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UPDATED

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS

REPORT

STS-004-002

c:::7

Revision VI ;.

Approved:

Senior Technical Advisor

Prepared by:

Sayres and Associates Corporation

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report – (STS-004-002)

Rev. VI ii

RECORD OF REVISIONS

Revision Summary of Revisions

Following Final Shutdown and Permanent Defueling

STS-004-002,

UFSAR

Revision IV

A complete revision to the FSAR that incorporates numerous changes that occurred from 1968 through March 2007

STS-004-002,

Revisions 1-4

These revision numbers to the STS were not used. By not using these numbers, the revision number for the FSAR and the revision number to STS-004-002 will be the same revision number.

STS-004-002,

Rev. 5;

FSAR Revision V

This revision incorporates changes that occurred after March 2007. The most significant changes are in Chapter 2 (Fire Detection and Alarm Systems, Security Systems and General Alarm) and Chapter 3 (Ship Movement and Port Operating Criteria).

STS-004-002,

Rev. 6;

FSAR Revision

VI

This revision incorporates changes that occurred after March 2009. The most significant change is the electrical modifications to deenergize all originally installed 450 volt switchgear. All required 450/480 volt loads were moved to a new 800A Shore Power Switchboard. Chapter 2.4.2, Fire Detection and Alarm system (FA) and Chapter 2.9. Dehumidification System were rewritten.

PREVIOUS ISSUES

N.S. SAVANNAH SAFETY ASSESSMENT, Volumes I-V, 1960-1962

N.S. SAVANNAH HAZARDS SUMMARY REPORT FOR DOCKSIDE OPERATION, September

N.S. SAVANNAH HAZARDS SUMMARY REPORT FOR 1964 SEA TRIALS, December 1963

N.S. SAVANNAH SAFETY ASSESSMENT, Revision I, July 1965

N.S. SAVANNAH SAFETY ASSESSMENT, Revision II, March 1967

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT N.S. SAVANNAH FUEL SHUFFLE, December 1, 1967

N.S. SAVANNAH SAFETY ASSESSMENT, Revision III, October 1968

SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMARY – N.S. SAVANNAH DEFUELING, February 1971

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT N.S. SAVANNAH FUEL SHUFFLE –

FUELING WITH CORE II, October 1971 (Note that Core II was never installed)

UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, Revision IV, April 2007

UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, Revision V, May 2009

Rev. VI iii

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Rev. VI v

Table of Contents

Record of Revisions......................................................................................................................................ii

Previous Issues..............................................................................................................................................ii

List of Effective Pages .................................................................................................................................iii

Foreword to Revision VI (2011)................................................................................................................xiii

Foreword to Revision V (2009) .................................................................................................................xiii

Foreword to Revision IV ...........................................................................................................................xiii

1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1 Summary of Significant Events

1.2 Principal Safety Features of the Ship

1.2.1 The Hull

1.2.2 The Power Plant

1.3 Ship and System Status – 1976 to Present

1.3.1 Power Plant Status as reported in April 1976

1.3.2 Status of N.S. SAVANNAH from April 1976 – April 2009

1.3.3 Radiological and Environmental Characterization Scoping Survey

1.3.4 Current Status of N.S. SAVANNAH April 2009 to present

1.4 Symbols for the Reactor Plant Auxiliary Systems

2 SHIP DESCRIPTION

2.1 Features and Characteristics

2.2 Compartmentation, Decks and Space Arrangement

2.2.1 Compartmentation

2.2.2 Deck Arrangements

2.2.3 Space Arrangement

2.3 Navigation and Steering Equipment

2.3.1 Navigation Equipment

2.3.2 Steering Gear

2.4 Fire Detection and Control System

2.4.1 Fire Detecting System

2.4.2 Fire Detection and Alarm System (FA)

2.5 Lifesaving Equipment

2.6 Radio Equipment

2.7 Deck Machinery

2.8 Flooding Alarms

2.9 Dehumidification System

Rev. VI vi

2.10 Hull Cathodic Protection System

2.11 Security Systems

2.11.1 Camera Surveillance System

2.11.2 Security Entrance Door

2.12 General Alarm

3 SITE AND SITE CRITERIA

3.1 Site Description

3.2 Ship Movement and Port Operating Criteria

3.2.1 Purpose

3.2.2 Ship Movement Criteria

3.2.3 Port Operating Criteria

3.3 Control Zones

3.4 Comparison with Central Station Site criteria in the USA

4 CONTAINMENT

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Primary Containment (Containment Vessel)

4.2.1 Function and General Design Criteria

4.2.2 Containment Vessel

4.2.3 Containment Vessel Penetrations

4.2.4 Containment Auxiliary Features

4.2.5 Containment Performance Requirements

4.3 Reactor Compartment (Secondary Containment)

4.3.1 General Description

4.3.2 Cooling Section

4.3.3 Exhaust Section

5 RADIATION SHIELDING

5.1 Design Basis

5.2 Radiation Sources

5.3 Radiation Shields

5.3.1 Primary Shield

5.3.2 Secondary Shield

5.3.3 Local Shielding

5.4 Radiation Sources

5.5 Shield Surveys

5.6 Calculated Doses from Failed Fuel Rods

6 REACTOR CORE

6.1 Reactor Core General Description

6.1.1 Fuel Elements

6.1.2 Control Rods

Rev. VI vii

6.1.3 Internals

6.2 Thermal and Hydraulic Characteristics

6.3 Nuclear Characteristics

6.4 Shipboard Physics Test Program

7 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM

7.1 General Description

7.1.1 General Design Data

7.1.2 General Performance Data

7.2 Reactor Vessel

7.3 Steam Generators

7.4 Pressurizer

7.5 Primary Pumps

7.6 Valves

7.7 Primary (Neutron) Shield Tank

7.8 Primary Piping

8 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS

8.1 Steam Generators

8.1.1 General Description

8.1.2 Design Conditions

8.1.3 Construction Features

8.2 Main and Auxiliary Steam Systems

8.2.1 Main Steam System

8.2.2 Auxiliary Steam System

8.2.3 Intermediate Pressure Steam System

8.3 Main Propulsion System

8.3.1 High-Pressure Turbine

8.3.2 Low-Pressure and Astern Turbine

8.3.3 Reduction Gears

8.3.4 Propulsion Shafting and Propeller

8.3.5 Main Condenser

8.3.6 Main Condensate and Feedwater System

8.4 Emergency Propulsion System

8.5 Electrical Power Systems

8.5.1 Shore Power Connection

8.5.2 Power Distribution

8.6 Auxiliary Engine Room Systems

8.6.1 Instrument Air System

8.6.2 Waste Dilution and Disposal (WD) System

8.6.3 Engine Room Ventilation System

8.6.4 Blowdown Evaporator System

8.6.5 Fresh Water System

Rev. VI viii

8.7 Water Chemistry and Control

8.7.1 Primary System

8.7.2 Secondary System

8.7.3 Laboratory Arrangements

8.7.4 Instrumentation

8.7.5 Operating Experience

8.8 Power Plant Performance

9 REACTOR PLANT AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

9.1 Reactor Emergency Systems

9.1.1 Emergency Cooling (DK) System

9.1.2 Soluble Poison (SP) System

9.2 Reactor Auxiliary Systems

9.2.1 Primary Loop Purification (PP) System

9.2.2 Buffer Seal (SL) System

9.2.3 Hydrogen Addition (HA) System

9.2.4 Primary Relief (PR) System

9.2.5 Primary Sampling (SA) System

9.2.6 Intermediate Cooling Water (CW) System

9.2.7 Containment Cooling (CC) System

9.2.8 Shutdown Circulation (SC) System

9.2.9 Primary Pressurizing (PE) System

9.3 Waste Management Systems

9.3.1 Equipment Drain and Waste Collection (PD) System

9.3.2 Gaseous Waste Collection and Disposal (WL) System

10 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

10.1 General Description

10.2 Plant Control Arrangement

10.2.1 Introduction

10.2.2 Main Control Room

10.2.3 Hydraulic Power Supply Room

10.2.4 GE Cubicle

10.2.5 Emergency Generator Room

10.2.6 Forward Control Area

10.2.7 Data Acquisition System

10.3 Instrumentation

10.3.1 Nuclear Instrumentation System

10.3.2 Safety System

10.3.3 Non-nuclear Instrumentation

10.4 Reactor Control

10.5 Control Rod Drive System

10.5.1 System Description

10.5.2 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms

10.5.3 System Status as of March 1976

Rev. VI ix

10.6 Radiation Monitoring System

11 CONDUCT OF LICENSED ACTIVITIES

11.1 Organization

11.2 Training

11.3 Procedures

11.4 Records

11.5 Quality Assurance Plan

11.6 Port Operating Plans

11.7 Radiation Protection Plan

11.8 Industrial Safety

11.8.1 Occupational Health and Environmental Control

11.8.2 Personal Protection

11.8.3 Lifting and Handling Equipment

12 SHIP ACCIDENTS

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Conventional Ship Safety

12.3 Collisions and Allisions

12.4 Grounding

12.5 Heavy Weather

12.6 Fire and Explosion

12.7 Flooding and Sinking

12.8 Salvage

13 RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERIZATION

13.1 Radiological Characterization Scoping Survey

13.1.1 Dose Rates

13.1.2 Radiological Contamination

13.1.3 Non-Radiological Areas

13.1.4 Radiological Areas

13.1.5 Reactor Compartment (Secondary Containment)

13.1.6 Containment Vessel

13.1.7 Estimate of the Quantity and Distribution of Radionuclides

13.1.8 Calculation of Total Contamination Inventory

13.1.9 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

13.2 Environmental Characterization (HAZMAT) Scoping Survey

13.2.1 Asbestos-Containing Material

13.2.2 Lead-Based Paint

13.2.3 Liquids

13.2.4 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)

13.2.5 Mercury

13.3 Updates to Known Radiological Conditions

Rev. VI x

13.4 References

14 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

14.1 Overview

14.2 Radiation Exposures during Licensed Activities

14.2.1 Offsite and Unrestricted Area Exposure

14.2.2 Occupational Radiation Exposure

14.2.3 Radiation Exposure from Radwaste Transportation

14.3 Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs)

14.4 Materials Handling Accident

14.5 Summary

Rev. VI xi

List of Tables

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events 2

Table 1-2 Tank Designation 12

Table 2-1 Principal Characteristics of the N.S. SAVANNAH 19

Table 2-2 Compartment Utilization 20

Table 4-1 List of Containment Penetrations 41

Table 6-1 Reactor Internals 58

Table 7-1 Primary System Water Quality 63

Table 7-2 Primary System Radiochemistry 63

Table 8-1 Steam Generator Data 72

Table 8-2 Group Control Centers 83

Table 8-3 480-Volt Power Panels 84

Table 8-4 450-Volt Power Panels 84

Table 8-5 120-Volt Power Panels 86

Table 8-6 Primary System Water Quality 90

Table 8-7 Steam Generator Water Quality 91

Table 9-1 Liquid Drainage and Storage 115

Table 9-2 Double Bottom Tanks below RC 117

Table 13-1 Non-Radiological Area Summary 136

Table 13-2 Radiological Area Summary 136

Table 13-3 Reactor Compartment Radiological Summary 137

Table 13-4 Containment Vessel Radiological Summary 138

Table 13-5 Area Monitoring Results 140

Table 13-6 Sample Analysis Results 141

Table 13-7 Total Surface Contamination Inventory 142

Table 13-8 Steam Generator Dose Rates (primary system side) 143

Table 13-9 Steam Generator Contamination Levels (primary system side) 143

Table 13-10 Volume of water remaining in the Primary Coolant system 144

Table 13-11 Summary of Radioactivity Present 145

Table 13-12 Summary of Radioactivity Present 145

Table 13-13 Radiological Spaces Liquid Sample Summary 147

Rev. VI xii

List of Figures

Figure 2-1 Containment, Reactor Compartment and Engine Room (Frames 99-148) 24

Figure 2-2 General Arrangement – Inboard Profile and Decks - Promenade, A and B 25

Figure 2-3 General Arrangement - Decks - C, D, Flats, Tank Tops and Containment Vessel 26

Figure 4-1 Arrangement of Principal Components in Containment 31

Figure 4-2 Containment Inerting Schematic 36

Figure 4-3 Reactor Compartment 37

Figure 4-4 Containment Vessel (showing the secondary shield) 40

Figure 5-1 Primary Shield Tank 54

Figure 6-1 Reactor Internals 59

Figure 7-1 Plant Arrangement in the Containment Vessel 62

Figure 7-2 Reactor Vessel during Fabrication 64

Figure 7-3 Reactor Vessel 65

Figure 7-4 Steam Generator 66

Figure 7-5 Pressurizer 68

Figure 8-1 Original Electrical Distribution System 80

Figure 8-2 Current Electrical Distribution System 480 VAC 81

Figure 9-1 Double Bottom Tanks below RC 118

Figure 9-2 Double Bottom Tanks 120

Rev. VI xiii

FOREWORD TO REVISION VI (2011)

Revision VI to the UFSAR is the 2011 biennial update. This revision incorporates changes based on improved staff knowledge and understanding of the condition of the ship and its infrastructure based on continuous crewing since 2009. Revision VI also incorporates, as appropriate, materials and information contained in license submittals over the past two years. Minor formatting changes are included to clarify the intent and structure of the document.

The ship and its nuclear facilities remain in protective storage. The ship is in an active layberthing condition, with a retention crew and regular attendance by the Maritime Administration’s nuclear operations staff. This condition is projected to continue throughout the next two-year biennial UFSAR update period. The updated safety analyses found in this revision apply to all activities within the site boundary (i.e.; all shipboard activities), regardless of how they may be characterized.

FOREWORD TO REVISION V (2009)

Revision V to the UFSAR is the 2009 biennial update. This revision incorporates changes based on improved staff knowledge and understanding of the condition of the ship and its infrastructure based on continuous crewing since 2007. Revision V also incorporates materials and information contained in license submittals over the past two years, including the most recent (April 2008) license amendment (14), the May 2008 Environmental Assessment (EA), and the December 2008 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR). Minor formatting changes are included to clarify the intent and structure of the document.

The ship and its nuclear facilities remain in protective storage. The ship is in an active layberthing condition, with a retention crew of four persons and regular attendance by the Maritime Administration’s nuclear operations staff. This condition is projected to continue throughout the next two-year biennial UFSAR update period. The updated safety analyses found in this revision apply to all activities within the site boundary (i.e.; all shipboard activities), regardless of how they may be characterized.

The near-term focus of decommissioning planning, as described in the EA and PSDAR, is to bring the ship and its nuclear facilities into conformance with contemporary NRC SAFSTOR criteria, and to place the ship into active retention for a period of as much as 15 years before starting DECON and License Termination. This revision provides appropriate safety analyses and bounding conditions for these activities.

FOREWORD TO REVISION IV

Revision IV to the FSAR is intended to provide a 2007 status of the N.S. SAVANNAH. It is a complete rewrite of Revision III and includes a summary of numerous documents submitted to the NRC since the last update in 1968, including the most recent (January 2007) license amendment (13).

At the end of 1972, after the ship had been defueled and placed in wet layup status, the Maritime Administration decided not to refuel the ship and return it to service. In effect, this decision made the 1970 and 1971 actions permanent. The final shutdown was in November 1970 and the permanent defueling was completed in fall 1971, these actions are retroactively considered to be permanent cessation of operations. Therefore, the fall 1971 defueling became the de facto permanent defueling and cessation of operations with the issuance of Technical Specification Change 13.

Rev. VI xiv

The ship is in a state of protective storage. Most weather openings are sealed. Almost no mechanical system or equipment is functional excepted as noted in the following text. The functional systems include a significant portion of the electrical distribution system, the hull cathodic protection system, the dehumidification (DH) system, the intrusion, fire and flooding alarm system and the anchor windlass.

The DH system was newly installed in 1994, and is mechanically independent of any other ship’s system.

Likewise, the alarm system was substantially renewed in 1994 and is isolated from any other ship’s system except electrical distribution. Note that modifications associated with the DH and alarm systems (i.e., vent ducting and cabling) generally obstructs the doorways, passageways and ladders throughout ship as is typical in the marine industry for deactivated ships.

The electrical distribution system, hull cathodic protection system and the anchor windlass are the only currently functional portions of the ship’s original outfit. Since 1994, there has been minimal maintenance and testing to the ship’s electrical system. Any future use of the electrical system would require surveying prior to energizing any of its currently deenergized portions.

Rev. VI 1

1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1 Summary of Significant Events

A nuclear merchant ship was first proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955 as evidence of this country’s interest in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1956, Congress authorized the program in Public Law 848, 84th Congress, which provided funds for the design and construction of a vessel, subsequently named the N.S. SAVANNAH (NSS).

On October 15, 1956, the President directed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to proceed with design and construction. To complement this effort, the entire project was placed under the direction of a dual status staff chosen jointly by MARAD and the AEC. The vessel was designed by George G. Sharp, Inc. Naval Architects of New York. The Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W) was awarded a fixed price contract for the design and construction of the nuclear power plant auxiliaries. The New York Shipbuilding Corporation (NYS) was selected to construct and test the ship at their Camden, New Jersey shipyard. In 1958, the States Marine Lines, Inc. was engaged as the operating agent for the ship. Todd Shipyard Corporation was chosen to provide the maintenance facility in May 1960. In 1963, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines Inc. (AEIL) became the operating agent. The initial operating License was issued in August 1965. First Atomic Ship Transport Inc., (FAST) a subsidiary of AEIL, placed the NSS in routine cargo service in September 1965.

The NSS, a vessel of the P-2 class (specifically P2-Nl-MA40a) was powered by an 80 MWth pressurized-water nuclear reactor and had a design speed of 22 knots at 22,000 shaft horsepower. The normal cruising speed was 20.25 knots at 20,000 shaft horsepower. The ship was intended to promote international goodwill by being displayed in the seaports of the world. Consequently, it was made as attractive and modern as any vessel of that era and its nuclear power plant was designed with an exceptional degree of reliability and safety.

The prime objectives of the creators of the NSS were to demonstrate the advanced technology and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The operation of a working test-bed laboratory ship provided a tool to be used in the development of economical ships and marine reactor operation. It also established acceptable standards for the design of ship and reactor, operating practices, manning, port entry and operation and safety of crew and the general public. It was necessary therefore, that entry into the domestic and foreign ports was in accordance with mutually acceptable regulations and operational procedures. The successful culmination of these objectives led to the general acceptance of the NSS’s safety and reliability by governmental authorities, cargo shippers and the general public.

During its operating phase, regulatory procedures, inspection standards and training requirements were improved and implemented. The relation of manning to the ship’s layout, design and service was studied.

The high degree of safety, reliability and performance of the NSS increased an acceptance of nuclear ships in the ports visited.

A chronology of significant events in the NSS program is shown in Table 1-1.

The NSS completed its program of domestic and foreign port visitation in March 1965. From that time until July 1970, the ship was in commercial cargo operations. The ports visited are listed in Table 1-2.

Rev. VI 2

During the period of 1968 through 1970, future use options for the ship were studied and proposed.

These included the following:

Conversion to: Proposed by:

Fish Protein Concentrate Factory Ship Marine Protein Incorporated

Ocean Science Ship Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Marine Nuclear Training Center Todd Shipyards Corp.

Containership including new Reactor and Steam Generators

AEIL

These options were ultimately rejected, and the ship was removed from service. The ship was permanently shutdown and placed in wet layup in November 1970. In Fall 1971, the nuclear plant was permanently defueled. In March 1976, the ship’s primary, auxiliary, and secondary systems were drained as completely as practical.

The ship was bareboat chartered1 to the Patriots Point Development Authority and berthed at the Patriots Point Naval and Maritime Museum, Mt. Pleasant, SC from 1981 through 1994. The ship was dry docked in Baltimore, MD for hull maintenance and preservation in 1975 and 1994. From 1994 to 2006, the ship was moored at the James River Reserve Fleet, Ft. Eustis, VA. In August 2006, the ship was moved to Colonna’s Shipyard, Norfolk, VA for infrequent, required topside maintenance.

The NSS is one of the most historically significant ships in existence. It is one of the first ships to be registered as a National Historic landmark. It is registered as an International Historical Mechanical Engineering Landmark by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. It is a registered landmark of the American Nuclear Society.

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events

April 1955 President Eisenhower announced a proposal to build a nuclear powered merchant ship to demonstrate peaceful uses of the atom.

July 30, 1956 Congress passed P.L. 848, 84th Congress, authorizing construction of a nuclear powered merchant ship.

October 1956 Contract to Babcock & Wilcox to design and construct the reactor.

January 22, 1957 MOU established between MARAD and AEC to perform tasks related to design development, testing, initial operation and international acceptance of nuclear merchant ships.

April 1957 Contract to George Sharp to design hull.

December 10, 1957 Contract to New York Ship building to construct ship.

May 22, 1958 Keel laid.

U p da te d Fi na lS af et yA n al ys is Re po rt

(S T

S-x)

1 A bareboat charter is an arrangement where the owner gives possession of the ship to the charterer but no crew or provisions are included as part of the agreement. The charterer is responsible for all operating expenses.

Rev. VI 3

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events

September 1958 Contract signed with States Marine Lines, to operate ship under General Agency Agreement (AEC and MARAD).

July 21, 1959 Ship launched, crew training began.

May 1960 Selection of Todd Shipyard Corporation for nuclear maintenance.

July 1960 Component testing started.

November 1960 Systems testing started.

March 1961 Public hearing.

July 24, 1961 Authorization of AEC fueling and operation for test and demonstration purposes.

September 1961 Pre-fueling testing comp1ete.

November 11, 1961 Reactor Core installed.

December 21, 1961 Initial criticality.

U.S. Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection issued (Doc. No. 287392), Passenger Nuclear.

January 1962 10% testing complete.

March 1962 Initial sea trials at Camden, NJ and Yorktown, VA.

April 19, 1962 States Marine Lines (Operator) under General Agreement.

May 1, 1962 Delivered to and accepted by the Government.

August 3, 1962 AEC provided interim sea and port operation authorization. Amended November 19, 1962 and May 1, 1963.

August 1962 Commencement of initial voyage. First voyage to commercial port Yorktown, VA to Savannah, GA. Demonstration phase of operations began with voyage from Savannah, GA to Norfolk, VA.

February 1963 Initial voyage complete.

May 1963 Cancellation of General Agent contract with States Marine Lines, Inc.

May 1963 to Spring

Labor dispute halted operations.

June 1963 New staff formation.

July 23, 1963 New Contract signed with American Export Isbrandtsen Lines (AEIL) to operate ship under General Agency Agreement from 1964-1965 (New crew trained).

February 20, 1964 AEIL sea trials.

Rev. VI 4

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events

Demonstration phase continued (May 1964) voyage from Galveston to East Coast, U.S. ports.

1964-65 Called at U.S. and Western European ports.

May 28, 1964 Resume port operation.

March 1965 Port visitation program complete and demonstration phase ended Mobile, Alabama to Galveston, TX for annual drydocking, maintenance and inspection.

May 11, 1965 First Atomic Ship Transport, Inc. (FAST) and AEIL agreement to operate as a commercial cargo freighter.

May 18, 1965 USCG Certificate of Inspection Renewed as Cargo Nuclear.

August 1965 AEC Operating License (NS-1) issued.

August 1965 Experimental commercial operations began. Bareboat chartered to First Atomic Ship Transport, Inc. (FAST) (a subsidiary of AEIL).

September 1965 Begin scheduled commercial operation.

August to October 1968

Commercial marine refueling at MARAD Refueling Faci1ity, Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX. The “fuel shuffle” was intended to extend the life of Core I. At the end of Core I lifetime, a shuffle operation was conducted to configure Core Ia. In this operation the four center elements were removed and replaced with four spare elements, two of 4.6% enrichment and the other two of 4.2%. The remaining 28 elements were rearranged to increase reactivity. In general, the inside elements were moved out and the outside elements were moved in. Additionally, one control rod was replaced.

During the last voyage before the Fuel Shuffle Outage, evidence of a minor fuel failure was detected. It appeared that small amounts of fission products were released to the primary coolant whenever there was a significant change in reactor power level. Post shuffle operation indicated that the situation still existed; however, it did not limit operation or access anywhere on the ship.

January 1, 1970 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires Environmental Impact Statements for proposed actions. Past actions such as the initial NS-1 operating license are exempt.

July 25, 1970

Commercial Operations ended. During experimental commercial operation August 1965 - July 1970, 32 domestic ports and 45 foreign ports were visited.

NSS berthed at Pier “E” Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX and Reactor Shutdown July 29, 1970.

November 6-8, 1970 Final Voyage to Pier “E” Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX from annual drydocking 10/30 through 11/06 at Todd Shipyards, New Orleans, LA for maintenance per Operations Report, FAST-21 April 26 - November 9, 1970.

November 8, 1970 Final Reactor shutdown at 5:50 PM and established Cold Iron condition at

Rev. VI 5

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events

Todd Shipyard, Galveston, TX per FAST-21.

November 9, 1970 License NS-1 transferred from FAST to MARAD (License Amendment 7).

April 13, 1971 AEC approved Technical Specification Change 11 to defuel NSS.

Fall 1971

Ship at MARAD Refueling Facility, Pier “E” Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX, for preparation of vessel for lay-up. Started removing fuel August 23, 1971. The last fuel element was removed September 29. Control rod drive (CRD) system disabled and sealed plates installed on 21 CRD head nozzles to separate drives from the control rods. 36 Fuel element flow nozzles were loaded into fuel channels in the reactor vessel. One control rod (cut into two six feet long pieces and one twelve inch piece) was placed in reactor vessel.

This is the control rod removed during the 1968 fuel shuffle. RCP motors and impellers were removed. The RCP volutes were blank flanged. Reactor, secondary and saltwater system filled with water to establish wet lay-up conditions. The reactor vessel head was reinstalled with 6 of the normal 48 studs in place. The containment vessel, port and starboard charge pump room and lower reactor compartment bilges were decontaminated, washed, vacuumed and painted. All cargo holds were decontaminated.

October 24, 1971 U.S. Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection expired and was not renewed.

December 3, 1971

Permanent cessation of operations established by completing Layup Procedure LU-9. The Layup Procedure LU-9 is the procedure implemented by the defueling team. It reinstalled the reactor vessel head with six tensioned reactor head studs. This event establishes the date of permanent cessation of operations.

January 3-10, 1972

Towed to Savannah, GA and following a welcoming celebration, additional non nuclear layup work was performed (4/24/1972 Operations Report) [Not open to Public and primary system and steam generators (boilers) maintained in wet lay-up (MARAD letter Nov 19, 1971)].

April 4, 1972

AEC stopped review of Core II and noted “If reactivation of N. S. SAVANNAH should become planned, an appropriate scope of review would need to be established in light of … the regulatory safety and environmental requirements at that time.”

November 3, 1972 All 36 Core I Spent fuel elements (32 plus the four replaced during the fuel shuffle) were transferred by AEC for reprocessing in SC.

January 29, 1973

License Amendment (Technical Specification Change 13) eliminated “Technical Specifications that referred to operational aspects since all nuclear fuel has been removed from the ship and the nuclear power plant (and the ship) is no longer operational.” Note that even though the final shutdown was in November 1970 and the permanent defueling was completed in fall 1971, these actions were not considered to be permanent cessation of operations until the decision was finally made to not load Core II. Therefore, the fall 1971 defueling became the de facto permanent defueling and

Rev. VI 6

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events cessation of operations with the completion of Layup Procedure LU-9 on December 3, 1971.

1972-75 Legislation was introduced to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to transfer ship to the City of Savannah, GA.

January 31, 1975

MARAD memo “Supplemental Memo on Working Document:

Environmental Impact Analysis Nuclear Merchant Ship Program” -MARAD recommended moving Core II from storage at Defense Atomic Support Agency, Killeen, TX to Nuclear Weapons and Storage Facility, Manzano Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM for indefinite storage. This action would be taken via an Interagency Agreement by Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (formerly AEC). Per NSS Defueling Log September 9, 1971, (MMA File 61-8), Core II consists of 36 new fuel elements.

April 3, 1975

Attachment 1 to memo for Assistant Administrator for Commercial Development states “In response to M-700 memo of December 23, 1974, …

5. Nuclear Fuel (Core II) it is understood this fuel will be returned to AEC

[ERDA].”

July 28, 1975 City of Savannah, GA requested removal of the ship and the ship left Savannah, GA for Baltimore, MD drydocking.

August 11, 1975 Moved from Baltimore, MD Drydock to Detyens Shipyard, Inc. Charleston, SC (topside work).

August 29, 1975

Moved from Detyens Shipyard, Charleston, SC to N. Charleston Army Depot, SC pending the outcome of legislation before the Congress to permit use of the NSS as an addition to the Patriots Point Naval and Maritime Museum, Mt. Pleasant, SC.

March 1976

While at N. Charleston Army Depot, SC, the primary, auxiliary and secondary systems were drained by Todd Research and Technical Division as completely as practical.

Per the September 14, 1976, Annual Operations Report, water from the reactor vessel shield water tank and secondary side of the steam generators was transferred to a double bottom tank below the reactor compartment.

Demineralizer resins (28 Ci) and 12,200 gallons of liquid (Primary Coolant and liquid waste) were properly disposed. Three dewatered primary purification ion exchangers (demineralizers) were removed and disposed.

Radiation levels in the containment vessel did not increase appreciably after the water was removed.

Per March 9, 1976 MARAD memo “Status Report on the Transfer of N.S.

SAVANNAH to [James River Reserve Fleet] JFFR,” the water from the secondary system was analyzed and does not have to be disposed of as nuclear waste.

May 19, 1976 Possession Only License issued (License Amendment 8) and recognized the ship was in a state of protective storage. Total estimated residual activity

Rev. VI 7

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events

1.09E+5 Ci.

April 1980 Main reduction bull gear was removed (NRC Inspection Report 81-01, March 2, 1981).

August 28, 1980 Public law 96-331 was enacted to authorize the NSS to be sent to Patriots Point, Mt. Pleasant, SC for use as a Museum and other public purposes.

September 24, 1980 Bureau Radiological Health, SC Department of Health & Environmental Control certifies all ten remaining radioactive sources have been transferred from the ship to them.

August 14, 1981 Patriots Point Development Authority (PPDA) became a co-licensee and the ship was bareboat chartered for public display at the Patriots Point Naval and Maritime Museum, Mt. Pleasant, SC from 1981 through 1994.

October 15, 1983 The American Society of Mechanical Engineers designated the ship as the Fourteenth International Historic Mechanical Engineering Landmark.

July 15, 1986 The NS-1 License was renewed for ten years by License Amendment 11.

September 1989 Hurricane Hugo hits the Charleston, SC area.

July 17, 1991 The National Park Service designated the ship as a National Historic Landmark.

October 1991 The Board of Directors for the American Nuclear Society approved the ship for a Nuclear Historic Landmark Award.

July 1991

Shortly after the second bareboat charter renewal in 14 July 1991, a hull leak developed. After a series of surveys and inspections, funding was requested from Congress in 1993 to drydock the ship to correct deterioration of the underwater hull.

December 1993 Public Tours of the ship were no longer allowed.

May 24, 1994 NSS left Patriots Point on the spring flood tide to minimize silting effects from Hurricane Hugo of September 1989.

June 29, 1994

License Amendment 12 removed PPDA as co-licensee. After routine drydocking and hull maintenance in Drydock # 4, Sparrows Point, Baltimore, MD, the ship was placed in protective storage at the James River Reserve Fleet, Ft. Eustis, VA. Numerous minor modifications including installation of a DH system were completed. Modifications associated with the DH system (i.e., vent ducting and cabling) generally obstructs the doorways, passageways and ladders throughout ship as is typical in the marine industry for deactivated ships.

July 29, 1996

License Renewal was no longer required by the revised 10 CFR 50.51, Continuation of license.

(b) Each license for a facility that has permanently ceased operations, continues in effect beyond the expiration date to authorize ownership

Rev. VI 8

Table 1-1 Chronology of Significant Events and possession of the production or utilization facility, until the Commission notifies the licensee in writing that the license is terminated.

August 15, 2006 NSS was moved to Colonna’s Shipyard, Norfolk, VA for infrequent, required topside maintenance.

December 11, 2006 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Revision 0 was submitted but withdrawn on January 27, 2007.

January 30, 2007 NSS moved to Pier 23 Newport News, VA for temporary layberthing.

January 31, 2007

License Amendment 13 was issued. It included six administrative changes.

The most significant change is following 30 day notification to NRC, the ship can be located at any appropriate U.S. domestic location with a MARAD approved Port Operating Plan.

May 31, 2007

NSS was moved to BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair facility in South Norfolk, Virginia in preparation for drydocking. On January 19, 2008, the NSS was placed onto the Titan Drydock and remained there until March 3 for hull maintenance and exterior surface cleaning and preservation. Hull inspections were conducted and identified no new degradation. These inspections included verifying the integrity of the underwater hull repairs made during the 1994 drydocking availability

April 3, 2008

License Amendment No. 14 was issued. It revised the Technical Specifications to match the current ship status and ship’s programs, policies and procedures. The function of Review and Audit Committee was revised commensurate with the Decommissioning Quality Assurance Plan. The committee was renamed the Safety Review Committee.

May 8, 2008 NSS was moved to Pier 13, Canton Marine Terminal at 4601 Newgate Ave., Baltimore, MD.

December 11, 2008 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Revision 1 submitted.

November 2010 Completed the electrical modifications to deenergize all originally installed 450 volt switchgear. All required 450/480 volt loads were moved to a new 800A Shore Power Switchboard.

1.2 Principal Safety Features of the Ship

1.2.1 The Hull

This text is retained from Revision III for historical context. In particular, items (1), (3) and (4) from the list below describe structural features installed on the N.S. SAVANNAH to enable it to resist the effects of damage. Item (2) describes the hydrodynamic standard applied to allow the ship to passively resist the effects of damage and remain afloat; this condition is referred to as “damaged stability.” During the period of museum operations at PPDA, most of the transverse watertight bulkheads listed in (1) were penetrated at various locations to permit convenient personnel access

Rev. VI 9 and service connections between the compartments. Most of these penetrations were closed prior to the ship’s removal from PPDA in 1994. Current operations only require the NSS to meet “intact stability” requirements, where intact stability refers to the capability of the ship to remain stable when not damaged. Based on stability calculations prepared in 1994 and the current (2008) baseline structural condition assessment, the NSS is presumed capable of meeting a “one compartment” damaged stability standard

For a ship of its generation, the hull design of the N.S. SAVANNAH was that of a conventional vessel with trim and modern lines, designed in accordance with the latest practice in naval architecture and hydrodynamics.

The principal safety features in the hull design may be summarized as follows:

1. The hull is divided by 10 watertight bulkheads terminating at the B-deck level.

2. The ship will remain afloat if any two of the nine compartment are flooded within the meaning of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) stability requirements.

3. Conventional all-welded steel construction is employed with full-continuity of structural members, except for a few longitudinal riveted seams serving as crack arresters in accordance with contemporary practices.

4. A 5-foot deep watertight double-bottom extends under all nine compartments but not under fore peak or after peak ballast tanks.

5. Special care was taken in the selection of materials to minimize galvanic corrosion.

6. The reactor compartment is reinforced outboard of the containment vessel with additional longitudinal and athwartship bulkheads, in addition to a laminated redwood and steel collision mat on each side, to minimize penetration in the event of a collision amidships.

7. The design details and construction of all components and systems was in accordance with the contemporary regulations of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), MARAD, USCG, the U.S. Public Health Service, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and other regulatory bodies.

1.2.2 The Power Plant

From the beginning of the project, analyses of hypothetical casualties and topical reports covering every phase of the design were prepared and reviewed by the regulatory agencies as well as Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In addition, a comprehensive analysis of reactor safeguards was prepared for review by the AEC and for the critical examination of the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

1.2.2.1 General

In the design and construction of the power plant, a special philosophy of safety and reliability was adopted at the outset of the project. Both preparatory and concurrent research and development work and special operational testing were undertaken in many areas, including a series of critical experiments on various configurations and designs for the reactor core, full scale testing of a prototype control rod drive mechanism and system under simulated reactor conditions, irradiation tests of fuel elements and pellets, containment vessel leak rate tests and filter efficiency tests.

1.2.2.2 Particular Safety Features

Rev. VI 10

The NSS has four remaining safety features in the power plant design that merit special mention:

1. Reactor System Containment - The reactor and primary coolant system are located inside a containment vessel. During the operating period, any failure of the primary system would have been contained by the containment vessel system. The CV system, consisting of a USCG approved pressure vessel and associated isolation valves, was designed and hydrostatically tested to withstand a pressure of 173 psig. During the operating period, the system was routinely pneumatically tested at 60 psig and demonstrated to have a leak rate of less than 1.2% of the contained volume per day. No integrated leak rate testing has been performed since the final shutdown in November 1970.

2. Containment Vessel Isolation – During the operating period, the reactor system was operated with the CV hermetically sealed at all times. The penetrating pipe lines were isolated by automatic valves if the pressure inside the containment vessel rose above 5 psig for any reason whatsoever. The steel containment vessel, moreover, was sufficiently thick that no danger of penetration existed from any high speed missiles within the containment vessel, such as a thermocouple well from the primary coolant system. No individual penetrations have been leak rate tested since the final shutdown in November 1970.

3. Radioactive Waste Control - During the operating period, the power plant operated with a minimum of radioactive waste disposal. Gaseous and liquid wastes were discharged in accordance with the “Standards for Protection Against Radiation” (10 CFR Part 20) and the Technical Specifications. Any solid wastes are kept aboard the ship and periodically discharged to a licensed waste disposal facility.

4. Shielding – During the operating period, the reactor vessel was surrounded laterally by 33 inches of water and 1 to 4 inches of lead shielding so that maintenance work was possible shortly after shutdown. In 1976, the reactor vessel shield water tank was drained. The secondary shielding around the containment vessel reduced the surface dose level at full reactor power to no more than 100 mR per week.

1.3 Ship and System Status – 1976 to Present

1.3.1 Power Plant Status as reported in April 1976

In support of the request for a possession only license in 1976, MARAD provided a “current” (i.e., contemporary) status of the ship. The April 1976 status of the NSS reactor plant following protective storage modifications to its operating condition was noted as follows:

1. Reactor Vessel - All 32 Core Ia fuel elements were removed from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool at the MARAD Refueling Facility, Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX [License SNM- 1015-YGP (Docket 70-1062)]. All reactor internal components are in place, i.e., core basket, upper grid plate, upper flow baffle. Thirty-six upper flow transition pieces and one irradiated control rod (cut in three pieces) have been loaded into six fuel element channels in the core basket. Thirty-two upper flow transition pieces were from Core I and four were from Core Ia (i.e., the 1968 fuel shuffle). The additional control rod was the one replaced during the 1968 fuel shuffle. The reactor head is in place with six of the original 48 reactor head hold down studs tensioned.

2. Spent Fuel - Per September 21, 1973, Operations Report, thirty six spent fuel elements (Core I and Ia) were shipped from Galveston, TX to USDOE - Savannah River Plant, Aiken, SC in nine

Rev. VI 11 shipments from October 4 through December 21, 1972 via a lowboy trailer using the Piqua/Elk River Shipping cask.

3. Fission Chambers - Per September 21, 1973, Operations Report, five fission Chambers were removed and shipped to Todd Shipyards, Galveston, TX in May 1973. On June 28, 1973, these five and an additional three stored on the NSV Atomic Servant (the nuclear services barge for NSS) were shipped to Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., Barnwell, SC for disposition as radioactive material.

4. Pressurizer - One relief valve PR-1V was removed. The nozzle flange was fitted with an absolute filter vent to allow for pressure equalization. Circuit breakers for the heaters have been opened at the switchboard.

5. Control Rod Drive System -

a. Electrical - The breakers for the rod drives have been opened and tagged in the Control Rod Drive Electrical Cubicle and the Control Room. The cables between the junction boxes on the Control Rod Drive (CRD) structure and the junction boxes located around the periphery of the cupola have been disconnected, coiled and secured on the CRD structure in the containment vessel. The support wireways have been removed, packaged and stored in Hold No. 4. In addition, the twenty one buffer seal flow meter cables and the vibration monitor cables have been disconnected.

b. Mechanical - All hydraulic oil has been drained and the piping disconnected between the cupola and the CRD structure. Buffer seal system valves have been closed and tagged out.

The inlet and outlet header spool pieces between the cupola and structure were removed.

The buffer seal system has been drained.

The 21 control rods were disconnected from their respective CRD extension shafts and remain in their fully inserted position between the empty fuel location channels. The CRD extension shafts have been disconnected from the lead screw and are in a fully inserted position from the reactor head nozzles to the top of the control rods. The CRD lead screws were withdrawn and pinned in place. Steel caps are placed onto the 21 reactor head nozzles to completely seal the nozzle from the containment vessel atmosphere and mechanically separate the CRD mechanism from the control rod.

6. Primary Coolant System - The system has been drained as completely as practical. All loop isolation inlet and outlet valves are open and back seated.

Primary Pump motors and impellers were removed. Blank flanges are installed over the volute openings. The grating, piping, valves, ducting, etc. that were disconnected while removing the pump motors and impellers are left in the removed condition within the containment vessel.

7. Secondary System - Both steam generators and piping were drained of water as completely as practical. The water on the secondary side of the steam generators was transferred to the double bottom tank below the reactor compartment. The isolation valves outside of the containment vessel are closed. There have been no modifications to the secondary system.

Rev. VI 12

8. Auxiliary Systems - All nuclear related auxiliary systems have been drained as completely as practical.

The auxiliary system tanks listed in Table 1-2 have been drained of liquids. Some still retain non-removable surface contamination.

The three primary purification system ion-exchangers (PP-E1, PP-E2 and PP-E3) and their resins (28 Ci) have been physically removed from the ship and their lines capped.

Water from the primary (neutron) shield water tank was transferred to the double bottom tank below the reactor compartment.

9. Containment Vessel - The forward and aft manway shield plugs were put in place with security seals installed. Containment vessel (CV) entries were expected to be made through the aft airlock.

The lifting chains and hooks were removed from the chain hoists used to handle the shield plugs to minimize the possibility of unauthorized containment vessel entry. The CV bilge was wiped clean. The inerting piping in the CV cupola head was disconnected outside and valves closed so that the integrity of the vessel was maintained.

10. Control Areas - The following areas of the ship are controlled by locking because they contain radioactive systems or components:

Secured boundaries were established to prevent unauthorized access into Radiation Control Areas (RCAs). The secured entrances included the following spaces:

a. The reactor compartment surrounding the containment vessel that originally formed a secondary containment around the pressure containment;

b. The Port and Starboard Stabilizer rooms;

c. The Forward Control which includes on C-Deck the Cold Water Chemistry Lab (Port) and Radiation Sampling Room plus on D-deck the Gas Adsorption Equipment Room (port) and Radiation Sampling Room (stbd);

d. The Port and Starboard Charge Pump rooms; and,

e. The Hot Chemistry Laboratory, in the Control Room Area.

When not in use, the entries to all of the above spaces are kept locked and are free of surface contamination (less than 450 ρCi/100 cm2) except for the interior of the containment vessel and lower reactor compartment. The containment vessel, port and starboard buffer seal charge pump room and lower reactor compartment bilges were decontaminated, washed, vacuumed and painted in Fall 1971 as part of defueling.

A complete survey was made on the ship after removal of the primary system water and demineralizers (ion-exchangers).