: The contractor shall evaluate hazards associated with the proposed design or function for severity, control approach (fault tolerance or design for minimum risk), and operational constraints.

SAF_16b: The contractor shall identify safety provisions and alternatives that are needed to eliminate hazards or reduce their associated risk to an acceptable level.

SAF_17: The contractor shall deliver the PHA with the preliminary ISAR (DID 3-4ISR).

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3.3.4.2 Operations Hazard Analysis and Hazard Verification Tracking Log

SAF_18: The contractor shall document, implement, and maintain an Operations Hazard Analysis and a hazard Verification Tracking Log (VTL) to demonstrate that hardware operations, test equipment operations, and integration and test (I&T) activities comply with the safety requirements of the facilities where the activities will be performed and that hazards associated with those activities are mitigated to an acceptable level of risk (DID 3‑3).

SAF_19: The contractor shall update and maintain the hazard VTL during I&T activities to track open issues.

3.3.4.3 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis

SAF_20: The contractor shall perform an Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) to evaluate activities for hazards introduced during testing, transportation, storage, integration, and pre-launch operations at the launch site. The primary purpose is to evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to eliminate, control, or mitigate identified hazards to ensure implementation of safety requirements for personnel, procedures, and equipment during activities at the launch site.

SAF_21: The contractor shall submit the results of the O&SHA as a part of the intermediate & final ISARs (DID 3-4ISR).

3.3.5 Verification Tracking Log

SAF_22: The contractor shall document and implement a VTL that documents a Hazard Control and Verification Tracking process as a closed-loop system that ensures safety compliance has been satisfied per applicable launch range safety requirements.

SAF_23: The contractor shall document in the VTL the process of verifying the control of hazards by test, analysis, inspection, similarity to previously qualified hardware, or any combination of these activities.

SAF_24: The contractor shall ensure that verifications listed on the hazard reports refer to specific test, analysis, or inspection reports with a summary of the pertinent results.

SAF_25: The contractor shall make the results of these tests, analyses, and inspections available for Government review.

SAF_26a: The VTL shall identify hazard controls that are not verified as closed.

SAF_26b: The VTL shall be delivered with the final ISAR (DID 3-4ISR).

SAF_27: The contractor shall provide regular electronic updates of the VTL until all hazard controls are verified as closed.

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3.3.6 Hazardous Procedures for Payload I&T and Pre-launch Processing

SAF_28: The contractor shall document the hazardous procedures that will be implemented when I&T and pre-launch activities are performed at processing facilities and the launch site (DID 3-5).

SAF_29: The contractor shall ensure that the procedures comply with applicable facility safety

SAF_30: The contractor shall provide safety support for the implementation of hazardous procedures.

3.3.6.1 Lifting Device Safety Requirements

SAF_31: The contractor shall implement the following safety requirements for lifting devices and equipment (LDE) when performing NASA work at non-NASA facilities:

Overhead cranes, winches, and wire rope hoists shall have a dual hoist braking system installed per the NASA STD 8719.9C (Lifting Standard). Chain hoists typically do not have dual brakes as standard equipment unless included in the manufacturer’s design when specifically requested by the user. A single hoist motor holding brake in combination with a Variable Frequency Drive dynamic braking system is an acceptable dual braking system.

Label and tag LDE, per NASA STD 8719.9C, Section 4.9, requirements, with no more than its Working Load Limit (WLL) as determined by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or its current certified WLL if that value is lower than the OEM rated WLL.

Perform an initial one-time proof load test per the following NASA STD 8719.9C, Section 4.5, requirements:

1.25X WLL for overhead cranes.

1X WLL for mobile elevated work platforms that are used near critical hardware.

1X WLL for mobile cranes and derricks (.95X to 1X is acceptable).

1.25X WLL for below-the-hook lifting devices.

Slings (i.e., wire rope, synthetics, chain, etc.,) shall only be proof load tested beyond its WLL with OEM approval.

2X WLL for rigging hardware items used for critical lifts (i.e., shackles, hoist rings, turnbuckles, etc.).

Perform a 1X WLL load test every four years after the initial proof test on all

LDE.

In addition to visual inspection, perform a post-load test non-destructive test inspection (e.g., radiographic, ultra-sonic, magnetic particle, dye penetrant, etc.)

on crane hooks and critical welds. A critical weld is one in which a failure would result in a failure of the hardware. The inspections shall be performed by an American Society of Non-destructive Testing (ASNT) or equivalently trained inspector.

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3.3.7 Mishap Reporting and Investigation

SAF_32: The contractor shall prepare a Pre-Mishap Plan that describes appropriate mishap and close call notification, reporting, recording, and investigation procedures (DID 3-6).

SAF_33: The contractor shall report accidents, test failures, or other mishaps and close calls promptly to NASA.

SAF_34: The contractor shall promptly investigate test failures, or other mishaps and close calls to determine the root cause.

3.3.8 NASA Payload Safety Program Forms

SAF_35: The contractor shall prepare NASA Payload Safety Program Forms. The forms are available at https://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/PayloadSafety/forms

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4 RELIABILITY

4.1 Reliability Program Plan

REL_01: The contractor shall document and implement a Reliability Program Plan (RPP) that includes both qualitative and quantitative techniques to support decisions regarding mission success and safety throughout system development (DID 4‑1).

REL_03: The contractor shall include a detailed approach to the analysis of hardware and software for their contributions to system reliability and mission success.

The contractor should perform reliability analyses concurrent with design and maintain consistency between reliability analyses so that identified problem areas are addressed, and corrective action taken in a timely manner.

4.2 Analysis of Design

4.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analyses and Critical Items List

REL_11a: The contractor shall perform, document, and maintain a Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) that addresses flight hardware and software and GSE that interfaces with flight systems that are being designed, built, or provided from project initiation through launch and mission operations.

REL_11b: The contractor’s FMECA shall include likelihood, cause, detection and mitigation, and the effects of each failure mode at the local, subsystem, and system or mission levels.

REL_11c: Components and systems designated as inherited items shall be analyzed at the interface level, all others at the box or functional level (DID 4‑2).

REL_12: The contractor shall prepare and maintain a Critical Items List (CIL) for items with failure-mode severity categories 1SC,1, , 2S , and 2, per Table 4-1.

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Table 4-1. GSFC FMECA RPN Table

C ri ti ca lit y

R at in g Technical

Failure Type

Failure Severity Detection/Prevention

(Mitigations) Likelihood of Occurrence

Consequence

V er y

H ig h

0.50 < PF

Minimum mission success criteria are not achievable.

C ri ti ca l a n d S

P F

1SC

Failures that could cause a catastrophic event such as the loss of life, permanently disabling injury to personnel, or facility loss/destruction.

None - Failure will not be detected and will not be prevented or mitigated.

Failures (and failures with failure recoveries) that could result in mission loss or minimum mission success criteria not being achievable.

H ig h

0.25 < PF ≤

0.50

Major impact to full mission success criteria.

Minimum mission success criteria are achievable.

C ri ti ca l

2S

Failures that could prevent detection, mitigation, or operations during a hazardous condition resulting in 1SC conditions, eliminate a hazard inhibit, or cause severe injury or occupational illness or major property damage.

Remote - Unlikely failure will be detected or prevented or mitigated.

Failures (and failures with failure recoveries) that could result in loss of one or more mission objectives, including the substantial loss of data, loss of functionality, or reduction in life of the mission, but minimum mission success criteria are still achievable.

M o d er at e

0.15 < PF ≤

0.25

Moderate impact to full mission success criteria. Minimum mission success criteria are achievable with margin.

Si gn if ic an t

Failures (and failures with failure recoveries) that could result in loss of one mission objective, including the significant loss of data, loss of functionality, or reduction in life of the mission, but minimum mission success criteria are still achievable.

Low to Moderate - Failure may be detected and may be prevented or mitigated.

L o w

0.02 < PF ≤

0.15

Minor impact to higher priority full mission success criteria.

M in o r

Significant failures that could cause degradation to full mission objectives and still meet minimum mission.

Moderate to High - Failure is likely to be detected before occurrence and has a good chance of being prevented or mitigated.

4T

Failures that cause a temporary 1, 2S, or 2 consequence condition until an identical provision or equivalent provisions are used to resolve with no more than degradation to mission success.

V er y

Lo w

0.001 <PF ≤

0.02

Minor impact to lower priority full mission success criteria.

Minor failures that could result in insignificant or no loss to mission objectives.

Certain - failure will be detected and prevented or mitigated.

O V er y

V er y Lo w

PF ≤ 0.001 N/A – Highly Implausible or Noncredible

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REL_13: The contractor shall prepare and maintain a Single Point Failure (SPF) list for modes resulting in category 1 and 1SC severities, per Table 4.-1. and document applicable failure causes, mitigations, and retention rationale.

REL_14: The contractor shall identify and assess any known common cause failure modes and their causes for redundant components where loss of that component set would result in severity categories 1SC, 1, 2 and 2S. Such information should be provided as notes/remarks on the FMECA spreadsheet.

REL_15: The contractor shall estimate the likelihood score for each failure mode from 0-5 using the appropriate criteria from table 4-1 and Goddard Procedural Requirement (GPR) 7120.4, as necessary, or another scale approved by GSFC Reliability Engineering. Each likelihood estimation can be based on qualitative assessment and/or failure rate data from other analyses (i.e., system calculations) in order to score each failure mode for the mission duration.

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REL_16: The contractor shall identify the consequence for each failure mode using the appropriate criteria from table 4-1 and GPR 7120.4, as necessary.

4.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis

REL_17: The contractor shall perform and maintain qualitative Fault Tree Analyses (FTAs), as deemed necessary by the CSO and the Mission Systems Engineer (MSE) (DID 4- 3).

REL_18: The fault tree shall address both hardware and software contributions at a level necessary to identify risks, verify mitigations, and assist in the development of fault management.

REL_19: In the event the contractor or the project identifies a major mission risk contributor in the FMECA or FTA, the contractor shall quantify (and if necessary, expand) the appropriate FTA or the portions of the FTA necessary for detailed risk assessment, as deemed necessary by the CSO and the MSE.

FTA should also be considered for use to check the FMECAs for completeness.

4.2.3 Reliability Calculations

REL_21: The contractor shall perform and maintain reliability and ground-system availability calculations (DID 4-4) using FTA, reliability block diagrams, and/or Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to identify design weaknesses, support design trades, and demonstrate the impact of critical items, as deemed necessary by the CSO and the

MSE.

4.3 Limited Life Analysis

REL_22: The contractor shall perform a Limited Life Item Analysis (LLA) that includes expected life, required life, an assessment of life margin (including servicing and maintenance); provides retention rationale for items with an expected life of less than 2x the required life and fosters a plan to manage limited life items (DID 4-5).

REL_25: The risk assessment and mitigations plans shall factor in wear caused by atomic oxygen, solar and trapped radiation, shelf-life, extreme temperatures, thermal cycling, write/erase cycles and mechanical wear or fatigue, and include refurbishment and maintenance plans.

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4.4 Parts Stress Analysis

REL_26: The contractor shall perform parts stress and derating analyses for electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts in accordance with GSFC EEE-INST- 002, or the contractor’s own established standard, unless specifically relieved of this requirement by the GSFC IIRA process (See Section 1.9) (DID 4-6).

REL_28: If alternate derating guidelines are requested to be used, they shall be submitted to the Parts Control Board and GSFC Reliability Engineering for approval.

4.5 Worst-Case Analysis

REL_30: The contractor shall perform worst-case analyses (WCA) for circuit designs that are new, or significantly modified, or are being used in an environment not covered by the existing analysis and identified as critical through analysis of the design (See Section 4.2) (DID 4-7).

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5 SOFTWARE ASSURANCE

5.1 Software Assurance Program

SWA_01: The contractor shall establish a software assurance program consisting of a planned and systematic set of activities and disciplines that ensures that software conforms to organizational and project-specific requirements and standards throughout the project lifecycle, where software is defined as:

Computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documentation and data pertaining to the operation of a computer system.

All or a part of the programs, procedures, rules, and associated documentation of an information processing system.

Program or set of programs used to run a computer.

All or part of the programs which process or support the processing of digital information.

Part of a product that is the computer program or the set of computer programs.

Note: The software definition applies to software developed by NASA, software developed for NASA, software maintained by or for NASA, COTS software, Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS), modified-off-the-shelf software (MOTS), open-source software , reused software components, auto-generated code, embedded software, software used on GSE, the software executed on processors embedded in programmable logic devices, legacy, heritage, applications, freeware, shareware, trial or demonstration software, and open-source software components.

SWA_03: The contractor shall ensure the independence of software assurance from software engineering.

SWA_04: The contractor shall document and implement a Software Assurance Plan and

Schedule compliant to NASA-STD-8739.8B (DID 5-1).

The plan should include the software assurance processes, procedures, tools, and techniques to be used commensurate with the software classification and software safety criticality assessment, with additional tailoring in accordance with guidance provided by NASA-STD-8739.8B for each category of software (new, reused, off-the-shelf, auto-generated code, etc.).

The plan addresses both Software Assurance and Software Safety disciplines. This should include the necessary collaboration with relevant SMA and Engineering stakeholders (i.e., system safety, system reliability, hardware quality, system security, and software engineering), and the process by which traceability is established to their respective analyses and/or

5.2 Surveillance of Software Development, Maintenance, and Assurance Activities

SWA_08: Consistent with the general requirement for support of Government surveillance (see Section 1.6, “Surveillance”), the contractor shall provide on-request access to following:

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Software problem reports Software documentation (i.e., management plans, assurance plans, configuration management plans, requirements specifications, design documents, test plans, test cases, test procedures, test results, software review results, software engineering and assurance schedule, maintenance plans)

Source code Findings and corrective actions from software process and product audits and assessments

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6 WORKMANSHIP

6.1 General

WOR_02: The contractor shall implement a workmanship program to assure that electronic packaging technologies, processes, and workmanship meet mission objectives for quality and reliability per the requirements of the following standards:

NASA-STD-8739.6 Implementation Requirements for NASA Workmanship Standards, excluding sections 8.1, 9.1, and 10.1.

J-STD-001

GSFC-STD-6001

IPC-2225

IPC-6015

WOR_04: The contractor shall comply with one of the following standards for electrical cables and harnesses:

NASA-STD-8739.4

IPC/WHMA-A-620-S

6.2 Electrostatic Discharge Control

WOR_06: The contractor shall prepare and implement an electrostatic discharge (ESD) control plan that conforms to the requirements of ANSI/ESD S20.20 (DID 6-1).

6.3 Printed Circuit Boards

WOR_08: The contractor shall comply with one of the following standards for rigid printed circuit boards (PCB):

IPC-6012 (Note: the latest revision preferred, but older revisions may be acceptable based on inherited designs or contractor standard practices)

MIL-PRF-55110H

ECSS-Q-ST-70-60

Note: In cases in which high-density interconnect components (e.g., reconfigurable field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), high-density static random-access memory , etc.) or board population are present, the contractor should consult with the Project and Government Microelectronic Packaging and Circuit Board (MPCB) CRAE for a specification strategy to avoid extensive rebuilds or the incorporation of risky features solely in order to meet the specification. This consultation may result in deviations from the specifications above with no waiver required.

WOR_10: The contractor shall document and implement a PCB procurement plan (DID 6-2).

WOR_12: For non-conforming coupons, the evaluation report shall be delivered to the GSFC

MPCB CRAE for a risk assessment. If the MPCB CRAE’s risk assessment

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determines that there is no elevated risk, no waiver is required and the CSO will determine the disposition of the board.

6.4 Lead-Free Control Measures

WOR_16: The contractor shall document and implement a Lead-Free Control Plan (LFCP)

(DID 6-5).

WOR_17: The contractors shall submit uses of lead-free solder or surface finishes to the NASA project office for approval before use.

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7 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE)

PARTS

7.1 General

EEE_02: The contractor shall document and implement a Parts Control Plan (PCP) per Level 3 instructions of GSFC EEE-INST-002 (DID 7-1).

Note: The contractor may use, as is, Class V, S, Q, B, M compliant microcircuits; Joint Army Navy Space (JANS), JANTXV, and JANTX semiconductors without any further approval. The contractor may use, as is, automotive or high-reliability COTS parts, compliant to Level 3, per NASA-STD-8739.10, without any additional screening or qualification tests and without any further approval.

7.2 Parts Control Board

EEE_07: The contractor shall establish a Parts Control Board (PCB) that is responsible for the planning, management, and coordination of the selection, application, and procurement requirements of EEE parts.

EEE_10: The contractor shall identify the person responsible for directing and managing the

EEE parts program and interfacing with Government assurance personnel.

EEE_13: The contractor shall include the GSFC Parts Engineer or the Parts and Radiation

Assurance Engineer as a participating member of the PCB.

7.3 Re-use of EEE Parts

EEE_15: The contractor shall require approval of the PCB to re-use EEE parts that have been installed.

7.4 Master EEE Parts List

EEE_16: The contractor shall develop and deliver a Master EEE Parts List and maintain it for the duration of the project (DID 7-2).

7.5 Radiation Effects Mitigation

EEE_19: The contractor shall provide a plan, for approval, for how radiation will be addressed

(DID 7-3).

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8 MATERIALS AND PROCESSES

8.1 M&P Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan

MAP_01a The contractor shall prepare and implement a Materials and Processes (M&P) Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan (MPSCIP) (DID 8-1).

MAP_01b: NASA-STD-6016 shall be used as a baseline, with contractor standard practices acceptable if associated command media are shared with NASA.

8.2 Materials Usage Agreement

MAP_03: The contractor shall prepare Materials Usage Agreements (MUA) (DID 8-2).

8.3 Materials Identification and Usage List

MAP_04: The contractor shall prepare a Materials Identification and Usage List (MIUL) (DID 8-3).

8.4 Life Test Plan and Final Report for Lubricated Mechanisms

MAP_05: The contractor shall prepare and implement a life test plan and final report for lubricated mechanisms (DID 8‑4).

8.5 Additive Manufacturing Control Plan (AMCP)

MAP_06: The contractor shall prepare and implement an Additive Manufacturing Control Plan (AMCP) for the design and manufacture of Additively Manufactured (AM) parts

(DID 8‑5).

8.6 AM Part Production Plan (PPP)

MAP_07: The contractor shall prepare a Part Production Plan (PPP) for each AM part

(DID 8‑6).

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9 CONTAMINATION CONTROL

9.1 Contamination Control Plan

CON_01: The contractor shall prepare and implement a contamination control program (DID 9-1).

9.2 Material Outgassing

CON_03: The contractor shall include in DID 8-3 information regarding material outgassing.

CON_04: If an alternate standard to NASA-STD-6016 is implemented, materials shall meet requirements of < 1% total mass loss (TML) and < 0.1% collected volatile condensable material (CVCM) at 125℃ under vacuum for twenty-four hours when tested to ASTM E595, “Standard Test Methods for Total Mass Loss and Collected Volatile Condensable Materials from Outgassing in a Vacuum Environment”.

9.3 Foreign Object Damage/Debris Program

CON_05: The contractor shall prepare and implement a foreign object damage/debris (FOD) program (DID 9-2).

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10 METROLOGY AND CALIBRATION

10.1 Metrology and Calibration Program

MAC_01: For measurement and test equipment that has documented requirements for metrological accuracy and traceability, the contractor shall comply with NASA- STD-8739.12 or verify equipment against calibrated instruments or intrinsic standards, using a documented procedure.

Note: The contractor may verify torque wrenches against a calibrated torque tester prior to use.

10.2 Use of Calibrated and Non-Calibrated Instruments

MAC_02: The contractor shall record the measurements that require accuracy in applicable project build documents (e.g., work order authorizations, job orders, task sheets, or test plans), including the article of calibrated equipment used to take the measurement and its calibration end date.

MAC_03: When verification is chosen instead of calibration, the contractor shall perform verification within a timeframe that has been demonstrated to provide appropriate levels of reliability, in the same facility, and under the same conditions that will be encountered during the process.

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11 GIDEP ALERTS AND…