10_Dec_13_Tier_Pricing_Industry_Q A.pdf

Question/Comment Govt Response

In general, it is possible to provide pricing in the requested structure and format, but it is very difficult to bid and administer. Furthermore, to provide a reasonable price will require significantly more detail than so far provided in the draft documents. Any lack of specificity will result in pricing errors, disagreements over expectations (what is in each tier), claims, and ultimately an adversarial relationship that will not benefit any of the stakeholders.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The final RFI posting should provide all the necessary workload, categorizations and specifics required to price, bid and administer this pricing structure.

The Sample Work Priorities are too subjective to base an accurate pricing response. For example, the difference between 3A and 3B is “at a slightly lower category/mission dependency.” Contractors cannot parse out individual tasks in the scope based on the subjective descriptions provided in the examples. Only the Government can do this, and it will require that each task in the original performance work statement be categorized by priority. The general statements and examples in the draft are not sufficiently clear.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

All of the documents provided must be use to correctly categorize and prioritize the proposed workload, including the sample work priorities, legacy to NexGen bridging, the additional Priority 3 examples and the proposed workload.

We will need all workload data provided for each function to be priced under the new tiered model to be broken down by priority for pricing purposes. This would include which specific equipment, systems, areas, etc. fall within each priority.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The final RFI posting should provide all the necessary workload categorizations and specifics required to price, bid and administer this pricing structure.

There will need to be a process for identifying and pricing individual tasks that fall outside the tier specified but are subsequently ordered for accomplishment. An example might be a command interest item not specified in the Tier the contractor is executing under the FFP.

SCONS: In‐scope work required that exceeds the established requirement may be separately negotiated and executed via an independent "over and above" CLIN, outside of the Tier structure.

It is likely that we will also need to have performance metrics redefined by Tier as the priorities for each vary – one size fits all does not seem appropriate.

The Government has reviewed your comment and will review the Performance Metrics.

We will need to know whether we have to maintain material inventories to support all priorities or just the one we are ultimately tasked with.

The actual material level is a business decision that the Service Provider must make in order to meet the Government's current priorities. Materials will be funded through a cost reimbursable CLIN and should not present any issues in the pricing Tiers.

We will need to know the weighting of each priority or Tier. To do this, we will need the

AF to break out all the work by priority and provide the workload data. As soon as they do this, the tasks in each Tier will begin to change. For example, each new BCE or

Commander will reevaluate their priorities and want to change what is included in a particular Tier. Rather than treating these changes as we do under a routine FFP, we will be changing and re‐pricing these baselines whether any of the new or changed work is even ordered. It will be difficult to administer for both parties.

SCONS: Tiers will be weighted for source selection evaluation purposes only. Selection of the tier to be executed is based on the CE priorities.

To estimate this effort, Offerors need:

1. Past workload marked with Legacy to NexGen Bridging to match service levels

2. All equipment lists to include the equipment value and NexGen service level

3. The PWS would need to remove all the ambiguity of service levels

4. The Tier reductions need to be clearly defined by equipment/site/operation.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents. All applicable data is provided

Concern/Risk: With the current FFP contract type the Contractor will have to structure its response to facilitate a “standing Army” to accomplish a Tier 1 LOE yet be reviewed to respond to a (1) year and/or (6) months possibility to reduce to a Tier 5 LOE and then possibly return back to a Tier 3 LOE in another year and/or (6) months. This theoretical philosophy would throw inherent and significant risk back upon the Contractor as well as the local Union workforce to accommodate. This inherent risk will ultimately lead to the

Contractor having to significantly increase price (which is counterintuitive to the rationale of the USAF efforts). Additionally, AETC is most assuredly very aware of the significant and crippling mission disruption that can take place with organized labor unrest as displayed with the 2009 Union strike at Vance. The aforementioned above methodology would significantly increase labor union relations animosity and tensions with the distinct possibilities of a fluctuating workforce over the contract period of performance resulting in the laying off of Union employees to accommodate Tier changes LOE. This would also result in increased costs associated with future CBA negotiations for the Union to mitigate this risk (once again counterintuitive to the rationale of the USAF efforts) which would ultimately be passed on to the USAF under revised CBAs.

Solution: We recommend the USAF:

1. Baseline the methodology based on historical and/or projected fluctuations and/or future projected budgets. Furthermore, change the contract type to a hybrid FFP/IDIQ.

This would afford the lowest risk and most flexibility to all parties. The steady state portions of the contract would be priced using FFP and the non steady state (i.e., enhancement work, project work, etc.) could be leveraged best through a task order/project work methodology as funds/priority dictate. This would allow the contractor the opportunity to either use the existing workforce for the increased and/or fluctuating LOE (per tiered methodology) and/or make use of subcontracting to accomplish. Based on USAF historical and/or projected workload would drive the percentage of FFP vs. IDIQ anticipated scope (i.e., 60% FFP/40% IDIQ). Great examples of these types of contracts are contained within most US Navy NAVFAC RFPs (i.e., NAVFAC JAXRBOSSFM, NAVFAC Kings Bay BOS, NAVFAC West Sound). For ease of viewing/reference, find attached link to previous NAVFAC Jacksonville BOS RFP documents:

https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=191716ff1cb9adc483d12cdc69d

0cf84&tab=core&_cview=1

2. Amend the contract type to a T&M or Cost Plus type contract to accommodate these

“unknowns”

SCONS: The government is pursuing all options with considerable preference for a FFP solution.

Significant efforts under Cost Reimbursable, Labor Hour, and/or Time & Material arrangements may not be in the government's best interest. Additional FFP pricing/contract arrangement options, including an

IDIQ component and other similar arrangements, are being considered.

Reference file name “VNC Draft 11 05 Operations Workload Appendix 11‐B.docx,”

Paragraph 11.B.2 Operations, Pages 11B‐6 through 11B‐8: This file provides three years of Workload Data for Emergency, Urgent and Routine Service Orders in hours.

Question: What are the numbers of Service Orders for Emergency, Urgent and Routine for the three years?

The data will be reviewed and updated as applicable.

Reference file name “DRAFT_B‐X_Tier_Pricing_10_Dec_13.docx:” This file identifies a tiered pricing model for certain CE functions to allow for flexibility in scope of work to be performed. The CE functions represented in the five (5) tiers are: O&M Sustainment, Electrical Distribution System, Water Distribution, Water Plant Operation, Sewer/Waste

Water System, Sewer/Waste Water Plant Operation, Electric Generating Plant Operation, Gas Distribution System, Heat Generating Plant Operation, Pavement Clearance, and

Pest Control (Entomology). Based on CE work priorities (Attachment XX), the Offeror shall provide a price for each individual function within each tier, as well as a total tier package price.

File name “CE_Work_Priorities.docx” identifies Work Priorities 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A and 4B.

File name “DRAFT_Tier_Pricing.xlsx” identifies the required Work Priorities for each of 5

Tiers.

However, the Workload Data contained in the DRAFT does not break out data according to these new Work Priorities. Without that data, Offerors will not be able to provide a realistic Firm Fixed Price for each individual function within each tier, as well as a total tier package price.

Question: Please provide Workload Data structured to match the pricing requirements in the final solicitation.

The workload categories are a consolidation of the work listed in Section 11. Further, the current work description are crossed referenced to the new Work Priorities in the Legacy to NexGen Bridging Table provided.

Breaking out the services at Vance into “Tiers” presents major challenges to the customer as well as the contractor.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

All of the documents provided must be use to correctly categorize and prioritize the proposed workload, including the sample work priorities, legacy to NexGen bridging, the additional Priority 3 examples and the proposed workload.

To eliminate work from successive tiers in the pricing, the workload data needs to have sufficient granularity to allow it to be parsed into the different functions/priorities. At this point, I did not see where the “enhancement” work was called out as such, and unless we can get some indication of what in the past was nice to haves, or some indication for the future, i.e.. a not to exceed number, there is really no way to price enhancements.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

All of the documents provided must be use to correctly categorize and prioritize the proposed workload, including the sample work priorities, legacy to NexGen bridging, the additional Priority 3 examples and the proposed workload.

We can discuss eliminating work on routine or priority service calls, but we all know that as soon as the contractor stops performing routine service calls, all inbound requests will become priority. Instead of calling in a leaky faucet, the customer will call in a faucet that is leaking and running all over the floor. One way or another, the customer is going to get their work done, and they don’t really care that we may not have priced it because we were told we weren’t going to be doing that work.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

Work request will be submitted by Facility Managers, who have been properly trained to correctly prioritized work request.

If we defer routine or priority service calls, the deferral itself will end up costing money in increased service call costs. For Example, if we don’t perform a routine call, the problem will get worse and become more expensive to fix at some point in the future, proving that deferring routine repairs presents a false economy.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

Rather that eliminating levels of work, we would suggest that the Government consider a fixed price for the maintenance work, and an IDIQ portion for the enhancement work.

SCONS: The government is pursuing all pricing/contract arrangement options with considerable preference for a FFP solution. The government is considering the feasibility of an IDIQ component and other similar FFP arrangements.

The approach to defer work does not impact the heart of the expenditures, that of

Preventive Maintenance. This is not to say we recommend that the Government should stop performing preventive maintenance, but rather, shift from the traditional approach to preventive maintenance to a “Reliability Centered Maintenance” program.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

Will the AETC's Tiered Pricing Strategy be applied only to the 11 functional areas identified in the, "Draft Tier Pricing" spreadsheet, or can we expect other functional areas to be added in the final RFP?

SCONS: The government does not anticipate utilizing tier pricing for additional functional areas.

Within the Tiered Pricing Approach defined by AETC, should contractors assume that

Tiered Pricing for the Base Year and Option Periods be ordered as a whole; with all functional elements purchased at the same Tier (1‐5), or does AETC intend to mix the

Tier Level among individual functional elements for any given option period of the base period?

SCONS: The government anticipates utilizing a single tier for each performance period and does not intend to “cherry pick” functions from different tiers.

For the Work Priorities 3A, 3B, and 3C shown in "MS/Word CE_Work_Priorities", will

AETC assign specific equipment and/or functions to each sustainment category (High, Medium or Low), or will it be up to the contractor to interpret/assign workload data in each category? Leaving this interpretation to the contractor could substantially bias pricing strategies among competing contractors and result in unbalanced pricing comparisons at the CLIN level. Also, leaving these items to contractor interpretation strongly favors the incumbent who maintains a current understanding of AETC's approach in this regard.

The equipment and/or function will be assigned to each sustainment category IAW government directives.

For the Base Year of the Contract, will the Tiered Pricing approach be defined by AETC in the final RFP or will those assignments be made post‐contract award? In the file, "MS/Word Draft_B‐X_Tier_Pricing 10_Dec_13, Section 3, Tier Pricing Execution", the government does not specifically identify when the "Base Year" will be defined. We recommend AETC define/assign the Base Year Tier Pricing Strategy in the RFP. This approach will provide non‐incumbent contractors a much better understanding of initial costs and level the playing field with respect to the incumbent contractor whose major start‐up costs have already been absorbed in the existing contract.

SCONS: For the purpose of evaluation and obtaining tiered pricing, the Government will weight all tiers based on its expectation of most likely future tier transition scenarios, given information known at time of solicitation release. The base period effective tier will be identified in the solicitation.

Will AETC provide additional information regarding the role of, "(Notional) Weighting" shown in the file "MS/Excel Draft Tier Pricing" spreadsheet? It is not clear to us what the impact of weighting might be on our operational and pricing approach.

SCONS: The “notional” weights provided under the RFI that generated this comment were for concept illustration purposes only. Under the eventual RFP, for the purpose of evaluation and obtaining tiered pricing, the Government will weight all tiers based on its expectation of most likely future tier transition scenarios, given information known at time of solicitation release. The base period effective tier will be identified in the solicitation. Ultimately, the Government will have the unilateral right to transition among Tiers IAW the proposal price model and the terms and conditions of the contract.

With materials, vehicles, and particularly Other Direct Costs, included in the Total

Evaluated Price, the incumbent has a huge pricing advantage due to the fact that they have already capitalized those costs. To support a fair competition, would the government consider using “plug” numbers for materials, vehicles, ODCs or perhaps place those CLINS outside of the Total Evaluated Price?

SCONS: The nature of being the incumbent carries certain benefits and greater understanding of the requirement. Some of these aspects cannot be mitigated by the government. As this acquisition is being conducted using Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) source selection procedures, the use of "plug" numbers is not in the best interest of the government as it does not capture realistic and competitive pricing.

Will AETC consider establishing a single Management Cost CLIN to ensure equitable comparisons among the Tier Levels and all functional elements not covered under the

Tiered Pricing Approach? Separating direct Management costs from operational costs within the Tiered Pricing approach would give AETC insight into competitor contractor management approach and ensure an equitable comparison of competitor costs within each tier.

SCONS: The government is not comparing offerors’ tier pricing alone. The tiers roll up into the overall

TEP. Management of each function/tier shall be a part of the tier pricing as the government is procuring, on a FFP basis, the results of the services and not the management of the work. This is not the entire CLIN, this data only addresses the staged workload further there is a single management CLIN that is not part of the Tier Pricing approach.

Additional clarity on a number of smaller issues is also highly desirable.

1. The spelling out of acronyms throughout referenced documents

2. A thorough review of all workload data to ensure competitors have information of a quality equivalent to the incumbent in order to support a fair competition

3. Additional information on how “priorities” (1, 2, 3A, 3B, etc.,) relate to the “tiers” with, perhaps, your examples of various priority work applied to each tier

SCONS:

1. The government will spell out acronyms

2. The Government will evaluate all proposals based on the information and workload provided in the

PWS.

3. Please refer to attachment CE Work Priorities posted 10 Dec 2013

Can acronyms be provided for the RWP.txt file? Example what does TY/NR mean, etc.?

Rationale: need to understand all acronyms and meaning to adequately assess workload.

Without the acronyms and definitions, a non‐incumbent could misread the intent of the data provided.

Acronyms for RWP file will be provided.

Are all MAS and workload data provided for all CE work scope? Rationale: The MAC numbers within the MAS sheets have missing numbers (i.e. there are MAS19 and MAS21 in cost center 454 but not MAS20). In an LPTA FFP environment all of the detailed data should be provided. If not, it favors the incumbent as they know the work while the others won’t have accurate assessment capabilities.

The current MAS and workload data are provided.

What is meant by the general data factor (GDF)? Can EPS be spelled out? Rationale: Each

MAS sheet has the following note. *NOTE: EPS hours have not been multiplied by the general data factor (GDF). This multiplication occurs when the hours are copied to the

RWP record. All offerors need to understand all acronyms and meaning to adequately assess workload. Without the acronyms and definitions, a non‐incumbent could misread the intent of the data provided.

Clarification and acronyms will be provided.

Table 1 of the VNC Additional CE Workload Data has asterisks by work priority 4a and 4b but there is no definition for the asterisks. Is the asterisk in error? If not, please provide the reason these priorities have an asterisk. Rationale: All offerors need to understand all acronyms and meaning to adequately assess workload. Without the acronyms and definitions, a non‐incumbent could misread the intent of the data provided.

Table 1 has been revised and will be provided in the final RFP.

In the CEMAS workload average table of the VNC Additional CE Workload Data file the turn‐in row as a number of .77 is that meant to be a percentage number? To avoid confusion, can units be provided when possible? Rationale: It appears as though all other rows are raw numbers and this row seems to be a percentage. To avoid confusion, can units be provided when possible?

".77" is inaccurate, the data will be corrected.

Several places in the VNC Additional CE Workload Data file it references one to the HHQ

PWS. Will that PWS be made available and will it have the expected Vance workload requirements? Rationale: A non‐incumbent needs all data to ensure proper workload assessment is provided on this LPTA FFP opportunity. The incumbent will be aware of the scope of work covered in the HHQ PWS where a non‐incumbent would not, and could therefore, over or under bid the work scope required.

The PWS will be/is located in the Technical Library.

Does the RWP.txt file show a year’s worth of work for each task? Rationale: To allow a non‐incumbent to adequately bid the right work scope, the RWP file should reflect a FY worth of scope.

The data provided in the RWP.txt is for the period indicated in the file.

In table 11B.2 Operations, how do the various hours columns relate to the priority and tier schemes provided? Can a cross reference be provided? i.e. does Emergency hours =

Tier 1 or Tier 3a or both? What is the relationship to work order hours and routine or

RWP hours? Rationale: The workload tables don’t easily translate into the new Tier and priority schemes which make it difficult for a non‐incumbent from discerning the appropriate hours workload to the right tier/priority. This in turn creates an advantage to the incumbent as they will know the translation as it relates to the PWS.

A cross reference is provided in the Legacy to NexGen Bridging table.

Will the Government’s Tiered Pricing Strategy be applied only to CE as defined in the, "Draft Tier Pricing" spreadsheet, or can we expect other functional areas to be added in the final RFP? Rationale: Knowing whether the CE tiered pricing strategy will be employed on the remaining CLINS will enable a contractor to perform addition work in advance of the FRFP.

SCONS: The government does not anticipate utilizing tier pricing for additional functional areas.

Will the Government identify which equipment sets/items have the level 3 priorities

(low/med/hi)? Rationale: Leaving this interpretation to the contractor could provide the incumbent with an advantage as they already understand which equipment sets/items have higher priority.

The equipment and/or function will be assigned to each sustainment category IAW government directives.

For the Base Year of the Contract, will the Government define the initial (base year)

Tiered Pricing approach in the final RFP or will those assignments be made post‐contract award? Rationale: In the file, "MS/Word Draft_B‐X_Tier_Pricing 10_Dec_13, Section 3, Tier Pricing Execution", does not specifically identify when the "Base Year" will be defined. We recommend the Government define/assign the Base Year Tier Pricing

Strategy in the RFP. This approach will provide non‐incumbent contractors a much better understanding of initial costs and level the playing field with respect to the incumbent contractor whose major start‐up costs have already been absorbed in the existing contract.

SCONS: For the purpose of evaluation and obtaining tiered pricing, the Government will weight all tiers based on its expectation of most likely future tier transition scenarios, given information known at time of solicitation release. The base period effective tier will be identified in the solicitation.

Has the Government considered using “plug” numbers for materials and ODCs or at least establish these CLINS outside of the TEP? Rationale: By placing materials, and particularly ODCs, into the TEP the incumbent has a huge cost advantage as their ODCs

(particularly vehicles) have already been capitalized on the existing contract. By placing an unbounded ODC cost into the TEP, the non‐incumbents are severely penalized on a

LPTA evaluation.

SCONS: The nature of being the incumbent carries certain benefits and greater understanding of the requirement. Some of these aspects cannot be mitigated by the government. As this acquisition is being conducted using Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) source selection procedures, the use of "plug" numbers is not in the best interest of the government as it does not capture realistic and competitive pricing.

Will the work load data for priorities 3B and 3C be further broken out? Without this additional information, the pricing of Tier 3 vs. Tier 4 in the matrix may rely heavily on individual assumptions from the offerors.

The workload data for priorities 3B and 3C will not be further broken out.

There does not appear to any workload for priorities 4A and 4B. Workload for priorities 4A and 4B is provided in 11‐05 and in the additional workload data provided.

The manner in which work load is provided does not provide sufficient detail to cost out

CLINs 02,03,04,06,07,08,and 09. For example under the work load category of Electrical how much is for Electrical Distribution systems and how much is for interior electric, airfield lighting systems, alarms etc. Shouldn’t the work load categories more closely mirror the categories of work listed in section 11?

The workload categories are a consolidation of the work listed in Section 11.

Is LUC 19 data included in the workload under RWP? If not, then where is it included?

The data provided under RWP is RWP. The workload is captured in Section 11‐05 and the additional workload documents.

The “Other operations work load” is not classified according to work priorities. To develop an appropriate cost based Tier Rating, this work needs to be assigned a work priority.

The workload categories are a consolidation of the work listed in Section 11.

It appears, with the proposed tiered pricing structure, that the Government is attempting to add flexibility and responsiveness to the recompeted contracts. While we understand the need for such contract characteristics, we do not believe the structure will accomplish the goals.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

The Government's proposed pricing structure does not provide enough certainty in the workload to solicit adequate pricing. Rather, the definitions as shown add risk to the pricing, which translates into added cost for the Government. This risk would be revealed in how the work calls are entered into the system; uncertainty in planning for staffing, materials, and equipment; and the inevitable continued deterioration of infrastructure and the resulting increase in high‐cost repairs to critical systems.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

Instead, we propose a contract with FFP core or baseline work covering RCM for designated infrastructure and an IDIQ component (FFP or cost‐plus, depending on the task) for work exceeding a specific threshold. Under this construct, RCM would be consistently performed, compliant with AF goals. And, workload above the threshold

(e.g., $2000), could be easily managed within AF budgetary limits. This concept enables contractors to plan and hire for the baseline workforce and have flexible subcontractors or staffing organizations (including potentially working with local Unions) to respond to

IDIQ work. Examples of this concept are NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center and

Wallops Flight Facility institutional contracts.

SCONS: The government is pursuing all pricing/contract arrangement options with considerable preference for a FFP solution. The government is considering the feasibility of an IDIQ component and other similar FFP arrangements.

We believe your 5‐tier model can work in developing an estimate as long as the USG:

Requires a detailed basis of estimate for each prescribed workload; this will provide the

USG a detailed technical approach with which to evaluate all bidders.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

Ensures that the tiers are differentiated by clearly defined expectations and work priorities and not just by supported population.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

Provides industry the weighting factors for each tier; this will eliminate large variations of approach and Total Evaluated Prices.

SCONS: Notional weights were provided for illustration. Actual tier weights will be identified in the

RFP.

Provides enough detail per PWS for each tier, or simply gives industry a percent drawdown per service level.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

All of the documents provided must be use to correctly categorize and prioritize the proposed workload, including the sample work priorities, legacy to NexGen bridging, the additional Priority 3 examples and the proposed workload.

Ensures that all undefined workload references are defined. Areas that have statements such as “As required” or when no data is provided need to have a definitive amount or count associated (plug numbers, if actual data is unknown). In order to get a fixed price, we need a fixed scope, otherwise the government will be paying a premium as contractors must try to price in the unknown risk.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

From an execution point of view we have the following concerns:

The RFP needs to be clear how the tiers will be budgeted upon execution, and the CLINs will need to stay within their respective tiered levels.

SCONS: A Section B clause will be included to detail the specifics of tier execution.

Changes to tiers need to be limited to no more than once per year with a 3 month notice; to have greater frequency will create instability and uncertainty thereby losing optimal efficiencies.

As currently written, changes are anticipated to be implemented at the beginning of a performance period and requiring 120 day notice to the contractor. The government understands the instability of a mid year tier change and is considering the feasibility of limiting such changes to once per year.

Once a lower level tier is executed, the USG cannot automatically assume that the quoted price on a higher tier is still valid. Again, once scope is reduced some cross leveling efficiencies are lost. Additionally, any deferred maintenance associated with a lower tier could significantly increase the cost of maintenance in the out‐years, invalidating the future higher tier bid amounts.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE.

Similarly, if you reduce to a lower service level, such as reducing or eliminating preventative maintenance, then your corrective maintenance workload may go up.

Basically, you are “deferring” maintenance, so eventually you will see greater system failures. Contractors must be allowed to submit change orders for the lower levels if the number of corrective maintenance actions fluctuates significantly. Otherwise, contractors will have to bid that risk into the original proposal costing the government significantly more than may be actually required.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE. The

Government will provide the most current and accurate data available in our historical files. If an

Equable Adjustment is warranty the Government will evaluate the necessity and feasibility at that time.

As this is a union based workforce, the USG will need to consider the cost of severance as service levels are de‐scoped. Additionally, if service levels are increased, there may be additional recruiting, hiring, or mobilization costs. The government may need a separate reimbursable CLIN to cover the personnel costs associated with scoping and de‐scoping.

The Government has reviewed your comment and understands the challenges this approach presents.

The Government has determined that this approach is in the best interest of the Air Force/CE. The

Government will provide the most current and accurate data available in our historical files. If an

Equable Adjustment is warranty the Government will evaluate the necessity and feasibility at that time.

We recognize the government’s desire to have flexibility in a changing budget environment. However, with this amount of uncertainty, this contract may not be suited for a Fixed Price contract. The government may want to relook at other contracting options, such as:

Cost Reimbursable contract with Incentive Fee or Cost Sharing tied to the contractor reducing target costs each year

SCONS: The government is pursuing all options with considerable preference for a FFP solution.

Significant efforts under Cost Reimbursable, Labor Hour, and/or Time & Material arrangements may not be in the government's best interest.

Hybrid Contract – Fixed Price for certain well defined scopes that will not change and reimbursable for some of the other functions that may need to change frequently to meet government budget requirements.

SCONS: The government is pursuing all options with considerable preference for a FFP solution.

Significant efforts under Cost Reimbursable, Labor Hour, and/or Time & Material arrangements may not be in the government's best interest.

Fixed Price contract with IDIQ task orders. Limit the scope of the Fixed Price and then setup a Fixed Labor Rate schedule for Task Orders. Each task order then becomes negotiated Fixed Price with Labor Rates not to exceed those in the original proposal.

SCONS: The government is pursuing all options with considerable preference for a FFP solution.

Significant efforts under Cost Reimbursable, Labor Hour, and/or Time & Material arrangements may not be in the government's best interest.

For evaluation purposes, the government needs to ensure that all bidders are bidding to the same set of requirements with no room for interpretation or the pricing will be inconsistent between offerors. Also, the government should realize that with a fixed price contract, the more uncertainty that the government puts into it, the higher the price to the government as contractors will have to build in more risk adjusted assumptions. This may not give the government the lowest price for the services they desire.

SCONS: The government understands the risk/pricing relationship and is striving to eliminate ambiguity to reduce contractor assumptions. While a certain level of uncertainty cannot be mitigated, the government anticipates price competition to counter risk inflated pricing.