CALL 001 Atch 2 IDRG.docx

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY

COMMUNICATION / NAVIGATION OUTAGE FORECASTING SYSTEM (C/NOFS)

INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES (IDRG)

PREPARED BY:

AFRL – C/NOFS Program Office

INITIAL RELEASE DATE

FINAL

REV -

FINAL

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY

COMMUNICATION / NAVIGATION OUTAGE FORECASTING SYSTEM (C/NOFS)

INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES (IDRG)

PREPARED BY:

REVIEWED BY:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

REVISION SUMMARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

LIST OF TABLES

PAGE

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

This document establishes the requirements and guidelines applicable to the design, construction, quality assurance, safety, analyses, and documentation for flight instruments to be used on the Communication /Navigation Outage Forecasting System (C/NOFS) missions. In this document, AFRL levies instrument development process requirements on the Instrument Development Teams (IDTs) for the C/NOFS mission.

1.2 Scope

This guide is intended for use by the C/NOFS payload development team, led by AFRL. The requirements and guidelines of this document are established by the AFRL C/NOFS Program Office, with inputs and comments from the C/NOFS Instrument Development Teams (IDTs) and the Space Test Program (SMC/Det 12 – “STP”). The primary users of this document are the IDTs, who will construct and execute an instrument development program consistent with these guidelines. The Space Test Program, which serves as the overall Mission Manager for C/NOFS, will review this document to ensure that the requirements and guidelines contained herein define an instrument development process that is consistent with STP instrument quality standards.

The requirements shown in this document represent the needs of the program at this time. Requirements may be tailored for specific instruments with AFRL approval. Changes to this document shall be controlled by the C/NOFS Program Office within AFRL, through the Payload Systems Engineer.

1.3 Definitions

a. Instrument Component: An individual part or device within and instrument element. The bus controller chip is a common component of the C/NOFS instruments.

b. Instrument Element: A self-contained piece of an overall instrument system. The VEFI on the C/NOFS mission has several different instrument elements, such as a magnetometer, trigger probe, electronics box, etc.

c. Instrument: A self-contained deliverable unit that provides science data on the C/NOFS mission. C/NOFS has six instruments, developed by five different Instrument Development Teams.

d. Instrument Development Team (IDT): The group of individuals responsible for the design, fabrication, integration, and qualification of an instrument for space flight on the C/NOFS mission. The size of the IDT will vary with instrument complexity. IDTs can contain Principal Investigators, Instrument Program Managers, Instrument Systems Engineers, Mechanical & Electrical Design Leads, etc.

e. Payload: The complete set of C/NOFS instruments.

f. Payload Module: The complete set of C/NOFS instruments integrated onto the part of the Space Vehicle designed and built to host payload systems.

g. Spacecraft: The part of the Space Vehicle that is built to support payload operations, providing structure, power, attitude control, etc for the mission.

h. Space Vehicle: The fully integrated satellite, including both spacecraft and payload systems. The flight-ready satellite configuration.

2. APPLICABLE AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

2.1 Applicable Documents

This Instrument Development Guide is a stand-alone document for defining the requirements and guidelines that govern the instrument development process. Reference documents that form a part of this IDRG are listed below. Other C/NOFS program documents are to be used in conjunction with this IDRG. These documents include but are not limited to:

The C/NOFS Instrument Integration and Test Plan (IITP) The C/NOFS Payload Module Integration and Test Plan (PMITP) The C/NOFS Mission Requirements Verification Matrix (MRVM)

The IITP and PLMITP identify the detailed integration and testing requirements for the C/NOFS payload development program. These documents are under the control and management of the AFRL C/NOFS Program Office, through the Payload I&T Engineer.

The C/NOFS Mission Requirements Verification Matrix (MRVM) flows down mission and science requirements and objectives to the instrument level. The MRVM is also under the control and management of the AFRL C/NOFS Program Office, through the Payload Chief Engineer.

The instruments developed under this IDRG must comply with all interface requirements as set forth and agreed to by signature in the individual spacecraft-to-instrument Interface Control Documents (ICDs) and spacecraft to payload ICD, which define the interface between the instruments and the spacecraft. The ICDs are under the control and management of the Space Test Program, through their contractor Spectrum Astro, Inc. Portions of this guide may overlap with requirements that exist in these ICDs. The titles of these sections are marked “(ICD)” in order to emphasize that the contents of that section apply not only to this guide, but also to the ICDs. In cases where differences exist between this IDRG and the ICDs, the information in the ICDs takes precedence.

Unless otherwise specified, the government documents listed below in Section 2.1.2 form a part of this guide to the extent specified herein. Documents that are not specified in this document shall be used as guidance documents. If a specific issue of a document is not called out, then the latest issue at the date of contract shall apply.

2.1.2 Government Reference Documents

Unless a revision is specified, when a design calls out a specification or standard that is obsolete, cancelled, or inactive, the last active revision of that specification or standard applies.

2.1.3 Other Documents

2.1.4 Equivalent NASA Documents

3. PARTS, MATERIALS, AND PROCESSES

3.1 General

Parts, materials, and processes shall be chosen from experience on previously qualified space hardware, whenever possible. Parts and materials shall be selected to meet applicable performance, environmental, reliability, and availability requirements for a two (2) year storage and three (3) year operating lifetime. The operating lifetime includes all expected operations and cycles associated with developmental and pre-launch ground testing. Parts and materials shall be procured from qualified suppliers and shall be inspected to assure that they meet the applicable specifications for flight use.

To minimize design and development risk, IDTs use proven instrument designs and fabrication processes whenever possible. Cost and schedule constraints are often acceptable rationale for use of non-standard parts and processes. Use of non-standard parts and processes are often permissible in the development of one-of-a-kind scientific instruments. The process for gaining approval of non-standard parts is described below.

3.1.1 Parts, Materials, and Processes List

The IDT shall prepare and maintain an "As-Built" parts and materials list for all assemblies. This parts and materials list shall include all parts and materials, by generic part number and manufacturer, used in space flight hardware. The As-Built parts and materials list shall be maintained for all deliverable flight hardware and delivered as part of the Acceptance Data Package.

3.1.2 Limited Shelf Life Materials (ICD)

The IDT shall mark all limited life materials that degrade with age to indicate the date critical life was initiated and when it will be expended. Expired material shall not be used.

3.1.3 Raw Materials

Purchased raw materials used in deliverable hardware should be tested to verify conformance to applicable specifications if vendor conformance data is not available. Manufacturer's test reports and/or Certificates of Conformance may also be used for verification. Test reports and CofCs should be traceable to the material tested. The IDT should maintain this information on file for review upon request.

3.1.4 Printed Wiring Boards

PWBs used in the manufacture of deliverable hardware shall meet the requirements of MIL-PRF-55110 or MIL-PRF-31032 or the equivalent NASA documents referenced in Section 2.1.4. Flexible circuits used in the manufacture of deliverable hardware shall meet the requirements of MIL-PRF-50884 or MIL-PRF-31032. Test coupons should be produced and analyzed for any multi-layer or non-standard board.

3.1.5 Traceability

All parts and materials shall be identified and shall be traceable to a specific manufacturer lot number or lot date code. Certification of conformance from the manufacturer is required for all non-COTS procured parts.

3.1.6 Venting and Outgassing (ICD)

Parts, materials, devices and components shall be capable of operating in a vacuum for the lifetime of the program, and adequately accommodate pressure differentials and/or venting rates generated during the launch and ascent to orbit. Materials selected shall have a total mass loss in vacuum of less than 1% and a collected volatile condensable of less than 0.1%, when tested in accordance with ASTM E595. Materials not meeting this requirement may be baked-out in a thermal vacuum chamber to achieve the desired limits upon approval by the AFRL C/NOFS Program Office and the STP Program Office.

3.1.7 Parts Risk Identification

Each IDT shall provide a listing that identifies parts with significant risk, such as any element of the instrument that requires special tracking or attention due to complexity, availability, or potential reliability issues. Such a part is one that meets any of the following criteria:

· Items used extensively throughout the instrument design

· Items with high or unknown failure rates

· Items with high susceptibility to Single Event Effects (see Section 4.4.1)

· Items stressed in excess of de-rating limits

· Items with a high degree of complexity

· Items that have significant availability constraints (i.e. long-lead items)

· Items that need special storage, handling, environmental controls, or testing

· Items whose operations represent a safety hazard

· Items that contain limited life components

· Items identified by the IDTs as parts with significant risk for their specific instrument

Based upon input from the IDTs, AFRL will create and maintain on overall Parts Risk List for the Payload. AFRL will develop any unique requirements and controls needed to ensure that parts on this list receive the appropriate attention during payload and SV processing.

3.2 Mechanical Parts Selection

Mechanical parts shall be based on similar applications on prior space flight programs whenever possible. Selection shall emphasize proven performance, minimum contamination potential and suitability for the expected life of each component. Major factors such as outgassing, flammability, aging, stability, corrosion, and electrical properties of materials shall be considered. New design mechanical parts shall be analyzed and/or tested to ensure adequate performance.

Mechanical designs shall have sufficient strength margin for the intended application. Expected loads and strength margins are provided in the IITP.

3.3 Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Control of Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) parts used on deliverable flight hardware shall be governed by the requirements of this document. EEE parts are defined as capacitors, connectors, crystal oscillators, diodes, filters, inductors, fuses, monolithic and hybrid microcircuits, resistors, transformers, transistors, wires, and cables. IDTs are encouraged to use the highest level of parts that are available and within instrument cost and schedule constraints. EEE parts shall be traceable by part number, manufacturer, date code, and/or lot number, and to the test data supplied by the vendor or produced by dedicated parts screening. This traceability information shall be provided as an element of the As-Built parts list.

3.3.1 EEE Standard Parts Selection

Parts shall be selected to meet applicable performance, environmental, reliability, and availability requirements. The overarching documents to be used for guidance in the selection and application of EEE parts are GSFC PPL 21, MIL-HDBK-1547, and NASA 311-INST-001. Table 3-1 lists other applicable documents that define specific types of flight hardware as “Standard Parts”. Parts that exceed the quality or reliability of those listed in Table 3-1 are also acceptable for use on flight hardware. All Standard Parts are considered qualified for flight. EEE parts older than seven (7) years (from end of fabrication until expected launch date) shall be categorized as non-standard parts, and may require supplemental retesting (e.g. visual inspection, measurement of critical electrical parameters) and /or approval by the MRB.

Table 3-1. Standard Parts for Flight Hardware

Cable

RF

General Purpose

MIL-C-17 (/113 ONLY)

MIL-DTL-27500 (w/ basic wire spec SB,SD, AND TE ONLY)

Capacitors Not listed herein Ceramic Chip Ceramic General Purpose Tantalum, Solid, Chip Tantalum, Non-Solid

Procured to MIL-SPEC, Failure Rate Level R or Equivalent MIL-PRF-55681, Product Level Designator R MIL-PRF-39014, Product Level Designator R MIL-PRF-55365, Product Level Designator B MIL-PRF-39006, Failure Rate Level R

Connectors Circular, High Density Circular, Quick Disconnect Coaxial, RF D-Subminiature Microminiature PC Mount

MIL-DTL-38999

MIL-C-26482

MIL-PRF-39012

MIL-DTL-24308

MIL-PRF-83513

MIL-C-55302

Resistors Not listed herein Film Chip Film General Purpose (RNC) Insulated Film (RLR) Network Wire Wound (RWR)

Procured to MIL-SPEC, Failure Rate Level R or Equivalent MIL-PRF-55342, Product Level Designator R MIL-PRF-55182, Product Level Designator R MIL-PRF-39017, Product Level Designator R

MIL-PRF-83401

MIL-PRF-39007, Product Level Designator R

Wire General Purpose Magnet Wire Uninsulated Braid

MIL-W-22759 (/16, /34 ONLY)

NEMA MW-1000

QQ-W-343 (QQW343SXXS1T ONLY)

QQ-B-575 (Tin Plated ONLY)

(1) Fuses are also subject to Visual and Mechanical Inspection Relays are millipore cleaned. Arc shields are not allowed.

3.3.2 Non-Standard Parts

Parts not listed in Table 3-1 are considered Non-Standard Parts. Non-Standard Parts may be acceptable for use in application where a Standard Part does not meet requirements, has availability issues, or would force a design that significantly departs from flight heritage approaches. Non-Standard Parts require approval prior to use. The approval request shall include a complete description of the part, the reason for the request, the part application, the technical justification for use and the criteria that are used to ensure that the part is acceptable for flight use. The request shall also include a summary of inspections, tests, qualifications, and de-rating summary of the part under consideration. The Request for Waiver/Deviation form to be used to submit an approval request for use of non-standard parts is attached to this document. A Material Review Board (MRB), under the management of the C/NOFS AFRL Program Office, will review all such requests and provide timely notification of their decision regarding the suitability of the part. Approved Non-Standard Parts must be processed in a manner equivalent to the closest standard part.

3.3.3 Additional EEE Considerations

Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) may be required to verify that manufacturing controls are adequate and that the parts do not have latent defects. DPA may be performed on suspect parts or in cases where a manufacturer’s parts and/or processes are suspect, have a history of reliability problems, or have a history of DPA rejections. DPA may also be appropriate for hybrid devices or devices from an unproven or unfamiliar supplier. When required, DPA will be performed in accordance with MIL-STD-1580.

Particle Impact Noise Detection (PIND) testing may be required for specific items, such as cavity devices. PIND testing should be used where applicable to ensure that no internal conductive particles are present that can affect the performance of the device. PIND testing may be performed by the part vendor or as part of an up-screening process by the IDT.

3.4 Materials

3.4.1 Material Selection

Material selection should be based upon considerations of space flight heritage, material properties, vacuum stability, contamination, magnetic properties, and safety. Previous heritage, analysis, and/or test are acceptable means for verification of the suitability of materials for the C/NOFS mission.

Organic materials (i.e. polymers) should be selected to minimize outgassing per the requirements detailed MRD: TML less than 1% and CVCM less than 0.10%. Materials and processes that generate significant particulate contamination during ground testing, transportation, or launch operations shall be avoided. Harnesses shall be properly cleaned prior to assembly. Composite materials used within the instrument systems should be identified, so that special precautions can be taken for handling and contamination control.

Inorganic materials (e.g. metals, alloys) shall be selected for heritage and mission suitability. Exposed inorganic materials shall have a mission-approved surface treatment to avoid exposure of bare metal surfaces. Metallic materials shall be chosen and implemented in a manner that minimizes the risk of corrosion factors. Corrosion control measures shall include proper selection of metal alloys, heat treatments and coatings, control of dissimilar metals and metal/non-metal interfaces, and use of fabrication and processing methods that minimize corrosion potential. Non-magnetic materials shall be used for all applications, unless use of magnetic parts is not reasonably avoidable. Control and testing of payload magnetic induction will be an essential element of the PLITP and the overall Space Vehicle Magnetic Control Plan. Magnetic materials will be identified in the ADP.

The IDTs shall identify all uses of lubricants. The IDT shall present data in the ADP to demonstrate that the lubricants are stable over vacuum and thermal conditions and meet outgassing requirements.

Atomic oxygen erosion is a design consideration in the C/NOFS mission. Externally-exposed materials should be selected for compatibility with exposure to atomic oxygen.

Materials that do not have previous flight qualification history, or that are not on the approved materials list are considered Non-Standard Materials, and are subject to review by the MRB. The IDT shall submit all Non-Standard Materials for review using the attached Request for Waiver/Deviation form.

3.4.2 Prohibited Materials (ICD)

The following materials shall not be used:

a. Cadmium, magnesium, zinc or selenium, except internal to hermetically sealed devices.

b. Unalloyed tin.

c. Corrosive solder fluxes, unless detailed cleaning procedures are specified, along with appropriate verification methods to insure removal of residual contaminants.

d. Mercury and compounds of mercury.

e. Materials that exhibit or are known to exhibit natural radioactivity such as uranium, potassium, radium, thorium, and/or any alloys thereof.

4. RELIABILITY

4.1 General

Reliability shall be considered during all phases of design, development and fabrication of the flight component. Some of the areas of concern for reliability are: simplicity of design and construction; the use of screened/burned-in parts to the maximum extent feasible; the conservative application of parts within their ratings and within their capabilities; and the use of heat sinks and conductive paths to minimize hot spot temperatures. Components within instrument elements shall be designed to meet the expected life as stated in Section 3.1.

Although no formal reliability predictions are required by the IDTs, the instrument design and development process should use informal reliability analysis to enhance the probability for success of the instrument. This analysis should focus on high-risk areas, and areas in which there are significant dependencies within the instrument design. This analysis should be used to verify that risk mitigation measures, such as alternate paths, cross-strapping, back-up systems, and graceful degradation, are being properly implemented within the instrument system.

4.2 Assessment of Failure Analysis

The IDT shall provide an Assessment of Failures (AoF) document. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) or associated Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) may take the place of the AoF. The AoF should address the most probable failure modes within the specific instrument system. This assessment should be performed to the level needed in order to identify critical high-level failure modes for instrument operations. The AoF should include consideration of interfaces and redundancy. The AoF is meant to be a very brief (i.e. one page to a few pages) description of the most likely failure modes of the instrument.

The primary reasons for performing the Assessment of Failures are (1) To take all reasonable measures to mitigate the risk that such failures will degrade the performance of the instrument, (2) To ensure that such failures cannot propagate across instrument interfaces to affect other C/NOFS mission elements (e.g. spacecraft, other instruments), and (3) To provide the C/NOFS Integration & Test Team and C/NOFS Mission Operations Team with situational awareness of the most probable failure modes within the mission that can appear during ground testing or on-orbit operations and (to the greatest extent possible) define actions to be taken in response to these failure modes. The final AoF shall be delivered as part of the Acceptance Data Package.

Special attention should be paid to Parts Risk List (as defined in Section 3.1.7), to isolation circuits for redundant elements, and to cross-strapping circuits. The AoF should include consideration of telemetry and commanding capabilities that can be used to detect and limit the effects of the failure. This assessment should also help to verify that redundant elements and critical failure modes can be tested to the greatest extent possible during integrated systems level testing (i.e. payload module, space vehicle).

4.3 Stress Analysis / De-Rating Analysis

Stress analyses shall be performed to verify that the applied stress on each instrument element does not exceed the specified rating for the application. EEE parts shall be derated in accordance with GSFC PPL-21. The purpose of de-rating of parts is to mitigate the risk of single-event effects for applicable devices, and to ensure instrument reliability is protected by limiting the applied electrical and thermal loads to de-rated limits. A de-rating analysis, using worst-case thermal and electrical operating conditions, shall be performed. This de-rating analysis should include the rated, de-rated, nominal, and worst case limits for power, voltage, current, and temperature. The nominal and worst-case stress ratios should be calculated for all parameters. The analysis should also include the duty cycle of the part and the maximum operating temperature.

The IDT shall take appropriate steps to correct any overstressed condition unless specifically approved. These steps may include replacement with a part of higher rating, or changes to the application circuit to reduce the applied stress on the part. If the IDT considers that use a part where the applied stress exceeds de-rating limits is unavoidable, then IDT shall use the attached Request for Waiver/Deviation form to justify the de-rating noncompliance. The C/NOFS AFRL Program Office Material Review Board (MRB) must grant approval in these cases. The IDT shall maintain the de-rating analyses on file and copies of the analyses shall be available upon request and in the ADP.

4.4 Radiation Requirements

The radiation environments to be considered for the C/NOFS mission includes total ionizing dose and single event effects. All devices determined to be susceptible to radiation effects shall be evaluated to determine the possible impacts of that susceptibility on the instrument and mission. If radiation effects are found to have an unacceptable impact, the IDT may need to seek a more radiation-tolerant part or design additional fault tolerance into the instrument system. Due to the uncertainty associated with trapped radiation models for low-earth orbits, a 2x margin will be used for radiation predictions/analysis.

4.4.1 Single Event Effects

All EEE active parts must be evaluated for susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). SEEs shall not cause unrecoverable failure or permanent performance degradation of the flight instruments. Instrument components shall meet all performance criteria when subjected to, the proton flux defined in Table 4-1 and the proton fluence defined in Table 4-2. The IDT shall demonstrate compliance with this requirement by selection of parts, derating of parts, testing, and mitigation techniques. Parts that are highly susceptible to SEEs shall be identified as such on the Parts Risk List.

4.4.1.1 Single Event Upset (SEU)

EEE parts shall be selected to minimize the occurrence of SEUs by selecting parts with SEU linear energy transfer (LET) threshold of greater than 10 MeV/mg-cm2, consistent with the information provided in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. SEU impacts and propagation mechanisms should be included in the Assessment of Failures (AoF) analysis for any device with LET thresholds under this limit. Circuit applications for susceptible items should be designed such that adequate circuit protection is provided. Circuit designs should overcome potential SEU occurrences through the use of watchdog timers, memory scrubbing, and/or error detection & control. Instrument designs in which upsets result in significant degradation or performance impacts on the system will not be permitted.

4.4.1.2 Single Event Latchup (SEL)

Parts that are susceptible to SEL shall be avoided. Instrument should use parts with SEL linear energy transfer (LET) threshold of greater than 20 MeV/mg-cm2, consistent with the information provided in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. SEL frequency and effects should be included in the Assessment of Failures (AoF) analysis for any device with LET thresholds under this limit. Risk mitigation measures may be required for such devices.

4.4.1.3 Single Event Burnout and Gate Rupture

Single event burnout and single event gate rupture in FETs shall be avoided through proper de-rating of the FET drain and gate voltages, per Section 4.3

Table 4-1. Proton Energy vs Mission Integral Flux

Proton Energy (MeV) Mission Integral Flux (/m²/sr/s)

Table 4-2. Proton Energy vs Mission Integral Fluence Proton Energy (MeV) Mission Integral Fluence (/m²/sr)

4.4.2 Total Dose Radiation Requirements

Electronic parts shall tolerate twice the expected total dose ionizing radiation environment (RDM = 2). Electronic parts shall tolerate a minimum of 1.4 krads (Si) when protected with 60 mil aluminum wall. Table 4-3 lists the total dose as a function of total equivalent aluminum shielding thickness. Parts which are spot shielded shall use environmental transport assumptions commensurate with the degree to which the coverage provided by their spot shields is complete.

Table 4-3. Total Ionizing Radiation Dose vs Aluminum Shield Thickness (RDM=2) Effective Shield Thickness (mil Al) Total Ionizing Dose Design Requirement (rad)

4.5 Government-Industry Data Exchange Program Alerts

Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) alerts are issued by Government contractors to document potential part, material or design problems discovered with Government qualified parts or materials. GIDEP alerts shall be reviewed by the IDTs for potential impact or non-applicability to their product. Any alert determined to have potential impact on their product shall be addressed in a formal response indicating impact and recommended resolution. The IDT shall respond to all applicable GIDEP alerts.

4.6 Anomaly and Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action The IDT shall have a structured internal process for identification, tracking, and reporting of all anomalies/failures encountered during the flight instrument development process. Significant anomalies and failures occurring during qualification, protoflight and/or acceptance testing shall be verbally reported to the C/NOFS AFRL Program Office within 3 days of occurrence. This verbal report should include the type of failure, the suspected cause, and the proposed failure analysis.

For flight unit formal test failures, a failure analysis shall be conducted to the extent necessary to define the problem, determine the cause, determine if an overstressed condition occurred as a result of the failure, and determine the necessary analysis and corrective action. Documentation of test anomalies/failures shall begin at the first application of power at instrument functional testing. The IDT shall document each anomaly or failure encountered in a failure report. Upon completion, the failure report shall be submitted to the C/NOFS AFRL Program Office for review and shall be included in the ADP. The failure report shall describe (as a minimum):

a. The type or nature of the failure, including identification of the failed item.

b. Type of test and environmental conditions at the time of the failure.

c. The symptoms and cause, including potential impact on other hardware/software.

d. Analysis and verification approach, and the results.

e. Any rework or retest performed.

f. Final disposition and corrective action.

4.6.1 Parts Failure Analysis

Part failures that occur during or after qualification, protoflight or acceptance testing shall be subjected to failure analysis to determine the cause of the failure. This failure analysis should be appropriate for the type of failure observed and may or may not include DPA.

4.7 Control of Static Sensitive Parts, Assemblies and Components (ICD - identification) All electronic parts and assemblies containing parts that are susceptible to damage or degradation from application of static electricity shall be protected and handled to protect them from static electricity (or ESD) charges. ESD Control shall be in accordance with EIA 625, NASA 8739.7, or equivalent. ESD sensitive instrument elements shall be identified with an applicable ESD symbol. Size of the symbol shall be commensurate with space restraints but shall be noticeable to unaided visual inspection. Marking shall be done in a contrasting color. ESD sensitive items shall be wrapped for shipment in an anti-static material. The package and shipping container shall be plainly marked with standard ESD symbols, and a caution note such as "Electrostatic Sensitive Items."

5. QUALITY ASSURANCE

5.1 General

The IDT shall maintain a quality system consistent with the internal practices of the IDT organization. The IDT’s Quality Assurance (QA) program shall be planned and organized to ensure that defects or other unsatisfactory conditions are discovered and corrected at the earliest practical point. The quality system shall provide recorded evidence of quality in the form of inspection and test results. Each IDT shall identify one or more QA representatives who will perform periodic inspections of the instrument products. These QA representatives shall participate in process development to ensure that assembly permits and facilitates producibility, repeatability, inspectability and that related quality inspection requirements are included in the process flow.

The C/NOFS AFRL Program Office will also have a QA team that will visit each IDT for periodic inspections of deliverable products. The IDTs shall accommodate these inspections and cooperate fully with the AFRL QA team. AFRL QA representative shall notify the IDT's QA representative of such visits and determine mutually agreed upon dates of each visit. The AFRL QA team may determine whether the requirements of this document are being met and whether the instrument hardware is of satisfactory quality for the intended use. The IDTs will be notified in writing of any unacceptable areas found by QA inspections, and will be given an appropriate period of time to correct them.

The AFRL Program Office reserves the right to witness any or all tests performed at the integrated instrument or major instrument element level and to invite STP observation of these tests. The IDT shall maintain and provide their development schedule such that the AFRL Program Office and/or STP may adequately plan for attendance at environmental and functional testing.

5.2 Control of Procurement Sources

The IDT shall be responsible for adequate and effective control over procurement sources to ensure that materials, supplies, hardware, software and services purchased meet all quality and reliability requirements specified herein. Adequate records of inspections and tests performed by the parts/materials vendor at the vendor facility shall be maintained by the IDT. The responsibility for supplying quality hardware rests with the IDT, and includes those materials, parts and assemblies and components procured from subtier vendors. The requirements of this specification shall be imposed on subtier vendors as necessary to ensure the quality and reliability of their products.

5.3 Identification, Handling and Storage

Adequate methods and facilities shall be established for controlling the identification, handling, and storage of deliverable articles. These controls shall prevent damage, deterioration, loss and substitution. The parts, materials and articles shall be controlled from the time of receipt until use or delivery. The IDT shall identify deliverable items by a specific part number and a unique serial number. Part number and serial number traceability shall be maintained to the next lower assembly. All deliverable components shall be properly marked or labeled to identify the manufacturer’s CAGE number, component part number, approved nomenclature, and serial number. Each external electrical or RF interface connection of the assembly or component shall be clearly labeled with a unique reference designation such as J1, J2, etc., as applicable.

5.4 Configuration Control

A configuration control program shall be established to track and verify the configuration of instrument systems. Technical documentation, such as drawings, specifications and procedures used to manufacture deliverable hardware and software, shall be released and placed under configuration control. Drawings used to manufacture space flight hardware shall be assigned a specific part number and shall be released prior to manufacture. Test procedures shall be released prior to any testing of space flight hardware. Any embedded firmware or software shall also be under configuration control prior to testing in flight hardware. Any changes to flight hardware or software that affect instrument interfaces will be accomplished by means of Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) or equivalent documents.

5.5.1 Drawing and Change Control

The IDT shall ensure that deliverable items are fabricated, inspected and tested to the latest applicable drawing, specification or procedure. These drawings and procedures shall be under IDT-managed change control processes. All approved changes shall be incorporated into each deliverable instrument element prior to delivery and so evidenced on inspection records. Engineering changes shall be classified as Class I or Class II. Class I changes shall be submitted for AFRL Program Office review prior to implementation. Class I and Class II changes are defined as:

5.6 Inspections and Tests

Sufficient inspections and tests shall be performed to ensure that all hardware and software conform to applicable drawings and specifications with respect to all details such as workmanship, finish, construction, functional performance, weight, interchangeability, identification and marking. Inspection and test of deliverable items are performed in accordance with established procedures and work instructions. Criteria for determining quality acceptance or rejection of items shall be established. A QA representative shall verify that tests are conducted to approved test procedures. When tests and inspections so require, the actual measurements and observations obtained shall be indicated. A QA representative shall monitor inspection and test operations to ensure approved procedures are used, equipment records are maintained, and equipment is calibrated. A QA representative shall verify that instruments have successfully passed all inspections and functional tests, as applicable, prior to the start of space qualification (i.e. environmental) testing.

Suitable inspection, measuring and test equipment of the range, accuracy and type necessary to ensure conformance of items to program requirements shall be used. Tools, gages, jigs or fixtures that measure dimensions, contours or locations affecting quality characteristics shall be inspected for accuracy prior to use. Inspection and test equipment used for acceptance of end items shall be calibrated in accordance with ANSI Z540-1 calibration requirements (or equivalent).

The IDT shall prepare test plans and procedures for testing of flight articles. The plans and procedures shall be reviewed by a QA representative to incorporate quality requirements. Test plans establish the type of test to be performed and test procedures provide the detailed operations for test implementation and verification of criteria. Test plans shall be available for review by the C/NOFS AFRL Program Office at least two (2) weeks prior to the test. The AFRL Program Office shall approve test plans and subsequent changes prior to performance of tests. Acceptance test data shall be recorded and traceable to the configured item. A QA representative shall ensure recorded test results are accurate and complete. Adequate records of all operations, inspections and tests performed shall be maintained and kept on file throughout the mission lifetime. Records shall be made available upon request.

5.6.1 Retest

Non-Conformances discovered during or after test operations shall be resolved prior to acceptance of the product for delivery. Modifications, repairs, or rework to be performed after acceptance are subject to review to ensure that new, retest or re-inspection requirements are defined to ensure the quality of the product. Whenever the design of the hardware is substantially changed, the hardware involved shall be re-tested and/or analyzed to verify the design change and to show that no new problems have been introduced. If it is determined that a discrepancy has negated prior testing, the item may need to be re-inspected and re-tested.

5.7 Indication of Inspection Status

The IDT shall maintain a system for indicating the inspection status of articles. This system may be accomplished by means of initials, stamps, seals or decals. The method of their application on individual articles, tags, routing cards, move tickets or other normal control devices attached to the articles or their containers shall also be defined. Indications shall not be applied in any way, which may damage or compromise the function or quality of the articles.

5.8 Process Control

The IDT shall establish those inspections and controls over processes as necessary to ensure compliance with quality requirements. These processes include plating, anodizing, heat treating, welding, soldering and other critical processes (including chemfilm), which affect the physical characteristics of the deliverable items. Processes or procedures used to fabricate and test hardware, including processes generated for rework or retrofit, shall be documented. The system of documentation shall establish process requirements, essential procedures, and critical controls necessary to ensure process reproducibility, product integrity, and reliability. Operators and inspectors shall be trained and certified to special processes, procedures and specifications. Recertification will be at appropriate intervals. The applicable military specification will be used when training for special process certification. However, the training may be tailored for specific applications. Contamination shall be controlled to eliminate possible particulate matter that could be detrimental to a part or component. Hardware shall be manufactured in a clean work area in accordance with IDT procedures. Flight components shall be visibly clean of all contamination when inspected under 4X magnification.

5.9 Nonconforming Material Control and Corrective Action

The IDT shall control nonconforming items to prevent their use as articles offered for delivery. Nonconforming items shall be identified and separated from normal work operations. When the IDT believes that a nonconformance will affect form, fit or function of the end item and wishes to offer the nonconforming item for delivery, the IDT shall notify the C/NOFS AFRL Program Office for disposition of the nonconformance. The IDT shall maintain records of any waivers or approvals of nonconforming items and shall identify the items so involved. Nonconformance documentation shall indicate the cause of the nonconformance, the disposition of the nonconformance, and corrective action. The IDT shall take prompt action to correct conditions that have resulted or might result in substandard or defective materials, parts, components or services. This action shall include preventive measures as well as correction of conditions that have occurred. Inspection and test results and detailed examination of deficient or failed articles shall be used to determine the nature and basic causes of deficiencies or failures.