Citrine Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study FCS Oxbow (Nov 2024).pdf

Page | 2, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

PROPERTY OFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents I. Executive Summary

II. Background and Purpose

III. Short-circuit Analysis & Equipment Evaluation

A. General

B. Standards and References

C. Methodology

1. Definitions

2. Relevant Formulas

3. Case Studies

D. Results Summary

E. Recommendations

IV. Protective Device Coordination

A. General

B. Standards and References

C. Methodology

1. Approach

2. Protection Philosophies

3. Case Studies

D. Results Summary

E. Recommendations

V. Arc Flash Analysis

A. General

B. Standards and References

C. Methodology

1. Definitions

2. Relevant Formulas

3. Case Studies

D. Results Summary

E. Recommendations

Page | 3, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A - Short-circuit Analysis Results

Appendix A1 - All Bus Evaluation

Appendix A2 - Dapper Evaluation

Appendix B - Coordination Study Results

Appendix C - Arc Flash Results

Appendix D - One Line Diagrams

Appendix D1 - CAD One Line

Appendix D2 - SKM One Line

Appendix D3 - Model Input Data

Appendix D4 - Utility Information

Appendix E - Arc Flash Labels

Appendix F - Floor Plans

Appendix G - Datasheets

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I. Executive Summary The Federal Center South (FCS) Oxbow Building B1202 in Seattle, Washington is a four-story building that is the regional headquarters of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Seattle District. Short-circuit, protective device coordination, and arc flash hazard analysis are performed in this study to identify electrical rating issues and miscoordination among the various protective devices. The analysis also calculates incident energy and the other necessary parameters required for creating NFPA 70E compliant arc flash labels.

The short-circuit analysis shows that the electrical equipment is sufficiently rated to handle maximum short-circuit conditions. Refer to the Short-circuit Analysis section of the report for further details.

The coordination study shows that protective devices are acceptable. There are minor recommendations for some protective devices where coordination can be improved by adjusting the circuit breaker settings. Refer to the Protective Device Coordination section of the report for further details.

The arc flash analysis shows that most incident energy levels are below 40 cal/cm2. There is one device that has an incident energy of 396.2 cal/cm2. Refer to the Arc Flash Analysis section of the report for further details.

II. Background and Purpose The purpose of this report is to present the electrical engineering analysis for the FCS Oxbow Building B1202 in Seattle, Washington. Three different types of analysis are performed including short-circuit, protective device coordination, and arc flash hazard analysis.

FCS Oxbow is 209,000 square feet, four-story, office building that was constructed in 2012. This building was surveyed as part of this study to verify as-installed conditions. This survey involved a 2-day inspection of the building’s electrical infrastructure. The survey focused on equipment that would most likely need to be examined or opened while energized, such as switchgear, motor control centers, switchboards, and panelboards. Equipment ratings were verified, protective devices were examined, and cable sizes were documented. The gathered information was used to confirm and update the existing one-line diagram and served as input to the electrical analysis. Details of the field survey data can be found in Appendix G.

GSA provided a drawing of the original power plan of the building which is used as the basis for these electrical studies. A new one-line diagram has been created based upon the findings during the field survey. The new one-line diagram along with a summary of all input data for the electrical model can be found in Appendix D.

• Drawing E-003 – One-Line Diagram

• Drawing E-004 – One-Line Diagram

The list of abbreviations below are used throughout this report and its appendices:

• XFMR – Transformer

• SWGR – Switchgear

• SWBD – Switchboard

• PNL – Panel

• MDP – Main Distribution Panel

• MLO – Main Lug Only

• FCB – Feeder Circuit Breaker

Page | 5, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

• CB – Circuit Breaker

• MCB – Main Circuit Breaker

• ECB – Enclosed Circuit Breaker

• DS – Disconnect Switch (Fused or Non-Fused)

• CBL – Cable

• SC – Short-circuit Rating

• MCC – Motor Control Center

• GEN – Generator

• FU – Fuse

• EQV – Equivalent

The short-circuit, protective device coordination, and arc flash analysis is performed with a software program called SKM Power*Tools for Windows (PTW) Software, version 11.0.0.4. The electrical network, including panelboards, transformers, cables, and circuit breakers are modeled within this software. Once modeled, the relevant electrical parameters are calculated, and the overall performance of the electrical network is verified. This software is widely accepted and frequently used in the engineering and power industry.

The naming conventions and abbreviations of the equipment listed above were applied throughout this study to reflect the character limitations associated within SKM software. Panel names are based on actual equipment labels

III. Short-circuit Analysis & Equipment Evaluation

A. General

An electrical fault current such as a short-circuit or ground fault, if allowed to continue, can cause considerable damage to the installation, including possible risk of fire and injury to personnel. The electrical system should be designed so that in the event of a short-circuit, the circuit breaker feeding the affected electrical circuit will automatically open quickly, disconnecting that circuit from the source of supply, and stop the flow of short-circuit current.

Each electrical device including circuit breaker and bus is given a rating of the maximum amount of short-circuit current it can safely carry or interrupt. The purpose of a short-circuit study is to calculate the maximum short-circuit current which could be produced in electrical distribution systems in the facility and compare this to the rating of corresponding electrical device to ensure no interrupting device will attempt to interrupt a short-circuit current in excess of its rating. The short-circuit values also serve as a critical input into the arc flash hazard analysis. Short-circuit values are also used for protection study and settings.

The short-circuit analysis requires technical data from the electrical utility providing service to the building. The FCS Oxbow Building B1202 in Seattle, Washington is served by Seattle City and Light (SCL). SCL was contacted for the available short-circuit and X/R values at the utility transformer. SCL provided the following information:

Utility on Secondary side of the XFMR (26.4 kV)

• 3P Short-circuit fault current 12.277kA

• SLG Short-circuit fault current 9.284kA

• 3P X/R ratio 2.890

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• SLG X/R ratio 4.284

Symmetrical short-circuit ratings that are labeled on the equipment have been documented during the building survey. Short-circuit ratings are based on the lowest observed rated device. For instance, if a panelboard is rated for 22 kA of short-circuit current and a circuit breaker within the same panelboard is rated for 14 kA, the entire panelboard/bus is assumed to have a rating of 14 kA unless the equipment is specifically labeled as being series rated. When short-circuit ratings cannot be verified in the field or within existing documentation, the analysis assumes that the equipment is rated at the lowest standard low voltage short-circuit rating for that type of equipment, which is typical 10 kA for most low voltage equipment.

B. Standards and References

The following industry standards are used in this study.

• IEEE 242. Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and

Commercial Power Systems (Buff Book).

• IEEE 399. Recommended Practice for Industrial and Commercial Power Systems

Analysis

• IEEE 551. Recommended Practice for Calculating Short-Circuit Currents in Industrial and

Commercial Power Systems

• IEEE C37.10. Guide for Investigation, Analysis, and Reporting of Power Circuit Breaker

Failures

• IEEE C37.13. Low Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures

C. Methodology

1. Definitions

Asymmetrical Current: The combination of the symmetrical component and the direct current component of the current. AC and DC components decay with time depending upon source characteristics and system (X/R). The term asymmetrical is derived from the fact that the current is not symmetrical along the time axis.

Fault: A current that flows from one conductor to ground or to another conductor owing to an abnormal connection (including an arc) between the two. Syn: short-circuit.

Feeder: All circuit conductors between the service equipment, the source of a separately derived system, or other power supply source and the final branch-circuit overcurrent device.

Interrupting Rating: The highest current at rated voltage that a device is intended to interrupt under standard test conditions.

Peak Current: The highest instantaneous current during a period.

Short-circuit Current Rating: The symmetrical fault current at a nominal voltage to which an apparatus or system is able to be subjected without sustaining damage exceeding defined acceptance criteria.

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Symmetrical Current: That portion of the total current that, when viewed as a waveform, has equal positive and negative values over time such as is exhibited by a pure single frequency sinusoidal waveform. Symmetrical current does not contain a DC component.

X/R Ratio: The ratio of rated frequency reactance and effective resistance to be used for short-circuit calculations. Approximately equal to av RX 2.1/2 or 32 afT .

2. Relevant Formulas

Symmetrical rms value of momentary short-circuit current:

eq faultpre symmrmsmom Z

V I where Zeq is the equivalent impedance at the faulted bus from the ½ cycle.

Asymmetrical rms value of momentary short-circuit current:

symmrmsmom

RX

asymmrmsmom IeI ,, ,, *21 π where expression under the square root is the momentary multiplying factor

Peak value of momentary short-circuit current:

symmrmsmom

RX

peakmom IeI ,, , *12 π where there is a peak multiplying factor before Imom,rms,symm.

3. Case Studies

All the short-circuit calculations in this report follow the ANSI/IEEE C37 standard. This method calculates momentary symmetrical and asymmetrical rms, momentary asymmetrical crest, interrupting symmetrical rms, and interrupting adjusted symmetrical rms short-circuit currents at faulted buses.

The software checks the protective device-rated close and latching, adjusted interrupting capacities against the fault currents, and flags inadequate devices.

The electrical system contains a generator as an alternative power source. The study assumes the electrical system is at steady state before a short-circuit occurs so pre-fault loading is neglected since pre-fault system load current is usually much smaller than the fault current. Two case studies are used for the short-circuit analysis. The basis of each short-circuit case is as follows:

• Case 1: Utility Feed SC-1 o All feeders are in operation.

o All transformers are in service.

o All loads are operating.

Page | 8, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study o Circuit breaker making peak and breaking current ratings are assumed to be the same as the associated switchboard peak and short-time ratings.

o Pre-fault system voltage is set at 100% o Utility fault current as provided by SCL Utilities

• Case 2: Generator Feed SC-2 o All generator feeders are in operation.

o All generator transformers are in service.

o All generator loads are operating.

o Utility service is disconnected.

o Circuit breaker making peak and breaking current ratings are assumed to be the same as the associated switchboard peak and short-time ratings.

o Pre-fault system voltage is set at 100%

For the purposes of fault calculations, SKM ignores all protective devices to find the maximum available fault current. This includes ignoring current-limiting fuses. Current-limiting fuses are designed to constrain the fault current to a specified maximum value.

Since the analysis ignores the effects of current-limiting fuses, additional consideration must be given to equipment that is protected by current-limiting fuses. Electrical equipment that fails the short-circuit analysis, but is protected by current-limiting fuses that limit the maximum let through current to a value that is below the equipment’s short-circuit rating can be considered to be acceptable in most cases.

D. Results Summary

Table 1 below summarizes the maximum short-circuit magnitudes. The short-circuit results show the maximum interrupting current versus the short-circuit rating of the electrical equipment. The interrupting current on each phase, as well as equipment evaluations, and minimum short-circuit values can all be found in Appendix A

Table 1: Maximum Equipment Short-circuit Results (Worst Case)

Bus Name Status Bus

Voltage (kV)

3-phase Symmetrical

Amps (A)

3-phase Asymmetrical

Amps (A)

Calculated Isc (kA)

Device Isc

Rating (kA)

CNEATS Pass 0.48 40,531 54,122 43.16 50.00

CP2C21 Pass 0.208 1,309 1,310 1.51 10.00

CP2C31 Pass 0.208 1,580 1,589 1.58 10.00

CP2CR1 Pass 0.208 2,012 2,153 2.20 10.00

CP2NE21 Pass 0.208 1,977 2,061 2.09 10.00

CP2SE1a Pass 0.208 3,394 3,616 3.71 10.00

CP2SE1b Pass 0.208 3,327 3,528 3.58 10.00

`CP2SE21 Pass 0.208 1,483 1,527 1.57 10.00

CP4C11 Pass 0.48 11,323 11,345 11.32 18.00

CP4CR1 Pass 0.48 16,645 17,412 16.65 35.00

CP4CR2 Pass 0.48 15,859 16,445 15.86 35.00

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Bus Name Status Bus

Voltage (kV)

3-phase Symmetrical

Amps (A)

3-phase Asymmetrical

Amps (A)

Calculated Isc (kA)

Device Isc

Rating (kA)

CP4NE11 Pass 0.48 20,633 20,693 20.63 35.00

CP4SE11 Pass 0.48 4,113 4,113 4.11 18.00

CRAC-1 Pass 0.48 2,384 2,384 2.38 200.00

CRAC-2 Pass 0.48 2,563 2,563 2.56 200.00

CSBD4NE1 Pass 0.48 39,109 51,287 40.99 65.00

CSBD4SE1 Pass 0.48 12,516 12,549 12.52 65.00

ELEVATOR 1 DS Pass 0.48 8,087 8,087 8.09 200.00

ELEVATOR 2 DS Pass 0.48 5,415 5,415 5.41 200.00

ELEVATOR 3 DS Pass 0.48 21,547 21,633 21.55 200.00

ENEATS Pass 0.48 30,862 37,044 30.86 50.00

EP2NE1 Pass 0.208 2,901 3,156 3.26 10.00

EP2NE1FA Pass 0.208 2,359 2,428 2.38 10.00

EP4C21 Pass 0.48 15,143 15,361 15.14 35.00

EP4NE21 Pass 0.48 20,346 21,926 20.35 35.00

EP4SE21 Pass 0.48 10,754 11,065 10.75 35.00

ESBD4NE1 Pass 0.48 30,008 35,744 30.01 65.00

GENERATOR BUS Pass 0.48 6,007 9,422 8.12 14.00

GUARD HOUSE Pass 0.208 633 633 0.63 10.00

HRC-1 Pass 0.48 14,364 14,989 14.36 22.00

HRC-2 Pass 0.48 14,702 15,608 14.70 22.00

MAIN Pass 26.40 12,262 13,573 12.26 40.00

MSBD4NE1 Pass 0.48 42,852 59,052 46.89 65.00

P2C11 Pass 0.208 6,393 7,155 6.67 25.00

P2C12a Pass 0.208 6,146 6,742 6.97 10.00

P2C12b Pass 0.208 5,913 6,384 6.55 10.00

P2C21a Pass 0.208 5,913 6,384 6.55 10.00

P2C21b Pass 0.208 5,692 6,068 6.17 10.00

P2C31a Pass 0.208 5,484 5,787 5.84 10.00

P2C31b Pass 0.208 5,288 5,535 5.54 10.00

P2NE11 Pass 0.208 6,782 7,699 6.95 25.00

P2NE12a Pass 0.208 6,509 7,215 7.49 10.00

P2NE12b Pass 0.208 6,251 6,801 7.00 10.00

P2NE21a Pass 0.208 6,251 6,801 7.00 10.00

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Bus Name Status Bus

Voltage (kV)

3-phase Symmetrical

Amps (A)

3-phase Asymmetrical

Amps (A)

Calculated Isc (kA)

Device Isc

Rating (kA)

P2NE21b Pass 0.208 6,007 6,440 6.58 10.00

P2NE31a Pass 0.208 5,778 6,122 6.20 10.00

P2NE31b Pass 0.208 5,562 5,839 5.86 10.00

P2NW11 Pass 0.208 6,121 6,650 6.48 25.00

P2NW12a Pass 0.208 5,887 6,305 6.59 10.00

P2NW12b Pass 0.208 5,666 6,001 6.07 10.00

P2NW21a Pass 0.208 5,666 6,001 6.07 10.00

P2NW21b Pass 0.208 5,458 5,728 5.75 10.00

P2NW31a Pass 0.208 5,262 5,482 5.46 10.00

P2NW31b Pass 0.208 5,077 5,258 5.20 10.00

P2SE11 Pass 0.208 5,797 6,251 7.00 10.00

P2SE12a Pass 0.208 5,584 5,949 6.32 10.00

P2SE12b Pass 0.208 5,384 5,679 5.76 10.00

P2SE21a Pass 0.208 5,384 5,679 5.76 10.00

P2SE21b Pass 0.208 5,195 5,435 5.44 10.00

P2SE31a Pass 0.208 5,016 5,214 5.18 10.00

P2SE31b Pass 0.208 4,847 5,012 4.94 10.00

P2SUB1 Pass 0.208 1,272 1,273 1.44 10.00

P2SW11 Pass 0.208 5,797 6,251 6.23 25.00

P2SW12a Pass 0.208 5,584 5,949 6.32 10.00

P2SW12b Pass 0.208 5,384 5,679 5.76 10.00

P2SW21a Pass 0.208 5,384 5,679 5.76 10.00

P2SW21b Pass 0.208 5,195 5,435 5.44 10.00

P2SW31a Pass 0.208 5,016 5,214 5.18 10.00

P2SW31b Pass 0.208 4,847 5,012 4.94 10.00

P4C10 Pass 0.48 21,616 23,099 21.62 35.00

P4C11 Pass 0.48 22,958 25,909 22.96 65.00

P4CR1 Pass 0.48 17,091 18,265 17.09 35.00

P4NE11 Pass 0.48 12,627 12,627 12.63 35.00

P4NE21 Pass 0.48 10,314 10,314 10.31 35.00

P4NE31 Pass 0.48 8,703 8,703 8.70 18.00

P4SE11 Pass 0.48 3,978 3,978 3.98 18.00

P4SE21 Pass 0.48 3,708 3,708 3.71 18.00

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Bus Name Status Bus

Voltage (kV)

3-phase Symmetrical

Amps (A)

3-phase Asymmetrical

Amps (A)

Calculated Isc (kA)

Device Isc

Rating (kA)

P4SE31 Pass 0.48 3,472 3,472 3.47 18.00

T2SUB1 DS Pass 0.48 1,070 1,070 1.07 200.00

UPS Pass 0.48 11,709 11,729 11.71 18.00

E. Recommendations

The short-circuit analysis shows that the electrical equipment is sufficiently rated to handle maximum short-circuit conditions. There are no short-circuit recommendations associated.

IV. Protective Device Coordination

A. General

The primary objective of an electrical system protective device coordination study is to reduce the extent and duration of service interruption in the event of equipment failure, adverse natural events or human error. A second and equally important objective is to minimize the damage to components incurred during a failure.

The protective device coordination effort should select settings that will isolate the distribution system equipment that is directly involved in a fault without impacting other connected equipment. This maximizes reliability and optimizes any redundancy which has been designed into the system which can potentially allow continued operation of the facility.

This coordination study examines the existing circuit breaker settings/ratings to verify proper coordination and protection of equipment and personnel. It is important to note that any changes to the as-found protection settings and circuit breaker ratings can change arc flash incident energy results.

B. Standards and References

The following industry standards and documents are used in this study.

• IEEE 242. Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and

Commercial Power System (Buff Book)

• IEEE 493. Recommended Practice for Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial

Power Systems (IEEE Gold Book)

C. Methodology

1. Approach

Similar to the short-circuit study, the protective device coordination analysis modeled the entire electrical network in SKM. Technical data on panelboards, transformers, cables, circuit breakers, and other pertinent electrical data collected during the building survey is used as inputs to the model. Time-current curves (TCCs) are generated by SKM and are specific to the model number of the installed circuit breakers, with field verified settings if applicable. The TCCs are used to verify

Page | 12, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study that circuit breakers are properly coordinated and that the protective devices operate before equipment is damaged from a short-circuit condition.

Due to the age of the equipment, some circuit breakers are not available in the SKM library nor are the TCCs available in published form. In these instances, the closest equivalent circuit breaker is modeled in SKM.

Depending on the results found on the TCC, breaker setting adjustments may be recommended. It is important to note that changing settings on adjustable circuit breakers to mitigate the coordination issues may increase or decrease incident energy of connected equipment.

2. Protection Philosophies

Low Voltage Equipment Protection

The protective device overcurrent pickup for low voltage equipment, such as panelboards, motor control centers, switchboards and switchgear, is set at or below the rated continuous current carrying capacity of the equipment and below the short-circuit withstand point. The mechanical integrity of the equipment may be compromised if current penetrates the limits of the short-circuit withstand point.

Feeder Protection

The protective device overcurrent pickup is set either at or below the ampacity of the feeder cable and the curve is set to fit below the intermediate overload and short-circuit damage curves. Insulation damage will occur if the maximum through fault current (maximum current that can flow for a short-circuit located on or beyond the load side feeder terminals) penetrates the limits of the cable short-circuit damage curve. Conductor damage will occur if the maximum through fault current penetrate the limits of the conductor short-circuit damage curve.

Non‐motor loads fed from 480 V MCCs are protected by molded case thermal magnetic circuit breakers.

Larger breakers are furnished with removable trip units with adjustable long time, adjustable short time and instantaneous protection. Breakers are selected for a minimum of 125% full load requirement, while not exceeding 115% of the feeder cable’s de‐rated ampacity.

Transformer Protection

Generally, the protective device overcurrent pickup settings must be above the full load amps and inrush points of the transformer. The protective device characteristic curve will be set below the through fault damage curves. Insulation damage may occur if fault current penetrates the limits of the thermal damage curve. In addition, cumulative mechanical damage is possible if fault current penetrates the limits of the mechanical damage curve.

3. Case Studies

The protective device coordination follows the same case studies that are outlined for the short-circuit analysis. The coordination uses defined time-current curves that are specific to each protective device and any applicable device settings. Damage curves are calculated based on equipment ratings.

D. Results Summary

Most of the protective devices within the building are molded case circuit breakers or fuses. Most of the circuit breakers have fixed settings and cannot be adjusted. Some of the large circuit breakers have an

Page | 13, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study adjustable instantaneous setting. Thus, there is little to no adjustment that can be made to many of the protective devices without changing circuit breakers. Fortunately, most fuses and molded case circuit breakers can simply be coordinated per their respective ampere rating.

The protective devices were found to be properly coordinated. The coordination analysis shows that some of the protection curves partially overlap. This is less than ideal coordination, but the devices still provide adequate equipment protection. A time-current curve for the less than ideal coordinated devices that can easily be adjusted to improve the coordination can be found in Appendix B.

E. Recommendations

The protective devices provide adequate equipment protection. If desired, the coordination of the protective devices can be improved by adjusting the settings for some of the existing circuit breakers.

Recommendations are provided in Table 2 and include a priority level for each mitigation. These recommendations improve circuit breaker coordination where time-current curves partially overlap.

Implementing these recommendations will improve overall coordination and selectivity.

Table 2: Protective Device Coordination Recommendations

Bus Name Status Recommendation Priority

P2C11 P2C11: MCB overlap with P2C11: CB P2C12a

TCC P2C11 MCB

Update P2C11: MCB settings:

INST = 6

Low

ESBD4NE1

ESBD4NE1: CB-EP2NE1

overlap with CBL-ETNE1 damage curve

TCC ESBD4NE1_CB-

EP2NE1

Update ESBD4NE1: CB- EP2NE1 settings:

LTD = 2

Low

V. Arc Flash Analysis

A. General

Over the past several years, there has been an increased emphasis by standards organizations, corporations, and regulatory agencies on the need to protect personnel from the energy that may be present during an electrical arcing fault. An arcing fault can be defined as the flow of current through a path where current is not intended to flow. The path can be through contaminants on the surface of non‐conductive materials, or through conductive materials. Arcing faults can be initiated by equipment failure, human error (incorrect tool placement, improper use of equipment), tracking of current due to foreign particles in air or on surfaces of equipment, etc.

Methods have been established to determine the amount of incident energy that can be present when an electrical arc is established. The amount of energy present during an arc can present a serious burn, blast, and explosion hazard for workers. Workers can protect themselves from these hazards

Page | 14, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study by wearing appropriate levels of personal protective equipment (PPE). Defining the level of the hazard present at each location in the power system is necessary to determine what type of PPE should be worn to improve worker safety.

This calculation is intended to be used as the basis for the development of strategies to address personnel safety issues resulting from the calculated arc-flash safety hazard levels. As a minimum, the personnel protective equipment and clothing (PPE) associated with each specific hazard category as prescribed by NFPA 70E is required when working on the energized equipment.

IEEE 1584, which is the guidance document for preparation of this calculation, provides mathematical models which are based on measured arc current incident energy under a specific set of test conditions and on theoretical work. Distances, which are the basis for the mathematical equations, are based on the measured distance of the test instrument from the arc-flash point source. These models enable the user to calculate the estimated maximum incident energy and the estimated arc-flash boundary distance. Real arc exposures may be more or less severe than indicated by these models.

NFPA 70E recommends that electrical equipment be placed into an electrically safe condition prior to performing work on or near equipment, unless it can be demonstrated that de-energizing the equipment introduces an additional or increased hazard or is infeasible because of equipment design or operational limitation. It is recommended that all electrical equipment be worked de-energized unless that is not feasible.

Any changes to the as-found protection settings and circuit breaker ratings will change arc flash incident energy results. The incident energy results contained in this report are applicable to the as-found condition and do not reflect any recommended changes.

B. Standards and References

The following industry standards and documents are used in this study.

• IEEE 1584, 2018. Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers

• NFPA 70E, 2024. Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, National Fire

Protection Association

C. Methodology

1. Definitions

Arc Flash Boundary – A distance from a prospective arc source at which the incident energy is calculated to be 1.2 cal/cm2.

Arc Flash Hazard - A source of possible injury or damage to health associated with the release of energy caused by an electric arc.

Electrode configuration – The orientation and arrangement of the electrodes used in the testing performed for the model development. Configurations can be any of the following:

VCB: Vertical conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure VCCB: Vertical conductors/electrodes terminated in an insulating barrier inside a metal box/enclosure

Page | 15, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

HCB: Horizontal conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure HOA: Horizontal conductors/electrodes in open air VOA: Vertical conductors/electrodes in open air

Incident Energy – The amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the source, generated during an electrical arc event. Incident energy is measured in calories per centimeter squared (cal/cm2).

Limited Approach Boundary – An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which a shock hazard exists.

Restricted Approach Boundary – An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which there is an increased likelihood of electric shock, due to electrical arc-over combined with inadvertent movement.

Shock Hazard – A source of possible injury or damage to health associated with current through the body caused by contact or approach to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts.

Working Distance – The distance between the potential arc source and the face and chest of the worker performing the task.

2. Relevant Formulas

The incident energy and arc-flash boundary for equipment rated 208 V to 600 V can be calculated in the following steps:

1. Find the intermediate arcing current values using the following equation:

�������� = 10( ����) ��4���� + �5���" + �6���$ + �7���� + �8���� + �9��� + �10(

[Ref IEEE 1584-2018 equation (1)] where

Voc is the open-circuit voltage (kV) Ibf is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical rms) (kA) Iarc is the final rms arcing current at the specified Voc (kA)

1. Apply the enclosure size correction factor per the following equation:

)* = +1 × --.� + +2 × --. + +3

[Ref IEEE 1584-2018 equation (14)]

Note: This equation is for a “typical enclosure”. Other enclosures require additional calculations.

where b1 to b3 are the coefficients as provided in Table 7 of IEEE 1584.

CF is the enclosure size correction factor

Page | 16, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

EES is the equivalent enclosure size used to find the correction factor

For typical box enclosures the minimum value of EES is 20

2. Find the intermediate value of incident energy per the following equation:

-�11 = 12.552 50 3 4 10 5�1 + �2678 + �3����_�11

�4���: + �5���� + �6���" + �7���$ + �8���� + �9���� + �10��� + �1167��� + �1267; + �1367����_<== + 67 1

[Ref IEEE 1584-2018 equation (6)] where

E600 is the incident energy at Voc = 600 V (J/cm2) E2700 is the incident energy at Voc = 2700 V (J/cm2) E14300 is the incident energy at Voc = 14 300 V (J/cm2) E≤600 is the incident energy for Voc ≤ 600 V (J/cm2) T is the arc duration (ms) G is the gap distance between conductors (electrodes) (mm) Iarc_600 is the rms arcing current for 600 V (kA) Iarc_2700 is the rms arcing current for 2700 V (kA) Iarc_14300 is the rms arcing current for 14 300 V (kA) Iarc is rms arcing current for Voc ≤ 600 V (kA) Ibf is bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical rms) (kA) D is the distance between electrodes and calorimeters (working distance) (mm) CF is correction factor for enclosure size (CF = 1 for VOA and HOA configurations) Lg is log10 k1 to k13 are the coefficients provided Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 in IEEE 1584

3. Find the final value of incident energy as follows:

- = -?�11 where

E≤600 is the incident energy for Voc ≤ 600 V determined using Equation (6) solved using the arc current determined from Equation (1) and Equation (25) (J/cm2)

E is the final incident energy at specified Voc (J/cm2)

4. Find the intermediate value of arc-flash boundary per the following equation:

@*A?�11 = 10⎣⎢

��EFG_<==

$���H � ����I � :���J � K���L � M���N �

�����EFG���O �PQR���O�1S R

[Ref IEEE 1584-2018 equation (10)]

AFB600 is the arc-flash boundary for Voc = 600 V (mm) AFB2700 is the arc-flash boundary for Voc = 2700 V (mm)

Page | 17, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AFB14300 is the arc-flash boundary for Voc = 1 300 V (mm) AFB≤600 is the arc-flash boundary for Voc ≤ 600 V (mm) G is the gap between electrodes (mm) Iarc_600 is the rms arcing current for 600 V (kA) Iarc_2700 is the rms arcing current for 2700 V (kA) Iarc_14300 is the rms arcing current for 14 300 V (kA) Iarc is the rms arcing current for Voc ≤ 600 V [obtained using Equation (25)] (kA) Ibf is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (symmetrical rms) (kA) CF is the correction factor for enclosure size (CF = 1 for VOA and HOA configurations) T is the arc duration (ms) lg is log10 k1 to k13 are the coefficients provided Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 in IEEE 1584

5. Find the final value of the AFB per the following equation:

@*A = @*A?�11 where

AFB≤600 is arc-flash boundary for Voc ≤ 600 V determined using Equation (10) solved using the arc current determined from Equation (1) and Equation (25) (mm)

AFB is the final arc-flash boundary at specified Voc (mm)

6. Find the arcing current correction factor per the following equations:

WXY)� = �1W��� + �2W��" + �3W��$ + �4W��� + �5W��� + �6W�� + �7

where

VarCf is the arcing current variation correction factor Voc is the open-circuit voltage between 0.208 kV and 15.0 kV k1 to k7 are the coefficients provided in Table 2 in IEEE 1584

7. Adjust the final values of arcing current with the correction factor:

���� Z[\ = ���� × �1 − 0.5 × WXY)�(

[Ref IEEE 1584-2018 equation (2)] where

Iarc is the final or intermediate rms arcing current(s) (kA) (see note) Iarc_min is a second rms arcing current reduced based on the variation correction factor (kA)

8. Repeat step 4 using the reduced arcing current:

9. Find the final value of incident energy as follows:

- = -?�11

Page | 18, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

E≤600 is the incident energy for Voc ≤ 600 V determined using Equation (6) solved using the arc current determined from Equation (1) and Equation (25) (J/cm2)

E is the final incident energy at specified Voc (J/cm2)

10. Repeat step 6 using the reduced arcing current:

11. Find the final value of the arc-flash boundary as follows:

@*A = @*A?�11 where

AFB≤600 is arc-flash boundary for Voc ≤ 600 V determined using Equation (10) solved using the arc current determined from Equation (1) and Equation (25) (mm)

AFB is the final arc-flash boundary at specified Voc (mm)

In addition to assessing the arc flash hazard, NFPA 70E requires a shock risk assessment, which is applicable where personnel are approaching exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts.

Shock protection boundaries for each piece of equipment are determined per Table 130.4(E)(a) in NFPA 70E-2024. Shock protection boundaries are a function of the system voltage. The higher the nominal voltage, the greater the shock boundary becomes. The shock protection boundaries and the arc flash boundary are independent of each other.

3. Case Studies

The electrical system contains a generator as an alternative power source. To determine worst-case incident energy, the following case studies are used:

• Case 1: Utility Feed AF-1 o All feeders are in operation.

o All transformers are in service.

o All loads are operating.

o Circuit breaker making peak and breaking current ratings are assumed to be the same as the associated switchboard peak and short-time ratings.

o Pre-fault system voltage is set at 100% (based upon transformer ratings) o Utility fault current as provided by the utility (see Short-circuit case SC-1) o Working distance for all panelboards in 18 inches o Fault clearing device is isolated and separate from faulted bus. For example, a faulted panelboard with a main circuit breaker is assumed to be cleared at the upstream protective device and not at the panelboard main circuit breaker.

o Maximum fault clearing time is 2 seconds.

o Calculations and labeling are based upon the 2018 IEEE 1584 standard and the 2024

NFPA 70E standard.

• Case 2: Generator Feed AF-2 o All generator connected feeders are in operation.

o All generator connected transformers are in service.

o All generator connected loads are operating.

o Circuit breaker making peak and breaking current ratings are assumed to be the same as the associated switchboard peak and short-time ratings.

o Pre-fault system voltage is set at 100% (based upon transformer ratings)

Page | 19, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study o Fault current source is generator only.

o Working distance for all panelboards in 18 inches o Fault clearing device is isolated and separate from faulted bus. For example, a faulted panelboard with a main circuit breaker is assumed to be cleared at the upstream protective device and not at the panelboard main circuit breaker.

o Maximum fault clearing time is 2 seconds.

o Calculations and labeling are based upon the 2018 IEEE 1584 standard and the 2024

NFPA 70E standard.

D. Results Summary

Table 3 below summarizes the incident energies, arc flash boundaries, and shock protection boundaries for the various electrical equipment. Longer clearing times are caused by the relatively low available short-circuit current and/or the high instantaneous circuit breaker settings. Faults with clearing times in excessive of a few seconds frequently result in high incident energy levels. In most cases, it is very unlikely that the arc flash will be sustained for more than 2 seconds before the person being exposed to the arc moves away or the arc is extinguished by other means. IEEE 1584 suggests that a 2 second duration is a more appropriate clearing time to use for incident energy calculations rather than using excessively long fault clearing times. Hence, equipment with an excessively long fault clearing time is manually changed in the analysis to 2 seconds to give a more realistic incident energy result.

The detailed results of the arc flash analysis can be found in Appendix C. The report in Appendix C only includes the incident energy for the bus and does not always represent the worst-case incident energy. The worst-case incident energy can sometimes be on the line side or the load side of the breaker and will not always match the incident energy at the bus. The worst-case incident energy is captured below in Table 2 and in the arc flash labels.

The results of the arc flash analysis are used to create arc flash labels that meet NFPA 70E-2024 requirements. Per NFPA 70E, equipment that has an incident energy level of 1.2 cal/cm2 or less is not considered to be an arc flash hazard. Anything less than 1.2 cal/cm2 is expected to result in a minor to moderate first-degree burn (i.e., easily survivable).

Hence, labeling arc flash PPE and arc flash boundaries for equipment that has an incident energy less than 1.2 cal/cm2 is technically not required. However, all equipment examined in this study has been labeled as an arc flash hazard for the following reasons:

• It is highly desirable to have all the arc flash labels be consistent throughout the facility. This will make them easier to read and decrease the chances of them being misread or misunderstood.

• There is still a shock hazard present at all energized equipment above 50 volts when protective coverings are removed so all equipment will still require a label to list the potential shock hazard.

• Having a label and calculated incident energy level on all relevant equipment tells personnel that the equipment has been formally examined.

• Although not required, wearing arc flash PPE for equipment with an incident energy less than

1.2 cal/cm2 is not very burdensome. Qualified persons working on electrical equipment will almost always be wearing safety glasses, hard hat, gloves, and boots by default. Most electrical workers regularly wear arc rated clothing. The only additional PPE would likely be a balaclava and face shield.

Page | 20, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

• Labeling all incident energies as an arc flash hazard provides an extra level of safety.

• The approach of labeling all examined electrical equipment with an arc flash label regardless of incident energy level is becoming more commonplace.

The printing proofs for the arc flash labels can be found in Appendix E.

Table 3: Arc Flash Results (Worst Case Only)

Bus Name Bus kV

Bus Arcing Fault (kA)

Trip/ Delay Time (sec.)

Arc Flash

Boundary (in)

Working Distance

(in)

Incident Energy

(cal/cm2)

CNEATS 0.48 4.15 2.000 98 18 18.0

CP2C21 0.208 0.50 2.000 25 18 2.06

CP2C31 0.208 0.48 0.1245 4 18 0.12

CP2CR1 0.208 0.80 2.000 34 18 3.35

CP2NE21 0.208 0.78 2.000 34 18 3.28

CP2SE1a 0.208 1.41 2.000 50 18 6.09

CP2SE1b 0.208 1.38 2.000 49 18 5.95

CP2SE21 0.208 0.57 2.000 28 18 2.37

CP4C11 0.48 8.69 0.0170 8 18 0.33

CP4CR1 0.48 3.48 2.000 87 18 15.0

CP4CR2 0.48 12.22 0.0170 10 18 0.48

CP4NE11 0.48 15.78 0.0175 12 18 0.65

CP4SE11 0.48 1.84 0.4862 24 18 1.88

CRAC-1 0.48 1.29 0.0947 7 18 0.25

CRAC-2 0.48 1.37 0.0837 7 18 0.24

CSBD4NE1 0.48 4.13 2.000 98 18 17.9

CSBD4SE1 0.48 9.63 0.0170 9 18 0.37

ELEVATOR 1 DS 0.48 6.13 0.0200 7 18 0.27

ELEVATOR 2 DS 0.48 4.02 0.0175 5 18 0.15

ELEVATOR 3 DS 0.48 16.44 0.0200 14 18 0.78

ENEATS 0.48 4.15 2.000 98 18 18.0

EP2NE1 0.208 1.19 2.000 44 18 5.09

EP2NE1FA 0.208 0.82 2.000 35 18 3.48

EP4C21 0.48 3.13 0.2000 19 18 1.35

EP4NE21 0.48 3.81 0.2000 22 18 1.64

EP4SE21 0.48 3.13 0.2000 19 18 1.34

ESBD4NE1 0.48 4.13 2.000 98 18 17.9

GENERATOR BUS 0.48 4.49 2.000 103 18 19.6

GUARD HOUSE 0.208 0.23 2.000 15 18 0.91

HRC-1 0.48 3.33 2.000 85 18 14.3

HRC-2 0.48 11.33 0.0600 21 18 1.57

MAIN 26.40 12.26 2.000 655 36 396.2

Page | 21, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

Bus Name Bus kV

Bus Arcing Fault (kA)

Trip/ Delay Time (sec.)

Arc Flash

Boundary (in)

Working Distance

(in)

Incident Energy

(cal/cm2)

MSBD4NE1 0.48 28.65 0.3200 114 18 22.8

P2C11 0.208 2.81 2.000 78 18 12.6

P2C12a 0.208 2.70 2.000 76 18 12.0

P2C12b 0.208 2.58 2.000 74 18 11.5

P2C21a 0.208 2.58 2.000 74 18 11.5

P2C21b 0.208 2.48 2.000 72 18 11.0

P2C31a 0.208 2.38 2.000 70 18 10.6

P2C31b 0.208 2.29 2.000 68 18 10.1

P2NE11 0.208 3.00 2.000 82 18 13.5

P2NE12a 0.208 2.47 2.000 73 18 11.1

P2NE12b 0.208 2.37 2.000 71 18 10.6

P2NE21a 0.208 2.37 2.000 71 18 10.6

P2NE21b 0.208 2.63 2.000 75 18 11.7

P2NE31a 0.208 2.52 2.000 73 18 11.2

P2NE31b 0.208 2.42 2.000 71 18 10.7

P2NW11 0.208 2.68 2.000 76 18 12.0

P2NW12a 0.208 2.57 2.000 74 18 11.5

P2NW12b 0.208 2.47 2.000 72 18 11.0

P2NW21a 0.208 2.47 2.000 72 18 11.0

P2NW21b 0.208 2.37 2.000 70 18 10.5

P2NW31a 0.208 2.28 2.000 68 18 10.1

P2NW31b 0.208 2.19 2.000 66 18 9.66

P2SE11 0.208 2.53 2.000 73 18 11.3

P2SE12a 0.208 2.43 2.000 71 18 10.8

P2SE12b 0.208 2.33 2.000 69 18 10.3

P2SE21a 0.208 2.33 2.000 69 18 10.3

P2SE21b 0.208 2.24 2.000 68 18 9.92

P2SE31a 0.208 2.16 2.000 66 18 9.53

P2SE31b 0.208 2.08 2.000 64 18 9.16

P2SUB1 0.208 0.49 2.000 25 18 1.99

P2SW11 0.208 2.53 2.000 73 18 11.3

P2SW12a 0.208 2.43 2.000 71 18 10.8

P2SW12b 0.208 2.33 2.000 69 18 10.3

P2SW21a 0.208 2.33 2.000 69 18 10.3

P2SW21b 0.208 2.24 2.000 68 18 9.92

P2SW31a 0.208 2.16 2.000 66 18 9.53

P2SW31b 0.208 2.08 2.000 64 18 9.16

P4C10 0.48 16.49 0.0500 24 18 1.95

Page | 22, Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

Bus Name Bus kV

Bus Arcing Fault (kA)

Trip/ Delay Time (sec.)

Arc Flash

Boundary (in)

Working Distance

(in)

Incident Energy

(cal/cm2)

P4C11 0.48 17.44 0.0600 28 18 2.48

P4CR1 0.48 13.16 0.0600 23 18 1.84

P4NE11 0.48 9.72 0.0200 10 18 0.44

P4NE21 0.48 7.89 0.0200 8 18 0.36

P4NE31 0.48 6.62 0.0200 7 18 0.29

P4SE11 0.48 2.55 0.3400 24 18 1.85

P4SE21 0.48 2.37 0.3400 23 18 1.72

P4SE31 0.48 2.52 0.3400 23 18 1.81

T2SUB1 DS 0.48 0.64 1.779 27 18 2.27

UPS 0.48 8.99 0.0175 8 18 0.36

E. Recommendations

The incident energy levels vary from less than 1.2 cal/cm2 to a maximum of 396.2 cal/cm2. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is commonly available for most of the calculated incident energy levels.

The exception is MAIN which has an incident energy of 396.2 cal/cm2. This device must be de-energized before any work is performed. The incident energy at this location was modeled with no protective device since the utility would not provide rating information for their protective devices. The actual incident energy is likely less than 396.2 cal/cm2. This high incident energy can be mitigated with utility cooperation. GSA could request that the utility provide actual rating information for their protective devices. If the protective device (i.e. fuse) does not provide acceptable incident energy, the protective device can likely be changed to lower the incident energy at MAIN without impacting the reliability and operation of the building.

Regardless of the incident energy, electrical equipment should always be de-energized prior to performing work unless it is determined to be infeasible or presents a greater hazard to do so.

Appropriate PPE should always be used when performing energized work.

Rev 0 FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

Appendix A - Short Circuit Analysis Results

FCS Oxbow - B1202 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Study

Appendix A1 - All Bus Evaluation

PROPERTY OFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Rev 0

Project: FCS Oxbow

All Bus Evaluation Comprehensive Fault Report

Bus Name EquipCategory Calc Isc kA

Dev Isc kA

Isc Rating%

Calc Mom_kA

Dev Mom kA

Mom Rating%

Status Series Rating

CNEATS LV Panelboard 50.00 0.00Pass 43.16 86.32 0.00 0.000.00 CP2C21 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 1.51 15.12 0.00 0.000.00 CP2C31 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 1.58 15.80 0.00 0.000.00 CP2CR1 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 2.20 21.95 0.00 0.000.00 CP2NE21 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 2.09 20.86 0.00 0.000.00 CP2SE1a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 3.71 37.08 0.00 0.000.00 CP2SE1b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 3.58 35.75 0.00 0.000.00 CP2SE21 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 1.57 15.74 0.00 0.000.00 CP4C11 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 11.32 62.91 0.00 0.000.00 CP4CR1 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 16.65 47.56 0.00 0.000.00 CP4CR2 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 15.86 45.31 0.00 0.000.00 CP4NE11 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 20.63 58.95 0.00 0.000.00 CP4SE11 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 4.11 22.85 0.00 0.000.00 CRAC-1 LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 2.38 1.19 0.00 0.000.00 CRAC-2 LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 2.56 1.28 0.00 0.000.00 CSBD4NE1 LV Panelboard 65.00 0.00Pass 40.99 63.06 0.00 0.000.00 CSBD4SE1 LV Panelboard 65.00 0.00Pass 12.52 19.26 0.00 0.000.00 ELEVATOR 1 DS LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 8.09 4.04 0.00 0.000.00 ELEVATOR 2 DS LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 5.41 2.71 0.00 0.000.00 ELEVATOR 3 DS LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 21.55 10.77 0.00 0.000.00 ENEATS LV Panelboard 50.00 0.00Pass 30.86 61.72 0.00 0.000.00 EP2NE1 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 3.26 32.57 0.00 0.000.00 EP2NE1FA LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 2.38 23.79 0.00 0.000.00 EP4C21 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 15.14 43.27 0.00 0.000.00 EP4NE21 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 20.35 58.13 0.00 0.000.00 EP4SE21 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 10.75 30.73 0.00 0.000.00 ESBD4NE1 LV Panelboard 65.00 0.00Pass 30.01 46.17 0.00 0.000.00 GENERATOR BUS LV Panelboard 14.00 0.00*Unknown 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000.00 GUARD HOUSE LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 0.63 6.33 0.00 0.000.00 HRC-1 LV Panelboard 22.00 0.00Pass 14.36 65.29 0.00 0.000.00 HRC-2 LV Panelboard 22.00 0.00Pass 14.70 66.83 0.00 0.000.00 MAIN MV Switchgear 40.00 64.00Pass 12.26 30.66 13.57 21.210.00 MSBD4NE1 LV Switchboard 65.00 0.00Pass 46.89 72.14 0.00 0.000.00 P2C11 LV Panelboard 25.00 0.00Pass 6.67 26.70 0.00 0.000.00 P2C12a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.97 69.70 0.00 0.000.00 P2C12b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.55 65.47 0.00 0.000.00 P2C21a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.55 65.47 0.00 0.000.00 P2C21b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.17 61.73 0.00 0.000.00 P2C31a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.84 58.39 0.00 0.000.00 P2C31b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.54 55.40 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE11 LV Panelboard 25.00 0.00Pass 6.95 27.81 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE12a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 7.49 74.89 0.00 0.000.00

All Bus Evaluation Comprehensive Fault Report Utility Feed

PROPERTY OFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Unknown status is a result of the bus not being energized by the utility feed.

Bus Name EquipCategory Calc Isc kA

Dev Isc kA

Isc Rating%

Calc Mom_kA

Dev Mom kA

Mom Rating%

Status Series Rating

P2NE12b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 7.00 70.03 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE21a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 7.00 70.03 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE21b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.58 65.77 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE31a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.20 61.99 0.00 0.000.00 P2NE31b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.86 58.63 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW11 LV Panelboard 25.00 0.00Pass 6.48 25.90 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW12a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.59 65.94 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW12b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.07 60.73 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW21a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.07 60.73 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW21b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.75 57.50 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW31a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.46 54.59 0.00 0.000.00 P2NW31b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.20 51.97 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE11 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 7.00 69.95 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE12a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.32 63.17 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE12b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.76 57.59 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE21a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.76 57.59 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE21b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.44 54.39 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE31a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.18 51.78 0.00 0.000.00 P2SE31b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 4.94 49.42 0.00 0.000.00 P2SUB1 LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 1.44 14.40 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW11 LV Panelboard 25.00 0.00Pass 6.23 24.92 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW12a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 6.32 63.17 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW12b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.76 57.59 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW21a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.76 57.59 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW21b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.44 54.39 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW31a LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 5.18 51.78 0.00 0.000.00 P2SW31b LV Panelboard 10.00 0.00Pass 4.94 49.42 0.00 0.000.00 P4C10 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 21.62 61.76 0.00 0.000.00 P4C11 LV Panelboard 65.00 0.00Pass 22.96 35.32 0.00 0.000.00 P4CR1 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 17.09 48.83 0.00 0.000.00 P4NE11 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 12.63 36.08 0.00 0.000.00 P4NE21 LV Panelboard 35.00 0.00Pass 10.31 29.47 0.00 0.000.00 P4NE31 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 8.70 48.35 0.00 0.000.00 P4SE11 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 3.98 22.10 0.00 0.000.00 P4SE21 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 3.71 20.60 0.00 0.000.00 P4SE31 LV Panelboard 18.00 0.00Pass 3.47 19.29 0.00 0.000.00 T2SUB1 DS LV Panelboard 200.00 0.00Pass 1.07…