J.10 Elections and Political Processes Assessment Report.pdf

This document is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United

States Government.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION SUPPORT ACTIVITY II (MEASURE II)

ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

November 2022

MONITORING AND EVALUATION SUPPORT

ACTIVITY II (MEASURE II)

ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL

PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Final Report November 2022

Prepared under the USAID Bosnia and Herzegovina Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity II

(MEASURE II), Contract Number AID-167-1-17-00004; Task Order Number 72016819F00001

Submitted to:

USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 2022

Contractor:

American Institutes for Research (AIR) iii | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V

INTRODUCTION V

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS V

RECOMMENDATIONS VII

INTRODUCTION 1

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS 1

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE 1

ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 1

BACKGROUND 2

ASSESSMENT METHODS AND LIMITATIONS 4

METHODOLOGY 4

LIMITATIONS 4

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 5

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1 5

CONCLUSIONS 11

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2 12

CONCLUSIONS 17

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2A 19

CONCLUSIONS 21

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2B 22

CONCLUSIONS 27

RECOMMENDATIONS 28

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 28

CIVIL SOCIETY AND PARTICIPATION 29

ANNEXES 30

ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK 31

DELIVERABLES AND SCHEDULE 35

ANNEX 2: DETAILED METHODOLOGY 38

LIMITATIONS 41

ANNEX 3: INFORMATION SOURCES 42

ANNEX 4: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 44

ANNEX 5: KEY LEARNING PRIORITIES 53

ANNEX 6: USAID SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES, 2011-2023 57

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEO

AIR

ALPI

AT

Association of Election Officials

American Institutes for Research

The Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute

Assessment Team

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

CCPI Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiative in BiH

CDCS

CEC

Country Development Cooperation Strategy

Central Election Commission

CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening

CLA Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting

CSO Civil Society Organization

DEC Development Experience Clearinghouse

DO

ECHR

Development Objective

European Court of Human Rights

EU

FBiH

FCR

FGD

HDZ

European Union

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Focus Group Discussion

Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IPA

IRI

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (EU)

International Republican Institute

KII

MEASURE

MEC

Key Informant Interview

Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity

Municipal Election Commission

NATO

NDI

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Democratic Institute

NGO

NSCP

ODIHR

OHR

OSCE

Non-Governmental Organization

National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Office of the High Representative

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PMP Performance Management Plan

PSC

RS

Polling Station Committee

Republika Srpska

SPPG

ToT

UNDP

Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes

Training of Trainers

United Nations Development Program

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WFD Westminster Foundation for Democracy v | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this assessment is to investigate electoral and political processes in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (BiH) in order to inform future USAID/BiH programming. More specifically, USAID requested an analysis of how best to address voter apathy and distrust by improving the integrity of the 2024 and 2026 BiH elections through targeted technical assistance at the local level.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1: WHAT GAPS OR OBSTACLES EXIST FOR TRANSPARENT AND

ACCOUNTABLE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL?

Polling station committees (PSCs) have been described as “the cancer of BiH elections” and are the primary obstacles to transparent and accountable election administration at the local level.

Fifty-seven percent of citizens said that most irregularities occur in counting ballots at polling stations or voting at polling stations. PSC members are randomly selected from nominees by political parties; to improve their odds of selection, parties create multiple allied parties on paper so they can nominate additional PSC candidates. After the selection of PSC members, parties openly trade seats so they can gain control of polling stations. This enables PSCs to operate without oversight and commit fraud, such as annulling ballots cast for opponents, casting leftover ballots after polls close, prefilling ballots handed to voters, instructing voters how to vote, and misreporting the vote count.

There is a need to professionalize and depoliticize polling stations by including politically nonaligned

PSC officials and giving them adequate training. One model is to staff PSCs with civil servants who have other government jobs with independent standing. The High Representative (HR) promulgated changes to election law with immediate effect that seek to address electoral problems, but it is too soon to assess their impact. Other obstacles include:

• Municipal election commissions (MECs) are under the control of local politicians and vulnerable to political influence.

• MECs and the Central Election Commission (CEC) communicate inadequately with citizens.

• The CEC faces shortcomings in staffing and budget, resulting in the CEC being slow in processing appeals during the election process.

• The total number of registered voters significantly exceeds the sum of adults living in BiH and voters registered for mail-in voting living abroad.

• Shortcomings in the absentee voter process enable people to commit fraud by requesting absentee ballots in the name of registered voters, some of whom are dead.

• There are not enough electoral observers from political parties, and party observers do not receive adequate training.

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ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2: WHAT TYPES OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE TECHNICAL CONDUCT

OF ELECTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL COULD INFLUENCE PUBLIC TRUST AND VOTER

BEHAVIOR?

An overwhelming majority of BiH citizens do not trust the election administration. Only one-third say that elections are fair, and 89 percent believe that election fraud occurs. Nevertheless, 56 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the last parliamentary election in 2018, which is comparable to the rate of neighboring countries and the United States. The most frequent reasons for voting are to perform one’s civic duty, to prevent votes from being stolen, or to advocate for change. Nonvoters cite futility, apathy, and distrust for not voting, particularly their dissatisfaction with candidates and the choices available.

Improvements to PSCs could include professionalization of PSC leadership, increased training for

PSC members, and resources for PSCs. Support for election observation would help deter fraud in the technical conduct of elections and increase public trust. Technological improvements like ballot scanners, biometric identification, and surveillance cameras could increase trust.

In addition, there are national-level interventions, unrelated to the technical conduct of elections at the local level, that could improve voter trust and turnout, including youth leadership and candidate training programs; support for training of the CEC, prosecutors, and judges on how to recognize and prosecute electoral fraud; and improvements to the voter registry.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2A: WHAT TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO ELECTION

ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL MAY COUNTER INTIMIDATION AND CONTROL

BY POLITICAL PARTIES AND/OR HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON ETHNIC TENSIONS?

Addressing problems with PSCs, improving enforcement of sanctions against election administrators committing election fraud, and deploying more election observers to detect and report fraud by election administrators could reduce control and intimidation by political parties. Ensuring that PSC members come from multiple parties would help eliminate intimidation by PSCs, but it would not eliminate intimidation outside the polling station, e.g., employer coercion of employees.

Freer and fairer elections might give multiethnic parties a better chance to win elections, thereby reducing the influence of ethnically based parties that ramp up ethnic tensions before elections.

Technical improvements in election administration are unlikely to reduce ethnic tensions directly.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 2B: WHAT APPROACHES WOULD ENCOURAGE VOTER

PARTICIPATION AND COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENT BY WOMEN AND YOUTH?

Women vote at the same rate as men, and adults under 30 vote at the same rate as older adults, so there is no need for an activity aimed specifically at women and youth to increase voter participation. Women, however, are underrepresented in elected office. While many challenges facing women are societal, programs that encourage women’s leadership have proven effective in increasing political engagement and accomplishment. The two most effective approaches are

(1) education for women on political leadership and civic activism and (2) support for political parties to support, coach, mentor, and integrate women in activities in leadership.

Political engagement by youth could be encouraged through civic education campaigns working through schools, universities, and social clubs. Hands-on activities like youth parliaments can complement curricula. More targeted approaches could include work with political parties to help them recruit, mentor, and promote young members as well as training programs for young leaders.

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The USAID-funded Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI) program has demonstrated successful results in helping young leaders get elected and advance in their political parties, including its use of peer-to-peer training and mentoring.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue to support the CEC. USAID should consider continuing support to the CEC, with a particular focus on the CEC’s ability to communicate with the public.

2. Improve voter outreach. USAID should consider working with the CEC, MECs, and/or the

Association of Election Officials to improve outreach and voter education to advance public perception of election officials’ work and increase their professionalism.

3. Pilot initiatives for the use of technology in the electoral process. USAID should consider providing funding for pilot initiatives to explore the use of technological improvements in the electoral process, such as ballot scanners, biometric voter identification, and surveillance cameras.

4. Support the professionalization of PSC staff. USAID should consider developing a new policy and/or procedure with the CEC for the professionalization of PSC staff, including appointing staff from existing civil servants to be trained, seconded to PSCs, and rotated among polling stations.

5. Fund a system for the Registry Office to share data with the CEC. USAID should consider funding a system that automatically shares Registry Office data with the CEC in order to establish a system in which the voter registry accurately reflects population figures.

6. Train judges, law enforcement, and prosecutors on electoral dispute resolution.

USAID should consider establishing a training program for prosecutors and judges that educates them in the technical specifics of election law to promote the successful prosecution of electoral fraud.

7. Support training for civil society and party election observers. USAID should consider supporting training for political party and civil society election observers.

8. Support projects and legacy bodies that promote women’s engagement. USAID should consider providing support to existing donor projects and legacy bodies that encourage women’s political engagement and leadership. Support should be provided to political parties to support, coach, mentor, and integrate women in leadership activities.

9. Support youth participation through civic education and ALPI. USAID should consider support for civic education for youth through school-based programs. USAID should continue to support ALPI and consider providing support to political parties for activities that promote, coach, mentor, and integrate youth into their leadership structures.

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INTRODUCTION

The American Institutes for Research (AIR) has been commissioned by the United States Agency for

International Development Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) under USAID/BiH’s

Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity II (MEASURE II) to conduct an assessment of elections and political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), focusing on the technical conduct of elections and voter behavior change.

This assessment will inform future USAID/BiH programming that will contribute to the Country

Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) through (1) Intermediate Result 1.1: Impact of inclusive citizen engagement improved and/or (2) Intermediate Result 2.1: Social cohesion strengthened.

USAID seeks to support voting by addressing the election administration factors that prevent or enable civic participation and engagement. Public faith in elections is not high, and confidence in adequate representation and accurate vote count is low. Generally, the population sees elections as a means for political elites and political parties, based on ethnicity, to maintain power.

Current USAID activity in this area is Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes

(SPPG) in BiH, implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening

(CEPPS).1 SPPG is a $4 million activity that runs from September 2019 to September 2023. Under

CDCS Development Objective 1: Government accountability to citizens strengthened, SPPG activity is envisaged to contribute to Intermediate Result 1.1: Impact of inclusive citizen engagement improved and Intermediate Result 1.2: Governance effectiveness in targeted areas strengthened.

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

ASSESSMENT PURPOSE

The main purpose of this assessment is to investigate electoral and political processes in BiH in order to inform future USAID/BiH programming. More specifically, USAID requested an analysis of how best to address voter apathy and distrust by improving the integrity of the 2024 and 2026 BiH elections through targeted technical assistance at the local level.

ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

The assessment was guided by two research questions and two sub-questions:

• Q1. What gaps or obstacles exist for transparent and accountable election administration at the local level?

• Q2. What types of improvements to the technical conduct of elections at the local level could influence public trust and voter behavior?

o Q2A. What technical improvements to election administration at the local level may counter intimidation and control by political parties and/or have a constructive impact on ethnic tensions?

1 CEPPS comprises the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

USAID.GOV ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 2 o Q2B. What approaches would encourage voter participation and collective engagement by women and youth?

BACKGROUND

Nearly the entirety of BiH’s institutional apparatus is under the control of an oligopoly of political parties that act without constraints and wield excessive control over public procurement and an expansive system of public enterprises and public administration. Ruling political parties control virtually all processes in the country, leaving very little room for alternative actors or opposition.

Consequently, the political arena is strongly tilted in the ruling parties’ favor. Ruling parties are deadlocked in an unresolvable conflict over who gets to dominate; at the same time, they maintain very strict separation over who controls what and cooperate quite well on a functional level, as demonstrated by various appointments, the awarding of public procurement contracts, and so on.

Government underperformance and corruption are obscured by intensive conflict over “major” issues of inter-ethnic relations and individual versus collective rights. These issues have been at the forefront of political discussion for more than 15 years, yet major actors have failed to reach any compromise whatsoever. Instead, ethnic interests and the ruling parties that claim to protect them have become entrenched in their diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive positions.

Pervasive corruption, which is deeply intertwined with ruling political parties’ structures, remains the main hindrance to social, economic, and political development and progress toward European Union

(EU) accession. Moreover, endemic corruption manifests itself in different forms in BiH, including undue political influence and interference, clientelism, patronage, bribery, and abuse of public office.

In 2021, BiH ranked 110th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption

Perception Index. The 2020 and 2021 USAID/BiH-supported National Survey of Citizens’

Perceptions (NSCP) identified corruption as one of the main drivers of emigration from BiH.

The current BiH political system rewards extreme ethno-nationalist and divisive narratives, perpetuating the ruling positions of the same political elites since the end of the war. Those political elites continue to exacerbate inter-ethnic relations by instilling fear and division and maintaining the status quo. To maintain their position of power, the ruling parties not only encourage and produce ethnic division, but also maintain control over mainstream media. Furthermore, much of their control is achieved through influencing elections. The 2018 general elections were characterized by democratic deficiencies, including fraudulent absentee voting schemes, manipulation of the election process by polling station committees (PSCs), and a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the election administration at all levels, largely due to suspicions of political and ethnic biases of commissioners.2 In addition, there are few credible public opinion polls that address the electoral process. After the general elections, BiH continued to struggle with the formation of a government, challenged at the Federation of BiH (FBiH) level by controversy over electoral reform and at the state level by conflict over potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession, resulting in a “caretaker” government and non-implementation of elections results on the FBiH level.

As highlighted in a report3 produced by the election-monitoring coalition Pod Lupom (Under the

Magnifying Glass), the run-up to the 2020 local elections process was characterized by the abuse of voting by mail (more than 5,000 citizens were victims of identity theft and had their votes cast by

2 Freedom House. 2019 BiH Country Report.

https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2019.

3 Pod Lupom, March 2021. https://podlupom.org/biblioteka/izvjestaji-o-posmatranju-izbora/lokalni-izbori-2020-finalni-izvjestaj-o-gradjanskom-nestranackom-posmatranju-lokalnih-izbora/.

https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2019

3 | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV others); trading of positions in local PSCs4, which is used to circumvent regulations; and abuse of public resources for campaign purposes (including the engagement of civil servants in the campaign).

Furthermore, a total of 24 local election commissions (municipal and city) documented violations of election deadlines, which did not result in any consequences.

The competent authorities responsible for the conduct of elections are the seven-member Central

Election Commission (CEC), municipal (or city) election commissions and the PSCs. Members of the

CEC are appointed by the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. The

CEC determines the required qualifications for members of local election commissions, who are appointed by municipal or city assemblies and approved by the CEC, and members of PSCs, who are appointed for each election.5

BiH is holding new general elections in October 2022 and political tensions are rising. Croat and

Serb constituencies have threatened to boycott the elections if progress on long-overdue electoral reforms stall. These reforms are vital for addressing a number of European Court of Human Rights

(ECHR) judgments, in particular a ruling that all citizens—not just members of the three dominant ethnic groups—should be eligible to run for the presidency. Moreover, Bosnian Croats insist on their own ethnic-majority electoral district in order to prevent the Bosniak majority from selecting the Croat member of the presidency with minimal Croat support, as happened in the last three out of four election cycles.

The Election Law of BiH must change to comply with ECHR and BiH Constitutional Court rulings.

Amendments have been debated for 15 years with no results. Recently, the High Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Christian Schmidt, enacted changes to election law in an attempt to restore the integrity of electoral processes. These include changes to Article 2.19. by introducing the text, “The abuse of the right to participate in the work of the Polling Station

Committee by fictitious representation as prescribed... shall be prohibited.”

The United States and the EU have been working with BiH officials to resolve the election law crisis and draft electoral reforms that tackle corruption and discrimination prior to the elections. Despite their efforts, domestic elites have failed to reach a deal. Difficulties associated with the tripartite presidential structure and with Republika Srpska (RS) efforts to seize state-level authorities have distracted from electoral, economic, and judicial reforms needed to advance EU accession efforts.

Political tensions that highlight the vulnerabilities of the BiH joint governance structure present a particular threat in the current context, characterized by regional and global crises of democracy, growing nationalism, and authoritarianism. This is the backdrop against which different types of electoral fraud take place at the local level in BiH, such as those related to PSCs. An example of such activities can be observed in political parties swapping their PSC seats in places where they would be more likely to get votes because of the ethnic makeup of those areas, which results in mono- and bipartisan PSCs that facilitate widespread manipulation and fraud.

4 Election Law of BiH, Article 2.19, Paragraph 14 (post-Office of the High Representative enactment, previously

Paragraph 13): “Only one representative of a political subject can be a member of a Polling Station

Committee.”

5 Ibid., Articles 2.4 and 2.5.

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ASSESSMENT METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

METHODOLOGY

The assessment team (AT) conducted this assessment from the end of June to September 2022, utilizing mixed methods, including a desk review, key informant interviews (KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs). A more detailed methodology can be found in Annex 2.

PHASE ONE: PLANNING AND PREPARATION

This independent assessment began in July 2022, when the AT commenced document review and began preparing the Workplan, which was submitted to USAID/BiH on July 15. During the planning phase, the AT reviewed relevant documents, prepared the Workplan, and formulated the assessment design.

PHASE TWO: DATA COLLECTION

The AT used a qualitative assessment design consisting of document review, 39 KIIs and 3 FGDs with key informants as well as 12 FGDs with citizens, including both state, entity, and municipal level insight when possible. MEASURE II staff and local consultants carried out interviews in four languages, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, and English. The data collection protocols to guide fieldwork are in Annex 4.

PHASE THREE: DATA ANALYSIS

The team co-leads oversaw and managed the systematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative data.

The team’s data analysis approach utilized data triangulation to cross-check results, and it applied several analysis methods to provide evidence for the assessment’s findings and conclusions.

PHASE FOUR: DISSEMINATION AND UTILIZATION

Following fieldwork and data analysis, the team presented the findings, conclusions, and recommendations during a remote out-briefing to USAID on September 8, 2022. MEASURE II submitted a draft assessment report answering all of the assessment questions on September 22.

LIMITATIONS

• Difficulty in reaching key informants. The majority of fieldwork was conducted in August, when many BiH citizens are away on vacation. The team addressed this limitation by extending fieldwork by two extra weeks, to five weeks in total.

• Selection bias. The assessment required meeting with Bosnian citizens who did vote and BiH citizens who did not vote in recent elections. However, politically disengaged individuals like nonvoters are less likely to volunteer their time for meetings. The team addressed this by ensuring that FGDs included both voters and nonvoters.

• Interviewer/Moderator bias. Interviewer or moderator conduct and actions may lead KII or

FGD participants to respond in a certain way. To prevent this from happening, key informant interviewers and FGD moderators were trained to ask questions in a neutral way; to restrain from giving body language signals or making facial expressions; and to ask all questions in the interview protocols.

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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

ASSESSMENT QUESTION 1

What gaps or obstacles exist for transparent and accountable election administration at the local level?

POLLING STATION COMMITTEES

Described by an international organization official as “the cancer of BiH elections,” PSCs are by far the weakest element of election administration. This is confirmed by citizens’ distrust at the polling station level. Fifty-seven percent of citizens said that most irregularities occur in counting ballots at polling stations or voting at polling stations; 22 percent said that someone at the polling station told them personally who to vote for; and only 12 percent said they trust PSCs completely or mostly.6 In

BiH, PSCs are completely political, which is uncommon among Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) member states.

Key informants and the desk review all confirmed that the trading of seats, which results in single-party and/or single-ethnicity PSCs, is a major problem that enables widespread fraud and manipulation.7 Established parties often create additional “fictitious” parties to inflate the number of their party members running as candidates for PSC seats, thereby increasing their chances of having a party member selected to a PSC. The appointment process is problematic too. Candidates are selected late in the election process (approximately one month before elections). Low financial compensation, coupled by the significant workload (members are supposed to spend 20 hours at a polling station on election day) and liability for wrongdoing, leads some members to resign shortly before the election. Key informants confirmed that some PSC members leave as soon as they can on election day and fail to observe post-closing fraud. According to most key informants, education for PSC members is brief (training is limited to two days) and insufficient; as a result, even honest

PSC members may not recognize fraud or may not understand proper procedures. Even key informants who said training was good observed that PSC members failed to master the material.

Numerous kinds of fraud take place at polling stations. Key informants reported instances in which

PSC members decided among themselves how to divide blank ballots remaining at the end of election day or annul opponents’ ballots. Key informants also confirmed that PSC members manipulate ballots to advance preferred candidates on open lists, such as prefilling ballots for their supporters to cast.8 Fraud typically requires all PSC members to collude, and key informants confirmed that corrupt members of PSCs often send members home when they are not amenable to fraudulent behavior. FGD participants were found to be well informed about fraud being committed or had witnessed fraud firsthand.

6 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Public Perceptions of Elections in BiH: Reforms Needed,”

March 25, 2022. https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/514606 (accessed September 5, 2022).

7 Azra Husarić, “Bosnian Polling Station Abuses are ‘Mechanism for Vote Theft,’” Detektor, September 4, 2020.

8 The CEC introduced a number of technical changes to improve visibility in polling stations and reduce ballot-switching fraud, such as altering the orientation and height of ballot boxes.

https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/514606

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“For example, me, few years ago, I accompanied my elderly mother to the polling station and when she wanted to vote, it turned out that she was registered as someone who already voted that day, even though she just arrived with me.” – Citizen focus group participant

Key informants and one FGD participant confirmed that votes that are counted by hand at polling stations after polls close are vulnerable to manipulation. The count can be intentionally changed, and ballots can be spoiled by PSC members. One OSCE official said there were polling stations in 2018 in which 15 percent of ballots were invalidated, compared to an expected rate of 1 percent.9 One key informant recounted a situation where ballots, for which a voter cast a vote for a party but did not vote for an individual candidate, were subsequently manipulated and accompanying forms either falsely filled in and signed or doctored at a later stage to generate more than 5,000 new preferential votes for candidates.

MUNICIPAL ELECTION COMMISSIONS

As stipulated by the Election Law of BiH,10 members of municipal election commissions (MECs) are appointed under the authority of city council presidents and mayors, though the CEC has some authority to block appointments. A high-ranking member of one of the biggest political parties confirmed that MECs can be under the political influence of an elected mayor or a president of a municipal assembly. MECs are poor at public relations and fail to explain the process adequately to citizens before elections, according to two international organization officials.

“Municipal election commissions and polling committees are somewhat invisible. Citizens do not understand the process and what is the organization between the national and local level. So, improving local level capacities not only at the CEC, but also in terms of how they are recognized by the citizens, is a trust-building measure.” – International organization officials

Key informants confirm that transporting ballots from PSCs to municipal commissions is not secure and allows the ballots to be compromised. This is important because those ballots would be used for recounts. According to two MEC members, the biggest problems are insufficient financial resources, lack of facilities, and technical capacities for conducting elections on the local level.

CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

The CEC, the main body tasked with administering elections, also lacks citizens’ trust, according to public opinion surveys and the AT’s interviews. Sixty-eight percent of citizens distrust the CEC either somewhat (31 percent) or a great deal (37 percent).11 There is also a noticeable distrust in the CEC’s ability to organize legitimate elections, evidenced by only 7 percent of citizens having a great deal of confidence in the commission. Similarly, only a small percentage of survey participants are confident in the CEC to be impartial in conducting elections (8 percent) and only a slim number

9 Joeri Maas, OSCE, quoted in Azra Husarić’s “Bosnian Polling Station Abuses are ‘Mechanism for Vote Theft,”

Detektor, September 4, 2020.

10 Election Law of BiH, Article 2.12, Paragraph 5: “The members of the Municipal Election Commission shall be appointed by the Municipal Council/Municipal Assembly, subject to the approval of the Central Election

Commission of BiH based on a public advertisement according to the procedure established by the Central

Election Commission of BiH under a separate regulation.”

11 International Republican Institute, “2022 Western Balkans Regional Survey,” January–February 2022.

7 | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV of participants believe the CEC has the ability to provide accurate and unbiased information (7 percent). In 2020, 39 percent of respondents had not changed their level of trust in the CEC since

2018, and 42 percent had less trust in the CEC than they did two years earlier.12 An IRI poll from

2022, however, indicates that citizens’ trust has improved since 2020: in 2020, the CEC was trusted by 19 percent of citizens; in 2022, this number rose to 27 percent. (This may be due to opposition party members being able to appoint some CEC members, but causality cannot be established.) The

CEC is more trusted than other institutions, such as Entity Prime Minister (20 percent in 2020 and

25 percent in 2022), the BiH Presidency (21 percent in 2020 and 23 percent in 2022), or BiH political parties (17 percent in 2020 and 19 percent in 2022).13 As an institution, the CEC was captured soon after the ownership was transferred from international to local actors. Since then, there has been a reversal of norms and procedures and the affirmation of almost complete political control,14 which contributed to citizens’ distrust in the electoral process. Several key informants noted that the current CEC setup represents an improvement over the previous one.

Generally speaking, electoral commissions can be comprised of political faction leaders (e.g., Mali and

Guyana) or a combination of partisan and technical actors (e.g., United States, Spain, Russia) or purely apolitical (e.g., France, Ireland, Sierra Leone). The overt politicization of polling staff is unusual and generally not accepted as it can interfere with exercising the right to vote and is linked to voter intimidation (e.g., Mozambique). Politicization is also synonymous with factional strongholds and is linked to a greater incidence of fraud because the number of people you have to co-opt into fraud and the cost of doing so is reduced (e.g., Kenya). The fact that it is locally prevalent does not mitigate these factors, meaning that the pattern is generally something that has to be addressed with a view to controlling if not eliminating it.

KIIs and FGDs confirmed that the CEC fails to intervene in cases of alleged election fraud. One key informant mentioned the case of an MEC member who said that the CEC was ignoring their request for assistance. Key informants cited the CEC’s lack of capacity as a cause for its shortcomings. The commission faces problems with its ability to provide obligatory training, which is where IFES is assisting in improving methodology and developing e-learning modules, but also in terms of handling the CEC’s mandate at the local level.

IFES is also providing support to the CEC to improve communication and voter registration processes and to strengthen cybersecurity. Key informants note that efforts are being made to improve CEC communication yet there is still room for progress. With support from the Embassy of Switzerland in BiH, the CEC and the Association of Election Officials (AEO) published a series of podcasts under the title “General elections 2022,” which dealt with diverse topics. With support from the EU, a strategy for election integrity and transparency was developed. Part of it focused on the communication strategy—as part of an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) system that requires the adoption of sectoral strategies—that was never adopted by the Parliamentary

Assembly of BiH. Nevertheless, the strategy was used as a basis for both CEC and international donors' projects.

The OSCE Mission to BiH and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(ODIHR) in Warsaw are working with the CEC to support the implementation of ODIHR recommendations by improving bylaws and practices. Their activities also include working with BiH

12 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Information Integrity and Trust in the Election Process and the Central Election Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2020.

13 International Republican Institute, “2022 Western Balkans Regional Survey,” January–February 2022.

14 Srđan Blagovčanin, The Rule of the Cartel. Transparency International, May 2020, p. 30.

USAID.GOV ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 8 institutions on legal reform related to elections, including amendments to the electoral law and legislation related to political party financing. According to the ODIHR website, “Currently, the

Mission is implementing a project that will develop a CEC voter education strategy, support the

CEC audit department, increase transparency on election-related complaints, and make the asset declarations of elected officials more accessible.” OSCE support to Bosnian elections is part of its

Support to Electoral Reforms in the Western Balkans project, a €1.72 million activity that runs from

January 2021 to December 2023, with funding from the EU and the Austrian government. It follows the Support to Elections in the Western Balkans project that ran from 2017 through 2020.

VOTER LISTS

Published studies have found that the number of eligible voters on the BiH electoral roll is significantly greater than the number of adults residing in the country. An IFES survey found that BiH citizens cited voter registration (37.9 percent) and the counting process (28.8 percent) as the most vulnerable parts of the election process when it comes to susceptibility to fraud.15

One 2020 study from the European Council on Foreign Relations found that there were almost

375,000 more names on the voter rolls than there were adults living in BiH, calculating there were

3.28 million registered voters and 2.91 million adult residents. The difference in those figures is

273,000 greater than the 102,000 emigres who were registered to vote. “A discrepancy of a quarter of a million in a country of 3.5 million people provides ample space to manipulate votes and swing an election,” the author wrote.16 Since 2014, the number of registered Bosnian voters has exceeded the number of adult residents by between 323,212 and 464,707 names. For context, the comparable figure in Croatia for the most recent elections is 193,326. In Slovenia, Austria, and the United States, there are fewer registered voters than the voting-age population.

A significant number of key informants and FGD participants confirmed these findings: Voter lists/centralized database for identification are not accurate or up to date and do not reflect voters who are out of the country or deceased. An election official argues that the problem with Registry

Office data is backlogs, i.e., persons whose deaths were not reported to the Registry Office.

Key informants and FGD participants argue that this leads to fraud and manipulation, such as impersonation of registered voters who are outside Bosnia or deceased. They said some individuals can vote multiple times using different identities, with the collaboration of PSC members. Citizen

FGDs in Banja Luka and Mostar found that citizens are going to the polls, among other reasons, to prevent the theft of their vote; one survey found that nearly half of BiH voters cast ballots for this reason.17

15 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Information Integrity and Trust in the Election Process and the Central Election Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2020.

16 Majda Ruge, “The Voting Dead: Why Electoral Fraud in Bosnia Should Matter to the EU,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2020.

https://ecfr.eu/article/the-voting-dead-why-electoral-fraud-in-bosnia-should-matter-to-the-eu (accessed

September 5, 2022).

17 National Democratic Institute, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Poll,” May 13, 2022.

https://www.ndi.org/publications/bosnia-and-herzegovina-poll.

https://ecfr.eu/article/the-voting-dead-why-electoral-fraud-in-bosnia-should-matter-to-the-eu/ https://www.ndi.org/publications/bosnia-and-herzegovina-poll

9 | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV

In order to prevent ballots manipulation, the CEC is working with the British Embassy to introduce stamps with advanced security features. Each ballot will be stamped and signed by the PSC president when handed over to an attending voter. This project is being implemented by the AEO.

ABSENTEE VOTING

The problems with the voter list discussed above lead to abuses with mail-in absentee ballots, where malign actors committing fraud request that multiple ballots in the names of registered voters be sent to their address abroad; these malign actors then cast those ballots fraudulently. One scholar wrote, “Such was the story of one man who found out that his deceased mother, who lived and died in Canada, was registered to cast an absentee ballot from Serbia. The ‘voting dead’ are not the only examples of falsified registration: a candidate for a municipal council in the municipality of Teslić in

Republika Srpska found out by accident that he was registered to vote by mail from Serbia—a country he has never lived in.”18

Key informants confirmed that fraud happens by requesting a mail-in ballot in the name of a voter, but having the ballot mailed to the address of the person committing fraud. The CEC and OSCE, upon the recommendation of IFES, introduced a registration application for voting abroad, so the process can be streamlined and fraud reduced. Prior to introducing this application, the CEC had to purge 27,000 names from the voter list before the 2020 elections.

The OSCE and CEC developed an application for mail-in voter registration that aims to prevent fraudulent registrations for the 2022 elections, plus instructional videos. The application has several modules and introduces online applications for observers, candidate asset declarations, and an identity-management module through the CEC’s e-Izbori platform. The CEC reported that around

88,000 individuals opened accounts for voting abroad and some 10,000 never completed the registration. There were 10,749 applications rejected for missing required documents. In total, 69,966 voters were registered to vote from abroad.

ELECTION OBSERVATION

Election observation is generally regarded favorably, but it could improve to affect the electoral process more positively. In general, there are two major groups of observers, party and nonparty, though according to two key informants, this line is sometimes blurred. This assessment identified numerous problems and vulnerabilities. KIIs and FGDs indicated that few observers possess the necessary expertise in election law, and they can be intimidated and distracted. Since they are not paid well, observers can be vulnerable to being bought off by parties on PSCs to turn their backs or go home before fraud is committed, while some observers leave not knowing how long they needed to stay.

Parties generally lack observers in the field and have no resources to cover all polling stations.

Several key informants and participants in citizen FGDs mentioned that politically appointed observers assume only a minimal role at the polling station, observing the turnout of their voters and registering their votes. NDI is developing an application for party observers, to help them identify and report cases of fraud or manipulation of votes. Pod Lupom will have a legal team standing by to assist observers, but they cannot offer the same assistance to party observers as they maintain strict separation from political parties.

18 Majde Ruge, “The Voting Dead,” European Council on Foreign Relations.

USAID.GOV ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 10

Nonparty observers are becoming harder to find. Pod Lupom officials said they are having problems with their own roster for 2022 elections as young people leave the country.

ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The CEC’s inadequate response to election disputes was frequently mentioned as a problem impacting the integrity of the electoral process. Such cases were handled by the Court of First

Instance until 2007. Since then, the body was abolished, and the CEC was left to deal with cases and a correspondingly increased workload. Three key informants and two FGD participants mentioned that the CEC takes a long time and responds only to a fraction of cases.

One key informant believes the problem is the appeal procedure, which requires an individual to cite the specific article of law violated. According to another key informant, the legal framework appears to be the problem: the CEC will not examine fraud allegations unless the number of problematic ballots exceeds the margin of victory.19 Election law has a provision for a complaints council to refer cases to the public prosecutor’s office in criminal matters (Article 6.8–6.12). However, one key informant and one FGD participant stated that prosecutors have insufficient understanding to prosecute election fraud cases, so criminal prosecution is rare. Lack of court proceedings is a huge problem, and frequently mentioned as such during interviews. Efforts are being made to improve the situation in this domain through better education of prosecutors as well as law enforcement liaison officers and improved coordination and responsiveness, but whether these strategies will rectify this shortcoming is too early to tell.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

On July 27, 2022, High Representative Christian Schmidt attempted to address some gaps and obstacles for transparent and accountable election administration by mandating changes to the electoral law. The decision is broadly based on recent negotiations to change the electoral law, which had ground to a halt. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) package did not go as far as envisaged from the package that was on the table during negotiations, according to key informants.

Changes to election law enacted by the OHR20 seek to address several important issues, such as delays in appointments or replacement of MEC members (Article 2), trading of seats in PSCs, penalties and fines, abuse of state resources, and hate speech. The Election Law of BiH now contains clearer provisions regarding impersonation (trading of seats)21 and foresees fines for both PSC members and appointing parties, ranging from 600–3,000 and 3,000–10,000 convertible marks, respectively.

19 Election Law of BiH, Article 5.30, Paragraph 6: “The Central Election Commission of BiH shall order a recount if it is established that this law was violated and the violation affected the allocation of mandates.”

20 Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

http://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-election-law-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-7/ 21 Election Law of BiH, Article 7.3, Paragraph 2: “False impersonation on behalf of any political party, coalition, list of independent candidates or independent candidate shall be prohibited, as well as the abuse of the legal right to participate in the work of a Polling Station Committee on behalf of one political entity contrary to the provision of Article 2.19 of this Law by fictitiously representing a political entity entitled to a seat at the Polling

Station Committee, in order to favor another political entity not entitled to the seat at the Polling Station

Committee. This prohibition shall also be applicable to members of a Polling Station Committee.”

http://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-election-law-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-7/

11 | ASSESSMENT OF ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA USAID.GOV

Key informants believe that the direction of changes in the OHR package is good; however, it is generally advised that changes to election law take place well in advance of polling to protect the integrity of the process, certainty, and the rule of law. The international standard is to have no changes within 12 months of election day to prevent incumbent governments from changing rules arbitrarily. However, changes six months before elections can be tolerated, if necessary. Some key informants believe that the OHR decisions might help by reducing political parties' ability to intimidate and control voters. Significant numbers of key informants believe that these decisions are good and will have a positive impact on elections.

CONCLUSIONS

Current PSC composition and operation are the primary obstacles to transparent and accountable election administration at the local level. There is a need to professionalize and depoliticize polling stations by including politically nonaligned PSC officials and giving them adequate training. One model is to staff PSCs with civil servants who have other government jobs with independent standing. There is a need for PSC oversight measures and observation.