Copy_of_C-17_ROCC_TAA_Approved_Certification_Basis_27_March_2018.xlsx
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| Title | Criteria | Applicable | Rationale | Standard | TailoredStandard | TailoredStndRationale | Method | TailoredMethod | TailoredMethRationale | SMEConcur | SMEComments | POReviewerComments | ENTAApproved | CBTAApproveDate | FINALConcur | ApproveDate |
| 4 | 4. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING |
EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA
1. Reliability, quality, and manufacturing program plans.
2. Contractor policies and procedures.
3. Durability and damage tolerance control plans.
4. Work instructions.
5. Process specifications.
6. Production/assembly progress reports.
7. Quality records.
8. Defect/failure data.
9. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.
10. Tech data package.
11. As-built list to include part numbers/serial numbers for all critical safety items/components.
12. List of deviations/waivers and unincorporated design changes.
13. List of approved class I engineering change proposals (ECPs).
14. DD Form 250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report.
15. Configuration management plans/process description documents.
16. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources Plan.
17. Obsolete Parts Plan.
18. Test reports.
19. Test plans.
20. FAA Airworthiness Directives and Advisory Circulars.
21. Manufacturer-issued service bulletins.
22. Civil aviation authority certification plan.
23. Civil aviation authority certification basis.
24. Civil aviation authority certification report.
25. System Safety Analysis Report.
26. Counterfeit Prevention Plan.
CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE
The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.
4.1 4.1 Design criteria.
4.1.1 4.1.1 Requirements allocation.
Criterion: Verify that the design criteria, including requirements and ground rules, adequately address airworthiness and safety for mission usage, full permissible flight envelope, duty cycle, interfaces, induced and natural environment, inspection capability, and maintenance philosophy.
| Y | Standard: Allocated high level airworthiness and safety requirements down through the design hierarchy are defined. Allocated design criteria for all system elements and components result in required levels of airworthiness and safety throughout the defined operational flight envelope, environment, usage and life. | ||||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of process documentation verifies allocation of airworthiness and safety requirements and design criteria. Traceability is documented among requirements, design criteria, design and verification. Consistency between design criteria and airworthiness and safety requirements is confirmed by inspection of documentation. | |||||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 Safety critical hardware and software. |
Criterion: Verify that airworthiness and safety design criteria are adequately addressed at component, subsystem and system levels, including interfaces, latencies, software and information assurance.
| Y | Standard: Safety critical software and hardware (including Critical Safety Items (CSIs)) are identified. Design criteria and critical characteristics of safety critical software and hardware are defined, substantiated and documented in sufficient detail to provide for "form, fit, function and interface" replacement without degrading system airworthiness. Design criteria and critical characteristics of safety critical software and hardware incorporate relevant security requirements and mitigation techniques needed to ensure safety of flight. | ||||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that a process is in place to adequately identify safety critical software and hardware, CSIs, and associated design criteria and critical characteristics at the component, subsystem and system levels. Inspection of documentation verifies that safety critical software and hardware, CSIs, and associated design criteria and critical characteristics resulting from this process are documented. Inspection of documentation verifies that security requirements and mitigation techniques that affect flight safety are incorporated into safety critical software and hardware and CSIs. | |||||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.3 | 4.1.3 Commercial derivative aircraft. |
Criterion: Verify that, for commercial derivative air vehicles, the air vehicle's certification basis addresses all design criteria appropriate for the planned military usage.
| N | No commercial C17's | Standard: Commercial derivative aircraft has been assessed for its suitability for the intended military application and determined to be airworthy and safe. Limitations appropriate to the intended military usage and environment are identified. | |||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of certification data and analyses substantiates that the military air vehicle is airworthy and safe for its intended military usage and environments. Military air vehicle airworthiness certification data addresses all equipment, usage, and environments not covered by the commercial certification. | |||||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.4 | 4.1.4 Failure conditions. |
Criterion: Verify that safety of flight related failure conditions have been adequately addressed in the design criteria.
| Y | Standard: Safety of flight failure conditions (including applicable single point failures) have been identified. No single safety of flight failure condition results in a "Catastrophic" severity (i.e., death, permanent total disability, monetary loss equal to or exceeding $10 million or loss of air vehicle) with a frequency greater than "improbable" (i.e., a rate of less than one event per one million flight hours). | ||||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of the hazard analysis verifies that safety critical hazards have been identified and that catastrophic failures are no more frequent than improbable. Analysis of the design verifies that the required level of safety is achieved. Operating limitations are defined. The analysis includes ground rules and assumptions. | |||||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.5 | 4.1.5 Operating environment. |
Criterion: Verify that the air system is designed to operate in the natural and induced environments for which it is intended.
| Y | Standard: The air system design criteria includes the intended natural and induced environments. The air system, including the air vehicle and control station equipment, is qualified to operate in the intended natural and induced environments (e.g., temperature, humidity, precipitation, icing, fungus, salt fog, particulate and liquid contamination, shock and vibration, and explosive atmosphere). |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that the air system intended natural and induced environments are documented. Analysis, demonstration and test verify that equipment provides required function and performance within the envelope of intended natural and induced environments without imposing a safety of flight risk. Inspection of qualification test results verifies that equipment is qualified for its intended environments. |
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.6 | 4.1.6 Flight and safety critical functions. |
Criterion: Verify that the air systems design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, and their degraded and failed modes and states. Verify that the air system and air vehicle detect and respond appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight and safety critical function degraded states or failures.
Y Standard: The design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle. The air system design criteria identify flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures.
The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures.
The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to air vehicle flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention.
The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s) between the operator and air vehicle.
The air vehicle response to loss of command and control data link is appropriate and safe for the airspace in which the air system will be operated.
The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to the sense and avoid function for the airspace in which the air system will be operated, with or without operator intervention.
The air system (including air vehicle) responses to flight and safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s):
a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,
b. Activate only when needed,
c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states (see also 6.2.2.4 of this document),
d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,
e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and
f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions (see also 11.1.1.5 of this document).
(For information, see also 6.2; 8.3.10; 11.1.1 and 11.2.3; Section 15; and 17.2.9 of this document.)
Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, simulation, demonstration, and inspection of documentation.
Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states; flight and safety critical functions degraded states and failures; and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s). Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes ensure air system responses are appropriate for the intended airspace.
Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle, are identified.
Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures are identified.
A combination of ground testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to: (1) flight or safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention, (2) loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s), and (3) sense and avoid function, with or without operator intervention. This testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) responses:
a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,
b. Activate only when needed,
c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states,
d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,
e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and
f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions.
(For information, see also 6.2.2.4, 6.2.2.8, and 6.2.2.9 of this document.)
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.1.7 | 4.1.7 Flight termination system. |
Criterion: Verify that the flight termination function, if incorporated into the design, is safe, secure and reliable.
| N | No impact to the C-17 aircraft | Standard: Design criteria ensure that the flight termination function operates reliably and in a timely manner when commanded. The flight termination function results in a defined air vehicle flight state (e.g., zero lift, zero thrust). The likelihood of uncommanded flight termination is remote. A minimum of two operator actions is required to execute the flight termination function. | |||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria are in place to ensure that the flight termination function operates reliably and appropriately, and only when required. Inspection of test and simulation data verifies that the flight termination function operates appropriately, only when required, and results in the expected defined flight state(s). Inspection of analysis documentation indicates that the flight termination function operates reliably. | |||||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.2 | 4.2 Tools and databases. |
4.2.1 4.2.1 Tool and database processes.
Criterion: Verify that all tools, methods, and databases used in the requirements management, design, risk control and assessments of safety are applied appropriately and exhibit accuracy commensurate with their application.
| Y | Standard: Processes are in place to ensure that all analysis, modeling and simulation tools and databases are of appropriate accuracy and fidelity, are validated for the intended applications, and are configuration controlled. Requirements definition/traceability, design and performance analysis tools, prediction methods, models and simulations are applied appropriately, and exhibit accuracy commensurate with their applications. |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that processes are in place to ensure that tools and databases are validated and under configuration control. Inspection of documentation verifies that analysis tools, models, simulations and databases are applied appropriately. Inspection of documentation verifies that analysis, modeling and simulation tools and databases are of appropriate accuracy and fidelity for the intended applications. Inspection of documentation verifies the validation basis of design analysis, models and simulations is substantiated and based on actual hardware/software test data. |
Inspection of documentation verifies that the design analysis, modeling and simulation tools are substantiated by and based on actual test data (when available). Actual system verification results are compared with design analysis, modeling and simulation tool results and databases for validation purposes.
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MATHESON, EDWARD, 2-27-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.3 | 4.3 Materials selection. |
4.3.1 4.3.1 Selection of materials.
Criterion: For Army and Navy air systems, verify that the material selection process uses validated and consistent material properties data, including design mechanical and physical properties such as material defects, and corrosion and environmental protection requirements (see also Section 19, Materials; Section 5, Structures; and Section 7, Propulsion; Section 8, Air Vehicle Subsystems of this document).
| N | Not Applicable to the Air Force. | Standard: Material selection process uses materials covered by an industry specification, government specification (Military or Federal) or other specifications as approved by the procuring agency. |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation confirms that materials are adequately covered by either: |
a. An Aerospace Materials Specification (AMS) issued by the SAE Aerospace Materials Division,
b. An ASTM standard published by ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials),
c. A government (Military or Federal) specification, or
d. Other specifications as approved by the procuring agency.
If an approved specification for the product is not available, an acceptable draft specification has been prepared.
Y (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Criterion is only applied to Army and Navy systems, not USAF systems; therefore it is not applicable.
(MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Non-Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur
| 4.4 | 4.4 Manufacturing and quality. |
| Y | |
| 4.4.1 | 4.4.1 Key characteristics. |
Criterion: Verify that key product characteristics (including critical characteristics) have been identified.
| N | There are no CSI or Flight Critical components related to ROCC. | Standard: Physical characteristics which are key to the successful function of critical safety items (CSIs) and flight critical components are defined and documented. Tolerance allowances for each characteristic and traceability through the design hierarchy are defined, and the effects of adverse tolerance accumulation at higher (e.g., above the CSI) levels of product assembly are analyzed and reflected in the design documentation. | |
| Method of Compliance: Key product characteristic (including critical characteristics) and tolerance definitions are verified by inspection and analysis of program design documentation at the applicable levels of the product hierarchy. Manufacturing process controls for specific key product characteristics identified as Critical to Safety (CTS) and manufacturing process parameters necessary to achieve and maintain acceptable process indices are verified by inspection and analysis of manufacturing process control documentation for the applicable stages of manufacture and assembly. | |||
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Non-Concur |
(KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): If there are no CSIs or Flight Critical Components, this should be marked as not applicable.
(MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-6-2018): Concur Y (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur
4.4.2 4.4.2 Critical processes.
Criterion: Verify that all critical process capabilities exist to meet key product characteristic requirements (including critical characteristics).
| N | There are no CSI or Flight Critical components related to ROCC. | Standard: All key characteristics (including critical characteristics) are mapped to corresponding critical processes. Critical process capabilities are characterized, process capability indices (Cpk) are calculated and acceptable limits established. Process control plans for critical processes are defined and implemented throughout the supply chain. For Army and Navy only, quality control procedures for critical processes are defined and implemented throughout the supply chain. | |
| Method of Compliance: Critical process capabilities and control plans are verified by inspection of design documentation and process control documentation and if applicable, on-site audit documentation, throughout the supply chain. | |||
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Non-Concur |
(KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): If there are no CSIs or Flight Critical Components, this should be marked as not applicable.
(MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-23-2018): Concur (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-6-2018): Concur Y (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-23-2018): Concur
4.4.3 4.4.3 Critical process controls.
Criterion: Verify that all critical process controls exist to assure key product characteristic requirements (including critical characteristics) are met.
| N | There are no CSI or Flight Critical components related to ROCC. | Standard: Work and inspection instructions are defined, documented and implemented for all critical manufacturing processes. A process capability index (Cpk) of at least 1.67 is maintained for processes Critical to Safety (CTS) or processes that produce Critical Safety Items (CSI). Quantitative product quality criteria (i.e., product acceptance criteria) are defined and used for product acceptance at all levels of the product hierarchy up to and including the air system level. | |
| Method of Compliance: Work and product inspection instructions, product acceptance criteria are verified by inspection. Cpk is verified by analysis and inspection of design documentation and manufacturing process capability data. Design conformance (i.e., "as built" configuration is in accordance with design requirements) is verified by first article inspections or first article tests, review of manufacturing process control data, and/or periodic hardware quality audits. | |||
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Non-Concur |
(KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): If there are no CSIs or Flight Critical Components, this should be marked as not applicable.
(MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-23-2018): Concur (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-6-2018): Concur Y (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-23-2018): Concur
4.4.4 4.4.4 Quality system.
Criterion: Verify that the as-built configuration matches the as-designed configuration.
| Y | Standard: The quality system is effective in assuring conformance to product design and realization, including production allowances and tolerances. The quality system addresses defect prevention and achieving stable, capable processes. The quality system employs methods sufficient for conducting root cause analyses and implementing effective corrective actions. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: Compliance is determined by inspection of the Quality System's policies, processes and procedures and examples of Material Review Board records. | |||||
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.4.5 | 4.4.5 Nondestructive inspections. |
Criterion: Verify that nondestructive inspection (NDI) processes have been validated to assure conforming parts.
| Y | Standard: Nondestructive inspection (NDI) methods and equipment have been qualified to suitable standards and meet the requirements of the applicable specification and application. The specification being used ensures any non-conformance adversely affecting the part will be detected. Accept and reject criteria for safety and flight critical hardware are based on validated models and data. | |||||
| Method of Compliance: Compliance is determined by inspection of NDI process, selection criteria, operator certification and method validation documentation. For new applications of specifications, test and inspection data confirms the inspection method is valid for the application. | ||||||
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur | |||
| 4.4.6 | 4.4.6 Verify that safety-related items (Critical Safety Items, flight critical components, and components containing critical characteristics that impact safety) conform to their approved design. | N | There are no CSI or Flight Critical components related to ROCC. | Standard: The quality of safety-related items, whether furnished by the prime contractor, supplier, or sustainment organization, is controlled to ensure conformance with design. The manufacturers of the items have instituted manufacturing process controls, inspections, and testing procedures to ensure each safety-related product or part conforms to its approved design. | Method of Compliance: For safety-related items, initial design conformance is verified by inspection of First Article Inspection reports, First Article Test reports, or other manufacturing records that prove design conformance. Controls for ensuring the quality of safety-related items are verified by inspecting manufacturing process control plans (including work instructions) and inspection and test procedures. | |
| Y | (KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): Non-Concur |
(KARR, DAVID, 3-5-2018): If there are no CSIs, Flight Critical Components, or critical characteristics, this should be marked as not applicable.
(MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-6-2018): Concur Y (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-12-2018): Concur (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-22-2018): Concur
| 4.5 | 4.5 OperatorÆs and maintenance manual/technical orders. |
| Y | |
| 4.5.1 | 4.5.1 Procedures and limitations. |
Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes.
| Y | Standard: Operator handbooks or manuals identify all normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes. Warnings, cautions and notes are identified in such a manner as to attract attention and set them apart from normal text. When an unsafe condition is detected and annunciated, the operator's manual has clear and precise corrective procedures for handling the condition. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of operator handbooks or manuals process documentation describes procedures for developing normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes from system technical data. Process descriptions include methods for updating this information as needed. For Army and Navy, inspection of operating handbooks and manuals verifies that they include all normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes. The USAF confirms operator manual accuracy and completeness through other sections contained within this document. | |||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 3-12-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.5.2 | 4.5.2 Technical data. |
Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document the technical data, and that the technical data are consistent with the defined functional and product baseline.
| Y | Standard: Process is defined, documented and implemented to establish and update product requirement, design, manufacturing, and maintenance data, which are used to generate technical manuals (e.g., flight manuals, operator's handbooks, maintenance manuals). Maximum timelines to accomplish updates are consistent with the criticality of the change activity (e.g., an identified safety hazard, or a "performance based" change having a safety effect). | ||||
| Method of Compliance: The adequacy of establishment and change processes for technical data is verified by inspection of process documentation. Inspection of examples of revised design or maintenance data verifies traceability to change events. | |||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 3-12-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.5.3 | 4.5.3 Maintenance of safety. |
Criterion: Verify that procedures are in place for establishing and maintaining air system flight safety, as affected by product design changes, safety issues, changes in operations, maintenance, transportation or storage.
| Y | Standard: Processes are defined, documented, and implemented to establish and accomplish timely updates to operator and maintenance manuals as made necessary by product design changes, identified safety issues (e.g., Category I Deficiency Reports), changes in operational concepts, usage, maintenance concepts, transportation, or storage. Current updated technical data are used to effect technical manual revisions. Maximum timelines to incorporate changes in manuals are based on the effect of the change and the severity of the identified hazard. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: The adequacy of establishment and change processes for operator and maintenance manuals is verified by inspection of process documentation. Inspection of examples of revised operator and maintenance manuals (i.e., change pages) verifies traceability to change events. | |||||
| Y | (SKUJINS, ROMANS, 3-12-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.6 | 4.6 Configuration management (CM). |
4.6.1 4.6.1 Functional baseline.
Criterion: Verify that the functional baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Y | Standard: The functional baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan (CMP) is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the functional baseline has been documented and approved. | |||||
| Y | (LEMASTER, LEISA, 3-13-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.6.2 | 4.6.2 Allocated baseline. |
Criterion: Verify that the allocated baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Y | Standard: The allocated baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the allocated baseline has been documented and approved. Inspection of the engineering release documentation verifies adequate capture of the allocated baseline. | |||||
| Y | (LEMASTER, LEISA, 3-13-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.6.3 | 4.6.3 Product baseline. |
Criterion: Verify that the product baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Y | Standard: The product baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the product baseline has been documented and approved. Inspection of the approved engineering documentation and engineering release system verifies adequate capture of the product baseline. | |||||
| Y | (LEMASTER, LEISA, 3-13-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 4.6.4 | 4.6.4 Safety critical item configuration management. |
Criterion: Verify that all safety-critical items are tracked and under configuration control.
| Y | Standard: A configuration status accounting (CSA) system is adequately documented and maintained and tracks the configuration of safety-critical items. | ||||
| Method of Compliance: CSA process documentation is verified by inspection. Inspection of CSA records and reports for CI/CSCIs verifies accuracy of the configuration status accounting system and that the system is able to track and record changes to the configuration. | |||||
| Y | (LEMASTER, LEISA, 3-13-2018): Concur | Y | (MEJIAS, WILLIAM, 3-13-2018): Concur | ||
| 5 | 5. STRUCTURES |
The air vehicle structure, herein referred to as the aircraft, includes the fuselage, cockpit, wing, main and tail rotor, proprotor, empennage, tail pylon, structural elements of landing gear, the control system, control surfaces, drive system, rotor control systems, radomes, antennas, engine mounts, nacelles, pylons, thrust reversers (if not part of the engine), inlets, aerial refueling mechanisms, shipboard related airborne apparatus/devices (fixed wing catapult and arresting components; rotary wing/tiltrotor recovery assist, securing probe/harpoon system components and backup structure), structural operating mechanisms, structural provisions for seats, equipment, medical evacuation equipment, storage and on-board facilities payload, cargo, personnel accommodations, etc.
EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA
1. Design criteria.
2. Loads analyses.
3. Internal load and stress analyses.
4. Materials, processes, corrosion prevention, nondestructive evaluation and repair data.
5. Results from any design development tests conducted.
6. Proof test results.
7. Flutter, mechanical stability and aeroservoelastic analyses.
8. Loads wind tunnel test data.
9. Flutter wind tunnel test data.
10. Ground vibration test results.
11. Damage tolerance and durability analyses.
12. Component/full-scale static and fatigue test results.
13. Live fire test results and ballistic analysis.
14. Bird strike test and analysis results.
15. Arresting wire strike test and analysis results.
16. User and maintainer manuals or equivalent.
17. Flight operating limits.
18. Strength summary and operating restrictions.
19. Damage tolerance and durability test results.
20. Full-scale durability test results.
21. Functional test results.
22. Flight loads test results.
23. Instrumentation and calibration test results.
24. Control surface, tabs and damper test results.
25. Thermoelastic test results.
26. Limit-load rigidity test results.
27. Flight flutter test results.
28. Mass properties control and management plan (interface).
29. Weight and balance reports (interface).
30. Inertia report.
31. Design trade studies and analyses.
32. Fuel system test results.
33. Results of actual weighing
34. Weight and balance handbook, or equivalent.
35. Hazard analysis.
36. Environmental criteria and test results.
37. Vibration and acoustic test results.
38. Aircraft tracking program.
39. Landing gear and airframe drop test plans and results.
40. Mechanical stability test plans and results.
41. Whirl test plans and results.
42. Tie-down test plans and results.
43. Structural description report.
44. Tipover and rollover stability analyses.
45. External store interface and release data.
46. Ground and/or air transport rigging procedures, interface loads, and associated inspections.
47. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.
48. Ground and rotor blade clearance dimensional data.
49. Loss of lubrication testing.
50. Heat generation/rejection analysis.
CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE
The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.
The documents referenced under any criterion, standard and/or method of compliance may provide other standards which are applicable. In addition to the specifically enumerated criteria, standards and methods of compliance, structures are checked for a variety of 14 CFR references and Airworthiness Circulars. Due to the complexity of different design configurations, each section in 14 CFR 23 and 25 should be consulted for applicability.
5.1 5.1 Loads.
5.1.1 5.1.1 Design flight and ground loads.
Criterion (Army, Navy and Air Force): Verify that the loads used in the design of the aircraft include the maximum, minimum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight loading conditions for the air vehicle. These include loads during piloted or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, gusts, pressurization, turbulence, take-off, landing, catapult (if applicable), shipboard and land based arrestments (if applicable), ground operations, maintenance activity, systems failures from which recovery is expected (to include rapid depressurization) and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage.
| Y | Standard (Army, Navy and Air Force): Flight loading conditions are based on aircraft response to pilot induced or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, pressurization and turbulence. These conditions consider both required, and expected to be encountered, critical combinations of configurations, gross weights, centers of gravity, thrust, power, altitudes, speeds, critical combinations of control system (surfaces and rotor system) deflections, control input variation and environmental factors and are used in the design of the aircraft. Flight loading conditions reflect symmetric and asymmetric flight operations and are established for both primary and secondary structural components by selection of flight parameters likely to produce critical applied loads. Symmetric and asymmetric flight operations include symmetric and unsymmetrical fuel and payload loadings and adverse trim conditions. Such loads also address normal and failure modes of operation, including rapid pressurization (Navy only) and depressurization, and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage. |
| Method of Compliance (Air Force): Verification methods include analysis and inspection of documentation. Multiple variables and factors account for development of maximum and minimum load factors. The following compliance paragraphs are applicable to all standards. |
a. Load factor selection considers the following items:
(1) Mission and flying techniques employed to execute the required mission.
(2) Weapon types and possible delivery methods.
(3) Anticipated weight and power plant growth.
(4) Maximum speed and time spent at maximum speed.
(5) Utilization of external stores and external fuel tanks.
(6) Training.
(7) Past experience with similar types of aircraft, mission, etc..
b. Load factors are defined which include appropriate ranges for symmetrical, asymmetrical, directional maneuvers, and atmospheric turbulence for each configuration. Analysis verifies that the load factors are attainable by the air vehicle.
Method of Compliance (Army and Navy): Verification methods include analyses and inspection of documentation, wind tunnel tests, simulation, and flight testing. Compliance is shown for each combination of configurations at all critical altitudes, gross weights, centers-of-gravity, thrust, power, control input variation, and payload conditions.
Y (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): Concur (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): I see only two areas that must be addressed... crash loads and operational environment (inertial loads, vibration, shock, etc).
Section 5.1.9 covers crash and 5.1.1 would cover the operational flight and ground load extremes on the inertia side. That leaves vibration and shock due to being tied down in the cargo bay.
Because it is not primary structure... nothing else should apply?!
| The intent of 5.6.1 should be covered by the ATTLA people. | Y | (ROGERS, LAWRENCE, 3-20-2018): Concur | ||
| 5.1.2 | 5.1.2 Use of probabilistic vs deterministic loads. |
Criterion: Verify that the limit loads used in the design of dynamic components and elements of the airframe subject to deterministic design criteria are the maximum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight use of the air vehicle. These include loads during maintenance activity, system failures from which recovery is expected, and loads experienced throughout the specific lifetime usage.
N This criteria only applies to the aircraft. Standard (Navy and Air Force): Only where deterministic values have no precedence or basis, is a combined load-strength probability analysis to predict the risk of detrimental structural deformation and structural failure used. In those cases, the airframe may not experience detrimental structural deformations with a probability of occurrence equal to or greater than that specified in the AVPS Addendum for the respective air vehicle. The resulting limit design loads are the maximum loads anticipated on the aircraft during its lifetime of service (see 5.1.1).
Standard (Army): Limit design loads are the maximum loads anticipated on the aircraft during its lifetime of service. For rotorcraft, the air vehicle structure is designed for load factors and airspeeds such that the structural design envelope exceeds the aircraft aerodynamic capability or operational limits. Limit loads for certain dynamic components may also require consideration of altitudes between sea level and service ceiling.
Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, demonstration and inspection of documentation.
a. Correlated ground and flight loads analyses are provided in which details of magnitudes and distribution of all applied external loads are identified for multiple air vehicle configurations, weights, center of gravity, and maneuvers covering all attainable altitudes, speeds and load factors. Service and maximum loads expected to be encountered are established for operation under all flight conditions. Wind tunnel tests are utilized for development of aerodynamic loads. Stiffness and ground vibration tests are utilized to update flexibility vs. rigid characteristics of loads analytical model. Flight controls and aerodynamic flight tests are utilized to update aircraft simulation models. Loads calibration tests are utilized to develop ground/flight load equations. 80% and 100% flight loads surveys/demonstrations are utilized to correlate analytical model and to substantiate the design loads.
b. For rotorcraft, loads analysis is performed for design load conditions specified in ADS-29 (cancelled). Structural demonstration flight testing is performed in accordance with ADS-24 (cancelled)) to demonstrate the safe operation of the aircraft to the maximum attainable operating limits consistent with the structural design and to verify that loads used in the structural analysis and static tests are not exceeded at the structural design limits of the airspeed and load factor envelope, or if analytical loads are exceeded during structural demonstration testing to establish the allowable flight envelope and the critical conditions for strength, rigidity, and operation.
c. For Navy rotorcraft, loads analyses are performed for conditions specified in sections 3 and 4 of the AVPS Addendum and/or AR-56. Ground and flight testing is performed in accordance with section 4 of the AVPS, AR-89 and MIL-D-23222 to demonstrate compliance with design requirements and to demonstrate safe operating limits.
| Y | (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): Non-Concur | |||
| (Franklin, CALENIA, 3-26-2018): SME TDY, SME provided verbal concurrence to change. | (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-16-2018): Concur. Design Flight and Ground load analysis in 5.1.1 should be sufficient for the ROCC. | |||
| (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-20-2018): After explanation during Review TIM, SPO concurs. | (ROGERS, LAWRENCE,3-20-2018): Concur | |||
| 5.1.3 | 5.1.3 Foreign object damage (FOD). |
Criterion: Verify that loads used in the design of the airframe include loads due to FOD from birds, hail, runway, taxiway, and ramp debris.
| N | This criteria only applies to the aircraft. | Standard: The aircraft is designed to withstand the impact of FOD during any phase of taxi, takeoff, flight and landing without loss of the air vehicle, incapacitation of the pilot or crew and without detectable or undetectable damage to structural elements that result in reductions in structural strength below ultimate load carrying capability throughout the flight envelope (including maneuvers). The aircraft, including main and tail rotor systems, is designed to ensure the capability of continued safe flight and landing following impact; windshields are designed to withstand impact, without penetration; and fairings that may be used to shield or enclose flight critical components (for example, flight control computers) are designed with sufficient strength to ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing. | ||
| Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, and inspection of documentation. Probabilistic analyses are performed to address FOD occurrences. Lab tests such as bird strike tests are performed to validate analytical model(s) and/or structural capabilities. | ||||
| Y | (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): Non-Concur | |||
| (Franklin, CALENIA, 3-26-2018): SME TDY, SME provided verbal concurrence to change. | (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-16-2018): The ROCC is not an airframe. It is mission equipment that is carried within the aircraft, therefore it is not subject to FO impact damage during any phase of flight. | |||
| (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-20-2018): After explanation during Review TIM, SPO concurs. | (ROGERS, LAWRENCE,3-20-2018): Concur | |||
| 5.1.4 | 5.1.4 Repeated loads. |
Criterion: Verify that the air vehicle structure is designed such that all sources of repeated loads are considered and included in the development of the service loads spectra and do not detract from the airframe service life or dynamic component retirement intervals.
N This criteria only applies to the aircraft. Standard (Army and Air Force):
a. Maneuvers - Designed such that final spectra accounts for variables such as maneuver capability, tactics, and flight control laws reflecting projected average usage with the design utilization distribution and also usage such that 90% of the fleet (95% for all fatigue damaging conditions for rotorcraft) is expected to meet the service life.
b. Gusts - Designed such that gust load spectra developed by continuous turbulence analysis methods.
c. Suppression system which enhances ride qualities such as active oscillation control, gust alleviation, flutter suppression and terrain following.
d. Vibration and aeroacoustics.
e. Landings - Designed with cumulative occurrences of sink speed per 1000 landings, by type of landing, typical of projected service usage.
f. For rotorcraft - Designed with consideration of CF loads due to rotor start and stop cycle and torsional loads due to rotor braking cycles.
g. Buffet due to non-linear flow caused by vortex shedding during high angle of attack maneuvers, rotary-wing blade stall and transonic shock instabilities - Designed such that analytical predictions of the structural response are generated during flight operations in the buffet regime and adjusted as needed by test data.
h. Ground operation loads - Designed with: (1) the number of hard and medium braking occurrences per full stop landing along with associated braking effects; (2) number of pivoting occurrences; and (3) definition of roughness characteristics of the airfield(s) to be utilized and the number of taxi operations on each airfield.
i. Pressurization - Designed with the total number of cycles projected for one service life.
j. Impact, operational, and residual loads occurring from the normal operation of movable structures such as control surfaces.
k. Store carriage and employment loads.
l. Heat flux.
Standard (Navy): All sources of repeated loads affecting the fatigue life, durability and damage tolerance of the air vehicle structure are considered to ensure that the required service life of the system is not degraded. The durability capability of the airframe is adequate to resist fatigue cracking, corrosion, thermal degradation, delamination, and wear during operation and maintenance such that the operational and maintenance capability of the airframe is not degraded and the service life, usage are not adversely affected. These requirements apply to metallic and nonmetallic structures, including composites, with appropriate distinctions and variations as indicated in applicable specifications, Airworthiness and Design Standards and Regulations, 3.2.14.3 of JSSG-2006 and the Addendum to the AVPS. Durability material properties are consistent with those properties of the same material, in the same component, used for loads, structural dynamics, strength, damage tolerance and durability. Typical repeated loads sources include: maneuvers, gusts, operation of suppression systems, vibration, take-off and landings, buffet, ground and shipboard operations, pressurization, weapons carriage and employment, environmental factors, impact conditions etc. A comprehensive database of load sources, exceedances and other parameters, based on data recorded from actual usage experience, ensures the greatest possible accuracy in the representation of the design usage and function of the aircraft.
Method of Compliance (Army and Air Force): Verification methods include analysis, test, and inspection of documentation.
a. The following methods of compliance are applicable to all of the conditions of the standard:
(1) Ground and flight loads analyses are correlated with test data.
(2) For rotorcraft, flight load survey testing is performed to gather loads for each regime in the usage spectrum.
b. The following two compliances are applicable to condition #7 of the standard:
(1). Wind tunnel tests are utilized for development of buffet loads.
(2). Buffet flight tests are utilized to verify analytical buffet predictions.
c. The following compliance is applicable to condition #4 of the standard:
(1) Updated predictions of the vibration and aeroacoustic environments are accomplished.
Method of Compliance (Navy): Verification methods include ground and flight loads analyses, inspection of documentation, simulation, wind tunnel testing, static testing and flight test.
| Y | (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): Non-Concur | |||
| (Franklin, CALENIA, 3-26-2018): SME TDY, SME provided verbal concurrence to change. | (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-16-2018): The ROCC will be operated from within an aircraft during flight. Therefore it will experience the same repeated loads that the aircraft will experience and will be required to sustain those loads without failure. The only exceptions are the aeroacoustic loads and other loads that only the exterior of the aircraft experiences. | |||
| (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-20-2018): After explanation during Review TIM, SPO concurs. | (ROGERS, LAWRENCE,3-20-2018): Concur | |||
| 5.1.5 | 5.1.5 Propulsion loads. |
Criterion: Verify that the air vehicle structure is designed such that the power or thrust of the installed propulsion system is commensurate with the ground and flight conditions of intended use, including system failures, and the capabilities of the propulsion system and crew.
| N | Criteria is only applicable to the aircraft. ROCC applicability should be addressed in another section. | Standard: See 5.1.1. | ||
| Method of Compliance: See 5.1.1. | ||||
| Y | (BUCKEY, WILLIAM, 3-9-2018): Non-Concur | |||
| (Franklin, CALENIA, 3-26-2018): SME TDY, SME provided verbal concurrence to change. | (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-16-2018): The ROCC has no propulsion system. Therefore, it does not experience thrust loads. | |||
| (STEVENSON, JULIAN, 3-20-2018): After explanation during Review TIM, SPO concurs. | (ROGERS, LAWRENCE,3-20-2018): Concur | |||
| 5.1.6 | 5.1.6 Flight control and automatic control device loads. |
Criterion: Verify, in the generation of loads, that flight control and automatic control devices, including load alleviation and ride control devices, are to be in all modes (operative, inoperative, and transient) for which use is required. This includes use due to or likely due to single or multiple system failure conditions.
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