DNA Markings_Statement of Work_Draft.docx

Statement of Work (SOW)

SUBJECT: Requirements for DNA Marking, Taggant, and/or Equivalent Counterfeit Traceability Technology

1.0 DESCRIPTION

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) requires a reliable method for tracing individual microcircuits back to their original vendor should a counterfeit or suspected counterfeit device enter the federal supply chain, particularly after the device has been separated from its unit packaging. Since 2015, DLA has utilized a counterfeit mitigation process involving a plant-based DNA-infused ink to mark individual microcircuits. This process provides a method for authenticating a device and tracing it back to the contract and vendor of origin. At the present time, Applied DNA Sciences (ADNAS) is the single known source for a botanical DNA marking technology with proven use in authentication marking that has the associated quality assurance/security processes in place, readily available for immediate implementation. DLA is seeking information on new or alternative approaches for authenticating sources of supply, whether by use of DNA or other marking technologies, that can meet or exceed the capabilities of the current DNA marking process in place.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Counterfeit electronic devices and components are a serious threat to our military service customers. Detecting counterfeits is an expensive process requiring extensive testing. As counterfeiters become more sophisticated, detection becomes more difficult and resource-intensive. An alternative approach is to provide the ability for items to be marked in a manner that authenticates the source of supply.

The ability of custom botanical DNA marks to provide authentication has been proven successful. However, DLA is seeking information about alternative techniques, technologies, and capabilities, including other DNA marking technologies, that can provide authentication of items. The information provided must be sufficient for DLA to determine that the authentication provided by the proposed alternative approach can provide assurance of the source of the item. DLA's focus is on technologies that meet or exceed the authentication and other related characteristics known to be available from custom botanical DNA marking.

DLA has an established process to mitigate the risk of counterfeit microcircuits entering the federal supply chain. The current methodology involves a multi-step verification and marking process. A vendor supplying the Government with microcircuits must utilize one of the following mitigation techniques: traceability documentation showing the chain of custody from the manufacturer to the Government (QSLD), a test report from an approved independent test laboratory (QTSL), or proof of sourcing through OEM trace, an authorized distributor, or an approved manufacturer listed on the QPL/QML. This information is required prior to shipment/supplies entering the supply chain.

Shipments of microcircuits are received at the Distribution Depot (DDWO) in Columbus, Ohio, and then transported to the Electronics Product Test Center (EPTC). At the EPTC, devices are unpackaged in an ESD-safe environment, and a trace reviewer verifies the device and accompanying paperwork against the Counterfeit Detection Avoidance Program (CDAP) table. Once vetted, technicians mark the microcircuits with a 2mm dot of DNA-infused ink, which is a plant-based solution that is changed quarterly. A sample from each marked substrate is sent to the supplier, ADNAS, for reference. The microcircuits are then repackaged, a DNA stamp is applied to the unit package label as a visual identifier, and the devices are returned to the DDWO warehouse for stocking. If a vendor needs to be identified, a DNA authentication request is sent to the ink supplier, who can sequence the DNA to determine the marking quarter, allowing the EPTC to identify the specific contract and vendor.

3.0 OBJECTIVE

The objective of this effort is to establish the requirements for submitting a Request for Information (RFI) from industry to aid with establishing a new source of supply of DNA infused ink or implementing a new bare item part marking mechanism that provides traceability back to the vendor should a counterfeit/ suspected counterfeit device enter the federal supply chain and is separated from its unit package.

4.0 MINIMUM TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

The proposed traceability solution shall satisfy the following minimum technical requirements:

4.1 Device Integrity: The method shall not damage the device to the extent that it is no longer serviceable.

4.2 Thermal Constraints: If the method generates heat, it shall not exceed the maximum storage temperature for the microcircuits: 150°C for military-grade devices and 85°C for commercial-grade devices.

4.3 Material Alteration Limits: If the method involves removing material (e.g., etching), it shall not exceed a nominal depth of 50-70 microinches and must not compromise the device's hermetic seal.

4.4 Substrate Versatility: The method shall be capable of being applied to various substrates—ceramic, plastic, nickel, and gold—during the same daily marking session.

4.5 Operational Efficiency: The method shall not require the use of the devices being marked to "dial in" or calibrate settings for each substrate type.

4.6 Non-Interference: The applied marking shall not obscure, interfere with, or otherwise compromise the legibility of any other required bare item part markings.

4.7 Size Constraint: The total area of the applied marking shall not exceed a 2mm x 2mm square.

4.8 Marking Clarity: If the method produces heat, it shall not distort or discolor the required bare item part markings in the area adjacent to the applied mark.

4.9 Application Flexibility: The method must be capable of being applied "ad hoc" to microcircuits of various shapes, sizes, and on varying available surface areas within the same marking session.

4.10 Throughput Capability: The solution must be efficient enough to allow the existing EPTC staff to process surge requirements not to exceed 10,000 devices within a 7-day cycle time.

4.11 Marking Durability: The traceability function of the mark shall remain viable even if a significant portion of the marking has been physically removed, abraded, or otherwise destroyed.

4.12 Cost-Effectiveness: The solution shall be cost-effective for an annual throughput ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 devices.

5.0 DELIVERABLES

Responses shall include the three (3) specific deliverables listed in the table below:

Responses must be detailed enough to allow DLA to evaluate the feasibility, practicality, repeatability, security, and performance of the proposed self-authentication marking method.

6.0 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

To be determined (TBD).

7.0 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

The primary place of performance will be a government facility (e.g., EPTC, DDWO, Columbus, Ohio). Specific location to be determined (TBD). Dependent upon contractor performance capabilities.

8.0 GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED PROPERTY / INFORMATION (GFP/GFI)

The Government will provide:

· Access to the designated facility space.

· Microcircuits of various types for testing, calibration, and operational use.

· Access to relevant personnel for operational inquiries.