Attach_6_FAFB_OPSEC_Information.pdf
PDF 2 MB Posted
- Attached to
- Base Recycling Service Federal contract opportunity
- Solicitation number
- FA462019QA105
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OPSEC
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| File | Type | Posted |
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| Contract_-_FA462019CA011_signed.pdf | ||
| Amendment_02_FA462019QA105.pdf | ||
| Recycling_Service_PWS_-_revised_4_June_2019.pdf | ||
| Amendment_01_FA462019QA105.pdf | ||
| Attach_5_Reps_AND_Certs.docx | DOCX document | |
| Attach_4_Wage_Determination.PDF | ||
| Attach_2_Pricing_Worksheet.docx | DOCX document | |
| Attach_3_PPQ.pdf | ||
| Attach_1_Recycling_Service_PWS_Final.pdf | ||
| Solicitation_Recycling_Services.pdf |
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Fairchild AFB
OPERATIONS SECURITY
(OPSEC)
“In the wild, the wolf studies his prey;
prowling and studying until he finds a vulnerability - then he attacks.”
What is OPSEC?
Operation Security is a process to deny adversaries information about friendly intentions and capabilities, which they need to make effective and timely decisions. It denies our adversaries classified information
“Like a wolf, America’s enemies are looking for vulnerabilities and waiting to attack us.”
Who’s the adversary?
Our adversaries are no longer the traditional threat from the Cold War era. Granted there is still the Foreign Intelligence Services
(FIS) threat from the different countries around the world, but our adversaries come from all sources. Some examples include but not limited to:
Competitors
Hackers
Criminals
Insiders
Terrorists
Basically anybody who has the intent and ability to collect and use our information against us is an adversary.
What are they after?
According to an Al Qaeda training manual, their operatives are to acquire any information regarding:
Details of future operations/exercises
Defensive tactics
Unit strengths
Names/photographs/travel plans of VIPs
Present and future US capabilities
Supply inventories
Training deficiencies
FACT: Over 80% of all terrorist planning information was provided by the target.
Foreign Intelligence Services are increasingly likely to target members of the technical community including engineers, regardless if they have a security clearance or not. The US spends millions of dollars in research and development on new technology. Why would another country spend that much for the same product when they could just obtain the information at a fraction of the cost or for free from the people working with it?
An adversary country or group takes that information and reproduces a cheaper product than the US, because they do not have to try to recover the research and development costs. This results in loss of revenue and ultimately jobs, even yours.
Then again, it does not just have to be a foreign country; it could be a business rival.
FAFB OPSEC Tri-Fold 2018
FACT: More than 80% of our adversaries’ intelligence needs come from unclassified sources.
In today’s world of global acquisition where so much information is available at a stroke of a key, unclassified information has taken on an entirely new importance. The internet is not the only source our adversaries use to collect on us. Other open sources available are:
Social Engineering
Newsletters
Television
Surveillance
Trash / recycling content
OPSEC has never been more important than it is today and will be in the future. It is what helps us to protect and maintain the technological advantage we have.
Remember: All military operations depend upon some form of technological advantage we currently have for mission success!
This is especially true since more and more of the US military systems have become more technological. The loss of militarily critical technology can result in surprise on the battlefield and a loss of US lives from our own technology. The acquisition of sensitive technology by our adversaries has led to the significant enhancement of their military-industrial capabilities at the expense of the US and our most precious resource, our warfighter!
“With every glimpse we give them, they gain an advantage. To ensure America’s victory over her adversaries, we must think like them – like the wolf.”
What can I do?
There are many things that you could do to apply OPSEC in your everyday procedures.
Things like:
- Shred Sensitive but Unclassified paperwork, such as alert rosters, work orders or technical manuals.
- Report suspicious activities on or near the installation to the Unit Security
Manager.
- Avoid wearing your security badge outside the installation.
- Practice “Need-to-Know”. Only share information with those that have a need to know the information in accomplishing our mission.
- Don’t photograph exercises or operations without authorization
- Don’t post sensitive information, to include photos, to the Internet
Mind you that we cannot and should not attempt to keep everything secret, but those bits of information that are “nice to know” for our adversaries need to be limited as much as possible. Remember, the adversary doesn't need just classified information; the disclosure of certain types of unclassified information can be just as damaging to our operation. OPSEC incorporates everyone, from the commander to the individual on an assembly line. The warfighter depends on us to give them the technological edge!
For Additional OPSEC information, contact your OPSEC Officer at 247-3012/5258.
Reference:
AFI 10-701, Operations Security
FAFB OPSEC 0
Fairchild AFB Contractor OPSEC Level 0 Measures
1. The Operations Security (OPSEC) program reduces potential vulnerabilities of Air Force missions to hostile intelligence collection by preventing exposure of sensitive information.
As your organization is contracted to perform work in support of the Fairchild AFB mission, you are responsible to protect this information. Sensitive, or Critical Information includes specific facts about U.S. Air Force operational intentions, capabilities or activities that are vitally needed by potential enemies to plan and act against US military mission accomplishment.
3. Contractor employees who visit Fairchild AFB or remote FAFB installations will within 30 days of reporting for duty —
a. Become familiar with each item of the Fairchild AFB Critical Information List below:
- Current and future operations and/or exercises
- Personnel, acquisition and logistics information
- Emergency response or base defense plans
- Perceived changes to, or details of, normal operating procedures
b. Protect the following information from disclosure to unauthorized people. These include other employees that are not part of the contracted work project, associates, family members and members of the news media.
c. Prevent disclosure of critical and sensitive information in any public domain to include but not limited to the Internet and other public forums.
d. Avoid publishing photographs, blogs, tweets that describe or display sensitive operations.
Examples include but are not limited to military formations and exercises, drills, emergency response procedures, and the protective measures of military facilities.
e. Destroy (burn, shred, etc.) critical and sensitive information that is no longer needed to prevent the inadvertent disclosure or reconstruction of this material.
NOTE. Contract employees who fail to protect critical information from unauthorized disclosure may be subject to adverse administrative, disciplinary or contractual action.
4. Contract employees will consider attempts by unauthorized personnel to solicit critical information or sensitive information as a human intelligence (HUMINT) incident against the
U.S. Air Force. If you have been involved in, or have knowledge of, a possible HUMINT incident, please report all facts immediately to the Fairchild Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI). If AFOSI is not readily available, report HUMINT incidents to the supported organization’s security manager, commander, or one of the other offices listed below:
Commercial DSN
Fairchild AFOSI (509) 247-2591/2592 657-2591/2592
Fairchild Antiterrorism Office (509) 247-9498 657-9498
92 ARW OPSEC Program Manager (509) 247-3012/5258 657-3012/5258
Fairchild AFB Basic Critical Information List May 2018
The following list describes types of sensitive (critical) information that may be of use to adversaries of the United States Air Force or Fairchild AFB. Do not discuss or transmit details of the following categories of information in non-secure areas or via non-secure means. Do not disclose them to people who do not possess a need-to-know – those who are not directly involved in you project.
Prior to any public release (articles, social media, web sites, blogs, etc.), contractor personnel will consult Public Affairs, the unit or wing Operations Security (OPSEC) specialists to ensure compliance. For further information contact the following offices:
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) (509) 247-2591/2592
Fairchild Antiterrorism Office (509) 247-9498
92 ARW OPSEC Program Manager (509) 247-3012/5258
FAFB Basic Critical Information List
Details of:
Current and future operations / exercises
Vulnerabilities, degradation /outages of critical infrastructures or telecommunications
Key personnel/VIP schedules and travel itineraries
Personnel, acquisition and logistics information
Emergency response or contingency plans
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Information
92d Air Refueling Wing
OPSEC Awareness Training
Mr. Herb Henderson
92d Air Refueling Wing Plans and Programs
247-3012
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Operations Security Definition
OPSEC is a Systematic and Proven Method of
• Identifying
• Controlling
• Protecting…
Generally UNCLASSIFIED Evidence of Planning and
Execution of Sensitive Activities
We want to Mask our Capabilities and Intentions
Expectations
OPSEC is Everyone’s Responsibility
• Military
• Assigned civilians
• Supporting contractors
• Family members
USAF uses OPSEC to protect its Critical Information
Consequences
Failure to use OPSEC can Result in:
• Serious injury or death to personnel
• Damage to weapons systems, equipment and facilities
• Loss of sensitive technologies
• Mission degradation or failure
OPSEC
Your Responsibilities
All AF personnel (active duty, reserve, ANG, DAFCs, and DoD contractors) will:
• Be familiar with the organization’s critical information and indicators
• Protect critical information and indicators from disclosure
Critical Information Defined
Critical information (CI) is a Specific Fact about
Friendly
• Activities
• Intentions
• Capabilities, or
• Limitations that an adversary seeks in order to gain a military, diplomatic, economic, or technological advantage.
Critical Information Defined
CI revealed to an Adversary may
• Prevent or degrade mission accomplishment
• Cause loss of life
• Damage friendly resources
92 ARW Critical Information List
Detailed Information on:
• Specific operations/exercises/mission nature & objectives
• Effects of adversary activities on our operations
• Deception capability and techniques
• Locations/status of critical comm systems infrastructures
• Movement of key personnel/VIP schedules & travel itineraries
• Personnel, acquisition and logistics information
• Computer system logon ID’s and passwords
• Emergency response or contingency plans
• Privacy Act Information
• Changes to, or details of, normal operating procedures
Personal Critical Info
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
• Home addresses, locations
• Home email, phone numbers
• Schedules / travel itineraries
• Areas frequented by family members
• Future plans or vacations
• Details about your family
• Social Security numbers
• Credit Card info
• Vehicle tag and registration
• Full birthdays
OPSEC Indicators
Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information
OPSEC Indicators
Abnormal Changes of Duty Schedules
Unplanned Mobility Processing
Unit recall
Unusual Working Hours
Staging Vehicles
Increased Security
Protect Critical Info and Indicators
Do not publicly disseminate, or publish photographs displaying critical information.
Examples include:
• FAFB flight line activities
• Special or unusual aircraft
• FAFB deployment activities
• Unusual activities taking place
• FAFB security force dispositions or defensive tactics
• Protective measures of military facilities
• Destroyed or damaged equipment
• Casualties
Protect Critical Info and Indicators
Do not include Critical Information in:
• Social media postings
• Web log (blog) postings
• Unencrypted e-mail
• Letters, resumes, articles, books, collegiate papers
• Internet message board discussions
• other forms of dissemination or documentation
Simple, Effective OPSEC
Know Critical Information and Indicators
Assume that all unencrypted e-mail is monitored
Don’t post sensitive information on the Internet
Use secure means to discuss sensitive topics
• Avoid sensitive discussions in non-secure areas
• Ensure “need-to-know” prior to discussion
• Use secure telephones
Properly dispose sensitive documents / materials
• Shred / burn / render useless
Know your organization’s OPSEC POCs
Apply “Need-to-Know”
Keep shop talk in the shop
• Before, during and after deployment
Those without a need-to-know include:
• Family members
• Neighbors
• Reporters
• Foreign nationals
• Anyone who is NOT directly involved in your deployment, sensitive mission or exercise!
Report Suspicious Contacts
Consider Attempts by Unauthorized Personnel to
Solicit Critical / Sensitive Information as Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) Gathering
• Consider it a HUMINT incident
• AF Personnel Involved in, or having Knowledge of, a possible HUMINT incident will immediately report all facts immediately to the AFOSI office
Don’t Give Your Critical
Information to These Guys!
Practice OPSEC Support Eagle Eyes
Mr. Herb Henderson
OPSEC Prgm Mgr, 247-3012
Mr. Kurt Tempel
Alt OPSEC Prgm Mgr, 247-5218
Ms. Melissa Johnson
Eagle Eyes Prgm Mgr, 247-9498
Questions???
and Surfing!!!
Help Shut the Pie Hole!!!
O
PE
RATIONS
S E C U R I T Y
OPERATIONS SECURITY
Your OPSEC Coordinators are:
PRIMARY:
ALTERNATE:
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