COLUMBUS VAMC Arc Flash Survey 100 PERCENT REPORT.pdf

Walker Federal Services, LLC Phone No. 240-529-5406

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

COLUMBUS VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER

ARC FLASH SURVEY

August 20, 2022 Prepared by:

Walker Federal Services, LLC & Astute Engineering, PLLC.

7820B Ste. 162 Wormans Mill Rd.

Frederick, Maryland 21701

August 20, 2022 TOC-1 Columbus VAMC – Arc Flash Survey

W

F Walker Federal Services, LLC S

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………...…4

1.01 Introduction

1.02 Study notes

1.03 Findings

1.04 Recommendations

2 SOURCE INPUT DATA………………………………………………………………………….9

2.01 Overview of System Modelling

2.02 Utility Contribution Data

2.03 Generator Contribution Data

2.04 Motor Contribution Data

3 OPERATING SCENARIOS……………………………………………………………….…….12

3.01 Study Scenarios

4 SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY AND EQUIPMENT EVALUATION STUDY…………….…..….14

4.01 Overview of Short Circuit Study

4.02 Results of Short Circuit Study

4.03 Equipment Evaluation

5 PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY…………………………………………..16

5.01 Overview of Coordination Study

5.02 Tabulation of TCCs

5.03 TCC Evaluation

5.04 Results of Coordination Study

6 ARC FLASH ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………………..…….42

6.01 Overview of Arc Flash Analysis

6.02 Study Scenarios

6.03 Arc Flash Analysis Results

6.04 De-Energized Work

6.05 Regular Maintenance

6.06 Conclusion

6.07 Recommendations

7 VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS AND EQUIPMENT CONDITION EVALUATIONS…….….49

7.01 Voltage Drop Analysis

7.02 Equipment Condition Evaluation

7.03 Automatic Transfer Switches

7.04 Cable Limiters

8 ABBREVIATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES…………………………………….54

8.01 List of Abbreviations

8.02 Definitions

8.03 References

August 20, 2022 TOC-2

Appendix A - Fault Analysis Input Report………………………………………………….….58

Appendix B - Fault Contribution Complete Report………………………………………..….86

Appendix C – Voltage Drop Analysis Report……………………………………...……….….111

Appendix D - Equipment Evaluation Report…………………………………………………..120

Appendix E - Equipment Code Clearance & Condition Assessment………………….….149

Appendix F - Time Current Curves……………………………………………………………...155

Appendix G – Recommended Protective Device Settings………………………………….327

Appendix H – Protective Device Settings Comparisons…………………………………….352

Appendix I - Arc Flash Evaluation Report………………………………………………….….358

Section I.1 – Arc Flash Evaluation Report – Normal Scenario…………………….…..359

Section I.2 – Arc Flash Evaluation Report – Generator Scenario…………………..…371

Section I.3 – Arc Flash Evaluation Comparison Report……………………………..….379

Appendix J - Arc Flash Labels………………………………………………….……………….450

Appendix K – Utility Contribution Information…………………………………………….….693

Appendix L – SKM One Line Diagrams……………………………………………………..….696

Section L.1 – Input Data One Line Diagrams……………………………………………697

Section L.2 – Short Circuit One Line Diagrams………………………………………….708

Section L.3 – Arc Flash One Line Diagrams………………………………………….….719

SECTION 1

Introduction, Findings and

Recommendations

1 INTRODUCTION, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.01 Introduction

In fulfillment of the Task assigned by Columbus VAMC under this project, the Team of Walker

Federal Services (WFS) & Astute Engineering, LLC (Astute) have performed a complete and in-depth arc flash survey of the Columbus VAMC campus’s all building’s electrical system per the

RFP. The goal of this studies to update the arc flash hazard analysis and improve system coordination and reliability with the consideration of system modeling, short circuit study, protective device coordination study, arc flash analysis, and other evaluations.

Per the requirements of the scope of work for this project, the window-based SKM Power Tools software was used in performing this task.

1.1.1 The objective of the analysis:

The basic intent of arc flash survey study for Columbus VAMC was to fulfill the following requirements:

a. Regulatory requirement NFPA 70E and OSHA for updating the arc flash results and labels every 5 years.

b. Replace existing arc flash labels per the updated study performed based on the field survey and revision of NFPA regulations.

c. Whenever there are changes to the electrical system, the single-line diagram has been updated and reviewed in the arc flash hazard analysis.

d. Compare the calculated fault duties with withstand and interrupting ratings for equipment in the scope of work.

e. Recommend settings for protective devices that will isolate faults in a manner that is consistent with the basic system design and operation. The recommendations given will balance system protection and selective fault isolation.

f. Upgrade the SKM model to make it user friendly for future expansions, operations, maintenance and troubleshooting.

g. Identify incident energy levels and what level of personal protective equipment (PPE) is required for safe energized work.

h. Note areas of deficiency and make recommendations for corrective measures that are consistent with applicable codes and standards.

i. Provide a percentage voltage drop analysis on all buses and feeders per the NEC.

j. Evaluation of existing time-current characteristic (TCC) curves to improve coordination while considering minimizing arc flash incident energy at all levels in the system

k. Update SKM model per available fault current data from the utility company and as-built conditions surveyed by Astute Team.

l. Perform the condition assessment to assign the condition of switchgear, switchboard, panelboards, generator, etc. based on various criteria set per the RFP requirement.

m. Evaluate the number of poles 3P/4P, proper grounding of all ATSs per the requirement of RFP.

Drawings, data, and results from the previous study report including SKM Model were provided to

Astute. The results derived, conclusions drawn, and recommendations provided by Astute in this report, are based on the following tasks undertaken:

• Review and update of existing System Model per the field survey information and available fault current information from the utility company

• Equipment Condition Assessment

• Voltage drop analysis

• Short Circuit Study

• Equipment evaluation study

• Protective device Coordination

• Arc Flash Hazard Analysis

This report includes a power system study for all buildings located within the Columbus VAMC campus electrical system of findings, results, and recommendations for improvement, if any, with a specific focus only on Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination & Arc Flash Analysis.

System SKM Model as provided was reviewed and necessary updates were made to develop an electrical one-line diagram(s) of the system based on an in-depth field survey performed by the

Astute Team.

Short Circuit Study was performed to verify the available fault currents and adequacy of equipment ratings throughout the distribution system, to handle such fault currents.

Arc Flash analysis was performed to ascertain incident energy levels, hazard/risk categories, and appropriate personal protective equipment. Numerous instances of dangerous levels of incident arc flash energy (>40 cal/cm2) have been found. High incident energy on the line side of the Main breaker is a typical condition, which is difficult to mitigate due to system configuration. However, workable solution(s) are available to mitigate or minimize the potential hazards of such instances of high incident energy within the campus electrical system and thereby improve operating personnel safety.

1.02 Notes and Comments

1. The SKM software permits the calculation of incident arc flash energy using equations included in NFPA 70E-2018 Annex D.4 / IEEE 1584-2018. These widely accepted methods yielding more accurate results are used to generate detailed bus reports and final recommendations.

The calculated values of incident energy at each bus are used to identify the minimum recommended personal protective equipment (PPE).

2. For ease of review and reference, system modeling and study reports, including conclusions and recommendations for the entire campus electrical system are provided.

3. All motor loads (where applicable) are modeled with a 0.85 power factor. All non-motor loads are modeled with a 0.96 power factor.

4. Where it was accessible and legible, conductor sizes are obtained from cable sheath labeling.

Data from available record drawings was used where it was not field verifiable. Cable sizes used in this study, are shown in the system input data report.

5. Unless otherwise noted, cables are assumed to be installed in EMT or rigid metallic conduit.

6. The recommendations and analysis outlined in this report are dependent upon the accuracy of pre-loaded input data and other information available in the as-built drawings. In-depth field verification of existing equipment was performed through limited visual field surveys by opening electrical equipment covers where feasible.

a. Cable information as available from “previous reports and as-builts” has been field verified extent possible and the SKM model has been updated accordingly.

b. Astute is not responsible for the inaccuracies or deficiencies in this report resulting from faulty or incomplete information.

7. The recommendations and analysis outlined in this report are valid only for the configurations studied. Affected results or recommendations offered by Astute shall be null and invalid, in the event of changes/alterations to the system being made.

8. Astute makes no representation, express or implied, that implementation or use of or adherence to the recommendations or analyses in this report will guarantee or constitute compliance with any standards, regulations, or other applicable legal requirements. Personal Protective

Equipment (PPE) recommended by any calculation method may NOT provide complete protection for all arc-flash hazards. An injury could occur even when wearing the recommended

PPE.

9. The recommendations and analysis outlined in this report are dependent upon the accuracy of data and other information available in the as-built drawings and information collected for the equipment accessible and approachable during field surveys. Equipment data could not be collected for Electrical protective devices that were physically inaccessible or had missing/obliterated nameplates or had field-imposed approach restrictions.

a. Astute is not responsible for the inaccuracies or deficiencies in this report resulting from faulty or incomplete information.

1.03 Findings

Even though PPE with ratings between 40 Cal/cm2 and 100 Cal/cm2 is commercially available, it is not recognized by NFPA 70E and it may not assure protection from injury due to high pressure and physical impact during the incidence of arc flash. NFPA 70E, Table 130.7(C)(15)(c) provides recognized PPE for incident energy levels up to 40 Cal/cm2.

a. Based on the model created, an analysis was performed representing the worst-case configuration and the available fault duties were compared to the interrupting ratings of the protective device studied. There are some protective devices where the available fault current exceeds the ampere interrupting ratings as listed in Appendix D in this report. These equipment are undersized and, may not be capable of handling the forces developed during fault conditions. Some equipment is deemed to be Marginal.

Full narratives of the analysis performed as well as the findings and recommendations of the analysis are included in other sections of this report. The appendices include the SKM-generated output from the analysis performed and tables containing the recommended settings for the adjustable devices in the scope of work. Time current curves and one-line diagrams of the system model are also included in the appendices.

1.04 Recommendations

Astute recommends the implementation of corrective measures to provide code-compliant and safe facilities at the locations listed in other sections of this report. The listing of the recommendation below and elsewhere in the report, is by no means, in order of importance or priority. Due to operational considerations, user discretion is advised in determining and implementing the recommendations. Provided hereunder are generic recommendations for a high-level assessment of the overall content:

1. ASAP, replace all equipment deemed to be “over duty”, with adequately rated devices. Perform periodic testing and monitor those devices which are found to be “Marginal” rated.

2. For over-duty electrical equipment that failed the short circuit equipment evaluation study, Astute proposes to provide “Danger” Arc flash labels and recommends to operate these equipment only in de-energized condition until this equipment is replaced with appropriately rated equipment.

3. Most equipment are found to be in good condition except few equipment; which were found to be in very poor/ critical condition (Grade D). We recommend replacing those equipment found in Grade D.

4. Modifications or/and mitigation measures (protective devices and associated protection scheme), to achieve safer arc flash hazard levels on equipment deemed to be “Danger”, Plan for replacement of these equipment; asap.

5. Provide arc flash training to designated & qualified personnel responsible for performing the operation, maintenance, and work on energized electrical equipment. Institutionalize and facilitate the use of appropriate PPE by O&M personnel for all tasks.

6. At several locations in the system, voltage drop found to be higher than allowable limit per NEC.

We recommend government to perform further detail analysis of those location to improve voltage drop.

SECTION 2

Source Input Data

2 SOURCE INPUT DATA

2.01 Overview of System Model

The electrical distribution system for all buildings at Columbus VAMC was modeled by Eaton

Electrical and Square D in the previous study project and provided to Astute for further revisions to update per requirement in the RFP. The system equipment was updated in the model using the as-built drawings and in-depth field investigation. The existing equipment information such as

Transformer ratings, protective device specifications, etc. was also field verified by Astute. Cable sizes, Cable lengths, etc. are also field-verified extent possible. Available data in the SKM model is considered to be accurate.

For this study, the following assumptions/considerations were made:

• Motors loads Power Factor – 0.85.

• Non-Motors loads Power Factor – 0.96

• Conductor types/sizes as shown in record drawings or as pre-loaded in the SKM model are considered to be accurate. The sizes used for this study, are shown in the system input data report. However, sizes have been verified during the field survey extent as possible.

• For equipment located within the same room, the interconnecting cable length is considered based on visual estimation.

• Cables are installed in EMT or rigid metallic conduit, unless otherwise noted.

• Maximum trip time (2 seconds) has been taken, wherever the trip time is not available.

The overall results of this study are based on the above assumptions and information. Using the system/equipment data available from as-built drawings, verified through an in-depth-invasive visual survey, and based on the assumptions cited above, the SKM model was updated to best simulate the electrical power distribution system of the existing campus electrical system.

Short Circuit Study – The objective of the Short Circuit Study is to model the current that flows in the power system under abnormal conditions and determine the prospective fault currents. These currents must be calculated to determine the arc flash incident energy at each bus.

Coordination Study – The objective of the Coordination Study is to determine the settings for protective relays and circuit breakers to find possible adjustments to improve the coordinated operation of equipment in the hierarchy, protect equipment, personnel, and limit/minimize the area of the system affected system by outages under fault conditions.

Arc Flash Hazard Analysis – The purpose of the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis is to determine if a thermal hazard exists and to select protective equipment necessary to minimize exposure of operating personnel to the arc flash. The flash protection boundary is the distance from the potential arcing fault point that will expose a person to a second-degree burn. PPE that will minimize the possibility of a second-degree burn should be selected once the flash protection boundaries have been determined.

2.02 Utility Contribution Data

For this study, the information about utility contributions and upstream protective device settings were obtained from The AEP OHIO Company, the utility service provider by Astute Team (email dated April 28, 2022) has been used in this study.

2.03 Generator Contribution Data

For this study, the existing generator contribution has been field verified and SKM model has been updated accordingly.

2.04 Motor Contribution Data

For this study, existing motor contribution (as noted in SKM Model provided by VAMC) is assumed

“unchanged”.

SECTION 3

Operating Scenarios

3 OPERATING SCENARIOS

3.01 Study Scenarios

This System report study has been prepared for the all studies with the following operating scenarios:

Scenario

Scenario Title Comments

1 Normal Operation - Facility fed by Utility (AEP OHIO)

Source

All ATSs are on normal source

2 Emergency Generator Mode - Facility fed from alternate Source (On-site Emergency Standby

Generator)

All ATSs are on emergency source

SECTION 4

Short Circuit Study and

Equipment Evaluation Study

4 SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION

4.01 Overview of Short Circuit Study

A short circuit study was performed to determine the available fault currents at pertinent locations throughout the distribution system. The short circuit study calculates and yields the results from the balanced and unbalanced fault currents at all buses. The results from the short circuit study are used to verify the adequacy of the interrupting and withstand ratings of the protective devices used in the system. The results obtained from the short circuit study are also used in the coordination study and arc flash analysis. The short circuit study was performed in accordance with IEEE 1584 Standard 2018 and NFPA 70E 2018.

4.02 Results of Short Circuit Study

The short circuit study was performed for both normal operating scenario and alternate operating scenario. The detailed short circuit results for the “Normal” operating scenario shown in Appendix B depict at each bus, the three-phase fault currents together with the 3-cycle, 5-cycle, and 8-cycle asymmetrical three-phase fault currents and the single-phase to ground fault currents. The normal operating scenario is determined to be more onerous, yielding higher short circuit currents.

Appendix L depicts the overall One Line Diagram with Short Circuit Results.

4.03 Equipment Evaluation

This study is conducted to determine, whether the short circuit current withstand capacity of the equipment is sufficient for the available fault current or not. AIC (ampere interrupting current) ratings for dynamic switching devices, and SCCR (Short circuit current ratings) for static devices are taken to perform this study. Results will be in three categories: Pass, fail, and marginal.

Pass: Available fault current < 80% of the fault current withstand capacity of the equipment Marginal: Available fault current > 80% and < 100% of the fault current withstand capacity of the equipment Fail: Available fault current > 100% of the fault current withstand capacity of the equipment

The calculated results from the short circuit study were used to confirm the interrupting / withstand ratings of electrical equipment and protective devices, and the interrupting/ withstand ratings of electrical equipment and protective devices were considered according to the field survey verifications.

Appendix D depicts the Equipment Evaluation Study results.

As determined by the study, there are many protective devices found to be failed (highlighted in the equipment evaluation report). Astute recommends replacing those equipment immediately.

SECTION 5

Protective Device Coordination

Study

5 PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY

5.01 Overview of Coordination Study

A protective device coordination study is used to ascertain the as-found settings and determine the new settings of protective devices within a distribution system. Settings and ampacities are verified by plotting Time Current Characteristic (TCC) curves of given protective devices. When protective device settings are properly implemented per the Coordination study, equipment protection is enhanced by ensuring that the protective devices trip in the right sequence. This, in turn increases facility reliability and limits the effects of nuisance tripping and disturbances to smaller areas within the distribution system, under fault conditions. The coordination study was performed in accordance with the IEEE Standard 242-2001 using the as-found settings and the results so obtained, are also used in the arc flash analysis.

Protective device coordination analysis was performed by plotting the protective device time-current characteristics of the equipment in the scope of work on to a series of Time-Current Characteristic (TCC) curve sets. The SKM coordination model was used for all analyses in this report. The TCCs are log-log graphs shown with the device operating time versus current. These TCCs curves illustrate graphically the quality of operation and coordination provided by the protective devices.

Starting with the device nearest the source, the TCCs are plotted with the objective of maintaining an adequate coordination interval between devices in series. In the analysis performed, an adequate time coordination interval is defined as follows:

• Low Voltage Circuit Breakers: The tolerance bands for the devices do not overlap.

• Fuses: The maximum clearing time for the protected devices is no more than 75% of the minimum melting time for the protective fuse.

• Relays: The operating time for the protective device is longer than the sum of operating time for the protected device, the breaker opening time for the protected device, a relay tolerance, and other relay functions (i.e., breaker failure). Typically, a time interval of 0.2- 03 seconds for electro-mechanical relays was used if breaker failure was not present (0.3-

0.4 seconds with breaker failure protection). Newer solid-state and microprocessor-based relays are much more accurate and can have intervals as low as 0.15 seconds.

ANSI/IEEE Standard 242 states, “whether minimizing the risk of equipment damage or preserving service continuity is the more important objective depends on the operating philosophy of the particular plant or business. “The recommended settings presented in this report offer a compromise between coordination, protection, and service continuity. Changes in system operation may require a re-evaluation of device settings to allow for selective operation.

There are occasions where selective operation cannot be achieved but is considered acceptable. These primarily occur when the devices are not adjustable (or have limited adjustments) and where there are a large number of devices are in series.

Devices are considered to be in series if the operation of either device results in the same equipment being de-energized, such as a feeder breaker in one panel serving the main breaker in the downstream panel (only one). If the downstream panel does not have a main breaker, then the feeder breaker in supplying panel cannot be considered directly in series with the feeder breaker in the downstream panel (because there is more than one). The findings and recommendations that follow in other sections do not address the lack of selectivity due to devices directly in series.

When the available fault current results in the operation of two or more instantaneous trip devices that are not directly in series, there will be a lack of selectivity. This is shown in graphically on the TCC curve sets when the curves overlap in the 0.1 second or less area. The lack of selectivity due to instantaneous units in series is very common and is not usually a problem, since most faults involve resistance to ground and thus are smaller in magnitude. The findings and recommendations that follow in the other section do not address the lack of selectivity due to instantaneous units in series.

Ground fault protective devices are typically only on specific devices (primary switchgear main and sometimes feeders). Selectivity is different from phase fault protection since ground fault devices do not have to (and typically cannot be) set above the load level. Separate TCC curve sets are generated when there is more than one level of ground fault device in a system.

A curve set consists of the time-current characteristic curves (TCCs) of devices plotted on a log-log current vs time. The first step in the analysis is to determine the voltage, current scale, drawing name, and description. These are indicated in the title block of the curve set.

Time-Current Curve (TCC)sets for the systems analyzed are in Appendix F. The curve set contains a simplified single-line diagram that graphically shows the relationship between the devices plotted on each curve set. The voltage and current scale multiplier used are included in the title block of the curve set. The curves for each device are terminated at the maximum fault magnitude available at the device’s location.

5.02 Tabulation of TCCs:

TCC No. & Title Description Type Respective

Switchboard/ Switchgear

TCC: EC-UTIL

RECLOSER/NPSS1

EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1, NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/

SS1-4 PHS

EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-UTIL

RECLOSER/NPSS1 GND

EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1 GND, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR G Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/

SS1-4 GND

EXIST CUST SERV GND RE, UTIL#1 GND, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR G Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-ATS-CR EMRG GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, CISBEMA

FDR, CISBEMA MAIN, C1SBEMA-4

Phase Overcurrent Protection

GPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-EQ EMRG GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, CISBEMA

FDR, CISBEMA MAIN, C1SBEMA-1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

GPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-FP EMRG GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, CISBEMA

FDR, CISBEMA MAIN, C1SBEMA-3

Phase Overcurrent Protection

GPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1E1 ATS-HEQ NORM FDR, ATS-HEQ1, H1EA MAIN, XFMR H1E1 FDR,

XFMR H1E1, H1E1 MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EA

EMRG

GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HEQ1

EMRG FDR, ATS-HEQ1, H1EA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

GPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EA

NORM

NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR NPSS1, NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HEQ

NORM FDR, ATS-HEQ1, H1EA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EB NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HEQ NORM FDR, ATS-HEQ1, H1EA MAIN,

H1EB FDR

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-GEN1-GPSS GEN1, GEN1CB, XFMR H1T1, GEN#1, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR,

GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-GEN2-GPSS GEN2, G GEN #2, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1,

XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-GPSS1 GRND GEN #1 GND, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR G, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 G Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-GPSS1 PHASE GEN #1, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR, GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR

GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, CISBEMA FDR

Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-NPSS1 PHASE UTIL #1, EXIST CUST SERV DISC, NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 FDR, NPSS1

SWG MAIN 1, NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, XFMR NPSS1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-NPSS1-GRND EXIST CUST SERV DISC GND, UTIL #1 GND, NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1

FDR G, NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1 GND, XFMR NPSS1

Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1C2 XFMR H1C1 FDR, XFMR H1C1, H1C1 MAIN, UPS-1 FDR, H1C2 MAIN Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1CA

EMRG

GPSS1 SWG MAIN1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HCR

EMRG FDR, ATS-HCR, H1CA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1CA

NORM

NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR NPSS1, NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HCR

NORM FDR, ATS-HCR, H1CA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1NA NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR NPSS1, NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, H1NA FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1S1 ATS-HLS NORM FDR, ATS-HLS, H1SA MAIN, XFMR H1S1 FDR,

XFMR H1S1, H1S1 MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1SA

EMRG

GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR GPSS1, GPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HLS

EMRG FDR, ATS-HLS, H1SA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1SA

NORM

NPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, XFMR NPSS1, NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HLS

NORM FDR, ATS-HLS, H1SA MAIN

Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS1-LV SWGR

GRND

NPSS1 SWBD MAIN, ATS-HEQ NORM FDR Ground Fault Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-NPSS-H1N1 H1NA FDR, XFMR H1N1 FDR, XFMR H1N1, H1N1 MAIN Phase Overcurrent Protection

NPSS1 SWBD

TCC: EC-SS-1/2/3/4 GEN

GRND

TIE #1 GND, TIE #2 GND, TIE #3 GND, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR G Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-SS-1/2/3/4 GEN

PHASE

TIE #1, TIE #2, TIE #3, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING SWG

PSG (EMRG)

TCC: EC-SS-1/SS-2/SS-

3/SS-4 GRND

EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR, MV-FU-

SS#1

Ground Fault Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-SS-3/SS-1 PHASE EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1, SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: EC-SS-4/SS-2 PHASE EXIST CUST SERV DISC, UTIL #1 , SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 FDR Phase Overcurrent Protection

PARALLELING

SWGR PSG (NORM)

TCC: SS#1 MV-FU-SS#1, XF SS#1, SS#1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-B1NA PHS MV-FU-SS#1, XF SS#1, SS#1 MB, SS#1-B1NA, B1NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-B2NA, B3NA,

B4NA PHS

SS#1 MB, SS#1-B1NA, B1NA MB, B2NA MB, B3NA MB, B4NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C1DNA PHS MV-FU-SS#1, XF SS#1, SS#1 MB, SS#1-C1DNA, C1SBEMA-6, ATS-

C1DEA, C1DEA SEC1, CWP1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C1NA PHS MV-FU-SS#1, XF SS#1, SS#1 MB, SS#1-C1NA, C1NA MB Phase Overcurrent

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C2NA, C3NA,

C4NA PHS

SS#1 MB, SS#1-C1NA, C1NA MB, C2NA MB, C3NA MB, C4NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT1

GF

SS#1 MB, SS#1-C4DNA Ground Fault Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT1

PH

SS#1 MB, SS#1-C4DNA, C4DNA-15, SF3 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT2

PHS

SS#1 MB, SS#1-C4DNA, C4DNA-3, SF1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-CHILLER1 PHS SS#1 MB, SS#1-ATS-CHILLER1, C1SBEMA-5, ATS-CHILLER1,

CHILLER1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#1-J1DN1 PHS SS#1 MB, SS#1-J1DN1, J1DN1 MB, J1DN1-1, CH-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#1

TCC: SS#2 MV-FU-SS#2, XF SS#2, SS#2 MB PHS Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-A1N2, A1N3

PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-A1DN1 PHS, A1DN1-1, A1N1-1, A1N1-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-A2N2, A3N2,

A4N2 PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-A1DN1 PHS, A1DN1-2, A2N1 MB, A2N1-1,

A1DN1-3, A1DN1-4,

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-A2N3 PHS SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-A1DN1 PHS, A1DN1-5, A2N3 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-B1DN1 PHS MV-FU-SS#2, XF SS#2, SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-81N3 PHS SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-1, B1N1-2, B1N1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-82N2 & B2N3

PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-2, B2N1-1, B2N1-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-83N2 & B3N3

PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-3, B3N1 MB, B3N1-1, B3N1-

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-84N2&B4N3

PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-4, B4N1 MB, B4N1-1, B4N1-

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-C1DN2 PHS SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-C1DN1 PHS, C1DN1 MB, C1DN1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-GOLFCART

PHS

MV-FU-SS#2, XF SS#2, SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-1,

B1N1-1, B1N2-1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-J1NA J1NB

PHS

SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-A1DN1 PHS, A1DN1-J1NA, J1NA MB Phase Overcurrent

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-J1NC PHS SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-A1DN1 PHS, A1DN1-J1NC, J1NC MB Phase Overcurrent

SS#2

TCC: SS#2-STARBUCKS SS#2 MB PHS, SS#2-B1DN1 PHS, B1DN1-5 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#2

TCC: SS#3 MV-FU-SS#3, XF SS#3, SS#3 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CRA1C1

PHS

B1CA-1, XF-B1C1, B1C1 MB, B1C1-1, A1C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR A2C1

PHS

B2CA-2, XF-B2C1, B2C1 MB, B2C1-2, A2C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR A3C1

PHS

C3CA-1, XF-C3C1, C3C1 MB, C3C1-1, A3C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR B2C2

PHS

B2CA-2, XF-B2C1, B2C1 MB, B2C1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR B3C1

PHS

B3CA-1, XF-B3C1, B3C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR B4C1

PHS

C4CA-1, XF-C4C1, C4C1 MB, C4C1-1, B4C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR C1C1

PHS

C1CA-1, XF-C1C1, C1C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR C1DCA

PHS

CISBEMA FDR, CISBEMA MAIN, C1SBEMA-4, ATS-CR, C1DCA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR C2C1

PHS

C2CA-1, XF-C2C1, C2C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR D1C1

PHS

D1CA-1, XF-D1C1, D1C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS# 3-ATS-CR D2C1

PHS

D2CA-1, XF-D2C1, D2C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR D3C1

PHS

D3CA-1, XF-D3C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CRE1C1

PHS

E1CA-1, XF-E1C1, E1C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR E2C2

PHS

E2CA-1, XF-E2C1, E2C1 MB, E2C1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR F1C1

PHS

C1DCA MB, C1DCA-2, C1CA MB, C1CA-F1CA, F1CA MB, F1CA-F1C1,

XF-F1C1, F1C1 MB

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR F2C1

F2C2 PHS

F1CA MB, F1CA-F2CA, F2CA-F2C1, XF-F2C1, F2C1 MB, F2C2 MB Phase Overcurrent

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR G1C1

PHS

C1DCA MB, C1DCA-9, DSW-G1C1, XF-G1C1, G1C1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CRIPU1,

IPU1X

C1SBEMA-4, ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-1, E2CA MB, E2CA-2,

E2CA-3

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR J1S1

PHS

J1SA MB, J1SA-1, XF-J1S1, J1S1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

B1C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-4, B1CA MB, B1CA-1, XF-B1C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

B2C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-4, B1CA MB, B2CA MB, B2CA-2, XF-

B2C1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

B3C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-4, B1CA MB, B2CA MB, B2CA-1, B3CA

MB, B3CA-1, XF-B3C1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

C1C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-2, C1CA MB, C1CA-1, XF-C1C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

C2C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-8, C2CA MB, C2CA-1, XF-C2C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

C3C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-2, C1CA-2, C3CA MB, C3CA-1, XF-C3C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

C4C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-8, C2CA MB, C4CA MB, C4CA-1, XF-

C4C1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

D1C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-3, D1CA MB, D1CA-1, XF-D1C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

02C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-6, D2CA MB, D2CA-1, XF-D2C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

03C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-5, D3CA MB, D3CA-1, XF-D3C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

E1C1 PHS

ATS-CR, C1DCA MB, C1DCA-7, E1CA MB, E1CA-1, XF-E1C1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-CR XF-

E2C1 PHS

C1SBEMA-4, ATS-CR, C1DCA MC, C1DCA-1, E2CA MB, E2CA-1, XF-

E2C1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ A1E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C431 MB, C4E1-8, C4E2-1, A2E1 MB, A1E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ A4E2

PHS

A4E1 MB, A4E1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ A4E3

PHS

A4E1 MB, A4E1-2, A4E3 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ A4E4

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-7, A3E1 MB Phase Overcurrent

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ A4E5

A4E1 MB, A4E1-3 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ B1E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-6, B3E1 MB, B1E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ C1E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-3, C1E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ

C1SBEA PHS

C1SBEMA-1, SS#3-C1SBEA, ATS-EQ, C1SBEA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ C2E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-5, C3E1 MB, C2E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ C2EA

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-14, XF-C2EA, C2EA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ C4E3

PHS

C4DEB-7, XF-C4E3, C4E3 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ

CHWP3 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-3, CHWP3 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ CRU

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-6, CRU Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ CRU1

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-1, CRU1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ CWP4

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-1, CHWP4 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ D1E2

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-2, D1E2 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ D2E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-4, D2E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ E2E1

PHS

XF-C4E1, C4E1 MB, C4E1-1, E1E1 MB, E2E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ E2E2

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-5, XF-E2E2, DSW-E2E2, E2E2 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ E2E3

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-6, XF-E2E3, DSW-E2E3, E2E3 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ E2EA C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-11 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ ELEV

P1 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-2, FU-VFD-ELEV P1, ELEV P1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ ELEV

P4 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-6, FU-ELEV P4, ELEV P4 Phase Overcurrent

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ ELEV

P5 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-7, FU-ELEV P5, ELEV P5 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ ELEV

S1 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-5, FU-VFD-ELEV S1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ ELEV

S2 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-8, FU-ELEV S2, ELEV S2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ F1E1

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-7, F1DEA MB, F1DEA-1, F1E1 MBV Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ F2E1

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-2, C4DEA-2, F2DEA-2, XF-F2E1, F2E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ F2E2

PHS

C4E1 MB, C4E1-2, D1E2 MB, D1E2-1, F1E2-F2E2, F2E2 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS03-ATS-EQ F3E1

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-2, C4DEA-2, F2DEA-1, F3EA-1, XF-F3E1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ G1E1

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-9, G1EA-G1E1, G1E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ J1EA C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-10, J1E1 MB, J1E1-1, DSW-J1EA, J1EA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ RT

CHILLER1 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-3, RT CHILLER1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ SF10

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ UPS

PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-2, C4DEA-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ UPS-

ROTARY PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-8 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ XF-

C4E3 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-1, C4DEB-7 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-EQ XF-

D1E1 PHS

C1SBEA MB, C1SBEA-5, D3DEA-4, FU-D1E1, D1E1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-FIRE

PUMP PHS

C1SBEMA-3, ATS-FP, MTR-FIRE PUMP Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS C1DSA

PHS

C1SBEMA-2, ATS-LS, C1DSA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS# 3-ATS-LS C1S1

PHS

C1SA-2, XF-C1S1, C1S1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS C4S2

PHS

C3SA-1, FU-XF-C4S1, C4S1 MB, C4S1-1, C4S2 MB Phase Overcurrent

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS C5S1

C3SA-1, FU-XF-C4S1, C4S1 MB, C4S1-2, C5S1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS DBS1

PHS

D1SA-1, D1S1 MB, D1S1-2, DBS1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS E3S1

PHS

D1SA-1, D1S1 MB, D1S1-1, E1S1 MB, E1S1-1, E3S1 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS PP

GEN PHS

D1SA-1, D1S1 MB, D1S1-1, E1S1 MB, E1S1-2, PP GEN MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS XF-

C1S1 PHS

C1DSA MB, C1DSA-1, C1SA MB, C1SA-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS XF-

C4S1 PHS

C1DSA MB, C1DSA-1, C1SA MB, C1SA-3, C3SA MB, C3SA-1, FU-XF-

C4S1

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-ATS-LS XF-

D1S1 PHS

C1DSA MB, C1DSA-2, D1SA MB, D1SA-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-C1DCA PHS MV-SW-SS#3, MV-FU-SS#3, SS#3 MB, SS#3-ATS-CR-N, C1DCA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-C1DSA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-C1DSA, C1SBEMA-2, ATS-LS, C1DSA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-C1SBEA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-C1SBEA, ATS-EQ, C1SBEA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS# 3-CHILLER2 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-CHILLER, CHILLER2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-CT-2 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-F1NA, F1NA MB, F1NA-1, CT-2 MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-D1NA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-D1NA, D1NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-D2DNA-1, -2, -3,

PHS

SS#3 MB, SS#3-D2DNA, D2DNA-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-D2DNA-5, -6, -7

PHS

SS#3 MB, SS#3-D2DNA, D2DNA-5 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-D2DNA-9 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-D2DNA, D2DNA-9 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-03DNA SECT1

PHS

SS#3 MB, SS#3-ATS-D3DEB, C1SBEMA-8, ATS-D3DEB, D3DNA-7,

D3NB MB

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-E2NA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-E2NA PHS, E1NA MB, E2NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-F1N1 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-F1NA, F1NA MB, F1NA-5, F1N1 MB, F1N1-F1N3,

F1N1-F1N2

Phase Overcurrent

TCC: SS#3-F2N1 PHS F1NA-2, F2NA MB, F2NA-XF-F2N1, F2N1 MB, F2N1-F2N3, F2N1-F2N2 Phase Overcurrent

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-F2NA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-F1NA, F1NA MB, F1NA-2, F2NA MB Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-FIRE PUMP ENCCB FP, C1SBEMA-3, ATS-FP, MTR-FIRE PUMP Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-G1N1 G1N2

PHS

SS#3 MB, SS#3-G1DNA PH, G1DNA MB, G1DNA-G1N1, G1N1 MB,

G1N1-G1N2

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-G1NA PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-G1DNA PH, G1DNA MB, G1DNA-G1NA, G1NA BR Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-SF07 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-ATS-D3DEB, C1SBEMA-8, ATS-D3DEB, D3DNA-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#3-SF11 PHS SS#3 MB, SS#3-ATS-D3DEB, C1SBEMA-8, ATS-D3DEB, D3DNA-5 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#3

TCC: SS#4 MV-FU-SS#4, SS#4 MB PHS Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-C1N2 & C1N3

PHS

MV-SW-SS#4, MV-FU-SS#4, SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-C1DN3 PHS,

C1DN3-1, C1N1-1, C1N1-2

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-C2N2 & C2N3

PHS

MV-SW-SS#4, MV-FU-SS#4, SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-C1DN3 PHS,

C1DN3-2, C2N1 MB, C2N1-1, C2N1-2

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-C3N2 & C3N3

PHS

MV-SW-SS#4, MV-FU-SS#4, SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-C1DN3 PHS,

C1DN3-3, C3N1 MB, C3N1-1, C3N1-2

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-C4N1 PHS MV-SW-SS#4, MV-FU-SS#4, SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-C1DN3 PHS,

C1DN3-4, C4N1 MB

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-D1N2 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-D1N1 PHS, D1N1 MB, D1N1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-D1N3 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-D1N1 PHS, D1N1 MB, D1N1-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-D1N4 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-D1N1 PHS, D1N1 MB, D1N1-1, D1N2-1, D1N4

MB

Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-D2N2 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4 D2N1 PHS, D2N1 MB, D2N1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-D2N3 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-D2N1 PHS, D2N1 MB, D2N1-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-E1N2 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-E1N1 PHS, E1N1 MB, E1N1-1 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-E1N3 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-E1N1 PHS, E1N1 MB, E1N1-2 Phase Overcurrent

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-E2N2 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-E2N1 PHS, E2N1 MB, E2N1-1 Phase Overcurrent

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-E2N3 PHS SS#4 MB PHS, SS#4-E2N1 PHS, E2N1 MB, E2N1-2 Phase Overcurrent Protection

SS#4

TCC: SS#4-MDP PHS SS#4-MDP, MDP MB, MDP-1, MDP-2 Phase Overcurrent

SS#4

5.03 TCC Evaluation:

1) TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/NPSS1

• Utility to Paralleling Switchgear Relay is Coordinated with NPSS Switch gear feeder relay for Phase Overcurrent Protection.

2) TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/SS1-4 PHS

• Utility to Paralleling Switchgear Relay is Coordinated with SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 feeder relay for Phase Overcurrent Protection.

3) TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/NPSS1 GND

• Utility to Paralleling Switchgear Relay is Coordinated with NPSS Switch gear feeder relay for Ground Fault Protection.

4) TCC: EC-UTIL RECLOSER/SS1-4 GND

• Utility to Paralleling Switchgear Relay is Coordinated with SS4/SS2/SS3/SS1 feeder relay for Ground Fault Protection.

5) TCC: EC-ATS-CR EMERG

• XFMR GPSS1 Transformer inrush Point is Well Coordinated with the Upstream Protective Device 005-01A GPSS1 SWG MAIN 1, Also the Main breaker of GPSS1 SWBD is in Coordination with C1SBEMA FDR BKR & C1SBEMA-4.

6) TCC: EC-ATS-EQ EMRG

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

7) TCC: EC-ATS-FP EMRG

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

8) TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1E1

• Due to the fixed settings of the breaker XFMR H1E1 FDR miscoordination is observed, selective coordination is not possible.

9) TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EA EMRG

• The curve of the breaker H1EA MAIN overlaps with the curve of the breaker ATS- HEQ1 EMRG FDR, as they are connected in series, hence no issues with coordination.

10) TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EA NORM

• The curve of the breaker H1EA MAIN overlaps with the curve of the breaker ATS- HEQ1 NORM FDR, as they are connected in series, hence no issues with the coordination.

11) TCC: EC-ATS-HEQ1-H1EB

• The curve of the breaker H1EA MAIN overlaps with the curve of the breaker ATS- HEQ1 NORM FDR, as they are connected in series, hence no issues with the coordination.

12) TCC: EC-GEN1-GPSS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

13) TCC: EC-GEN2-GPSS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

14) TCC: EC-GPSS1 GRND

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

15) TCC: EC-GPSS1 PHASE

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

16) TCC: EC-NPSS1 PHASE

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

17) TCC: EC-NPSS1-GRND

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

18) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1C2

• Due to the fixed settings of the breaker XFMR H1C1 FDR miscoordination is observed, selective coordination is not possible.

19) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1CA EMRG

• The curve of the breaker H1CA MAIN overlaps with the curve of the breaker ATS- HCR EMRG FDR, as they are connected in series, hence no issues with the coordination.

20) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1CA NORM

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

21) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1NA

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

22) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1S1

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

23) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1SA EMRG

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

24) TCC: EC-NPSS1-H1SA NORM

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

25) TCC: EC-NPSS1-LV SWGR GRND

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

26) TCC: EC-NPSS-H1N1

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

27) TCC: EC-SS-1/2/3/4 GEN GRND

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

28) TCC: EC-SS-1/2/3/4 GEN PHASE

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

29) TCC: EC-SS-1/SS-2/SS-3/SS-4 GRND

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

30) TCC: EC-SS-3/SS-1 PHASE

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

31) TCC: EC-SS-4/SS-2 PHASE

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

32) TCC: SS#1

• All protective devices are in coordination.

33) TCC: SS#1-B1NA PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all Protective devices.

34) TCC: SS#1-B2NA, B3NA, B4NA PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

35) TCC: SS#1-C1DNA PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

36) TCC: SS#1-C1NA PHS

37) TCC: SS#1-C2NA, C3NA, C4NA PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

38) TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT1 GF

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between both breakers.

39) TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT1 PH

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

40) TCC: SS#1-C4DNA SECT2 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

41) TCC: SS#1-CHILLER1 PHS

• Keeping INST value at 4, for the breaker C1SBEMA-5 makes a miscoordination with the damage curve of CHILLER1, and keeping INST at 8 makes a miscoordination with the main breaker of C1SBEMA. Selective coordination is not possible in either situation.

42) TCC: SS#1-J1DN1 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

43) TCC: SS#2

• The fuse MV-FU-SS#2 curve is well coordinated with the inrush point of the transformer XF SS#2, and the breaker SS#2 MB PHS.

44) TCC: SS#2-A1N2, A1N3 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

45) TCC: SS#2-A2N2, A3N2, A4N2 PHS

• Selective coordination is not possible between breakers A1DN1-3, A1DN1-4, A2N1 MB, and A1DN1-2 as all breakers have fixed settings.

46) TCC: SS#2-A2N3 PHS

• There is a miscoordination between the breakers A1DN1-5 and A2N3 MB, selective coordination cannot be achieved since they both have fixed settings.

47) TCC: SS#2-B1DN1 PHS

• All protective devices are in coordination.

48) TCC: SS#2-B1N3 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

49) TCC: SS#2-B2N2 & B2N3 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

50) TCC: SS#2-B3N2 & B3N3 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

51) TCC: SS#2-B4N2 & B4N3 PHS

• Satisfactory coordination could be achieved between all breakers.

52) TCC: SS#2-C1DN2 PHS

• The long-time delay setting is fixed for the breaker SS#2-C1DN1 PHS, so there is a miscoordination between the breakers SS#2-C1DN1 PHS, C1DN1 MB, and

C1DN1-1.

53) TCC: SS#2-GOLFCART PHS

54) TCC: SS#2-J1NA J1NB PHS

• There is a miscoordination between the breakers A1DN1-J1NA and J1NA MB, selective coordination cannot be achieved since they both have fixed settings.

55) TCC: SS#2-J1NC PHS

• There is a miscoordination…