Attachment A - MDA-QS-001-MAP-Rev_C.pdf

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This document is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Assurance Provisions (MAP) Revision C, a comprehensive technical document that establishes quality, safety, and mission assurance requirements for MDA contract opportunities. The document provides detailed guidelines for government and contractor activities across multiple technical domains, including systems engineering, configuration management, reliability, software development, test and evaluation, and risk management.

The MAP covers critical processes for hardware and software development, emphasizing requirements for safety-critical and mission-critical items. Key focus areas include configuration management, interface control, technical reviews, reliability and maintainability analyses, software development standards, test planning, and cybersecurity. The document is designed to ensure high-quality, reliable, and safe system development across MDA's missile defense programs, with specific technical requirements for design, testing, verification, validation, and mission assurance throughout the system lifecycle. It serves as a comprehensive technical standard for contractors working on MDA systems, providing detailed guidance on engineering practices, quality control, and mission-critical system development.

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Missile Defense Agency Assurance Provisions

Distribution D: Distribution authorized to Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only for the purpose of administrative and operational use, October 01, 2019. Other requests for this document shall be referred to MDA.

Destruction Statement: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

MDA-QS-001-MAP-Rev C

Hard copies of this document are for REFERENCE ONLY and shall not be considered the latest revision.

October 01, 2019

October 01, 2019 MDA-QS-001-MAP-Rev C

Revision Record

Revision Date Change Affected Pages Original January 9, 2004 Reflects CCB approval with comments Rev A November 28, 2006 Addressed IG Audit Findings and MDA

Reengineering All

Rev B June 13, 2014 Incorporates updates and MDA community comments

Added Preface

Added Appendix A, Requirements Applicability Matrix

Added Appendix B, MDA Core Metrics

Added Appendix C, Workmanship Requirements

Added Appendix D, Acronyms

Added Appendix E, Definitions

All

Rev C October 01, 2019 Incorporates changes to cybersecurity software assurance, AS9100 Rev. D, software safety, and lessons learned

Transferred MDA Core Metrics to

QS-INST-10

Replaced Appendix B, MDA Core Metrics with Appendix B, Guide for Selecting Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance Requirements for Contracts

Added Appendix F, Guide for Technical and Mission Assurance Review Requirements

All i

PREFACE

In 2002, the Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance Directorate (QS) was established as the independent organization within the Missile Defense Agency responsible for establishing and maintaining Quality, Safety and Mission Assurance (QSMA) policy and requirements across a wide range of evolving development and legacy programs. The Agency Director, Lt. General Kadish, was seeking a solution for test failures within the programs caused by what he referred to as quality control problems. The new QS Director had a vision to create a policy document that would integrate best practice disciplines of design assurance, mission assurance, quality assurance, and safety into a single volume of requirements; MDA Assurance Provisions (MAP). The document’s scope was limited to only safety or mission critical items (hardware and software). A small team was assigned and dedicated to writing the requirements based on other successful programs, like the Navy’s Trident and STANDARD Missile Programs, NASA, and Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; academia, Defense Acquisition University; history, Military and Industry Standards, lessons learned, and common sense. The challenge was to create a document that would encompass all aspects of planning, design, development, fabrication, test, deployment, and support in an acquisition environment primarily focused on development but desiring a production focus and discipline.

The MAP challenge was the same as the Agency challenge to bring process rigor into a development environment and reverse the trend of test flight failure, create a quality environment, and institutionalize a quality culture for team success. The original MAP drafts were vetted first through the QSMA community and then through a combined industry and element team. The MAP was revised based on these vetting comments and submitted for review and comment from all MDA elements. Like the current process, comments were adjudicated and discussed; the MAP was revised and discussed, and finally signed by then Director on January 4, 2004.

The challenge was far from over. The question remained on how to adapt and scale the MAP to each program based on product complexity, life cycle phase, and existing legacy contracts written in an acquisition reform language. Some programs felt that the MAP was in conflict with the Acquisition Reform Movement, but the requirements were deemed necessary to focus on attention to detail. In defense of the MAP, QS cited a RAND Corporation study which found that the drastic measures taken during acquisition reform should not apply equally to all programs. The RAND report stated that acquisition reform was more successful in high volume, low technology programs (bombs and bullets) but unsuccessful in low production, advanced technology programs (missiles and sensors). The original concept for MAP on contract was the Mission Assurance Implementation Plan (MAIP). Each program was to develop an implementation matrix to indicate how each requirement would be met, modified, or omitted based on product complexity, life cycle phase, current program or contractor procedure, but mostly by the reality of current contract requirements. The MAP requirements and MAIP process were moderately successful introducing a new set of requirements and quality focus into programs and prime contractors. The greatest challenge was driving the requirements beyond the primes to the supply chain where quality is most important and needed as evidenced by test failures traced to supplied items and a lapse in quality.

In November 2006, MAP Revision A was approved by the Director. Revision A incorporated lessons learned from experience with the previous revision, recommendations from a DoD Inspector General (IG) review, and MDA reengineering directives. Of these three change factors, the most significant was the incorporation of the DoD IG review recommendations to address the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act concerning acquisition and support of safety or mission critical software and firmware.

As the Agency meets the challenges of inserting new technology to counter evolving threats, the focus must remain on quality and attention to detail. Revision B of the MAP presented an opportunity to incorporate more lessons learned and new ideas to meet the challenge. The MAP Revision B was revised based on more than eight years of lessons learned, field experience, and results from years of QSMA Technical Assessments. The MAP is now tailorable through the Requirements Applicability Matrix ii to allow for program complexity, life cycle phase, and existing processes with a track record of yielding quality products and services. The expectation is that the MAP and its requirements will be flowed down the supply chain where the improvement in process rigor and quality improvement is most needed. The MAP remains true to the original vision of a single document that provides a measurable, standardized set of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance requirements that Government and contractors apply to safety or mission critical items in support of acquisition and deployment of MDA systems.

Software is essential to the operation of MDA systems. To ensure system reliability, integrity, and safety, MAP Revision C introduces cybersecurity and software assurance requirements. In addition, MAP Revision C incorporates SAE AS9100 Rev. D quality management system requirements and MIL-STD-882E, System Safety, requirements.

iii

Table of Contents

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................ i

1.0 SCOPE

1.1 Purpose

1.2 Applicability and Accountability

1.2.1 Mission Assurance Implementation Plan

1.2.2 MAP on Contract

1.3 International Traffic in Arms Regulations

1.4 Federal Acquisition Regulation Requirements

1.5 Order of Precedence

2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

3.0 QUALITY, SAFETY, AND MISSION ASSURANCE PROVISIONS

3.1 Management

3.1.1 Contract Reviews

3.1.2 Management Reviews

3.1.3 Technology Change Management

3.1.4 Continual Process Improvements and Metrics

3.1.4.1 MDA Core Metrics

3.1.4.1.1 MDA/QS Metrics

3.1.5 Integrated Digital Environment

3.1.6 Risk Management Program

3.1.6.1 Risk Management Plan

3.1.7 Pedigree Program

3.1.8 Internal Assessment Program

3.1.9 Training and Certification Program

3.1.9.1 Training

3.1.9.2 Certification

3.1.10 Problem and Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System

3.1.11 Data Exchange Programs Participation

3.1.12 MDA Insight and Oversight

3.1.12.1 MDA Assurance Representatives

3.1.12.2 MDA Inspections

3.1.12.3 MDA Assessments

3.1.13 Program Reviews

3.1.14 Government Furnished Material, Equipment, or Information

3.1.14.1 Contractor Acquired Property

3.1.15 Repair, Refurbishment, and Modification

3.1.16 Responsible Engineer

3.2 Design and Development

3.2.1 Integrated Product and Process Development

3.2.2 Peer Reviews

iv

3.2.3 Technical Performance Measurement

3.2.4 Systems Engineering for Design

3.2.4.1 Element Systems Engineering Plan

3.2.4.2 Contractor Systems Engineering Management Plan

3.2.4.3 System Security Engineering

3.2.5 Design for Interoperability

3.2.6 Design for Producibility

3.2.7 Design for Testability

3.2.7.1 Testability Program Plan

3.2.8 Design for Supportability

3.2.9 Design for Commercial and Nondevelopmental Items

3.2.9.1 COTS/NDI Design Strategies

3.2.10 Requirements Traceability and Verification Matrix

3.2.11 System Design Verification and Validation

3.2.12 Safety and Environmental Requirements

3.2.13 Open Systems Design and Standards

3.2.14 Modeling and Simulation

3.2.14.1 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Processes

3.2.14.2 Models and Simulations Verification & Validation

3.2.14.3 Models and Simulations Accreditation

3.2.14.4 Accreditation Decision

3.2.14.5 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Documentation

3.2.15 Classification of Characteristics

3.2.15.1 Classification of Characteristics Levels

3.2.16 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Design and Verification

3.2.17 Space Radiation, Nuclear Hardness, and Survivability Program

3.2.18 Transition to Operations or Production

3.2.18.1 Transition to Production Plan

3.2.19 Legacy Designs

3.2.20 BMDS Technical Core Standards

3.2.21 Safety or Mission Critical Computing Systems

3.2.21.1 Computer System Synchronization

3.2.21.2 Read-Only Memories

3.2.21.3 Self-Checking Design Requirements

3.2.21.3.1 Time Constraints for Execution

3.2.21.3.2 Memory Checks

3.2.21.4 Systems Degradation

3.2.21.5 Unauthorized Interaction

3.2.21.6 Unauthorized Access

3.2.21.7 Peak Load Requirements

3.2.21.8 Fault Tolerance

3.2.21.9 Risk Management Framework

3.3 Software and Firmware

3.3.1 Management Processes

3.3.1.1 Intergroup Coordination

3.3.1.2 Software Development Plan

3.3.1.3 Estimation

3.3.1.4 Software and Firmware Risk Management

3.3.1.5 Software Process Improvement

3.3.1.6 Software and Firmware Supplier Management

3.3.1.6.1 Flow Down of Requirements

3.3.1.6.2 Acceptance of Supplier Software and Firmware Products

3.3.1.7 Software Personnel Training

3.3.2 Software Development, Maintenance, and Operational Processes

3.3.2.1 Software Requirements

v

3.3.2.1.1 Software Reuse

3.3.2.2 Software Design

3.3.2.3 Software Code/Implementation

3.3.2.3.1 Software Programming Standards

3.3.2.3.2 Software Coding Standards

3.3.2.3.3 Software Code Analysis

3.3.2.4 Software Test Coverage and Analysis

3.3.2.4.1 Requirements Based Test Coverage Analysis

3.3.2.4.2 Structural Test Coverage Analysis

3.3.2.4.3 Software Threading and Concurrency Analysis

3.3.2.4.4 Multitasking and Multicore Processing Analysis

3.3.2.5 Software Unit Testing

3.3.2.6 Software Integration Testing

3.3.2.7 Software Qualification Testing

3.3.2.7.1 Software Qualification Test Report

3.3.2.7.2 Software Requalification Testing

3.3.2.8 Regression Tests

3.3.2.9 Software Test Program Status Reports

3.3.2.10 System Integration and Testing

3.3.2.11 System Qualification

3.3.2.12 Software Installation

3.3.2.12.1 Software Deliverable Package

3.3.2.12.2 Software Release Review

3.3.2.13 Software Acceptance

3.3.2.14 Operation

3.3.2.15 Software Maintenance

3.3.2.16 Software Retirement

3.3.3 Supporting Activities and Processes

3.3.3.1 Software Quality Assurance Plan

3.3.3.2 Software Verification

3.3.3.3 Software Validation

3.3.3.4 Support of Independent Verification and Validation

3.3.3.5 Independent Verification and Validation

3.3.3.6 Software Reviews

3.3.3.7 Software Audits

3.3.3.8 Software Problem Reporting

3.3.3.9 Software Dependability

3.3.3.9.1 Software Reliability Program

3.3.3.9.1.1 Software Reliability Program Plan

3.3.3.9.1.2 Software Reliability Documentation

3.3.3.9.1.3 Allocation of Reliability Requirements to Software

3.3.3.9.1.4 Software Reliability Analysis

3.3.3.9.1.5 Software Reliability Evaluation and Achievement

3.3.3.9.1.6 Fault Avoidance and Fault Tolerance

3.3.3.10 Software Safety

3.3.3.11 Software and Firmware Configuration Management

3.3.3.11.1 Software Configuration Items

3.3.3.11.2 Software and Firmware Change Control Process

3.3.3.11.3 Software Library

3.3.3.11.4 Software Configuration Audits

3.3.3.11.5 Software Status Accounting

3.3.3.11.6 Software and Firmware Media Generation

3.3.3.12 Software Documentation

3.3.4 Firmware Development Plan

3.4 Technical and Mission Assurance Reviews

vi

3.4.1 Technical Reviews

3.4.1.1 System Requirements Review

3.4.1.2 Software Specification Review

3.4.1.3 Preliminary Design Review

3.4.1.4 Critical Design Review

3.4.1.5 Test Readiness Review

3.4.1.6 System Verification Review

3.4.1.7 Production Readiness Review

3.4.1.7.1 Follow-On Production Readiness Review

3.4.1.8 Functional Configuration Audit

3.4.1.9 Physical Configuration Audit

3.4.2 Mission Assurance Reviews

3.4.2.1 MDA Executive Level Test Review

3.4.2.2 Pre-Shipment Review

3.5 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability

3.5.1 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Program Plan

3.5.1.1 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Program Planning

3.5.2 Supplier Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Requirements

3.5.3 Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System

3.5.4 Failure Review Board

3.5.4.1 Unverified Failures

3.5.5 Reliability Modeling, Allocation, and Prediction

3.5.5.1 Reliability Prediction Methodology

3.5.6 Reliability Analyses

3.5.6.1 Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis

3.5.6.2 Fault Tree Analysis

3.5.6.3 Finite Element Analysis

3.5.6.4 Sneak Circuit Analysis

3.5.6.5 Worst Case Analysis

3.5.6.6 Electrical, Mechanical, and Thermal Stress Analyses

3.5.6.6.1 Thermal Stress Analysis

3.5.6.6.2 Mechanical Stress Analysis

3.5.6.6.3 Electrical/Electronic Stress Analysis

3.5.7 Mission Critical Items

3.5.8 Effects of Functional Testing, Storage, Handling, Packaging, Transportation, and

Maintenance

3.5.9 Controlled and Limited Life Items

3.5.10 Reliability Growth Test Program

3.5.11 Accelerated Life Testing

3.5.12 Highly Accelerated Life Test

3.5.13 Highly Accelerated Stress Screen

3.5.14 Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

3.5.15 Environmental Stress Screening

3.5.16 Reliability Qualification Test Program/Demonstration

3.5.17 Maintainability Modeling, Allocations, and Predictions

3.5.18 Maintainability Analysis

3.5.19 Maintainability Demonstration

3.5.20 Availability Modeling, Allocations, and Predictions

3.5.21 Availability Assessment

3.5.22 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability of Government Furnished Equipment/

Information

3.5.23 Reliability Surveillance of Deployed and Fielded Systems

3.6 Parts, Materials, and Processes Control Program

3.6.1 Parts, Materials, and Processes Plan

vii

3.7 Integrated Test and Evaluation Program

3.7.1 Integrated Test and Evaluation Program Plan

3.7.2 Engineering Evaluation Tests

3.7.2.1 Integration Tests

3.7.2.2 Interoperability Tests

3.7.2.3 Test-Like-You-Fly

3.7.2.4 Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation

3.7.3 Qualification and Requalification Test Program

3.7.3.1 Qualification Program Plan

3.7.3.2 Qualification Tests

3.7.3.2.1 Qualification by Similarity

3.7.4 Acceptance Tests

3.7.5 Production Assessment Tests

3.7.6 Surveillance and Service Life Evaluation Tests

3.7.6.1 Surveillance and Service Life Evaluation Test Program Plan

3.7.7 Ground and Flight Tests

3.7.7.1 RESERVED

3.7.7.2 Critical Test Gate Process

3.7.7.3 Post Test Performance Analysis

3.7.7.4 Failure Review Process

3.7.8 Modeling and Simulation

3.7.9 Test Plans

3.7.10 Test Procedures

3.7.11 Test Reports

3.8 Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment and Standards

3.8.1 Selection and Design

3.8.1.1 Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment Configuration Documentation

3.8.1.2 Evaluation of Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment

3.8.1.3 Proofing, Qualification, and Correlation

3.8.2 Calibration and Maintenance

3.8.2.1 Calibration and Maintenance Procedures

3.8.2.2 Records and Analysis

3.8.2.3 Out-of-Tolerance Conditions

3.8.2.4 Calibration Standards and Reference Materials

3.8.3 General Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment and Standards Requirements

3.8.3.1 Intervals and Recall

3.8.3.2 Labeling

3.8.3.3 Sealing for Integrity

3.8.3.4 Removal of Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment and Standards

3.8.3.5 Test Station Logs

3.9 Interface Management

3.9.1 Interface Control Plan

3.9.1.1 Interface Control Plan Development

3.9.2 Interface Documentation

3.9.3 Interface Control Working Groups

3.9.4 Interface Change Notice

3.10 Configuration Management

3.10.1 Configuration Management Plan

3.10.2 Supplier Configuration Management

3.10.3 Configuration Identification

3.10.3.1 Product Information

3.10.3.2 Product Structure and Configuration Item Selection

3.10.3.3 Product Identifiers

viii

3.10.3.3.1 Unique Software Identifiers

3.10.3.3.2 Identifying Individual Units of Product

3.10.3.3.3 Identifying Groups of Units of a Product

3.10.3.3.4 Department Of Defense Item Unique Identification

3.10.3.4 Document Identification

3.10.3.5 Configuration Baselines

3.10.3.5.1 Establishing Configuration Baselines

3.10.3.5.2 Types of Configuration Baselines

3.10.3.6 Interface Control

3.10.4 Configuration Change Management

3.10.4.1 Classifying Changes

3.10.4.1.1 Class I Engineering Change

3.10.4.1.2 Class II Engineering Change

3.10.4.2 Documenting Requests for Engineering Changes

3.10.4.3 Configuration Control Board

3.10.4.4 Change Effectivity Determination

3.10.4.5 Change Implementation and Verification

3.10.4.6 Change Management Process Applied to Variances

3.10.4.6.1 Requests for Waiver

3.10.4.6.2 Requests for Deviation

3.10.4.6.2.1 Restrictions on Waivers and Deviations

3.10.4.6.2.2 Classification of Waivers and Deviations

3.10.4.6.3 Review and Approval of Waivers and Deviations

3.10.5 Configuration Status Accounting

3.10.6 Configuration Audit

3.10.7 Configuration Management of Digital Data

3.10.7.1 Digital Data Identification

3.10.7.2 Data Status Level Management

3.10.7.3 Digital Data Transmittal

3.10.7.4 Data Access Control

3.11 Control of Nonconforming Items and Materials

3.11.1 Preliminary Review

3.11.2 Material Review Board

3.11.2.1 Material Review Board Membership

3.11.2.2 Material Review Board Dispositions

3.12 Fabrication and Quality

3.12.1 Manufacturing, Process, and Quality Control Planning

3.12.2 Process Selection and Development

3.12.2.1 Process Selection and Development Planning

3.12.2.2 Mission Critical Process Selection

3.12.2.3 Special Processes

3.12.3 Product Test and Inspection Plan

3.12.4 Fabrication and Quality Procedures

3.12.4.1 Fabrication and Process Procedures

3.12.4.2 Test and Inspection Procedures

3.12.4.3 Workmanship Standards

3.12.4.3.1 Connector Mating and Demating

3.12.4.3.2 Threaded Fasteners and Torque

3.12.4.3.3 Structural Bonding

3.12.5 Product Control during Fabrication

3.12.5.1 Product Identification and Handling

3.12.5.2 Product Protection

3.12.5.2.1 Electrostatic Discharge Controls

3.12.5.2.2 Contamination Control Program

ix

3.12.5.2.2.1 Clean Rooms

3.12.5.2.3 Foreign Object Elimination Program

3.12.5.3 Product Status Indication

3.12.6 Fabrication Process Control

3.12.6.1 Process Qualification and Requalification Program

3.12.6.2 Fabrication and Quality Metrics

3.12.6.3 Fabrication Defects

3.12.6.4 Continuous Process Improvement

3.12.7 Fabrication Environmental Stress Screening

3.12.8 Fabrication Quality Verification

3.12.8.1 In-Process and Acceptance Test and Inspection

3.12.8.2 First Article Test and Inspection

3.12.8.3 Nondestructive Test and Inspection

3.12.8.4 Nonconforming Items Control

3.12.9 Fabrication and Quality Records

3.12.9.1 Fabrication Records

3.12.9.2 Quality Control Records

3.12.9.2.1 Closeout Photographs

3.12.10 Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation of Product

3.12.10.1 Packaging

3.12.10.2 Handling and Storage

3.12.10.3 Preparation for Shipment and Transportation

3.12.11 Lifting Devices and Equipment Program

3.12.11.1 Identification of Critical Lifts

3.12.11.2 Lifting Devices and Equipment Program Certification

3.12.11.3 Identification of Critical Moves

3.13 Supplier Management

3.13.1 Supplier Selection

3.13.1.1 Safety Critical Supplier List and Mission Critical Supplier List

3.13.1.2 Conditional Source Approval

3.13.2 Supplier Ratings

3.13.3 Supplier Evaluations

3.13.4 Supplier Program Requirements

3.13.4.1 Supplier Management System

3.13.5 Procurement Process

3.13.5.1 Technical Requirements

3.13.5.2 Detailed Provisions

3.13.5.3 Procurement Document Review

3.13.5.4 Procurement Document Change Control

3.13.6 Control of Customer or Government Furnished Material

3.13.7 Government Source Inspection

3.13.8 Contractor Source Inspection

3.13.9 Receiving Inspection and Test

3.13.10 Intra-Corporate Work Transfers

3.14 Safety

3.14.1 Safety Program Requirements

3.14.1.1 Safety Policies

3.14.1.2 System Safety Management Documentation and Activities

3.14.1.3 System Safety Analyses

3.14.1.4 System Safety Reports, Reviews, and Assessments

3.14.2 RESERVED

3.14.3 System Safety Engineering Approach

3.14.3.1 System Safety Hazard Identification and Analysis Methodology

3.14.3.2 Safety Risk Assessment Methodology

x

3.14.3.3 Risk Acceptance Authority

3.14.3.4 Mishap Investigations

3.14.4 Safety Design Criteria

3.14.4.1 Unacceptable Conditions

3.14.4.2 Design Constraints

3.14.4.3 Interlock Status and Restoration

3.14.4.4 Ignition System Safety Requirements

3.14.4.5 Fuze System Safety Requirements

3.14.4.6 Hazardous Materials Transportation

3.14.4.6.1 Lithium Batteries

3.14.4.7 Insensitive Munitions Design and Safety Tests

3.14.4.8 Ordnance Systems

3.14.4.8.1 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance

3.14.4.9 Missile and Space Vehicle Pressure Systems

3.14.4.10 Orbital Debris

3.14.4.11 Communication System Configuration

3.14.5 Safety and Health

3.14.5.1 Occupational Safety and Health

3.14.5.1.1 Hazardous Materials Management

3.14.5.1.2 Human Engineering

3.14.5.1.3 Lasers

3.14.5.1.4 Human Exposure to Radio Frequency

3.14.6 Test and Range Safety

3.14.6.1 Test Safety

3.14.6.2 Range Safety

3.14.6.2.1 Flight Termination System and Range Safety Tracking System Standards

3.14.6.2.2 Three-Tone Receivers

3.14.6.2.3 FTS Receiver Implementation Exclusivity

3.14.6.2.4 Flight Safety Analysis

3.14.7 Safety Critical Functions and Safety Related Functions

3.14.8 Safety Critical Variables

3.14.9 Software Safety

3.14.9.1 Nondevelopmental Item & Commercial-Off-The Shelf

3.14.9.2 Independent Validation and Verification

3.14.10 Software Maintenance Requirements for Safety Critical Computing Systems

3.14.11 Design and Development of Computer Systems

3.14.11.1 General Design Requirements

3.14.11.2 Design Verification and Validation

3.14.11.3 System Design Requirements for Computer Systems

3.14.11.3.1 Designed Safe States

3.14.11.3.2 Safe State Return

3.14.11.3.3 Safety Critical Data Isolation

3.14.11.3.4 Safety Critical Software Isolation

3.14.11.3.5 Input or Output Registers and Ports

3.14.11.3.6 Fault Detection

3.14.11.3.7 Circumvent Unsafe Conditions

3.14.11.3.8 Fallback and Recovery

3.14.11.3.9 Simulators

3.14.11.3.10 System Errors Log

3.14.11.3.11 Positive Feedback Mechanisms

3.14.11.3.12 Corruption of Computing Environment

3.14.11.4 Power-Up System Initialization Requirements

3.14.11.5 System Level Check

3.14.11.6 Operational Checks

3.14.11.7 Feedback Loops

3.14.11.8 Interface Control

xi

3.14.11.9 BMDS Interface Control

3.14.11.10 Inter-CPU Communications

3.14.11.11 Data Transfer Messages

3.14.11.12 External Functions

3.14.11.13 Value Verification

3.14.11.14 Full Scale Representations

3.14.11.15 Safety Kernel

3.14.11.16 Inadvertent Jumps

3.14.11.17 Overwritten Safety Critical Functions

3.14.11.18 Safety Critical Functions User Interfaces

3.14.11.18.1 Processing Cancellation

3.14.11.18.2 Hazardous Function Initiation

3.14.11.18.3 Safety Critical Displays

3.14.11.18.4 System Response to Operator Actions

3.14.11.18.5 Safety Alerts

3.14.12 MDA Safety Integration

3.14.12.1 Integration Responsibility

3.14.12.2 Flow Down of Requirements from Contractor to Supplier

4.0 NOTES

4.1 Custodian

APPENDIX (A.1) Mission Assurance Implementation Plan Development and Approval ............... A-1

APPENDIX (A.2) Requirements Applicability Matrix .......................................................................... A-7

APPENDIX (B) Guide for Selecting Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance Requirements for Contracts.................................................................................................................................................. B-1

APPENDIX (C) Workmanship Requirements ....................................................................................... C-1

APPENDIX (D) Acronyms ...................................................................................................................... D-1

APPENDIX (E) Definitions ......................................................................................................................E-1

APPENDIX (F) Guide for Technical and Mission Assurance Review Requirements ....................... F-1

Figures

Figure 3.14.1.3-1 General Flow of System Safety Analyses and Assessments

Tables

Table 2-1: Applicable Requirements Documents Table 2-2: Applicable Guidance Documents

Table 3.14.3.3-1: Safety Risk Acceptance Authority xii

1.0 SCOPE

The MDA Assurance Provisions (MAP) encompasses development, engineering, testing, production, procurement, and implementation of systems under contract to MDA. The MAP provides a measurable and standardized set of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance requirements that Government and contractors apply to safety critical, mission critical, or both safety and mission critical items in support of acquisition and deployment of MDA Systems. This includes test items impacting safety or mission assurance during ground test events, distributed test events, flight tests, and operations.

1.1 Purpose

The MAP establishes Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance processes and actions through disciplined application of system engineering; interface management, configuration management, risk management, cybersecurity and software assurance; and quality, safety, and management principles needed to achieve mission success throughout the acquisition process.

The implementation of MAP disciplines promotes continual process improvement and cost reductions by improving productivity, mitigating risk, and enhancing Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance.

1.2 Applicability and Accountability

The MAP applies to Government and contractor organizations involved in planning, designing, developing, fabricating, testing, integrating, deploying, supporting, and sustaining systems under the cognizance of MDA. The activity responsible for performing each requirement will be stated (i.e., Government, Contractor, or both). The term ‘Government’ applies to MDA/AB, MDA/CR, MDA/DE, MDA/DI, MDA/DP, MDA/DT, MDA/DV, MDA/QS, and Program Offices. The term ‘Contractor’ applies to prime contractors, subcontractors, subtier suppliers; or any organization (e.g., other Government Agencies) performing these functions: development, assembly, integration test, or operations in support of MDA. In addition, the MAP applies to test items impacting safety or mission assurance during ground test events, distributed test events, flight tests, and operations.

Government and contractors involved in planning, designing, developing, fabricating, testing, integrating, deploying, supporting, and sustaining MDA products and services shall establish and maintain accountability for fulfilling Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance requirements herein. Accountability shall be documented through assignment of specific roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

1.2.1 Mission Assurance Implementation Plan

A Mission Assurance Implementation Plan (MAIP) will be established and maintained by MDA/DE, MDA/DT, and MDA/DV to describe how the MAP is implemented in their organization. Contents and tailoring requirements for a MAIP shall be in accordance with (IAW) Appendix A.1.

1.2.2 MAP on Contract

The MDA Program Office responsible for planning, design, development, fabrication, test, integration, deployment, support, and sustainment of MDA safety or mission critical products and services by contractors shall invoke the MAP on contract with an MDA Quality, Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate (MDA/QS), and MDA Program Office approved Requirements Applicability Matrix (RAM) (Appendix A.2). The MDA Engineering Directorate (MDA/DE) shall approve RAMs that alter requirements for which MDA/DE is the MDA Office of Primary Responsibility or Office of Collateral Responsibility.

Tailoring of MAP requirements shall consider program objectives, maturity, and applicable acquisition life cycle phases. The contractor may use Aerospace Report No. TOR-2011(8591)-21, Mission Assurance Guidelines for A-D Mission Risk Classes, as additional guidance for tailoring MAP requirements. The Government and contractor shall comply with International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions for the MAP on contract and RAM tailoring when foreign contractors and suppliers are used.

1.3 International Traffic in Arms Regulations

The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), IAW 22 U.S.C. 2778-2780 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR Parts 120-130), is charged with controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML).

The ITAR regulations dictate that information and material pertaining to defense and military related technologies (for items listed on the USML) may only be shared with U.S. Persons unless authorization from the Department of State is received or a special exemption is used.

1.4 Federal Acquisition Regulation Requirements

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements are cited within the individual provisions of this document to provide definition, clarification, and guidance on requirements. The MAP does not alter the FAR requirements or inadvertently or intentionally impose additional criteria (requirements).

1.5 Order of Precedence

Nothing in this document supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained. Conflicts between the MAP and other requirements documents shall be resolved by MDA/QS, MDA Office of Primary Responsibility (e.g., DE, DT), and the MDA Program Office. Potential conflicts between MAP and FAR requirements shall be referred to the Contract Administration Office and MDA/DA for clarification and resolution.

2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

The documents listed in Table 2-1: Applicable Requirements Documents and Table 2-2: Applicable Guidance Documents are cited within the MAP text and form a part of this document to the extent specified herein. Documents cited within the reference shall be used as cited in the reference (i.e., requirement or guidance). For dated documents, only the cited revision applies. For undated documents, the latest revision of the reference document (including amendments), applicable at the time of contract award, applies unless a specific exemption has been obtained. Where MAP requirement text does not indicate specific document revision the revision annotated in this list is applicable. Requests for use of revisions to documents shall be submitted to MDA/QS.

Table 2-1: Applicable Requirements Documents

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

49 CFR Parts 100-199 Transportation

Aerospace Report No. TR-99 (1413)-1 Natural and Triggered Lightning Launch Commit Criteria Jan 1999

AFMAN 91-201 Explosives Safety Standards Mar 2017

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 1

Range Safety User Requirements Manual, Air Force Command Range Safety Policies And Procedures Nov 2016

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 2

Range User Launch Safety Requirements Manual Volume 2, Flight Safety Requirements Jul 2017

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 3

Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 3 - Launch Vehicles, Payloads, and Ground Support Systems Requirements

May 2019

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 4

Range Safety User Requirements Manual, Airborne Flight Safety System Design, Test, and Documentation Requirements

Nov 2017

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 5

Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 5 - Facilities, Structures and Reusable Launch Vehicle/Reentry Vehicle Operating Location Requirements

Feb 2018

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 6

Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 6 - Ground and Launch Personnel, Equipment, Systems, and Material Operations Safety Requirements

May 2019

AFSPC Manual 91-710, Volume 7

Range Safety User Requirements Manual Volume 7 - Glossary of References, Abbreviations and Acronyms, and Terms

Feb 2018

AIAA S-113A-2016 Criteria for Explosive Systems and Devices on Space and Launch Vehicles Oct 2016

ANSI/AIAA S-080A Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure Components Mar 2018

ANSI/AIAA S-081B Space Systems - Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels Mar 2018

ANSI Z136.1 Safe Use of Lasers Jan 2014

ANSI Z136.6 Safe Use of Lasers Outdoors Jan 2015

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

ANSI/ESD-S20.20-2014

ESD Association Standard for the Development of an Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electrical and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices)

Jul 2014

ANSI/NCSL Z540.3-2006 Requirements for the Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment 2006

ASME Y14.24 Types and Applications of Engineering Drawings 2012

DA PAM 385-64 Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards Oct 2013

DoD 4145.26-M Change 2 DOD Contractor’s Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives Aug 2018

DoDI 5000.02 Change 4 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System Aug 2018

DESR 6055.09, Edition 1 Defense Explosives Safety Regulation Jan 2019

DoDI 3222.03 Change 2 DoD Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program Oct 2017

DoDI 8510.01 Change 2 Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT) Jul 2017

DoD-STD-2101 Classification of Characteristics May 1979

FAR 46.4 Government Contract Quality Assurance

FAR 52.245-1 Government Property Jan 2017

FAR 52.246-2 through 52.246-8 Inspection Requirements

IEEE 1012-2016 IEEE Standard for System, Software, and Hardware Verification and Validation Sep 2017

IEEE 730-2014 IEEE Standard for Software Quality Assurance Processes Jun 2014

IEEE 14764-2006

ISO/IEC/IEEE International Standard for Software Engineering - Software Life Cycle Processes - Maintenance

Dec 2011

IEEE 15288.2-2014 IEEE Standard for Technical Reviews and Audits on Defense Programs May 2015

IEEE C95.1

Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz

Apr 2006

IPC J-STD-001G (Class 3) Requirements for Soldered Electrical and Electronic Assemblies Oct 2017

IPC J-STD-001GS

Space and Military Applications Electronic Hardware Addendum to IPC J-STD-001G Requirements for Soldered Electrical and Electronic Assemblies

Mar 2018

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

IPC/WHMA-A-620C (Class 3) Requirements and Acceptance for Cable and Wire Harness Assemblies Jan 2017

IPC/WHMA-A-620C-S

Space Applications Electronic Hardware Addendum to IPC/WHMA-A-620C Mar 2018

IPC-2220 Series (Class 3) Family of Design Documents

IPC-6010 Series (Class 3) Family of Board Performance Documents

IPC-6012DS

Space and Military Avionics Applications Addendum to IPC-6012D, Qualification and Performance Specification for Rigid Printed Boards

Sep 2015

IPC-6018CS

Space and Military Avionics Applications Addendum to IPC-6018C Qualification and Performance Specification for High Frequency (Microwave) Printed Boards

Jul 2016

ISO 14644-1

Cleanrooms and Associated Controlled Environments – Part 1: Classification of Air Cleanliness by Particle Concentration

Dec 2015

ISO 14644-2

Cleanrooms and Associated Controlled Environments – Part 2: Monitoring to Provide Evidence of Cleanroom Performance Related to Air Cleanliness by Particle Concentration

Dec 2015

ISO/IEC 17025:2017 General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories Nov 2017

MDA Directive 3000.10 Ballistic Missile Defense System Flight Test Concept of Operations Jun 2019

MDA Directive 3000.11 Test Policy Nov 2018

MDA Directive 3200.12 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability Nov 2015

MDA Directive 4122.01 Ballistic Missile Defense System Technical Core Standards Aug 2018

MDA Directive 5000.15 Ballistic Missile Defense System Requirements Traceability Process Jul 2018

MDA Directive 6055.05 Failure Investigations Nov 2017

MDA Directive 8315.03 Modeling and Simulation Program Dec 2015

MDA DX Memorandum Updated Safety Risk Acceptance Authority May 2007

MDA Instruction 3000.07-INS Ballistic Missile Defense System Ground Test Concept of Operations Aug 2017

MDA Instruction 3058.01-INS Risk Management Feb 2016

MDA Instruction 4161.02-INS Item Unique Identification May 2016

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

MDA Instruction 5000.20-INS Engineering Technical Review Process Jul 2015

MDA Instruction 5000.21-INS Unverified and Non-Repeatable Failure Process Jan 2016

MDA Instruction 5010.24-INS Performing an Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Level Assessment Feb 2017

MDA Instruction 6055.02-INS Accident Investigations and Reporting Nov 2018

MDA Instruction 8300.01-INS Missile Defense Agency Closeout Photography Requirements Aug 2018

MDA Instruction 8315.05-INS Ballistic Missile Defense System Modeling and Simulation, Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Feb 2017

MDA Instruction 8430.01-INS Software Engineering Jan 2019

MDA Manual 3000.05-M Ballistic Missile Defense System Flight Test Failure Initial Response Process Jan 2017

MDA Manual 3500.01-M Ballistic Missile Defense System Change Management Process Nov 2017

MDA Policy Memorandum No. 72 Safe Use of Message Modification Technologies Jul 2018

MDA QS-SOP-14 Rev 04 System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Quality, Safety and Mission Assurance Standard Operating Procedure

Oct 2018

MDA-QS-003-PMAP-REV C Missile Defense Agency Parts, Materials, and Processes Mission Assurance Plan (PMAP) Oct 2019

MDA-QS-IPP-001 V2.0 Missile Defense Agency Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance Isolation Protection Profile Feb 2018

MDA-QS-PTM-001 V1.0 QS Approved List of Passive Taps Dec 2017

MDA-QS-STD-001 MDA Lifting Standard Aug 2019

MDA SEP Revision 3.1 Missile Defense Agency Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) Jul 2018

MDA-STD-001 High Altitude Exoatmospheric Nuclear Survivability (HAENS) Oct 2007

MIL-STD-130N w/Change 1 Department of Defense Standard Practice Identification Marking of U.S. Military Property Nov 2012

MIL-STD-1316F Fuze Design, Safety Criteria for Aug 2017

MIL-STD-1472G Change 1 Human Engineering Jan 2019

MIL-STD-1522A Notices 1, 2, and 3

General Requirements for Safe Design and Operation of Pressurized Missile and Space Systems Sep 1992

MIL-STD-1766C Nuclear Hardness and Survivability Program Requirements for ICBM Weapon Systems Jan 2017

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

MIL-STD-1901A Munitions Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition System Design, Safety Criteria for Jun 2002

MIL-STD-2105D Hazard Assessment Test for Non-Nuclear Munitions Apr 2011

MIL-STD-3022

W/Change 1

Documentation of Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) for Models and Simulations Apr 2012

MIL-STD-464C Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems Dec 2010

MIL-STD-810H Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests Jan 2019

MIL-STD-882E System Safety May 2012

NASA-STD-8739.5 Rev. A Workmanship Standard for Fiber Optics Terminations, Cable Assemblies, and Installation Sep 2015

NAVSEA OP 4 Eleventh Revision Explosives Safety Afloat Jul 2015

NAVSEA OP 5 Volume 1 Seventh Revision Change 14 Ammunition and Explosives Safety Ashore Jul 2017

NAVSEA S9310-AQ-SAF-010

Second Revision

Technical Manual for Navy Lithium Battery Safety Program Responsibilities and Procedures Jul 2010

NAVSEAINST 9310.1C Naval Lithium Battery Safety Program Aug 2015

PDUSD(AT&L) Memorandum Document Streamlining – Life Cycle Sustainment Plan Sep 2011

Public Law 10 USC 141 Section 2389

Armed Forces Miscellaneous Procurement Provisions:

Ensuring Safety Regarding Insensitive Munitions

Public Law 22 CFR Parts 120-130 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

Public Law 22 USC 2778- 2780 Arms Export Control Act (AECA)

RCC-106-19 Telemetry Standards Jul 2019

RCC-319-19 Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard Jun 2019

RCC-321-17 Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges Sep 2017

RCC-324-11 Global Positioning and Inertial Measurements Range Safety Tracking Systems Commonality Standard Feb 2011

RTCA DO-311A Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems Dec 2017

RTCA DO-347 Certification Test Guidance for Small and Medium Sized Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems Dec 2013

SAE AS9003A Inspection and Test Quality System Jul 2012

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

SAE AS9100 Rev. D Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation, Space and Defense Organizations Sep 2016

SAE AS9102 Rev. B Aerospace First Article Inspection Requirement Oct 2014

SAE AS9146

Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Prevention Program - Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations

Apr 2017

SMC-S-016 Test Requirements for Launch, Upper-Stage, and Space Vehicles Sep 2014

TB-700-2 NAVSEAINST

8020.8C/TO 11A-1-47

Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures Jul 2012

Table 2-2: Applicable Guidance Documents

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

Department of Defense (DoD) Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation Guidebook Apr 2018

AC 20-184 Guidance on Testing and Installation of Rechargeable Lithium Battery and Battery Systems on Aircraft Oct 2015

Aerospace Report No. TOR- 2011(8591)-21

Mission Assurance Guidelines for A-D Mission Risk Classes Jun 2011

CMMI-DEV Version 1.3 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) for Development Nov 2010

DoDI 8320.03 Change 2 Unique Identification (UID) Standards for Supporting the DoD Information Enterprise Aug 2018

DoDI 8320.04 Change 2 Item Unique Identification (IUID) Standards for Tangible Personal Property Aug 2018

DT-212 Flight Test Mission Execution Standards Guide Dec 2017

ESD TR20.20-2016

Handbook for the Development of an Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for the Protection of Electronic Parts, Assemblies, and Equipment

May 2016

GEIA-STD-0009 Reliability Program Standard for Systems Design, Development, and Manufacturing Aug 2008

IEEE 12207-2017 ISO/IEC/IEEE International Standard - Systems and Software Engineering – Software Life Cycle Processes Nov 2017

IEEE 15288.1-2014 IEEE Standard for Application of Systems Engineering on Defense Programs May 2015

IEEE 1633-2016 IEEE Recommended Practice on Software Reliability Jan 2017

ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 Systems and software engineering – System life cycle processes May 2015

M-2699-1.0 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Technical Core Standards Management Handbook Feb 2014

Document Number Document Title Issue Date

MIL-HDBK-189C Notice 1 Reliability Growth Management Mar 2016

MIL-HDBK-2155 Notice 1 Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Taken Sep 2014

MIL-HDBK-2164A Environmental Stress Screening Process for Electronic Equipment Jun 1996

MIL-HDBK-2165 Notice 2 Testability Handbook for Systems and Equipment Feb 2019

MIL-HDBK-344A

Notice 2

Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) of Electronic Equipment May 2012

MIL-HDBK-470A

Notice 2

Designing and Developing Maintainable Products and Systems, Volume I May 2012

MIL-HDBK-61A(SE) Configuration Management Guidance Feb 2001

NAS 412 Revision 2 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Prevention Guidance Document Apr 2018

NASA-STD-5020A (with Change 1)

Requirements for Threaded Fastening Systems in Spaceflight Hardware Feb 2019

NASA-STD-8719.14B Process for Limiting Orbital Debris Apr 2019

NASA-STD-8739.4A (with Change 2)

Workmanship Standard for Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, and Wiring Dec 2016

NIST Special Publication 800- 37 Revision 2

Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations, A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy

Dec 2018

NIST Special Publication 800- 53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Jan 2015

NIST Special Publication 800- 160 Volume 1

Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems

Mar 2018

QS-INST-10 MDA Core Metrics Guidebook Jul 2019

S-2816-1.0 Ballistic Missile Defense System Requirements Traceability Handbook May 2013

SMC-T-006 Specialty and Systems Engineering Supplement to IEEE-

15288.1 Aug 2017

3.0 QUALITY, SAFETY, AND MISSION ASSURANCE PROVISIONS

3.1 Management

The Government and contractor shall establish and maintain fundamental management disciplines to plan, establish, and monitor a Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance (QSMA) Program. It shall include requirements for internal and external communication, sharing information, mitigating risk, and encouraging continual improvement. This is accomplished by establishing effective management programs, including policy, planning, training, documentation, and review processes to execute the QSMA Program. The Government and contractor shall have a Quality Management System (QMS) that is compliant with requirements of SAE AS9100, Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation, Space and Defense Organizations. Assurance related activities not covered by SAE AS9100 requirements are identified in the following sections and supplement SAE AS9100 requirements.

The Government and contractor shall establish and maintain those policies, procedures, or command media necessary to fulfill Missile Defense Agency Assurance Provisions (MAP) requirements. Where practical, MAP requirements should be satisfied through application of the Government’s and contractor’s documented and approved standard processes and programs rather than creating a new, separate set of processes to meet the MAP requirement’s intent.

The contractor implementing procedures shall be identified in a QSMA Implementation Matrix, which defines how MAP requirements imposed herein, are implemented. The QSMA Implementation Matrix shall specify applicable MAP requirements, cross-referenced to applicable implementation procedures, instructions, and specifications. The matrix shall clearly delineate organizational accountability for implementation of MAP requirements. The matrix shall be retained as a quality record.

3.1.1 Contract Reviews

The contractor shall establish and maintain a process for contract reviews to ensure that program and technical requirements are understood. Any requirement problems identified shall be resolved with the MDA Program Office. The review process shall be used to communicate requirements to various supporting organizations and disciplines within the program. Contractor program management shall conduct contract reviews with participation from affected disciplines (e.g., contracts, quality, manufacturing, engineering, configuration management, and supplier management). The contractor shall evaluate contract requirements using applicable criteria assuring:

a. The capability to satisfy requirements is available.

b. The requirements are consistent and cover customer needs.

c. Adequate procedures are documented and implemented for handling changes to contract requirements and escalating problems.

d. Procedures are documented and implemented for interface and cooperation among the parties, including ownership, warranty, copyright, licenses, and confidentiality.

e. Acceptance criteria and procedures are documented and implemented IAW requirements.

Amendments or modifications to contract requirements shall result in a review of requirement changes with affected disciplines by the contractor’s program manager. Results of contract reviews shall be documented and retained as a quality record.

3.1.2 Management Reviews

Management reviews discussed in SAE AS9100 shall also include information on results of metrics monitoring, internal audits, external audits, MDA Technical Assessments, analysis of product data, and risk assessments. Output from management reviews shall include assessments related to effectiveness of systems used to implement QSMA requirements, including program and technical performance results.

The Government and contractor shall use output of management reviews to continually improve effectiveness of the QSMA program. Contractor records from management reviews, including any actions assigned, shall be retained as a quality record.

3.1.3 Technology Change Management

The contractor’s top-level management shall define the organization’s Technology Change Management policy for improving hardware, software, firmware, safety, quality, fabrication, productivity, and development time. This includes establishing responsibilities and authority for implementing policy, allocating resources for technology change management activities, and coordinating requirements and issues associated with technology change management at appropriate management levels within the organization. The contractor shall establish a program which identifies, selects, and evaluates new technologies; incorporates technologies that improve hardware, software, firmware, safety, quality, and fabrication; increases productivity; and decreases development cycle time.

3.1.4 Continual Process Improvements and Metrics

The Government’s and contractor’s top-level management shall define and oversee the organization’s program for implementing process development, assessment, and continual process improvement. The Government and contractor shall monitor, control, and report on the effectiveness of processes used during development, maintenance, and operations. The program shall address:

a. Increasing quality and productivity.

b. Decreasing development time and rework.

c. Adopting new technologies and processes.

d. Developing and improving processes and related process assets.

e. Coordinating process development, assessment, and improvement across the organization.

f. Ensuring safety (3.14).

g. Processing noncompliances.

The…

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